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PREFACE

The cases appearing in this volume have been selected

primarily for the use of students pursuing - the study of Negotiable

Instruments and particularly for students of the Law Department

of the University of Michigan. They are arranged in an order

to conform to the plan of instruction now pursued in that

Department. The plan to which reference is made is sufficiently

PREFACE

indicated by the Table of Contents infra. In brief, it involves a

study of the law of Negotiable Instruments on the basis of the

contract of the several parties as that law has been declared by

the courts and, incidentally only, a study of the "Negotiable

Instruments Law." The cases will be found to illustrate the

several phases of the negotiable contract and to be arranged, I

believe, in such an order as to show, in sequence, the liabilities

and rights of parties to Negotiable Instruments. As to selection

and arrangement they are submitted to the test of actual use. It

is my hope, if not my expectation, that when the plan exemplified

by this volume is put to the test of actual use it will be found of

service to all who seek to acquire a comprehensive knowledge of

the law of Negotiable Instruments.

I am under obligations to Mr. H. Gerald Chapin of New
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York City, for valuable suggestions, and to Mr. Oscar E. Waer

of the Michigan Bar, and Mr. Ralph M. Tate of the law class of

1907, University of Michigan, for valuable assistance in the prep-

aration of this work, obligations which I acknowledge with

grateful appreciation.

ROBERT E. BUNKER.

Ann Arbor, Michigan,

October 1, 1906.

m

The case appearing 111 this volume have been el t d
primarily for the u e of students pursuing the study of Negotiabl
Instruments and particularly for students of the Law Departm nt
of the University of Michigan. They are arranged in an order
to conform to the plan of instruction now pursued in that
Department. The . plan to which reference is made is sufficiently
indicated by the Table of Contents infra. In brief, it involve a
study of the law of Negotiable Instruments on the basis of the
contract of the several parties as that law has been declared by
the courts and, incidentally only, a study of the "Negotiable
Instruments Law." The cases will be found to illustrate the
several phases pf the negotiable contract and to be arranged, I
believe, in uch an order as to show, in sequence, the liabilitie
and rights of parties to Negotiable Instruments. A to election
and ·arrangement they are submitted to the test of actual u . It
is my hope, if not my expectation, that when th plan exemplified
by this volume is put to the test of actual use it will be found of
ervice to all who eek to acquire a comprehen ive knowledo- of
the law of Negotiable Instrument .
I am under obligation to Mr. H. Gerald Chapin of N w
York City, for valuable sugo-estion , and to Mr. Oscar E. vVaer
of the Michigan Bar, and Mr. Ralph L Tate of the law cla of
I907, University of fichio-an , for valuable assi tance in the preparation of this work, obligation which I acknowledge with
grateful appreciation.
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CASES

ON

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

TITLE I.

HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT.

Dunlop v. Silver, i Cranch (App'x), (1801), 367.

The case was this : James Cavan made a promissory note, by

CASES

which he promised to pay to Silver et at., or order, sixty days

after date, $600 for value received, negotiable at the Bank of

Alexandria. Silver et al. indorsed the note to Downing & Dowell

ON

in these words, "pay the contents to Downing & Dowell," who

indorsed, "pay the contents to John Dunlop or order." Dunlop

had obtained judgment on the note against Cavan, the .maker, who

was taken upon the execution, and took the oath of an insolvent

debtor.

The declaration had two counts. 1st. A special count stating

NEGOTIABLE INS1'RUMENTS

the making and indorsing the note, the suit, judgment, execution

and insolvency of Cavan, by reason whereof the defendant became

liable, etc. 2d. Indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received.

TITLE I.

The plea was non assumpsit, and a verdict was taken for the

plaintiff subject to the opinion of the Court, upon the point,
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whether the holder could maintain an action against the remote

indorser of a promissory note. * * * * The principal question

HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT.

then is whether this action could have been supported in England

before the Statute of Anne. 1

1

Dunlop v. Silver, I Cranch (App x), ( 1801) , 367.

I. In order to ascertain how the law stood before that statute,

it may be necessary to examine how far the custom of merchants,

1 See text of this statute — Intro. Bunker's Neg. Ins. 18-20.

The case was this: James Cavan made a promissory note, by
which he promised to pay to Silver et al., or order, sixty days
after date, $6oo for value received, negotiable at the Bank of
Alexandria. Silver et al. indorsed the note to Downing & Dowell
in these words, "pay the contents to Downing & Dowell," who
indorsed, "pay the contents to John Dunlop or order." Dunlop
had obtained judgment on the note against Cavan, the .maker, who
was taken upon the execution, and took the oath of an insolvent
debtor.
The declaration had two counts. 1st. A special count stating
the making and indorsing the note, the suit, judgment, execution
and insolvency of Cavan, by reason whereof the defendant became
liable, etc. 2d. Indebitatus assimipsit for mon~y had and received.
The plea was non asswnipsit, and .a verdict wa taken for the
plaintiff subject to the opinion of the Court, upon the point,
whether the holder could maintain an action against the remote
indorser of a promissory note. * * * * The principal question
then is whether this action could have been supported in England
before the Statute of Anne. 1
I. In order to ascertain how the law stood before that statute,
it may be necessary to examine how far the custom of merchants,
1

See text of this statute-Intro. Bunker's Neg. Ins.

18-20.

2
2 History of the Law Merchant

or the lex mercatoria, was recognised by the courts of justice and

by what means the common-law forms of judicial proceedings

were adapted to its principles.

A distinction seems to have been made, very early, between

the contracts of merchants (especially of foreign merchants) and

those of other people. Nearly six hundred years ago we find

their "old and rightful customs" protected by the great charter of

English liberties. (Magna Charta, c. 30.) Peculiar privileges

were also granted them more than 500 years ago by the Statute

of Acton Burnel, de mercatoribus 11 Edw. I., and the Statute of

Merchants, 13 Edw. I. And in the reign of Edw. III., many

statutes were made for their encouragement, in some of which,

particularly 27 Edw. III., c. 19 and 20, the law merchant is

expressly recognised. In 13 Edw. VI., 9, 10 (cited by Malloy,

book 3, c. 7, § 15), it is said, that "a merchant stranger made suit

before the king's privy council, for certain bales of silk, feloniously

taken from him, wherein it was moved that this matter should be

determined at common law ; but the lord chancellor answered,

that this suit is brought by a merchant who is not bound to sue

according to the law of the land nor to tarry the trial of twelve
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men." The custom of merchants is mentioned in 34 Hen. VIII.,

cited in Bro. Abr., tit. Customs, pi. 59, where it was pleaded, as

a custom between merchants throughout the whole realm, and

the plea was adjudged bad, because a custom throughout the

whole realm was the common law. And for a long time, it was

thought necessary to plead it as a custom between merchants of

particular places, viz., as a custom among merchants residing in

London and merchants in Hamburg, &c. By degrees, however,

the courts began to consider it as a general custom. Co. Litt. 182,

2 Inst. 404. And in the time of James I., Ch. J. Hobart, in the

case of Vanhcath v. Turner, Winch 24, said that "the custom of

merchants is part of the common law, of which the judges ought

to take notice." It was stilly however, deemed necessary to set

forth the custom specially ; and in that form the precedents con-

tinned, for some time after. Indeed, the pleadings continued in

that form, long after the courts had decided it to be unnecessary.

Lord Coke in his Commentary on Littleton (first published in

1628), folio 182a, speaking of the lex mercatoria says, "Which,

as hath been said, is part of the laws of this realm." See also

2 Inst. 404.

But after this, in the year 1640, in Eaglechild's case reported

in Hetly 167 and Litt. 363, 6 Car. I (it was said to have been

HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHA T

•

or the lex mercatoria, wa r cognised by the courts of ju tice and
by what m an the common-law forms of judicial proceedings
w r adapted t it principle .
di tinction s m to have been made, very ea rly, between
th contract of mer hants ( pecially of foreign merchants) and
th
of other pe pl .
early ix hundr d y ar ago w find
their "old and rightful custom " prot cted by th great chart r of
Engli h liberti . (Magna harta, c. 30.) Peculiar privileges
\ ere al o grant d them more than 500 y ar ago by the Statute
of cton urn 1, de mercatoribus I I Edw. I., and the Statute of
Merchant , 13 Edw. I.
nd in the reign of Edw. III., many
statutes w re made for their encouragement, in some of which,
particularly 27 Edw. III., c. 19 and 20, the law merchant is
xpre ly recogni ed. In 13 Edw. I., 9, IO (cited by Malloy,
book 3 c. 7, § l 5), it is said, that "a merchant strang r made suit
before the king' privy council, for certain bale of silk, feloniously
taken from him, wherein it wa mov d that this matter should be
determined at common law; but th e lord chancellor answered,
that thi uit i brought by a merchant who is not bound to sue
according to the law of the land nor to tarry the trial of twelve
men." The custom of merchant is mentioned in 34 Hen. VIII.,
cited in Bro. Abr., tit. Customs, pl. 59, where it was pleaded, a
a cu tom between merchants throughout the whole realm, and
the plea was adjudged bad, because a custom throughout the
whole realm was the common law. And for a long time, it was
thought nece sary to plead it as a custom between merchants of
particular places, viz., as a custom among merchants residing in
London and merchants in Hamburg, &c. By d gr e , however,
the court began to consider it as a general custom. Co. Litt. 182,
2 Inst. 404. And in the time of James I., Ch. J. Hobart, in the
ca e of Vanheath v. Turner, Winch 24, aid that 'the custom of
merchants is part of the common law, of which the judges ought
to take notice.' It was still 1 howev r, deemed necessary to set
forth the custom specially; and in that form the precedents continued, for ome time after. Indeed, the pleadings continued in
that form, long after the courts had de id d it to be unnece ary.
Lord oke in his ommentary on Littleton (first published in
162 ) , folio l 2a, speaking of the le.-c 1nercatoria ays, "Which,
as hath been said, is part of the laws of this realm." See also
2 In t. 404.
ut after this, in the yea·r 1640, in Eaglechild' s case reported
in Hetly 167 and Litt. 363, 6 ar. I (it wa said to have been
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Dunlop v. Silver 3

ruled in B. R.), that upon a bill of exchange between party and

party, who were not merchants, there cannot be a declaration

upon the law merchant, but there may be a declaration upon

assumpsit, and give the acceptance of the bill in evidence." This

decision seemed to confine the operation of the law merchant, not

to contracts of a certain description, but to the persons of mer-

chants : whereas, the custom of merchants is nothing more than

a rule of construction of certain contracts. Jac. Law Diet. (Toml.

edit.), tit. Custom of Merchants. Eaglechild's case, however, was

overruled in 18 Car. II B. R. (1666), in the case of Woodward

v. Rowe, 2 Keb. 105, 132, which was an action by the indorsee

against the drawer of a bill of exchange. "The plaintiff counted

on the custom and law of the realm that if any man writes a bill

to another, then if he to whom the bill is directed do not pay for

the value received by the maker, the maker of such bill should

pay." "It was moved in arrest of judgment, that this count is ill,

the general custom being the law ; and it doth not appear to the

court that there is any such law. Sed curia, contra, that by the

common law, a man may resort to him that received the money,

if he to whom the bill was directed refuse." It was afterwards
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moved again, that this "is only a particular custom among mer-

chants, and not common law ; but, per curiam, the law of

merchants is the law of the land ; and the custom is good enough,

generally, for any man without naming him merchant; judgment

pro plaintiff, per totam curiam, and they will intend that he, of

whom the value is said to be received by the defendant, was the

plaintiff's servant.

The same principle was, two years afterwards, recognised in

an Anonymous case (but believed to be Milton's Case, vide 1,

Mod. 286) in the Exchequer, reported in Hadres 485, Mich. 20

Car. II (1668), where the plaintiff declared on the custom of

England, and after verdict, Offfey moved in arrest of judgment,

because the "plaintiff had declared that per consuetudinem Ang-

lice, &c, which he said was naught, because the custom of England

is the law of England, and what the judges are bound to take

notice of; and that, therefore, the consuetudo Anglicc ought to

have been omitted." But the Chief Baron said, "but for the

plaintiff's inserting the custom of the realm into his declaration

here, I hold that to be mere surplusage and redundancy, which

does not vitiate the declaration." And again he says, "it were

worth while to inquire, what the course has been amongst mer-

chants ; or to direct an issue for trial of the custom among

ruled in B. R.), that upon a bill of exchange between party and
party, who were not merchants, there cannot be a declaration
upon the law merchant, but there may be a declaration upon
assumpsit, and give the acceptance of the bill in evidence." This
decision seemed to confine the operation of the law merchant, not
to contracts of a certain description, but to the persons of merchants: whereas, the custom of merchants is nothing more than
a rule of construction of certain contracts. Jae. Law Diet. (Tom!.
edit.), tit. Custom of Merchants. Eagle child's case, however, was
overruled in 18 Car. II B. R. ( 1666), in the case of Woodward
v. Rowe, 2 Keb. 105, 132, which was an action by the indorsee
against the drawer of a biH of exchange. "The plaintiff counted
on the custom and law of the realm that if any man writes a bill
to another, then if he to whom the bill is directed do not pay for
the value received by the. maker, the maker of such bill should
pay." "It was moved in arrest of judgment, that this count is ill,
the general custom being the law; and it doth not appear to the
court that there is any such law. Sed curia, contra, that by the
common law, a man may resort to him that received the money,
if he to whom the bill was directed refuse." It was afterwards
moved again, that this "is only a particular custom among merchants, and not common law; but, per citriam, the law of
merchants is the law of the land; and the custom is good enough,
generally, for any man without naming him merchant; judgment
pro plaintiff, per to tam citriam, and they · will intend that he, of
whom the value is said to be received by the defendant, was the
plaintiff's servant.
The same principle was, two years afterwards, recognised in
an Anonymous case (but believed to be Milton's Case, vide 1,
Mod. 286) in the Exchequer, reported in Hadres 485, Mich. 20
Car. II ( 1668), where the plaintiff declared on the custom of
England, and after verdict, Offley moved in arrest of judgment,
because the "plaintiff had declared that per consuetudinem Anglir.e, &c., which he said was naught, because the custom of England
is the law of England, and what the judges are bound to take
notice of; and that, therefore, the consue.tudo Anglice ought to
have been omitted." But the Chief Baron said, "but for the
plaintiff's inserting the custom of the realm into his declaration
here, I hold that to be mere surplusage and redundancy, which
does not vitiate the declar~tion." And again he says, "it were
worth while to inquire, what the course has been amongst merchants; or to direct an issue for trial of the custom among

4

HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT

4 History of the Law Merchant

merchants ; yet, all their customs we cannot know, but by inform-

ation." Afterwards, in declaring their opinions, the court said

"that this course of accepting bills being a general custom amongst

all traders, both within and without the realm, and having every-

where that effect to make the acceptor subject to pay the contents,

the Court must take notice of that custom."

Notwithstanding these decisions, the question was again

made, about twenty years afterwards, in the case of Carter v.

Downish (i W. & M. Anno 1688), 1 Show. 127, in the Exche-

quer, on a writ of error from the king's bench. The defendant

had covenanted to pay all bills which should be drawn on him,

in favor of the plaintiff, on account of 1000 kentals of fish, and

the breach assigned was, the non-payment of a certain bill. The

defendants pleaded, that the plaintiff by indorsement on the bill,

according to the custom of merchants, appointed the payment to

Herbert Aylwin, or his order, who indorsed it to Tassel, to whom

the defendant paid it. To this plea there was a demurrer and

joinder. One of the errors assigned was, that the defendant had

not set forth a particular custom, to warrant the indorsement. To

which it was answered "that the law and custom of merchants
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warrant the indorsement of foreign bills of exchange, and for

that, all the book cases on foreign bills are a proof ; and that such

indorsement doth really transfer the property of the money, or

contents, in such bills to the indorsee, and that all this law of

merchants is part of the law of the land, and the judges are

obliged to take notice of that as well as of any other law." * * *

Three years after this, however, the point was again made,

in the case of Mogadara v. Holt (3 W. & M.), 1 Show, 318 and

12 Mod. 15, 16 (Anno 1699), where it was held by Holt, Chief

Justice, and the whole court, "that the law of merchants is jus

gentium, and a part of common law, and ergo, we ought to take

notice of it when set forth in pleading." And "though the plain-

tiff hath alleged a custom contrary to fact, yet that is but surplus-

age ; and he needed not to have alleged a custom." Jud. pro qner.

Not satisfied with these adjudications, the question was

again agitated two years afterwards, in the exchequer, on a writ

of error from the king's bench, in the case of Williams v. Wil-

liams, Carth. 269 (Pasch. 5 W. & M., Anno 1693) where "the

only error insisted on was that the plaintiff had not declared on

the custom of merchants in London, or any other particular place

(as the usual way is) but had declared on a custom through all

England, and if so. 'tis the common law, and then it ought not to

merchant · y t, all their cu toms w cannot know, but by information.' Afterward , in d claring their opinion , the court said
"that this cour e of accepting bill being a general custom amongst
all trader , both within and without the r alm, and having everywhere that effect to make the acceptor ubject to pay the contents,
the ourt must take notice of that custom."
Not\\ ith tanding the e deci ion , the question was again
made, about twenty y ars afterward , in the ca e of Carter v.
Doi nish ( l W. & M. Anno 168 , l how. 127, in the Exch quer, on a writ of error from th king's bench. The defendant
had covenanted to pay all bill which should be drawn on him ,
in favor of th e plaintiff on account of lcxx:> kentals of fish, and
the breach a igned was, the non-payment of a certain bill. The
defendant pleaded, that the plaintiff by indor ement on the bill,
according to the cu tom of merchant , appointed the payment to
Herbert Aylwin, or his order, who indorsed it to Tassel, to whom
the defendant paid it. To this plea there was a demurrer and
joinder.
ne of the errors a signed wa , that the defendant had
not set forth a particular cu tom, to warrant the indorsement. To
which it was an wered "that the law and custom of merchants
warrant the indor ement of foreign bills of exchange and for
that, all the book ca es on foreign bills are a proof; and that such
indorsement doth r ally transfer the property of the money, or
content , in uch bill to the indorsee, and that all thi law of
merchants is part of the law of the land, and the judges are
oblig d to take notice of that as well as of any other law." * * *
Three years aft r this, however, the point was again made,
in the ca e of Mogadara v. Holt (3 W. & M.), l Show 318 and
12 Mod. l 5, 16 (Anno 1699), where it was held by Holt, Chief
Ju tice, and the whole court 'that the law of merchants i jus
gentiwn, and a part of common law, and ergo, we ought to take
notice of it when t forth in pleading." And "though the plaintiff hath alleged. a custom contrary to fact yet that is but surplusage; and he n ed d not to hav all ged a custom." Jud. pro quer.
Not ati fied with these adjudications, the question wa
again ao-itat d two y ars aft rward , in th exchequer, on a writ
of error from the kings bench, in the ca e of Williams v. Williams arth. 269 (Pasch. 5 W. & M., Anno 1693) where "the
on ly error in i ted on wa that the plaintiff had not declared on
th cu tom of merchant in London, or any other particular place
(a the u ual way i ) but had d clared on a cu tom throuo-h all
· England , and if o. 'tis the common law, and then it ought not to
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be set out by way of custom ; and if it is a custom, then it ought

to be laid in some particular place from whence a venue might

arise to try it. To which it was answered, that this custom of

merchants, concerning bills of exchange, is part of the common

law of which the judges will take notice ex officio, as it was

resolved in the case of Carter v. Downish; and therefore, it is

needless to set forth the custom specially in the declaration, for it

is sufficient to say, that such a person secundum usum et consue-

tudincm mercatorum, drew the bill; therefore, all the matter in the

declaration concerning the special custom was merely surplusage

and the declaration good without it. The judgment was affirmed. v

* * * Again, in Hilary term (B. R. 8 and 9, Wm. Ill, Anno

1697) Pinkney v. Hall, 1 Ld. Raym. 175, the exception was taken,

"that the declaration being per consuetudinem Anglice, &c, was

ill, because the custom of England is the law of England, of which

the judges ought to take notice, without pleading. Sed non allo-

catur. For the custom is not restrained to any particular place."

The same principles were, in the same term, in the common

pleas, held, in the case of Bromwich v. Loyd (Hilary term, 8 Wm.

Ill) 2 Lutw., 1585, where Treby, Chief Justice, said, "That bills
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of exchange, at first were extended only to merchant strangers,

and afterwards to inland bills between merchants trading one

with another here in England ; and after that, to all traders and

dealers, and of late, to all persons trading or not ; and there was

no occasion to allege any custom : and that was not denied by any

of the other justices."

In 10 Wm. Ill, Anno 1698 B. R., Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld.

Raym. 360, an action was brought on a promissory note, made by

the defendant, and indorsed by the payee to the plaintiff for part

only, who declared on the custom of merchants for such an

indorsement. But on demurrer it was adjudged ill. "For a man

cannot apportion such personal contract, for he cannot make a

man liable to two actions, where by contract he is liable but to

one." And Holt, Chief Justice, said, "This is not a particular

local custom, but the custom of merchants, of which the law takes

notice; and therefore the court cannot take the custom to be so.

Judgment for defendant.

Four years after this, in the case of B idler v. Crips, 6 Mod.

29 (B. R. 2 Ann., Anno 1702) Lord Holt said, "I remember

when actions upon inland bills of exchange did first begin ; and

there they laid a particular custom between London and Bristol,

and it was an action against the acceptor * * * And in my

Lord North's time it was said, that the custom in that case was

be set out by way of custom; and if it is a custom, then it ought
to be laid in some particular place from whence a venue might
arise to try it. To which it was answered, that this custom of
merchants, concerning bills of exchange, is part of the common
law of which the judges will take notice ex officio, as it was
resolved in the case of Carter v. Downish; and therefore, it is
needless to set forth the custom specially in the declaration, for it
is sufficient to say, that such a person secundum usu1n et consuet1tdine11i mercatorimi, drew the bill; therefore, all the matter in the
declaration concerning the special custom was merely surplu age
and the declaration good without it. The judgment was affirmed:"
* * * Again, in Hilary term (B. R. 8 and 9, Wm. III, Anno
l6g7) Pinkney v. Hall, l Ld. Raym. 175, the exception was taken,
"that the declaration being per consuetHdineni Anglice, &c., was
ill, because the custom of England is the law of England, of which
the judges ought to take notice, without pleading. Sed non allocatur. For the custom is not restrained to any particular place."
The same principles were, in the same term, in the common
pleas, held, in the case of Bromw ich v. Loyd (Hilary term, 8 Wm.
III) 2 Lutw., 1585, where Treby, Chief Justice, said, "That bills
of exchange, at first were extended only to merchant strangers,
and afterwards to inland bills between merchants trading one
with another here in England; and after that, to all traders and
dealers, and of late, to all persons trading or not; and there was
no occasion to allege any custom: and that was not denied by any
of the other justices."
In ro Wm. III, Anno 1698 B. R., Haw kins v. Cardy, l Ld.
Raym. 360, an action was brought on a promissory note, made by
the defendant, and indorsed by the payee to the plaintiff for part
only, who declared on the custom of merchants for such an
indorsement. But on demurrer it was adjudged ill. "For a man
cannot apportion such personal contract, for he cannot make a
man liable to two actions, where by contract he is liable but to
one." And Holt, Chief Justice, said, "This is not a particular
local custom, but the custom of merchants, of which the law takes
notice ; and therefore the court cannot take the custom to be so.
Judgment for defendant.
Four years after this, in the case of Bitller v. Crips, 6 Mod.
29 ( B. R. 2 Ann., Anno 1702) Lord Holt said, "I remember
when actions upon inland bills of exchange did first begin; and
there they laid a particular custom between London and Bristol,
and it was an action against the acceptor * * * And in my
Lord North's time it was said, that the custom in that case was
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part of the common law of England, and the actions since became

frequent as the trade of the nation did increase ; and all the differ-

ence between foreign and inland bills is, that foreign bills must

be protested before a public notary, before the drawer may be

charged ; but inland bills need no protest."

In the year 1760 (1 Geo. III.), in the case of Edic v. The

East India Company, 2 Burr. 1226, Mr. Justice Foster said,

"Much has been said about the custom of merchants; but the

custom of merchants or law of merchants, is the law of the king-

dom, and is part of the common law." * * * And in the same

case, p. 1228, Mr. Justice Wilmot says, "The custom of merchants

is part of the law of England ; and courts of law must take notice

of it as such." * * * In the case of Pillans & Ross v. Van

Mierop & Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1669, Lord Mansfield says, "The

law of merchants and the law of the land is the same." * * *

This chronological list of authorities tends to elucidate the

manner in which the custom of merchants gained an establishment

in the courts of law, as part of the common or general law of the

land ; and shows that it ought not to be considered as a system

contrary to the common law, but as an essential constituent part
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of it, and that it always was of co-equal authority so far as sub-

jects existed for it to act upon. The reason why it was not

recognized by the courts, and reduced to a regular system, as soon

as the laws relating to real estate, and pleas of the crown, seems

to be, that in ancient times, the questions of a mercantile nature,

in the courts of justice, bore no proportion to those relating to

the former subjects. Before the time of James I., we have

scarcely a mercantile case in the books ; and yet, long before that

time, the laws respecting real estates and the criminal code were

nearly as well understood as they are at this day. * * *

Another reason, perhaps, why we see so much tardiness in

the courts in admitting the principles of commercial law in prac-

tice, has been the obstinacy of judicial forms of process, and the

difficulty of adapting them to those principles which were not

judicially established, until after those forms had acquired a kind

of sanctity from their long use. * * * It required the tran-

scendant talents, and the confidence in those talents, which were

possessed by Lord Mansfield to remove those obstructions. When

he ascended the bench he found justice fettered in the forms of

law. It was his task to burst those fetters and to transform the

chains into instruments of substantial justice. From that time a

new era commenced in the history of English jurisprudence. His

sagacitv discovered those intermediate terms, those minor propo-

part of th common la' of England, and th actions since became
fr qu nt a the trad of the nation did incr a e · and all the differn between for ign and inland bill i , that for ign bill mu t
be prot t d before a public notary, befor the drawer may be
charged · but inland bill need no prote t."
In the year I 760 ( l G o. III.), in the ca e of Edie v. The
East India Co111pany, 2
urr. 1226, Mr. Ju tice Fo ter said,
''l\Iuch ha be n aid about the custom of merchant ; but the
cu tom of merchant or law of merchant , i the law of th kingdom and i~ part of the common law." * * * And in the ame
ca , p. 1228, Mr. Ju tice Wilmot ay , "Th cu tom of merchants
i part of the law of England; and courts of law must take notice
f it a uch." * * * In the case of Pillans & Ross v. Van
11Iierop & Hop kins, 3 Burr. 1669, Lord Mansfield say , "The
la" of merchant and the law of the land is the ame." * * *
Thi chronological list of authorities tend to elucidate the
manner in which the custom of merchant gained an e tablishment
in the court of law, a part of the common or general law of the
land; and shows that it ought not to be con idered a a sy tern
contrary to the common law, but a an e ential constitu nt part
of it, and that it always was of co-equal authority so far as ubject existed for it to act upon. The reason why it was not
recognized by the courts, and reduced to a re ular ystem, as soon
a the laws relating to real e tate, and plea of the crown, eem
to be, that in ancient times, the questions of a mercantile nature,
in the courts of ju tice, bore no proportion to tho e relating to
the former subject .
Before the time of James I., we have
carcely a mercantile case in the books; and yet, long before that
time, the laws re pecting real estate and th criminal code were
nearly as well understood as they are at thi day. * * *
Another reason, perhap , why we see so much tardiness in
the courts in admitting the principle of commercial law in practi , has been th ob tinacy of judicial forms of process, and the
difficulty of adapting them to tho e principle which were not
judicially establi hed, until after tho e form had acquired a kind
of anctity from their long u e. * * * It required the tranc ndant talent , and the confidence in tho e tal nt , which were
po e ed by Lord Man field to remove tho e obstruction . When
he a cended the bench he found justice fetter d in the forms of
law. It wa his ta k to bur t tho e fetter and to tran form the
chains into in trument of ubstantial justice. From that time a
n w era commenced in the hi tory of Engli h jurisprudence. His
sagacity di cover d tho e int rmediate term , those minor propo-
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sitions, which seemed wanting to connect the newly-developed

principles of commercial law with the ancient doctrines of the

common law, and to adapt the accustomed forms to the great and

important purposes of substantial justice in mercantile tran-

sactions.

II. Forms of pleading often tend to elucidate the law. By

observing the forms of declarations, which have, from time to

time been adapted, in actions upon bills of exchange, we may per-

haps discover the steps by which the courts allowed actions to be

brought upon them as substantive causes of action without

alleging any consideration for the making or accepting them.

The first forms which were used take no notice of the custom of

merchants as creating a liability distinct from that which arises at

common law ; but by making use of several fictions, bring the case

within the general principles of actions of assumpsit. The oldest

form which is recollected is to be found in Rastell's Entries fol. 10

(a), under the head, "Action on the case upon promise to pay

money." Rastell finished his book, as appears by his preface, on

the 28th of March, 1564, and gathered his forms from four old

books of precedents, then existing. This declaration sets forth
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that A complains of B, &c, for that whereas the said A, by a

certain I C, his sufficient attorney, factor and deputy in this

behalf, on such a day and year, at L., at the special instance and

request of the said B, had delivered to the said B, by the hand of

the said I C, to the proper use of the said B, noi 8 s 4d, lawful

money of England; for which said 110/ 8s 4d, so to the said

B delivered, he the said B, then and there, to the said I C

(then being the sufficient attorney, factor and deputy of the said

A in this behalf) faithfully promised and undertook, that a certain

John of G. well and faithfully would content and pay to Reginald

S. (on such a day and year, and always afterwards, hitherto the

sufficient deputy, factor and attorney of the said A in this behalf)

443 2-3 ducats, on a certain day in the declaration mentioned.

And if the aforesaid John of G. should not pay and content the said

Reginald S. the said 443 2-3 ducats, at the time above limited, that

then the said B would well and faithfully pay and content the said

A 110/ 8s 4d lawful money of England, with all damages and

interest thereof, whenever he should be thereunto by the said A

requested. It then avers, that the said 443 2-3 ducats were of the

value of 110/ 8s 4d, lawful money of England, that John of G.

had not paid the ducats to Reginald S. and that if he had paid

them "to the said R, I, B. and associates or to either of them, then

sitions, which seemed wanting to connect the newly-developed
principles of commercial law with the ancient doctrine of the
common law, and to adapt the accustom d forms to the great and
important purposes of substantial justice in mercantile transactions.
II. Forms of pleading often tend to elucidate the law. By
observing the forms of declaration , which have, from time to
time been adapted, in actions upon bills of exchange, we may perhaps discover the steps by which the courts allowed actions to be
brought upon them as substantive causes of action without
alleging any consideration for the making or accepting them.
The first forms which were used take no notice of the custom of
merchants as creating a liability distinct from that which arises at
common law ; but by making use of several fictions, bring the case
within the general principles of actions of assu,mpsit. The oldest
form which is recollected is to be found in Rastell's Entries fol. IO
(a), under the head, "Action on the case upon promise to pay
money." Rastell finished his book, as appears by his preface, on
the 28th of March, 1564, and gathered his forms from four old
books of precedents, then existing. This declaration sets forth
that A complains of B, &c., for that whereas the said A, by a
certain I C, his sufficient attorney, factor and deputy in this
behalf, on such a day and year, at L., at the special instance and
request of the said B, had delivered to the said B, by the hand of
the said I C, to the proper use of the said B, I rnl 8 s 4d, lawful
money of England; for which said I rnl 8s 4d, so to the said
B delivered, he the said B, then and there, to the said I C
(then being the sufficient attorney, factor and deputy of the said
A in this behalf) faithfully promised and undertook, that a certain
John of G. well and faithfully would content and pay to Reginald
S. (on such a day and year, and always afterwards, hitherto the
sufficient deputy, factor and attorney of the said A in this behalf)
443 2-3 ducats, on a certain day in the decla·r ation mentioned.
And if the aforesaid John of G. should not pay and content the said
Reginald S. the said 443 2-3 ducats, at the time above limited, that
then the said B would well and faithfully pay and content the said
A nol 8s 4d lawful money of England, with all damages and
interest thereof, whenever he should be thereunto by the said A
requested. It then avers, that the said 443 2-3 ducats were of the
value of nol 8s 4d, lawful money of England, that John of G.
had not paid the ducats to Reginald S. and that if he had paid
~hem "to the said R, I, B. and associates or to either of them, then
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the said 443 2-3 ducats would have come to the benefit and profit

of the said A." * * *

This declaration seems to have been by the indorsee of a bill

of exchange against the drawer. For although nothing is said of

a bill of exchange, or of the custom of merchants, yet the facts

stated will apply to no other transaction. It appears that ducats

were to be given for pounds sterling; this was in fact an

exchange. Again the defendant promised to repay the original

money advanced, with all damages and interest ; this is the precise

obligation of the drawer of a bill of exchange according to the

law merchant. Besides, the transaction, if literally true, as set

forth in the declaration, was, at least, a very uncommon one. A

is supposed to make I. C. his attorney for the purpose of paying

110/ to B, and to receive a promise from B, that John of G.

should pay to Reginald S. 443 ducats. And A is also supposed to

have made Reginald S. his attorney for the purpose of recovering

the ducats. Such a transaction must certainly be very rare,

especially, as it was so much easier to have done the same thing in

substance, by a simple bill of exchange. * * *

In the declaration of payee v. acceptor, fol. 338a, the foreign
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merchant who paid the 1400 crowns to the drawer of the bill in

France, to be remitted to the plaintiff (the payee), in England,

is stated to be the plaintiff's factor ; and the drawer of the bill is

stated to be the factor of the defendant (the acceptor), so that

the plaintiff, by his factor, is supposed to pay to the defendant,

through the medium of the defendant's factor, the 1400 crowns,

in consideration of which it is averred that the defendant in

England promised the plaintiff to pay him 414/ 3s 4d, lawful

money of England.

This declaration sets forth, that whereas, the plaintiff, on the

10th of June, 37 Eliz., at Rochelle, in France, in parts beyond

seas, by the hands of a certain T. S., then the factor of the plain-

tiff, at the request of a certain R. W., then the factor of the

defendant, delivered and paid to the said R. W., then factor of

the defendant, to the use of the defendant, as much ready money

as amounted to 1400 French crowns, of the money of France, in

parts beyond sea, at the rate of 5s nd, lawful money of England,

for each French crown. And thereupon, the said R. W., at

Rochelle aforesaid, then delivered to the said T. S. three bills of

exchange, viz., first, second and third. In the first of which bills

of exchange, the said R. W. requested the defendant to pay to

the plaintiff at L. 414/ 3s 4d lawful money of England at the end

of thirty days next after sight of that bill of exchange (the second

the said 443 2-3 ducat would hav come to the benefit and profit
of the aid A. ' * * *
Thi declaration e m to have b en by the indor e of a bill
of exchan again t th draw r. For althou h nothing is said of
a bill of exchange, or of the custom of m rchant , y t the facts
tat d will apply to no other transaction. It app ars that ducats
\\' r to b giv n fo r pound
terling; thi ' a in fact an
xchan e.
gain the defendant promi ed to repay the original
money advanc d, ' ith all damage and intere t; thi i the pr ci e
obli ation of the drawer of a bill of exchange according to the
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e id s, th tran action, if literally tru , as s t
f rth in the declaration wa , at lea t, a very uncommon on~. A
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I rol to
, and to r ceive a promise from B, that John of G.
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is al so uppo ed to
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In the declaration of payee v. acceptor, fol. 338a, the foreign
m rchant who paid the 1400 crowns to the drawer of the bill in
France, to be remitted to the plaintiff (the payee), in England,
i tated to be th plaintiff' factor; and th drawer of the bill i
tated to be the factor of the defendant (the acceptor), so that
the plaintiff, by hi factor, i upposed to pay to the defendant,
through the med ium of the def ndant's factor, the 1400 cruwns,
in consideration of which it is averred that the defendant in
E ngland promis d the plaintiff to pay him 414l 3s 4d, lawful
money of England.
This declaration sets forth, that whereas, the plaintiff, on the
10th of Jun e, 37 E liz., at Rochelle, in France, in part beyond
ea , by the hands of a certain T. ., then the factor of the plaintiff, at the reque t of a certain R. W., th n the factor f the
efendant deliv red and paid to the said . W., th en factor of
the d fendant, to the use of the def ndant, a much r ady money
a amounted to 1400 Fr.ench crowns, of th money of France, in
parts beyond ea, at the rate of 5 I rd lawful man y of England
for each Fr nch crown .
nd thereupon the aid
. W., at
Rochelle afo re aid, then d liver d to the said T. . three bills of
xchanO'e, viz ., fir t, cond and third. In the fir t of which bills
of exchange, the aid R . W. reque t d the d fendant to pay to
th plaintiff at L. 4r4l 3 4d lawful money of England at the end
of thirty da next after iO'ht of that bill f exchanO'e (the s~cond
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and third bills to the plaintiff not paid). It then sets forth the

tenor of the second and third bills and then avers that the defend-

ant, on the day and year first aforesaid, at the city of E. * * *

in consideration thereof, undertook and to the plaintiff then and

there and faithfully promised, that he, the defendant, well and

faithfully would pay to the plaintiff, to the plaintiff's use, at

the City of E. aforesaid * * * by way of exchange accord-

ing to the usage of merchants, the aforesaid 414/ 3s 4d lawful

money of England, at the end of thirty days next after sight of

any of the bills of exchange aforesaid; and the plaintiff in fact

saith, that afterwards, viz., on the 1st of September, in the year

aforesaid at &c, the first of said bills came to the sight of, and

was then and there shown to, the defendant, yet the defendant not

regarding, &c, but contriving, &c, did not pay the said 414/ 3s 4d,

&c, at the end of said thirty days, &c. * * * In this declar-

ation, it will be perceived that the custom of merchants is not

alleged as the foundation of the action or the cause of liability of

the defendant ; nor is it stated that the defendant accepted the bill.

But the plaintiff grounds his action upon the defendant's promise

to pay the amount mentioned in the bill, in consideration of 1400
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crowns paid to his use in France; and in consideration that his

factor had drawn and delivered the bills to the plaintiff's factor.

This idea of factorage is probably a fiction, introduced for the

purpose of adapting the custom of merchants to the common law

forms, and to show a sufficient consideration for the assumpsit.

The question of factorage was not traversable ; as the facts of

drawing the bill, and the drawee's acceptance, were sufficient evi-

dence of the drawer's being the acceptor's factor quoad hoc. This

fiction might, perhaps, be considered as part of the custom of

merchants; but at any rate, it seems to have been considered

necessary, in order to create that degree of privity between the

payee and the acceptor which, at that time, was supposed neces-

sary to support the action of assumpsit.

Both this and the former are declarations at common law ; that

is neither of them is aided by the custom of merchants, unless the

custom may be considered as supporting the fiction of factorage.

They show, also, that if privity of contract was necessary at com-

mon law, to support the action of assumpsit, the law would pre-

sume a privity or at least would presume facts which constituted

a privity, between the payee and acceptor or between an indorsee

and a drawer of a bill of exchange.

III. It is not ascertained exactly at what time inland bills

first came into use in England or at what period they were first

and third bills to the plain tiff not paid). It then sets forth the
tenor of the second and third bills and then avers that the defendant, on the day and year first aforesaid, at the city of E. * * *
in consideration thereof, undertook and to the plaintiff then and
there and faithfully promised, that he, the defendant, well and
faithfully would pay to the plaintiff, to the plaintiff's use, at
the City of E. aforesaid * * * by way of exchange according to the usage of merchants, the aforesaid 414l 3s 4d lawful
money of England, at the end of thirty days next after sight of
any of the bills of exchange aforesaid; and the plaintiff in fact
saith, that afterwards, viz., on the rst of September, in the year
aforesaid at &c., the first of said bills came to the sight of, and
was then and there shown to, the defendant, yet the defendant not
regarding, &c., but contriving, &c., did not pay the said 414l 3s 4d,
&c., at the end of said thirty day s, &c. * * * In this declaration, it will be perceived that the custom of merchants is not
alleged as the foundation of the action or the cause of liability of
the defendant; nor is it stated that the defendant accepted the bill.
But the plaintiff grounds his action upon the defendant's promise
to pay the amount mentioned in the bill, in consideration of 1400
crowns paid to his use in France; and in consideration that his
factor had drawn and delivered the bills to the plaintiff's factor.
This idea of factorage is probably a fiction, introduced for the
purpose of adapting the custom of merchants to the common law
forms, and to show a sufficient consideration for the assu.mpsit.
The question of factorage was not traversable; as the facts of
drawing the bill, and the drawee's acceptance, were sufficient evidence of the drawer's being the acceptor's factor quoad hoc. This
fiction might, perhaps, be considered as part of the custom of
merchants; but at any rate, it seems to have been considered
necessary, in order to create that degree of privity between the
payee and the acceptor which, at that time, was supposed necessary to support the action of assumpsit.
Both this and the former are declarations at common law; that
is neither of them is aided by the custom of merchants, unless the
custom may be considered as supporting the fiction of factorage.
They show, also, that if privity of contract was necessary at common law, to support the action of assimipsit} the law would presume a privity or at least would presume facts which constituted
a privity, between the payee and acceptor or between an indorsee
and a drawer of a bill of exchange.
III. It is not ascertained exactly at what time inland bills
first came into use in England or at what period they were first
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considered as entitled to the privileges of bills of exchange, under

the law merchant. But there was a time when the law merchant

was considered as "confined to cases where one of the parties was

a merchant stranger", 3 Woodeson, 109; and when those bills of

exchange only were entitled to its privileges, one of the parties to

which was a foreign merchant. * * * And in B idler v.

Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (2 Ann.) Lord Chief Justice Holt said he

remembered "when actions upon inland bills of exchange first

began."

Perhaps Lord Holt might have been correct as to the time

when actions upon inland bills first began, or rather when the first

notice was taken of a difference between inland and foreign bills ;

but it appears probable that inland bills were in use much before

Lord Holt's remembrance. * * *

The time when inland bills and promissory notes began to be

in general use in England was probably about the year 1645 or

1646. * * * Indeed we know that to be the fact, from the

cases in the books ; upon examining which, we shall find, that

there was no distinction made between inland bills of exchange

and promissory notes ; they were both called bills ; they were both
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called notes ; sometimes they were called "bills or notes." Neither

the word "inland" nor the word "promissory" was at this time in

use as applied to distinguish the one species of paper from the

other. The term "promissory note" does not seem to have

obtained a general use, until after the statute. There was no dis-

tinction made either by the bench, by the bar or by merchants,

between a promissory note and an inland bill, and this is the cause

of that obscurity in the reports of mercantile cases during the

reigns of Charles II, James II and King William, of which Lord

Mansfield complained so much in the case of Grant v. Vaughan, 3

Burr. 1525 and 1 W. Bl. 488; where he says that in all the cases

in King William's time "there is great confusion; for without

searching the record, one cannot tell whether they arose upon

promissory notes or inland bills of exchange. For the reporters

do not express themselves with sufficient precision, but use the

words 'note' and 'bill' promiscuously." This want of precision is

apparent enough to us who now. (since the decision of Lord Holt

in the case of Clerk v. Martin) read the cases decided by him

before that time ; but at the time of reporting them, there was no

want of precision in the reporter, for there was not, in fact, and

never had been suggested, a difference in law between a promis-

sory note and an inland bill. They both came into use at the same

con ider d a entitl d to th privileges of bill of xchange, under
th law m rchant.
ut th r wa a time when the law m rchant
wa on id·e red a "confin d to ca e wh re one of the partie wa
a merchant tranger", 3 Woode on, rn9; and v h n those bill of
exchange only wer entitl d to it pri il ge , one of the partie to
\ hich was a for ign merchant. * * * And in Buller v.
Crips) 6 Mod. 29 (2 Ann.) Lord Chief Justice Holt said he
r membered "wh n actions upon inland bills of exchange fir t
began."
Perhaps L ord Holt might have been correct as to the time
when actions upon inland bills first began, or rather when the fir t
n tice wa taken of a diff rence between inland and foreign bills;
but it appear probable that inland bills were in use much befo re
L rd Holt' remembrance. * * *
The time when inland bills a~d promissory notes began to be
in a neral use in England wa probably about the year 1645 or
164 . * * * Indeed we know that to be th e fact, from the
ca es in the book ; upon examining which, we shall find, that
th re was no distinction made between inland bill of exchange
and promis ory notes; they were both called bills; th y were both
called notes; sometimes they were called "bills or notes." Neither
the word "inland" nor the word " promi ory" was at this time in
u e as applied to distingui h the one species of paper from the
oth er.
The term "promi ory note" does not seem to have
obtaifled a general use, until after the statute. There was no distin tion made either by the bench , by th bar or by merchants,
b tween a promissory note and an inland bill, and this is the cau e
of that obscurity in the reports of m rcantile case during the
rei g ns of Charles II, James II and King William, of which Lord
Man field complained so much in the case of Grant v. VaHghan) 3
Burr. l 525 and l W. Bl. 4 8; where he says that in all the case
in King William's time "there i great confu ion; for without
s arching the record, one cannot tell whether they aro e upon
promi sory notes or inland bills of exchano-e. For the reporters
do not expres themselves with sufficient preci ion, but u e the
word 'note' and 'bill' promi cuou ly." This want of preci ion is
apparent enough to us who now. (since th d ci ion of Lord Holt
in th ca e of Clerk v. Martin) r ad the ca
d cided by him
bef re that time; but at the time of r porting them, there was no
want of pr ci ion in the reporter for there wa not, in fact, and
never had been sugge ted, a difference in law between a promissory note and an inland bill. They both cam into use at the same
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time, were of equal benefit to commerce, depended upon the same

principles and were supported by the same law.

IV. The case of Edgar v. Chut, or Chat v. Edgar, reported

in i Keb. 592, 636 (Mich. 15 Car. II, Anno 1663), seems to be the

first in the books which appears clearly to be upon an inland bill

of exchange. Without doubt, many had preceded it, and passed

sub silentio. The case was this : A butcher had bought cattle of

a grazier, but not having money to pay for them, and knowing

that the parson of the parish had money in London, he obtained

(by promising to pay for it) the parson's order or bill on his cor-

respondent, a merchant in London, in favor of the grazier. The

parson having doubts of the credit of the butcher, wrote secretly

to his correspondent, not to pay the money to the grazier, until

the butcher had paid the parson. In consequence of which the

London merchant did not pay the draft, and the grazier brought

his suit against the parson, and declared on the custom of

merchants. It was moved in arrest of judgment, that neither the

drawer nor the payee was a merchant ; but it was held to be suffi-

cient, that the drawee was a merchant.

Next came the case of Woodward v. Row (Mich., 18 Car. II,
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Anno 1666) 2 Keb. 105, 132, in which the court said, that "the

law of merchants is the law of the land, and the custom is good

enough generally for any man, without naming him merchant;

and they will intend that he of whom the value is said to be

received by the defendant, was the plaintiff's servant."

The next is Milton's case (Mich., 20 Car. II) Hardr. 485,

of which it may be necessary to take notice, as it has been consid-

ered as a leading case, and as having established some principles

upon which a number of subsequent cases have been decided. It

was an action of debt, in the exchequer, upon a bill of exchange

accepted. The plaintiff declared, that by the custom of England,

if a merchant send a bill of exchange to another merchant, to pay

money to another person, and the bill be accepted, that he who

accepts the bill does thereby become chargeable with the sum there-

in contained ; and that a certain merchant drew a bill of exchange

upon the defendant, payable to the plaintiff, which bill the defend-

ant accepted ; per quod actio acrcvit. Upon nil debet pleaded, the

verdict was for the plaintiff. A motion was made in arrest of

judgment, and one of the reasons assigned was, that there was

"no privity between the plaintiff and defendant," "nor any contract

in deed or in law."

The Chief Baron, among other things, said, that "without

time, were of equal benefit to commerce, depended upon the same
principles and were supported by the same law.
IV. The case of Edgar v. Chut, or Chat. v. Edgar, reported
in I Keb. 592, 636 (Mich. IS Car. II, Anno r663), seems to be the
first in the books which appears clearly to be upon an inland bill
of exchange. Without doubt, many had preceded it, and passed
sub silentio. The case was this: A butcher had bought cattle of
a grazier, but not having money to pay for them, and knowing
that the parson of the parish had money in London, he obtained
(by promising to pay for it) the parson's order or bill on his correspondent, a merchant in London, in favor of the grazier. The
parson having doubts of the credit of the butcher, wrote secretly
to his correspondent, not to pay the money to the grazier, until
the butcher had paid the parson. In consequence of which the
London merchant did not pay the draft, and the grazier brought
his suit against the parson, and declared on the custom of
merchants. It was moved in arrest of judgment, that neither the
drawer nor the payee was a merchant; but it was held to be sufficient, that the drawee ,was a merchant.
Next came the case of Woodward v. Row (Mich., r8 Car. II,.
Anno 1666) 2 Keb. 105, r32, in which the court said, that "the
law of merchants is the law of the land, and the custom is good
enough generally for any man, without naming him merchant;
and they will intend that he of whom the value is said to be
received by the defendant, was the plaintiff's servant."
The next is Milton's case (Mich., 20 Car. II) Hardr. 485,
of which it may be necessary to take notice, as it has been considered as a leading case, and as having established some principles
upon which a number of subsequent cases have been decided. It
was an action of debt, in the exchequer, upon a bill of exchange
accepted. The plaintiff declared, that by the custom of England,
if a merchant send a bill of exchange to another merchant, to pay
money to another person, and the bill be accepted, that he who
accepts the bill does thereby become chargeable with the sum therein contained ; and that a certain merchant drew a bill of exchange
upon the defendant, payable to the plaintiff, which bill the defendant accepted; per quad actio acrevit. Upon nil debet pleaded, the
verdict was for the plaintiff. A motion was made in arrest of
judgment, and one of the reasons as igned was, that there was
"no privity between the plaintiff and defendant," "nor any contract
in deed or in law."
The Chief Baron, among other things, said, that "without
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doubt, if the common law, or the custom of the place, create a

duty, debt lies for it ; as in the case of a toll due by custom. * * *

But the great question here is, whether or no a debt or duty be

hereby raised: for if it be no more than a collateral engagement,

order or promise, debt lies not, as in the case that has been cited,

of goods delivered by A to B, at the request of C, which C prom-

iseth to pay for, if the other does not ; for in that case a debt or

duty does not arise betwixt A and C, but a collateral obligation

only. In our case, the acceptance of the bill amounts clearly to

a promise to pay the money ; but it may be a question whether it

amounts to a debt or not."

Precedents were ordered to be searched ; but none being

found, the court, afterwards, in Hilary term, 20 & 21 Car. II.,

declared their opinions, "that an action of debt would not lie upon

a bill of exchange accepted, against the acceptor ; but that a special

action upon the case must be brought against him. For the accept-

ance does not create a duty, no more than a promise made by a

stranger to pay, &c, if the creditor will forbear his debt. And

he that drew the bill continues debtor, notwithstanding the accept-

ance, which makes the acceptor liable to pay it. And this course
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of accepting bills, being a general custom among all traders, both

within and without the realm, and having everywhere that effect

as to make the acceptor liable to pay the contents, the court must

take notice of that custom ; but the custom does not extend so far

as to create a debt; it only makes the acceptor onerabilis to pay

the money. Though custom may give an action of debt, as in the

case of toll ; and so in case of a fine for a copyhold. Where-

fore, and because no precedent could be produced that an action

of debt had been brought upon an accepted bill of exchange,

judgment was arrested."

The ground of this judgment seems to be, that the drawer is

the original debtor, and that the undertaking of the acceptor is

only to pay the drawer's debt ; and therefore, is a collateral and

not an original engagement. If the court were mistaken in this

position, the case is not law ; or, at least, the reason of the case

fails. It may be true, that the drawer is the original debtor, until

the bill is accepted ; but after the bill is accepted, the acceptor is

the original debtor, and the undertaking of the drawer is collat-

eral, viz., to pay in case the acceptor does not. * * *

(After commenting upon numerous cases, the court con-

tinues) : We have now examined all the reported cases upon

promissory notes, from the time of the first introduction of inland

doubt if the common law or the cu tom of the place, create a
duty d bt li for it; a in th a c of a toll due by custom. * * *
ut th crreat que tion here i , whether or n a debt or duty be
h r by rai ed: for if it be no more than a collateral engag mcnt,
order or promi e, debt lie not, a in the ca e that ha b en cited,
of good deliv red by A to B, at the requ t of , which
promi th to pay f r, if the other doe not; for in that ca e a debt or
duty doe not ari e b twixt A and C, but a collateral obli ation
only. In our ca e, th acceptance of the bill amounts clearly to
a promise to pay the money; but it may be a qu stion whether it
amounts to a debt or not."
Precedents were ordered to be search d; but none being
found, the court, afterward , in Hilary t rm, 20 & 2r Car. IL,
d clared their opinion , "that an action of debt would not lie upon
a bill of exchange accepted, ao-ain t the accept r; but that a special
action upon the ca e must be brought again t him. For the acceptance doe not create a duty, no more than a promi e made by a
tranger to pay, &c., if the creditor will forbear his debt. And
he that drew the bill continues debtor, notwith tanding the acceptance, which makes the acceptor liabl e to pay it. And thi cour e
of accepting bill , being a gen ral custom among all traders, both
within and without the realm, and having everywhere that effect
a to make the acceptor liable to pay the contents, the court must
take notice of that custom; but the custom does not extend so far
as to create a debt; it only makes the acceptor onerabilis to pay
the money. Though custom may give an action of debt, as in the
ca e of toll; and so in case of a fine for a copyhold. Wherefore, and becau e no precedent could be produced that an action
of cl bt had been brought upon an accepted bill of exchange,
judgment was arre ted."
The around of this judgment seems to be, that the drawer is
th original debtor, and that the undertaking of the acceptor is
only to pay the draw r's debt; and therefore, is a collateral and
not an original engag ment. If the court were mi taken in this
po ition, the case is not law; or, at least, th rea on of the case
fail . It may b true, that the drawer is the original debtor, until
the bill is accepted · but after the bill i ace pted, the acceptor i
the original d btor, and the und rtaking of the drawer is collateral, viz., to pay in ca e the acceptor does not. * * *
(After commenting upon numerous ca , the court conupon
tinue ) : We have now examined all the repo rted ca
promi sory notes, from the time of the first introduction of inland
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bills, to the time of Lord Holt's decision in the case of Clerke v.

Martin. At least, if any others are to be found, they have escaped

a diligent search. They form a series of decisions for a period of

more than thirty years, in which we discover an uncommon degree

of unanimity as well as of uniformity. We find the law clearly

established to be the same upon promissory notes as upon inland

bills; and we find no evidence that the latter were in use before

the former. There is not a contradictory case, or even dictum,

unless we consider as such the doubt expressed in the case of

Butcher v. Swift, cited by Comyns ; but that case is not reported,

and therefore, it is impossible to say, upon what ground the doubt

was suggested. The cases upon promissory notes and inland bills

go to establish not only their likeness in every respect, but even

their identity ; for the former are almost uniformly called inland

bills.

V. Upon examining the printed books of precedents, during

the above period, we shall find that the common usage was, to

declare upon a promissory note, as upon an inland bill of

exchange. * * * (After commenting upon various prece-

dents, the court continues) : Upon a review of this list of
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authorities and precedents, we are at a loss to imagine from what

motive, and upon what grounds, Lord Holt could at once under-

take to overrule all these cases, and totally change the law as to

promissory notes ; and why he should admit inland bills of

exchange to be within the custom of merchants, and deny that

privilege to promissory notes ; when the same evidence which

proved the former to be within the custom, equally proved that it

extended to the latter. By examining the books, it will be found,

that most of the points which have been decided respecting inland

bills of exchange, have been decided upon cases on promissory

notes. If he considered promissory notes as a new invention,

when compared with inland bills of exchange, he seems to have

mistaken the fact; for the probability is, that the former are the

most ancient, or, to say the least, are of equal antiquity.

But let us proceed to examine the case of Clerke v. Martin

(Pasch., i Anne, B. R., 2 Ld. Raym. 757; 1 Salk. 129), upon which

alone is founded the assertion in modern books "that before the

statute of Anne, promissory notes were not assignable or indor-

sable over, within the custom of merchants, so as to enable the

indorsee to bring an action in his own name against the maker."

The case is thus reported by Lord Raymond :

"The plaintiff brought an action upon the case, against the

defendant, upon several promises ; one count was upon a general

bills, to the time of Lord Holt's decision in the case of Clerke v.
Martin. At least, if any others are to be found, they have escaped
a diligent search. They form a series of decisions for a. period of
more than thirty years, in which we discover an uncommon degree
of m1animity as well as of uniformity. We find the law clearly
established to be the same upon promissory notes as upon inland
bills; and we find no evidence that the latter were in use before
the former. There is not a contradictory case, or even dictum,
unless we consider as such the doubt expressed in the case of
Butcher v. Swift, cited by Comyns; but that case is not reported,
and therefore, it is impo sible to say, upon what ground the doubt
was suggested. The cases upon promissory notes and inland bills
rro to establish not only their likeness in every respect, but even
their identity; for the former are almost uniformly called inland
bills.
V. Upon examining the printed books of precedents, during
the above period, we shall find that the common usage was, to
declare upon a promissory note, as upon an inland bill of
exchange. * * * (After commenting upon various precedents, the court continues) : Upon a review of this list of
authorities and precedents, we are at a loss to imagine from what
motive, and upon what grounds, Lord Holt could at once undertake to overrule all these cases, and totally change the law as to
promissory notes; and why he should admit inland bills of
exchange to be within the custom of merchants, and deny that
privilege to promissory notes; when the same evidence which
proved the former to be within the custom, equally proved that it
extended to the latter. By examining the books, it will be found,
that most of the points which have been decided respecting inland
bills of exchange, have been decided upon cases on promissory
notes. If he considered promissory notes as a new invention,
when compared with inland bills of exchange, he seems to have
mistaken the fact; for the probability is, that the former are the
most ancient, or, to say the least, are of equal antiquity.
But let us proceed to examine the case of Clerke v. JV! artin
(Pasch., I Anne, B. R., 2 Ld. Raym. 757; I Salk. 129), upon which
alone is founded the assertion in modern books "that before the
statute of Anne, promissory notes were not assignable or indorsable over, within the custom of merchants, so as to enable the
indorsee to bring an action in his own name against the maker."
The case is thus reported by Lord Raymond:
"The plaintiff brought an action upon the case, against the
defendant, upon severnl promises; one count was upon a general
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indebitatus assumpsit for money lent to the defendant; another

was upon the custom of merchants, as upon a hill of exchange ;

and showed that the defendant gave a note subscribed by himself,

I iy which he promised to pay to the plaintiff, or his order,

&c. Upon non assumpsit, a verdict was given for the plaintiff,

and entire damages. And it was moved in arrest of judgment

that this note was not a bill of exchange, within the custom of

merchants, and therefore, the plaintiff, having declared upon it as

such, was wrong; but that the proper way, in such cases, is to

declare upon a general indebitatus assumpsit for money lent, and

the note would be good evidence of it.

"But it was argued by Sir Bartholomew Shower, the last

Michalmas term, for the plaintiff, that this note being payable to

the plaintiff or his order, was a bill of exchange, inasmuch as, by

its nature, it was negotiable ; and that distinguishes it from a note

payable to I. S., or bearer, which he admitted was not a bill of

exchange, because it is not assignable nor indorsable by the intent

of the subscriber, and consequently, not negotiable, and there-

fore, it cannot be a bill of exchange, because it is incident to the

nature of a bill of exchange to be negotiable ; but here this bill
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is negotiable, for if it had been indorsed payable to I. N., I. N.

might have brought his action upon it, as upon a bill of exchange,

and might have declared upon the custom of merchants. Why

then should it not be, before such indorsement, a bill of exchange

to the plaintiff himself, since the defendant, by his subscription,

has shown his intent to be liable to the payment of this money to

the plaintiff or his order; and since he hath thereby agreed that it

shall be assignable over, which is, by consequence, that it shall be

a bill of exchange. That there is no difference in reason,

between a note which saith, 'I promise to pay to I. S., or order,'

&c, and a note which saith, 'I pray to pay to I. S., or order,'

&c, they are both equally negotiable, and to make such a note a

bill of exchange can be no wrong to the defendant, because he,

by the signing of the note, has made himself to that purpose a

merchant (2 Vent. 292, Sarsficld v. Witherly), and has given his

consent that his note shall be negotiated, and thereby has

subjected himself to the law of merchants."

But Holt, Chief Justice, was totis viribus against the action,

and said that this could not be a bill of exchange. That the

maintaining of these actions upon such notes were innovations

upon the rules of the common law ; and that it amounted to a

new sort of specialty, unknown to the common law, and invented

in Lombard Street, which attempted, in these matters of bills of

iJ1debitatus assumpsit for money lent to the defendant; another
wa up n the cu tom of m r hant , as up n a bill of xchange;
an 1 h w d that the def ndant gav a not ub crib d by himself,
by which he promi d to pay
to th plaintiff, or his order,
' C.
Upon non assumpsit, a v rdict ' a given for the plaintiff,
nd it was moved in arr t of judgment
and entire ·damage .
that this note wa not a bill of exchange, within the cu tom of
merchants, and therefore, the plaintiff, having declar d upon it a.s
uch, wa wrong; but that the proper way, in such ca e , i to
d clare upon a aencral indebitatus assumpsit for money lent, and
th note would b good evidence of it.
"But it wa argued by Sir artholomew Shower, the last
Michalmas term, for the plaintiff, that this note being payable to
the plaintiff r hi order, wa a bill of xchange, ina much as, by
it nature, it wa n otiable; and that distinguishes it from a note
payable to I. ., or bearer, which he admitted was not a bill of
exchano-e, becau e it is not a io-nable nor indorsable by the ;ntent
of the ubscrib r, and con equently, not negotiabl , and therefore, it cannot be a bill of exchange, becau e it is incident to the
nature of a bill of exchange to be negotiable; but here this bill
i negotiable, for if it had been indor eel payable to I. N., I. N.
might have brought his action upon it, a upon a bill of exchange,
and might have declared upon the cu tom of merchants. \; hy
then hould it not be, before such indorsement, a bill of exchange
to the plaintiff himself, since the defendant, by his subscription,
has hown his intent to be liable to th payment of this money to
the plaintiff or his order ; and since .he hath thereby agreed that it
shall be assignable over, which is, by con equence, that it hall be
a bill of exchange. That there is no difference in r a on,
between a note which saith, 'I promise to pay to I. S., or order,'
&c., and a note which saith, 'I pray to pay to I. ., or order,'
&c., they are 1 oth qually negotiable, and to mal~ uch a note a
bill of exchange can be no wrong to th defendant, b cau e he,
1 y the igning of the note, has made him elf to that purpo e a
m rchant ( 2 Vent. 292, Sarsfield v. Witherly), and has given his
c n ent that hi note shall be neo-otiated, and thereby has
subjected himself to the law of merchant . '
ut Holt, hief Ju tice, wa totis viribits against the action,
and said that thi could not b a bill of exchang . That the
maintaining of th e action upon such notes were innovations
upon the rule of th common law; and that it amounted to a
n w ort of specialty, unknown to the common law, and invented
in Lombard Street, which attempted, in the e matters of bills of
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exchange, to give laws to Westminster Hall. That the continuing

to declare upon these notes, upon the custom of merchants, pro-

ceeded upon obstinacy and opinionativeness, since he had always

expressed his opinion against them, and since there was so easy

a method as to declare upon a general indebitatus assumpsit for

money lent, &c. As to the case of Sarsfield v. Witherly, he said,

he was not satisfied with the judgment of the king's bench, and

that he advised the bringing of a writ of error. * * *

As four other cases are reported upon this subject, prior to

the statute of, Anne, all of which were dependent upon this of

Clerke v. Martin, it may be proper to notice what fell from the

court in each, before any comments are made on that case.

(After discussing the four cases, viz., Potter v. Pearson, I

Ld. Raym. 774 ; Williams v. Cutting, 2 Ld. Raym. 825 ; Burton

v. S outer, 2 Ld. Raym. 825, and B idler v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29, the

court continues.) These five cases, viz., Clerke v. Martin, Potter

v. Pearson, Burton v. S outer, Cutting v. Williams, and B idler v.

Crips, are the only reported cases in which the former decisions

were overruled, and it may be observed, that the four last were

decided upon the authority of the first, which is to be considered
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as the leading case; and it is in that case, therefore, that we are

to look for the grounds upon which so great a change of the

established law was founded. We shall, however, consider the

reasons that are scattered among the whole, as having concurred

in the formation of Lord Holt's opinion. In the first place, we

find an assertion of his lordship, in Clerke v. Martin, "that this

note could not be a bill of exchange," but he seems to have been

too much irritated, at that time, to give a reason for the assertion,

or to recollect that in the case of Hill v. Lcivis, upon promissory

notes, he had said, "that goldsmiths' bills were governed by the

same laws and customs as other bills of exchange," and that the

verdict in that case would be good, "if found upon bills of

exchange." His next assertion is, "that the maintaining these

actions upon such notes, were innovations upon the rules of the

common law." But if, as we have shown, the custom of mer-

chants is a part of the common law ; if promissory notes had

always, from the time of their first introduction, been adjudged

to be as much within the custom of merchants as inland bills of

exchange, then an action on a promissory note founded on

the custom was not more an innovation than a like action upon

an inland bill of exchange. Besides that could hardly deserve

the name of innovation, which had been sanctioned by all the

exchange, to give laws to Westminster Hall. That the continuing
to declare upon these notes, upon the cu tom of merchants, proceeded upon obstinacy and opinionativeness, since he had always
expressed his opinion against them, and ince there was so easy
a method as to declare upon a general indebitatus assumpsit for
money lent, &c. As to the ca e of Sarsfield v. Witherly, he said,
he was not satisfied with the judgment of the king's bench, and
that he advised the bringing of a writ of error. * * *
As four other cases are reported upon this subject, prior to
the statute of, Anne, all of which were dependent upon this of
Clerke v. Martin, it may be proper to no tice what fell from the
court in each, before any comments are made on that case.
(After discussing the four cases, viz., Potter v. P earson, I
Ld. Raym. 774 ; Willia<ms v. Cittting, 2 Ld. Raym. 825; Bitrton
v. Souter, 2 Ld. Raym. 825, and Bitller v. Crips1 6 Mod. 29, the
cou.rt continues.) These five cases, viz., Clerke v. Martin, Potter
v. Pearson Burton v. Souter, Cutting v. vVillianis, and Buller v.
Crips, are the only reported case in which the former decision
were overruled, and it may be observed, that the four last were
decided upon the authority of the first, which is to be considered
as the leading case; and it is in that case, therefore, that we are
to look for the grounds upon which so great a change of the
established law was founded. We shall, however, consider the
reasons that are scattered among the whole, as having concurred
in the formation of Lord Holt's opinion. In the fir st place, we
find an assertion of his lordship, in Clerlu v. Martin, "that this
note could not be a bill of exchange," but he seems to have been
too much irritated, at that time, to give a reason for the assertion,
or to recollect that in the case of Hill v. L ewis upon promissory
notes, he had said, " that goldsmiths' bills were governed by the
same laws and customs as other bill s of exchange," and that the
verdict in that case would be good, " if found upon bills of
exchange." His next assertion is, "that the maintaining the e
actions upon such notes, were innovations upon the rules of the
common law." But if, as we have shown, the custom of merchants is a part of the common law; if promissory notes had
always, from the time of th eir fir t introduction, been adjudged
to be as much within the custom of merchants as inland bill of
exchange, then an action on a promi sory note founded on
the custom was not more an innovation than a like action upon
an inland bill of exchange. Beside that could hardly deserve
the name of innovation, which had been sanctioned by all the
1

1

16

Hi

' TORY

F THE LAW MER HA T

16 History of the Law Merchant

judges of England, on a demurrer, as was the case in Williams

v. Williams.

His next assertion is, "that it amounted to the setting up a

new sort of specialty, unknown to the common law, and invented

in Lombard Street." To this, it may be answered, that it did not

amount to the setting up a specialty, because the consideration of

a specialty is not examinable at law ; but between immediate

parties to a bill of exchange, or a promissory note, the defendant

might always have availed himself of the want of consideration.

It only amounted, at most, to the setting up a promissory note as

a bill of exchange. The assertion that promissory notes were

invented in Lombard Street is certainly not correct, for Malynes

mentions them as in use in foreign countries, and as being

assignable by the custom of merchants, long before they appear

to have been introduced into England. The other assertions of

his lordship only tend to show a degree of irritation which dero-

gates from the respect which the decision might otherwise

deserve. * * *

Hence then, we find, from an examination of all the cases

before the statute of Anne, that it never was adjudged, that a
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promissory note for money, payable to order, and indorsed, was

not an inland bill of exchange. But we find, that the contrary

principle had been recognised, in all the cases, from the time of

the first introduction of inland bills and promissory notes, to the

first year of Queen Anne, and that in one of them it had been

expressly adjudged, upon demurrer in the king's bench, and the

judgment affirmed upon argument, in the exchequer chamber,

before all the judges of the common pleas and barons of the

exchequer, so that it may truly be said to have been solemnly

adjudged by all the judges of England. Principles of law so

established are not to be shaken by the breath of a single judge,

however great may be his learning, his talents or his virtues.

That Lord Holt possessed these in an eminent degree will never

be denied ; but he was not exempt from human infirmity. * * *

Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Wahnslcy v. Child (Anno

1749), 1 Ves. 346, says, "The reason of making the statute 3

and 4 Anne arose from some determinations, in the beginning of

her reign, by Holt, Chief Justice, that no action could be main-

tained on a promissory note, nor declaration thereupon, viz.,

Clerke v. Martin, and Potter v. Pearson, 1 Salk. 129, which

cases produced the act, as the act itself recites; but that act of

parliament did not alter, but that still an indebitatus assumpsit

may be brought, and the note given in evidence, or proved if

judges of England, on a demurrer, a "a the case in ~Villiams
v. 1Villia111s.
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lost." From this concurrent testimony it is apparent, that the

case of Clcrke v. Martin was a hasty, intemperate decision of

Lord Holt, which was acquiesced in by the other judges, in con-

sequence of his overbearing authority, "which made others yield

to him" ; and that he so "pertinaciously" adhered to his opinion,

as to render it necessary to apply to parliament to overrule him.

This, it is believed, is the true origin of the statute of Anne,

which did not enact a new law, but simply confirmed the old ;

the authority of which had been shaken by the late decision of

Lord Holt. * * *

It follows, therefore, that it was passed simply to restore the

old order of things, which had been disturbed by Lord Holt.

The only real effect of the statute was to alter a few words

in the declaration. The old forms allege that the defendant

became liable by reason of the custom of merchants, the new

say that he became liable by force of the statute. Even Lord

Holt himself always admitted, that an indebitatus assumpsit for

money had and received, or money lent, would lie, and the note

'would be good evidence of it. His objections were only to the

form of the action, and not to the liability of the parties.
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A promissory note was always as much a mercantile instru-

ment as an inland bill of exchange, and there certainly seems to be

more evidence that the former is within the custom of merchants

than the latter, and that it was so at an earlier period, on the con-

tinent of Europe, from whence it was introduced into England;

and when introduced, it came attended with all the obligations

annexed, which the custom had attached to it.

We, sometimes, in modern books, meet with an assertion

that a promissory note was not negotiable at common law ; this

may be true, because a promissory note was not known at com-

mon law, if from the term common law we exclude the idea of

the custom of merchants. It was a mercantile instrument, intro-

duced under the custom of merchants. But if the custom of

merchants is considered, as it really is, a part of the common law,

then the assertion that a promissory note was not negotiable at

the common law, is not correct.

lost." From this concurrent testimony it is apparent, that the
case of Clerke v. Ma.rtin wa a ha ty, intemperate decision of
Lord Holt, which was acquiesced in by the other judges, in consequence of his overbearing authority, "which made other yield
to him"; and that he so "pertinaciously" adhered to his opinion,
as to render it nece sary to apply to parliament to overrule him.
This, it i believed, is the true origin of the tatute of Anne,
which did not enact a new law, but simply confirmed the old;
the authority of which had been shaken by the late decision of
Lord Holt. * * *
It follows, therefore, that it was passed simply to restore the
old order of things, which had been di turbed by Lord Holt.
The only real effect of the statute v. as to alter a few words
in the declaration. The old forms allege that the defendant
became liable by reason of the custom of merchants, the new
say that he became liable by force of the statute. Even Lord
Holt him elf always admitted, that an illdebita.tus assumpsit for
money had and received, or money lent, would lie, and the note
would be good evidence of it. His objections were only to the
form of the action, and not to the liability of the parties.
A promi sory note was always as much a mercantile instrument as an inland bill of exchange, and there certainly seem to be
more evidence that the former is within the custom of merchants
than the latter, and that it was so at an earlier period, on the continent of Europe, from whence it was introduced into England;
and when introduced, it came attended with all the obligations
annexed, which the custom had attached to it.
We, sometimes, in modern book , meet with an assertion
that a promissory note was not negotiable at common law; this
may be true, because a promissory note was not known at common law, if from the term common law we exclude the idea of
the custom of merchants. It was a mercantile instrument, introduced under the custom of merchant . But if the cu tom of
merchants i considered, as it really i , a part of the common law,
then the assertion that a promissory note was not negotiable at
the common law, is not correct.
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Goodwin v. Robarts, L. R. 10 Exchequer (18/5), 337.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion

Benjamin (Q. C), for the plaintiff.

Goodwin v. Robarts L. R. ro Exchequer ( r875), 3371

Brown (Q. C), for the defendant.

July 7. The judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C.J., Mel-

lor, Lush, Brett, and Lindley, JJ.) was delivered by

Cockburn, C.J. The question for our decision in this case is

whether certain scrip issued by the authority of the Russian Gov-

The fact are ufficiently tated in the opinion
Benjamin (Q. C.), for the plaintiff.
Brown ( Q. .) , for the defendant.

ernment, and certain other scrip issued by the authority of the

Austro-Hungarian Government, is a negotiable security for money,

so that the transfer of it by a person not being the true owner to

a bona fide holder, for value, can confer a good title on the latter.

July 7. The judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C.J., Mellor, Lu h, Brett, and Lindley, JJ.) was delivered by

The scrip in question was bought by the plaintiff through one

Clayton, a stockbroker, and was allowed to remain in Clayton's

hands, who unlawfully pledged it with the defendants, who are

bankers, as security for a loan of money. Clayton having become

bankrupt and having absconded, the defendants sold the scrip at

the market price of the day, and the plaintiff brings his action to

recover the amount realised on such sale.

The scrip in question was in the following form : —
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"1873 . C. 1873. Imperial Government of Russia.

Issue of 15,000,000/. sterling nominal capital in 5 per cent, con-

solidated bonds of 1873. Negotiated by Messrs. N. M. Roth-

schild & Sons, London, and Messrs. de Rothschild Brothers, Paris.

Bearing interest half-yearly, payable in London from 1st of De-

cember, 1873. Scrip for one hundred pounds stock, No. .

"Received the sum of twenty pounds, being the first instal-

ment of 20 per cent, upon one hundred pounds stock, and on

payment of the remaining instalments at the period specified, the

bearer will be entitled to receive a definitive bond or bonds for one

hundred pounds after receipt thereof from the Imperial Govern-

ment.

"London, 1st December, 1873. The instalments are to be

paid at our office as follows: 15/. per cent., or 15/., on the 5th

February, 1874; 15/. per cent., or 15/., on the 9th of March, 1874;

20/. per cent., or 20/., on the 2nd May, 1874; 23/. per cent, or 23/.,

on the 9th June, 1874. Subscribers may pay the same, under a

discount at 3 per cent, per annum, on any Monday or Thursday

after the 16th instant.

COCKBURN, C.J. The question for our decision in this case is
whether certain scrip is ued by the authority of the Russian Government, and certain other crip issued by the authority of the
Au tro-Hungarian Government, i a negotiable security for money,
so that the transfer of it by a person not being the true owner to
a bona fide holder, for value, can confer a good title on the latter.
The crip in que tion wa bought by the plaintiff through one
Clayton, a stockbroker, and was allowed to remain in Clayton's
hand , who unlawfully pledged it with the defendants, who are
bankers, as security for a loan of money. Clayton having become
bankrupt and having ab conded, the defendants sold the scrip at
the market price of the day, and the plaintiff brings his action to
recover the amount realised on such sale.
The scrip in question was in the following form:" 1873
. C.
1873. Imperial Government of Russia.
Is ue of 15,000,oool. sterling nominal capital in 5 per cent. consolidated bonds of 1873. Negotiated by Me srs. N. M. Rothschild & Sons, London, and Me srs. de othschild Brothers, Paris.
caring intere t half-yearly, payable in London from lst of December, 1873. Scrip for one hundred pounds stock, No.--.
"Received the um of twenty pound , being the first instalment of 20 per cent. upon one hundred pounds tock, and on
payment of the remaining in talment at the period specified, the
b arer will be entitled to receive a definitive bond or bonds for one
hundred pounds after receipt thereof from the Imperial Government.
"London, lst December, 1873. The in talments are to be
paid at our offi ce a follow : 15l. per cent., or 15l., on the 5th
February, 1874; 15l. per cent., or 15l. on the 9th of March, 1874;
2ol. per cent., or 2ol., on the 2nd May, l 74; 23l. per cent. or 23l.,
on the 9th June, 1874. Sub criber may pay the ame und er a
li. count at 3 per cent. per annum, on any Monday or Thursday
after the 16th in tant.
1
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"In default of payment of these instalments at the proper

dates, all previous payments will be liable to forfeiture." Then

follow four other receipts for 20/. each, making up the 100/., for

which the bond is afterwards to be given.

The scrip issued by the authority of the Austro-Hungarian

Government was in a precisely similar form.

The scrip in question was issued by Messrs. de Rothschild as

the agents of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian governments,

they being employed by these governments to negotiate and raise

a loan for them respectively on government bonds, bearing

interest, to be afterwards issued in exchange for the scrip when all

the instalments of the sum for which the scrip was issued should

have been paid up. No question is raised as to the fact of Messrs.

de Rothschild having acted in the matter as agents of the two

governments, or of the scrip having been issued by the authority

of the latter.

The contention on the part of the plaintiff was that, scrip of

this description not coming under the category of any of the

securities for money which, by the law merchant, are capable of

being transferred by indorsement or delivery — indeed, not being a
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security for money at all, but only for the future delivery of a

bond — the right of the true owner could not be divested by the

fraudulent transfer of the chattel by a person who had no title as

against the owner.

Strenuous efforts were made by Mr. Benjamin in his able

argument on behalf of the plaintiff to distinguish the present case

from Gorgier v. Mieville., 3 B. & C. 45. He insisted, first, that

although it must be admitted that, if a bond had been given in lieu

of this scrip, the bond would have been a negotiable instrument,

as the case would then have come within Gorgier v. Mieville, 3

B. & C. 45, here there was no engagement on the part of the for-

eign government. The only party signing the scrip, or who could

be held bound by it, were the Messrs. de Rothschild ; and the

persons advancing their money, and taking the scrip, could look

only to them. Secondly, that even assuming that the issuing 01

the scrip was to be taken to be the act of the foreign government,

yet that as it had been issued in London, and the parties taking it

had advanced their money in this country, the contract must be

taken to have been made here, and must be subject to the law of

England. That when a foreign sovereign negotiated a loan in

this country, through his agent, it was in effect the same thing as

though such sovereign had himself come to this country and

entered into the contract in person. That, consequently, in either

"In default of payment of these instalments at the proper
dates, all previous payments will be liable to forfeiture." Then
follow four other receipts for 2ol. each, making up the root., for
which the bond is afterwards to be given.
The scrip issued by the authority of the Austro-Hungarian
Government was in a precisely similar form.
The scrip in question was issued by Mes rs. de Rothscliild as
the agents of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian governments,
they being employed by these governments to negotiate and raise
a loan for them respectively on government bonds, bearing
interest, to be afterwards issued in exchange for the scrip wh~n all
the instalments of the sum for which the scrip was issued should
have been paid up. No question is raised as to the fact of Messrs.
de Rothschild having acted in the matter as agents of the two
governments, or of the scrip having been issued by the authority
of the latter.
The contention on the part of the plaintiff was that, scrip of
this description not coming under the category of any of the
ecurities for money which, by the law merchant are capable of
being transferred by indorsement or delivery-indeed, not being a
ecurity for money at all, but only for the future delivery of a
bond-the right of the true owner could not be divested by the
fraudulent transfer of the chattel by a person who had no title as
against the owner.
Strenuous efforts were made by Mr. Benjamin in his able
argument on behalf of the plaintiff to distinguish the present case
from Gorgier v. Mieville. 1 3 B. & C. 45. He insisted, first, that
although it must be admitted that, if a bond had been given in lieu
of this scrip, the bond would have been a negotiable instrument,
as the case would then have come within Gorgier v. Mieville, 3
B. & C. 45, here there was no engagement on the part of the foreign government. The only party signing the scrip, or who could
be held bound by it, were the Messrs. de Rothschild ; and the
persons advancing their money, and taking the scrip, could look
only to them. Secondly, that even assuming that the issuing of
the scrip was to be taken to be the act of the foreign government,
yet that as it had been issued in London, and the parties taking it
had advanced their money in this country, the contract must be
taken to have been made here, and must be subject to the law of
England. That when a foreign overeign negotiated a loan in
this country, through his agent, it wa in effect the same thing as
though such sovereign had himself come to this country and
.entered into the contract in person. That, consequently, in either
1
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view, the contract arising on the scrip must be taken to have been

made here, and must be dealt with according to English law.

That this being so, the case of Crouch v. The Credit Fonder of

England, Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 374, was an authority which estab-

lished that it was not competent to anyone, by the law of England,

to give to a security, not negotiable by the law merchant, the

character of negotiability, by making it payable to bearer, even

though such security were a security for money. That, a fortiori,

this scrip, not being a promise to pay money, but only to give a

bond when all the instalments should have been paid up, could

not have the character of negotiability given to it by being made

payable to bearer. That choses in action not being assignable

by the general common law, it was only by the law merchant,

which was recognized by the common law and adopted by it, that

a particular class of securities for money could be made negotiable,

either by indorsement, or by being made payable to bearer ; and

that this class of securities was confined to bills of exchange,

promissory notes, and drafts payable to bearer. That this scrip

did not coincide with either of the securities for money to which

by the law merchant, the quality of being so rendered negotiable
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had been conceded; the more so as in fact it was not a security

for money at all, but only an agreement to give such a security

in the shape of a bond. That the bonds of foreign governments

had been held to be negotiable by the Courts of this country, not

because they were negotiable by the law of the country in which

they were made, but because they were in substance and effect

promissory notes.

We entirely dissent from the contention that the contract in

question is one in which the Messrs. de Rothschild can be looked

upon as principals. And though our decision on that head may

not be essential to the conclusion we have arrived at on the case,,

we think it desirable in a matter in which the public are so much

interested that our view should be made known. It is plain on

the face of the document that the Messrs. de Rothschild only

profess to be acting as the agents of the foreign governments.

The law on this subject is correctly laid down in Story on Agency,

in the chapter on the Liabilities of Public Agents, s. 302. Col-

lecting the English and American authorities in a note, the learned

jurist writes as follows: 'Tn the ordinary course of things, an

agent, contracting on behalf of the government, or of the public,

is not personally bound by such a contract, even though he would

be by the terms of the contract, if it were an agency of a private

nature. The reason of the distinction is, that it is not to be pre-

vi w, the contract ari ing on the scrip must be taken to have been
made h r , and mu t be dealt with according to Engli h law.
That thi being o, th ca of Croiich v. The Credit Fancier of
England, Law
p.
Q. . 374, \ a an authority which e tabli h d that it \ a not ompetent to anyone, by the law of Enofand,
to give to a ecurity, not negotiable by the law merchant, the
character of n gotiability, by making it payable to bearer, even
thouo-h uch ecurity were a ecurity for m on y. That, a fortiori,
thi crip, not b in a promi e to pay money, but only to give a
nd when all the in talm nts should have been paid up, could
not have the character of negotiability given to it by being made
payable to b arer. That cho e in action not being a signable
by the general common law, it wa only by the law merchant,,
which wa r ecognized by the common law and adopted by it, that
a particular cla of securiti for money could be made negotiable,
either by indor ement, or by being made payable to bearer ; and
that thi cla
of ecu n t1
wa confined to bill of exchange,
promi ory note , and draft payable to b arer. That thi scrip
did not coincide with eith r of the ecuritie for money to wh ich
by the law merchant, the quality of being o rendered nego~iable
had been conceded; the mor e o as in fact it wa not a ecurity
for money at all, but only an agreement to give such a ecurity
in the shape of a bond. That the bonds of foreio-n governments
had been held to be negotiabl e by the Court of this country, not
becau e they were negotiable by the law of the country in which
they were made, but b cau e they were in substance and effect
promis ory note .
\ e entirely di sent from the contention that the contract in
que tion is one in which the Me sr . de Roth child can be looked
upon a principal . And though our deci ion on that head may
not be essential to the conclu ion we have arrived at on th ca e,
we think it de irable in a matter in which the public are o much
in t re ted that our vievv should be made known. It i plain on
the face of the document that the Me r . de Roth child only
profe s to be actino- a th agent of th foreign government .
The law on thi ubject is c rrectly laid down in tory on ACTency,
in the chapt r on the Liabilities of Public A ent
. 302. Coll cting the Engli h and American authoritie in a note, the learned
juri t write a follow : 'In the ordinary our e of thino- , an
ag nt, contracting on behalf of the governm nt, or of the public,
i not per anally ound by uch a contract, ven though he would
be by the term of the contract, if it were an agency of a private
nature. The r a on of the di tinction is, that it i not to be pre-
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sumed, either that the public agent means to bind himself per-

sonally in acting as a functionary of the government, or, that the

party dealing with him in his public character, means to rely on

his individual responsibility. On the contrary, the natural pre-

sumption in such cases is that the contract was made upon the

credit and responsibility of the Government itself, as possessing

an entire ability to fulfil all its just contracts, far beyond that of

any private man, and that it is ready to fulfil them not only with

good faith, but with punctilious promptitude, and in a spirit of

liberal courtesy. Great public inconvenience would result from a

different doctrine, considering the various public functionaries

which the government must employ in order to transact its ordi-

nary business and operations ; and many persons would be

deterred from accepting of many offices of trust under the govern-

ment, if they were held personally liable upon all their official

contracts. This principle not only applies to simple contracts, both

parol and written, but also to instruments under seal, which are

executed by agents of the government in their own name, and

purport to be made by them on behalf of the government ; for the

like presumption prevails in such cases, that the parties contract
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not personally, but merely officially, within the sphere of their

appropriate duties."

Chancellor Kent lays down the law to the like effect (2nd

Commentaries, p. 810, 7th ed.), "There is a distinction in the

books between public and private agents on the point of personal

responsibility. If an agent, on behalf of government, makes a

contract and describes himself as such, he is not personally bound,

even though the terms of the contract be such as might, in a case

of a private nature, involve him in a personal obligation. The

reason of the distinction is, that it is not to be presumed that a

public agent meant to bind himself individually for the govern-

ment, and the party who deals with him in that character is justly

supposed to rely upon the good faith and undoubted ability of the

government. But the agent in behalf of the public may still bind

himself by an express engagement, and the distinction terminates

in a question of evidence. The inquiry in all the cases is, to

whom was the credit, in the contemplation of the parties, intended

to be given. This is the general inference to be drawn from all

the cases, and it is expressly declared in some of them."

It is true these authors are speaking of persons acting as

agents for their own governments ; but the reasoning applies

equally to persons acting as agents for a foreign government, and

the same presumption must arise in both cases. Nor can we sup-

sumed, either that th e public agent means to bind himself personally in actin o- as a functi nary of the government, or, that the
party dealinO' with him in hi public cha racter, means to rely on
his individual responsibility.
n the contrary, the nati.aral presumption in such cases i that the contract was made upon the
credit and responsibility of the Gov rnm ent itself, as po essing
an ,entire ability to fulfil all its just contracts, far beyond that of
any private man, and that it is ready to fulfil them not only with
good faith, but with punctilious promptitude, and in a spirit of
liberal courtesy. Great public inconvenience would r·esult from a
different doctrine, considering the various public functionari es
which the government must employ in order to transact its ordinary business and operations; and many persons would be
deterred from accepting of many offices of trust under the government, if they were held personally liable upon all their official
contracts. This principle not only applies to simple contracts, both
parol and written, but also to instruments under seal, which are
executed by agents of the government in their own name, and
purport to be made by them on behalf of the government; for the
like presumption ·prevails in such cases, that the parties contract
not personally, but merely officially, within the sphere of th ei r
appropriate duties."
Chancellor Kent lays down the law to the like effect (2nd
Commentaries, p. 810, 7th ed.), "There is a distinction in the
books between public and private agents on the point of personal
responsibility. If an agent, on behalf of government, makes a
contract and describes himself as such, he is not personally bound,
even though the terms of the contract be such as might, in a ca e
of a private nature, involve him in a personal obligation. The
reason of the distinction is, that it is not to be presumed that a
public agent meant to bind himself individually for the government, and the party who deals with him in that character is justly
supposed to rely upon the good faith and undoubted ability of the
government. But the agent in behalf of the public may still bind
himself by an express engagement, and the distinction terminates
in a question of evidence. The inquiry in all the cases is, to
whom was the credit, in the contemplation of the parties, intend ed
to be given. This is the general inference to be drawn from all
the cases, and it is expressly declared in some of them."
It is true these authors are speaking of persons acting as
agents for their own governments; but the reasoning applies
equally to persons acting a agents for a foreign government. and
the same pre umption must arise in both ca es. Nor can we sup-
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pose that the persons taking this scrip did so otherwise than

through their faith in the honour of the foreign government, just

as they would have had to trust to it on their afterwards receiving

the bonds in lieu of the scrip. They would then be equally with-

out legal redress against the foreign government and must have

trusted to its honour in the fulfilment of its engagements.

We think it unnecessary to enter upon the question whether

the contract thus entered into is to be considered as a Russian or

an English contract, as we agree in thinking^ that its negotiable

character, if it exists at all, must depend^on what might be its

negotiability by the foreign law, but on now far the universal

usage of the monetary world has given it that character here.

"The question," says Tindal, C.J., in Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284,

at p. 293, "is not so much what is the usage in the country whence

the instrument comes, as in the country where it passed. The

substance of Mr. Benjamin's argument is, that, because the scrip

does not correspond with any of the forms of the securities for

money which have been hitherto held to be nogitiable by the law

merchant, and does not contain a direct promise to pay money,

but only a promise to give security for money, it is not a security
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to which, by the law merchant, the character of negotiability can

attach.

Having given the fullest consideration to this argument, we

are of opinion that it cannot prevail. It is founded on the view

that the law merchant thus referred to is fixed and stereotyped,

and incapable of being expanded and enlarged so as to meet the

wants and requirements of trade in the varying circumstances of

commerce. It is true that the law merchant is sometimes spoken

of as a fixed body of law, forming part of the common law, and as

it were coeval with it. But as a matter of legal history, this view

is altogether incorrect. The law merchant thus spoken of with

reference to bills of exchange and other negotiable securities,

though forming part of the general body of the lex mercatoria, is

of comparatively recent origin. It is neither more nor less than

the usages of merchants and traders in the different departments

of trade, ratified by the decisions of Courts of law, which, upon

such usages being proved before them, have adopted them as

settled law with a view to the interests of trade and the public

convenience, the Court proceeding herein on the well-known prin-

ciple of law that, with reference to transactions in the different

departments of trade, Courts of law, in giving effect to the con-

tracts and dealings of the parties, will assume that the latter have

dealt with one another on the footing of any custom or usage

pose that the per ons taking this scrip did so otherwise than
through th ir faith in the honour of th foreign gov rnment, ju t
a th y vrnuld have had to tru t to it on their afterward receiving
th bond in lieu of the scrip. Th y would then be equally without 1 gal r edr s again t th foreign government and mu t have
tru ted to its honour in the fulfilment of its ngagements.
\Ve think it unneces ary to enter upon the que tion whether
the contrad thus entered into is to be considered as a Ru ian or
an English contract, a we agree in thi12~i11~ that its negotiable
character, if it exi ts at all, must depen<fOri"' what might be its
n o-otiability by the foreign law, but on 1iow far the univer al
u age of the monetary world has given it that character here.
"The question," says Tindal, C.J., in Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284,
at p. 293, "is not so much what is the usao-e in the country whence
the instrument comes, as in the country where it passed. The
substance of Mr. Benjamin's argument is, that, because the scrip
doe not correspond with any of the forms of the securities for
money which have been hitherto held to be nogitiable by the law
merchant, and does not contain a direct promise to pay money,
but only a promise to give security for money, it is not a security
to which, by the law merchant, the character of negotiability can
attach.
Having given the fullest consideration to this argument, we
are of opinion that it cannot prevail. It is founded on the view
that the law merchant thus referred to is fixed and stereotyped,
and incapable of being expanded and enlarged so as to meet the
wants and requirements of trade in the varying circum tances of
commerce. It is true that the law merchant is sometimes poken
of a a fixed body of law, forming part of the common law, and as
it were coeval with it. But as a matter of legal history, thi view
is altogether incorrect. The law merchant thus spoken of with
reference to bills of exchange and other negotiable securitie ,
thouo-h formino- part of the general body of the lex mercatoria, is
of comparativ ly recent origin. It is neith r more nor le than
the u ages of merchants and traders in the different departments
of trad , ratifi d by the d cision of Courts of law, which, upon
such u ages b ing proved before them, have adopted them as
settled law with a view to the intere ts of trade and the public
convenience, the Court proc ding herein on th well-known principle of law that, with ref rence to tran actions in the different
departments of trade, Courts of law, in giving effect to the contracts and d aling of the partie , will assume that the latter have
dealt with one another on the footing of any custom or usage
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prevailing generally in the particular department. By this process,

what before was usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has

become engrafted upon, or incorporated into, the common law,

and may thus be said to form a part of it. "When a general usage

has been judicially ascertained and established," says Lord Camp-

bell, in Brandao v. Barnctt, 12 CI. & F., at p. 805, "it becomes a

part of the law merchant, which Courts of justice are bound to

know and recognise."

Bills of exchange are known to be of comparatively modern

origin, having been first brought into use, so far as is at present

known, by the Florentines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians

about the thirteenth, century. The use of them gradually found

its way into France, and, still later and but slowly, into England.

We find it stated in a law tract, by Mr. Macleod, entitled "Speci-

men of a Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange," printed, we

believe, as a report to the government, but which, from its

research and ability, deserves to be produced in a form calculated

to insure a wider circulation, that Richard Malynes, a London

merchant, who published a work called the Lex Mercatoria, in

1622, and who gives a full account of these bills as used by the
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merchants of Amsterdam, Hamburg, and other places, expressly

states that such bills were not used in England. There is reason

to think, however, that this is a mistake. Mr. Macleod shows that

promissory notes, payable to bearer, or to a man and his assigns,

were known in the time of Edward IV. Indeed, as early as the

statute of 3 Rich. 2, c. 3, bills of exchange are referred to as a

means of conveying money out of the realm, though not as a pro-

cess in use among English merchants. But the fact that a

London merchant writing expressly on the law merchant was

unaware of the use of bills of exchange in this country, shews

that that use at the time he wrote must have been limited.

According to Professor Story, who herein is, no doubt, perfectly

right, "the introduction and use of bills of exchange in England,"

as indeed it was everywhere else, "seems to have been founded

on the mere practice of merchants, and gradually to have acquired

the force of a custom." With the development of English com-

merce the use of these most convenient instruments of commer-

cial traffic would of course increase, yet, according to Mr. Chitty,

the earliest case on the subject to be found in the English books

is that of Martin v. Boure, Cro. Jac. 6, in the first James I. Up

to this time the practice of making these bills negotiable by

indorsement had been unknown, and the earlier bills are found

to be made payable to a man and his assigns, though in some

prevailing generally in the particular department. By this process,
what before was usage only, unsanctioned by legal decision, has
become engrafted upon, or incorporated into, the common law,
and may thus be said to form a part of it. "When a general usage
has been judicially ascertained and established," says Lord Campbell, in Brandao v. Barnett, 12 Cl. & F., at p. 8o5, "it becomes a
part of the law merchant, which Courts of justice are bound to
know and recognise."
Bills of exchange are known to be of comparatively modern
origin, having been fir t brought into use, so far as is at present
known, by the Florentines in the twelfth, and by the Venetians
about the thirteenth, century. The use of them gradually found
its way into France, and, still later and but slowly, into England.
We find it stated in a law tract, by Mr. Macleod, entitled "Specimen of a Digest of the Law of Bills of Exchange," printed, we
believe, as a report to the government, but which, from its
research and ability, deserves to be produced in a form calculated
to insure a wider circulation, that Richard Malynes, a London
merchant, who published a work called the Lex Mercatoria, in
1622, and who gives a full account of these bills as used by the
merchants of Amsterdam, Hamburg, and other places, expressly
states that such bills were not used in England. There is reason
to think, however, that this is a mistake. Mr. Macleod shows that
promissory notes, payable to bearer, or to a man and his assigns,
were known in the time of Edward IV. Indeed, as early as the
statute of 3 Rich. 2, c. 3, bills of exchange are referred to as a
means of conveying money out of the realm, though not as a process in use among English merchants. But the fact that a
London merchant writing expressly on the law merchant was
unaware of the use of bills of exchange in this country, shews
that that us·e at the time he wrote must have been limitfd.
According to Professor Story, who herein is, no doubt, perfectly
right, "the introduction and use of bills of exchange in England,"
as indeed it was everywhere else, "seems to have been founded
on the mere practice of merchants, and gradually to have acquired
the force of a custom." With the development of English commerce the use of these most convenient instruments of commercial traffic would of course increase, yet, according to Mr. Chitty,
the earliest case on the subject to be found in the English books
is that of Martin v. Boure, Cro. Jae. 6, in the first James I. Up
to this time the practice of making these bills negotiable by
indorsement had been unknown, and the earlier bills are found
to be made payable· to a man and hi a signs, though in some
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instances to bearer. But about this period, that is to say, at the

close of the sixteenth or the commencement of the seventeenth

century, the practice of making bills payable to order, and trans-

ferring them by indorsement, took its rise. Hartmann, in a very

learned work on Bills of Exchange, recently published in Ger-

many, states that the first known mention of the indorsement of

these instruments occurs in the Neapolitan Pragmatica of 1607.

Savary, cited by Mons. Nouguier, in his work "Des lettres de

change," had assigned to it a later date, namely 1620. From its

obvious convenience this practice speedily came into general use,

and, as part of the general custom of merchants, received the

sanction of our Courts. At first the use of bills of exchange

seems to have been confined to foreign bills between English and

foreign merchants. It was afterwards extended to domestic bills

between traders, and finally to bills of all persons, whether traders

or not: see Chitty on Bills, 8th ed., p. 13.

In the meantime, promissory notes had also come into use,

differing herein from bills of exchange that they were not drawn

upon a third party, but contained a simple promise to pay by the

maker,' resting, therefore, upon the security of the maker alone.
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They were at first made payable to bearer, but when the practice

of making bills of exchange payable to order, and making them

transferable by indorsement, had once become established, the

practice of making promissory notes payable to order, and of

transferring them by indorsement, as had been done with bills of

exchange, speedily prevailed. And for some time the courts of

law acted upon the usage with reference to promissory notes, as

well as with reference to bills of exchange.

In 1680, in the case of Sheldon v. Hentley, 2 Show. 160, an

action was brought on a note under seal by which the defendant

promised to pay to bearer 100/., and it was objected that the note

was void because not made payable to a specific person. But it

was said by the Court, "Traditio facit chartam loqui, and by the

delivery he (the maker) expounds the person before meant; as

when a merchant promises to pay to the bearer of the note, any-

one that brings the note shall be paid." Jones, J., said that "it

was the custom of merchants that made that good." In Brom-

wich v. Lloyd, 2 Lutw. 1582, the plaintiff declared upon the

custom of merchants in London, on a note for money payable on

demand, and recovered; and Treby, C.J., said that "bills of

exchange were originally between foreigners and merchants trad-

ing with the English ; afterwards, when such bills came to be

more frequent, then they were allowed between merchants trading

in tances to bearer. But about thi period, that is to say, at the
i ·teenth or the commencem nt of the eventeenth
clo e of th
c ntury, the practice of making bills payable to order, and tran £erring them by indor ement, took its ri . Hartmann, in a v ry
learned work on Bill of Exchange, recently publi hed in Germany, tate that the fir t known me'tltion of the indorsement of
the e in truments occur in the Neapolitan Pragmatica of 1607.
avary, cited by Mon . ouauier, in his work "Des lettre de
change," had a igned to it a later date, namely 1620. From it
obvious conveni nee this practice speedily came into general use,
and, as part of the general custom of merchants, rec ived the
anction of our Courts. At fir t the use of bills of exchange
eem to have been confined to foreign bills between English and
foreign merchants. It was afterward extended to dome tic bills
between traders, and finally to bill of all persons, whether traders
or not: ee Chitty on Bills, 8th ed., p. 13.
In the meantime, promis ory notes had also come into use,
differing herein from bills of exchange that they w re not drawn
upon a third party, but contained a simple promise to pay by the
maker; resting, therefore, upon the security of the maker alone.
They were at fir t made payable to bearer, but when the practice
of making bills of exchange payable to order, and making them
trans£ erable by ind or ement, had once become established, the
practice of making promissory notes payable to order, and of
transferring them by indorsement, as had been done with bills of
exchange, speedily prevailed. And for some time the courts of
law acted upon the usage with reference to promissory notes, as
well as with reference to bill of exchange.
In l68o, in the case of Sheldon v. H entley, 2 Show. 160, an
action was brought on a note under seal by which the defendant
promi ed to pay to bearer rnol., and it was objected that the note
wa void becau e not made payable to a specific per on. But it
wa said by the ourt, "Traditio facit chartam loqui, and by the
delivery he (the maker) expound the person before meant; a
when a merchant promise to pay to the bearer of the note, anyone that brings the note shall be paid." Jones, ]., said that "it
was the cu tom of merchants that mad that good.' In Bromwich v. Lloyd, 2 Lutw. 1582, the plaintiff declared upon the
cu tom of merchant in London, on a note for money payable on
demand, and recovered; and Treby, C.]., aid that "bill of
exchange were originally between foreigner and merchants trading with the Engli h; afterward , when uch bill came to be
more frequent, then they were allowed between merchant trading
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in England, and afterwards between any traders whatsoever, and

now between any persons, whether trading or not ; and, therefore,

the plaintiff need not allege any custom, for now those bills were

of that general use that upon an indebitatus assumpsit they may

be given in evidence upon the trial." To which Powell, J., added,

"On indebitatus assumpsit for money received to the use of the

plaintiff the bill may be left to the jury to determine whether it

was given for value received."

In Williams v. Williams, Carth. 269, where the plaintiff

brought his action as indorsee against the payee and indorser of

a promissory note, declaring on the custom of merchants, it was

objected on error, that the note having been made in London, the

custom, if any, should have been laid as the custom of London.

It was answered "that this custom of merchants was part of the

common law, and the Court would take notice of it ex officio;

and, therefore, it was needless to set forth the custom specially

in the declaration, but it was sufficient to say that such a person

secundum usum et consuetudinem mercatorum, drew the bill."

And the plaintiff had judgment.

Thus far the practice of merchants, traders, and others, of
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treating promissory notes, whether payable to order or bearer, on

the same footing as bills of exchange had received the sanction of

the Courts, but Holt having become Chief Justice, a somewhat

unseemly conflict arose between him and the merchants as to the

negotiability of promissory notes, whether payable to order or to

bearer, the Chief Justice taking what must now be admitted to

have been a narrow-minded view of the matter, setting his face

strongly against the negotiability of these instruments, contrary,

as we are told by authority, to the opinion of Westminster Hall,

and in a series of successive cases, persisting in holding them not

to be negotiable by indorsement or delivery. The inconvenience

to trade arising therefrom led to the passing of the statute of

3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, whereby promissory notes were made capable of

being assigned by indorsement, or made payable to bearer, and

such assignment was thus rendered valid beyond dispute or

difficulty.

It is obvious from the preamble of the statute, which merely

recites that "it had been held that such notes were not within the

custom of Merchants," that these decisions were not acceptable to

the profession or the country. Nor can there be much doubt that

by the usage prevalent amongst merchants, these notes had been

treated as securities negotiable by the customary method of assign-

ment as much as bills of exchange properly so called. The Stat-

in England, and afterwards between any traders whatsoever, and
now between any persons, whether trading or not; and, therefore,
the plaintiff need not allege any custom, for now tho e bills were
of that general use that upon an indebitatus assumpsit they may
be given in evidence upon the trial." To which Powell, J., added,
'On indebitatus assumpsit for money received to the use of the
plaintiff the bill may be left to the jury to determine whether it
was given for value received. " ·
In Williams v. Williams, Carth. 269, where the plaintiff
brought his action as indorsee against the payee and indorser of
a promissory note, declaring on the custom of merchants, it wa
objected on error, that the note having been made in London, the
custom, if any, should have been laid as the custom of London.
It was answered "that this custom of merchants was part of the
common law, and the Court would take notice of it ex officio;
and, therefore, it was needless to set forth the custom specially
in the declaration, but it was sufficient to say that such a person
ecundum usum et consuetudinem mercatorum, drew the bill."
And the plaintiff had judgment.
Thus far the practice of merchants, traders, and others, of
treating promissory notes, whether payable to order or bearer, on
the same footing as bills of exchange had received the sanction of
the Courts, but Holt having become Chief Justice, a somewhat
unseemly conflict arose between him and the ml=!rchants as to the
negotiability of promissory notes, whether payable to order or to
bearer, the Chief Justice taking what must now be admitted to
have been a narrow-minded view of the matter, setting his face
·strongly against the negotiability of these instruments, contrary,
as we are told by authority, to the opinion of Westminster Hall,
and in a series of successive cases, persisting in holding them not
to be negotiable by indorsement or delivery. The inconvenience
to trade arising therefrom led to the passing of the statute of
3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, whereby promissory notes were made capable of
being as igned by indorsement, or made payable to bearer, and
such assignment was thus rendered valid beyond dispute or
difficulty.
It is obvious from the preamble of the statute, which merely
recites that "it had been held that such notes were not within the
custom of Merchants," that these deci ions were not acceptable to
the profession or the country. Nor can there be much doubt that
by the usage prevalent among t merchant , these notes had been
treated as securities negotiable by the cu. tomary method of as ignment as much a bills of exchange properly so called. The Stat-
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ute of Anne may indeed, practically speaking, be looked upon

as a declaratory statute, confirming the decisions prior to the

time of Lord Holt.

We now arrive at an epoch when a new form of security for

money, namely, goldsmiths' or bankers' notes, came into general

use. Holding them to be part of the currency of the country, as

cash, Lord Mansfield and the Court of King's Bench had no diffi-

culty in holding, in Miller v. Race, i Burr. 452, that the property

in such a note passes, like that in cash, by delivery, and that a

party taking it bona fide, and for value, is consequently entitled

to hold it against a former owner from whom it has been stolen.

In like manner it was held, in Collins v. Martin, I B. & P.

648, that where bills indorsed in blank had been deposited with a

banker, to be received when due, and the latter had pledged them

with another banker as security for a loan, the owner could not

bring trover to recover them from the holder.

Both these decisions of course proceeded on the ground that

the property in the bank-note payable to bearer passed by deliv-

ery, that in the bill of exchange by indorsement in blank, provided

the acquisition had been made bona fide.
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A similar question arose in Wookey v. Pole, 4 B. & Aid. 1,

in respect of an exchequer bill, notoriously a security of modern

growth. These securities being made in favour of blank or order,

contained this clause, "If the blank is not filled up the bill will be

paid to bearer." Such an exchequer bill, having been placed,

without the blank being filled up, in the hands of the plaintiffs'

agent, had been depositd by him with the defendants, on a bona

fide advance of money. It was held by three judges of the

Queen's Bench, Bayley, J., dissentiente, that an exchequer bill

was a negotiable security, and judgment was therefore given for

the defendants. The judgment of Holroyd, J., goes fully into the

subject, pointing out the distinction between money and instru-

ments which are the representatives of money, and other forms

of property. "The Courts," he says, "have considered these

instruments, either promises or orders for the payment of money,

or instruments entitling the holder to a sum of money, as being

appendages to money, and following the nature of their principal."

After referring to the authorities, he proceeds: "These author-

ities shew, that not only money itself may pass, and the right to

it may arise, by currency alone, but further, that these mercantile

instruments, which entitle the bearer of them to money, may also

pass, and the right to them may arise, in like manner, by currency

or delivery. These decisions proceed upon the nature of the

ute of nne may ind d, pra ti ally p aking be looked upon
a a declaratory tatut , confirming the d ci ion prior to the
time of Lord I olt.
\Ve now arriv at an epoch \\1ohen a n w form of curity for
money, nam ly, gold mith ' or bank r ' not , cam into general
u e. Holding th m to be part of th e currency of the country, as
ca h, Lord Mansfi Id and the ourt of King's
nch had no difficulty in holding, in Miller v. Race) I urr. 452, that the property
in uch a note pa e , like that in cash, by deliv ry, and that a
party taking it bona fid e, and for value, i consequently entitled
t hold it against a form r owner from whom it ha b n tol n.
In lik manner it was held, in Collin s v. Martin, I B. & P.
648, that where bill indorsed in blank had been d p it d with a
banker, to be receiv d when due, and the latter had pledged them
with another bank r as curity for a loan , th e owner could not
bring trover to rec ver them from th holder.
Both the e deci ions of cour e proceeded on the ground that
the property in the bank-note payabl to b arer pa ed by delivery, that in the bill of exchang by inclorsement in blank, provided
the acquisition had been made bona fid e.
A imilar que tion arose in Wookey v. Pole1 4 B. & Ald. r,
in re pect of an exchequer bill, notoriously a security of modern
growth. These securitie being made in favour of blank or order,
contained this clau e, " If the blank is not filled up the bill will be
paid to bearer." Such an exchequer bill , having b en placed,
without th e blank being filled up, in the hands of th e plaintiff ~
agent, had b en d positd by him with the defendants, on a bona
of th e
fide advan ce of money. It was held by three jud
Queen'
ench, ayley J., di entiente, that an exchequer bill
\ a a negotiable ecurity, and judgment was therefo r g iven for
the defendants. The judgment of Holroyd, J., goe fully into the
ubj ct, pointing out the distinction betwe n money and in trument which are the r presentative of money, and other forms
of property. "The Courts," he say , "have considered the e
in truments, either promi es or orders for th paym nt of money,
or in trum nts entitling the holder to a sum of money, as being
appendages to mon y and following the nature of their principal."
After r f rring to the authoriti , he proceed : "The e authoritie sh w, that not only money itself may pass, and the right to
it may ari e, by currency alone, but forth r, that thes mercantile
instrum nt which entitle the bearer of th m to money, may al o
pa s and the right to them may ari e, in like manner, by currency
or delivery. The e d ci · ion proc ed upon the nature of the
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property (i. e., money), to which such instruments give the right,

and which is in itself current, and the effect of the instruments,

which either give to their holders, merely as such, a right to

receive the money, or specify them as the persons entitled to

receive it."

Another very remarkable instance of the efficacy of usage is

to be found in much more recent times. It is notorious that,

with the exception of the Bank of England, the system of banking

has recently undergone an entire change. Instead of the banker

issuing his own notes in return for the money of the customer

deposited with him, he gives credit in account to the depositor, and

leaves it to the latter to draw upon him, to bearer or order, by

what is now called a cheque. Upon this state of things the gen-

eral course of dealing between bankers and their customers has

attached incidents previously unknown, and these by the decisions

of the Courts have become fixed law. Thus, while an ordinary

drawee, although in possession of funds of the drawer, is not

bound to accept, unless by his own agreement or consent, the

banker, if he has funds, is bound to pay on presentation of a

cheque on demand. Even admission of funds is not sufficient to
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bind an ordinary drawee, while it is sufficient with a banker ; and

money deposited with a banker is not only money lent, but the

banker is bound to repay it when called for by the draft of the

customer (see Pott v. Clegg, 16 M. & W. 321). Besides this, a

custom has grown up among bankers themselves of marking

cheques as good for the purposes of clearance, by which they

become bound to one another.

Though not immediately to the present purpose, bills of lad-

ing may also be referred to as an instance of how general mer-

cantile usage may give effect to a writing which without it would

not have had that effect at common law. It is from mercantile

usage, as proved in evidence, and ratified by judicial decision in

the great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63, that the effi-

cacy of bills of lading to pass the property in goods is derived.

It thus appears that all these instruments which are said to

have derived their negotiability from the law merchant had their

origin, and that at no very remote period, in mercantile usage,

and were adopted into the law by our Courts as being in confor-

mity with the usages of trade ; of which, if it were needed, a

further confirmation might be found in the fact that, according

to the old form of declaring on bills of exchange, the declaration

always was founded on the custom of merchants.

Usage, adopted by the Courts, having been thus the origin

property ( i. e., money), to wh ich such in truments give the right,
and which is in itself current, and the ffect of the· instruments,
which either give to their holders, merely as such, a right to
receive the money, or specify them a the persons entitled to
receive it. "
Another very remarkable instance of the efficacy of usage is
to be found in much more recent times. It is notorious that,
with the exception of the Bank of England, the sy tern of banking
has recently undergone an ntire change. Instead of the banker
issuing his own notes in return for the money of the customer
deposited with him, he gives credit in account to the depositor, and
leaves it to the latter to draw upon him, to bearer or order, by
what is now called a cheque. Upon this state of things the general course of dealing between bankers and their customers has
attached incidents previously unknown, and these by the decisions
of the Courts have become fixed law. Thus, while an ordinary
drawee, although in possession of funds of the drawer, is not
bound to accept, unless by his own agreement or consent, the
banker, if he has fund s, is bound to pay on presentation of a
cheque on demand. Even admission of funds is not sufficient to
bind an ordinary drawee, while it is sufficient with a banker; and
money deposited with a banker is not only money lent, but the
banker is bound to repay it when called for by the draft of the
customer (see Pott v. Clegg, 16 M. & W. 321). Besides this, a
custom has grown up among bankers themselves of marking
cheques as good for the purpqses of clearance, by which they
become bound to one another.
Though not immediately to the present purpose, bills of lading may also be referred to as an instance of how general mercantile usage may give effect to a writing which without it would
not have had that effect at common law. It is from mercantile
usage, as proved in evidence, and ratified by judicial decision in
the great case of Lick barrow v. Mas on, 2 T. R. 63, that the efficacy of bills of lading to pass the property in goods is derived.
It thus appears that all these instruments which are said to
have derived their negotiability from the law merchant had th eir
origin, and that at no very remote period, in mercantile usage
and were adopted into the law by our Courts as being in conformity with the usages of trade ; of which , if it were needed a
further confirmation might be found in the fact that, according
to the old form of declaring on bills of exchange, the declaration
always was founded on the custom of merchants.
Usage, adopted by the Courts, having been thus the origin
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of the whole of the so-called law merchant as to negotiable secur-

ities, what is there to prevent our acting upon the principle acted

upon by our predecessors, and followed in the precedents they

have left to us? Why is it to be said that a new usage which has

sprung up under altered circumstances, is to be less admissible

than the usages of past times? Why is the door to be now shut

to the admission and adoption of usage in a matter altogether of

cognate character, as though the law had been finally stereotyped

and settled by some positive and peremptory enactment? It is

true that this scrip purports, on the face of it, to be a security not

for money, but for the delivery of a bond ; nevertheless we think

that substantially and in effect it is a security for money, which,

till the bond shall be delivered, stands in the place of that docu-

ment, which, when delivered, will be beyond doubt the represen-

tative of the sum it is intended to secure. Suppose the possible

case that the borrowing government, after receiving one or two

instalments, were to determine to proceed no further with its

loan, and to pay back to the lenders the amount they had already

advanced; the scrip with its receipts would be the security to the

holders for the amount. The usage of the money market has
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solved the question whether scrip should be considered security

for, and the representative of, money, by treating it as such.

The universality of a usage voluntarily adopted between buy-

ers and sellers is conclusive proof of its being in accordance with

public convenience; and there can be no doubt that by holding

this species of security to be incapable of being transferred by

delivery, and as requiring some more cumbrous method of assign-

ment, we should materially hamper the transactions of the money

market with respect to it, and cause great public inconvenience.

No doubt there is an evil arising from the facility of transfer by

delivery, namely, that it occasionally gives rise to the theft or

misappropriation of the security, to the loss of the true owner.

But this is an evil common to the whole body of negotiable securi-

ties. It is one which may be in a great degree prevented by pru-

dence and care. It is one which is counterbalanced by the general

convenience arising from facility of transfer, or the usage would

never have become general to make scrip available to bearer, and

to treat it as transferable by delivery. It is obvious that no injus-

tice is done to one who has been fraudulently dispossessed of

scrip through his own misplaced confidence, in holding that the

property in it has passed to a borfa fide holder for value, seeing

that he himself must have known that it purported on the face

of it to be available to bearer, and must be presumed to have been

f the '''hole of the o-called law merchant a to negotiable securitie , wha t i there to pr vent our acting upon the prim.: iple acted
upon by our predece sor , and followed in the prec dents they
ha e left to u ? W hy is it to be aid that a new u a e which has
prung up un de r altered circumstances, i to be less admissible
than the u a es of pa t times? Why is the door to be now hut
to the admi ion and adoption of u age in a matter altogether of
ognate character, a though the law had been finally tereotyped
a nd ettled by ome positive and peremptory enactment? It is
tru e that this crip purport , on the face of it, to be a ecurity not
for money, but for the deliv ry of a bond; nevertheles we think
that ub tantially and in effect it i a security for money, which,
till the bond hall be deliver ed, stands in the place of that document, which, when delivered, will be beyond doubt the representative of the um it is intended to secure. Suppose the possible
ca e that the borrowing gov rnment, after receiving one or two
in talm ents, were to determine to proceed no further with its
loan, and to pay back to the lenders the amount they had already
advanced; the crip with its receipts would be the security to the
hold rs for the amount. The u age of the money market has
olved the question whether scrip should be considered security
for, and the representative of, money, by treating it as such.
The universality of a u age voluntarily adopted between buyers and sellers i conclusive proof of its being in accordance with
public convenience; and there can be no doubt that by holding
this pecies of security to be incapable of being transferred by
delivery, and as requiring some more cumbrous method of assignment, we hould materially hamper the transactions of the money
market with respect to it, and cause great public inconvenience.
No doubt there is an evil arising from the facility of transfer by
delivery, namely, that it occasionally gives rise to the theft or
mi appropriation of the security, to the loss of the true owner.
But this is an evil common to the whole body of negotiable ecuritie . It i one which may be in a great degree prevented by prudence and care. It i one which is counterbalanced by the general
convenience ari ing from facility of transfer, or the u age would
never have becom o-eneral to make scrip available to bearer, and
t treat it as tran ferable by delivery. It i obviou that no injustice is done to one who ha been fraudulently di po sessed of
crip through his own misplaced confidence, in holding that the
property in it has passed to a bona fide holder for value, seeing
that he himself mu t have known that it purported on the face
of it to be available to bearer, and must be presumed to have been
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aware of the usage prevalent with respect to it in the market in

which he purchased it.

Lastly, it is to be observed that the tendency of the Courts,

except only in the time of Lord Holt, has been to give effect to

mercantile usage in respect to securities for money, and that

where legal difficulties have arisen, the legislature has been prompt

to give the necessary remedy, as in the case of promissory notes

and of the East India bonds.

The authorities relied on on the part of the plaintiff do not

appear to us materially to conflict with this view. In Glyn v.

Baker, 13 East. 509, which was an action to recover India Bonds,

and in which it w-as held that such bonds did not pass by delivery,

the bonds were not made payable to bearer, and there was a total

absence of proof that they passed by delivery, though it was

asserted by counsel in argument that when these bonds, which in

the first instance were made payable to the treasurer of the com-

pany, had been indorsed by him, they were afterwards negotiable

and passed by delivery from one to another. The inconvenience

which would have arisen from this decision was remedied by the

immediate passing of 51 Geo. 3, c. 64, by which bonds of the
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East India Company were made transferable by delivery.

The case of Partridge v. Governor and Company of the Bank

of England, 9 Q. B. 396; 15 L. J. Q. B. 395, and which, amongst

other things, turned on the negotiability of dividend warrants of

the Bank of England, is not, so far as that expression is concerned,

altogether satisfactory, as the decision turned also upon other

points. The bank were in the habit of paying dividends to those

entitled to them by warrants, and it was pleaded and proved that

by a usage of sixty years standing of the bankers and merchants

of London, these warrants, which are not made to bearer, were

nevertheless negotiable so soon as the party to whom they were

made payable had annexed to them the receipt which the bank

required before payment would be made. Such a warrant had

been obtained by an agent of the plaintiff authorized to receive

his dividends, and had been made over to the defendants for

good consideration, in fraud of the plaintiff, so far as the agent

was concerned, but without knowledge of such fraud on the part

of the defendants. The warrant had been delivered by the

defendants to the bank, with whom they had an account, to be

carried to their credit, and the amount had been entered to their

credit in the cash book of the defendants, but had not been carried

to their drawing account. The Court of Queen's Bench held

this proof of the custom to be a good defence. The Court of

aware of the u age prevalent with respect to it in the market in
which he purcha ed it.
Lastly, it is to be observed that the tendency of the Courts,
except only in the time of Lord Holt, has been to give effect to
mercantile u age in re pect to securities for money, and that
·where legal difficulties have arisen, the legi lature ha been prompt
to give the necessary remedy, as in the casf! of promissory notes
and of the East India bonds.
The authorities relied on on the part of the plaintiff do not
appear to us materially to conflict with this view. In Glyn v.
Baker, 13 Ea t. 509, which was an action to recover India Bonds,,
and in which it was held that such bonds did not pass by delivery,
the bonds were not made payable to bearer, and there was a total
absence of proof that they passed by delivery, though it was
asserted by counsel in argument that when these bonds, which in
the first in tance \\ere made payable to the treasurer of the company, had been indorsed by him, they were afterwards negotiable
and passed by delivery from one to another. The inconvenience
which would have arisen from this decision was remedied by the
immediate passing of 51 Geo. 3, c. 64, by which bonds of the
East India Company were made transferable by delivery.
The case of Partridge v. Governor and Company of the Bank
of England, 9 Q. B. 396; 15 L. J. Q. B. 395, and which, amongst
other things, turned on the negotiability of dividend warrants of
the Bank of England, is not, so far as that expression is concerned,
altogether satisfactory, as the decision turned al o upon other
points. The bank were in the habit of paying dividends to tho e
entitled to them b) warrants, and it was pleaded and proved that
by a usage of ixty years standing of the bankers and merchants
of London, these warrants, which are not made to bearer, were
nevertheless negotiable so soon as the party to whom they were
made payable had annexed to them the receipt which the bank
required before payment would be made. Such a warrant had
been obtained by an agent of the plaintiff authorized to receive
his dividends, and had been made over to the defendants for
good consideration, in fraud of the plaintiff, so far as the agent
was concerned, but without knowledge of such fraud on the part
of the defendants. The warrant had been delivered by the
defendants to the bank, with whom they had an account, to be
carried to their credit, and the amount had been entered to their
credit in the cash book of the defendants, but had not been carried
to their drawing account. The Court of Queen's Bench held
this proof of the custom to be a good defence. The Court of
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Exchequer Chamber reversed their judgment, on the ground,

among others, that the custom relied on was "rather a practice

of trade than a custom properly so-called, and that such a practice

could not alter the law according to which such an instrument con-

ferred no right of action on an assignee." We quite feel the force

of this distinction, though it is not quite so clear in what sense it

was here intended to be applied. Possibly what was meant was,

that the custom applied to the warrants of a particular company,

and therefore could not form the subject of any general mercan-

tile usage.

In Dixon v. Bovill, 3 Macq. 1, where the note was "to deliver

so much iron when required to the party lodging this document

with me," there was neither a promise to bearer, nor was there

any proof whatever of any usage whereby such notes were dealt

with as negotiable. The case has therefore, with reference to its

facts, no bearing on the present.

In Crouch v. The Credit Fonder of England, Law Rep. 8 Q.

B. 374, the defendants, a limited company, had issued bonds pay-

able to bearer, "subject to the conditions indorsed on this deben-

ture;" and by the conditions so indorsed the bonds were to be
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paid off by a certain number being drawn at stated periods; in

which respect, it may be observed, they bore a close resemblance

to the bonds of foreign governments when loans are thus raised

by way of bond. A bond thus made having been stolen from the

lawful owner, and having been purchased bona fide by the

plaintiff from the thief, was drawn for payment. The plaintiff

claimed payment, which was refused, whereupon the action was

brought. It was there held by three judges of the Court of

Queen's Bench that the plaintiff could not recover ; first, because,

even assuming that a promise to pay under seal could be con-

sidered a promissory note, here the conditions annexed to the

promise took away that character from the instrument. No evi-

dence had been offered at the trial as to whether these or similar

documents were in practice treated as negotiable, nor was any

expressed admission made as to the point ; but it was assumed,

from the report of the learned judge before whom the cause was

tried, that this had been tacitly admitted. But it was said that

these instruments having been only of recent introduction, it fol-

lowed that such custom, to whatever extent it had gone, must

also have been quite recent. Under these circumstances the Court

held that, while it was incompetent to the defendants, as an indi-

vidual company, to give to that which was not a negotiable instru-

ment at law the character of negotiability by making it payable to

Exchequer Chamber reversed their judgment, on the ground,
amona other , that the custom r lied on ' a "rather a practice
of trade than a custom properly so-called, and that such a practice
could not alter the law according to which uch an in trument conf rr d no right of action on an a ignee." We quite feel th force
of this di tinction, though it i not quik o clear in what en e it
wa here intend d to be applied. Possibly what wa meant wa ,
that the custom applied to the warrant of a particular company,
and therefore could not form the subject of any general mercantile u age.
In Dixon v. Bovill, 3 Macq. I, where the note was "to deliver
so much iron when required to the party lodging thi document
with me, ' there was neither a promi e to bearer, nor wa there
any proof what ver of any u age whereby such note were dealt
with a negotiable. The ca has therefore, with reference to its
fact , no bearing on the pre ent.
In Crouch v. The Credit Fancier of England, Law Rep. 8 Q.
B. 374, the def ndant , a limit d company, had i ued bonds payable to bearer, " ubject to the conditions indor ed on thi debenture;" and by the conditions so indorsed the bond were to be
paid off by a certain number being drawn at stated period ; in
which respect, it may be ob rved, they bore a clo e re emblance
to the bonds of foreign governments when loans are thus raised
by way of bond. A bond thu made having been stolen from the
la.wful owner, and having been purcha ed bona fide by the
plaintiff from the thief, was drawn for payment. The plaintiff
claimed payment, which wa refu ed, whereupon the action was
brought. It was there held by three judge of the Court of
Queen's Bench that the plaintiff could not recover; fir t, because,
even a urning that a promi e to pay under eal could be considered a promi ry note, here the conditi n annexed to the
promi e took away that character from th in trument. No vidence had been offered at the trial as to wh ther these or imilar
document w re in practice treated as negotiable, nor wa any
expre ed admi ion mad a to the point· but it wa a urn ed,
from the report of the learned judge before whom the cau e was
ut it wa aid that
tried, that this had been tacitly admitted.
the in trument having been only of recent introduction, it followed that such cu tom, to whatever extent it had gone, must
al o have been quite recent. Under these circumstances the Court
held that, while it wa incompetent to the def ndants, as an individual company, to ive to that which wa not a negotiable in trument at law the chai:acter of negotiability by making it payable to
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bearer, the custom could not have that effect, because, being

recent, it formed no part of the ancient law merchant. For the

reasons we have already given we cannot concur in thinking the

latter ground conclusive. While we quite agree that the greater

or less time during which a custom has existed may be material

in determining how far it has generally prevailed, we cannot think

that, if a usage is once shewn to be universal, it is the less entitled

to prevail because it may not have formed part of the law mer-

chant as previously recognised and adopted by the Courts. It is

obvious that such reasoning would have been fatal to the negotia-

bility of foreign bonds, which are of comparatively modern origin,

and yet, according to Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45, are to be

treated as negotiable. We think the judgment in Crouch v. The

Credit Fonder, Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 374, may well be supported on

the ground that in that case there was substantially no proof

whatever of general usage. We cannot concur in thinking that if

proof of general usage had been established, it would have been

a sufficient ground for refusing to give effect to it that it did not

form part of what is called "the ancient law merchant."

In addition to the cases we have already referred to, in which
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usage has been relied on as making mercantile instruments nego-

tiable, the case of Lang v. Smyth, 7 Bing. 284, was cited as shew-

ing that the question with reference to instruments of this descrip-

tion turns upon how far the particular instrument has by usage

acquired the quality of negotiability. The action had reference

to Neapolitan bonds with coupons attached to them, which latter

referred to a certificate. The plaintiff's agent being in possession

of the coupons belonging to the plaintiff, but not of the certificate,

fraudulently pledged the coupons with the defendant, who took

them bona fide. On an action by the plaintiff to recover the

amount received by the defendant on the coupons, Tindal, C.J.,

left it to the jury to say whether the coupons without the certifi-

cate "passed from hand to hand like money or bank notes," in

other words, "whether they had acquired, from the course of

dealing pursued in the City, the character of bank notes, bills of

exchange, dividend warrants, exchequer bills, or other instru-

ments which formed part of the currency of this country." The

jury, indeed, found in the negative, but it was held by the Court

of Common Pleas that the question had been rightly left to them.

If the usage had been found the other way, and the Court had

been satisfied with the verdict, it would no doubt have been

upheld.

We must by no means be understood as saying that mer-

cantile usage, however extensive, should be allowed to prevail if

bearer, the custom could not have that effect, because, being
recent, it formed no part of the ancient law merchant. For the
reasons we have already given we cannot concur in thinking the
latter ground conclusive. While we quite agree that the greater
or less time during which a custom has existed may be material
in determining how far it has generally prevailed, we cannot think
that, if a usage is once shewn to be universal, it is the less entitled
to prevail because it may not have formed part of the law merchant as previously recognised and adopted by the Courts. It is
obvious that such reasoning would have been fatal to the negotiability of foreign bonds, which are of comparatively modern origin,
and yet, according to Gorgier v. Mieville, 3 B. & C. 45, are to be
treated as negotiable. We think the judgment in Croitch v. The
Credit Fancier, Law Rep. 8 Q. B. 374, may well be supported on
the ground that in that case there was substantially no proof
whatever of general usage. We cannot concur in thinking that if
proof of general usage had been established, it would have been
a sufficient ground for refusing to give effect to it that it did not
form part of what is called "the ancient law merchant."
In addition to the cases we have already referred to, in which
usage has been relied on as making mercantile instruments negotiable, the case of Lang v. S myth, 7 Bing. 284, was cited as shewing that the question with reference to instruments of this description turns upon how far the particular instrument has by usage
acquired the quality of negotiability. The action had reference
to Neapolitan bonds with coupons attached to th em, which latter
r eferred to a certificate. The plaintiff's agent being in possession
of the coupons belonging to the plaintiff, but not of the certificate,
fraudulently pledged the coupons with the defendant, who took
them bona fide. On an action by the plaintiff to recover the
amount received by the defendant on the coupons, Tindal , C.J.,
left it to the jury to say whether the coupons without the certificate "passed from hand to hand like money or bank notes," in
other words, "whether they had acquired, from the course of
dealing pursued in the City, the character of bank notes, bills of
exchange, dividend warrants, exchequer bills, or other instruments which formed part of the currency of this country." The
jury, indeed, found in the negative, but it was held by the Court
of Common P~eas that the question had been rightly left to them.
If the usage had been found the other way, and the Court had
been satisfied with the verdict, it would no doubt have been
upheld.
We must by no means be understood as saying that mercantile usage, however extensive, shoul~ be allowed to prevail if
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contrary to positive law, including in the latter such usages as r

having been made the subject of legal decision, and having been

sanctioned and adopted by the Courts, have become, by such

adoption, part of the common law. To give effect to a usage

which involves a defiance or disregard of the law would be obvi-

ously contrary to a fundamental principle. And we quite agree

that this would apply quite as strongly to an attempt to set up a

new usage against one which has become settled and adopted by

the common law as to one in conflict with the more ancient rules of

the common law itself. Thus, it having been decided in the two

cases of More v. Manning, i Comyns' Rep. 311, and Acheson v.

Fountain, 1 Str. 557, that when a bill of exchange was indorsed

to A. B., without the words "or order," the bill was nevertheless

assignable by A. B., by further indorsement, Lord Mansfield and

the Court of King's Bench, in the case of Edic v. The East India

Company, 2 Burr. 1216, held that evidence of a contrary usage

was inadmissible. In like manner in Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr.

1516, where a cash note, payable to bearer, had been lost by

the owner, but had been taken by the plaintiff bona fide for value,

on an action on the note by the latter against the maker, Lord
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Mansfield having left it to the jury to say "whether such drafts

as this, when actually paid away in the course of trade dealing

and business, were negotiable or in fact and practice negotiable,"

and the jury, influenced no doubt by the natural desire to protect

the owner of the note, having found for the defendant, Lord

Mansfield and the Court here again set the verdict aside, on the

ground that, the law having been settled by former decisions that

notes payable to bearer passed by delivery to a bona fide holder,

the judge ought to have directed a verdict for the plaintiff.

If we could see our way to the conclusion that, in holding the

scrip in question to pass by delivery, and to be available to bearer,

we were giving effect to a usage incompatible either with the

common law or with the law merchant as incorporated into and

embodied in it, our decision would be a very different one from

that which we are about to pronounce. But so far from this

being the case, we are, on the contrary, in our opinion, only

acting on an established principle of that law in giving legal effect

to a usage, now become universal, to treat this form of security,

being on the face of it expressly made transferable to bearer, as

the representative of money, and as such, being made to bearer,

as assignable by delivery. This being the conclusion at which

we have arrived, the judgment of the Court of Exchequer will

be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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TITLE II.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, A CONTRACT.

Section I — In General.

Conine v. The Junction and Breakwater R. R. Co. (1866), 5

Houst. {Del.), 288, 89 Am. Dec. 230.

Action on the following instrument :

Gentlemen, — Eighteen months after date please pay to my

own order, six thousand nine hundred dollars, for value received,

TITLE II.

that being the amount which will be due from said State of Dela-

ware to the Junction and Breakwater Railroad Company, January

1 st, 1862, out of the semi-annual instalments, which will on that

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, A CONTRACT.

day, be due to said State from Richard France under the pro-

visions of the act of the General Assembly of said State, entitled

SECTION I-IN GENERAL.

"An Act for the encouragement of Internal Improvements in the

State of Delaware," passed at Dover, January 26th, 1859, and

your receipt indorsed hereon for the share of said corporation of

said instalment, shall be good against said Corporation.

Conine v. The Junction and Breakwater R. R. Co. ( 1866), 3
Houst. (Del.) , 288, 89 Am. Dec. 230.

H. W. McColley,

Treasurer of the Junction & Breakwater R. R. Co.

To Messrs. France, Broadbent & Co.,

Baltimore, Md.
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This instrument was indorsed by said company by the name

of H. W. McColley, Treasurer, and accepted upon the face

thereof thus: "Accepted, France, Broadbent & Co." The firm

of France, Broadbent & Co. was composed of Richard France,

Stephen Broadbent, Sr., Stephen Broadbent, Jr., and William C.

France. After acceptance the instrument was negotiated with

Stephen Broadbent, Sr., who afterwards indorsed and negotiated

the same with the said plaintiff. Afterward the said draft was

duly presented for payment in Baltimore and payment demanded

and refused, of which presentment, demand and refusal the

defendant had due notice. Further facts appear in the opinion.

Gilpin, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court. Con-

sidering the third ground of defence taken by the defendant as

Action on the following instrument :
GENTLEMEN,-Eighteen months after date please pay to my
own order, six thousand nine hundred dollars, for value received,
that being the amount which will be due from said State of Delaware to the Junction and Breakwater Railroad Company, January
1st, 1862, out of the semi-annual instalments, which will on that
day, be due to said State from Richard France under the provisions of the act of the General Assembly of said State, entitled
"An Act for the encouragement of Internal Improvements in the
State of Delaware," passed at Dover, January 26th, 1859, and
your receipt indorsed hereon for the share of said corporation of
said instalment, shall be good against said Corporation.
H. W. MCCOLLEY,
Treasurer of the Junction & Breakwater R. R. Co.
To MESSRS. FRANCE, BROADBENT & Co.,
Baltimore, Md.
This instrument was indorsed by said company by the name
of H. W. McColley, Treasurer, and accepted upon the face
thereof thus: "Accepted, France, Broadbent & Co." The firm
of France, Broadbent & Co. was composed of Richard France,
Stephen Broadbent, Sr., Stephen Broadbent, Jr., and William C.
France. After acceptance the instrument was negotiated with
Stephen Broadbent, Sr., who afterwards indorsed and negotiated
the same with the said plaintiff. Afterward the said draft was
duly presented for payment in Baltimore and payment demanded
and refused, of which presentment, demand and refusal the
defendant had due notice. Further facts appear in the opinion.
Gilpin, Chief !itstice, delivered the opinion of the Court. Considering the third ground of defence taken by the def end ant as
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fatal to the plaintiff's right to recover in this action, I do not pro-

pose to express any opinion on the question as to whether the

draft, which is the subject of controversy, was or not, according

to its terms and meaning, made payable out of a particular fund,

nor the other question as to the legal effect of the draft's having

been held by Stephen Broadbent, one of the acceptors as an

indorsee. Much has been said and well said on this point, but

for the reason just suggested, I do not deem it at all material to

pass upon them.

By agreement of the parties the original draft is made a part

of the case stated, and upon examination of the draft we find that

the corporate seal of the company is affixed or impressed upon the

paper upon the left of the signature of H. W. McColley, Treas-

urer of the Company. The usual terms indicating the affixing

of the seal, are not found at the end of the draft — they are

omitted altogether. If the case had been tried at the bar of the

Superior Court before a jury, the fact of, whether the seal had

been rightfully affixed to the draft, might have been controverted,

notwithstanding the well established legal presumption arising

from the presence of the corporate seal affixed to the instrument
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produced, that it was placed there by competent authority; the

rule being, that, when the common seal of a corporation appears

to be affixed to an instrument and the signature of a proper officer

is proved or admitted, the Court is bound to presume that the

officer did not exceed his authority, and the seal itself is prima

facie evi dence that i t was affixed by proper authority^ ; and the""

burden of showing that it is wrongfully there rests upon the party

objecting to it. Lovit v. The Steam Saiv Mill Association, 6 Paige

54. The President, Manager and Company of the Berks and

Dauphin Turnpike Road v. Myers, 6 Serg. & Rawle 12. Baptist

Church v. Mulford, 3 Halst. (N. J.) 183. The case of St. Mary's

Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 530. The proprietors of the Mill Dam

Foundry v. Hovey, 21 Pick. 417. Phillips v. Coffee, 17 Illinois

154. Johnson v. Crawley, 25 Ohio 316. Potter et al. v. Andros-

coggins & Kennebec R. R. Company, 37 Maine 316.

But in this case, the question as to whether the seal is right-

fully or wrongfully on the draft cannot be raised. For the parties

have made the seal itself, just as much as the body of the draft

or the signature of the Treasurer, a part of the case stated, with-

out suggesting the slightest doubt of it being there properly.

Indeed, it is alleged in the case stated that the draft, after it was

indorsed by H. W. McColley, Treasurer of the Junction and

Breakwater Railroad Company, was sent by a duly appointed

fatal to the plaintiff' ri ht to r cover in this action, I do not proany opinion on the qu stion a to whether the
p
to expr
draft, which is th ubject of controver y, wa or not, according
t it term and meaning mad payable out of a particular fund ,
nor the other que tion a to th 1 gal eff ct of the drafts havinrr
been held by tephen Broadb nt one of the acceptors a an
indor ee. l\Iuch ha been aid and well said on thi point, but
f r the rea on ju t urrge ted, I do not deem it at all material to
pa upon th m.
y aar ement of the parti the original draft i made a part
of the ca e tat d, an 1 upon examination of the draft we find that
the corporate eal of the company i affixed or impres ed upon the
paper upon the left of the ignature of H. W. McColley, Trea urer of the ompany. The u ual terms indicating the affixing
of the eal, are not found at the end of the draft-they are
omitted altogeth r. If the ca e had been tried at the bar of the
up rior ourt before a jury, the fact of, whether the seal had
been rightfully affixed to the draft, might have been controverted,
notwith tanding th well e tabli hed legal presumption ari ing
from the pr nee of the corporate seal affixed to the instrument
pr duced, that it was placed there by competent authority; the
rule being, that, when the common eal of a corporation app ar
t be affixed to an in trument and the signature of a proper officer
is proved or admitted, the ourt is bound to presume that the
fficer did not exceed hi authority, and the seal itself is prima
facie evidence that it was affixed by prop r authority; and the
burden of howino- that it i wrongfully there rests upon the party
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54. The President, Manager and Company of the Berks and
Dauphin Turnpike Roa:d v. J.V f yers, 6 erg. & Rawle 12. Baptist
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But in thi case, the questi n as to whether the seal is rightfully or wrongfully on the draft cannot be rais d. For the parties
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committee of said company to Baltimore for acceptance, and was

there accepted by France, Broadbent & Co. It passed from the

hands of the Treasurer to the committee, (of course with the

seal on it — for it does not appear that it ever afterwards returned

to the hands of the Treasurer) — was sent by them to Baltimore,

was accepted by the drawees, was negotiated by the company, and

is now produced by the plaintiff with the seal on it and made a

part of the case stated. All this amounts to an admission that

the seal was placed on the draft rightfully and not surreptitiously,

improperly or fraudulently. But aside from this admission, the

presence of the seal on the draft, in the absence of evidence or

statement impeaching its correctness, concludes the question here,

as to its having been affixed by proper authority.

The more approved mode of executing a deed by a corpora-

tion, is to conclude the instrument by saying "In testimony

whereof the common seal of the said corporation is hereunto

affixed." But this is not necessary to the validity of the instru-

ment. Nor is it necessary to name or refer to the seal at all.

Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey 21. Pick. 417. Godard's Case 5

Co. R. 5. Com. Dig. Fait a 2. 2 Serg. & Razvle R. 504. In the
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case of Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, the instrument concluded

in the words, "In witness whereof we have hereunto set our

hands ;" and the seal consisted of a wafer and a small bit of paper

stamped with a common desk seal of a merchant. And it was

contended that this was not the seal of the corporation, the words

of in testimonium being, "we have hereunto set our hands" merely.

But the Court thought otherwise, and decided that it was the

deed of the parties, declaring that it had been settled that words

indicating that the parties had affixed their seals, were not abso-

lutely necessary.

The question reserved for the decision of this Court is this :

whether the instrument of writing sued on and described as a

bill of Exchange, does in fact and in law constitute a valid bill

of exchange, so as to entitle the present indorsee and holder, Wil-

liam C. Conine, the plaintiff, to sue and recover upon it as such.

In other words, is it transferable by mere indorsement, so as to

entitle the holder by force of such indorsement, to maintain an

action upon it, in his own name.

At the common law, choses in action could not be assigned, \

so as to give the assignee a right of action in his own name. Bills \

of Exchange, however, have always constituted an exception to \

this rule.

The origin of the latter is involved in some obscurity. It

committee of said company to Baltimor for acceptance, and wa
there accepted by France, Broadbent & o. It passed from the
hands of the Treasurer to the committee, (of course with the
seal on it-for it doe not appear that it eve r afterwards returned
to the hands of the Treasurer )-was sent by them to Baltimore,
was accepted by the drawees, was negotiated by the company, and
is now produced by the plaintiff with the seal on it and made a
part of the case stated. All this amounts to an admission that
the seal was placed on the draft rightfully and not surreptitiously,
improperly or fraudulently. But aside from this admission, the
presence of the seal on the draft, in the absence of evidence or
statement impeaching its correctness, concludes the question here,
as to its having been affixed by proper authority.
The more approved mode of executing a deed by a corporation, is to conclude the instrument by saying "In testimony
whereof the common seal of the said corporation is hereunto
affixed." But this is not necessary to the validity of the instrument. Nor is it necessary to name or refer to the seal at all.
Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey 21. Pick. 417. Godard's Case 5
Co. R. 5. Com. Dig. Fait a 2. 2 Serg. & Rcnvle R. 504. In the
case of Mill Dam Foundry v. Hovey, the instrument concluded
in the words, "In witness whereof we have hereunto set our
hands;" and the seal consisted of a wafer and a small bit of paper
stamped with a common desk seal of a merchant. And it was
contended that this was not the seal of the corporation, the words
of in testimoniuni being, "we have hereunto set our hands" merely.
But the Court thought otherwise, and decided that it was the
deed of the par~ies, declaring that it had been settled that words
indicating that the parties had affixed their seals, were not absolutely necessary.
The question reserved for the decision of thi Court is this:
whether the instrument of writing sued on and described as a
bill of Exchange, does in fact and in law constitute a valid bill
of exchange, so as to entitle the present indorsee and holder, \!Villiam C. Conine, the plaintiff, to sue and recover upon it as such.
In other words, is it transferable by mere indorsement, so as to
entitle the holder by force of such indorsement, to maintain an
action upon it, in his own name.
At the common law, choses in action could not be assigned, \
so as to give the assignee a right of action in his own name. Bills
of Exchange, however, have always constituted an exception to
this rule.
The o rigin of the latter is involved in some obscurity. It

r

36

THE

EGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT,

A CONTRACT

36 The Negotiable Instrument, A Contract

is very questionable whether they were known to the nations of

antiquity. But whether they were invented by the Jews and

Lombards, (as some writers have supposed) during the thirteenth

century, and after their banishment, in order the more readily to

draw their effects out of France and England ; or by the Gibelins,

upon their expulsion from Italy by the Guelphs, in order to avoid

confiscation of their effects by their enemies, certain it is that we

find them to have been in use among the maritime and com-

mercial communities, inhabiting the shores of the Mediterranean

as early as the fourteenth century ; from which region, it is most

probable, they were introduced into England about the year 1381.

The facilities which they afforded for the safe transmission

of money, or values, from one country to another, soon brought

them into general use among merchants ; and the use of them

becoming an established custom, it is believed they received judi-

cial recognition at a very early day, although no authentic

decision in regard to the custom, can be found prior to the time

of James the First, 1603. The first case of which we have any

knowledge, is that of Marten v. Boure reported Cro. Jac. 6 — 7.

The declaration in the case, which is set out in the report,
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describes the cause of action as a bill of Exchange, "signed with

rtiis hand secundum usuin mercatorum." And from that day to

Uhis, no case can be found in the books, of a bill of exchange with

(a seal affixed to it.

The most solemn and authentic act, as matter of contract,

for finally and conclusively binding men to the observance of good

faith toward each other, known to the civil law, was called a

stipulation ; it was entered into before the civil magistrate upon

questions and answers, carefully propounded and taken in writing,

intended to explain the nature and character of the transaction,

and to show that there was no surprise, and that the contract of the

parties was their maturely considered and deliberate act. It could

only be impeached by fraud.

Deeds, by the common law, are strikingly analogous to the

ancient stipulation of the Civilians. The ancient forms and cere-

monies prescribed by the common law, for proper authentication

and establishment of a deed, were writing, sealing and delivery,

and if the parties were illiterate, also reading of the instrument,

all indicating a solemn and deliberate act, intended to be final and

conclusive between the parties. Sealing was an essential element

though signing was not.

Authentic history informs us, that seals come down to us

from the most remote antiquity, and were originally derived from

is very questionable whether they were known to the nations of
antiquity. But whether they were invented by the Jew and
Lombards, (as some writers have supposed) during the thirteenth
c ntury, and after their banishment, in order the more readily to
draw their effects out of France and England; or by the ibelins,
upon their expul ion from Italy by the Guelphs, in ord, r to avoid
confiscation of their effects by their enemies, certain it is that we
find them to have been in u e among the maritime and commercial communitie , inhabiting the shores of the Mediterranean
as early a the fourteenth century; from which region, it is mo t
probable, they were introduced into England about the year 138r.
The facilitie which they afforded for the safe tran mission
of money, or value , from one country to another, soon brought
them into general u e among merchants; and the use of them
becoming an established custom, it is believed they received judicial recognition at a very early day, although no authentic
deci ion in regard to the cu tom, can be found prior to the time
of Jame the Fir t, 16o3. The fir t case of which we have any
knowledge, is that of Marten v. Boure reported Cro. ]?-c. 6--7.
The declaration in the ca e, which is set out in the report,
de cribes the cause of action as a bill of Exchange, "signed with
i HA D secundum usuni mercatorum."
nd from that day to
his, no case can be found in the books, of a bill of exchange with
seal affixed to it.
The mo t solemn and authentic act, as matter of contract,
for finally and conclusively binding men to the observance of good
faith toward each other, known to the civil law, was called a
stipulation; it was entered into before the civil magistrate upon
questions and answers. carefully propounded and taken in writing,
intended to explain the nature and character of the transaction,
and to show that there was no surprise, and that the contract of the
parties wa their maturely considered and deliberate act. It could
only be impeached by fraud.
Deeds, by the common law, are trikingly analogou to the
ancient stipulation of the Civilians. The ancient forms and ceremonies prescribed by the common law for proper auth ntication
and establishment of a deed, were writing, sealing and delivery,,
and if the parties were illiterate, al reading of the in trument,
all indicating a solemn and deliberate act, intended to be final and
conclusive between the parties. Sealing wa an essential element
though igning was not.
Authentic history informs us, that seal come down to us
from the most remote antiquity, and were originally derived from
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the nations of the far East. The scriptures declare that the ''writ-

ing that is written in the King's name, and sealed with the King's

seal, can no man reverse." Writings under seal constituted part

of the formalities of a Jewish purchase of land. "And I bought

the field of Hanameel, and weighed him the money, and subscribed

the evidence and sealed it, and took witnesses." see Jeremiah,

chap. 32, 1 Kings, chap. 21, Esther, chap. 8. Daniel, chap. 8, 9.

Seals, however, did not come into general use in England

until after, or about the time of, the conquest ; indeed, prior to

that time, they were almost entirely unknown to our English

ancestors ; and, probably, the most ancient authentic sealed docu-

ment in England, is the charter granted by Edward the Confessor

to Westminister Abbey. A. D. 1017.

Deeds or sealed instruments, are not only of much higher

antiquity than bills of exchange, but they are of a totally different

origin. They cannot be said to be made secundum iisum merca-

toriim, since they find their recognition and validity in the more

ancient rules of the common law. On the other hand, bills of

exchange find their origin and sanction in the usage and custom

of merchants, the lex mercatoria, a particular or peculiar system,
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which, being in the interest of commerce, became at length gradu-

ally ingrafted into, and established as a part of the common law

itself. By. th e common law, contracts are distinguished into two

kinds, — contracts under seal , which are specialties, and contracts

not under seal , which are simple contracts. It can hardly be nec-

essary to say, that a bill of exchange is not a specialty, for no

contract, by that law, is held to be a specialty unless it be

under seal, or a matter of record. But notwithstanding a__bill_

of ex-change is only a simple contract, it nevertheless differs from

other simple contracts in two very important particulars, namely,

its negotiability, and its presumed valuable consideration . At

common law no chose in action was assignable, until bills of

exchange became by force of the custom of merchants, the excep-

tion to the general rule. Notes were made assignable in 1704 by

the statute 3 and 4 Anne. Bonds, and specialties , as well as notes,

are made assignable by our statute ; — the last by simple

indorsement, the two former " under hand and seal and before at

least two credible witn£ i£££,." Chap. 63, sec. 8. Revised statutes.

If a specialty had been assignable by mere indorsement, where

would have been the necessity for this statutory provision? The

distinction between a bill of exchange and a specialty, is found

noticed in almost all elementary works on contracts — Chitty on

Contracts 3. 4. Chitty on Bills 12. 13. Story on Bills, sec. 16.

the nations of the far East. The scriptures declare that the ' writing that is written in the King's name, and ealed with the King'
eal, can no man rever e." Writings under seal constituted part
of the formalities of a Jewish purchase of land. "And I bought
the field of Hanameel, and weighed him the money, and subscribed
the evidence and sealed it, and took witnesse ." see Jeremiah,
chap. 32, l Kings, chap. 21, Esther, chap. 8. Daniel, chap. 8, 9.
Seal , however, did not come into general use in England
until after, or about the time of, the conquest; indeed, prior to
that time, they were almost entirely unknown to our English
ancestors; and, probably, the most ancient authentic sealed document in England, is the charter granted by Edward the Confessor
to Westminister Abbey. A. D. ro17.
Deeds or ealed instruments, are not only of much higher
antiquity than bills of exchange, but they are of a totally different
origin. They cannot be said to be made secundum 'USum mercatoru1n, since they find their recognition and validity in the more
ancient rules of the common law. On the other hand, bills of
exchange find their origin and sanction in the usage and custom
of merchants, the le."C 11iercatoria, a particular or peculiar system,
which, being in the interest of commerce, became at length gradually ingrafted into, and e tablished as a part of the common law
itself. By the common law, contracts are distinguished into two
~,-contracts under seal, which are specialties, and contract
not under seal, which are simple contracts. It can hardly be nece sary to say, that a bill of exchange is not a specialty, for no
contract, by that law, is held to be a specialty unless it be
under eal, or a matter of record. But notwithstanding a bill
of excha nge is only a simple contract, it nevertheless differs from
other simple contracts in two very important particulars, namely,
its negotiability, and its presumed valuable consideration. At
common law no chose in action was assignable, until bills of
exchange became by force of the custom of merchants, the exception to the general rule. Notes were made assignable in 1704 by
the statute 3 and 4 Anne. Bonds and specialties, as well as notes,
are made assignable by our statute ;-the last by simple
indorsement, the two former "under hand and seal and before at
least two credible witnesses." Chap. 63 sec. 8. Revised statutes.
If a specialty had been assignable by mere indorsement, where
would have been the necessity for this statutory provision? The
di tinction between a bill of exchange and a specialty, is found
noticed in almost all elementary works on contracts-Chitty on
Contracts 3. 4. Chitty on Bills 12. 13. Story on Bills, sec. 16.
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2 Blac. Com. 465. 466. All contracts under seal are specialties,

sealing and delivery being the particular form and ceremony which

alter the nature and operation of the agreement. Forms, conse-

crated by time and usage, become substance. The seal is sub-

stance and changes the nature and operation of the contract. It

seems to me therefore, that the question which I have been con-

sidering, is settled upon principle against the plaintiff. But how-

ever this may be, it has been held as settled upon authority for

more than thirty years past.

In the case of Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239, it was con-

ceded by counsel on both sides, and by the court, Chancellor Kent,

then Chief Justice, presiding and delivering the opinion, that a

sealed note is not negotiable.

In the case of Clark v. The Farmers' Woolen Manufacturing

Company of Benton, 15 Wendell R. 256, it was held by the

Supreme Court of the State of New York, first, that a note for

the payment of money under seal, though in all other respects

like a promissory note, was not negotiable, and that an action

could not be obtained upon it in the name of a person to whom it

had been transferred ; secondly, that the effect of affixing the
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seal of a corpor ation to a contract, is the same as when a seal

is affixed to the contract of an individual ; it renders the instru-

ment a specialty.

I am not aware that this decision has ever been overruled, or

even doubted.

We are therefore of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled

to recover on this action. . k v

Section II — General Requisites.

THE INSTRUMENT MUST BE IN WRITING. §3 — I.

Thomas ct at. v. Bishop (1734), 2 Strange, 955.

The plaintiffs were indorsees of a bill of exchange drawn

from Scotland upon the defendant, in these words, "At thirty days

" sight pay to /. S. or order 200/. value received of him, and place

" the same to account of the York Buildings company, as per

"advice from Charles Mildmay. To Mr. Humphrey Bishop,

" cashier of the York Buildings company, at their house in Win-

" chester-street, London. Accepted 13 June 1732. per H. Bishop."

Blac. Com,. 465. 466. All contracts under seal are specialties,
ealing and delivery being the particular form and ceremony which
alt r the nature and operation of the agreement. Forms, conserated by time and u age, become ubstance. The seal i subtance and changes the nature and operation of the contract. It
seems to me therefore, that the question which I have been considering, i settled upon principle against the plaintiff. But howev r this may be, it has been held a ettled upon authorit for
more than thirty y ars pa t.
In the ca e of Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239, it was cone <led by coun el on b th ides, and by the court, Chancellor Kent,
then Chief Justice, presidinO' and delivering the opinion, that a
ealed note is not negotiable.
In the case of Clark v. The Farniers' Woolen Manufacturing
Company of Benton, rs \i\Tendell R. 256, it was held by the
Supreme Court of the State of Tew York, first, that a note for
the · payment of money under eal, though in all other respects
like a promissory note, was not negotiable, and that an action
could not be obtained upon it in the name of a person to whom it
had been transferred; secondly, that the effect of affixing the
seal of a corporation to a contract, is the same as \vhen a seal
is affixed to the contract of an individual; it renders the in trument a pecialty.
I am not aware that this decision has ever been overruled, or
even doubted.
We are therefore of opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover on this action.
2

This bill not being paid, an action was brought against the

SECTION II-GENERAL REQUISITES.
THE IN TRUME

T MUST BE I

Thomas ct al. v. Bishop ( r734),

WRITI
2

G.

§ 3-I.

Strange, 955.

The plaintiff were indor e of a bilI of exchange drawn
from Scotland upon the defendant, in the words, ' t thirty day
" ight pay to J. S. or order 2ool. value received of him, and place
"the same to account of the York Bitildings company, a per
"advice from Charles J.11ildmay. To Mr. Himiphrey B1'shop,
" ca hier of the York B?tildings company, at their hou e in Win" chester-street, London. ccepted 13 June 1732. per H. Bishop."
This bill not being paid, an action was brouO'ht against the
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Geary v. Physic 39

defendant upon his acceptance. And the defendant proved, that

the letter of advice was addressed to the company ; and that the

bill being brought to their house, he was ordered to accept it,

which he did in the same manner as he had accepted other bills.

But Mr. J. Page, who had tried the cause, directed the jury to

find for the plaintiff, which they did accordingly.

And now upon motion for a new trial, the court held, .that

the direction was right. For the bill on the face of it imports to

be drawn upon the defendant, and it is accepted by him generally,-

and not as servant to the company, to whose account he had no

right to charge it till actual payment by himself. And this being

an action by an indorsee, it would be of dangerous consequence

to trade, to admit of evidence arising from extrinsic circum-

stances, as the letter of advice. And they said, this differed widely

from the case of a bill addressed to the master, and under-wrote

by the servant ; where undoubtedly the servant would not be

liable; but his acceptance would be considered as the act of his

master. A bill of exchange is a contract by the custom of mer-

chants, and the whole of that contract must appear in writing.

Now here is nothing in writing to bind the company., nor can any
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action be maintained against them upon the bill ; for the addition

of cashier to the defendant's name is only to denote the person

with more certainty, and the York Buildings house is only to

inform the order, where the drawee is to be found ; and the direc-

tion whose account to place it to, is for the use of the drawee only.

And they compared it to the case in Carth. 5. 2 Ven. 307. where

a bill was drawn payable to Price, for the use of Calvert, and held

that the legal property was in Price, which is stronger than the

present case. They said it might be otherwise if the action had

been by /. 5". who was privy to the transaction, and it had

appeared he tendered the bill as a bill on the company. But this

plaintiff being a stranger, they could not consider those circum-

stances. The plaintiffs had their judgment.

Geary v. Physic {page 266).

rjkt^-t^i^-^- . ■ A - A -
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defendant upon his acceptance. And the defendant proved, that
the letter of advice was addressed to the company; and that the
bill being brought to their house, he was ordered to accept it,
which he did in the same manner as he had accepted other bills.
But Mr. J. Page, who had tried the cause, directed the jury to
find for the plaintiff, which they did accordingly.
And now upon motion for a new trial, the court held, .that
the direction was right. For the bill on the face of it imports to
be drawn upon the defendant, and it is accepted by him generally,and not as servant to the company, to whose account he had no
right to charge it till actual payment by himself. And this being
an action by an indorsee, it would be of dangerous consequence
to trade, to admit of evidence arising from extrinsic circumtances, as the letter of advice. And they said, this differed widely
from the case of a bill addres ed to the master, and under-wrote
by the ervant; where undoubtedly the servant would not be
liable,· but his acceptance would be considered as the act of his
master. A bill of exchange is a contract by the custom of merchants, and the whole of that contract must appear in writing.
Now here is nothing in writing to bind the company_, nor can any
action be maintained against them upon the bill; for the addition
of ca hier to the defendant's name is only to denote the person
with more certainty, and the York Buildings house is only to
inform the order, where the drawee is to be found; and the direction whose account to place it to, is for the use of the drawee only.
And they compared it to the case in Carth. 5. 2 Ven. 307. where
a bill was drawn payable to Price, for the use of Calvert, and held
that the legal property wa in Price, which is stronger than the
present case. They said it might be otherwise if the action had
been by J. S. who was privy to the transaction, and it had
appeared he tendered the bill as a bill on the company. But this
plaintiff being a stranger, they could not consider those circumtances. The plaintiffs had their judgment.

Geary v. Physic (page 266).

)
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the instrument must be signed. § 3 — i.

Reg. v. Harper, L. R., 7 Q. B. D. (1881), 78.

THE IN TRUMENT MUST

The following case was stated by Stephen, J : —

BE

IGNED.

§ 3-I.

John Harper was convicted of forgery before me at Durham

Reg. v. Harper L. R., 7 Q. B. D. (1881), 78.

assizes under the following circumstances: Messrs. Watson &

Son, of Kilmarnock, having supplied Harper with some machin-

ery, drew a bill upon him for the price, and forwarded it to him

for acceptance, unsigned by the drawers. It had been arranged

that Harper should procure the indorsement of a solvent person,

and should himself accept the bill. Harper returned it accepted

by himself, and purporting to be indorsed by one Hunt. It was

proved that Hunt's indorsement had been forged by Harper. On

getting the bill back, Watson & Son indorsed it and paid it into

the bank for collection when due. They did not at any time sign

it as drawers.

The following is a copy of the bill of exchange : —

" £22 10s. <\d. " Kilmarnock, 2 Nov. 1880.

" One month after date pay to me or order the sum of

£22 10s. \d., that being for value received in machinery.

"Indorsed, |£
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" Mr. J. Harper, " John Hunt.

" Contractor and Builder, " John Watson & Son.

" Rutland Street, Pallion,

"Sunderland."

Across the bill was written "Accepted payable at the Union

The following ca e wa tated by Stephen J : John Harper wa convicted of foro-ery before me at Durham
as izes under the followino- circum tance : Me r . . Wat on &
on, of Kilmarnock, having upplied Harper with some machinery, drew a bill upon him for the price, and forwarded it to him
for acceptance, un igned by the drawers. It had been arranged
that Harper hould procur the indor ement of a olvent person,
and hould himself accept the bill. Harper returned it accepted
by himself, and purporting to be indorsed by one Hunt. It was
proved that Hunt's indorsement had been forged by Harper. On
o-etting the bill back, Wat on & on indorsed it and paid it into
the bank for collection when due. They did not at any time sign
it as drawers.

Bank of London. John Harper."

The following is a copy of the bill of exchange:-

The indictment contained six counts, which charged Harper:

1. With feloniously forging a certain indorsement to and on

2. With feloniously forging an indorsement to and on a cer-

tain paper writing, which said paper writing is in the form of, and

purports to be, a bill of exchange, unsigned by any drawer

thereof.

3. Feloniously forging a crtain indorsement to and on a

certain paper writing.

In the 4th, 5th, and 6th counts he was charged with felon-

iously uttering the documents described in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

counts.

ros. 4d.
"KILMARNOCK, 2 Nov. 1880.
" One month after date pay to me or order the um of
ros. 4d., that being for value received in machinery.
' Indorsed, ,.. " '1 ) - - "MR. J. HARPER,
"JoHN Hu T. 0
"Contractor and Builder,
"]oHN W. TSON & SoN.
" Rutland Street, Pallion,
" underland."
" £22

a bill of exchange.

£22

Across the bill was written "Accepted payable at the Union
Bank of London. John Harper."
The indictment contained six counts, which charged Harper:
I.
With feloniou ly forging a certain indorsement to and on
a bill of exchange.
2.
With feloniou ly forging an indor ement to and on a certain paper writing, which said paper writing is in the form of, and
purport to be, a bill of exchano-e, un igned by any drawer
thereof.
3. Feloniou ly forging a crtain indor ement to and on a
certain paper writing.
In the 4th, 5th, and 6th counts he was charged with feloniously uttering the documents de cribed in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
counts.

41
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I was of opinion that all the counts were bad, except the ist

and 4th, but I left the whole matter to the jury.

The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and I sentenced

Harper to be imprisoned with hard labour for nine months, but

suspended the execution of the sentence till the decision of this case

by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

The question for the Court is, whether, under the circum-

stances stated, Harper was properly convicted of either of the

offences charged in the ist or 4th counts of the indictment, and

whether any of the other counts charge a felony ?

No counsel appeared upon either side.

Lord Coleridge, C.J. The conviction cannot be sustained.

The instrument was not a bill of exchange; it was an inchoate

bill of exchange. The point requires no authority, though it has

the authority of the cases of McCall v. Taylor, 34 L. J. (C.P.)

365 ; Stoessinger v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 3 E. & B. 549 ; Peto

v. Reynolds, 23 L. J. (Ex.) 98; 9 Ex. 410; 11 Ex. 418, and Rex

v. Pate man, Russ. & Ry. 455.

Stephen, J. Though I entirely agree with the opinion ex-

pressed by my Lord, I cannot help observing that the act of the
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prisoner had all the effect of a forgery punishable under the

statute as a felony; the prisoner could, however, have been

indicted, and ought to have been indicted, for forgery at common

law.

Grove, Hawkins, and Lopes, JJ., concurred.

Conviction quashed.

McCall v. Taylor, 34 L. J. R. C. P. (1865), 365.

Suit on an instrument in the words and figures following :

£300 Four months after date pay to my order the sum of

three hundred pounds for value received.

To Captain Taylor,

Ship Jasper.

There was no date to this instrument nor the signature of

any drawer ; but there was written across it by the defendant these

words : "Accepted, William Taylor."

The first count was against the defendant and as the accep-

I was of opinion that all the count were bad, xcept the 1st
and 4th, but I left the whole matter to the jury.
The jury return d a g neral verdict f guilty, and I sentenced
Harper to be impri oned with hard labour for nine months, but
uspended the execution of the sentence till the deci ion of this ca e
by the ourt for Crown a es e erved.
The question for the ourt is, whether, und r the circumtances stated, Harper wa properly convicted of either of thei
offences charged in the I t or 4th counts of the indictment, and
whether any of the other count charge a felony?
No counsel appeared upon either side.
LORD OLERIDGE C.J. The conviction cannot be sustained.
The instrument was not a bill of exchange; it was an inchoate
bill of exchange. The point requires no authority, though it has
the authority of the cases of McCall v. Taylor 34 L. J. (C.P.)
365; Stoessinger v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 3 E. & B. 549; Peto
v. Re3 1wlds 23 L. J. (Ex.) 98; 9 Ex. 410; I I Ex. 418, and Rex
v. Pa.teman, Russ. & Ry. 455.
STEPHE , J. Though I entirely agree with the opinion expressed by my Lord, I cannot help observing that the act of the
prisoner had all the effect of a forgery punishable under the
tatute a a felony; the prisoner could, however, have been
indicted, and ought to have been indicted, for forgery at common
law.
GROVE, HAWKINS, and LOPES, JJ. concurred.
Conviction qiiashed.
1

1

1

1

tion of a bill of exchange for £300. The second count was on

the same instrument as a promissory note, of which the defendant

McCall v. Taylor, 34 L. J. R. C. P. ( 1865), 365.
Suit on an in trument in the word and figures following:
£300 Four months after date pay to my order the sum of
three hundred pounds for value received.
To Captain Taylor,
Ship Jasper.
There was no date to thi in trument nor the signature of
any drawer· but there wa written aero it by the defendant these
words: "Accepted, William Taylor."
The first count wa against the defendant and as the acception of a bill of exchange for £300. The econd count wa on
the same instrument as a promissory note of which the defendant
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was alleged to be the maker. There were counts also for goods

sold and delivered and on an account stated.

Pleas to the first count — a traverse of the acceptance ; to the

second — a traverse of the making; and to the residue of the dec-

laration — never indebted.

The learned Judge was of opinion that the instrument

could not be declared on either as a bill of exchange or promissory

note, and a verdict was accordingly entered for the defendant ;

but leave was reserved to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict

on either the first or second counts, if the instrument could be

declared on as either a bill or note. A rule nisi to that effect having

been subsequently obtained by Hanncn, for the plaintiff, —

Day now shewed cause.

Hanncn and Lord, in support of the rule.

Erle, C.J. — I am of opinion that this rule should be dis-

charged. The declaration is on a bill of exchange, and also on

the same instrument described as a promissory note. The instru-

ment in question was in this form — [The learned Judge read it].

wa alleged to b the maker. Th r were counts al o for goods
old and deliv red and on an account tated.
1 a to the fir t count-a traver e of th ace ptance; to the
cond-a trav r e of the making; and to the re idu of the declaration-n v r indebted.
The learned J udg was of opinion that the instrument
ould not b declared on ither a a bill of exchan or promi ory
note, and a verdict \Vas accordingly entered for the defendant·
but leave ' a re erved to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict
on either the fir t or cond counts, if the in trument could be
declared on a ither a bill or note. A ru le nisi to that effect having
been subsequently obtained by Hannen, for the plaintiff,Day now hewed cause.

— It has no date and no drawer's name; but the defendant wrote

his acceptance across it ; and the question is, has the holder of
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such an instrument a right to declare on it either as a bill of

exchange or promissory note? It certainly is not a bill of

exchange, nor is it a promissory note ; and there has been no case

cited as an authority for its being considered as either a bill or a

note. It is, in fact, only an inchoate instrument , though capable

of being completed. Let the party who has the authority to make

it a complete instrument do so; but if he will not do this, he

cannot sue on it. The case of Stoessigcr v. the South-Eastern Rail-

way Company, 3 El. & B. 549; 23 Law J. (N. S.) (Ex.) O. B.

293, is directly in point. In the other cases which have been

referred to, where effect was given to the instrument, nothing

more had to be done to make the instrument complete ; and so

those cases are distinguishable from the present. The captain"

may possibly have given his acceptance for the necessaries sup-

plied to the ship, and the plaintiff may have had authority to put

his name as drawer ; but that should have been shewn by his L

doing so. As it is, he seeks to sue on it without putting his name

to it as drawer ; and it may be that the reason is, because he never J>

had authority to insert a drawer's name. It is, however, sufficient

for us to say that the instrument is inchoate and imperfect ; and |

therefore there is no ground for making this rule absolute. y

Willes, J., Byles, J., and Smith, J., concurred.

Rule discharged.

Hannen and Lord, in upport of the rule.
ERLE, .].-I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. Th declaration i on a bill of exchange, and al o on
the ame instrument de cribed as a promissory note. The instrument in que tion was in this form-[The learned Judge read it).
-It has no date and no drawer's name; but the cl fendant wrote
hi acceptance acros it; and the que tion is, ha the holder of
uch an in trument a right to declare on it eith r as a bill of
exchange or promissory note? It c rtainly i not a bill of
exchange, nor i it a promissory note; and there ha been no case
cited as an authority for its being con idered as either a bill or a
note. It is, in fact, only an inchoate instrument, though capable
of being completed. Let the party who has the authority to make
it a compl te instrument do so; but if he will not do thi , he
cannot sue on it. The case of Stoessiger v. the South-Eastern Rail'luay Company, 3 El. & . 549; 23 Law ]. (N. .) (Ex.) Q. B.
293, is directly in point. In th other case which have been
referred to, where effect was given to the in trument, nothing
mor had to be done to mak the in trument compl te ; and o
tho e case ar di tinguishable from th pre ent. The captain
may po sibly have giv n hi acceptanc for the n ce aries upplied to the hip, and th plaintiff may have had authority to put
hi name as draw r; but that should have be n hewn by hi / ,
cl ing o. A it i , he ek to u on it without puttino- his name ~
to it as draw r; and it may be that the r a on i b cau e he n ver
1
had authority to in ert a draw r's name. It i , however, ufficient
for u to ay that the instrument is inchoate and imperfect ; and
therefore there is no ground for rnakino- fhis rule absolute.
,,,}
WILLES, ]., BYLES, ]., and SMITH, ]., concurred.

Ride discharged.

White v. Cushing 43

MUST CONTAIN AN UNCONDITIONAL PROMISE OR ORDER. § 3 — 2.

White v. Cushing (1896), 88 Me. 339, 5/ Am. St. Rep. 402.

T. W. Vose, for plaintiff.

/. B. Peaks, for defendant.

Foster, J. The plaintiff sues as indorsee of an order signed

by the defendant of the following tenor :

"$120. Dover, Oct. 27th, 1893.

Piscataquis Savings Bank.

"Pay James Lawler, or order, one hundred and twenty dol-

lars, and charge to my account on book No. .

J. N. Cushing."

" Witness—

"The bank book of the depositor must accompany this order."

The order was indorsed in blank on the back by James

Lawler and Samuel Lewis, and the plaintiff claimed to recover

against the defendant as upon a negotiable instrument. The

real question presented is whether the instrument declared on

Js_ negotiable, so that an action may be maintained upon it in the

name of the indorsee.

To constitute a negotiable draft or order, it must be a written
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order from one party to another for the payment of a certain

sum of money, and that absolutely, and without any contingency

that would embarrass its circulation, to a third party or his order

or bearer.

It has often been held that a bill or note is not negotiable if

made payable out of a particular fund. But there is a distinc-

tion between such instruments made payable out of a particular

fund, and those that are simply chargeable to a particular account.

In the latter case, the payment is not made to depend upon the

adequacy of that fund, the only purpose being to inform the

drawee as to his means of reimbursement, and the negotiability

of the instrument is not affected by it.

The objection that is raised to the negotiability of this instru-

ment is, not that it is made payable out of a particular fund, but

that it is subject to such a contingency as necessarily embarrasses

its circulation and imposes a restraint upon its negotiability, by

means of these words contained upon the face of the order : "The

bank book of the depositor must accompany this order." Although

these words are upon the face of the order below the signature
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of the drawer, they were there at the time of its inception,

hecame a suhstantive part of it and qualified its terms as if they

had been inserted in the body of the instrument. Littlefield v.

Coombs, 71 Maine, no; dishing v. Field, 70 Maine, 50, 54;

Johnson v. Heagan, 23 Maine, 329; Barnard v. dishing, 4 Met-

of the drawer, they were there at the time of it inception,
b came a ub tantive part of it and qualifi d it term a if they
had been in erted in the body of th in trument. Littlefield v.
Coo mbs 71 faine, I IO· Cushing v. Field, 70 Maine, 50, 54;
Johnson v. Heagan 23 Maine, 329; Barnard v. Cushing 4 Metcalf, 230; Ii eyz ood v. Perrin IO ick. 228; Benedict v. Cowden
49 . Y. 39 ; Castelo v. Cro~ ell 127 Ma . 293, and cases there
cited.
\Vas the order negotiable? The answer to that depends upon
the effect of the word "The bank book of the depo itor must
accompany thi order." If not negotiable, the plaintiff a indor ee
can not maintain an action upon it.
oyes v. Gilman 65 Maine,
589. If their effect is uch as constitute a contingency in relation
to the payment of the order, dependent upon the production of the
drawer' bank book by the holder or indorsee of the order, then
they mu t be regarded a uch an embarra ment to the negotiation of the order, and uch a re triction upon its circulation for
commercial purpo e a to render it non-negotiable.
With ut the e word the order i payable absolutely, and
there is no apparent uncertainty affecting its negotiability. With
them, the order i payable only upon contingency, or condition,
and that i upon the production of the drawer's bank book. Thi
i rendered imperative from the language employed, and the bank
upon ·which the order i drawn, would have the right to insist upon
uch production of the book in compliance with the terms of the
order; and the ca e shows that it ha refused payment upon
presentation of the order for the reason that it was not accompanied by the bank book. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as
J?ayable ab olutely and without any contingency that would embarras it circulation. The drawer ha it in his power to defeat its
payment by withholding the bank book. Certainly the bank book
of the depo itor 1 within hi own control rather than that of the
indorsee of thi order.
It wa the nece ity of certainty and precision in mercantile
affair and the inconveniences which would result if commercial
~ was incumbered with condition and canting ncie , that led
to the e tabli hment of an inflexible rule that to be negotiable they
mu t be payable ab olutely and without any conditions or contingencie to embarrass their circulation. American Ex. Bank v.
Blanchard 7 Allen, 333. In that ca e the words, "subject to the
policy," being included in a promissory note, were held to render
the promi e conditional and not ab olute, and so the note was
1

calf, 230; Heywood v. Pcrrin, 10 Pick. 228; Benedict v. Cowden,

49 N. Y. 396; Costelo v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293, and cases there

cited.

1

1

1

Was the order negotiable ? The answer to that depends upon

the effect of the words "The bank book of the depositor must

accompany this order." If not negotiable, the plaintiff as indorsee

can not maintain an action upon it. Noyes v. Gilman, 65 Maine,

589. If their effect is such as constitute a contingency in relation

to the payment of the order, dependent upon the production of the

drawer's bank book by the holder or indorsee of the order, then

they must be regarded as such an embarrassment to the negotia-

tion of the order, and such a restriction upon its circulation for

commercial purposes as to render it non-negotiable.

Without these words the order is payable absolutely, and

there is no apparent uncertainty affecting its negotiability. With
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them, the order is payable only upon contingency, or condition,

and that is upon the production of the drawer's bank book. This

is rendered imperative from the language employed, and the bank

upon which the order is drawn, would have the right to insist upon

such production of the book in compliance with the terms of the

order; and the case shows that it has refused payment upon

presentation of the order for the reason that it was not accom-

panied by the bank book. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as

payable absolutely and without any contingency that would embar-

rass its circulation. The drawer has it in his power to defeat its

payment by withh old ing the bank book . Certainly the bank book

of the depositor is within his own control rather than that of the

indorsee of this order.

It was the necessity of certainty and precision in mercantile

affairs and the inconveniences which would result if commercial

paper was incumbered with conditions and contingencies, that led

to the establishment of an inflexible rule that to be negotia ble, they

must be payable absolutely and without any conditions or contin-

gencies to embarrass their circulation, American Ex. Bank v.

Blanchard, 7 Allen, 333. In that case the words, "subject to the

1 policy," being included in a promissory note, were held to render

the promise conditional and not absolute, and so the note was

1

1

1
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held not to be negotiable. Noyes v. Gilman, 65 Maine, 589, 591 ;

Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray, 170.

A case in every essential like the one we are considering was

before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1891. A fac simile

of the order is given in the opinion. No two cases could be

nearer alike. There, as here, the order was drawn on a savings

bank. The suit was by the indorsee against the drawer as in this

case. There, as here, the order contained a statement upon its

face, but below the signature of the drawer, that the "Deposit

book must be at bank before money can be paid." In discussing

the question of its negotiability cases are cited from the courts of

Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts and New York, as well as from

Pennsylvania. In the course of the opinion the court say: "It

sufficiently appears from the memoranda on its face that it was

drawn on a specially deposited fund held by the bank subject to

certain rules and regulations, in force between it and the depositor,

requiring certain things to be done before payment could be

required, viz: previous notice of depositor's intention to draw

upon the fund, return of the notice ticket with the order to pay,

and presentation of the deposit book at the bank, so that the pay-

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ment might be entered therein." * * * "It is, in substance, merely

an order on the dollar savings bank to pay J. W. Quinn, or order,

nine hundred dollars in nine weeks from date, or February 1,

1888, provided he or his transferee present to the bank, with the

order, the notice ticket, and also produce at and before the time

of payment the drawer's deposit book. As already remarked,

these are undoubtedly pre-requisites which restrain or qualify the

generality of the order to pay as contained in the body of the

instrument. They are also pre-requisites with which it may be

difficult, if not sometimes impossible, for the payee, transferee, or

holder of such an order to comply." Iron City Nat. Bank v.

McCord, 139 Pa. St. 52 (23 Am. State Rep. 166).

The order in question was drawn upon a savings bank, and it

is common knowledge that all such banks in this State have a

by-law which all depositors are required to subscribe to, that

"no money shall be paid to any person without the production

of the original book that such payment may be entered therein."

This court in the case of Sullivan v. Lcz^iston Inst, for Sav-

ings, 56 Maine, 507, has considered the purpose and necessity of

these salutary regulations. We should be slow to countenance

any departure from this rule needed for the protection of depos

itors in our savings banks now numbering more than 160,000, and

where deposits aggregate nearly $60,000,000.

held not to be negotiable.
oyes v. Gilman, 65 Maine, 589, 591;
Hubbard v. Mosely, I I Gray, 170.
A case in every ess ntial like th one we are consideri ng was
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face, but below the signature of the drawer, that the "Deposit
book mu t be at bank b for money can be paid." In discussing
the question of its negotiability cases are cited from the courts of
faine, ermont, Ma achu ett ·and New Yo rk, a well as from
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Inasmuch as this order is not negotiable and no suit can be

maintained upon it by the plaintiff as indorsee, it becomes

unnecessary to consider the other exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

SIGNING IN REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. § 22.

INDICATION OF A PARTICULAR FUND OUT OF WHICH REIMBURSE-

MENT IS TO BE MADE. § 5 — I.

Schmittler v. Simon (1886), 101 N. Y. 554, 34 Am. Rep. 737.

Wm. W. Jenks, for appellant.

Joseph B. Reilly, for respondent.

Ruger, Ch.J. The plaintiff claimed to recover as the holder

of a draft, drawn upon and accepted by the defendant, reading

as follows :

"New York, February 26, 1877.

"Mr. Adam Simon, executor, will please pay to Johannes

Schmittler or his order, on the first day of July, which will be

in the year 1879, the sum of $900, with seven per cent interest,

to be paid besides this amount yearly, July month, and charge the

amount against me and of my mother's estate.

"William J. Scharen."
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Written upon the face : "Accept, Adam Simon, "executor,"

and indorsed, "Pay to the order of Mary Schmittler, the amount

of note. "Johannes Schmittler."

Upon the trial, after proving the execution of the draft, its

acceptance and transfer, and offering to prove the payment of

a consideration by the plaintiff to the payee, which was objected

to by defendant, and excluded by the court, the plaintiff rested.

The defendant thereupon moved to nonsuit upon the ground that

the obligation was not binding upon the defendant personally,

but he was liable thereon, if at all, in his representative character

alone, and that it was payable out of a specific fund, and a recovery

thereon, could not be had without proving the existence and

extent of such fund. The court thereupon nonsuited the plaintiff,

to which decision she excepted. The General Term having

affirmed the determination of the trial court, the plaintiff took

this appeal.

SCHMlTTLER V.

I ION

47

SCHMITTLEK V. SlMON 47

We think the court below erred as to both of the grounds

upon which their judgment proceeded. That the defendant was

liable upon the draft, if liable at all , in his individual capacity

alone, seems under the authorities to admit of no doubt.

We think th

court below erred as to both of the ground
ed d. That th defendant wa
individual capacity

Neither executors nor administrators have power to bind the

estate represented by them thro ugh an executory contract, having

for its object the creation ofa new liability, not founded upon the

contract or 'obligation oTHf e testator or intestate . They take the

personal property as owners and have no principal behind them

for whom they can contract. The title vests in them for the

purposes of administration, and they must account as owners

to the persons ultimately entitled to distribution. In actions

upon contracts made by them, however they may describe them-

selves therein, they are personally liable, and in actions thereon

the judgment must be de bonis propriis. Not so, however, upon

contracts made by their testator or intestate ; in such case the

judgment is always de bonis tcstatoris. (Gillet v. Hutchinson's

Adm., 24 Wend. 184; Ferrin v. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315; Austin v.

Monroe, 47 id. 360, 366.)

The action here is exclusively upon the undertaking of the
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defendant, importing a promise to pay the sum of $900 on the

1st day of July, 1879, to the payee of the draft or his order for a

consideration received by the promisor. No facts are alleged or

proved, showing any liability on the part of the defendant's tes-

tator to the drawee of the draft, or any legal demand existing in

his favor, against the estate represented by the defendant.

It follows that the obligation must be held to be the indi-

vidual contract of the defendant, and enforceable as such by a

judgment against him, and execution to be levied de bonis pro-

priis, or it is nudum pactum creating no liability whatever.

The cases are very numerous to the effect that the addition

of an official character, to the signatures of executors and admin-

istrators, in executing written contracts and obligations has no

significance, and operates merely to identify the person and not

to limit or qualify the liability. Thus it was held in Finney v.

Administrators of Johnson (8 Wend. 500), that a bond given by

administrators in their representative capacity to a creditor for a

debt of their intestate, was the individual obligation of the admin-

istrators and enforceable against them de bonis propriis only;

that the description of the obligors in the bond as administrators,

and their promise in that character was surplusage, and they were

chargeable upon such a bond only In their personal capacity.

(See, also, Gould v. Ray, 13 Wend. 633.) Parsons on Bills and

vidual contract of the defendant, and enforceabl a uch by a
judgment ao·ain t him, and xecution to be levi d de bonis propriis1 or it i nitditm pactum creating no liability whatever.
The ca s ar very numerou t the effect that the addition
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Notes, vol. i, page 161, lays down the rule that "an administrator

or executor can only bind himself by his contracts ; he cannot bind

the assets of the deceased. Therefore, if he make, indorse or

accept negotiable paper, he will be held personally liable, even if

he adds to his own name the name of his office. Signing a note

for example, 'A. as executor of B.' for this will be deemed only

a part of his description or will be rejected as surplusage." To

similar effect are Pumpelly v. Phelps (40 N. Y. 59), Taft v.

Brewster (9 Johns. 334), Forster v. Fuller (6 Mass. 58), Hills

v. Banister (8 Cow. 31), Thatcher v. Dismore (5 Mass. 299),

Cornthzvaite v. First Nat. Bank (57 Ind. 268).

Being of the opinion, therefore, that the defendant is liable

upon the draft in question in his individual capacity alone, the

question still remains as to the extent of such liability. He

was undoubtedly competent to enter into a personal contract in

reference to the funds in his possession, and in such case would

be bound to perform according to the tenor and legal effect of

the obligation assumed by him, and entitled to be allowed the

amount paid upon an accounting, as executor. Such instruments

are subject to the rules of construction applicable to other con-
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tracts, and must be interpreted upon consideration of the language

used by the parties, with a view of arriving at their intention in

executing them. The court below held that the draft in question

was payable only from a particular fund, and was, therefore,

non-negotiable, and enforceable only to the extent of the fund

referred to.

Considering the question as we are compelled to do from the

language of the instrument alone, we are unable to agree to the

interpretation thus put upon it. It is not claimed that there is

any distinction between the instrument in question and an ordi-

nary bill of exchange except that made by the clause referring to

the mother's estate. Unless that clause deprives the paper of its

commercial character, the rights and liabilities of the parties

thereto must be governed by the rules pertaining to negotiable

securities, which would render the defendant liable for the amount

named in the draft, upon the theory that his acceptance was an

admission by him of assets applicable to its payment.

The distinction between a fund from which the draft or order

is directed to be paid, and one referred to as the means of reim-

bursement to its drawee, is a material one and cannot be disre-

garded in the construction of such instruments. Thus it is said:

' ' When a reference is made to a sp ecial_fund mere ly as a direc-

tion to the drawee how to reimburse himself, and the payment

Yol. l pa<Yc 161, lay down th rule that 'an admini trator
ut r can nly bind him If by hi contract ; he cannot bind
t of the d cea ed. Th r f r , if he mak indor e or
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is jiot made to depend up on the ad equacy of the fund, it will not

vitiate the bill. " (Edw. on Bills and Notes, § 158.) See, also,

Parsons on Merc. Law, 87; Chitty on Bills, 158. Dwight, Com.,

in Munger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 255, says: "A bill is an order

drawn by one person on another to pay a third a certain sum of

money absolutely and at all events. Under this definition the

order cannot be paid out of a particular fund, but must be drawn

on the general credit of the drawer, though it is no objection,

when so drawn, that a particular fund is specified from which

the drawee may reimburse himself." Judge Rapallo, in Brill v.

Tuttle (81 N. Y. 457), says: ''If a draft be drawn generally upon

the drawee, to be paid by him in the first instance, on the credit

of the drawer and without regard to the source from which the

money used for its payment is obtained, the designation by the

drawer of a particular fund, out of which the drawee is to sub-

sequently reimburse himself for such payment, or a particular

account to which it is to be charged, will not convert the draft

into an assignment of the fund, and the payee of the draft can

have no action thereon against the drawee unless he duly accepts."

In that case the drawee refused to accept and the action was
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sought to be maintained upon the theory of an equitable assign-

ment. It was held under the peculiar circumstances of the case,

and the form of the instrument, that it did transfer the fund.

It is thus seen that the m ere mention of a fund in a draft,

does not necessarily deprive it of the character of commer cial

pap er, but it must further appear in order to have that effe ct,

that it contains either an express or implied direction to pay it

therefrom, and not otherwise.

The question, therefore, to be determined here is, whether

the fund in question is referred to as the measure of liability or

the means of reimbursement. While the point is not free from

doubt, we think a reasonable construction of the draft favors

the conclusion that it is mentioned only as the source of reim-

bursement. No express language in it can be pointed out as

requiring its payment from the fund mentioned, and none from

which that requirement can be implied, except such as exists, in

all drafts where a fund is referred to . Its language is to "charge

the amount against me and of my mother's estate" and contains

no provision for delay until the amount is realized from the estate,

or for payment pro tanto in case the estate should prove insuffi-

cient to pay the whole amount. There is no language importing

a transfer of the fund to the payee, and nothing from which such

an intention can be inferred. The draft contains an absolute direc-

and
t
15 .)
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tion to pay a fixed sum, at a specified date, with interest. It

imports a present indebtedness of a sum named, from the drawee

to the payee, and an absolute direction to pay that sum at a fixed

date, subject to no contingency either as to time or amount. In

express language he directs the amount when paid to be charged

against him individually, and adds the words, plainly implying, as

we think, that the fund for the acceptor's reimbursement 'would

be found in an amount eventually, or immediately payable to the

drawer from his mother's estate.

We think, also, that the insertion of words expressly making

the paper negotiable, was quite significant a nd indicated an inten-

tion on the part of all parties, that it should be transferable, and

partake of the character of commercial paper. Any contingency

inferable from the language of the draft, making the amount pay-

able thereon indefinite and uncertain, would tend largely to depre-

ciate its value for such purpose, and defeat the intention with

which it was apparently made.

If the language of the paper could be considered at all

ambiguous, it was the duty of the defendant to li mit his liability

by apt words of accep tance when it was presented to him, but
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as it is, he has unqualifiedly promised to pay a fixed and definite

sum at a specified time, and we think, should be held to the con-

tract which other parties were authorized by his acceptance to

infer he intended to make. The case of Tasscy v. Church (4

Watts & Sergeant, 346) seems quite in point. The instrument

there read :

"$55548 Allegheny, 1st July, 1840.

"Please pay Church, McVay & Gordon $555.48 and charge

the estate of Thomas C. Patterson.

"Adam Flemming, Trustee."

"To John Tassey, Administrator.

Indorsed: "Accepted, John Tassey, Administrator."

Fleming was the trustee of Mrs. Patterson, who was the heir

at law of Thomas C. Patterson ; Tassey was the administrator of

Patterson's estate. It was held that the promise of the acceptor

was unconditional and bound him absolutely. In Childs v. Monins

tion to pay a fixed sum, at a specified date, with interest. It
imports a present indebtedness of a um named, from the drawee
to the payee, and an absolute direction to pay that sum at a fixed
date, subject to no contingency either as to time or amount. In
express language he directs the amount when paid to be charged
against him individually, and add the words, plainly implying, as
we think, that the fund for the acceptor's reimburs m nt would
be found in an amount eventually, or immediately payable to the
drawer from his mother's estate.
We think, also, that the in ertion of words expressly makin
the paper negotiable, was quite significant and indicate an intention on the part of all parties, that it should be transferable, and
partake of the character of commercial paper. Any contingency
inferable from the language of the draft, making the amount payable thereon ind finite and uncertain, would tend largely to depreciate its value for such purpose, and defeat the intention with
which it was apparently made.
If the language of the paper could be considered at all
ambiguous, it was the duty of the defendant to limit his liability
by apt words of acceptance when it was presented to him, but
as it is, he has unqualifiedly promised to pay a fixed and definite
sum at a specified time, and we think, should be held to the contract which other parties were authorized by his acceptance to
infer he intended to make. The case of Tassey v. Church (4
Watts & Sergeant, 346) seems quite in point. The instrument
there read:

(6 Eng. C. L. 228), the defendants, as executors of the estate of

Thomas Taylor, promised to pay £200 on demand with interest,

signing as executors. It was held that they became personally

liable, and that the plea of plcnc administravit was no defense. It

was further held that the promise to pay interest made the debt

that of the administrators personally. In Kelly v. Brooklyn (4

"$555-48
ALLEGHENY, !St July, 1840.
"Please pay Church, McVay & Gordon $555-48 and charge
the estate of Thomas C. Patterson.
"ADAM FLEMMING, Trustee."
"To JOHN TA EY, Administrator.
Indorsed: "Accepted, JOHN TASSEY, Administrator."
Fleming was the trustee of Mrs. Patterson, who was the heir
at law of Thomas C. Patterson; Tassey was the administrator of
Patterson's estate. It was held that the promise of the acceptor
was unconditional and bound him absolut ly. In Childs v. M onins
( 6 Eng. C. L. 22.8 ) , the defendants, as executors of the estate of
Thomas Taylor, promised to pay £200 on demand with interest,
. ignina as executors. It wa held that they became personally
liable, and that the plea of plene ad11iinistravit was no defense. It
was further held that the promi e to pay interest made the debt
that of the administrators personally. In Kelly v. Brooklyn ( 4
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Hill, 263), the action was upon an order drawn by the mayor

upon the treasurer of defendant in the following words: "Pay

Alexander Lyon or order $1,500 for award No. 7, and charge to

Bedford Road Assessment." It was held that it was a bill of

exchange and not payable from a particular fund. For further

illustration of the point under discussion we would refer to Hol-

listcr v. Hopkins (13 Hun. 210); Redmond v. Adams (51 Me.

429; Luff v. Pope (5 Hill, 413). The case of Tooker v. Arnoux

(76 N. Y. 397) is referred to by the respondent as sustaining the

views of the court below ; but we are of the opinion that it cannot

be so regarded. The order there directed the drawee to pay a

certain sum out "of the money to be realized from the sale" of

certain houses. This order was accepted, and it was held that a

sale of the houses was a condition precedent, to any liability on the

part of the acceptor. This was the plain language of the contract.

In all the cases examined by us where an order has been held

to operate as an equitable assignment of a fund, there were either

special phrases contained in the instrument, indicating an intent

to have it so operate, or ambiguous language used, which, con-

strued in the light of surrounding circumstances, justified the
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inference of a limitation of liability. (Parker v. Syracuse, 31

N. Y. 376; Alger v. Scott, 54 id. 14; Munger v. Shannon, 61 id.

251 ; Ehrichs v. DeMill, 75 id. 370; Brill v. Tuttle, supra.) Here,

however, there is no such language, and this contract is to pay a

fixed amount at a specified date, absolutely and unconditionally.

We are, therefore of the opinion that the instrument in ques-

tion is_a bill of exchange and rendered the p arties exec uting it

liable ab solutely for the amount stated therein.

The judgment of the courts below should be reversed and a

new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.

All concur.

Judgment reversed.

Hill, 263), the action was upon an order drawn by the mayor
upon th trea urer of def ndant in th f llowin word : " ay
l xand r Lyon or ord r $1,500 for award No. 7, and charge to
B dford Road A se m nt." It wa h Id that it was a bill f
exchange and not pa ya bl from a particular fund. ~o r furth er
illu tration of the point under di cu i n w would r f r to Ha/lister v. Hopkins ( 13 H un. 210); Red11iond v. Adams (51 M .
429; Luff v. Pope ( S Hill) 413) . The ca e of Toolur v. Arnoux
( 7 N. Y. 397) is referred to by the r pondent as su taining the
view of the court b 10\ ; but ' e are of the opinion that it cannot
be so regarded. Th order th re directed the drawee to pay a
certain um out 'of th mon y to be realized from the ale" of
certain hou . Thi order was accept d, and it was held that a
sale of th hou e wa a condition precedent, to any liability on the
part of the acceptor. This was the plain language of the contract.
In all th ca e examined by us where an order has been held
to operate as an equitable assignment of a fund, there were either
pecial phra e contained in the instrument, indicating an intent
to have it so operate, or ambiguous language used, which, contrued in the light of surrounding circumstances, ju tified th e
inference of a limitation of liability. (Parker v. Syracuse, 31
. Y. 376; Alger v. Scott, 54 id. 14; Munger v. Shannon, 6r id.
251; Ehrichs v. DeMill, 75 id. 370; Brill v. Tuttle, sitpra.) Her ,
however, there i no uch language, and this contract is to pay a
fixed amount at a specified date, absolutely and unconditionally.
W e are, therefore of the opinion that the in trument in gue tion is a bill of exchange and rendered the parties executing it
liable absolutely for the amount stated therein.
The judgment of the courts below hould be reversed and a
new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
All concur.

Judgment reversed.
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Casco Nat' I Bank v. Clark et al. (1893), 139 N. V. 307. § 22.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the second judicial department, entered upon an order

Casco Nat'l Bank v. Clark et al. (1893), 139 N. Y. 307.

§ zz.

made May 9, 1892, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plain-

tiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material,

are stated in the opinion.

Henry Daily, Jr., for appellant.

Edward B. Merrill, for respondent.

Gray, J. The action is upon a promissory note, in the

following form, viz. :

o

U

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the second judicial department, entered upon an order
made May 9, i8g2, which affirm d a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material,
are stated in the opinion.

o

Henry Daily, Jr., for appellant.
Edward B . NI errill, for respondent.

o

Brooklyn, N. Y., Aug. 2, 1890.

$7,500. Three months after date, we promise to

pay to the order of Clark & Chaplin Ice Company, seventy-

five hundred dollars at Mechanics' Bank : value received.

John Clark, Prest.

GRAY, J. The action is upon a promissory note, m the
following form, viz. :
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E. H. Close, Treas.

It was delivered in payment for ice sold by the payee com-

pany to the Ridgewood Ice Company, under a contract between

those companies, and was discounted by the plaintiff for the

payee, before its maturity. The appellants, Clark and Close,

appearing as makers upon the note, the one describing himself

as "Prest." and the other as "Treas.," were made individually

defendants. They defended on the ground that they had made

the note as officers of the Ridgewood Ice Company and did not

become personally liable thereby for the debt represented.

c
u

BROOKLYN, N. Y., Aug. z, 1890.
Three
months after date, we promise to
1
pay to the order of Clark & Chaplin Ice Company, seventyfive hundred dollars at Mechanics' Bank: value received .
JoHN CLARK, Prest.
E. H. CLOSE, Treas.

$7 500.

Where a negotiable promissory note has been given for the

payment of a debt contracted by a cor poration, and the language^

of the promise does not disclose the corporate obligation, and

the signatures to the paper are in the n ames of individuals, a

hold er, taking bona fide and w ithou t notice of the circumstances

of its making, is entitled to hold the note as the personal under-

taking of its signers, notwithstanding they affix to their names

th e title of an office.. Such an a ffix w ill be re garded as descrip-

tive of the persons and n ot of the c haracter of the liability . Unless"

the promise' purports to be by the corporation, it is that of the

persons who subscribe to it ; and the fact of adding to their

It was delivered in payment for ice sold by the payee company to the Ridgewood Ice Company, under a contract between
those companies, and was discounted by the plaintiff for the
payee, before its maturity. The appellants, Clark and Close,
appearing as makers upon the note, the one de cribing himself
as "Prest." and the other as "Treas.," were made individually
defendants. They defended on the ground that they had made
the note as officers of the Ridgewood Ice Company and did not
become personally liable thereby for the debt represented.
Where a negotiable promis ory note ha been given for the
pa ment of a debt contracted by a corporation, and the Ian ua e
of the promise does not disclo e t e corporate obligation, and
the si natures to the a er are in the names of in lividuals a
older, taking bona fide and wit out notice of the circumstances
of its making, is entitled to hold the note as the per onal undertaking of its igners, notwithstanding they affix to their names
the title of an office. Such an affix will be re arded as descriptive of the ~rsons and notof the charact r of the liabilit . Unless
the promise purports to be by the corporation, it is that of the
persons who subscribe to it; and the fact of adding to their
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names an abbreviation of some official title has no legal significa-

tion as qualifying their obligation, and imposes no obligation upon

the corporation whose officers they may be. This must be

regarded as the long and well-settled rule. (Byles on Bills, §§ 36,

yj, 71 ; Pentz v. Stanton, 10 Wend. 271 ; Taft v. Brewster, 9

Johns. 334; Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow. 31; Moss v. Livingston,

4 N. Y. 208; De Witt v. Walton, 9 id. 571 ; Bottomley v. Fisher,

I Hurlst. & Colt. 211.) It is founded in the general principle that

in a contract every material thing must be definitely expressed,

and not left to conjecture. Unless the language creates, or fairly

implies, the undertaking of the corporation, if the purpose is

equivocal, the obligation is that of its apparent makers.

It was said in Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 363, that

persons taking negotiable instruments are presumed to take them

on the credit of the parties whose names appear upon them, and

a person not a party cannot be charged, upon proof that the

ostensible party signed, or indorsed, as his agent. It may be per-

fectly true, if there is proof that the holder of negotiable paper

was aware, when he received it, of the facts and circumstances

connected with its making, and knew that it was intended and
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delivered as a corporate obligation only, that the persons signing

it in this manner could not be held individually liable. Such

knowledge might be imputable from the language of the paper,

in connection with other circumstances ; as in the case of Mott

v. Hicks, 1 Cowen, 513, where the note read, "the president and

directors promise to pay," and was subscribed by the defendant

as ''president." The court held that that was sufficient to dis-

tinguish the case from Taft v. Brewster, supra, and made it

evident that no personal engagement was entered into or intended.

Much stress was placed in that case upon the proof that the plain-

tiff was intimately acquainted with the transaction out of which

arose the giving of the corporate obligation.

In the case of the Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y.

312, referred to by the appellants' counsel, the action was against

the defendant to hold it as the indorser of a bill of exchange,

drawn to the order of "S. B. Stokes, Cas.," and indorsed in the

same words. The plaintiff bank was advised, at the time of dis-

counting the bill, by the president of the Patchin Bank, that

Stokes was its cashier, and that he had been directed to send it

in for discount, and Stokes forwarded it in an official way to the

plaintiff. It was held that the Patchin Bank was liable, because

the agency of the cashier in the matter was communicated to

the knowledge of the plaintiff as well as apparent.

nam an abbreviation of ome official title has no legal significano obligation upon
tion a qualifying th ir obligation, and impo
th
rporation who e officer th y may be. Thi mu t be
regard d a the long and well- ettl d rule. ( yl on ills, §§ 36,
37, 71; Pentz v. Stantou, ro W nd. 271; Taft v. Brewster, 9
J ohn . 334 · Hills v. Bannister,
w. 31 · Moss v. Livingston,
4 N. Y. 20 ; De Witt v. ~Valton, id. 571; Bottomley v. Fisher,
l Hurl t. & Colt. 21 I.)
It i founded in the general principl that
in a contract very mat rial thing must be d finitely expressed,
and not left to conj cture. U nle s the language creates, or fairly
implie , th undertaking of the corporation, if the purpose is
equivocal, the obliaation i that of it apparent makers.
It was said in Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 363, that
per on taking negotiabl in truments are presumed to take th m
on th e credit of the parties whose names appear upon them, and
a per on not a party cannot be charged, upon proof that the
o ten ible party sign d, or indor ed, as hi agent. It may be perfectly true, if there i proof that the holder of negotiable paper
was aware, when he received it, of the facts and circumstances
connected with its making, and knew that it was intended and
delivered as a corporate obligation only, that the persons signing
it in thi manner could not be held individually liable.
uch
knO\ ledge miaht be imputable from the language of the paper,
in connection with other circumstance ; as in the case of Mott
v. Hicks, l owen, 513, where the note read, 'the president and
director promi e to pay," and wa sub cribed by the defendant
a
president." The court held that that was sufficient to di tingui h the case from Taft v. Brewster, s?tpra, and made it
evident that no personal enga ement wa entered into or intended.
Much tre wa plac d in that ca e upon the proof that the plaintiff wa intimately acquaint d with th transaction out of which
aro e the aivina of th corporate obliaation.
In the ca e of th Bank of Genesee v. Patchin Bank, 19 N. Y.
312, referred to by th appellant ' coun el, the action ' a aaain t
the d fendant to hold it a the ind r er of a bill of exchano- .
drawn to the ord r of " .
toke
a . ' an indor d in the
ame word . The plaintiff bank wa advi ed at th tim of di countino- th bill, by th pre id nt of th Patchin ank, that
Stoke wa it ca hier and that h had been dir ted to end it
in for di count, and toke forward d it in an official ' a to the
plaintiff. It was held that the atchin ank ' a liable, becau e
the ao- ncy of the ca hi r in th matter wa
ommunicated to
the knowl dge of th plaintiff a w 11 a apparent.
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GENERAL REQUISITES OF THE

ONTRACT

Incidentally, it was said that the same strictness is not

required in the execution of commercia l paper as bet ween banks,

that is, in other respects, between Individuals.

In the absence of competent evidence showing or charging

knowledge in the holder of negotiable paper as to the character

of the obligation, the establised and safe rule must be regarded

to be that it is the agreement of its ostensible maker and not of

some other party, neither disclosed by the language, nor in the

manner of execution. In this case the language is "we promise

to pay," and the signatures by the defendants Clark and Close

are perfectly consistent with an assumption by them of the com-

pany's debt.

The appearance upon the margin of the paper of the printed

name "Ridgewood Ice Company" was not a fact carrying any

presumption that the note was, or was intended to be, one by

that company .

It was competent for its officers to obligate themselves per-

sonally, for any reason satisfactory to themselves, and, apparently

to the world, they did so by the language of the note ; which the

mere use of a blank form of note, having upon its margin the
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name of their company, was insufficient to negative.

In order to obviate the effect of the rule we have discussed,

the appellants proved that Winslow, a director of the payee com-

pany, was also a director in the plaintiff bank, at the time when

the note was discounted, and it was argued that the knowledge

chargeable to him, as director of the former company, was

imputable to the plaintiff. But that fact is insufficient to charge

the plaintiff with knowledge of the character of the obligation.

He in no sense represented, or acted for the bank in the transac-

tion, and whatever his knowledge respecting the note, it will not

be imputable to the bank. (National Bank v. Norton, i Hill, 572,

578; Mayor, etc., v. Tenth National Bank, in N. Y. 446, 457;

Farmers', etc., Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444.) He was but one

of the plaintiffs' directors, who could only act as a board.

(National Bank v. Norton, supra.) If he knew the fact that these

were not individual but corporate notes, we cannot presume that

he communicated that knowledge to the board. An officer's

knowledge, derived as an individual, and not while acting

officially for the bank, cannot operate to the prejudice of the

latter. (Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 451.) The knowledge with

which the bank as his principal would be deemed chargeable, so

as to affect it, would be where, as one of the board of directors

and participating in the discount of the paper, he had acted

Incidentally, it was said that the ame strictness is not
required in the execution of commercial paper as between banks,
that is, in other respects, between individuals.
In the absence of competent evidence showing or charging
knowledge in the holder of negotiable paper as to the character
of the obligation, the establi ed and saf rule must be regarded
to be that it i the agreement of its o tensible maker and not of
ome other party, neither disclosed by the language, nor in the
manner of execution. In this case the language is "we promise
to pay," and the signatures by the defendants Clark and Close
are perfectly consistent with an assumption by them of the company's debt.
The appearanc~ upon the margin of the paper of the 12rinted
~e "Ridgewood Ice Company" was not a fact carrying any
Eresumption that the note was, or was intended to pe, one .fil'
that company.
It was competent for its officers to obligate themselves peronally, for any rea on satisfactory to themselves, and, apparently
to the world, they did so by the language of the note; which the
mere use of a blank form of note, having upon its margin the
name of their company, was insufficient to negative.
In order to obviate the effect of the rule we have discussedr
the appellants proved that Winslow, a director of the payee company, was also a director in the plaintiff bank, at the time when
the note was discounted, and it was argued that the knowledge
chargeable to him, as director of the former company, was
imputable to the plaintiff. But that fact is insufficient to charge
the plaintiff with knowledge of the character of the obligation.
He in no sense represented, or acted for the bank in the transaction, and whatever his knowledge respecting the note, it will not
be imputable to the bank. (National Bank v. Norton, I Hill, 572,
578; Mayor, etc., v. Tenth National Bank, I I I N. Y. 446, 457;
Farmers', etc., Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444.) He was but one
of the plaintiffs' directors, who could only act as a board.
(National Bank v. Norton, siipra.) If h knew the fact that these
were not individual but corporate note , we cannot pre ume that
he communicated that knowledge to the board. An officer's
knowledge, derived as an individual, and not while acting
officially for the bank, cannot operate to the prejudice of the
latter. (Bank of U.S. v. Davis, 2 Hill, 45i.) The knowledge with
which the bank as his principal would be deemed chargeable, so
as to affect it, would be where, as one of the board of directors
and participating in the discount of th paper, he had acted
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affirmatively, or fraudulently, with respect to it; as in the case

of Bank v. Dazns (supra), by a fraudulent perversion of the bills

from the object for which drawn ; or as in H olden v. New York

& Erie Bank (72 N. Y. 286), where the president of the bank, who

represented it in all the transactions, was engaged in a fraudulent

scheme of conversion. It was said in the latter case that the

knowledge of the president, as an individual or as an executor,

was not imputable to the bank merely because he was the pres-

ident, but because, when it acted through him as president, in

any transaction where that knowledge was material and appli-

cable, it acted through an agent.

The rule may be stated, generally, to be that where a direc-

tor or an officer has knowledge of material facts respecting a

proposed transaction, which his relations to it, as representing

the bank, have given him, then, as it becomes his official duty to

communicat e that knowledge to the bank, he will be presumed 1

to have done so , and his knowledge will then be imputed to the)

bank. But no such duty can be deemed to have existed in this

case, where the appellants have made and delivered a promissory

note, purporting to be their individual promise. If one of the
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plaintiff's officers did have knowledge, whether individually or

as a director of the Clark & Chaplin Company is not material,

that the paper was made and intended as a corporate note, his

failure to so state to the bank could not prejudice it. It was in

no sense incumbent upon him, assuming that he actually partici-

pated in the discount (a fact not shown), to explain that the note

was the obligation of the Ridgewood Company and not of the

persons who appeared as its makers. He was under no duty to

these persons to explain their acts, and the law would not imply

any. At most, it would be merely a case of knowledge, acquired

by a director, of facts not material to the transaction of discount

by the plaintiff, and which he was under no obligation to com-

municate. No other questions require discussion, and the judg-

ment rendered below should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

affirmatively, or fraudulently, with r pect to it; as in the case
of Bank v. Davis (supra), by a fraudulent perversion of the bills
from th object for which drawn; or as in Holden v. New York
& Erie Bank (72 N. Y. 286), where the president f th bank, who
repre ented it in all the transactions, was ngaged in a fraudulent
cheme of conversion. It was aid in the latter ca e that the
knowledge of the president, as an individual or a an executor,
was not imputable to th bank merely because he was the president, but because, when it acted through him as president, in
any tran action where that knowledge was material and applicable, it acted through an agent.
The rule may be tated, generally, to be that where a director or an officer has knowledge of material facts respecting a
proposed tran action, which his relations to it, as representing
the bank, have given him, then, as it becomes his official duty to
communicate that knowled e to the bank he will be presumea
to have one so, and hi knowledge will then be imputed to t e
bank. But no such duty can be deemed to have existed in thi
case, where the appellants have made and delivered a promisso
note, purporting to be their individual promise. If one of the
plaintiff's officers did have knowledge, whether individually or
as a director of the Clark & Chaplin Company is not material,
that the paper was made and intended as a corporate note, hi
failure to o state to the bank could not prejudioe it. It was in
no en e incumbent upon him, as urning that he actually participated in th discount (a fact not shown), to explain that the note
' as the obligation of the Ridgewood Company and not of the
person who appeared a it maker . He ' as under no duty to
these per on to explain their acts, and the law would not imply
any. At most, it would be mer ly a ca e of knowledge, acquired
by a director, of facts n t material to the transaction of discount
by the plaintiff, and which he wa under no obligation to communicate.
o other qu tion require di cu ion, and the judO'ment r nd red below should be affirmed with co t .
All concur.
Judgment amrmed.
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Miinger v. Shannon (1874), 61 N. Y. 251. § 5 — 1.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the fourth judicial department, affirming a judgment

Mmiger v. Shannon (1874), 61 N. Y. 251.

§ 5-r.

and order of Special Term, granted upon summary application

for judgment against defendant.

The complaint alleged in substance that Livonia A. Gulick,

on the 31st day of December, 1868, at Starkey, Yates county,

made her promissory note, by which, for value received, she

promised to pay to her own order $2,000, three months after

date, at the Central National Bank in the city of New York.

There were additional allegations to the effect that the note was

indorsed by Nathan Randall and Herrick Munger, and thereupon

discounted and held by Wilkin & Hair, bankers, at Dundee, in

the same county. That on the 26th day of January, 1869, and

before the note came due, L. A. Gulick, by her agent, made her

bill of exchange, addressed to the defendant, as follows : "Mr A

Harrison Shannon. You will please" pay to Messrs. Wilkin &

Hair the amount of a note for $2,000, dated December 31st, 1868, Q

and deduct the same from my share of the profits of our partner-

ship business in malting. Note made by myself as principal
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to the order of myself, and indorsed by Nathan Randall and J

Herrick Munger. L. A. Gulick, per E. Gulick. January 26, 1869.'-'

That said bill or order was thereupon duly transferred and deliv-

ered to the said Wilkin & Hair ; and afterward, on the 6th day

of February, 1869, the defendant duly accepted said bill or order

by writing upon the back of it these words : "Accepted February

6, 1869. H. Shannon ;" and therefore became liable upon said

bill or order as accepted. It was further alleged that before the

commencement of the action the note and bill, or order, were

transferred to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration ; that the

note was due and payable before action brought ; and that pay-

ment of it, as well as of the bill, etc., was demanded of the defend

ant, but that no part of the same, or either of them, had ever been

paid ; and that there was due to the plaintiff thereon $2,000, with

interest from April 3, 1869.

The defendant, in his answer, alleged that, after the accept-

ance of the order mentioned in the complaint, and before the note

matured, L. A. Gulick countermanded the order, and directed the

defendant not to pay it ; and that before such maturity she

requested the holders not to call upon the defendants to pay ; and

that she then made arrangements to take up and pay the note at

w\

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the fourth judicial department, affirming a judgmenfl
and order of Special Term, granted upon summary application
for judgment again t defendant.
The complaint alleged in substance that Livonia A. Gulick,
on the 31st day of December, 1868, at Starkey, Yates county,
made her promissory note, by which, for value received, she
promised to pay to her own order $2,000, three months after
date, at the Central National Bank in the city of New York.
There were additional allegations to the effect that the note was
indorsed by Nathan Randall and Herrick Munger, and thereupon
discounted and held by Wilkin & Hair, bankers, at Dundee, in
the same county. That on the 26th day of January, 1869, and
before the note came due, L. A. Gulicl?, by her agent, made her
bill of exchange, addressed to the ef~nj.ant, as follows: "Mr.~
Harrison Shannon. You will please"' pay to Messrs. Wilkin &
Hair the amount of a note for $2,000, dated December 31st, 1868, I
and deduct the same from my share of the profits of our partner- ~ .
ship bitsiness 1·n malting. Note made by myself as principal C~
to the order of myself, and indorsed by Nathan Randall and i.:l"N'Herrick Munger. L.A. Gulick, per E. Gulick. January 26, 1869"
That said bill or order was thereupon duly transferred and delivered to the said Wilkin & Hair; and afterward, on the 6th day
of February, 186g, the defendant duly accepted said bill or order
by writing upon the back of it these words: "Acee ted February 1
6, 186g. H. Shannon ;" and therefore became liable upon said
bill or or er as accepted. It was further alleged that before the
commencement of the action the note and bill, or order, were
transferred to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration ; that the
note was due and payable before action brought; and that payment of it, as well as of the bill, etc., wa demanded of the defend.
ant, but that no part of the same, or either of them, had ever been
paid; and that there was due to the plaintiff thereon $2,ooo, with
interest from April 3, 1869.
The def ndant, in his answer, alleged that, after the acceptance of the order mentioned in the complaint, and before the note
matured, L. A. Gulick countermanded the order, and directed the
defendant not to pay it; and that before such maturity she
requested the holders not to call upon the defendants to pay; and
that she then made arrangements to take up and pay the note at
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its maturity; and that said note was either paid by the maker at

maturity or renewed by another note for the same amount, with

the same indorsers; and that the note was thereby paid by the

maker.

David B. Prosser, for the appellant

E. G. Lapham, for the respondent.

its maturity; and that aid note wa ither paid by the maker at
maturity or r newed by anoth r note for the sam amount, with
the ame indor ers; and that the note was thereby paid by the
maker.

Dwight, C. It will be necessary to consider whether the

instrument on which the action is brought is a bill of exchange.

A bill is an order drawn by one person on another to pay a third

a certain sum of money, absolutely and at all events. Under this

David B. Prosser, for the appellant
E. G. Lapham, for the respondent.

definition the order cannot be paid out of a particular fund, but

must be drawn on the general credit of the drawer, though it is

no objection, when so drawn, that a particular fund is specified

from which the drawee may reimburse himself. The difficulty is

in determining whether the bill is to be paid out of the fund or

not. The cases are very numerous, and do not appear to proceed

on any very well defined distinction. The true test would seem

to be whether the drawee is confined to th e parHmlar fund, nr

whether, though a specified fund is mentioned, he would have

the power to charge the bill up to the general account of the
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dr awer, if the designated fund should turn out to be insuffi-

cient. In the final analysis of each case, it must appear that the

alleged bill of exchange is drawn on the general credit of the

drawer. For example, if he were an accommodation drawer, it

must be of such a nature that the amount paid under it could be

charged against him as a debt, or if the transaction were business

paper, it must be of such a character as to be entered as a debit,

on the debtor side of the account.

The remarks in Dawkes v. De Lorane (3 Wils. 207), are

worthy of approval : "The instrument or writing which consti-

tutes a good bill of exchange is not confined to any certain form,

or set of words, yet it must have some essential qualities, without

which it is no bill of exchange ; it must carry with it a personal

and certain credit given to the drawer, not confined to credit upon

any thing or fund; it is upon the credit of a person's hand, as on

the hand of the drawer, the indorser, or the person who nego-

tiates it ; he to whom such bill is made payable, or indorsed, takes

it upon no particular event or contingency, except the failure of

the general personal credit of the persons drawing or negotiating

the same." Whatever is said of a bill here is equally applicable

to a promissory note. Under this rule, an order drawn payable

"out of one's growing subsistence" is not a good bill (Jossclyn v.

DwrGHT, C. It will b necessary to consider whether the
instrument on which th action i brought i a bill of xchan n-e.
bill is an order dra\ n by one person on another to pay a third
a certain um of money, ab olutely and at all events. Under this
definition the ord r cannot be paid out of a particular fund, but
mu t be drawn on th genei:al credit of the drawer, though it is
no objection, when so drawn, that a particular fund is specified
from which th drawee may reimburse himself. The difficulty i
in determinin<Y whether the bill is to be paid out of the fund or
not. The ca e are very numerous and do not appear to proceed
on any very well defined distinction. The true te t would seem
to be whether the drawee is confined to the pa rtjrnlar fund. or
whether. though a specified fund is mentioned. he would have
the power to charge the bill up to the general account of the
drawer, if the designated fund should turn out to be insuffi~ In the final analysis of each case, it must appear that the
alleged bill of exchange is drawn on the <Yen ral credit of the
drawer. For example, if he were an accommodation dra\ er, it
mu t be of such a nature that the amount paid und r it could be
charged again t him as a debt, or if the transaction wer busine s
paper, it must be of uch a character as to be entered a a debit,
on the debtor ide of the account.
The remark in Dawkes v. De Lorane (3 Wil . 207), are
worthy of approval: "The instrument or writing which con titute a o-ood bill of exchange i not onfined to any certain form
or set of word , y t it mu t have some e ential qualitie , without
which it is no bill f exchange· it mu t carr ' ith it a personal
and certain credit given t th drav er, r.ot confin d to r <lit upon
any thing or fund; it i upon the er dit of a p r on hand, a on
the hand of the drawer th indor r r th p r on \Yh n otiate it; he to whom uch bill i mad payable, or indor ed, take
it upon no particular event or contin n
x pt th failure of
the general per onal credit of the per n dra\\ in or n ·otiatmo·
th am ." What ver i
f a bill h r i quall applicable
a promis ory not .
thi rul , an ord r dra\\ n payal l
out of on ' o-rowin
ub i ten ' i n t a ood bill (! ossel·y n
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Lacier, 10 Mod. 294) ; nor one payable "out of rents" (Jenney v.

Herle, 2 Lord Raym. 1361); nor out of money in the hands

of ; ''nor out of a certain payment when due." (Haydock

v. Lynch, 2 Lord Raym. 1563.) On the other hand, the statement

of a particular fund in a bill of exchange does not vitiate it. if it

be inserted merely as a _ directj on_t o the drawee how to reimburse

himsel f. Thus, an order requesting the defendant to pay to the

plaintiff, or order, £9 10s., "as my quarterly half-pay, to be due

from the twenty-fourth of June to twenty-seventh of September

next, by advance," was held to be a bill of exchange. The court

said : "The mention of the half-pay is only by way of direction

how he shall reimburse himself, but the money is still to be

advanced on the credit of the person." (Macleod v. Snee, 2"

Strange, 762.) The direction in the case at bar is equivalent to

an order to pay out of the profits. It is to deduct the amount paid

from the drawer's share of "the profits." This is equivalent to a

direction to subtract the amount from a particular fund. If the

language had been "please pay Wilkes and Hare $2,000 out of

my share of the profits of the partnership," it would have been a

clear case of assignment and not a bill of exchange. The actual
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direction was in substance the same. {Cook v. Satterlce, 6 Cowen,

108), is in point. The words there were: "Ninety days after date

pay plaintiff or bearer $400, and take up their note given to Wm.

and H. B. Cook for that amount, dated April 19th, 1825." On

demurrer it was held that this was not a bill of exchange. The

words "pay and take up," &c, were held to be equivalent to pay

on taking up. Applying the same construction to the present

case, "pay and deduct" would be equivalent to "pay on deduct-

ing," or "pay by deducting." Either construction must take away

negotiability. Cook v. Satterlee is not at all weakened by Leonard

v. Mason (1 Wend. 522). The opinion is given by the same

judge in both cases. The language in Leonard v. Mason was,

"pay a specified note, and hold it against me in our settlement."

The court said the note was thus referred to merely to ascertain

the amount. The language was equivalent to the words "charge

to my account." In Leonard v. Mason there was no independent

act to be performed other than paying the note. In Cook v. Sat-

terlee, and in the case at bar, there are two wholly distinct acts

to be done, besides payment ; in the one to take up a note, and in

the other to deduct from profits of a firm. The order, accord-

ingly, is not drawn on the general credit of the drawer. (Low-

ery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239.) The order there was: "Please

pay to the order of Archibald H. Lowery the sum of $500 on

Lacier, IO Mod. 294); nor one payable "out of rents" (Jenney v.
H erle, 2 Lord Raym. 1361) ; nor out of money in the hand
of - - ; "nor out of a certain payment when due." (Haydock
v. Lynch, 2 Lord Raym. 1563.) On the other hand, the statement
of a particular fund in a bill of exchange does not vitiate it. if it
be in erted merely as a direction to the drawee how to reimburse
himself. Thus, an order requesting the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff, or order, £9 ms., "as my quarterly half-pay, to be due
from the twenty-fourth of June to twenty-seventh of September
next, by advance," was held to be a bill of exchange. The court
aid: "The mention of the half-pay i only by way of direction
how he shall reimburse himself, but the money is still to be
advanced on the credit of the person." (Macleod v. Snee, 2
trange, 762.) The direction in the case at bar is equivalent to
an order to pay out of the profits. It is to deduct the amount paid
from the drawer's share of "the profits." This is equivalent to a
direction to subtract the amount from a particular fund. If the
language had been "plea e pay Wilkes and Hare $2,000 out of
_ _ _m share of the profits of the partner hip," it would have been a
clear case of assignment and not a bill of exchange. The actual
direction was in substance the same. (Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cowen,
108), is in point. The words there were: "Ninety days after date
pay plaintiff or bearer $400, and take up their note given to Wm.
and H. B. Cook for that amount, dated April 19th, 1825.' On
demurrer it was held that this was not a bill of exchange. The
words "pay and take up," &c., were held to be equivalent to pay
on taking up. Applying the same construction to the present
case, "pay and deduct" would be equivalent to " pay on deducting," or "pay by deducting." Either construction mu t take away
negotiability. Cook v. Satterlee i not at all weakened by Leonard
v. Mason (1 Wend. 522). The opinion i given by the same
judge in both cases. The language in Leonard v. Mason was.
"pay a specified note, and hold it against me in our settlement.''
The court aid the note was thu ref rred to merely to ascertain
the amount. The language wa equ ivalent to the words "charge
t my account." In Leonard v. Mason there was no independent
act to be performed other than paying the note. In Cook v. Satterlee, and in the ca e at bar, there are two wholly distinct acts
to be done, beside payment; in the one to take up a note, and in
the other to deduct from profits of a firm. The order, accordingly, i not drawn on the general credit of the drawer. (Lowery v. Steward, 25 N. Y. 239.) The order there was: "Please
pay to the order of Archibald H. Lowery the sum of $500 on
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account of twenty-four bales cotton shipped to you as per bill of

lading by steamer Colorado, inclosed to you in letter." It was

held that this was not a bill of exchange, requiring acceptance

to bind the drawers, but a specific draft or order upon a partic-

ular fund. (Pp. 242-244; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583; Parker

v. City of Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376.) The present order, it should

be observed, is payable out of an uncertain fund, from profits,

and of course, none may he realized. This fact, of itself, deprives

it of an element essential in a bill of exchange, which is, that it

be payable absolutely, and not upon a contingency. (Cook v.

Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108; Wordcn v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 159 ; 1 Parsons

on Notes and Bills, 42.)

I think that the true construction of the present order is,

that it was an equitable assignment of a certain amount of the

pro fits of the business of L. A. Gulick.

The judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed.

All concur; except Earl, C, dissenting. Lott, Ch.C, con-

curs on the ground that the answer should not have been held

frivolous.

Judgment reversed and motion denied.
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statement of the transaction which gave rise to instru-

ment. § 5 — 2.

Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank (1890),

IS 1 III. 569, 19 Am. St. Rep. 5/.

Mr. John C. Richberg, for the appellants.

Messrs. Floiver, Smith and Musgrave, for the appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice Shope delivered the opinion of the court :

This was an action of assumpsit, by appellee, against appel-

account of twenty-four bale cotton shipp d to you as per bill of
lading by team r Colorado, inclo ed t
ou in letter. ' It was
h Id that this was not a bill of exchange, requiring acceptance
to bind the drawers, but a pecific draft or or ler up n a particula r fund. (Pp. 242-244 · Morton v. Naylor I
ill, 583; Parker
v. City of Syracuse, 3I N. . 376.) The pre nt order, it hould
be observed, is payable out of an uncertain fund, from profit ,
and of cour e, none may be realized. This fact, of itself, deprives
it of an element ssential in a bill of xchange. which i , that it
b payable abso lutely, and not upon a contingency. (Cook v.
Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108; Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio, I59; I Par ans
on N ates and Bill , 42.)
I think that the true construction of the present order is,
that it was an eq uitable a signment of a certain amount of the
profits of the business of L. A. Gulick.
The judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed.
All concur; except EARL, C., dissenting. LOTT, Ch.C., concurs on the ground that the answer should not have been held
frivolous.

Judgment reversed and motion denied.

lants, upon the following instrument :

"$300. Chicago, March 5, 1887.

"On July 1, 1887, we promise to pay D. Dalziel, or order, the

sum of three hundred dollars, for the privilege of one framed

advertising sign, size x inches, one end of

STATEMENT OF THE TRANSACTION WHICH GAVE RISE TO INSTRUMENT.
§ 5-2.

each of one hundred and fifty-nine street cars of the North Chi-

cago City Railway Co., for a term of three months, from May 15,

1887. Siegel, Cooper & Co."

— which was indorsed by Dalziel, the payee, to appellee, for value,

Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Chicago Trust & Savings Bank (!890),
IJl Ill. 569, 19 Am. St. Rep. 51.

on the day of its execution.

Mr. John C. R ichberg, for the appellants.
Messrs. Flower, Smith and Musgrave, for the appellee.
Mr. CHIEF JusTICE SHOPE delivered the opinion of the court:
This wa an action of as umpsit, by appellee, again t appellants, upon the following instrument:
' $300.
CHICAGO, March 5, I887.
" On July r, I887, we promise to pay D. Dalziel or ord r the
um of three hundred dollars, for the privile
of one fram d
advertisina sign, size
x
inche one end of
each of one hundr d and fifty-nine tr t car of th North Chicago City Railway Co., for a term of three month , from fay I5
1887.
IEGEL C PER & Co. '
-v hich was indor ed by Dalziel, the payee, to appellee, for value,
, cuti on.
on the day of it
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The first question presented is, is this instrument negotiable?

— and this question has been answered affirmatively by the Circuit

and Appellate courts. The Appellate Court having affirmed the

judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the case is brought here by

appeal, upon certificate of importance granted by that court.

It appears, that before the time when the privilege of adver-

tising was to commence, Dalziel forfeited any right he may have

acquired to use the cars in the manner indicated, and the privilege

specified never was furnished appellants ; and it is insisted that the

instrument is a simple contract, only, and that therefore the same

defense — failure of consideration — is available against the indor-

see of the paper for value, and before due, as might be interposed

against such paper in the hands of the payee. It is also insisted,

that the instrument shows, on its face, that payment depended

upon a condition precedent to be performed by the payee, and

therefore the indorsee took it with notice, and by the failure of the

payee to perform the condition, no right of recovery exists in the

indorsee. It is not contended that the indorsee had any other

notice than that contained in the instrument itself, and it is appar-

ent that at the time of its indorsement, which was the day of its
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execution, no right to the consideration had accrued to the makers.

It is a promise to pay a certain sum of money at a day certain, for

a consideration thereafter to be rendered, and depends for its

validity upon the implied promise of the payee to furnish the con-

sideration at the time and in the manner stipulated, — that is, it is

a promise to pay a sum certain on a particular day, in considera-

tion of the promise of the payee to do and perform on his part. A

promise is a valuable consideration for a promise.

But the question remains, whether the statement or the

recital of the consideration on the face of the instrument impairs

its negotiability, and, in this instance, amounts to a condition pre-

cedent. The mere fact that the consideration for which a note is

gi ven is recited i n it, althou gh it may appear thereby that it was

giv en for or in co nsider^on_o^n_ex^ecut ory contract or promise

on the part of the payee, will not destroy its negotiability, unless

it appears, through the recital, that it qualifi es the pro mise to pay,

and renders it condition al or uncertain, either as to the time of

pay ment or the sum to be paid" Daniel on Neg. Inst. sees. 790-

797; Davis v. McCready, 17 N. Y. 320; State Nat. Bank v.

Casson, 39 La. Ann. 865; Goodloe v. Taylor, 13 N. C. 458;

Stevens v. Blunt, 7 Mass. 240.

In State Nat. Bank v. Casson, supra, it is said: "Plaintiff

received the note before maturity, and before a failure of the

The fir t que tion presented i , i this instrument negotiable?
-and this que tion has been an wered affirmatively by the Circuit
and Appellate courts. The Appellate Court having affirmed the
jud£Yrnent in favor of the plaintiff, the ca e is brought here by
appeal, upon certificate of importance granted by that court.
It appea rs, that before the time when the privilege of advertising was to commence, Dalziel forfeited any right he may have
acquired to use the cars in the manner indicated, and the privilege
pecified never was furnished appellants; and it is insisted that the
instrument is a simple contract, only, and that therefore the same
defense-failure of consideration-is available against the indorsee of the paper for value, and before due, as might be interposed
against such paper in the hands of the payee. It is also insisted,
that the instrument shows, on its face, that payment depended
upon a condition precedent to be performed by the payee, and
therefore the indorsee took it with notice, and by the failure of the
payee to perform the condition, no right of recovery exists in the
indorsee. It is not contended that the indorsee had any other
notice than that contained in the instrument itself, and it is apparent that at the time of its indorsement, which was the day of it
execution, no right to the consideration had accrued to the makers.
It is a promise to pay a certain sum of money at a day certain, for
a consideration thereafter to be rendered, and depends for its
validity upon the implied J1romise of the payee to furnish the consideration at the time and in the manner stipulated,-that is, it is
a promise to pay a sum certain on a particular day, in consideration of the promise of the payee to do and perform on his part. A
promise is a valuable consideration for a promise.
But the question remains, whether the statement or the
recital of the consideration on the face of the instrument impair
its negotiability, and, in this instance, amounts to a condition precedent. The mere fact that the consideration for which a note is
giyen is recited in it, although 1t may appear thereby that it was
given for or in consideration of an executory contract or promise
on the part of the payee, will not destroy its negotiability, unless
it appears, through the recital, that it qualifies the promise to pay,
and renders it conditional or uncertain, either as to the time of
payment or the sum to be paid. Darnel on Neg. Inst. secs. 790797 ; Davis v. M cCready, 17 N. Y. 320; State Nat. Bank v.
Casson, 39 La. Ann. 865; Goodloe v. Taylor, 13 N. C. 458;
Stevens v. Blunt, 7 Mass. 240.
In State Nat. Bank v. Casson, supra, it is said: "Plaintiff
received the note before maturity, and before a failure of the
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consideration. Even if it were known to him that the considera-

tion was future and contingent, and that there might be offsets

against it, this would not make him liable to the equities between

the defendant and the payee. It can not affect the negotiability

of a note that its consideration is to be hereafter realized, or that,

from contingency, it may never be enjoyed."

The most that can be said of a recital in the instrument itself,

of the consideration upon which it rests, is, that the indorsee,

taking it before maturity, is chargeable with notice of the recital.

Such recital, however, is not sufficient, of itself, to advise him that

there was, or would necessarily be, a failure of consideration, but

if, at the time of the indorsement, the consideration has in fact

failed, the recital might be sufficient to put him upon inquiry, and,

in connection with other facts, amount to notice. (Henneberry v.

Morse, 56 111. 394.) The case at bar does not, however, fall within

the rule just stated, for the assignment was made the same day

the note was made, and by the terms of the recital it was appar-

ent the payee was required to do no act till the 15th of May

following, — an interval of seventy days.

There is a distinctio n, clearly recognized in the authorities,
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betwee n an instru ment payable at a particular da v. and one

payable~upon t he happening of some event ; and the rule is, that

where the parties insert a specificdate of payment, the instrument

is then p ayable at all events. — and this altho ugh, in the same

instrument, an uncertain and different time of payment may be

mentioned, as, that it shall be payable upon a particular day, or

upon the completion of a house, or the performance of other

contracts, and the like. (McCarthy v. Howell, 24 111. 341, and

authorities supra.) But the doctrine of this and kindred cases,

where there are both a certain day of payment and one more

or less contingent, need not be here invoked, for the time of

payment in the instrument under consideration is not made to

depend upon the happening or not happening of any event, but

is specific and certain, and must occur by the efflux of time, alone.

If, therefore, it be conceded, as it must, that a condition

inserted in a promissory note, postponing the day of payment

until the happening of some uncertain or contingent event, will

destroy its negotiability and render the instrument a mere agree-

ment, yet under the authorities, if by the instrument the maker

promises to pay a sum certain at a day certain to a certain person

or his order, such instrument must be regarded as negotiable,

although it also contains a recital of the consideration upon which

it is based, and although it further appear that such consideration,

if executory, may not have been performed. Here, the money

consideration. Even if it were known to him that the consideration wa future and contingent, and that th er might be off et
again t it, thi would not make him liable to th e equities betwe n
the defendant and th pay e. It can not affect the negotiability
of a not that its con ideration is to be h reafter r alized, or that,
from contingency, it may never be enj oyed."
The mo t that can be aid of a re ital in the instrument it elf,
of the consideration upon which it re ts, is, that the indorsee,
taking it before maturity, is charg able with notice of the recital.
Such recital, however, is not sufficient, of itself, to advise him that
there was, or would nece sarily be, a failure of consideration, but
if, at the time of the indorsement, the consideration has in fa ct
failed, the recital might be sufficient tb put him upon inquiry, and,
in connection with other facts, amount to notice. (Henneberry v.
Morse} 56 Ill. 394.) The case at bar does not, however, fall within
the rule just stated, for the assignment was made the same day
the note was made, and by the terms of the recital it was apparent the payee was required to do no act till the 15th of May
following,-an interval of seventy days.
There is a distinction, clearly recognized in the authorities,
le
·
r
r and one
between an mstrument
paya e upon the happening of some event; and the rule is, that
' here the arties insert a s ecific date of a ment, the instrument
is t en payable at all events.-and this although, in the same
mstrum nt, an uncertain and differe time of a ment may be
mentione , as, t at 1t shall be payable upon a particular day, or
upon the completion of a house, or the performance of other
McCarthy v. How ell} 24 Ill. 341 , and
contracts, and the like.
authorities supra.) But the doctrine of thi and kindred ca e ,
where there are both a certain day of payment and one more
or less contingent, need not be here invoked, for the time of
payment in the instrument under con ideration is not made to
depend upon the happening or not happening of any event but
is specific and certain, and must occur by the effiux of time, alone.
If, therefore, it be conceded, as it mu t, that a condition
inserted in a promis ory note, po tp ning the day of payment
until the happenin(J" of some uncertain or contingent e ent will
destroy it negotiability and render th in trument a mere agreement, yet under the authorities, if by the in trum nt the maker
promise to pay a um c rtain at a da certain to a certain per on
or his order, such instrument mu t be regard d a n gotiable,
although it also contain a recital of the con ideration upon which
it is based, and although it further app ar that uch con ideration,
if executory, may not have been performed. Here, the money
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was payable, absolutely, on the first day of July, 1887, — a time

when the contract for the advertising could not have been com-

pleted. If the instrument had remained the property of the payee,

and upon its maturity and performance to that time, suit had been

brought, it is clear that no plea of partial failure of consideration

could have been sustained, for the reason that the entire term had

not then expired. No analysis of the instrument itself is neces-

sary. The most_ c areful exam ination of it will fai l to disclose a

co ndition~p7ecedent to the payment of~tne money at the time stip-

ulated. Nor is there anything in the recitafof the consideration

to put the indorsee upon inquiry at the time the indorsement was

made. Indeed, it is clear that at that time no inquiry would have

led to notice that Dalziel would fail to comply with his contract

on the 15th of May thereafter, when the term was to commence.

All that the recitals would give notice of was, that the note was

given in consideration of an agreement on the part of the payee

that the privilege of advertisement named should be enjoyed by

the makers for three months, from May 15, 1887. Giving to

the language employed its broadest possible meaning, it can not

be construed as notice to the indorsee of the future breach of the
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contract by Dalziel. The presumption of law would be, that the

contract would be carried out in good faith, and the consideration

performed as stipulated. The makers had put their promissory

note into the hands of Dalziel upon an expressed consideration

which they were thereafter to receive, and for the performance

of which they had seen fit to rely upon the undertaking of Dalziel,

and we are aware of no rule by which they can hold this indorsee

for value, before due and before the time of performance was to

begin, chargeable with notice that the promise upon which the

makers relied would not be kept and performed. Wade on Notice,

sec. 94 a; Loomis v. Maury, 15 N. Y. 312; Davis v. McCready,

supra.

It is also contended that the court erred in giving the eighth

instruction in behalf of appellee, as to the meaning of the words

"good faith." Without pausing to discuss the instruction, we

think it clear that appellants were not prejudiced thereby, and that

no inference unfavorable or prejudicial to them could have been

drawn therefrom by the jury. While, therefore, the instruction

may be regarded as inaccurate, it worked no injury, and appellants

can not complain. See Comstock ct al. v. Hannah, 76 111. 530.

Other minor objections are urged, which, it is sufficient to

say, we have examined with care, but find no prejudicial error.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

was payabl , ab olutely, on the fir t day of July, 1887,-a time
when the contract fo r the advertising could not have been complet d. If the in trum nt had remained the property of the payee,
and upon its maturity and performance to that time, suit had been
brought, it i dear that no plea of partial failure of consideration
could have been sustained, for the reason that the entire term had
not then expired. No analys is of the instrument it elf is necessary. The most careful examination of it will fail to disclose a
condition recedent to the a ment of the money at the time stipulated. Nor is there anything in the recital of t e con i eration
to put the indorsee upon inquiry at the time the indorsement was
made. Indeed, it is clear that at that time no inquiry would have
led to notice that Dalziel would fail to comply with his contract
on the 15th of May thereafter, when the term was to commence.
All that the recitals would give notice of was, that the note was
given in consideration of an agre€ment on the part of the payee
that the privilege of advertisement named should be enjoyed by
the makers for three month , from May 15, 1887. Giving to
the language employed its broadest possible meaning, it can not
be construed as notice to the indorsee of the future breach of the
contract by Dalziel. The presumption of law would be, that the
contract would be carried opt in good faith, and the consideration
performed as stipulated. The makers had put their promissory
note into the hands of Dalziel upon an expressed consideration
which they were thereafter to receive, and for the performance
of which they had seen fit to rely upon the undertaking of Dalziel,
and we are aware of no rule by which they can hold this indorsee
for value, befo re due and before the time of performance was to
begin, chargeable with notice that the promise upon which the
makers relied would not be kept and performed. Wade on Notice.
ec. 94 a; L ooniis v. Maury, 15 N. Y. 312; Davis v. M cCready,
supra.
It is also contended that the court erred in giving the eighth
in truction in behalf of appellee, as to the meaning of the words
"good faith." Without pausing to discuss the instruction, we
think it clear that appellants were not prejudiced thereby, and that
no inference unfavorable or prejudicial to them could have been
drawn therefrom by the jury. While, therefore, the instruction
may be reCTarded as inaccurate, it worked no injury, and appellants
can not complain. See Comstock et al. v. Hannah, 76 Ill. 530.
Other minor objections are urged, which, it is sufficient to
say, we have examined with care, but find no prejudicial error.
The judgment of the Appellate ourt will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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THE SUM MUST BE CERTAIN. § 3 — 2.

Dodge v. Emerson (1852), 34 Me. 96.

THE

UM MU T BE

CERTAIN.

Assumpsit, by the indorsee against the makers of a note pay-

§3-2.

able to the Protection Insurance Company or order, for "$271.25,

with such additional premium as may arise on policy No. 50,

Dodge v. Emerson (1852), 34 Me. 96.

issued at the Calais agency."

The opinion of the court, Shepley, C.J., Wells, Rice,

Hathaway and Appleton, J.J., was drawn up by

Appleton, J. — No principle of law is more fully established

by authority and the universal concurrence of the commercial

world, than that to make a wri^e" prnrpjs e a valid promissory

note, it must be fq r_a_fi xed and cert ain, and tint for a variable

amount. In Franceit is so determined by the provisions of the

Code Napoleon. It is the recognized mercantile law of con-

tinental Europe. In England and in this country, it has received

the sanction of repeated and well considered adjudications. Story

on Promissory Notes, § 20. Without this essential requisite, a'

written promise, though in terms payable to order, is_ to be

regarded as a simpl e contract and not negotiable.

The defendants in this case have promised to pay two several
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sums ; one certain and definite, the other uncertain and contingent.

The defendants' liability being for both these sums, is obviously

fo r an unascertained and indefinite amount.

It is insisted in argument, that the plaintiff may abandon all

claim for the additional premium, which is uncertain, and proceed

only for the certain sum expressed in the contract. Undoubtedly

he may take judgment for any sum less than the amount due.

and in that mode abandon a portion of his legal claims, but that

still leaves the contract in its original state, and can in no way

affect its legal construction. He could not erase the clause relating

to the additional premium, without thereby making such an alter-

ation in the instrument declared on, as would discharge the

defendants.

In Smith v. Nightingale, 2 Stark. R. 375, the promise was

to pay the payee sixty-five pounds and all other sums that may be

due him, and it was claimed for the plaintiff, to whom the interest

in the contract had passed by indorsement, that he might disre-

gard the latter clause and recover on the certain sum set forth in

his contract as indorsee, but the Court decided otherwise. Davis

v. Wilkinson. 10 Adol. & El. 98.

Assumpsit, by the indorsee against the maker of a note payable to the Protection In urance ompany or ord r, for '$27I .25,
with uch additional pr mium a may ari e on policy No . 50,
i sued at the Calai ag ncy."
The opinion of the court, SHEPLEY, C.J., vVELLS RICE,
HATHAWAY and APPLET N, J.J., was drawn up by
APPLETON, J.-No principle of lav.r is more fully e tabli hed
by authority and the universal concurrence of the commercial
world, than that to make a written promjse a valid prnmjssor
note, it mu t be for a fixe
m
· e
amount. In ranee it i
determined by the provision of the
recognized mercantile law of conode Napoleon. It i
tinental Europe. In England and in this country, it has received
the sanction of repeated and well considered adjudications. Story
on Promi sory Notes, § 20. Without this essential requisite, a}
written promi e, though in terms payable to order, is to be
regarded a a simple contract and not negotiable.
The defendant in this case have promi ed fo pay two several
urns ; one certain and definite, the other uncertain and contingent.
The d fendants' liability bein for both the e sums, is obvious}
for an una certain
and indefinite amount.
It i insi ted in argument, that the plaintiff may abandon all
claim for the additional premium, which i uncertain, and proceed
only for the certain sum expre ed in the contract. Undoubtedly
he may take judgm nt for any um 1
than th amount due.
and in that mode abandon a portion of hi le al claim , but that
till leave the contract in it ori inal tate, and an in no way
affect it legal construction. He could not era e the clau e relatin
to the additional premium v ithout th r b makino- uch an alteration in the instrument declared on a ' ou1d di charge the
defendant .
In mith v. N ,i ahtingale 2 tark. R. 375 the promi e wa
to pay th pa ee ixty-fiv pound and all other um that ma b
due him and it "a claimed for th plaintiff to whom the intere t
in the contract had pa ed by indor ement, that he mio-ht di reo-ard the latter clau e and recover on the certain um et forth in
his contract a indor e but the ourt decided then ise. Davis
v. Wilkinson. IO Adol. & El. 9 .
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The inquiry is made by the counsel for the plaintiff, whether

the clause providing for the payment of an additional sum, intro-

duced after the promise to pay the sum fixed and certain, controls

that sum so as to make it in any event uncertain. The amount

due to the plaintiff is uncertain. Whether the contract is to be

regarded as a promise to pay one sum, which shall be the aggre-

gate composed of a certain and of an uncertain sum, the amount

of which is to be ascertained at some subsequent time, or as a

promise to pay two sums, one fixed and the other uncertain, is

perfectly immaterial. In either case there is no precise and ascer- 1

tained amount due by the contract, and it cannot be regarded as

a promissory note. If it was not in its origin, it cannot be made

one b y any abandonment, which the plaintiff may deem it advisable

to make of any portion of the sum due him. The contract declared

on not being in its character negotiable, the action cannot be main-

tained by the present plaintiff. Plaintiff nonsuit.

MAY BE PAYABLE BY STATED INSTALMENTS. § 4 — 3.

Cook v. Horn (Q. B.) {1873), 29 L. T. (N. S.) 369.

This was an action upon a promissory note, tried before

Honyman, J., at the York Summer Assizes. A verdict of 175/.
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5-y. ioc?. was found for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to the

defendant to move to enter a verdict for him, on the ground that

The inquiry is made by the counsel for the plaintiff, whether
the clau e providing for the payment of an additional um, introduced after the promise to pay the sum fixed and certain, controls
that um so a to make it in any event uncertain. The amount
due to the plaintiff is uncertain. Whether the contract is to be
regarded as a promise to pay one sum, which shall be the aggregate composed of a certain and of an uncertain sum, the amount
of which i to be a certained at some subsequent time, or a a
promi e to pay two sums, one fixed and the other uncertain, is
perfectly immaterial. In either case there is no preci e and ascertained amount due by the contract, and it cannot be regarded as
a promissory note. If it was not in its origin, it cannot be made
one by any abandonment, which the plaintiff may deem it advisable
to make of any portion of the sum due him. The contract declared
on not being in its character negotiable, the action cannot be maintained by the present plaintiff.
Plaintiff nonsuit.

the note was not good.

The form of the note was as follows :

£170. 25th April, 1872.

We promise to pay to Messrs. M. H. Cook and Co. 170/.,

with interest thereon at the rate of 5/. per cent, per annum, as

follows: the first payment, to wit, 40/., or more, to be made on

MAY BE PAYABLE BY STATED INSTALMENTS.

§ 4-3.

the 1st Feb. 1873, and 5/. on the first day of each month following

until this note and interest shall be fully satisfied. And in case

default shall be made in payment of any of the said instalments,

Cook v. Horn (Q. B.) (1873), 29 L. T. (N. S.) 369.

the full amount then remaining due in respect of the said note

and interest shall be forthwith payable.

The note was signed by the defendant and one John Horn,

since deceased.

J. W. Mellor, on behalf of the defendant, moved in pursuance

of the leave reserved. — This instrument cannot be considered a

This was an action upon a promissory note, tried before
Honyman, J., at the York Summer Assizes. A verdict of 175/.
5s. wd. was found for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to the
defendant to move to enter a verdict for him, on the ground that
the note wa not good.
The form of the note was as follows :
£r70.
25th April, 1872.
We promise to pay to Messrs. M. H. Cook and Co. 1701.,
with interest thereon at the rate of 5l. per cent. per annum, as
follows: the first payment, to wit, 4ol., or more to be made on
the 1st Feb. 1873, and 5l. on the first day o eac month following
until this note and interest shall be fully satisfied. And in case
default hall be made in payment of any of the aid in talments,
the full amount then remaining due in respect of the said note
and intere t hall be forthwith payable.
The note was signed by the defendant and one John Horn,
since decea ed.
J. W. Mellor, on behalf of the defendant, moved in pursuance
of the leave reserved.-This instrument cannot be considered a

65

OOK V. HORN
Cook v. Horn 65

promissory note, for it is not made for the payment of a certain

sum at a particular day. If the defendant paid more than 40/. on

the 1st Feb., which would be in accordance with the terms of his

promise, there could be no certainty as to his liability for the

remaining instalments concerning either the amount or the day.

In Smith v. Nightingale, 2 Starkie, 375, the promise was to pay

011 a particular day a certain sum, with interest, "and also all

other sums which may be due to him." Lord Ellenborough was

of opinion (p. 376) "that the instrument was too indefinite to be

considered as a promissory note ; it contained a promise to pay

interest for a sum not specified, and not otherwise ascertained

than by reference to the defendant's books, and that since the

whole constituted one entire promise, it could not be divided into

parts. He also held, that since the instrument contained an agree-

ment to pay the money, it could not be receivable in evidence as

an acknowledgment without a stamp." Similarly, this note con-

tains a promise to pay interest for a sum the amount of which,

after the 1st Feb., is not specified. Moreover, the day of final

payment depends upon the contingency of the defendant's first

payment ; and it has been held that a promissory note cannot be
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so indefinite, e. g., to pay so many days after marriage. (Beardsley

v. Baldunn, 2 Stra. 1151.) [Blackburn, J. — That is only when the

event may never happen ; if the period of payment be inevitable,

as upon a death, it need not be definite.] Here there is no state-

ment of the sum upon which interest is to be paid.

Blackburn, J. — I do not think there should be any rule in

this case. The objection to the note is, that if the first payment

were more than 40/., which the note provides it might be, the

subsequent instalments and the final time for payment would be

indefinite. The_amount of the note, however, is rerrnin, and anv

variation in the time will depend only upon the defendant . No

case has been cited which is an authority against this note ; and

by analogy with other objections, this one, as it seems to me,

ought not to prevail. I do not see why a stipulation which enables"}

the maker of a note to reduce his liability for interest, should T

prevent the instrument containing it from being a promissory

note.

Quain and Archibald, JJ., concurred.

Rule refused.

promissory note, for it is not mad for the payment of a certain
um at a particular day. If th e d f ndan t paid mor than 4ol. on
the 1st Feb., which woul d be in accordanc with th e terms of his
promis , th r could b no c r tain ty a to hi liability fo r th e
remaining in talment co nce rnin
ither the amoun t or th e day.
In mith v. ightingalc, - tarki , 375 the prom i e wa to pay
n a particular day a
rtain um, with intere t, "and al o all
other sum wh ich may be due to him ." Lord Ellenborou h was
of opi nion ( p. 376) " that the in trum en t wa to ind finite to be
con sider d a a promi ory note; it contained a promi e to pay
inter t for a um not pecified, and not oth er wi e a ce rta ined
than by refer ence to the defendant' books, and that ince the
' hole con tituted one entire promise, it could not be divided into
part . He al o held, that ince the in trum ent contained an agreement to pay th e money, it could not be receivable in evidence as
an acknowledgment without a tamp. " Similarl y, this note contains a promise to pay interest for a sum the amount of which,
after the r t Feb., is not specified. Moreover, the day of final
payment depends upon the contingency of the defendant' fir t
payment ; and it has been held that a promissory note cannot be
so indefinite, e.g., to pay so many days after marriage. ( B eardsley
v. Bald·win, 2 tra. IISL) [Blackburn, J .-That i only when the
event may never happen· if the period of payment be inevitable,
a upon a death, it need not be definite.] H ere there is no statement of the um upon which interest is to be paid.
BLACI B R 1 , J.-I do not think there hould be any rule in
this ca e. The objection to the note is, that if the fir t payment
' ere more than 4ol., which the note provi de it might be, the
ubsequent instalment and the final time for paym ent would be
indefinite. The amount of the note. howe.ver. i~ertain . and any
variation in the time will depend on y upon the defendant. No
ca e ha been cited which i an authority again t thi note; and
by analoo-y with other objection , thi one, a it eems to me,
ought not to prevail. I do not ee why a tipulation ' hich enables
the maker of a note to reduce hi liability for intere t, hould
prevent the instrument containing it from being a promi ory
note.
QUAIN and ARCHIBALD, JJ., concurred.

I

Rule ref it-Sed.

66 General Requisites of the Contract

INSTRUMENT PAYABLE ill EXCHANGE IS NOT NEGOTIABLE. § 4 4-

First Nat. Bank v. Slette (189/), 67 Minn. 425, 64 Am. St. Rep.

429.

Carmody & Leslie and F. H. Peterson, for appellants.

Calkins & Sharpe, for respondent.

Start, C.J. This action is based upon an obligation, which

is substantially in these words:

"$1,673. Halstad, Mixn., July 26th, 1894.

"For value received, we promise to pay to the order of the

John Good Cordage & Machine Company the sum of sixteen

hundred and seventy-three dollars, as follows: Payable by New

York or Chicago exchange. $560, Nov. 15th, 1894; $560, Dec.

1 st, 1894; $560, Dec. 15th, 1894. Without interest, if paid as due ;

if not, then legal rate from date until paid."

The only question on this appeal is whether this is a nego-

tiable instrument under the law merchant. It is absolutely essen-

tial, in ord er to constitute a promissory note under the lawjner-

c hant, trTat^fmr-pTDmise beto pay in mon ey. If this instrument

can be construed as an absolute promise to"pay in money $1,673,

with exchange, it is negotiable; otherwise, not. Hastings v.
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Thompson, 54 Minn. 184, 55 N. W. 968.

The case of Bradley v. Lill, 4 Biss. 473, Fed. Cas. No. 1,783,

is the only one to which our attention has been called, where the

language of the instrument was similar to the one under consid-

eration. In the case referred to the note was made in Chicago,

and was payable at New York, "in" exchange ; and it was held

that the note was negotiable, upon the ground that the promise

was to pay the sum named in the note, "with" exchange, which

was a mere incident to the debt.

In the case at bar the note is not payable at any particular

place, and the promise is, not to pay a given number of dollars

in money "with" — that is, plus — the current rate of exchange,

but it is to pay the sum named in the note by New York or

Chicago exchange. The holder of this instrument cannot demand

in payment thereof $1,673 in money, plus the cost of exchange:

for the maker is not bound to discharge his obligation except by

means of inland bills on New York or Chicago. Nor can the

maker tender in payment $1,673 m money, with the cost of

exchange; for his promise is to make payment by inland bills,

Oppenheimer v. Bank 67

which he must purchase in the market. The instrument, then, is

not payable in money, and is, therefore, notJ~nfomrssory n ote^

wTtlih2j_hT~taw'meic r haiiL.., Haston v. Ayde. nMinnr

Jones v. rales, 4 Mass. 245 ; Irvine v. Lowry, 14 Pet. 293; 1

Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§55, 56; Tied. Com. Paper, §29; 1 Rand.

Com. Paper, § 90. In reaching this conclusion we have not been

unmindful of the fact that, in commercial usage, bills of exchange

are regarded as substitutes for money ; but this usage cannot make

them such.

Order reversed, and a new trial granted.

THE SUM IS CERTAIN THOUGH PAYABLE WITH COSTS OF COLLEC-

TION OR AN ATTORNEY'S FEE. § 4 — 5.

Oppenheimer v. Bank (1896), gj Tcnn. 20, $6 Am. St. Rep. ?/8.

Appeal in Error from Chancery Court of Gibson County.

McAllister, J. Complainants filed this bill to enjoin the

defendant bank from prosecuting three several suits before a Jus-

tice of the Peace, for the collection of certain promissory notes.

It is charged in the bill that said notes were procured by fraud

and are without consideration, and that the bank received the notes

from the payees with actual or constructive notice of the fraud.
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It is further charged said notes were not negotiable, for the reason

that each contained a stipulation for the payment of reasonable

attorney's fees, and that said bank is not protected in its title to

said notes as an innocent holder for value in due course of trade.

The Chancellor, upon final hearing, was of opinion that the

defendant bank purchased said notes without actual or construc-

tive knowledge of the fraud, but held that the stipulation in

respect of attorney's fees, destroyed the negotiability of said instru-

ments, and thereby defeated the claim of said bank ; that it was

an innocent holder for value within the meaning of the law mer-

chant. The Court decreed that said notes had been procured bv

fraud and were void in the hands of defendant bank, and perpetu-

ally enjoined their collection. The bank appealed, and has

assigned as error the action of the Chancellor in adjudging said

notes non-negotiable on account of the stipulation in respect of

attorney's fees.

The facts out of which the present controversy has arisen

may be briefly stated. The record discloses that Curtis Bros, were

7

ob

GENERAL R EQU ISITES OF THE CONTRACT

68 General Requisites of the Contract

the proprietors of a patent churn, which they were engaged in

selling in Gibson County. Complainants purchased of Curtis Bros,

the exclusive right to sell this churn in the State of Louisiana and

certain counties of Mississippi, for which they agreed to pay the

sum of $2,000, evidenced by four notes, each for the sum of $500,

and payable, respectively, in seven, eight, nine, and ten months

from date. The following is a specimen of the notes in controv-

ersy, viz. :

"Trenton, Tenn., June 3, 1889.

"Nine months after date we promise to pay to the order of

Curtis Bros., or bearer, the sum of five hundred dollars, negoti-

able and payable at the Exchange Bank of Trenton, Tenn., for

value received. The drawers and indorsers severally waive pre-

sentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest and nonpay-

ment of this note, and, in case of suit, agree to pay all reasonable

attorney's fees for collecting the same.

"$500 due February 3, 1890.

"L. Oppenheimer,

"C. T. Love,

"R. F. Ross,
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"H. R. Camp."

On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of June, 1889, three

of these notes were purchased by the defendant bank at a discount

of twenty per cent. — that is to say, the bank paid twelve hundred

dollars for the three notes of the aggregate face value of fifteen

hundred dollars. H. R. Camp, one of the signers of the notes,

was in the employment of Curtis Bros, in the capacity of salesman,

and negotiated the sale to Oppenheimer of the exclusive right to

sell this churn in Louisiana and Mississippi. It was agreed be-

the propn tor of a patent churn, which they were engaged in
' ell ing in ibson ounty. Complainants purcha ed of Curti Bros.
tate of Loui iana and
the excl usive right to ell this churn in th
certain counties of 1ississippi, for which they agreed to pay the
um of $2,000, ev idenced by four notes, each for the um of $500,
and payable, re pectively, in seven, eight, nine, and ten months
from date. The following is a specimen of the notes in controversy, viz.:
" TRENTON, TENN., June 3, 1889.
"Nine months after date we promise to pay to the order of
Curtis Bros., or bearer, the sum of five hundred dollars, negotiable and payable at the Exchange Bank of Trenton, Tenn., for
value received. The drawers and indorser severally waive preentment for payment, protest, and notice of protest and nonpayment of thi note, and, in case of suit, agree to pay all reasonable
attorney's fees for collecting the same.
"$500 due February 3, 18go.
"L. OPPENHEIMER,
"C. T. LOVE,

"R. F. Ross,
"H. R. CAMP.,,

tween the original parties, at the time the notes were executed,

they were not to be transferred, and were alone payable out of

the profits of the new business. Curtis Bros., Camp, and Ames,

soon after the execution of the notes, left the state clandestinely,

and their whereabouts is unknown. The proof abundantly shows

that Curtis Bros, were in collusion with Camp, and that said notes

were procured to be executed upon false and fraudulent repre-

sentations, and as between the original parties there was a total

failure of consideration. The defendant bank, however, relies

upon the plea of innocent purchaser for value before maturity, in

due course of trade, and without notice. Defendant's counsel

insist that, complainant not having appealed from the ruling of

the Chancellor that the bank had no actual or constructive notice

of the fraudulent conduct of the payees in procuring the execution

On the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth of June, 1889, three
of these notes were purchased by the defendant bank at a discount
of twenty per cent.-that is to say, the bank paid twelve hundred
dollars for the three notes of the aggregate face value of fifteen
hundred dollars. H. R. Camp, one of the signers of the notes,
was in the employment of Curtis Bro . in the capacity of salesman,
and negotiated the sale to Oppenheimer of the exclusive right to
sell this churn in Louisiana and Mis issippi. It wa agreed between the original parties, at the time the notes were execute d,
they were not to be tran £erred, and were alone payable out of
the profit of the new business. Curtis Bros., Camp, and Ames,
oon after the execution of the note , left the state clandestinely,
and their whereabouts is unknown. The proof abundantly how
that Curti Bros. we re in collusion with Camp, and that said notes
were procured to be executed upon fal e and fraudulent repreentations, and as between the original parties there was a total
failure of con ideration. The defendant bank, however, relies
upon the plea of innocent purchas r for value before maturity, in
due course of trade, and without notic . Defendant' counsel
in i t that, complainant not having appealed from the ruling of
the Chancellor that the bank had no actual or constructive notice
of the fraudulent conduct of the payees in procuring the execution.
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of the notes, this question cannot be reopened in this court. But

this position is manifestly erroneous, since, upon the appeal of the l

bank, the whole case is open for re-examination, and if the decree >

m favor of complainant is found correct upon any ground,

although incorrect upon the ground assigned by the Chancellor,

we should affirm it.

The contention of learned counsel for complainant is that the

purchase of the notes in suit from strangers at a discount of

twenty per cent., when the bank knew that Oppenheimer, one of

the makers, was perfectly solvent, indicates knowledge of the

fraud, or that the bank had such constructive notice as to put it

upon inquiry. As said by this court : "When the indorsee takes

negotiable paper before maturity under circumstances which might

reasonably create a suspicion that it was not good — as, where he

buys a note on a solvent man, having less than one year to run,

for $333.33 at $125, with an agreement to pay $25 more if col-

lected without suit, he takes it at his peril and subject to the

equities between the original parties." Hunt v. Sanford, 6 Yer.,

387; 7 Heis., 163.

Says Mr. Tiedeman, in his work on Commercial Paper, Sec.
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291 : "It is said that inadequacy of price paid for negotiable paper

may be so gross as to justify the conclusion that the purchaser is

charged with notice of a fraudulent or defective title on the part

of the vendor. And it has been held there was constructive notice

of fraud or of some other equally effective defense to the paper

where the purchaser paid $125 for a note of $333.33, $50 for a

note of $300, $5 for a note of $300. On the other hand, it has

been held that the purchaser of a commercial instrument was a

holder for value, and hence took it free from equitable defenses,

when he paid $100 for a note of $250, $50 for a note of $100, or

$12.50 for a note of $25. It is certain that a pure! y_jornirnl||

consideration would not make the_ _purchaser a holder for value/'

And it may be stated, subject to an explanation of terms7fhat

an inadequate price always pu ts the person upon inquir y and

may, certainly, along with other suspicious circumstances, charge

him with notice of existing defenses. But every price is not

inadequate which is less than the face value of the instru-

ment purchased. Commercial paper of every kind has its com-

mercial value, rising above or falling below par, according to

the financial credit of the person liable on it. Only that price is

inadequate which falls below the market value, and if the dispro-

portion between the price paid and the market value be very

great, it is fair and just to presume that the purchaser had rea-

of the notes, this que tion cannot 1 reopened in this court. But
thi p ition i manife tly rron u , ince, upon th appeal of the \
lank, the whole ca i op n for r - xamination, and if the d cree
in favor of complamant i found correct upon any ground,
although incorrect upon the ground a signed by th e Chancellor,
we hould affirm it.
Th contention of learned coun 1 for complainant is that the
purcha e of the note in uit from trangers at a di count of
twenty per cent., when the bank knew that Oppenh imer, one of
the mak rs, was perfectly olvent, indicates knowledge of the
fraud, or that the bank had uch constructive notice as to put it
upon inquiry.
aid by this court: "When the indor ee takes
negotiable paper before maturity under circum tanc s which might
rea onably create a u picion that it was not good-as, where he
buy a note on a olvent man, having less than one year to run,
for $333·33 at $125, with an agreement to pay $25 more if collected without suit, he take it at his peril and ubject to the
equities between the original parties." Hunt v. Sanford, 6 Yer.,
387; 7 Heis., 163.
Says Mr. Tiedeman, in his work on Commercial Paper, Sec.
291: "It is aid that inadequacy of price paid for negotiable paper
may be o gros as to ju tify the conclusion that the purchaser i
charged ,. ith notice of a fraudulent or defective title on the part
of the vendor.
nd it has been held there wa con tructive notice
of fraud or of some other equally effective defense to the paper
where the purchaser paid $125 for a note of $333·33, $50 for a
n the other hand it ha
note of $300, $5 for a note of $300.
been held that the purcha er of a commercial in trument wa a
holder for value, and henc took it free from equitable defen e ,
when he paid $roo for a note of $250, $so for a note of $100, or
$12.50 for a note of $25. It is certain that a purely nomjnaij/
urcha er a holder for alue/
consideration would not make th
nd it may be tated ubject to an explanation o terms t at
an inadeguate price ah' ay put
per on upon inquiry and
may, certainly, alone- "ith other u p1c1ou
him with noti e of exi tino· def n
not
inadequat which is le
than th face
ment purcha ed. Commercial pap r of every kind ha it commercial value, risino- above or fallin helm par accordino- to
the financial credit of th per on liabl on it.
nly that price i
inadequat which fall below th mark t value and if the di proportion between the pric paid and the mark t value be very
great. it i fair and ju t to pr um that the pur ha er had rea-
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sonable grounds for suspecting fraud or some other defense to the

instrument. Each case must, therefore, stand on its own merits.

One-half the face value may, under some circumstances, be a

grossly inadequate price, while, under different circumstances, it

may be greatly in excess of what the instrument is worth on the

market." Tiedeman, Sec. 291.

We think the rule laid down by Mr. Tiedeman is sound, and

furnishes an intelligible basis for the determination of what con-

stitutes inadequacy of price in the purchase of commercial paper.

We cannot say , however, in view of this rule and the proof in the

record, that th ere was any such gross disparity between the com-

me rcial value of the notes and the price actually paid, as to

awa ken suspicion in the minds of the officers of the bank of any

infirmity in the paper. The proof shows that this bank was accus-

tomed, during this time, to discount paper at rates varying from

twelve to twenty-five per cent, per annum, and that it had, prior

to this time, discounted paper held by these payees on other sol-

vent parties at such rates. It was also insisted in argument that

H. R. Camp, one of the makers of the notes, negotiated the sale

of this paper to the bank, and that this fact was sufficient to put
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the purchaser upon inquiry. Nothing can be predicated upon this

position, for the reason that it does not distinctly appear from the

record whether it was Ames or Camp who sold the notes to the

bank. The officers of the bank who purchased the paper, are

unable to state which of these parties conducted the transaction,

and there is no other proof in the record on the subject. We hold,

however, this feature unimportant in this case. We find no facts,

or circumstances in the record fixing the bank witH km > \v 1 e d ge .

actual or constructive, of the fraudulent character of the paper.

and the holdi ng of the Chancellor in respect of this propo sition

is correct .

The next question presented is whether the stipulation • in

respect of payment of attorney's fees, written in the face of the

note, destroys its negotiability .and thus dismantles the note, allow-

ing proof of fraud in its execution. The question presented has

given rise to much judicial controversy, and the decisions an-

nounced in different states and jurisdictions are by no means

reconcilable, and, since the question is one of first impression in

this state, we shall, after a review of the authorities, adopt that

view which most commends itself to our reason and judgment.

Mr. Tiedeman, in the work already cited, Commercial Paper,

Sec. 28 (b), says: "Bills and notes, particularly the latter, some-

times contain stipulations that, if not paid voluntarily, the drawer

sonable grounds for suspecting fraud or ome other defense to the
in trument. Each ca e must, therefore, stand on it own merits.
One-half the face value may, under ome circum tances, be a
gros ly inad quat price, while, under different circum tances, it
may be greatly in excess of what the instrument is worth on the
market." Tiedeman, ec. 29r.
We think the rule laid down by Mr. Tiedeman is sound, and
furni hes an intelligible ba is for the d~termination of what contitutes inadequacy of price in the purchase of commercial paper.
We cannot say, however, in view of this rule and the proof in the
record, that there was any such gross disparity between the commercial value of th n tes and the rice actuall
aid, as to
awaken su picion in the minds of the officers of the bank o any
infirmity in the paper. The proof shows that this bank was accustomed, during this time, to discount paper at rates varying from
twelve to twenty-five per cent. per annum, and that it had, prior
to this time, discounted paper held by the e payees on other solvent parties at such rates. It was also insisted in argument that
H. R. Camp, one of the makers of the notes, negotiated the sale
of this paper to the bank, and that this fact was sufficient to put
the purchaser upon inquiry. Nothing can be predicated upon this
position, for the reason that it does not distinctly appear from the
record whether it was Ames or Camp who sold the notes to the
bank. The officers of the bank who purchased the paper, are.
unable to state which of these parties conducted the transaction,
and there is no other proof in the record on the subject. vVe hold,
however, this feature unimportant in this case. We find no facts
or circumstances in the record fixing the bank wit know1
ra 1lent character of the a er
actual or con tructive of th
an t e o ding of . the Chancellor in respect of this proposition
is correct.
The next question presented is whether the stipulation · in
respect of payment of attorney's fees, written in the face of the
note, destroys its negotiability .and thus di mantles the note, allowing proof of fraud in its xecution. The que tion presented has
criven ri e to much judicial controver y, and the decisions announced in different states and j uri diction are by no means
reconcilable, and, since the question is one of first impression in
this state, we shall, after a review of the authorities, adopt that
view which most commends it elf to our rea on and judgment.
Mr. Tiedeman, in the work already cited, Commercial Paper,
ec. 28 ( b), ay : "B ills and notes, particularly the latter, sometimes contain stipulations that, if not paid voluntarily, the drawer
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or maker will pay the attorney and collection fee. It has been

much discussed what is the effect of such a stipulation upon the

legal character of the instruments to which they are added.

CD "A few decisions maintain that the stipulation is in the

nature of a usurious charge and avoids the whole transaction

under the laws prohibiting usury." Citing State v. Taylor, 10

Ohio, 378; Shelton v. Gill, n Ohio, 417; Dow v. Updike, 11 Neb.,

95-

It may be remarked under this head that, in the case of Par-

ham v. /. /. Pulliam, Exr. etc., 5 Cold., 497, this court held that

a stipulation in a note to pay attorney's commission for collecting

is not usurious.CPOther decisions hold the stipu lation to be void

because it is in the nature of a penalty and tends to the oppression

of impecunious debtors. But the avoidance of the stipulation on

such grounds enables the courts to treat the stipulation as mere

surplusage and hold the instrument to be negotiable notwithstand- .

ing." Citing JJ Pa. St., 131 ; 84 Pa. St., 410; 92 Pa. St., 227; /

84 N. C, 24 ; 63 Mo., 23 ; 64 Mo., 477 ; 71 Mo., 618, 622, 627 ; 53 I

Wis., 599 ; 27 Minn., 240; 14 Bush, 814; Meyer v. Hart, 40 Mich.,

517; Bulloch v. Taylor, 39 Mich., 138; Garr v. Louisville Bank-
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ingCo., 11 Bush, 182.

i^J'In a large number of cases the stipulation is held to be valid,

but because it renders the gross sum to be recovered on the instru-

ment uncertain, its insertion in a bill or note is declared to destroy

its negotiability." Citing Szveeney v. Thickstrew, yy Pa. St., 131 ;

Woods v. North, 84 Pa. St., 410; Johnston v: Spear, 92 Pa. St.,

227; First National Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C, 24 ; First National ")

Bank v. Gay, '63 Mo., 33 ; Samstag v. Conley, 64 Mo., 477; First X '

National Bank v. MarJozv, 71 Mo., 618; Storr v. Wakefield, 71 \

Mo., 622; First National Bank v. Gay, 71 Mo., 627; Morgan v. J^y^^y

Edwards, 53 Wis., 599 ; Jones v. Radtiz, 27 Minn., 240. ^xx>-- S>-<^

(Hr/There are also other cases which not only recognize the

validity of the stipulation, but also the negotiability of the paper

in which it appears." Citing Dietrich v. Baylie, 23 La. Ann., 767;

Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark., 147 ; Smith v. Muncie National

Bank, 29 Ind., 159; First National Bank v. Canatsey, 34 Ind.,

149; Johnston v. Crossland, 34 Ind., 344: Smith v. St. Silvers,

32 Ind., 321; Wyant v. Parttorff, 37 Ind., 512; Hubbard v.

Harrison, 38 Ind., 325; Wilkes v. Woollen, 54 Ind., 164;

Sperry v. Harr, 32 Iowa, 184; Seatin v. Scoville, 18 Kan., 435;

Hozvestien v. Barnes, U. S. C. C, Kansas, 28 Am. Rep., 406 (S.

C, 5 Dillon, 482) ; Heard v. Dubuque Bank, 8 Neb., to; Farmers'

National Bank v. Rasmusson, 1 Dakota, 60: Wilson Sewing Ma-

or maker will pay th attorney and collection fee. It has been
much discussed what is th ffect of uch a stipulation upon the
legal character of th in trum nt to which they ar added.
' "A few decisions maintain that th stipulation is in the
natur of a u uriou charge and avoids the whole transacti n
under th laws prohibiting u ury.'
iting State v. Taylor, IO
hio, 378; Shelton v. Gill, I I Ohio, 4I7; Dow v. Updike, I I Neb.,
95.
It may be remarked under this head that, in the case of Parham v. J. !. PulliMn, E.t:r. etc., 5 Cold., 497, this court held that
a stipulation in a note to pay attorn y's commi sion for collecting
i not u uriou Q) th r deci ions hold the stipulation to be void
because it i in the nature of a penalty and tends to the oppress10n
of imp cunious debtors. But the avoidance of the stipulation on
such o-rounds enables th courts to treat the stipulation as mere
surplu ag and hold the instrument to be negotiable notwith tanding."
iting 77 Pa. t., I3I; 84 Pa. St., 410; 92 Pa. St., 227;
84 N. C., 24; 63 Mo., 23; 64 Mo., 477; 7I Mo., 6I8, 622, 627; 53
vVi ., 599; 27 Minn., 240; I4 Bush, 8I4; Meyer v. Hart, 40 Mich.,
5I7; Bulloch v. Ta':llor, 39 Mich., I38; Garr v. Loitisville Banki1~g_.f o., II Bush, 182.
~' In a large number of cases the stipulation is held to be valid,
but becau e it render the gross sum to be recovered on the instrument uncertain, its in ertion in a bill or note i declared to de tro
it negotiability." Citing Sweeney v. Thickstrew, 77 Pa. t. I3I;
Woods v. North, 84 Pa. t., 410; Johnston v: Spear, 92 Pa. t.,
227; First National Bank v . Bynuni, 84 N. C., 24 · First National
Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo., 33; Samstag v. Conley, 64 Mo., 477; First
National Banll v. l\!l arloi , 71 Mo., 6I ; Storr v. Wakefield, 7I
Mo., 22; First National Bank v. Gay, 7r Mo., 627; JV! organ v.
Edwards, 53 Wis., 599; Jones v. Radti:::, 27 Minn., 240.
"t There are also other case which not only recoo-nize the
validity f the tipulation, but al o th n gotiability of the paper
in which it appear . '
iting Dietrich v. Baylie, 23 La. Ann. 767 ·
Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark., 147 · niith v. Muncie National
Bank 2 Ind. 159 · First National Bank v. Canatse 34 Ind.
149; I ohnston v. Crossland, 34 In 1., -l4; mith . St. il rs,
32 Ind. 321; Wyant v. Parttorff 7 Ind. 512 · Hubbard v.
Harrison, 38 Ind.
25; H i/kes v. TT oollen, 54 Ind. 164 ·
Sperry v. Harr, 32 Iowa I 84 · eatin v. coville, l Kan. 43 S ·
Howestien v. Barnes U. S. C. C., I ansa , 2
m. Rep. 406 ( .
C., S Dillon, 482) ; Heard v. Dubuque Bank,
b., TO· Farmers'
National Bank v. Rasmusson. l akota, o; !Vi/son e ing Nla-
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chine Co. v. Moreno, 7 Fed. Rep. 806; Storieman v. Pyle, 35 Ind.,

103. Indiana now prohibits by statute such stipulations in notes

unless unconditional. Rev. Stat. (1876), 149.

Mr. Tiedeman remarks that where the amount to be recov-

ered as attorney's fees is explicitly stated in the instrument, it

would seem that the sum of money to be recovered on the paper,

with the attorney's fees added to the principal and interest, would

be as certain as the principal and interest would be alone, for the

interest continues to accumulate if the paper is not honored at

maturity. When the exact amount of the fee is not stated, only

reasonable fees can be recovered, and there may be some ground

for objecting to the negotiability of such an instrument. But it

would seem that even such an instrument ought to be held nego-

tiable, for the stipulation for reasonable attorney's fees renders

the amount no more uncertain than the addition by the law mer-

chant to the principal sum of the costs of protest and the taxed

cost of the suit.

Mr. Randolph, in his work on Commercial Paper, Vol. I.,

Sec. 205, in treating this subject, says: "The effect of a stipula-

tion for attorney's fees or costs of suit contained in a note has
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been the subject of much consideration, more especially in our

Western States. As an agreement and irrespective of usury laws

and other statutory prohibitions, such a stipulation is in itself

valid." Citing Meacham v. Penrose, 60 Miss., 217 ; Brown v.

Barber, 59 Ind., 533 ; First Nat. Bank v. Breese, 39 Iowa, 640 ;

Garver v. Pontorris, 66 Ind., 191 ; 42 Ind., 176; 61 Ind., 276; 47

Ind. 559; 85 Ind., 317; Miner v. Paris Exchange Bank, 53 Texas,

559. "And the fees so stipulated for may be recovered by the

holder of the notes, although not the original payee." Citing

Johnson v. Crossland, 34 Ind., 334. "And where a stipulation of

' this sort is contained in a bill of exchange, it has been held to be

embraced in the liability assumed by the acceptor." Bank of

British North America v. Ellis, 2 Fed. Rep., 44; 29 Ind. 158.

"It may be said in general," says the author, "that such a

stipulation for fees does not affect the negotiability of the note

containing it, even though the stipulation be restricted to the case

of suit being brought on the instrument." Citing 1 Daniel Neg.

Instrument, 66; 2 Parson's Bills and Notes, 147; Dietrich v. Bay-

He, 23 La. Ann., 767; Heard v. Dubuque Co. Bank, 8 Neb. 10,

24; S perry v. Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Seaton v. Scoville, 18 Kan.

433; 7 Fed. Rep., 806; 16 Fed. Rep., 89; Trader v. Chiccster, 41

Ark., 242; Gaar v. Louisznlle Banking Co., n Bush, 180; Nicher-

son v. Sheldon, 33 111., 372; and citing also the Indiana cases;

chine Co. v. Hon?no, 7 Fed. Rep. 806; Storienian v. Pyle, 35 Ind.,
103. Indiana now prohibits by statute such tipulations in note
unle unconditional. Rev. Stat. ( 1876), 149·
~Ir. Tiedeman remarks that where the amount to be recovered a attorney' fee i explicitly tated in the in trument, it
would seem that the sum of money to be recovered on the paper,
with the attorney's fees added to the principal and interest, would
be a certain as the principal and interest would be alone, for the
interest continues to accumulate if the paper is not honored at
maturity. When the exact amount of the fee is not stated, only
rea onable fee s can be recovered, and there may be some ground
for objecting to the negotiability of such an instrument. But it
would seem that even such an instrument ouo-ht to be held negotiable, for the stipulation for rea onable attorney' fees renders
the amount no more uncertain than the addition by the law merchant to the principal sum of the costs of protest and the taxed
cost of the suit.
Mr. Randolph, in his work on Commercial Paper, Vol. I.,
Sec. 205, in treating this subject, says: "The effect of a stipulation for attorney's fees or costs of uit contained in a note has
been the subject of much consideration, more especially in our
\Vestern States. As an agreement and irrespective of usury laws
and other statutory prohibitions, such a stipulation is in itself
valid." Citing M eachani v. Penrose, 60 Miss., 217; Brown v.
Barber, 59 Ind., 533; First Nat. Bank v. Breese, 39 Iowa, 640;
Garver v. Pontorris, 66 Ind., 191; 42 Ind., 176; 61 Ind., 276; 47
Ind. 559; 85 Ind., 317; Miner v. Paris Exchange Bank, 53 Texas,
559. "And the fees so stipulated for may be recovered by the
holder of the notes, although not the original payee." Citing
I ohnson v. Crossland, 34 Ind., 334. "And where a stipulation of
·this sort is contained in a bill of exchange, it has been held to be
embraced in the liability assumed by the acceptor." Bank of
British North Anierica v. Ellis, 2 Fed. Rep., 44; 29 Ind. 158.
"It may be said in general," ays the author, "that such a
stipulation for fees does not aff ct the negotiability of the note
containing it, ev n though the stipulation be restricted to the case
of suit being brought on the instrument." Citing l Daniel Neg.
Instrument, 66; 2 Parson' Bills and Notes, 147; Dietrich v. Baylie, 23 La. Ann., 767; Heard v. Dubuque Co. Bank, 8 Neb. IO,
24 · Sperry v. Horr, 32 Iowa, 184; Seaton v. Scoville, 18 Kan.
433; 7 Fed. Rep., 806; 16 Fed. Rep., 89; Trader v. Chicester, 41
Ark., 242; Gaar v. Louisville Banking Co., I I Bush, 180; Nicherson v. Sheldon, 33 Ill., 372; and citing also the Indiana cases;
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Davidson v. Vorsc, 52 Iowa, 384; McGill v. Griffin, 32 Iowa, 445 ;

Randolph on Com. Paper, Vol. III., §§ 1717, 1718; Chitty, 770.

Says Mr. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments,

Sec. 62 (a) : "Such instruments should, we think, be upheld as

negotiable. They are not like contracts to pay money and do some

other thing. They are simply for a payment of a certain sum of

money at a certain time, and the additional stipulation as to

attorneys' fees can never go into effect if the terms of the note

or bill are complied with. They are, therefore, incidental and

ancillary to the main engagement, intended to assure its perform-

ance or to compensate for trouble and expense entailed by its

breach. At maturity negotiable paper ceases to be negotiable in

the full commercial sense of the term, as heretofore explained,

though it still passes from hand to hand by the negotiable forms

of transfer, and it seems paradoxical to hold that instruments evi-

dently framed as bills and notes are not negotialbe during their

currency because, when they cease to be current, they contain a

stipulation to defray the expenses of collection. Such stipula-

tions do not, we think, render such instruments usurious. The

additional amounts are in consideration of additional trouble and
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expense inflicted on the holder, and not excessive interest for the

loan or forbearance of money." The author states further that

the cases sustaining the negotiability of such instruments consider

that the stipulation in respect of attorneys' fees is valid because

it is an indemnification assured by the maker against the conse-

quences of his own act, for, unless in default, he will not have to

pay the additional amount ; that it is consonant with public policy,

because it adds to the value of the paper ; has a tendency to lower

the rate of discount, not only because it promises less expensive

collection, but bears evidence of a greater degree of confidence on

the part of the maker in his ability to pay without suit, and that it

does not impair the negotiability of the instrument, for the reason

that the sum to be paid at maturity is certain ; that commercial

paper is expected to be paid promptly ; that, if so paid, no element

of uncertainty enters into the contract ; that it ceases to be negoti-

able in the full sense of the term if not paid at maturity, and that

the additional agreement relates rather to the remedy upon the

note, if a legal remedy be pursued, than to the sum which the

maker is bound to pay," etc. 2 Daniel on Neg. Ins. (3d Ed.).

Sec. 62.

This doctrine has received the indorsement of such eminent

jurists as Mr. Justice Brewer, now an Associate Justice of the

United States Supreme Court, who said, in the case of Scaton v.

Davidson, v. Vorse, 52 lO\va, 384; McGill v. Griflin, 32 Iowa, 445;
Randolph on om. ap r, Vol. III.,
1717, 171 8; ·bitty, 770.
ay Mr. Dani 1, in his work on
egotiabl Instrum nt ,
c. 62 (a) : " uch in trum nts should, we think, be upheld a
ne otiabl . Th y are not lik contract to pay mon y and do some
other thing. Th y are imply for a payment of a c rtain sum of
money at a certain time and the additional stipulation as to
attorn y ' f e can n v r
into ffect if the term of th nol
or bill are complied with. They ar , therefore, incidental and
ancillary to the main en ·agement, intend d to as ure its performance or to compen ate for trouble and expense entailed by it
breach. At maturity negotiabl paper cea e to be negotiable in
the full commercial sen e of the term, as heretofore explained,
though it till pa es from hand to hand by the neg tiable form
of trans£ r, and it seems paradoxical to hold that in truments evidently framed as bills and notes are not negotialbe during their
currency b cau e, when they cease to be current, they contain a
stipulation to defray the expenses of collection.
uch stipulations do not, we think, render such in truments u urious. The
additional amounts are in consideration of additional trouble and
expense inflicted on the holder, and not excessive intere t for the
loan or forbearance of money." The author state further that
the ca e u taining the negotiability of uch instruments con ider
that the tipulation in re pect of attorneys' fee i valid becau e
it is an indemnific-ation a ured by the maker against the con equ nee of his own act, for, unle in d fault he will not have to
pay the additional amount; that it is con onant with public policy,
becau e it add to the valu of the paper ; ha a tendency to lov er
the rate of di count, not only becau e it promi e le expensive
collection, but bears evidence of a gr ater degree of confidence on
the part of the maker in hi ability to pay without suit, and that it
does not impair the negotiability of the in trument for the rea on
that the um to be paid at maturity i certain· that commercial
paper is expect d to be paid prompt! · that, if o paid , no elem nt
f uncertainty enter into the contra t; that it c a
to be n O'Otiable in th full sense of th term if not paid at maturity, and that
the additional agreement relate rath r to the r medy upon the
note, if a le al remedy be pur ued than to the um \\ hich the
maker i bound to pay" etc. 2 Daniel on eg. In . (3d Ed. ),
ec. 62.
Thi doctrine ha received the indor em nt of uch emin nt
juri t a Mr. Ju ti e re\ er, nO\ an
ociat Ju tice of th e
nited tates Supreme
urt, \ h aid, in the a e of caton v.
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Scoville, 18 Kan., 781, viz.: "It seems to us, therefore, a just

conclusion that paper otherwise negotiable is not rendered non-

negotiable by a stipulation for the payment of costs of collection,

including attorneys' fees, in case suit is brought thereon." Justice

Brewer cited with approval the case of Gaar v. Louisville Banking

Co., 11 Bush (Ky.), 180 (S. C, 21 Am. Rep., 709), in which it

was said, viz. : "The reason for the rule, that the amount to be

paid must be fixed and certain, is that the paper is to become a

substitute for money, and this it cannot be unless it can be ascer-

tained from it exactly how much money it represents. As long,

therefore, as it remains a substitute for money, the amount which

it entitles the holder to demand must be fixed and certain ; but

when it is past due, it ceases to have that peculiar quality denom-

inated negotiability, or to perform the office of money ; and hence,

anything which only renders its amount uncertain after it has

ceased to be a substitute for money, but which in nowise affected

it until it had performed its office, cannot prevent its becoming

negotiable paper."

Upon a careful review of the authorities, we can perceive no

reason why a note, otherwise endowed with all the attributes of
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negotiability, is rendered non-negotiable by a stipulation which is

entirely inoperative until after the maturity of the note and its dis-

honor by the maker . The amount to be paid is certain during the

currency of the note as a negotiable instrument, and it only be-

comes uncertain after it ceases to be negotiable by the default of

the maker in its payment. It is eminently just that the creditor

who has incurred an expense in the collection of the debt, should

be reimbursed by the debtor by whose default the action was ren-

dered necessary and the expense entailed. So far from such a

stipulati on di scounting the negotiability of the instr ument^ we

think, "with MrT'Daniel. that~ TTls~lmTridernnrfication assured by

the maker against the consequences of his own act ; that it is con-

crman«_wMth puhlir policy bec ause it adds to the value o f the

paper ; has a tendency to jnjA^e r_Jjh e_ rate _ of discount, not only

because it promises less expensive collection, but bears evidence

of a greater degree of confidence on the part of the maker in his

ability to pay without suit.

We are, therefore, of opinion the decree of the Chancellor

adjudging said notes non-negotiable was erroneous. We hold,

however, that these notes being fraudulent in their inception and

without consideration between the original parties, the bank will

only be entitled to recover to the extent of the sum actually paid

by it, to wit, the sum of $t,20Q and interest. In other words, we

Scoville, I8 Kan., 78I, viz.: 'It seems to u , therefore, a just
conclu ion that paper otherwise negotiable is not rendered nonn gotiable by a tipulation for the payment of co t of collection,
including attorn y ' fee , in ca e uit i brought thereon." Justice
Br wer cited v ith approval the ca e of Gaar v. Louisville Banking
Co., II Bush (Ky.), 180 ( . ., 2I m. Rep., 709), in which it
wa aid, viz.: ''The rea on for the rule, that the amount to be
paid must be fixed and certain, is that the paper i to become a
ub titute for money, and thi it cannot be unless it can be ascertained from it exactly how much money it represent . As long,
therefore, as it remain a ub titute for money, the amount which
it entitles the holder to d mand mu t b fixed and certain; but
when it is pa t due, it cea
to have that peculiar quality denominated negotiability, or to perform the office of money· and hence,
anything which only render its amount uncertain after it ha
cea ed to be a ubstitute for money, but which in nowise affected
it until it had performed it office, cannot prevent its becoming
neo·otiable paper."
Upon a careful review of the authorities, we _can perceive no
rea on why a note, otherwise endowed "' ith all the attribute of
negotiability, i rend red non-negotiabTe by a tipulation which i
entirely inoperative until after the maturity of th note and its di honor by the maker. The amount to be paid is certain during the
currency of the note as a negotiable in trument, and it only becomes uncertain after it cea es to be negotiable by the default of
the maker in it payment. It is eminently ju t that the creditor
who has incurred an expen e in the collection of the debt, should
be reimbur ed by the debtor by who e default the action wa rendered nece ary and the expense entailed. So far from such a
stipulation di counting the negotiability of the in trument, we
think, with 1r. Darnel, that 1t 1 an indemnification as ured by
the maker again t the consequence of hi own act; that it i consonant with public policy because it add to the value of the
pap r; ha a tendency to lower the rat of di count, not only
becau e it promi e le s xpen ive collection, but bears evidence
of a greater d ree of confidence on the part of the maker in hi
ability to pay without uit.
We are, therefore, of opinion th decree of the Chancellor
adjudging aid notes non-negotiabl was erroneou . We hold,
how vcr, that these notes bein<Y fraudulent in their inception and
without con ideration betw en the original parti , the bank will
only b entitled to recov r to the extent of the um actually paid
by it, to ' it, the um of $1,200 and intere t. In other word , we
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hold there was a negotiation of the notes in due course of trade

only in extent to the amount ^actually paid. Petty v. Hannum, 2

Hum., 102; Hole man v. Hobson, 8 Hum., 127; May v. Campbell,

7 Hum., 450; Green v. Stuart, 7 Baxter, 422.

The reason of this rule is thus stated by Mr. Daniel, viz. :

"When the execution of a bill or note has been induced by fraud,

a different rule applies. The bona fide holder of it, for value and

without notice, is undoubtedly entitled to be protected against a

loss which would befall him if the party defrauded were permitted

to set up the defense of fraud on the part of the payee against him.

But it does not, therefore, follow that he may recover of such

party the whole amount, when he has paid a less sum. For his

protection and security against loss, it is only necessary that he

should be paid back the amount which he was induced to give for

the instrument by its appearance of validity, and, therefore, such

amount is the limit of his recovery against the drawer or maker

who was defrauded into the execution of the instrument. * * *

The paper derives its validity wholly from the circumstances that

it has been obtained for value without notice by an innocent pur-

chaser. For his protection, it is maintained in his hands as a
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legal obligation. The object of the law is to sayg_ hjrc Lfrom los

and, to do that, a recovery of the amount he may advance is all

that can be required. To go beyond it would be inequitable and

unjust to the party after that equally entitled to be protected from

loss." Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Vol. I., Sec. 758.

INSTRUMENT MUST BE PAYABLE IN MONEY. § 3 — 2.

First Nat. Bank v. Greenville Nat. Bank {1892), 84 Tex. 40.

John Church and Garnet & Muse, for appellant.

Mathezv & Newland and Craig & Wolfe, for appellee.

Stayton, Chief Justice. This action was brought by ap-

pellee to recover on the following instrument :

"First National Bank,

"$2180. "Farmersville, Texas, April 21, 1887.

"Thomas Wilkerson has deposited in this bank twenty-one

hundred and eighty and 00/100 dollars in cks., payable to the

order of himself, on the return of this certificate properly indorsed,

one day after date.

hold there wa a negotiation of the note in due curse of trade
nly in extent to th amounttctually paid. Petty v. Hannum, 2
Hum., 102; Holeman v. Hobson, 8 um., I27; May v. Campbell,
7 Hum., 450; Green v. Stuart, 7 Baxt r 422.
The r a on of this rul e is thu tated by Mr. Daniel, viz.:
"\Vhen th xecution of a bill or note ha been induced by fraud,
a different rul applie . The bona fide holder of it, fo:.- value and
without notice, is undoubtedly entitled to be prot cted against a
lo which would befall him if the party d fraud ed were permitted
to et up the defense of fraud on the part of the payee against him .
ut it do s not, therefor , follow that he may recover of such
party the whole amount, when he has paid a less um. For hi
protection and ecurity against loss, it is only necessary that he
hould be paid back the amount which he was induced to give for
the instrument by its appearance of validity, and, therefore, such
amount i the limit of his recovery against the drawer or maker
who was defrauded into the execution of the instrument. * * *
The paper derives its validity wholly from the circumstances that
it has been obtained for value without notice by an innocent purchaser. For his protection, it is maintained in his hands a a
rom los ~
legal obligation. The object of the law is to save h"
and, to do that, a recovery of the amount he may advance is all
that can be required. To go beyond it would be inequitable and
unjust to the party after that equally entitled to be protected from
Joss. " Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, Vol. I., Sec. 758.

~~~ ~ )j--i_~

~~:~~

"L. E. Bumpass, Cashier."

IN TRUMENT MUST BE P YABLE IN MONEY.

§3-2.

First Nat. Bank v. Greenv ille Nat. Bank (1892), 84 Tex. 40.
John Church and Garnet & Muse, for appellant.
Mat he~ &
ewland and Craig & iVolfe, for appellee.
STAYTO , CHIEF Ju TICE. This action wa brought by appellee to recover on the following in trument:

"FIR T ATION L B NK,
" 2180.
·' FARMER ILLE, TEXA , April 2I I 7.
Thoma \'\ ilker on ha depo ited in thi bank t\\ ent)-011
hund red and eighty and 00/100 dollar in ck ., payabl to the
ord r of him elf, on the return of thi certificate prop rly indor ed,
one day after date.
"L. E. BuMPA s, Ca h,ier."
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This instrument was executed by the cashier of the bank,

appellant. It is admitted that the abbreviation "cks." means

checks, and that the paper came into the hands of appellee under

such circumstances as to entitle it to recover if the paper be nego-

tiable. This is the entire case as it is presented to this court.

It is claimed that the instrument sued on is a negotiable cer-

tificate of deposit ; and if this is true, we are of opinion that plain-

tiff was entitled to recover; for, notwithstanding some conflict of

authority, it seems to us that in accordance with the great weight

of authority, as well as reason, such paper when negotiable in

form should be considered negotiable in fact and law.

A certificate of deposit is ordinarily defined to be a written

acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of

money on deposit, which the bank or banker promises to pay to

the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other per-

son or to his order, and its form must determine its negotiability.

For the purposes of this case this definition is sufficiently accurate

and comprehensive, and the first question is, whether the instru-

ment sued on can be deemed, within the meaning of the law, or

the understanding of mercantile men, a certificate of deposit. To
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give to an instrument the character of a "certificate of deposit .

the deposit on which it is _bas ed must be one of iiioiicx .: and where

this appears to be the case, from the face of the paper, the word

"payable" becomes certain as to the mode or medium in which

payment must be made ; for the law implies, under such a state

of facts, a promise to pay money for money deposited, and to pay

a sum equal to the deposit.

The instrument before us has the usual form of a certificate

of deposit in all respects, except that it shows upon its face that

checks, and not money, were deposited. When money is depos-

ited with a bank, not merely for safe keeping, it becomes the

property of the bank, and the relation of creditor and debtor arises

between them ; but when the deposit is of something else than

money, this relation can not arise from the mere fact of deposit

as on an implied contract. The paper itself informs us that the

things deposited were checks ; but we are not advised by it whether

the sum named in the paper is the sum called for on the face of

the checks or their estimated value, but were this otherwise, that

would be unimportant in determining the true character of the

instrument.

If the word "checks" were used in the sense attributed to it

by mercantile men and law writers — "an order upon a bank or

banking house purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds

This instrument wa executed by the ca hier of the bank,
app llant. It i admitt d that the abbr viation 'ck ." mean
check , and that the pap r cam into the hands of app llee under
uch circumstance as to entitle it to recover if th pap r be negotiable. Thi i the entire ca e a it is pre ented to this court.
It is claimed that the in trument sued on is a negotiable certificate of d po it; and if thi i true, we are of opinion that plaintiff was entitl d to recover; for, notwith tanding ome conflict of
authority, it em to u that in accordanc with the great weight
of authority, as w 11 as rea on, such paper when negotiable in
f rm hould be considered negotiable in fact and law.
A certificate of dcpo it is ordinarily defined to be a written
acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of
money on d po it, ' hich the bank or banker promi es to pay to
the deposit r, to th order of th depositor, or to some other peron or to his ord r, and its form mu t determine its negotiability.
For the purposes of thi case this definition i sufficiently accurate
and comprehen iv , and the first que tion i , whether the instrument ued on can be deemed, within the meaning of the law, or
the understanding of mercantile men, a certificate of deposit. L2
give to an instrument the character of a "certificate 9f deposit,'
the depo it on which it i based mu t be one o[ 1~W1}J.Jl; and where
this appear to be the case, from the face of the paper, the word
"payable" becomes certain as to the mode or medium in which
payment must be made; for the law implies, under uch a state
of facts, a promise to pay money for money deposited, and to pay
a sum equal to the depo it.
The instrument before us has the usual form of a certificate
of deposit in all re pects, except that it hows upon it face that
checks, and not money, were deposited. When money is deposited with a bank, not merely for afe keeping, it becomes the
property of the bank, and the relation of creditor and d btor arises
between them; but when the depo it is of something else than
mon y, this relation can not aris from th mere fact of depo it
a on an implied contract. The paper it elf informs us that the
things depo ited were ch cks; but we ar not advi ed by it whether
the sum named in the paper is the um called for on the face of
the checks or their e timated value but w r thi oth rwise, that
would be unimportant in determining th true character of the
in trument.
If the word "check " were u ed in the sense attributed to it
by mercantile men and law writer -"an order upon a bank or
banking house purporting to be drawn upon a depo it of funds
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for the payment at all events of a certain sum of money to a

person named therein, to his order or bearer, and payable instantly

on demand" — the inference would perhaps be, that the checks

deposited were checks on some bank other than that issuing the

paper sued upon, and for the purpose of safe keeping or collection ;

but in neither event would the relation of debtor and creditor

arise from such a deposit. But for the determination of this case

we can not indulge in inferences or presumptions other than such

as arise as matter of law.

It has frequently been said that certificates of deposit have

most of the characteristics of promissory notes, and this seems

to be true ; but a paper to be entitled to the force and effect which

paper of these classes have, whether negotiable or non-negotiable,

must contain a promise "in writing by one person to pay another

person therein named, or to his order, or to bearer, a specified

sum of money absolutely and at all events." Dan. on Neg. Inst.,

28. A paper not having these characteristics can not be a certifi-

cate of deposit or promissory note. The promise to pay must be

either an express promise or such a promise as must necessarily

be implied from words used in the instrument ; but this implication
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will not arise simply from the fact that the paper may evidence

the indebtedness of its maker to the person to whom it is given.

In certificates of deposit there is sometimes an express prom-

ise to pay, but the promise is most frequently implied from the

word "payable" used in connection with the acknowledgment of

the deposit or receipt of a named sum of money by or for the

benefit of the person to whom or to whose order the payment is

to be made. The acknowledgment by a banker of the deposit

of money by another, nothing further showing that it was a

special deposit, is sufficient to show the relation of debtor and

creditor between the banker and depositor or person for whose

benefit the deposit is made, and the word "payable" used in such

a connection must be understood to be used with reference to that

relation, and can mean nothing less than that the maker of the

paper intends thereby to be understood to promise to pay the sum

acknowledged to have been received. The word "payable" in

such a connection can have no other application.

If the acknowledgment of the receipt of the money showed

that the deposit was made only for safe keeping — as a special

de posit — then the word "payable" used in connection with such

acknowledgment would certainly not be construed into an abso-

lute promise to pay money , but would be deemed only an agree-

-

for the payment at all event of a certain um of money to a
person named therein, to his order or bearer, and payable instantly
on demand"-the infer nee would perhap be, that the check
deposited were checks on some bank oth r than that issuing the
paper sued upon, and for the purpose of afe keepina or collection;
but in neither event would the relation of debtor and creditor
arise from such a deposit. But for the determination of this ca e
"e can not indulge in inferences or presumption other than such
as arise as matter of law.
It has frequently been said that certificates of deposit have
most of the characteristics of promissory notes, and this seems
to be true; but a paper to be entitled to the force and effect which
paper of these classes have, whether negotiable or non-negotiable,
mu t contain a promise "in writing by one person to pay another
per on therein named, or to his order, or to bearer, a specified
sum of money absolutely and at all events." Dan. on Neg. Inst.,
28. A paper not having the e characteristics can not be a certificate of deposit or promissory note. The promise to pay must be
either an express promise or such a promise as must necessarily
be implied from words used in the instrument; but this implication
will not arise simply from the fact that the paper may evidence
the indebtedness of its maker to the person to whom it is given.
In certificates of deposit there is sometimes an express promi e to pay, but the promise is most frequently implied from the
word "pa ~ble" used in connection with the acknowledgment of
the deposit or receipt of a named sum of money by or for the
benefit of the person to whom or to whose order the payment is
to be made. The acknowledgment by a banker of the deposit
of money by another, nothing further showing that it was a
pecial deposit, is sufficient to show the relation of debtor a"d
creditor between the banker and depositor or person for who e
benefit the deposit is made, and the word "payable" used in such
a connection mu t be understood to be used with reference to that
relation, and can mean nothing less than that the maker of the
paper intends thereby to be understood to promise to pay the sum
acknow ledged to have been received. The ;vord "payable" in
such a connection can have no other application.
If the acknowledgment of the receipt f the money showed
that the depos it was made only for safe keepina-as a special
deposit-then the word "payable" u ed in connection with such
acknowledgment woul d certainly not be con trued into an absolute promise to pay money, but would be deemed only an agree-

78

GE

ERAL

RE

Ul ITE

OF THE

C

NTRACT

78 General Requisites of the Contract

ment to deliver the special deposit, and the paper could not be

held to be either a certificate of deposit or promissory note.

The instrument sued on shows clearly that the paper styled

"checks" was deposited, and does not show that money was; and

it is unimportant whether the sum named in the instrument be

the face value of the checks or their estimated value, for the word

"payable," us ed in connection wit h t he acknowledgment of the

deposit ot somet hing else than money , can not be held necessarily

to~rJe the equiv alent of any express promise to pay any sum of

money ^ It becomes a promise to pay only when used in connection

with words showing an obligation to pay.

Literally, the words "payable to the order of himself on the

return of this certificate properly indorsed" are descriptive of the

checks received, but the words could never be so considered when

they have application to a sum of money deposited generally, and

to which they relate. We do not think, however, that these words

were used as descriptive of the checks deposited ; for the original

certificate, made part of the transcript, shows that it was written

on a blank form intended for certificates of deposit, and we refer

to this matter only to show that the word "payable," when used in
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such papers, does not always import a promise to pay. The word

"payable" is a descriptive word, meaning "capable of being paid ;

suitable to be paid; admitting or demanding payment; justly due;

legally enforceable" (Webster) ; and "to pay" means to discharge

one's obligation to another. If the obligation be to deliver specific

articles or a package of money left on deposit, although the obli-

gation arises from an express promise, this would not, although

reduced to writing, constitute a promissory note, ; nor would a

like promise, coupled with an acknowledgment of the deposit of

such things, constitute a certificate of deposit ; but if the obligation

be to pay a certain sum of money absolutely, the maker of the

instrument so obligated to pay ought to be held to have promised

to pay when he executes such an instrument as that before us

would be if the words "in cks." were not in it.

If a promise to pay something could be implied from the

instrument, could a promise to pay a certain sum of money be

implied? If money had been delivered to the bank by Wilkerson,

in the absence of something showing that the parties did not so

intend, the money would have become the property of the bank,

and the relation of debtor and creditor would have arisen, and the

amount of the debt and credit would thus have been fixed ; but

the instrument shows that checks, and not money, were deposited.

Whether mercantile paper passes to a bank on deposit depends

m nt
clcliv r the p cial depo it, and th paper could not be
held t b eith ' r a certifi at f d po it or promi ory note.
Th in trument su d n h w cl arly that the pap r styled
.. Ii k " wa cl po ited, and doe not how that mon y was; and
it i unimportant \ beth r th
um named in the in trument be
th e face value of th ch cks or th ir e timat d value, for the word
"payable," used in connection with the acknowled ment of the
depo 1t o something el e than money, can not be held nece sarily
t-- e the equivalent of any expr s promis to pay any sum of
mon~.
t ecom a promi e to pay only ·w hen u ed in connection
with word howin an obli ·ation to pay.
Literally, the word "payabl to the order of him elf on the
return of this certificate properly indorsed" are descriptive of the
checks receiv cl, but th word could never be o con id red when '
they have application to a um of money deposited generally, and
to which they relat . We do not think, however, that these words
were u ed a de criptive of the check deposited; for the original
certificate, made part of the tran cript, shows that it was written
on a blank form intended for certificat of depo it, and we r fer
to this matter only to show that the word "payable," when used in
uch papers, doe not always import a promi e to pay. The word
"payable" is a de criptive word, meaning "capable of being paid;
suitable to be paid; admitting or demanding payment; justly due;
legally enforceable" (Webster) ; and "to pay" means to discharge
one's obligation to another. If the obligation be to deliver pecific
articles or a packao-e of money left on deposit, although the obligation arise from an express promise, this would not, although
reduced to writing, constitute a promissory note,; nor would a
lik promi e, coupled with an acknowled ment of the d posit of
uch thing , constitut a certificat of depo it; but if the obligation
be to pay a certain sum of money absolutely, the maker of the
instrument o obligated to pay ought to be held to have promised
to pay when he executes uch an instrument as that before us
would be if the word "in cks." were not in it.
If a promi e to pay om thino- could b implied from the
in trum nt, c uld a promis to pay a c rtain sum of money be
impli d? If money had be n deliv red to the bank by Wi lkerson,
in the absence of om thino- howin that th parties did not so
int nd, th money would have b om th pr perty of the bank,
and the relation of d btor and er ditor would have ari en, and the
amount of the d bt and er dit would thu have been fixed; but
the in trum nt shows that ch cks, and not money, were deposited.
Whether mercantile paper pa
to a bank on deposit depends
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upon the intent of the parties evidenced by their acts ; but there

is nothing in the record before us, except the instrument sued on,

from which the intent of the parties may be ascertained.

If we assume that the checks became the property of the

bank, which is the most favorable presumption for appellee, then

may or must we imply a promise, if a promise could be implied,

to pay the sum named in the paper sued on. Unless we are

required by the instrument itself to assume this, no person dealing

with the depositor could safely make such assumption. From the

word s, "Thomas Wilkerson has deposited in this bank twenty-one

hundred and eighty and 00/100 dollars in checks," even if it be

conceded that title to the paper passed to the bank, we can not

assume that the b ank became obligated to pay him that sum in

money, a s must we, did the certificate show that he had deposited

that amount ot money. The instrument does show that the bank

assumed some obligation to Wilkerson ; and if it could be held

that from it a promise to pay some sum in money might be

implied, this would not be sufficient to sustain plaintiff's case ;

for he must, in order to maintain this action, sho w not merely that

the bank promised to pay something, but that it promised abso-

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

lutely to pa y a certain sum of money to Wilkerson or to his order.

That is not shown ; hence the instrument is not one which could

be made negotiable by any form of words.

In determining whether paper is negotiable, it alone can be

looked to; for it is to that alone which persons dealing with it

must and have the right to look ; and were it shown by extrinsic

evidence that the bank bought from Wilkerson checks on another

bank for which it agreed to pay him the sum of $2,180, and that

it executed the instrument sued on as the evidence of that debt,

still we would be compelled to deny to the instrument the char-

acter of a certificate of deposit as well as negotiability.

It may seem that a bank that would put out such paper ought

to pay it, on the ground that the form it gave to it may have

misled a purchaser ; but such considerations can have no weight

in determining the liability of parties, for all persons are pre-

sumed to know what is negotiable paper and what not ; and there

are no rules affecting the business of a country which it is more

necessary to rigidly enforce than those which relate to mercantile

paper. The paper was not negotiable , and the judgment of the

court below will be reversed and judgment will be here rendered

for appellant. ^

It is so ordered. \^ ^V

Reversed and rendered.

upon the intent of the parties evidenced by their acts; but there
is nothing in the record before us, except the instrument sued on,
from which the intent of the parties may be ascertained.
If we assume that the checks became the property of the
bank, which is the most favorable presumption for appellee, then
may or must we imply a promise, if a promise could be implied,
to pay the sum named in the paper sued on. Unless we are
required by the instrument itself to assume this, no person dealing
with the depositor could safely make such assumption. From the
words, "Thomas Wilkerson has depo ited in this bank twenty-one
fiUridred and eighty and 00/100 dollars in checks," even if it be
conceded that title to the paper passed to the bank, we can not
assume that the bank became obligated to pay him that sum in
money, as must we, did the certificate show that he had d osited
that amount o money.
e instrument does show that the bank
assumed some obligation to Wilkerson; and if it could be held
that from it a promise to pay some sum in money might be
implied, this would not be sufficient to sustain plaintiff's case;
for he must, in order to maintain this action, show not merely that
the bank romised to pa somethin but that it romised absolutely to pay a certain sum of money to Wilkerson or to his or er,
That is not shown; hence the instrument is not one which could
be made negotiable by any form of words.
In determining whether paper is negotiable, it alone can be
looked to; for it is to that alone which persons dealing with it
must and have the right to look; and were it shown by extrinsic
evidence that the bank bought from Wilkerson checks on another
bank for which it agreed to pay him the sum of $2,180, and that
it executed the instrument sued on as the evidence of that debt,
still we would be compelled to deny to the instrument the character of a certificate of deposit as well as negotiability.
It may seem that a bank that would put out such paper ought
to pay it, on the ground that the form it gave to it may have
misled a purchaser; but such considerations can have no weight
in determining the liability of parties, for all persons are preumed to know what is negotiable paper and what not; and there
are no rules affecting the business of a country which it is more
necessary to rigidly enforce than those which relate to mercantile
paper. The paper was not neg-otiable, and the judgment of the
court below will be reversed and judgment will be here rendered
for appellant.
It is so ordered.
~Reversed and rendered.
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must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable

future time. § 3 — 3.

.'.\ili T

GUdden v. Henry (1885), 104 hid. 278, 34 Am. Rep. 316.

From the Henry Circuit Court.

DE PAYABLE

0.

DEl\IA1 D OR AT A FIXED OR DETERMINABLE
FUTURE TIME.
§ 3-3.

/. H. Mcllctt and E. H. Bundy, for appellant.

/. M. Morris, for appellee.

Glidden v. Henry (1885), 104 Ind. 278, 54 Am. Rep. 316.

Zollars, J. For value and before maturity, appellee became

the owner of two promissory notes, executed by appellant, one

From the Henry Circuit Court.

of which is as follows :

"$750. Newcastle, Ind., April 14, 1883.

"Twelve months after date we, or either of us, promise to

pay to the order of George W. Nugen, Jr., seven hundred and

J. H. Mellett and E. H. Bundy, for appellant.
J. i\1. Morris, for appellee.

fifty dollars, with interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum

after date until paid, and attorney fees, value received, without

any relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws, with

eight per cent interest from maturity. The drawers and endorsers

severally waive presentment for payment, protest, and notice of

ZOLLARS, J. For value and before maturity, appellee became
the owner of two promis ory notes, executed by appellant, one
of which is a follows:

protest, and non-payment of this note ; and further expressly

agree that the payee, or his assigns, may extend the time of pay-

ment thereof from time to time indefinitely, as he or they may

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:48 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

see fit, and receive interest in advance, or otherwise, from the

maker or endorsers, for any extension or forbearance so made.

Negotiable and payable at the Citizens' State Bank of Newcastle.

"J. W. Glidden."

So far as is material here, the other note is the same. Appel-

lee brought this action to recover the amount of the notes, and to

foreclose the mortgage given by appellant to secure them.

The questions for decision are presented by the ruling of the

court below in sustaining a demurrer to appellant's answers, and

the assignment here that that ruling was erroneous.

If the notes are negotiable as inland bills of exchange, the

demurrer was properly sustained, because the defences set up

in the answers are such as can not be made as against the bona

fide holder of such paper. We are, therefore, met at the threshold

with the question, are these notes negotiable as inland bills of

exchange? In section 5506, R. S. 1881, it is provided that "Notes

payable to order or bearer in a bank in this State shall be nego-

tiable as inland bills of exchange, and the payees and endorsees

"$750.

NEWCASTLE, IND., April I4, I883.
"Twelve month after date we, or either of us, promise to
pay to the order of George W. Nugen, Jr., seven hundred and
fifty dollar , with interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum
after date until paid, and attorney fees, value received, without
any relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws, with
eio-ht per cent interest from maturity. The drawer and endor er
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, and notice of
protest, and non-payment of this note; and furth er expressly
agree that the payee, or his a signs, may extend the time of payment thereof from time to time indefinitely, as he or they may
see fit, and receive interest in advance, or otherwi e, from the
maker or endorsers, for any extension or forbearance so made.
Negotiable and payable at the Citizens' State Bank of Newcastle.
"J. W. GLIDDEN."

thereof may recover, as in case of such bills."

So far a is material here, the other note is the ame. Appellee brought thi action to recover the amount of the note , and to
foreclose the mortgage given by appellant to ecure them.
The que tion for decision are presented by the ruling of the
court below in su taining a demurrer to appellant's answer , and
the assignment here that that ruling was erroneou .
If the notes are negotiable a inland bills of exchange, the
demurrer was properly sustained, becau e the defences set up
in the answers are such as can not be made as against the bona
fide holder of such paper. We are, ther fore, met at the threshold
with the question, are these notes negotiable as inland bills of
exchange? In section 5506, R. S. I88I, it i provided that "Notes
payable to order or bearer in a bank in this State shall be negotiable as inland bills of exchange, and the payees and endorsees
thereof may recover, as in case of such bills."

GLIDDEN
Glidden v. Henry 81

v.

HENRY

81

This statute does not provide what shall constitute a promis-

sory note. The term "note" is used, as it was then and still is

defined by the authorities, and well understood under the law

merchant in the commercial world. Melton v. Gibson, 97 Ind.

■58.

The sole purpose of the section was to put a limitation upon

section 5503, and provide for commercial paper that might circu-

late free from defences in favor of the maker. This is accom-

plished by the provision, that if the note be payable at a bank in

this State, it shall be negotiable as inland bills of exchange.

The note, then, with the addition prescribed by the statute,

must be such as would have been negotiable under the law mer-

chant without any statutory provision. Are the notes in suit

such as would have been thus negotiable? A standard author

has said : "To learn what qualities are essential to a negotiable

promissory note, we must bear in mind the purpose of the note,

and of the law in relation to it. This is simply that the note may

represent money, and do all the work of money in business tran-

sactions. For this purpose, the, first requisite , that, indeed, which

includes all the rest, is certainty . This means certainty, * * *
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Second, as to the person or persons who are to make this pay-

ment, and the order and conditions of their liability. * * *

Fourth, as to the time when payment is to be made. * * *

It will be seen that the law endeavors to enforce, define, and pro-

tect all these certainties as far as possible." 1 Parsons Notes

and Bills, p. 30. See, also, 1 Daniel Neg. Inst., section 41. This

same general doctrine of the books is recognized by this and all

other courts. Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind. 164 (23 Am. R. 639).

In this case it was said: "A note, in order that it be negotiable")

in accordance with the law merchant, must be payable uncon- >

ditionally and at all events, and at some fixed period of time, I

or upon some event which must inevitably happen." J

Were it necessary, we might cite numerous decisions by this

court asserting the general doctrine of certainty as necessary to

a promissory note under the law merchant. The difficulty is not

as to the general doctrine, but the application of it to each case

as it arises.

In the case before us, all parts of the note must be looked to

in determining the quality of the paper. There is a promise to

pay in twelve months, but that promise is not certain and uncon-

ditional. The other clause is, that the time of payment may be

extended indefinitely, as the parties may agree. From an inspec-

tion of the note, it is impossible to tell when it may mature,

This statute do not provid what shall constitute a promissory note. The term "note" is used, as it was th n and still is
defined by the authorities, and well und r tood under the law
merchant in the commercial world. lvf elton v. Gibson, 97 Ind.
15 .
The sole purpose of the ection was to put a limitation upon
ection 5503, and provide for commercial paper that might circulate free from defenc s in favor of the maker. This i accomplished by the provision, that if the note be payable at a bank in
this State, it shall be ne ·otiable as inland bills of exchange.
The note, then, with tH.e addition prescribed by the statute,
mu t be uch a would have been negotiable under the law merchant without any tatutory provision. Are the notes in suit
uch as would have been thus negotiable? A standard author
has said: "To learn what qualities are essential to a negotiable
promi ory note, we must bear in mind the purpose of the note,
and of the law in relation to it. This is simply that the note may
repre ent money, and do all the work of money in business tranactions. For this purpose, the first requisite, that, indeed, which
includes all the rest, is certainty. This means certainty, * * *
Second, as to the person or persons who are to make this payment, and the order and conditions of their liability. * * *
Fourth, as to the time when payment is to be made. * * *
It will be seen that the law endeavors to enforce, define, and protect all these certaintie a far as po sible." r Parsons
otes
and Bills p. 30. See, also, I Daniel Neg. Inst., e-ction 41. This
ame general doctrine of the books is recognized by this and all
other courts. Walker v. T¥ oollen, 54 Ind. i 64 ( 23 Am. R. 639).
In thi case it \Va said: A note, in order that it be negotiable}
in accordance with the law merchant, mu t be payable unconditionally and at all event , and at some fixed period of time,
upon some event which mu t inevitably happen."
Were it nece ary, we might cite numerous deci ions by thi
·ourt a erting the general doctrin e of certainty a nece ary to
a promis ory note under the law merchant. The difficulty i not
a to the general doctrine, but the application of it to each ca e
a it arises.
In the case before u , all parts of the note mu t be looked to
in determining th€ quality of the paper. Th re i a promi e to
pay in twelve months, but that promi e i not certain and unconditional. The other clau e i , that the tim of payment may be
extended indefinitely, a the parti s may agree. Fr m an in pection of the note, it i impos ible to t 11 when it - ma. mature,
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because it is impossible to know what extension may have been,

or may hereafter be, agreed upon. No definite time is fixed, nor

is the maturity of the note dependent upon an event that must

inevitably happen. The condition is not that something may

happen, or be done, that will mature the note before the time

named, thus leaving that time as fixed and certain, if the thing

do not happen, or be not done ; but the condition is that the time

named may be displaced by another, uncertain and indefinite time,

as the parties may agree.

This distinguishes the case from some of the cases cited by

appellee, which hold that so long as a definite time of payment,

as fixed in the note, remains fixed and certain, the note retains

its negotiability, although by certain agreed conditions it may

be matured before that time. The case here is, also, distinguish-

able from another class of cases which hold that the time of pay-

ment may be dependent upon an event that must inevitably

happen, such as the death of the maker, the coming of the seasons,

etc. The precise question involved here has been passed upon by

the Supreme Courts of Iowa and Michigan, and in each case it

was held that the condition destroyed the negotiability of the
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note. Woodbury v. Roberts, 59 Iowa, 348 (44 Am. R. 685) ;

SmitJi v. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich. 371. See, also, as in point, Cook

v. Satterlce, 6 Cow. 108; Gillilan v. Myers, 31 111. 525; Costelo v.

Crowell, 127 Mass. 293 (34 Am. R. 367).

We conclude from the foregoing that the notes in suit are

n ot negotiable under the statute as inland bills of exchange, and

that, therefore, whatever defences appellant might have set up

and made available as against Nugen, the payee, he may set up

and make available as against appellee. * * *

The judgment is reversed, with costs.

INSTRUMENT MAY BE PAYABLE ON OR BEFORE A FIXED TTME. § 6 — 2.

Mat Us on v. Marks (1875), 31 Mich. 421, 18 Am. Rep. 197.

Newton Foster, for plaintiff in error.

Richards & Barnum, for defendants in error.

Coolev, J. The view of the circuit judge, that the evidence

introduced on the part of the defendant tended to show the note

in suit to have been paid by Almanson M. Mattison, appears to us

untenable. This person, it appears, had a mortgage which cov-

MATTI ' ON \'.

M

RK

3

V-

Mattison v. Marks 83

ered the same premises as the mortgage which secured the note

in suit. His mortgage he had foreclosed, and had become the

purchaser of the property, but to protect his title it was necessary

that the prior mortgage should be taken care of. This he could

only do by purchasing it, or paying it off; but whichever form

the transaction assumed, he would be entitled to be subrogated

to the rights of the former holder, and might enforce payment

from the parties who were responsible therefor. There is no

ground on which the maker and endorser of the note secured by

the first mortgage can claim that the taking up of that note by

a second mortgagee with whom they were in no way in privity,

can operate to release them from their obligation to pay it.

Whether the second mortgagee takes a formal assignment or not,

such a transaction makes him in equity an assignee, and he is

entitled to resort to all suitable remedies to enforce payment.

Russell v. Howard, 2 McLean, 489 ; Downer v. Fox, 20 Vt. 388.

This view will dispose of the case, unless the defendant is

correct in the position he takes, that the paper sued upon is not

a promissory note. If it is not, the suit must fail, because the
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declaration has treated it as such, and is not adapted to the case

of any other special contract. The objection to this instrument

is, that it promises to pay a certain sum of money "on or before"

a day named ; and this, it is said, is not a promise to pay on a day

certain, and consequently cannot be a promissory note. We are

referred to Hubbard v. Mosely, 11 Gray, 170, in support of this

view. That case certainly seems to support the position of

defendant, and it is to be regretted, perhaps, that the learned

judge who delivered the opinion did not deem it important to

present more fully the reasons that led him to his conclusions,

instead of contenting himself with a simple reference to the gen-

eral doctrine that a promissory note must be payable at a time

certain. It seems to us that this note is payable at a time

certain. It is payable certainly, and at all events, on a day par-

ticularly named ; and at that time, and not before, payment might

be enforced against the maker, jt is impossible to say that this

paper makes the payment subject to any continge ncy, or puts it

upon any condition^ The legal rights of the holder are clear and

certain ; the n o te is due at a time fixed , and it is not due before -

True, the maker may pay sooner if he shall choose, but thi s

option, if exerc ised r would be a paym ent in advance of the legal

liability to pay, and nothing m ore^ Notes like this are common

in commercial transactions, and we are not aware that their nego-

tiable quality is ever questioned in business dealings. It ought

ered the same premises a th mortga(Ye which secured the not
in uit.
Iis mortgag he had for clo d and had become the
purchaser of the prop rty, but to protect hi title it wa neces ary
that the prior mortgage hould b taken care of. Thi he could
only do by purcha in<Y it, or payin it off; but whichever form
the tran action a urned, he would b entitled to be subrogated
to the right of th former holder, and might enforce payment
from th parties who were re pon ible therefor. 1 here i no
ground on which the maker and endor r of the note ecured by
the fir t mortgage can claim that the tahng up of that note by
a econd mortgagee with whom they were in no way in privity,
can operate to relea e them from their obligation to pay it.
Whether the econd mortgagee takes a formal as ignment or not,
uch a tran action make him in equity an a signee, and he i
entitled to re ort to all suitable remedie to enforce payment.
Russell v. Howard) 2 McLean, 489; Downer v. Fox, 20 Vt. 388.
This view will di po e of the case, unless the defendant i
correct in the position he takes, that the paper sued upon is not
a promissory note. If it i not, th e suit mu t fail, because the
declaration has treated it as such, and is not adapted to the case
of any other special contract. The objection to this instrument.
i , that it promi es to pay a certain sum of money "on or before ·
a day named; and this, it is aid, is not a promi e to pay on a day
certain, and consequently cannot be a promi ory note. \ e are
referred to Hubbard v. Jl,Josely) r r Gray, 170, in support of thi
view. That case certainly seems to support the position of
d fendant, and it is to be regretted perhaps, that the learned
judge who delivered the opinion did not deem it important to
present more fully the rea ons that led him to his conclusions,
instead of contenting him elf with a imple reference to the general doctrine that a promissory note mu t be payable at a time
certain. It eems to u that thi note i payable at a time
certain. It is payable certainly, and at all events, on a day particularly named; and at that time, and not before, payment migh t
be enforced against the maker. Jt i impo ible to say that thi
a er make the a ment sub· ect to an contin ency, or put it
upon any condition. The le<Yal ri<Yht of the hold r ar c ear an
Certain; the note is due at a time fix a, and it i not due before.
True the maker ma
a
ooner if he ha11 choo e but thi
option, if exercised, would he a paym
liability to pay." and nothing more.
in commercial transa~i:10ns , and vve ar not aware that their neg tiable quality i ever que tioned in bu ine dealing . It ought

84 General Requisites of the Contract

not to be questioned for the sake of any distinction that does not

rest upon sound reason, and we can discover no sound reason for

the distinction here insisted upon.

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new

trial ordered. J^.^JU^..

Graves, Ch.J., and Campbell, J., concurred.

MAY BE PAYABLE AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF A SPECIFIED EVENT

WHICH IS SURE TO HAPPEN, THOUGH THE TIME OF

HAPPENING BE UNCERTAIN. §6 3.

J*. Kclley v. Hemmingway (1852), 13 III. 604.

Farnsworth and Ferguson and T. L. Dickey, for appellant.

Glover & Cook, for appellee.

Treat, C.J. This was an action brought by Hemmingway

against Kelley before a justice of the peace, and taken by appeal

to the Circuit Court. On the trial, in the latter court, the plain-

tiff offered in evidence an instrument in these words :

"Castleton, April 27th, 1844.

"Due Henry D. Kelley fifty-three dollars when he is twenty-

one years old, with interest. David Kelley."

On the back of which was this indorsement.
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"Rockton, May 21st, 1849.

"Signed the within, payable to Moses Hemmingway.

"Henry Kelley."

The plaintiff proved that the payee became of age in August,

1849. The defendant objected to the introduction of the instru-

ment, because it was not negotiable, but the court admitted it

in evidence, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff.

Our statute makes promissory notes assignable by indorse-

ment in writing, so as absolutely to vest the legal interest in the

assignee. Was the instrument in question a promissory note?

To constitute a promissory note, the money must be certainly

payable, not dependent on any contingency, either as to event,

or the fund, out of which payment is to be made, or the parties

by or to whom payment is to be made. If the terms of an instru-

ment leave it uncertain whet her the money wiJL ever become

payable, it cannot be considered as a prom issory note. Chitty on

KELLEY V. HEMMINGWAY
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Kelley v. Hemmingway 85

Bills, 134. Thus, a promise in writing to pay a sum of money

when a particular person shall be married, is not a promissory

note, because it is not certain that he will ever be married.

Pearson v. Ganct, 4 Mod. 242 ; Bcardslcy v. Baldzvin, 2 Strange,

1 151. So of a promise to pay when a particular ship shall return

from sea, for it is not certain that she will ever return. Palmer

v. Pratt, 2 Bing. 185; Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 387. In all

such cases, the promise is to pay on a contingency that may never

happen. But if the event on which the money is to become pay-

able must inevitably take place, it is a matter of no imp ortance

h ow long the payment may be suspended . A promise to pay a

sum of money on the death of a particular individual, is a good

promissory note, for the event on which the payment is made to

depend will certainly transpire. Colehan v. Cooke, Willes, 393 ;

S. C. 2 Strange, 1217.

In this case , the payment was to be made when the payee

should attain his majority — an event tha t might or might not

tak e p lace. The contingency might never happen, and therefore

jjjg_j Tioney was not certainly and at all events payable . The

instrument lacked one of the essential ingredients of a promissory
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note, and consequently was not negotiable under the statute.

The fact that the payee lived till he was twenty-one years of age

makes no difference. It was not ajpromisso ry note when made ,

a£d_i^ouhj_n ot become such by matter ex postjacto. The plain-

tiff has not the legal title to the instrument. If it presents a cause

of action against the maker, the suit must be brought in the

name of the payee. The case of Goss v. Nelson (1 Burr. 226), is

clearly distinguishable from the present. There, the note was

made payable to an infant when he should arrive at age, and the

day when that was to be was specified. The court held the instru-

ment to be a good promissory note, but expressly on the ground

that the money was at all events payable on the day named,

whether the payee should live till that time, or die in the interim ;

and it was distinctly intimated, that the case would be very differ-

ent had the day not been stated in the note. It was regarded as

an absolute promise to pay on the day specified, and no effect was

given to the words that the payee would then become of age.

The judgment must be reversed. Judgment reversed.

V^

Bills, 134· Thus, a promi
in wntmg t pay a sum of money
when a particular person shall be marri d, is not a promi ory
note, because it is not certain that he will ev r be married.
Pearson v. Ganet, 4 Mod. 242; Beardsley v. Baldi in, 2 Strang ,
II5I.
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In thi ca e, th payment was to be made when the payee
hould attain his majority-an event that might or might not
tal e lac . The contingency might never happen, and therefore
the money was not certainly and at all events payable. The
in trument lacked one of the essential ingredients of a promissory
note, and consequently was not negotiable under the statute.
T he fact that the payee lived till he was twenty-one years of age
makes no difference. It was not a promissor note when made,
and it could not become such by matter ex post facto. The plaintiff has not the legal title to the in trument. If it presents a cause
of action against the maker, the suit must be brought in the
name of the payee. The case of Goss v. Nelson ( r Burr. 226). is
clearly distinguishable from the present. There, the note was
made payable to an infant when he should arrive at age, and the
day when that was to be was specified. The court held the in trument to be a good promi sory note, but expressly on the ground
that the money was at all events payable on the day named,
whether the payee should live till that time, or die in the interim:
and it was distinctly intimated, that the ca ~ e would be very different J:ad the day not been tated if). the note. It wa regarded a
an absolute promise to pay on the day specified, and no effect wa
o-iven to the word that the payee would then become of a<Ye.
The judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.

v
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MUST BE PAYABLE TO ORDER OR TO BEARER. § 3 — 4.

Zander v. New York Security & Trust Co. {1902), 78 N. Y.

Supp. 900; Affirmed, A pp. Div. 81 N. Y. Supp. 11 51, with-

out opinion; Affirmed 178 N. Y. 208.

MUST :BE PAYABLE TO

RDER OR TO BEARER.

§3-4·

Action by Caroline Zander against the New York Security

& Trust Company. Demurrer to complaint overruled.

Wilson, Barker & Wilson, for plaintiff.

Homblower, Byrne, Miller & Potter, for defendant.

Scott, J. It is alleged by the complaint, and admitted by the

demurrer, that on or about July 11, 1901, the plaintiff deposited

Z ander v . ei York Sernrity & Trust Co . (1902), 78 T. Y.
Supp. 900; Affinned) App. Div. 81 N. Y . up p. 1151) without opillion). Affinned I78 N . Y . 208.

with the defendant the sum of $500, and received therefor the

following certificate or receipt :

"The New York Security and Trust Company, New York,

July 11, 1901, has received from Caroline Zander the sum of five

Action by aroline Zander against the ew York Security
& T ru st Company. Dem urrer to complaint overruled.

hundred dollars, of current funds, upon which the said company

agrees to allow interest at the annual rate of three per cent, from

this date, and on five days' notice will repay, in current funds,

the like amount, with interest, to the said Caroline Zander or her

iVilson) Barker & vVilson) for plaintiff.
Hornblower) Byrne) Miller & Potter) for defendant.

assigns, on return of this certificate, which is assignable only on

the books of the company."
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Then followed provisions as to the reduction or discontin-

uance of interest, not material here.

Plaintiff always remained the owner of the certificate ; has

never assigned it, or any part thereof, or in any way indorsed or

transferred it, or any interest therein. Before August 9, 1901,

ScoTTJ J. It is alleged by the complaint, and admitted by the
demurrer, that on or about July II, I90I, the plaintiff deposited
with the defendant the sum of $Soo, and received therefor the
following certificate or rec ipt:

she lost or inadvertently destroyed the certificate, and, though

she has diligently searched, she has been unable to find it, and

on August 9, 1901, she notified defendant of the loss of the

certificate. She has duly demanded of defendant the issue of a

new certificate, or the payment of the amount of the deposit. The

demurrer is stated to be interposed merely for the purpose of

enabling the defendant to insist that the plaintiff shall be required

to give the security specified in section 191 7, Code Civ. Proc.

That section refers to lost negotiable paper, and the question

which presents itself is, therefore, whether or not the certificate

of deposit given by defendant is negotiable. Section 20, c. 612,

"The New York Security and Trust Company: New York,
July I I, I901, has received from Caroline Zander the sum of five
hund red dollars, of current funds, upon which the said company
agrees to allow intere t at the annual rate of three per cent. from
th is date, and on five days' notice will repay, in current fund ,
the like amount, with intere t, to the sa id Caroline Zander or her
assigns, on return of thi certificate, wh ich is assirrnable only on
the books of the compan:, ."
Then foll owed provisions as to th e reduction or discontinuance of interest, not material here.
Plaintiff always remained the owner of the certificate; has
never assigned it, or any part ther of, or in any way indorsed or
transferred it, or any intere t therein. Before August 9, 1901,
she lost or inadvertently destroyed the certificate, and, though
he ha diligently sea rched, she has been unabl e to find it, and
on August 9, 1901, she notified def ndant of the lo s of th e
certificate. She has duly demanded of defendant the issue of a
new certificate, or the payment of the amount of the deposit. The
demurrer i stated to be interpo d mer ly for the purpose of
enabling the defendant to in i t th at the plaintiff shall be required
to give th
curity pecified in section 1917, Code Civ. Proc.
That section refers to lost negotiable paper , and the question
which presents itself i , therefore wh ther or not the certificate
of deposit given by defendant is negotiable. Section 20, c. 612,

ZANDER

v.

NEw YORK SECURITY

& TRUST Co.
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Laws 1897, known as the "Negotiable Instruments Law," declares

that an instrument, to be negotiable, "must be payable to order

or to bearer," and in this respect is merely declaratory of the law

of negotiable paper as it existed before the passage of the statute.

The papers which were before the court in the cases principally

relied upon by defendant conformed to the foregoing definition,

and in each case the decision turned upon the fact that the lost

receipts were payable to "order," which circumstance was held to

render them negotiable instruments, and to require that indemnity

be given before judgment upon them could be rendered. Frank

v. [Vessels, 64 N. Y. 155 ; Read v. Bank, 136 N. Y. 454, 32 N. E.

1083, 32 Am. St. Rep. 758. The receipt or cert ificate in the

present c ase_js nnt ne gotiable. The money represented by it is

paya ble, not "to order or bearer," but to the plaintiff "or her

assigns ." It is therefore what is known to the law as a "non-

negotiable instrument ." In an action upon a lost or destroyed

instrument of this description, it is not necessa ry that the plaintiff

should give or tender indemnity . Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y.

437; Mills v. Bank, 28 Misc. Rep. 251, 59 N. Y. Supp. 149. The

distinction between actions on negotiable and non-negotiable
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instruments, and the reason for the different rules respecting the

necessity for indemnity in such actions, are too obvious, and too

clearly stated in the authorities cited, to require restatement here.

The demurrer admits that the plaintiff never parted with or

assigned the certificate, and that it has been lost or destroyed.

Even if the plaintiff had not lost or destroyed the certificate, and

has assigned it, the defendant would assume no risk in paying her

the amount represented thereby. Section 1909 of the Code of

Civil Procedure provides that, except in the case of a negotiable

instrument, the transfer of a claim or demand passes an instru-

ment which the transferee may enforce by an action or special

proceeding, or interpose as a defense or counterclaim, in his own

name, as the transferror might have done, "subject to any defense

or counterclaim, existing against the transferror, before notice of

the transfer." Payment to the plai ntiff would b e a com plete

defense to any claim or action by her upon the certificate of

deposit, and equ ajly_be a defense o f any action or claim by a trans -

feree jrpm her,lfmade before notice ot the transfer ; and it does

norappear, and is not suggested, that defendant has received any

notice of a transfer by her. The demurrer must be overruled,

with costs and an extra allowance of $25, with leave to the

defendant to withdraw the demurrer and answer within 20 days

upon payment of costs.

Laws 1897, known as the "Negotiable Instruments Law," declares
that an in trument, to be negotiabl , ''must be pa able to ord r
or to bearer, and in thi respect i m rely declaratory of the law
of negotiabl paper as it xisted before the passage of the tatute.
The papers which were before th e court in the cases principally
relied upon by defendant conformed to the foregoing definition,
and in each case the d ci ion turned upon the fact that the lo t
receipts were payable to "order," which circumstance was held to
render th m negotiable instruments, and to require that indemnity
be given before judgment upon them could be rendered. Frank
v. [,-Vessels, 64 N. . 155; Read v. Bank, 136 N. Y. 454, 32 N. E.
1083, 32 Am. St. Rep. 7 58. The receipt or certificate in the
present ca e i not negotiable. The money repre ented by it is
payable, not "to order or bearer," but to the plaintiff "or her
as igns." It is therefore what is known to the law as a "nonnegotiable in trument." In an action upon a lost or destroyed
instrument of this description, it is not necessary that the plaintiff
should give or tender indemnity. Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y.
437; JV!ills v. Bank, 28 Misc. Rep. 251, 59 N. Y. Supp. 149· The
distinction between actions on negotiable and non-negotiable
instruments, and the reason for the different rules respecting the
necessity for indemnity in such actions, are too obvious, and too
clearly stated in the authorities cited, to require restatement here.
The demurrer admits that the plaintiff never parted with or
assigned the certificate, and that it has been lost or de troyed.
Even if the plaintiff had not lost or destroyed the certificate, and
has assigned it, the defendant vvould assume no risk in paying her
the amount represented thereby. Section 1909 of the Code of
Civil Proc <lure provides that except in the case of a negotiable
instrument, the tran fer of a claim or demand passe an instrument which the transferee may enforce by an action or special
proceeding, or interpo e as a defense or counterclaim, in hi own
name, as the transferrer might have done. " ubject to any defen e
or counterclaim exi tina against the tran £error, before notice of
the transfer." Payment to the plaintiff would b a complet
defense t any claim or action by her upon the certificate of
de osit, and e uall be a defen e of any action or claim by a tran feree from her, if made be or notice o
e tran r; and it o s
not appear, and i not uaae ted, that defendant ha r ceived an
notice of a transfer by her. Th demurrer mu t be overruled
with costs and an extra. allowance of $25 with 1 ave to the
lefendant to withdraw the demurrer and an wer within 20 days
upon payment of co ts.
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Demurrer overruled, with costs and extra allowance, with

leave to withdraw demurrer and answer within twenty days upon

payment of costs.

Westberg v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. (1903), 117 Wis. 389.

(See page 460).

DRAWEE MUST BE NAMED OR OTHERWISE INDICATED. § 3 — 5.

Watrous v. Halbrook (1873), 39 Tex. 373.

Appeal from Travis.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

Hancock & West, for appellant.

Moore & Shelley, for appellee.

Ogden, P.J. This suit was brought by the heirs of John

S. Storrs against the estate of D. E. Watrous, on the following

instrument of writing, viz. :

"$2,771.62. Montevallo, June 1, 1858.

"Ten months after date pay to the order of John S. Storrs

two thousand seven hundred and seventy-one and 62-100 dollars,

value received, and charge to the account of

"D. E. Watrous.

"To , Mobile, Ala/'
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The petition charged that for a valuable consideration from

John S. Storrs to him thereunto moving, said Daniel E. Watrous

executed and delivered to said Storrs the instrument of writing

above set out, and that thereby said Watrous undertook, and

bound himself, and became liable to pay said sum therein

specified.

To this petition the defendants filed a general and special

demurrer, which were both overruled by the court, and judgment

was rendered for the plaintiffs, and the defendants took their bills

of exception to the ruling of the court, and brought the case

here by appeal.

The only question now presented for decision is, does this

instrument, independent of any allegations of ownership for a

\ ATR US V. HALBROOK

9
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valuable consideration, or promise to pay, give the holder any

cause of action.

This instrument is not a promissory note in its ordinary

form, nor can it be treated as such, since there is no promise

to pay in any event. The instrument is directed to no one, and

therefore cannot be considered a draft or bill of exchange. Had

it been accepted by any one, that acceptance would have consti-

tuted a promise to pay in the acceptor, and then the maker might

have become liable as surety or guarantor ; but as there is no

drawee or acceptor, the maker cannot , without allegations and

proof of other facts setting forth and establishing his liability,

be held responsible . The instrument, with the exception of the

want of a drawee, is in the ordinary form of an accommodation

bill or draft, on which the maker cannot be held liable until after

an acceptance or non-acceptance. We think the instrument, as

it is, is an imperfect bill or draft, for the payment of which no

one is liable . With proper averments, showing the objects and

purpose of the parties, and that the maker intended to bind him-

self in the first instance to pay the same, he might possibly be

held responsible without a drawee or acceptor, but not otherwise.
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We can see no material difference between the writing here

sued on and the one in Ball v. Allen, 15 Mass. 433, in which the

court says : "But the mere possession of a paper drawn in the

form of an order, there being no drawee in existence, we think

cannot entitle the possessor to an action in anv form."

The same doctrine may be drawn from Fetro v. Reynolds,

9 Exch. 414. and in Davis v. Clark, 47 Eng. C. L. 177. From

these authorities, and the reason of law governing instruments

of this or the like character, we are clearly of the opinion that

the petition in this case did not set out a good cause of action,

and that the court erred in overruling defendants' special demur-

rer to the same. We think the demurrer should have been sus-

tained and the plaintiffs permitted to amend their pleadings, that,

if desired, they might, by proper averments and proof, establish

the liability of the maker or drawer in the first instance, without

an acceptance or non-acceptance.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause

remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

yersea a
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valuable consideration, or promi e to pay, give the holder any
cause of action.
This instrument is not a promis ory not in its ordinary
form, nor can it be treated a such, since there is no promise
to pay in any event. The instrument i directed to no one, and
therefore cannot be considered a draft or bill of exchange. Had
it been accepted by any one, that acceptance would have con tituted a promise to pay in the acceptor, and then the maker might
have become liable as surety or guarantor; but as there is no
drawee or acceptor, the maker cannot, without allegations and
proof of other facts setting forth and establishing his liability,
be held respon ible. The instrument, with the exception of the
' ant of a drawee, is in the ordinary form of an accommodation
bill or draft, on which the maker cannot be held liable until after
an acceptance or non-acceptance. 'vVe think the instrument, as
it i , is an imperfect bill or draft. for the payment of . which no
one is liable. With proper averments, showing the objects and
purpose of the parties, and that the maker intended to bind himelf in the first instance to pay the same, he might possibly be
held responsible without a drawee or acceptor, but not otherwise.
We can see no material difference between the writing here
sued on and the one in Ball v. Allen, 15 Ma s. 433, in which the
court ays : "But the mere posses ion of a paper drawn in the
form of an order, there being no drawee in existence. we think
cannot entitle the possessor to an action in any form."
The same doctrine may be drawn from Petro v. Reynolds,
9 Exch . 414, and in Davis v. Clark, 47 Ena. C. L. 177· From
these authorities, and the reason of law governing instruments
of this or the like character, we are clearly of the opinion that
the petition in this case did not set out a good cause of action,
and that the court erred in overruling defendants' pecial demurrer to the same. We think the demurrer should have been sustained and the plaintiffs permitted to amend their pleadings, that,
if desired, they might, by proper averment and proof, establish
the liability of the maker or drawer in the fir t in tance, without
an acceptance or non-acceptance.
The judoment of the district court i reversed and the cau e
remanded.
Revrsed and remanded.

~~ -
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PROVISION GIVING THE HOLDER AN ELECTION TO REQUIRE SOME-

THING TO BE DONE IN LIEU OF PAYMENT OF THE MONEY. § 7 — 4.

Hodges v. Shulcr (i860), 22 N. Y. 114.

Appeal from the Supreme Court. The action was against the

defendants as indorsers of the following instrument or note:

"RUTLAND AND BURLINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY.

•'No. 253. $1,000.

"Boston, April 1, 1850.

"In four years from date, for value received, the Rutland

and Burlington Railroad Company promises to pay in Boston, to

Messrs. W. S. and D. W. Shuler, or order, $1,000, with interest

thereon, payahle semi-annually, as per interest warrants hereto

attached, as the same shall become due ; or upon the surrender

of this note, together with the interest warrants not due to the

treasurer, at any time until six months of its maturity, he shall

issue to the holder thereof ten shares in the capital stock in said

company in exchange therefor, in which case interest shall he

paid to the date to which a dividend of profits shall have been

previously declared, the holder not being entitled to both interest

and accruing profits during the same period.
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"T. Follett, President. Sam. Henshaw, Treasurer."

At the time the suit was brought there was an unpaid interest

warrant attached, and which was attached at the time of indorse-

ment.

The answer of the defendants put in issue none of the alle-

gations in the complaint except those in respect to presentment,

notice and protest.

It was admitted on the trial that on the 4th of April, 1854.

a notary public in Boston, at the request of the Bank of Com-

merce of that city (to which bank the plaintiff had sent for col-

lection the note mentioned in the complaint in this action), did

present the note at the office, in Boston, of the treasurer of the

Rutland and Burlington Railroad Company, the place of business

in Boston of said company, and there demanded payment of the

same of the treasurer, which was refused ; and thereupon notified

the defendants thereof by depositing, on the same day, in the

postoffice in Boston, a written notice, of which the following is a

copy :

HODGE
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"City of Boston, April 4, 1854.

"CITY

To Messrs. W. S. and D. W. Shuler :

"Please take notice that a promissory note made by S. Hen-

shaw, treasurer, for $1,000, dated April 1st, 1850, payable in four

years, in favor of yourselves, and indorsed by you, has been pre-

sented by me to the office of the treisurer, and payment being

duly demanded was refused, whereupon, by direction of the

holder, the same has been protested, and payment thereof i;.

requested of you.

"Adolphus Bates, Notary Public."

This notice was inclosed, and directed to the defendants at

Amsterdam, N. Y., their place of residence, and the post office

at which they received their letters ; and the notice was received

by them in due course of mail, and the post mark thereon was

To Mes rs. vV.

. and D.

OF

o

TON,

April 4, 1854.

HULER:

"Please take notice that a promi
ry note mad by . Henhavv, tr asurer, for $r,ooo, dat d April r t, I 50, payable in four
years, in favor of you r elve , and indor ed by you, has been preented by me to the office of the tre1 urer, and payment being
duly demanded was refu ed, wh reupon, by direction of the
holder, the same has been protested, and payment thereof is
requested of you.

"Boston, April 5."

It was further admitted that for some time immediately pre- J

'ADOLPHUS BATES, Notary Public."

ceding the date of the note, the defendants were engaged as con-

tractors in building the road of the said railroad company, and

on or about the date of said note received from the company, in

satisfaction of their contract and work, the said note together
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with four other notes, each of the same date and amount, and in

every respect corresponding with said note, except that the num-

bers of all the said notes marked thereon, were different each

from the other ; that the transfer by said defendants of the note

mentioned in said complaint was in the city of Boston, and State

of Massachusetts, and that each of said notes was transferred

by said defendants shortly after the date of the said notes, in the

same manner as the note set forth in the complaint ; and that Sam.

Henshaw (whose name is signed as treasurer to the note men-

tioned in said complaint) never signed as treasurer or otherwise,

any note in which the said defendants were named as payees,

except the notes above mentioned.

The court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover

against the defendants, and gave judgment accordingly. The

defendants excepted to the decision as follows:

1st. The court erred in deciding that the defendants were

liable upon the instrument set forth in the complaint by their

indorsement.

2d. The court erred in deciding that the notice of demand

and refusal to pay, served upon the defendants, was sufficient to

charge the defendants as indorsers.

This notice was inclosed, and directed to the defendants at
Am terdam, N. Y. , their place of residence, and the po t office
at which they received their letters; and the notice was received
by them in due cour e of mail, and the post mark thereon was
"Boston, April 5."
It was further admitted that for some time immediately preceding the date of the note, the defendants were engaged as contractors in building the road of the said railroad company, and
on or about the date of said note received from the company, in
atisfaction of their contract and work, the said note together.
with four other notes, each of the same date and amount, and in
every respect corresponding with aid note, except that the numbers of all the aid notes marked th ereon, were different each
from the other ; that the transfer by aid defendant of th e note
mentioned in said complaint was in the city of Bo ton, and State
of Massachusetts, and that each of aid note wa tran £erred
by said defendants hortly after the date of the aid note , in th e
ame manner as the note set forth in the complaint; and that Sam.
Henshaw (whose name is sia ned a treasurer to th e note mentioned in said complaint) never igned a treasurer or othen i e,
any note in which the aid defendant were named a payee ,
except the notes above mentioned.
The court decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recov r
against the defendants and gave judament accordingly. The
defendants excepted to the deci ion a follm'
1st. The court erred in decidin a that the d fendant were
liable upon the instrument et forth in the complaint b) their
indorsement.
2d. The court erred in deciding that the notice of demand
and refusal to pay, served upon the defendant , "a ufficient to
charge the defendant a indorsers.
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3d. The court erred in deciding that the plaintiff was

entitled to recover in the action.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, and the defend-

ants appealed to this court.

John K. Porter, for the appellant.

John B. Gale, for the respondent.

3d. The court erred in deciding that the plaintiff was
ntitled t recover in the action.
The upremc Court affirmed the ju lgment and the defendant , appealed to thi court.

Wright, J. The single question is, whether the defendants

can be held as indorsers. It is insisted that they cannot, for the

reasons, 1st. That the instrument set out in the complaint, is

neither in terms nor legal effect a negotiable promissory note, but

J olzn K. Porter) for the appellant.
J aim B . Cale) for the re pondent.

a mere agreement ; the indorsement in blank of the defendants,

operating, if at all, only as a mere transfer, and not as an engage-

ment to fulfill the contract of the railroad company in case of its

default ; and 2d. That if it be a note, the notice of its dishonor

was insufficient to charge the defendants as indorsers.

Whether the blank indorsement of the defendants imports

any binding contract, depends on the law of Massachusetts ; in

which state it is to be assumed, from the facts in the case, that

the original instrument and indorsement were made. But the

law of Massachusetts does not differ from that of this state or
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of England in any particular material to the present inquiry. In

Massachusetts there has been apparently a relaxation of the com-

mon law rule so far as to extend the remedy against indorsers to

notes payable absolutely in a medium other than cash ; but in all

other respects the legal rules applicable to negotiable paper, are

the same in that state as in our own.

The instrument on which the action was brought has all the

essential qualities of a negotiable promissory note. It is for the

unconditional payment of a certain sum of money, at a specified

time, to the payee's order. It is not a n a greement in the alter-

natiyej to pay in money or railroad stock. It was not optional

with the makers to pay in money or stock and thus fulfill their

promise in either of two specified w ays ; in such case, the promise

would have been in the alternative. The possibility seems to

have been contemplated that the owner of the note might, before

its maturity, surrend er it in exchange for stock, thus canceling it

and its money promise; Fu t t hat promise was nevertheless abso-

lute and unconditional, and was as lasting as~the note itself ! Tn

no event could the holder require money and stock. It was only

upon a surrender of the note that he was to receive stock ; and

the money payment did not mature until six months after the

\VRIGIIT, ]. The ingle que tion is, whether the defendant
can be held as indor er . It i insisted that they cannot, for the
rea on , r t. That the instrument et out in the c mplaint, i
neither in term nor legal effect a negotiable promis ory note, but
a mere agreement; the indorsement in blank of the defendant ,
operating, if at all, only a a mere tran fer, and not as an engagement to fulfill the contract of the railroad company in case of its
default; and 2d. That if it be a note, the notice of it dishonor
was insufficient to charge the defendant a indor ers.
\Vhether the blank inclorsement of the defendant import
any binding contract, depends n the law of l\Iassachusett ; in
which tate it is to be as urned, from the facts in the ca , that
the original instrument and inclorsement were made.
ut the
law of Ma sachu etts does not differ from that of this tate or
f England in any particular material to the present inquiry. 1 n
Ia sachu etts there has been apparently a relaxation of the common law rule so far as to extend the remedy again t inclor er to
notes payable ab olutely in a medium other than ca h; but in all
other re pccts the legal rul es applicable to negotiable paper, are
the same in that tate as in our own.
The in trument on which the action wa brought bas all the
essential qualitie of a negotiable promi ory note. It is for the
nnconditional payment of a certain um of money, at a specifi cl
time, to the payee's rcl er. It i not an agreem nt in the alternativ~ to pay in money or railroad stock.
It was not optional
with the makers to pay in money or tock and thus fulfill th ir
romi e in either of two specified way ; in uch ca , the promi e
would have been in the alternative. Th pos ibility se m to
have been contemplated that the owner of the note i t before
its rnaturit ' urrend r it in ex hange for tock, thu cancelin it
and it money promise; ut that promi e wa nevertheles ab 0lute and unconditional, and wa a a ting as
n
no event could the holder require money and tock. It was only
upon a urrend r of the note that he wa to receive stock; and
the money payment did not mature until ix month after the
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holder's right to exchange the note for stock had expired. We

are of the opinion that the instrument wants none of the essential

requisites of a negotiable promissory note. It was an absolute

and unconditional engagement to pay money on a day fixed : and

although an election was given to the promisees, upon a surrender

of the instrument six months before its maturity, to exchange it

for stock, this did not alter its character, or make the promise in

the alternative, in the sense in which that word is used respecting

promises to pay. The engagement of the railroad company was

to pay the sum of $1,000 in four years from date, and its promise

could only be fulfilled by the payment of the money, at the day

named.

We are next to inquire whether the notice was sufficient. A

notice , that, in terms, or by necessary implication or reasonable

intendment, informs the indorser that th e note has berjjrnp_diip 1

and has been presented to the maker, and payment refused, is

sufficient . The party to whom the notice is addressed should not

be misled by an indefinite or uncertain description of the note

and, from the imperfection of the notice itself, be unable to deter-

mine to what particular note it refers. A notice which omits an
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essential feature of the note, or misdescribes it, is an imperfect

one, but is not necessarily invalid. It is invalid only when it fails

to give that information which it would have given but for its

particular imperfection ; and even in case the notice in itself be

defective, if, from evidence aliunde of the attendant circum-

stances, it is apparent that the indorser was not deceived or mis-

led as to the identity of the dishonored note, he will be charged.

A note is well described when its maker, payee, date, amount, and

time and place of payment, are stated: and when a notice sets

forth these particulars, with reasonable accuracy, together with

the facts of presentment and dishonor, it cannot be rendered

invalid by showing aliunde that notes similar as to parties, date,

amount, and time, and place of payment were outstanding, and

were only distinguishable from each other by their numbering.

This notice, which was dated at Boston, informed the indors-

ers that a promissory note made by S. Henshaw, treasurer, for

$1,000, dated April ist, 1850, payable in four years, in favor of

themselves, and indorsed by them, had been presented on the 4th

of April, 1854, at the office of the treasurer, and payment being

duly demanded, was refused. The notice contained no allusion

to the number of the note, and described it as made bv "S. Hen-

shaw, Treasurer." The date, amount, payees, indorsees and time,

and, inferentially, the place of payment, were accurately described.

hol ler's rio-ht to e:xchan o-e the note for stock had expired. We
are of the opinion that the in trument want none of the e ential
r qui ite
f a neo"otiabl promissory note. It wa an ab olute
and unconditional engagement to pay money on a day fixed: and
although an election wa given to th promi ees, upon a surrender
of the in trument ix months before it maturity, to xchange it
for tock, this did not alter it character, or make th e promise in
the alternative, in the sen c in which that word i u eel re pecting
promises t pay. The eng ag ement of the railroad company ,,.a
to pay the sum of $1 ,000 in four year fr om date, and its promi e
could only b fulfilled by the payment of the money, at the day
named.
'
VVe ar next to inquire whether the notice was sufficient. A
notice, that in terms, or by necessary implication or reasonable
intendment, inform the indorser that the note has become due.
and has been presented to the maker, and payment refused, i
ufficient. The party to whom the notice is addressed should not
be misled by an indefinite or uncertain description of the note
and, from the imperfection of the notice itself, be unable to determine to what particular note it refers. A notice which omits an
essential feature of the note, or misde cribes it, is an impedect
one, but i not necessarily invalid. It is invalid only when it fail
to give that information which it would have given but for its
particular imperfection ; and even in case the notice in it elf be
defective, if, from evidence aliunde of the attendant circumstance , it i apparent that the indor er was not deceived or misled as to the identity of the dishonored note, he will be charged.
A note is well described when it maker, payee date amount, and\
time and pTace of payment, are stated; and when a notice et
forth these particulars, with rea onable accuracy, together v. ith
the facts of pre entment and di honor, it cannot be rendered
invalid by showing aliunde that note imilar a to partie , date,
amount, and time, and place of payment were out tanding and
were only di tino-ui hable from each other by their numberino-.
Thi n tice, "" hich " as dated at Bo ton informed the indor er that a promi ory note made by S. Hen haw trea urer for
l ,ooo, dated April lst, 1850, payable in four year in favor of
themselves, and indor ed by them, had been pre ented on the 4th
of April, l 54, at the office of the trea ur r, and payment bein
duly demanded, wa refu d. Th notic contained no allusion
to the number of the note, and d cribed it a made by
. Henhaw, Trea urer." The <lat , amount paye
indor ee and time,
and, infer ntially, the plac of paym nt, w r accurately d cribed.

94

GEZ\ERAL REQUI JTE

01' THE CONTR.

T

94 General Requisites of the Contract

But it is urged that there was a failure to charge the defendants

as indorsers, for the reason that there was a misdescription as to

the maker, and the notice contained no reference to the number

by which the note was designated and distinguished from four

others of a similar description, given and transferred by the

defendants simultaneously. I think both of the reasons are with-

out force, and that the notice, construed in the light of its attend-

ing and surrounding circumstances, was sufficient. At least,

from the contents of the notice itself, and the extrinsic facts

admitted in the case, it was a question not of law, but of fact^

whether knowledge was actually brought home to t he indorsers

of the dishonor of the note in suit ; and that question of fact

has been found against the defendants in the court be low. Exam-

ine, for a moment, the objections to the notice, separately. It

describes the note to have been made by "S. Henshaw, treasurer."

This was a misdescription, as it was, in fact, made by the rail-

road company, Henshaw acting as its agent, and signing the

instrument in his capacity as treasurer. But did this misdescrip-

tion deceive or mislead the defendants as to the identity of the

dishonored paper? It is very apparent that it did not. Henshaw
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never signed, as treasurer or otherwise, any note in which the

defendants were named as payees, except the five notes given

to the defendants on the ist April, 1850, for $1,000 each, payable

in four years from date, for labor performed as contractors in

constructing the road of the company. It is admitted that these

five notes were given in satisfaction of their contract with the

railroad company. They knew its financial officer, the treasurer,

and that the five notes dated April ist, 1850, became due and

payable in Boston on the 4th April, 1854; and they are to be

presumed not to have indorsed any like notes of the company,

or have had any indorsement outstanding on any note, except

the five, which resembled them in any one important feature.

Upon the receipt, therefore, by due course of mail, of the notice

dated and mailed at Boston on the 4th April, 1854, and

describing the note accurately as to date, amount, payees, and

time and place of payment, and giving the name of one of its

signers, whom the defendants knew was the treasurer of the

railroad company, they were fully informed that such notice

referred to one of the five notes. At all events, it was a question

of fact, whether the information had been actually given to them,

and whether they were reasonably apprised of the particular

paper upon which they were sought to be charged.

Secondly, as to the objection founded on an omission in the

ut it is urged that there was a failure to charge the defendants
a indorser , for the reason that there v. a a misdescription as to
the maker, and the notice contain d no reference to the number
by which the note was de ignated an d distingui hed from four
other of a imilar descript ion, given and tran £erred by the
def ndants simultaneously. I think both of the rea ons are without force, and that the notice, constru ed in the light of its atten lin()"" and surrounding circum tances, was sufficient. At least,
from the contents of the notice itself, and th e extrinsic facts
admitted in the case, it was a question not of law, but of fact
whether knowledge was actually brought home to th e indorsers
of the dishonor of the note in suit; a"nd that question of fact
ha been found again t the defendants in the court below. Examine, for a moment, the objections to the notice, sepa rat ly. It
de cribes the note to have been made by "S. Henshaw, treasurer. "
Thi was a misde cription, as it was, in fact, made by the railroad company, Hen haw acting a it agent, and sig ning the
instrument in hi s capacity as treasurer. But did this misdescription dee ive or mislead the defendant as to the identity of the
·di honored paper? It is very apparent that it did not. Henshaw
never igned, as treasurer or otherwi e, any note in which the
defendants we re named as payees, except the five notes given
to the defendants on the Ist Ap ril , 1850, for $1,000 each, payable
in fou r yea rs from date, for labor performed as contractors in
constructing the road of the company. It is admitted that these
five notes were given in satisfaction of their contract with the
railroad company. They knew its financial officer, the treasurer,
and that the fiv e notes dated April Ist, 1850, became due and
payable in Boston on the 4th April, 1854; and th ey are to be
presumed not to have indorsed any like notes of the company,
or have had any in<lorsement outstanding on any note, except
the five, which resembled them in any one important feature.
U pon the rece ipt, therefore, by due course of mail, of th e notice
dated and mailed at Boston on the 4th April, I854, and
describing the note accurately as to date, amount, payees, and
t ime ~nd place of payment, and giving th e name of one of its
igners, whom ·the defendants knew was the treasurer of the
railroad company, th ey were fully informed that such notice
referred to one of the five notes.
t all events, it was a question
of fact , whether the information had been actually given to them,
and whether they were reasonably appri ed of the particular
paper upon wh ich they were sought to be charged.
Secondly, as to the objection founded on an omission in the
1
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notice to designate the number of the note sued on. It seems

that the note designated in its margin as No. 253, and the notice

omitted to describe it by the number. But this did not render the

notice per se fatally defective. The number was not a part of

the note, and there was a complete des cription of it without the

number . It cannot be, that when a notice actually describes every

essential feature of a dishonored note, such notice may be invali-

dated, by an indorser showing, aliunde, that there were similar

notes indorsed by him simultaneously, and distinguishable only

by their different numbers. All that the holder of a note is bound

to do is, to give the indorser a complete description of it, and if

from such description it cannot be identified, it is the fault or

misfortune of the indorser in having indorsed several notes alike

in every essential feature. Showing, in this case, that there were

four other notes given to the defendants by the railroad company,

on the 1st April, 1850, and shortly afterwards transferred by them

by indorsement, like the one in suit except that they were differ-

ently numbered, did not, as matter of law, stamp the notice as a

defective and insufficient one. Indeed, these extrinsic facts were

quite immaterial, without showing further that the four notes
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were transferred to persons other than the holder of the note in

suit, and that they were outstanding in April, 1854. The latter

facts were not to be presumed, with the view of invalidating the

notice, or imposing the onus upon the plaintiff to identify, by

extraneous evidence, the note in suit to the defendants as the one

referred to in the notice as dishonored.

I am of the opinion that the action was well brought against

the defendants as indorsers of a negotiable promissory note, and

that the notice of its dishonor was sufficient.

The judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.

All the judges agreed that the instrument in suit was a prom-

issory note; Denio and Welles, Js., dissented on the ground

that the notice of non-payment was insufficient in omitting the

number upon the margin of the note.

Judgment affirmed.
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notice to designat the number of the note sued on. It seem
that th note designat d in its margin a No. 253, and the notice
omitted to de cribe it by the numb r.
ut this lid not render the
notice per se fatally def ctive. The number was not a part of
the note and there wa a com let de cription of it without the
number. It cannot b , that when a notice actua y de cribes every
e ential feature of a di honored note, uch notice may be invalidated, by an indor er howing, aliunde, that there were similar
notes indorsed by him imultaneou ly, and di tinguishable only
11 that the holder of a note i bound
by their different number .
to do i , to give the indor er a complete description of it, and if
from uch description it cannot be identified, it is the fault or
misfortune of the indor er in having indorsed several notes alike
in every essential feature.
hawing, in this case, that there were
four other notes given to the defendants by the railroad company,
on the lst April, 1850, and shortly afterwards transferred by them
by indor ement, like the one in suit except that they were differently numbered, did not, as matter of law, s:amp the notice as a
defective and insufficient one. Indeed, these extrinsic facts were
quite immaterial, without showing further that the four notes
were trans ferred to person other than the holder of the note in
uit, and that they were out tanding in pril, 1854. The latter
facts were not to be presumed, with the view of invalidating the
notice, or imposing the onus upon the plaintiff to identify, by
extraneous evidence, the note in suit to the defendants as the one
referred to in the notice a dishonored.
ell brought again t
I am of the opinion that the action wa
the defendants as indorser of a negotiable promissory note, and
that the notice of it di honor wa ufficient.
The judgment of the Supreme Court hould be affirmed.
All the judges agreed that the in trument in suit was a promissory note; DENIO and WELLES, J ., di ented on the ground
that the notice of non-payment wa in ufficient in omitting the
number upon the margin of the note.
Judgmeut affirmed.
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PRESENCE OF SEAL ON INSTRUMENT. §8 — 4.

See Conine v. The Junction and Breakwater R. R. Co., p. $3.

Brozen v. Jordhal (1884), 32 Minn. i$$ t 50 Am. Rep. 560.

EAL 0

I TSTR

ME

T.

§ 8-4.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Free-

born County, as holder of the following instrument :

'Township of Manchester, Feb'y 23, 1881.

e Conine v . The Junction a11d Breakwater R. R. Co., p. 33.

"$120. Six months after date, (or before, if made out of the

sale of Drake's horse hay fork and hay carrier,) I promise to pay

Brown v. Jordhal (1884), 32 Jt,Jinn. 135, 50 Am. Rep. 560.

James B. Drake or bearer one hundred and twenty dollars.

"Negotiable and payable at the Freeborn County Bank,

Albert Lea, Minn., with ten per cent, interest after maturity until

paid.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Freeborn County, as holder of the following in trument:

"Ole J. Jordahl. [Seal.]

"Witness: J. Williamson." [Seal.]

At the trial before Farmer, J., the plaintiff, having intro-

duced evidence that he bought the note from Williamson for

value, before maturity, in good faith and without notice of any

• iefence to it, admitted that the note was obtained from defendant

by Williamson by fraud, and that as between those parties the

note was without consideration and fraudulent. The court there-
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upon directed a verdict for defendant; a new trial was denied,

and the plaintiff appealed.

Dr. R. P. Hibbs and John Whytock, for appellant.

Lovely & Morgan, for respondent.

Gilfillan, C.J. (Dickinson. J., because of illness, took no

"TowNSIIIP OF MANCHES1ER, Feb'y 23, 188r.
' $120. Six months after date, (or b for , if made out of the
sale of Dral -e' horse hay fork and hay carrier,) I promise to pay
J me B. Dral-e or bearer one hundred and twenty dollars.
"N g tiable and pa able at the Freeborn County Bank,
A lbert Lea, Minn., with ten per cent. intere t after maturity until
paid.
"OLE J. }ORDAHL. [Seal.]
" Witness: J. WILLIAMSON."
[Seal.]

part in the decision.) The defendant executed an instrument in

the form of a negotiable promissory note, except that after and

opposite the signature were brackets, and between them the word

"seal," thus, "[ Seal. )" The question in the case is, is this a nego-

tiable promissory note, so as to be entitled to the peculiar privi-

leges and immunities accorded to commercial paper? The rule

that anjnstrument under seal, though otherwise in the form of~a

promissory note, is not (certainly ~ when executed by a na tural

person, however it may be when executed by a corporation) a_ '

novnUxh} e nntp p ntitWI 7o__^iLcJi_p rivileges and immunities, is'

i miyersally recognized , and is not disputed in this state. But the

appellant contends that merely placing upon an instrument a

At th trial before FARMER, J., the plaintiff, having introc uced evidence that he bought the note from vVilliam on f r
value, bef re maturity, in good faith and without notice of an y
defence to it, admitted that the note was obtained from defendant
by \.Villiamson by fraud, and that as between tho e parties th
n te was without consideration and fraudulent . The court thereupon dir cted a verdict for defendant; a new trial was deni d,
and the plaintiff appealed.

Dr. R. P. Hibbs and John Whytock, for appellant.
Lovely & Morgan, for respon lc:nt.
GILFILLAN, C.J. (DICKINSON, ]., becaus of illnes , took no
part in the deci ion.) The defendant executed an instrument in
the form of a negotiable promi ory not , x ept that aft r and
01 posite the signatur were brack t , and between them the \vord
·· eal," thu , " [ eal.]" The question in the ca is i this a negotiable promissory note, o a to be ntitl d to the peculiar privilrges and immunitie accorded to commercial pap r? The rule
that an instrument under seal, thouo-h otherwi in the form of a
promissory note, is not (certainly when ex cuted by a natural
rson how ever · ma be when ex cuted by a corporation) a
n gotiable note, entitled to such privil ge an 1mmumties, 1s
univer ally r cognized, and is not disputed in this state. But the
appellant contends that merely placin · upon an instrument a
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scroll or device, such as the statute allows as a substitute for a

common-law seal, without any recognition of it as a seal in the

body of the instrument, does not make it a sealed instrument.

Undoubtedly, where there is a scroll or device upon an instru-

ment, there must be something upon the instrument to show that

the scroll or device was intended for and used as a seal. The

scroll or device does not necessarily, as does a common-law seal,

es tablish its own character . Such words in the testimonium

clause as "witness my hand and seal," or "sealed with my seal,"

would establish that the scroll or device was used as a seal. No

such reference in the body of the instrument was necessary in

the case of a common-law seal. Goddard's Case, 2 Coke Rep. 5a;

7 Bac. Abr. (Bouvier's Ed.) 244. Nor is there any reason to

require it in the case of the statutory substitute, if the instrument

anywhere shows clearly that the device was used as and intended

for a seal. It would be difficult to conceive how the party could

express that the device was intended for a seal, more clearly than

by the word "seal," placed within and made a part of it . This

was an instrument under seal.

Order affirmed.
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V-

INDORSEMENT AFTER DISHONOR MAKES INSTRUMENT PAYABLE ON

DEMAND AS TO SUCH INDORSER. § 9 2.

Leavitt v. Putnam (1850), 3 N. Y. 494, 53 Am. Dec. 322.

Appeal from the superior court of the city of New York,

where the action was against Putnam and others, as the indorsers

of a promissory note. The plaintiff was nonsuited on the trial,

and after judgment he appealed to this court.

J. IV. Gerard, for appellant.

S. Sherwood, for respondent.

Hurlbut, J. On the 29th day of August, 1844, Messrs. J.

W. & R. Leavitt made their note for $1570.52, payable to the

order of T. Putnam & Co. (the defendants) eight months after

date. A few days after the maturity of the note, the defendants

indorsed it as follows: "Pay the within to A. Thacher, value

received, May 21, 1845. T. Putnam & Co." Thacher indorsed

without recourse, and delivered the note for a valuable considera-

tion to the American Exchange Bank, in whose behalf this action

is brought.

98
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On the trial the defendants urged, among other grounds of

objection to the plaintiff's recovery, that the defendants' indorse-

ment was in effect a new draft payable to Thacher only, and not

negotiable, so that no action could be maintained upon it in the

name of the plaintiff. In this they were sustained by the court,

and the plaintiff was nonsuited.

The other objections taken by the defendants on their motion

for a nonsuit were not considered by the court below, and under

the circumstances of the case can not be noticed on this appeal ;

so that the only thing for us to consider is, whether the indorse-

ment of a note made after due, differs from one made before

maturity in respect to its negotiability? It was conceded on the

argument that no express authority could be found sustaining the

distinction upon which the decision of the superior court was

based, but it was urged that the defence could be sustained upon

the principle that a dishonored note loses its mercantile character,

and its indorsement becomes an original contract which must be

made expressly negotiable in terms, or it could not be held to

possess the character of negotiability. There is unquestionably _a.

difference between the indorsement of a note after due and one
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while it is running to maturity , but this relates only to a single

point arising from the necessity of the case, to wit, the time of

payment, which, in the latter indorsement, is fixed at a future day

by the express agreement of the parties, while in the former, it is

declared by law to be within a reasonable time, upon demand.

But in all other respects the contract is the same as an indorse-

ment in the usual course of trade ; and it is difficult to perceive

how the single difference referred to can at all affect the negotia-

bility of the indorsement. A bill or note does not lose its nego-

tiable character by being dishonored. If originally negotiable it

may still pass from hand to hand ad infinitum until paid by the

drawer. Moreover the indorser after maturity writes in the same

form and is bound only upon the same condition of demand upon

the drawer and notice of non-payment as any other indorser.

Thus the paper preserves its mercantile existence and retains the

main attributes of a proper bill or note, and circulates as such

in the commercial community. Exceptions to a general rule affect-

ing so important and numerous a class of transactions as the one

under consideration must be productive of great inconvenience,

and will not be indulged except for urgent reasons ; and nothing

has been made to appear in the argument or seems to exist in the

case, which warrants the court in treating the ordinary indorse-

ment of a dishonored bill or note as without the law merchant and

n the trial the defendants urged, among other grounds of
obj ction to the plaintiff's recovery, that the defendant ' indorsement was in effect a new draft payable to Thacher only, and not
nc;otiable, so that no action could be maintained upon it in the
name of the plaintiff. In this they were u tained by the court,
and the plaintiff wa nonsuited.
The other objections taken by the defendants on their motion
for a nonsuit were not considered by the court below, and under
the circumstances of the case can not be noticed on this appeal;
o that the only thing for us to consider i , whether the indQrSe:.
ment of a note made after due, differs from one made before
maturity in re pect to its negotiability? It was conceded on the
argument that no expres authority could be found sustaining the
distinction upon which the decision of the superior court was
ba ed, but it was urged that the defence could be sustained upon
th principle that a di honored note lo es its mercantile character,
and it indor ement becomes an original contract which must be
made expre ly n gotiable in term , or it could not be held to
po se s the character of negotiability. There is unquestionably~
cLlfference between the indorsement of a note after due and one
while it is running to maturity, but this relate only to a single
point ari ing from the neces ity of the case, to wit, the time of
payment, which, in the latter indor ement, is fixed at a future day
by the express agreement of the parties, while in the former, it is
declared by law to be within a reasonable time, upon demand.
But in all other respects the contract is the same as an indorsement in the usual course of trade; and it is difficult to perceive
how the ino-le difference referred to can at all affect the negotiability of the indor ement. A bill or note does not lose its negotiable character by being di honored. If originally neo-otiable it
may still pa from hand to hand ad infinitmn until paid by the
drawer. Moreover the indorser after maturity write in the same
form and i bound only upon the ame condition of d mand upon
the drawer and notice of non-payment a any other indor er.
Thu the paper pre erves it mercantile exi tence and retains the
main attributes of a proper bill or note, and circulat s a such
in the omm rcial community. Exe ptions to a eneral rule affecting o important and numerou a cla of tran actions as the one
un 1 r consideration must be productive of great inconvenience,
and will not be indulrr d xcept for urgent rea ons; and nothing
has been made to appear in the argum nt or eem to exist in the
case, which warrant the court in treating the ordinary indorse-·
ment of a di . honored hill or n te a without the law merchant and
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not negotiable. While it was questioned whether such a note was

negotiable, and whether the indorser was chargeable except upon

the usual condition of demand and notice, there was perhaps rea-

son enough to sustain the decision of the court below. But since

both the note and its indorsement, by a long course of decisions,

have been treated as within the law merchant in respect to their

main attributes, the indorsement ought to be regarded as negoti-

able to the same extent as an indorsement before maturity . The

latter follows the nature of the original bill and is equally nego-

tiable. (Edie v. The East India Co. 2 Burr. 1216; Mil ford v.

Wolcoti, 1 Ld. Raym. 574 ; Allzvood v. Hazelton, 2 Baylies' S. C.

R. 457; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. R. 419; Berry v. Robinson, 9

John. 121.)

The note in the present case was upon its face transferable,

and its character in respect to negotiability could only have been

changed by an indorsement containing express words of restric-

tion. The defendants' indorsement was a full one, containing the

name of the person in whose favor it was made, but omitting the

words "or order, " the legal effect of which was, nevertheless, to

make the note payable to him or his order, and his endorsement
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therefore was effectual to transfer the note to the plaintiff . (Chitty

on Bills, 136; Story on Prom. Notes, § 139.)

I am of opinion that the judgment of the superior court

should be reversed, and a new trial awarded.

Judgment reversed.

payee must be indicated with reasonable certainty.

§ 10—6.

Gordon v. Lansing State Bank (1903), jjj Mich. 143.

Error to Ingham ; Wiest, J. Submitted December 2, 1902.

(Docket No. 125.) Decided May 12, 1903.

Assumpsit by John R. Gordon against the Lansing State Sav-

ings Bank to recover the balance of a deposit. From a judgment

for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Charles F. Hammond, for appellant.

Russell C. Ostrander, for appellee.

not negotiable. While it was que tioned whether such a note was
negotiable, and whether the indorser was chargeable except upon
the u ual condition of demand and notice, there was perhaps reason enough to sustain the d ci ion of the court below. But since
both th note and it indor ement, by a long course of deci ion ,
have been treated as within the law merchant in re pect to their
main attributes, the indor em nt ought to be regarded as negotiable to the same extent as an indorsement before maturity. The
latter follows the nature of the original bill and is equally negotiable. (Edie v. The East India Co. 2 Burr. I2I6; Milford v.
Wolcott, I Ld. Raym. 574; Allwood v. Hazelton, 2 Bay lies' S. C.
R. 457; Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. R. 4I9; Berry v. Robinson, 9
John. I2I.)
The note in the present case was upon its face transferable,
and its character in respect to negotiability could only have been
changed by an indorsement containing expre s words of restriction. The defendant ' indorsement was a full one, containing the
name of' the person in whose favor it was made, but omitting the
words "or order/' the legal effect of which was, nevertheless, to
make the note payable to him or his order, and his endorsement
therefore was effectual to transfer the note to the plaintiff. (Chitty
on Bills, I36; Story on Pro11i. N ates, § I39·)
I am of opinion that the judgment of the superior court
hould be reversed, and a new trial awarded.
Judgment reversed.

Moore, J. This case was tried by the circuit judge without

a jury. At the request of the defendant, he made a finding of

facts, which is as follows:

PAYEE MUST BE INDICATED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY.
§ Io-6.

Gordon v. Lansing State Bank (1903), 133 Mich. 143·
Error to Ingham ; Wiest, J. Submitted December
(Docket No. I25.) Decided May I2, I903.

2,

Igo2.

Assumpsit by John R. Gordon against the Lansing State Savings Bank to recover the balance of a depo it. From a judgment
for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Charles F. H awimond, for appellant.
Russell C. Ostrander, for appellee.
MooRE, J. This case was tried by the circuit judge without
a jury. At the reque t of the defendant, he made a finding of
facts, "' hich is a follows:
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"Monday morning, December 9, 1901, at about 9 o'clock,

there was presented at the bank of defendant at the City of Lan-

sing for payment the following check, made upon the printed

form of check supplied by defendant to its patrons, and signed by

plaintiff, viz. :

" 'Lansing, Mich., . . . ., 190. . No

" 'Lansing State Savings Bank of Lansing.

" 'Pay to the order of

Nine Hundred and Seventy Dollars. $970.00.

"John R. Gordon."

"The check was indorsed by Charles P. Downey, and was

presented by an employe of Mr. Downey, and cash was paid at

the time of its presentation.

"The plaintiff had been a depositor at defendant's bank at

periods for three or four years, and at the opening of the bank on

the morning of December 9, 1901, his balance or credit upon the

books of the bank was $3.40, but during the day $2,997.50 was

added to plaintiff's credit. The day defendant cashed the check

plaintiff was at the bank, and was informed that the check for

$970 had been cashed by payment to Mr. Downey, and he then
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notified defendant he would not accept that check as a voucher

for the money paid.

"December 14, 1901, plaintiff prepared and presented to

defendant his check, payable to himself, for $970, being the

amount he claimed to then have on deposit in the bank. Payment

on this check was refused by defendant upon the ground that

plaintiff had no funds in the bank."

The Circuit Judge rendered a judgment in favor of the plain-

tiff for $970 and interest. The case is brought here by writ of

error.

Two questions are discussed by counsel : First, the effect of

not dating the check ; second, has the check a payee ? We do not

deem it necessary to discuss the first question. As to the second

question, it will be noticed the drawer of the check di d not name

a payee therein, nor did he leave a blank space where the name of

a_ payee might be inserted, no r did he name an imp erson al payee .

In the case of Mcintosh v. Lytle, 26 Minn. 336 (3 N. W. 983),

the court used the following language :

" A check must name or i ndicate a payee. Checks drawn pay-

able to an impersonal payee, as to 'Bills Payable' or order, or to a

number or order, are held to be payable to bearer, on the ground

that the use of the words 'or order' indicates an intention that the

paper shall be negotiable, and the mention of an impersonal payee,

"Monday morning, December 9, I90'I at about 9 o clockJ
th r wa pr ent d at the bank of d fendant at the ity of Laning for payment the following check, made upon the printed
form of check supplied by d fendant to its patrons, and igned by
plaintiff, viz. :
"'L A SING, M ICH., . . . . , I9Q. . N 0 . . • . .
''LAN ING

TATE SAVINGS BA

K OF LANSING.

" 'Pay to the order of ....................................................... .
Nine Hundred and Seventy Dollars. $970.00.
"JOHN R. GoRDON. "
"The check was indorsed by Charle P. DowneyJ and was
presented by an employe of Mr. Downey, and cash wa paid at
the time of its presentation.
"The plaintiff had been a depositor at defendant's bank at
periods for three or four years, and at the opening of the bank on
the morning of December 9, I90I, hi balance or credit upon the
books of the bank was $3-40, but during the day $2,997.50 was
added to plaintiff's credit. The day defendant cashed the check
plaintiff was at the bank, and was informed that the check for
$970 had been cashed by payment to Mr. Downey, and he then
notified defendant he would not accept that check as a voucher·
for the money paid.
"December I4, I90I, plaintiff prepared and pre ented to
defendant hi check, payable to him elf, for $970, being the
amount he claimed to then have on deposit in the bank. Payment
on this check was refused by defendant upon the ground that
plaintiff had no funds in the bank."
The Circuit Judge rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $970 and interest. The case is brought here by writ of
error.
Two questions are di cus ed by counsel: First) the effect of
not dating the check; second) ha the check a payee? We do not
deem it nece sary to di cuss the fir t qu tion. As to the second
que tion, it will be notic d the draw r of the check did not name
a payee therein, nor did he leave a blank pace where the name of
a payee might be inserted, nor did he name an impersonal payee.
In the ca e of M clntosh v. Lytle) 26 Minn. 336 (3 N. W. 983)
the court u ed the following language :
"A check must name or indicate a payee. Check dra\ n payable to an impersonal payee, a to 'Bill Payable' or ord r, or to a
number or order, are held to be payable to bearer, on the ground
that the use of the words 'or order' indicates an intention that the
paper shall be negotiable, and the mention of an impersonal payee,.
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rendering an indorsement by the payee impossible, indicates an

intention that it shall be negotiable without indorsement, — that is,

that it shall be payable to bearer. So, when a bill, note, or check

is made payable to a blank or order, and actually delivered to take

effect as commercial paper, the person to whom delivered may

insert his name in the blank space as payee, and a bona fide holder

may then recover on it.

"These cases differ essentially from the one at bar. In the

latter case the person to whom delivered is presumed, in favor of

a bona fide holder, to have had authority to insert a name as payee.

In the former cases the instrument is, when it passes from the

hands of the maker, complete, in just the form the parties intend.

But in this case there is neither a blank space for the name of the

payee, indicating authority to insert the payee's name, nor is the

instrument' made payable to an impersonal payee, indicating a fully

completed instrument. It is claimed that the words 'on sight'

are such impersonal payee. They were inserted, however, for

another purpose, — to fix the time of payment, — and not to indi-

cate the payee. It is clearly the case of an inadvertent failure

to complete the instrument intended by the parties. The drawer
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undoubtedly meant to draw a check, but, having left out the

payee's name, without inserting in lieu thereof words indicating

the bearer as payee, it is as fatally defective as it would be if the

drawee's name were omitted."

See, also, Rush v. Haggard, 68 Tex. 674 (5 S. W. 683) ;

Prewitt v. Chapman, 6 Ala. 86; Brown v. Gilnian, 13 Mass. 160;

Rich v. Starbuck, 51 Ind. 87; Norton, Bills & N. (3d Ed.) p. 59,

and notes ; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 102.

The case differs from the one at bar in some respects, but the

important part of the decision is that a payee is necessary to make

a co mplete instrument, and, even though the maker of the check

may have intended to name a payee, if he has not in fact done so

the check is incomplete . In the case at bar the failure to name a

payee was not an oversight, if we may judge from what Mr. Gor-

don did, as will appear more in detail later.

Our attention has been called to Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunt.

529. In this case the bill of exchange was made payable to the

order of The court found that, under the

facts shown, the conclusion was irresistible that the name was

filled in with the consent of the drawer. The same case was pre-

viously reported in 2 Maule & S. 90 (Crutchley v. Clarance),

where, as the case then stood, it appeared the bill of exchange had

been sent out, the defendant leaving a blank for the name of the

rendering an indor ement by the pay e impos ible, indicates an
intention that it hall be n botiable without indor ement,-that is,
that it shall be payable to bearer.
o, wh n a bill, note, or check
is made payable to a blank or order, and actually delivered to take
effect a comm rcial paper, the per on to whom delivered may
in ert hi name in the blank pace as payee, and a bona fide holder
may then recover 0n it.
'These ca es differ e entially from the one at bar. In the
latter case the person .to whom delivered is presumed, in favor of
.a bona fide holder, to have had authority to insert a name as payee.
In the former cases the in trument i , when it pa ses from the
hands of the maker, complete, in just the form the parties intend.
But in this ca e there i neither a blank space for the name of the
payee, indicating authority to insert the payee's name, nor is the
instrument' made payable to an impersonal payee, indicating a fully
completed in trument. It i claimed that the words 'on sight'
are such impersonal payee. They were inserted, however, for
another purpo e,-to fix the time of payment,-and not to indicate the payee. It is clearly the case of an inadvertent failure
to complete the instrument intended by the parties. The drawer
undoubtedly meant to draw a check, but, having left out the
payee's name, without inserting in lieu thereof words indicating
the bearer a payee, it is as fatally defective as it would be if the
drav. ee's name were omitted."
See, also, Rush v. Haggard, 68 Tex. 674 (S S. W. 683):
Prewitt v. Chapnrian, 6 Ala. 86 · Brown v. Gilman, 13 Mass. 160;
Rich v. Starbiick, 51 Ind. 87; Norton, Bills & N. (3d Ed.) p. 59,
and notes; l Daniel, Neg. In t. § 102.
The case differs from the o_ne at bar in some respects, but the
important part of the decision i that a payee is necessary to make
a complete instrument, and, even though the maker of the check
may have intended to name a payee, if he has not in fact done so
the check is incomplete. In the case at bar the failure to name a
payee was not an oversight, if we may judge from what Mr. Gordon did, as will appear more in detail later.
Our attention has been called to Crutclily v. Mann, 5 Taunt.
529. In this case the bill of exchano- was made payable to the
order of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The court found that, under the
facts shown the conclu ion was irre i tible that the name was
filled in with the consent of the drawer. The same case was previously reported in 2 Maule & S. 90 ·cCrutchley v. Clarance),
where, as the case then stood, it appeared the bill of exchano-e had
been sent out, the defendant leavino- a blank for the name of the
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payee. One of the judges was of the opinion that the defendant,

by leaving the blank, undertook to be answerable for it, when filled

up in the shape of a bill of exchange; another judge was of the

opinion that it was as though the defendant had made the bill pay-

able to bearer; while the third judge was of the opinion that the

issuing of the bill in blank without the name of the payee was an

authority to a bona fide holder to insert the name.

In the case of Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359, a promissory

note was drawn, leaving a blank space for the name of the payee ;

and it was held :

" 'So the name of the payee may be left blank, and this will

authorize any bona fide holder to insert his own name.' Pars.

Notes & B. 33."

In the case of Brummel v. Enders, 18 Grat. 873, promissory

notes, blank as to the names of the payees, has been put in the

hands of an agent to be sold for the benefit of the makers. The

agent sold them, at a greater discount than the legal rate of inter-

est, to purchasers who did not know they were sold for the benefit

of the makers. At the time of the sale the names of the pur-

chasers were inserted, either by the purchasers or by the agent,
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in the blank left for the payee. When the notes were sued, the

makers pleaded usury. The court, following the cases already

cited, held that any bona fide holder of a bill or note which is

blank as to the name of the payee may insert his own name, and

thus acquire all the rights of the payee.

It will be observed that the case at bar differs from all of

these cases. As before stated, not only did Mr. Gordon fail to

insert the name of a payee, or to leave a blank where the name of

the payee might be inserted, but he did more; he drew a line

through the blank space , making it impossible for any one else to

insert therein a name, indicatin g very clearly that he _no t only.

decli ned to name a payee, bu t intended to mak-p it imp ossible for

any one else to do so . Had Mr. Gordon issued a check otherwise

perfect, but with the blank space for the amount of the check

unfilled, and delivered it to a third person, it would be presumed

the third person was given authority to fill the blank space. But

had he, instead of leaving the space a blank, filled it by drawing a

line through it, would any one say the third person might then

insert a sum of money in that space? If not, upon what principle

may the name of a payee be inserted when the space was filled in

the same way, or upon what theory may it be presumed there was

an impersonal payee when the maker has not made the check

payable to cash, or some other impersonal payee? In order to

paye .
ne of the judges wa of the opinion that the defendant,
by leaving the blank, undertook to be an w rabl for it, when filled
up in the shape of a bill of exchang ; another judg was of the
opinion that it v as as though the defendant had made the bill payable to bearer; while the third judge wa of the opinion that the
i uing f th bill in blank without the nam of the payee was an
authority to a bona fide holder to insert the name.
In the ca e of Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359, a promi ory
note was drawn, leaving a blank space for the name of the payee;
and it was held:
'' 'So the name of the payee may b 1 ft blank, and thi will
authorize any bona fide holder to in ert his own name.' Pars.
Notes & . 33."
In the case of Brimmiel v. Enders, 18 Grat. 873, promissory
notes, blank as to the names of the payee , has been put in the
hands of an agent to be sold for the benefit of the maker . The
agent sold them, at a greater di count than the legal rate of intere t, to purcha ers who did not know they were sold for the benefit
of the maker . At the time of the ale the names of the purcha er were inserted, either by the purchaser or by the agent,
in the blank left for the payee. \.\Then the note were sued, the
makers pleaded u ury. The court, following the ca e alr ady
cited, held that any bona fide holder of a bill or note which is
blank a to the name of the payee may in ert his own name, and
thu acquire all the riO'ht of the payee.
It will be ob erved that the ca e at 1 ar differs from all of
the e ca s.
s b fore stated, not only did Mr. ordon fail to
insert the name of a payee, or to leave a blank where the name of
the payee might be in ert d, but he did more; jie dr w a line
through the blank space, making it impo ible for any on el e to
in rt therein a name, indicatin · very clearly that he not only
declined to name a payee. but intended to make it impo ible for
any one el c to clo o. Had Mr. ord n i ued a ch ck otherwise
perfect, but \\ ith the blank spac f r th amount of the check
unfilled, and delivered it to a third person, it would be presumed
th third per on was giv n auth rity to fill the blank space. But
had he, instead of 1 aving the pa e a blank, fill d it 1 y drawing a
line through it, would any on ay the third person miD"ht then
insert a sum of money in that pac ? If n t, upon what principle
may the nam of a payee be in erted when th spac wa filled in
the same way or upon what th ory may it be pre urned there was
an imper onal payee when the maker ha not made the check
payable to cash , or some other impersonal payee? 'rn order to
1

GORDON

v.

103

LANSING STATE BANK

Gordon v. Lansing State Bank 103

construe t h e check as a c omplete instrument, we must read into it

an intention not only no t ex pressed by its language, but contrary"

to t he act of the maker . ~ TKe~check , as it appears today, is without

any payee. The record is silent in relation to whom it was deliv-

ered, or whether the person who presented it at the bank or the

person whose indorsement it bears was a bona fide holder.

Judgment is affirmed.

Hooker, C. J., concurred with Moore, J. ~v r " v Li,VJVA ^-

construe th e check as a complete instrument, we must read into it
an intention not only not expressed by it language, but contrary
to the act of the maker.
e check, as it appears today, is without
any payee. The record is silent in relation to whom it was delivered, or whether the person who presented it at the bank or the
person whose indorsement it bears wa a bona fide holder.

Carpenter, J. I regret that I cannot concur in the opinion V*^*x^

Judgment is affirmed.

of my Brother Moore. I agree with him that the check in ques-

tion is not governed by the authorities which hold that, where a

blank is left for the insertion of the name of a payee, the instru-

HOOKER,

c. J., concurred with MOORE, J.

_

~ ~·

ment is to be treated as payable to bearer. I cannot agree, how-

ever, that the case of Mcintosh v. Lytle, 26 Minn. 336 (3 N. W.

983), is controlling. That case resembles this in many particu-

lars. There is, however, a difference which, in my judgment,

renders the reasoning of that case inapplicable. The fact that the

plaintiff in the case at bar used the ordinary blank, and drew a

line through the space intended for the name of the payee, pre-

vents our assuming, as did the court there, — and its decision was
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based on this assumption, — that it is "the case of an inadvertent

failure to complete the instrument intended by the parties." The_

instrument under consideration is obviously comp lete, i n just the

form the maker intended .

In my judgment, the authorities which hold a check payable

to the order of an impersonal payee to be valid and negotiable

control this case. I quote from the case of Willets v. Bank, 2

Duer, at page 129:

"One of the checks was payable to the order of 1658, the

other three to the order of bills payable ; and, as the required order

could not in either case possibly be given, the checks, unless trans-

ferable by delivery, were payable to no one, and were void upon

their face. The law is well settled that a draft payable to the

order of a fictitious p ersoryinasmuch as a title cannot b e given by

an i ndorsement, is, in judgment of law, pa y able to bea rer. Vere

v. Lewis, 3 Term R. 183; Minet v. Gibson, Id. 481; Gibson v.

Minet, 1 H. Black. 569, affirmed in the House of Lords. And it

seems to us quite manifest that in principle these decisions embrace

the present case. At any rate, the bank, by certifying the checks

as good, is estopped from denying that they were valid as drafts

upon the funds of the maker, and, consequently, were payable to

I regret that I cannot concur in the opinion ~ ·
of my Brother MooRE. I agree with him that the check in question is not governed by the authorities which hold that, where a
blank is left for the insertion of the name of a payee, the instrument is to be treated as payable to bearer. I cannot agree, however, that the case of M clntosh v. Lytle) 26 Minn. 336 (3 N. W.
983), is controlling. That case resembles this in many particulars. There is, however, a difference which, in my judgment,
renders the reasoning of that case inapplicable. The fact that the
plaintiff in the case at bar used the ordinary blank, and drew a
line through the space intended for the name of the payee, prevents our assuming, as did the court there,-and its decision was
based on this assumption,-that it is " the case of an inadvertent
failure to complete the instrument intended by the parties." ~
instrument under consideration is obviously complete, in just the
form the maker intended.
In my judgment, the authorities which hold a check payable
to the order of an impersonal payee to be valid and negotiable
control this case. I quote from the case of Willets v. Bank) 2
Duer, at page 129:
"One of the checks was payable to the order of 1658, the
other three to the order of bills payable; and, as the required order
could not in either case po ibly be given, the checks, unless transferable by delivery, were payable to no one, and were void upon
their face. The law is well settled that a draft a able to the
order of a fictitious p ~ r so n , inasmuch as a title cannot be given by
an indorsement, is, in judgment of law, pay~ble to bearer. Vere
v. Lewis) 3 Term R. 183 ; Minet v. Gibson) Id. 481; Gibson v.
Minet) r H. Black. 569, affirmed in the House of Lords. And it
seems to us quite manifest that in principle these decisions embrace
the present case. At any rate, the bank, by certifyina the checks
as good, is estopped from denying that they were valid as drafts
upon the funds of the maker, and, consequently, were payable to
CARPENTER,

J.
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bearer. The giving of such a certificate, if otherwise construed,

would be a positive fraud."

In Mechanics' Bank v. Straiton, 3 Abb. Dec. 269, a check

payable to bills payable or order was held payable to bearer, the

court saying:

"By naming the persons to whose order the instrument is

payable, the maker manifests his intention to limit its negotiability

by imposing the condition of indorsement upon its first transfer.

But no such intention is indicated by the designation of a ficti-

tious or impersonal payee, for indorsement under such circum-

stances is manifestly impossible ; and words of negotiability, when

used in connection with such designations, are capable of no rea-

sonable interpretation except as expressive of an intention that the

bill shall be negotiable without indorsement, — i. e., in the same

manner as if it had been made payable to bearer."

We must decide that the check in the case at bar, like those

in the cases cited, is either altogether void, or is transferable by

delivery. I submit that we should follow those cases; and decide

that it is transferable by delivery. To quote the language of Lord

Ellenborough, in Cruchley v. Clarance, 2 Maule & S. 90:
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"As the defendant has chosen to send the bill [check] into

the world in this form, the world ought not to be deceived by his

acts."

This view of the case compels me to notice the fact that the

check under consideration is not dated . According to the weight

of authority, this omission d oes not invalidate it. See Zane, Banks,

§ 152; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst., § 15*77; Norton, Bills & N. (3d Ed.),

p. 405, note.

I think the judgment of the court below should be reversed,

and a judgment entered in this court for the defendant.

Grant, J., concurring with Carpenter, J.

Montgomery, J., did not sit. „ -

bearer. The g iving of uch a certificate, if otherwise construed,
would be a positiv fraud."
In 11Iec!L anics' Bank v. traiton, 3 bb. ec. 2 , a check
payab le to bill payable or order was held payable to bearer, the
c u rt ayin O'" :
"By naming the per ons to who e ord r the instrument is
payabl , the maker manif t his intention to limit its n gotiability
by impo ing the condition of indor ement upon its fir t tran fer.
ut n
uch intention i indicated by the designation of a fictitiou or impersonal paye , for indorsement under uch circumtanc s is manifestly impos ible; and words of negotiability, when
u ed in connection with uch de ignations, are capable of no reaonable interpretation xcept a expressive of an intention that the
bill shall be negotiabl without indorsement,-i. e., in the same
manner as if it had been made payable to bearer."
We mu t decid that the che k in the ca e at bar, like those
in th cases cited, i either altoget)1er void, or is transferable by
delivery. I ubmit that we hould follow tho e ca e , and decide
that it is tran ferable by delivery. To quote the lanO'"uage of Lord
Ellenborough, in Cruchley v. Clarance, 2 Maule & S. 90:
"As the defendant ha chos n to send the bill [check] into
the world in this form, th world ought not to be deceived by his
acts."
Tqis view of the case compel me to notice the fact that the
~ under consideration i not dated. According to the weight
of authority, this omi ion does not invalidate it. See Zane, Banks,
§ 152; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst.,§ 1577; Norton, Bill & N. (3d Ed.),
p. 405, note.
I think the judgment of the court below hould be reversed,
and a judgm nt entered in this court for the defendant.
GRANT, J., concurring with CARPENTER, J.
MONTGOMERY, J., did not sit.
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instrument payable to order of fictitious person. § ii — 3.

Shipman v. Bank (1891), 126 N. Y. 318, 22 Am. St. Rep. 821.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are

INSTRUMENT PAYABLE T O ORDER OF FICTITIOUS PERSON.

§ II-3.

stated in the opinion.

William Allen Butler, for appellant.

Shipman v. Bank (I89I ), I 26 N. Y. 3I8, 22 A m. St. Rep. 82I.

Elihu Root, for respondents.

O'Brien, J. This appeal brings here for review a judgment

of over $223,000, recovered by the plaintiffs against the defendant,

upon a state of facts fully found and stated by the referee in his

The nature of the action and the facts, so far a material, are
stated in the opinion.

report, and in regard to which there is little, if any, serious dispute

between the parties^ The form of the action is for the recovery

of a sum of money which, it- is claimed, the defendant undertook,

when accepting the plaintiffs' deposits, to pay to them or upon

William Allen Butler, for appellant.
Elihu Root, for respondents.

their order and direction. It has been found, and is admitted on

both sides, that on the 7th of April, 1884, the plaintiffs had upon

deposit to their credit with the defendant the sum of $14,499:08.

That from this date to the close of business, on the 3d day of

October, 1888, the defendant had and received, to and for the use

of the plaintiffs, various other sums of money deposited from time

to time between these dates by the plaintiffs with the defendant
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amounting in the aggregate to six million, two hundred and thir-

teen thousand, five hundred and eighty-six dollars and seventy-one

cents. That between the 7th day of April, 1884, and the close of

business, on the 3d day of October, 1888, the defendant paid ,to

the order of the plaintiff on their checks, drawn against the bal-

ance above stated and the deposits subsequently made, various

sums of money amounting in the aggregate to six million, thirty

thousand and forty dollars and twenty-nine cents. This would

leave a balance due to the plaintiffs by the defendant of one hun-

dred and ninety-eight thousand and forty-five dollars and fifty

cents, which, with interest, is the sum that constitutes the subject

of this controversy. The defendant alleged in its answer that all

moneys deposited with it by the plaintiffs were fully paid upon

their order and by checks drawn upon it by them, and in order

to meet and disprove the plaintiffs' claim that there was due to

them from the defendant at the close of business, on the 3d day

of October, 1888, the sum of one hundred and ninety-eight thou-

sand and forty-five dollars and fifty cents, the defendant produced

twenty-seven checks, all signed by the plaintiffs and drawn upon

O'BRIEN, J. This appeal brings here for review a judgment
of over $223,000, recovered by the plaintiffs against the defendant,
, upon a state of facts fully found and stated by the referee in his
report, and in regard to which there is little, if any, serious dispute
between the parties , The form of the action is for the recovery
of a sum of money which, it· is claimed, the defendant undertook,
when accepting the plaintiffs' deposits, to pay to them or upon
their order and direction. It has been found, and is admitted on
· both sides, that on the 7th of April, I884, the plaintiffs had upon
deposit to their credit with the defendant the sum of $I4,499:08.
That from this date to the close of business, on the 3d day of
October, I888, the defendant had and received, to and for the use
of the plaintiffs, various other sums of money deposited from time
· to time between these dates by the plaintiffs with the defendant
amounting in the aggregate to six million, two hundred and thirteen thousand, five hundred and eighty-six dollars and seventy-one
cents. That between the 7th day of April, I884, and the clo~~ of
business, on the 3d day of October, I888, the defendant paia ,to
the order of the plaintiff on their checks, drawn against the balance above stated and the deposits subsequently made, various
sums of money amounting in the aggregate to six million, thirty
thousand and forty dollars and twenty-nine cents. This would
leave a balance due to the plaintiffs by the defendant of one hundred and ninety-eight thousand and forty-five dollars and fifty
cents, which, with interest, is the sum that constitutes the subject
of this controversy. The defendant alleged in its answer that all
moneys deposited with it by the plaintiffs were fully paid upon
their order and by checks drawn upon it by them, and in order
to meet and disprove the plaintiffs' claim that there was due to
them from the defendant at the close of business, on the 3d day
of October, I888, the sum of one hundred and ninety-eight thousand and forty-five dollars and fifty cents, the defendant produced
twenty-seven checks, all signed by the plaintiffs and drawn upon
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the defendant, directing the payment of sums respectively aggre-

gating the total balance above mentioned, and to recover which

the plaintiffs brought the action. That the defendant actually paid

these checks is not disputed, and the case is thus made to turn

upon the question whether they are available to the defendant as_

lawful vouchers, establishing the fact that the moneys claimed

b y the plaintiffs were paid out by the defendant upon these checks.

Recording to the order and direction of the plaintiffs . A clear

understanding of the question involved requires a brief statement

of the facts and circumstances under which the twenty-seven

checks were signed by the plaintiffs and presented to and paid by

the defendant. The pjajntiffs are a well known law firm in the

city of New York, engaged in an extensive business which, in

its organization, had a department known as the "Real Estate

Department." In this branch of their business they exam ined

titles for clients who were lenders of money on bond and mortgage,

carried out and completed such loans, and occasionally examined

titles for clients who were purchasers of real estate. One of the

members of the firm had general charge of this department, but

the details of the business and the execution of the work was
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entrusted to subordinates. One James E. Bedell, a lawyer who

had been admitted to the bar in the year 1868, and had been in

the employ of the plaintiffs since 1873, assisting in the real estate

department, was, in the year 1881, practically put in charge of

the work of this department under the direction of the member

of plaintiffs' firm who had general charge. Bedell was an experi-

enced and capable lawyer. The plaintiffs believed that he was

honest and trustworthy, and, prior to the discovery of the very

extraordinary crimes in connection with these checks, they had

no reason whatever to suspect or distrust him. During the period

covered by the transactions in question the plaintiffs employed one

Dodge, a competent expert bookkeeper, who took charge of the

plaintiffs' books and acted as cashier. He kept the account

between the plaintiffs and defendant. He filled out all the checks

and made all the entries in the check-books, and the checks, when

paid by defendant, came to him with the pass-book, which was

balanced by the defendant, and the vouchers, including the checks

in question, returned with the book, from time to time, at frequent

intervals. The course of the business in which the checks in ques-

tion were issued was substantially as follows : The plaintiffs' client

who wished to make a loan through them, furnished the money,

which went directly into the plaintiffs' general bank account with

the defendant. Against the sum to be loaned and thus put to the

th d f ndant, directing the payment of urns r pectively aggreating th total balance above m ntion d, and to recover which
the plaintiff brought th action. That th d fendant actually paid
th e ch cks i not di put d, and the ca is thus mad e to turn
u on the qu tion wh th er th y are available to the defendant as
lawful vouch r , e tabli hing th fact that the money claimed
by the laintiffs wer paid out by the dtfendant upon the e check
acco rding t th e ord r and direction of the plaintiff . A clear
unde rstanding of th qu tion involved r quires a brief statement
f the facts and circum tance under which the twenty-seven
che k were ign d by th plaintiff and pr sent d to and paid by
the defendant. Th ~ are a well known law firm in the
city of J e\ York nrraged in an exten ive bu ine which, in
it
rganization, had a d partm nt known a the " Real Estate
epa rtment. ' In thi branch of their bu in ess they examined
!ill__ for cli nt who wer 1 nd r of mon yon bond and mortgage,
carried out and complet d uch loan , and occasionally examined
ne of the
title for clients who w re purcha er of real estat .
members of the firm had general charge of this d partment, but
the detail of th bu in e s and the execution of the work was
entru ted to subordinates. One Jame E. Bedell, a lawyer who
had been admitted to the bar in the year 186 , and had been in
th mploy of the plaintiff sine 1873, a i ting in th real estate
department, wa , in th e year 18. l, practically put in charge of
th work of this lepartm nt und er the direction of the memb r
of plaintiffs' firm who had o-eneral charg . B dell was an experienced and capable lawyer. The plaintiff beli ved that he wa
honest and trustworthy, and, prior to the di covery of the very
extraordin ary crim in connection with these checks, th y had
n rea on whatev r to suspect or distru t him. Durinrr the period
covered by the transaction in qu e tion th plaintiffs employed one
oclo-e, a competent xpert bookk eper, who took charg of the
plaintiff ' book and act d a ca hier. He k pt th account
b tv;een the plaintiff and defendant. H fill d out all the ch ch
and made all the entri in th ch k-book , and th check , wh n
paid by d fendant, came to him with th e pa -book, which wa
balanced by th d f ndant, and the voucher , includin th checks
in que tion, r turned with the bo k, from tim to tim , at frequ nt
intervals. The cour e of th bu ine in which th ch cks in que tion were is u d wa ub tantially a follows: Th plaintiff ' cli nt
wh wi h cl t make a loan through th em , furni h d the mon ey,
which went Erectly into the plaintiffs' g n ral oank account with
the def ndant.
gainst the um to be loan d and thu put to the
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plaintiffs' credit checks were rilled up by Dodge, the cashier, from

a written statement made by Bedell, showing the amount required

to pay liens or charges on the property to be mortgaged, the

amount of the plaintiffs' charges, and any other items entering

into the transaction, and the balance to be paid the borrower.

After filling up the checks Dodge would take the check-book,

with the filled-up checks, to a member of the firm for signature,

showing him the entries in the check-book of the deposit of the

client's money and the statement of Bedell as to the payments to

be made, and thereupon the check would be signed by the plain-

tiffs, in the name of the individual partner to whom it was pre-

sented by Dodge, the firm name being engraved on each check

and the individual signature underwritten. Dodge would then

take away the check-book and deliver the several checks to Bedell.

In this manner the twenty-seven checks in question were entrusted

by the plainiffs to Bedell, their clerk, for delivery to the payees,

respectively, therein named, who were in good faith believed by

the plaintiffs to be real persons, entitled to receive the amount of

said checks, respectively, from them or their clients. The defend-

ant paid th e checks to. a third person, upon an indorsement there-
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on of the payees named, f o rged by Bedell, who converted the pro-

ceeds to his own use . The nam es of the payees _written in sixtee n

of the twenty-seven checks, drawn for sums aggregating $112,-

818.72, were_not the_ names of reaLbut fieititjous, persona. The

remaining eleven checks, drawn for sums aggregating $85,227.08,

were made payable^ to the order of real persons, w hose indorse-

ments were_ in every case forged by Bedell . Only three of the

checks, drawn for less than $2,400, were paid to Bedell by defend-

ant. All the others were deposited, from time to time, in various

other banks in the city of New York, and the money thereon

received by Bedell from these banks, and the checks all ultimately

paid by defendant through the exchanges in the clearing house,

in the due and regular course of business. As to the sixteen

checks payable to the order of ficititious persons, the plaintiffs

were led by fraudulent contrivances and representations on the

part of Bedell, the details of which appear in the record, to believe,

and they did in fact believe, until the discovery of the forgeries,

that such payees were real persons ; and as to all the checks, the

plaintiffs did not intend that any of them should go into circulation

or should be paid by the defendant otherwise than through a

delivery to and indorsement by the payee named therein. The

checks were paid in every case by the defendant, without any

inquiry as to the genuineness of the indorsements, and in reliance

plaintiffs' credit checks were filled up by Dodge, the cashier, from
a writt n statement made by edell, hO\ ing th amount re }Uired
to pay li n or charges on the pr perty to be mortgaged, the
amount of the plaintiff ' charge , and any other item entering
into the tran action, and the balanc to be paid the borrower.
After filling up the checks DodCTe would take the check-book,
\\ ith the filled-up checks, to a m mber of the firm for signature,
bowing him the entries in the check-book of th e d posit of the
client's money and the tatement of edell as to th payments to
be made, and thereupon the check would be signed by the plaintiffs, in the name of the individual partner to whom it was presented by Dodge, the firm name beino- engraved on each check
and the individual ignature underwritten. Dodge would then
take away the check-book and deliver the several checks to BedeII.
In this manner the twenty-seven checks in question were entrusted
by the plai~ffs to Bedell, their clerk, for delivery to the payee ,
re pectively, therein named, who were in good faith believed by
the plaintiffs to be real persons, entitled to receive the amount of
aid checks, respectively, from them or their clients. The defendant paid the checks to a third person, upon an indor ement thereon of the payees named, forged by Bedell, who converted the proceeds to his own use. The names of the payees written in sixteen
of the twenty-seven checks, drawn for sums ag<Tregating $112,The
818.72, ~ere not the names of real but ficititiou
remainino- eleven checks, drawn for um ao-gregating $85,227.08
were made payable to the order of real persons. who e indorsements were in every ca e forged by Bedell. Only three of the
checks, drawn for less than $2,400, were paid to Bedell by defendant. All the other were deposited, from time to time, in various
other banks in the city of New York, and the money thereon
received by Bedell from these banks, and the check all ultimately
paid by defendant through the exchan<Te in the clearing house,
in the due and regular course of bu iness. A to the ixteen
checks payable to the order of ficititiou per on , the plaintiffs
were led by fraudulent contrivance and repre entation on the
part of Bedell, the details of which appear in the record, to believe
and they did in fact beli ve, until th di covery f the forgerie .
that such payees were real per on ; and a to all the check , the
plaintiff did not intend that any of th m hould go into circulation
or should be paid by the defendant otherwi
than through a
delivery to and indorsement by the payee named therein. The
checks were paid in every case by th defendant, without any
inquiry as to the genuinene s of the indor ement , and in refiance
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upon the responsibility of the parties presenting the same, and not

in reliance upon anything done or forborne by the plaintiffs,

except that they were signed by them. There is no elaim that, at

the time the defendant paid the checks, it had any knowledge or

suspicion or reason to suspect that any of the indorsements were

forged, or that any of the names were fictitious, or that there was

any fraud or irregularity in respect to any of the checks or any

indorsement or writing thereon. The plaintiffs' confidence in

Bedell and his representation of them in all their dealings with

clients, concerning loans on real estate, continued without inter-

ruption, until one of these clients, upon examining a fabricated

mortgage sent to him by Bedell, had his attention arrested by the

faintness of the impression of the seal of the register on the certi-

ficate of record that he sent the mortgage to the register's office

for a better sealing. This led to the discovery of all the frauds,

forgeries, fabrications of documents, attestations and official certi-

ficates carried on by him in the plaintiff's' office for more than four

years. The plaintiffs did not discover that the indorsements on

the checks had been forged, or that the amount thereof had not

been paid to them or their order, until nearly four months after
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May 22, 1888, which was the date of the last check so forged.

On the discovery of the facts and before the commencement of

this action, the plaintiffs tendered the checks to the defendant,

and demanded that the amount of the same should be paid to

them, or credited in their account by the defendant, which tender

and demand was refused.

The various deposits of money made from time to time by

the plaintiffs with the defendant created the relation of debtor and

creditor, and the law implies a contract on the part of the defend-

ant to disburse the money standing to the plaintiffs' credit only

upon their order and in conformity with their directions. The

defendant is not entitled to charge against the plaintiffs' account

any sums as payments unless they have been made to such persons

as the plaintiffs directed. Such payments as were made without

the order of the plaintiffs of their funds by the defendant, afford

to it no protection when called upon by the plaintiffs to account

for the money deposited. Payments made upon for ged indorse-

ments are at the peril of the bank_ unless it can claim protectio n

upon some principle of estoppel or by reas on of some negligence"

char^linTe~Fo the depositor^ These rules are so familar and so

well established and illustrated by the adjudged cases that a bare

reference to them is all that is needful here. (Crazvford v. West

Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 53 : JEtna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank,

upon the re pan ibility of th partie pr enting the ame, and not
in r liance upon anything done or forborne by th plaintiffs,
xcept that they \\·ere igned by them. There i no laim that, at
the tim th e defendant paid the check , it had any knowledge or
u picion or rea n to u pect that any of the indor ements wer
for ed or that any of the name wer fictitiou , or that there wa
any fraud or irr gularit in re pect to any of the check or any
indor ment or \ riting thereon. The plaintiff ' confidence in
Dedell and hi r pre entation of them in all thei r d aling with
client , concerning loans on real estate, continu d without interruption, until one of the e cli nt , upon examining a fabricated
mortgage ent to him by Bedell, had his attention arr sted by the
faintne of the impr ion of the al of the register on the certificate of record that he s nt the mortaage to the register's office
for a better ealing. Thi led to th di covery of all the fraud ,
forgerie fabrication of document , atte tation and official certificate carried on by him in the plaintiffs' office for more than four
year . The plaintiff did not ii cov r that th e indo r em nts on
the check had been forged, or that the amount thereof had not
been paid to them or th eir order, until nearly four months after
May 22, 1888, which wa the date of the la t check so forged.
On the discovery of the fact and before the commencement of
this action, the plaintiffs tendered the checks to the defendant ,
and demanded that the amount of the ame hould be paid to
them, or credited in their account by the defendant, which tender
and demand wa refu ed.
The variou deposit of money made from time to time by
the plaintiff with the defendant created the relation of debtor and
creditor, and the law implies a contract on the part of the defendant to di bur e th e money standing to the plaintiffs' credit only
upon thei r order and in conformity with their directions. The
defendant is not entitled to charge again t th e plaintiff ' account
any sum a payment unle s they have b en made to such per ans
as the plaintiff directed.
uch payment as were made without
the ord r of th plaintiffs of their funds by the defendant afford
to it no protection when called upon by the plaintiff to account
for the money depo ited. Payments mad upon forged indor ement are at th p ril of the bank unle it can claim protection
upon ome principle of e toppel or by rea on of ome ne Ii ence
chargea e to t e epo itor.
e ru e are o familar and so
well e tabli hed and illustrated by the adjudged ca es that a bare
refe rence to them i all that i needful here. (Crawford v. West
Side Bank, roo . Y. 53: .!Etna Nat. Ba.nk v. Fourth Nat. Bank,
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46 id. 86; Corn Exchange Bank v. Nassau Bank, 91 id. 80;

Phoenix Bank v. Rislcy, m U. S. 125; Bank of British North

America v. Merchants' i\ r at. Bank, 91 N. Y. 106; Marine Bank v.

Fulton Bank, 2 Wallace, 256; First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94

U. S. 347 ; Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Importers & Traders' Bank,

119 N. Y. 195.)

The statement of the account made by the defendant to the

plaintiffs from time to time, the balancing of the bank pass-book

and the return of the same to the plaintiffs with the vouchers,

including, as they did, the checks in controversy, with the forged

indorsements thereon, constitute no obstacle to the maintenance

of this action by the plaintiffs as they were ignorant of the facts

and circumstances under which the checks were issued and put in

circulation. An account thus stated can always be opened upon

proof of mistake or fraud, and the only effect of the plaintiffs'

silence as to the correctness of the account rendered by the defend-

ant is to put upon them, in this action, the burden of showing that

the account, as stated, was the result of fraud or mistake, a burden

which they have fully assumed and met, as the referee has found.

It is urged that the plaintiffs owed the duty to the defendant
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of examining the vouchers returned to them with the balanced

pass-book from time to time, and that a careful examination of

the same would have disclosed the fact that the money was

received upon the checks by Bedell and his forgeries thus detected.

The duty of examining the returned vouchers was delegated by

the plaintiffs to their cashier and bookkeeper, who was a faithful

and competent person for many years in plaintiffs' employ. The

referee found as a fact, from all the circumstances of the case,

that the fail u re -to discover the forgeries sooner than they w ere

was not, in any case, caused by any neglect on the part of the

jlaTntiff s or their cashier, o f any duty that the plaintiffs owed to

the defen dant. The examination~of~the checks would, of course,

enabkTthe plaintiffs to ascertain whether their own signature was

genuine, and whether the amount, date or name of the payee had

been changed, but would not necessarily enable them to detect the

forgery of the payee's name. The law imposed no duty upon the

plaintiffs to do more than they did to ascertain whether the

indorsements on the checks were genuine. The defendant's con-

tract was to pay the checks only upon a genuine indorsement.

The drawer is not presumed to know, and in fact seldom does

know, the signature of the payee. The ba nk must, at its own peri^

determ ine that question . It has the opportunity, by requiring

identification when the check is presented, or a responsible guar-

46 id. 86; Corn ExchaHge Bank v. Nassau Bank, 91 id. 80;
Phamix Bank v. Risley, I l l U. . 125; Bank of British North
A m erica v . .Merchants
at. Bank, 91 . Y. IO ; Marine Bank v.
Fulton Bank, 2 Wallac , 256; First Nat. Bank v. Whit11ian, 94
U . . 347; Citi:=ens' Nat. Bank v. Importers & Traders' Bank,

II9 N. Y. 195.)
The tatem nt of the account made by the defendant to the
plaintiff from time to time, the balancing of the bank pa s-book
and the return of the same to the plaintiffs with the vouchers,
including, as they did, the checks in controver y, with the fo rged
indorsements th ereon, constitute no ob tacle to the maintenance
of thi action by the plaintiffs a they were ignorant of the fact
and circumstance und r which the checks were issued and put in
circulation. An account thus stated can always be opened upon
proof of mistake or fraud , and the only effect of the plaintiff '
silence as to the correctness of the account rendered by the defendant is to put upon them, in this action. the burden of showing that
the account, as stated, was the result of fraud or mistake, a burden
which they have fully assumed and met, as the referee ha found.
It is urged that the plaintiffs owed the duty to the defendant
of examining the vouchers returned to them with the balanced
pass-book from time to time, and that a careful examination of
the ame would have disclo ed the fact that the money wa
received upon the checks by Bedell and his forgeries thu detected.
The duty of examininrr the returned voucher ' as delegated by
the plaintiffs to their ca hier and bookkeeper, who was a faithful
and competent person for many years in plaintiff ' employ. The
referee found as a fact, from all the circumstances of the ca e
that the failure. to di cover the forgeries sooner than they ' ere
was not, in any case, cau ed b an ne lect on the art of th
laintiffs or t eir ca hier of any duty that the plaintiff owed to
the defendant. The examination of the check ' ould, of cour e
enable the plaintiffs to a certain whether their own signature wa
genuine and whether the amount, date or name of the payee had
been chanrred, but would not necessaril enable them to detect the
forgery of the payee's name. The law impo ed no dut upon th
plaintiffs to do more than they did to ascertain whether the
indor ements on the checks w re rrenuine. The defendant' contract was to pay the check only upon a rr nuine indor ement.
The drawer is not pre urned to kno", and in fact eldom does
know the signature of the payee. The bank mu t at it o" n peril,
determine that question. It ha the opportunit_, b requiring
identification when the check i pre ented or a re pon 'ible rruar-
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anty from the party presenting it, of ascertaining whether the

indorsement is genuine or not. When it returns thejdi eck to the

depositor, as evidence of a payment made by his direction, the

Tattpr Jiasj-h e right to assume that the bank has ascertained the

fact to bejth at the indorsement is genuine . (Weisser v. Denison,

10 N. Y. 68; Welsh v. German American Bank, -3 id. 424; Frank

v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 84 id. 209; First Nat. Bank v. Whitman,

(;4 U. S. 347; Leather Mfg. Bank v. Morgan, 117 id. 107.) The

plaintiffs committed the examination of the vouchers when

returned from the bank to a faithful and competent cashier, who

failed to discover the forged indorsements. There is not the

slightest reason to believe that if the checks had been examined

by one of the plaintiffs themselves the results would have been

any different. We are unable to see that anything was done or

omitted by the plaintiffs with respect to the examination of the

indorsements upon the vouchers that excuses the defendant from

its obligation to pay upon a genuine order only. Nor can we

perceive anything done or omitted by the plantiffs in the general

conduct and management of their business, or in the employment

of and confidence reposed in Bedell that estops them from alleging
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that the twenty-seven checks were paid without their authority.

Whether the plaintffs were guilty of any negligence in that

regard was a question of fact and the finding is that they were,

in so far as the defendant was concerned, reasonably prudent and

careful and that the payment of the checks was not caused by

any negligence on their part and we do not think it can be said

that the finding is without evidence. Moreover, it is found that

the defendant paid the twenty-seven checks, in each case, without

any inquiry as to the genuineness of the indorsements, and in

reliance upon the responsibility of the persons presenting the same

for payment, and not in reliance upon anything done or forborne

by the plaintiffs, except the fact that the checks had been drawn

by them ; and, further, that all the checks except the three paid

directly to Bedell, and amounting to less than $2,400, were pre-

sented to the defendant by, and paid to banks perfectly solvent,

and liable to respond to the defendant for all moneys paid upon

the forged indorsements. These findings, supported as they are

by the evidence, dispose of much of the argument upon which it

is sought to establish the proposition that the plaintiffs are, by

reason of their own acts and omissions, estopped from claiming

that the checks were paid by the defendant without their authority.

The facts upon which an estoppel must always be based are found

against the defendant. Bede ll in issuing the false c hecks and

anty from the party presenting it, of a certaining whether the
indor ment i o-enuin or not. V hen it returns the check to the
d po itor a evidence of a a ment made b hi dir ction th
latter ha th -·
1
that the bank has ascertained the
fuet to be th;t the indor ement i genuine. (Weisser v. Denison,
IO T. Y. 68; T1/ elsh v. German Anierican Bank, 73 id. 424; Frank
v. Chemical
at. Bank, 84 id. 209; First Nat . Bank v. Whitman,
94
. 347; Leather Mfg. Bank v. Morgan) 117 id. 107.) The
plaintiffs committed the examination of the voucher when
returned from the bank to a faithful and competent cashier, who
failed to di cov r the forged indorsements. There is not the
lighte t reason to believe that if the checks had been examined
by one ·of the plaintiff them elves the re ults would have been
any different. We are unable to see that anything was done or
omitted by the plaintiffs with respect to th e examination of the
indor ements upon the voucher that excuses the defendant from
it obligation to pay upon a genuine order onl y. Nor can we
perceive anything done or omitted by the plantiffs in the general
conduct and management of their busine , or in the employment
of and confidence reposed in Bedell that estop them from alleging
that the twenty-seven checks were paid witho ut their authority.
Whether the plaintffs we re guilty of any negligence in that
regard was a que tion of fact and the finding i that they were,
in so far as the defendant was concerned, reasonably prudent and
careful and that the payment of the checks vvas not caused by
any negligence on their part and we do not think it can be said
that the finding is without evidence. Moreover, it is found that
the defendant paid the twenty-seven checks, in each ca e, without
any inquiry a to the genuinene s of the indorsements, and in
reliance upon the responsibility of the persons presentin the same
fo r payment, and not in reliance upon anything don e or forborn e
by the plaintiff , except the fact that the checks had b en drawn
by them ; and, further, that all the check xcept the three paid
directly to edell ; and amounting to le than $2 400 were presented to the defendant by, and paid to bank perf ctly solvent,
and liable to re pond to the defendant for all money paid upon
the forged indor ement . The e finding , supported a they are
by the vidence, di pose of muc~ of the argument upon which it
i sought to e tabli h the propo ition that the plaintiff are, by
rea on of thei r own acts and om i ion , topped from claiming
that the checks were paid by th e defendant without their authority.
The fact upon which an e topp 1 mu t alway be based are found
against th e defendant. Bed 11 in is uing the fal e checks and
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fabricati ng the false papers to conceal his crime, did not act_ _as_

the plaintiff s' agent and his acts in this regard are not binding

upon them nor are they in any manner affected by his knowledge

of the facts. The questions that arise in this case and are so ably

and elaborately discussed in the briefs of counsel, with respect to

the examination of the returned checks and pass-book, the man-

ner in which the plaintiffs' business was conducted and the degree

of care and supervision that was exercised over their subordinates,

how far the plaintiffs are bound by the criminal acts and knowl-

edge of their clerk as well as the general rule of estoppel, when

applied to this class of cases, are not new. They have been fre-

quently and fully discussed in the numerous cases in this court,

involving the rights and duties of banks and depositors, and it

would extend this opinon beyond reasonable limits, and serve no

useful purpose, to go over the ground again. (Frank v. Chemical

Nat. Bank, supra; Welsh v. German American Bank, supra;

Weisser v. Denison, supra; People v. Bank of N. A., 75 N. Y.

547; Leather Mfg. Bank v. Morgan, supra; Mayor, etc., v. Bank

of England, L. R. [21 Q. B. D.], 160.)

It is enough to state our general conclusion that, with respect
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to all these points, the defendant has failed to establish any defense

to the action.

It is claimed by the defendant that the sixteen checks made

payable to the order of persons having no existence were, in legal

effect, payable to bearer. It is provided by statute that paper

made payable to the order of a fictitious person and negotiated by

the maker has the same validity "as against the maker and all

persons having knowledge of the facts, as if payable to bearer ."

1 R. S. 768, § 5.

We are of the opinion, upon examination of the authorities

cited by counsel on both sides, that this rule applies only to paper

put into circulation by the maker with knowledge that the name

of the payee does not represent a real person. The maker's inten-

tio n is the cont r olling consideration which determines the char-

acter of such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to bearer

unless the maker knows the payee to be fictitious and actually

intends to make the paper payable to a fictitious person. (Irving

fabricating the false papers to conceal his crime, did not act as
the plaintiff ·agent and hi act in this regard are not binding
upon them nor are they in any manner affected by hi knowledge
of the facts. The question that ari in thi case and are o ably
and elaborately discussed in the briefs of coun el, with respect to
the examination of the returned check and pa -book, the manner in which the plaintiffs' bu ine was conducted and the degree
of care and upervision that wa exerci ed over their ubordinates,
how far the plaintiff are bound by the criminal act and knowledge of their clerk as well a the general rule of estoppel, when
applied to this clas of ca es, are not new. They have been frequently and fully di cu ed in the numerous cases in this court,
involving the rights and duties of banks and depo itors, and it
would extend this opinon beyond rea onable limits, and serve no
useful purpose, to go over the ground again. (Frank v. Chemical
Nat. Bank, supra; Welsh v. Gennan Anierican Bank, supra;
Weisser v. Denison, supra; People v. Bank of . A., 75 N. Y.
547; L eather Mfg. Bank v. Morgan, supra; Mayor, etc., v. Bank
of England, L. R. [21 Q. B. D.], 160.)
It is enough to state our general conclusion that, with respect
to all the e points, the defendant has failed to establish any defense
to the action.
It is claimed by the defendant that the sixteen checks made
pa.yable to the order of persons having no existence were, in legal
effect, payable to bearer. It is provided by statute that paper
made payable to the order of a fictitious person and negotiated bv
the maker has the same validity ' as against the maker and all
person having knowledge of the facts, as if payable to bearer."

National Bank v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536: Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40

id. 456; Vagliano v. Bank of England, L. R. [22 O. B. D.], 103;

S. C, on app. 2^ id. 243; Armstrong v. Pomeroy National Bank,

46 Ohio St. 512; [7 Railway & Corporation Law Journal, 114] ;

Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Black. 569.)

The findings of the referee that the plaintiffs in good faith

believed that the names of the payees represented real persons,

l

R. S. 768 § 5.

We are of the opinion, upon examination of the authorities
c ited by counsel on both sides, that this rule applie only to paper
put into circulation by the maker with knowledge that the name
of the payee does not represent a real per on. The maker's intention i the controlling consideration which determine the character of such paper. It cannot be treated a payable to bearer
unless the maker knows the payee to be fictitiou and actuall;
intends to make the paper payable to a fictitiou per on. (Irvin CT
National Bank v. Alley, 79 N. Y. 536: Turnbull v. Bo,, 1yer, 40
1d. 456; Vagliano v. Bank of England, L. R. [22 Q. B. D.], 103 ·
S. C., on app. 23 id. 243; Armstrong v. Pomeroy National Bank,
46 Ohio St. 512; [7 Railway & Corporation Law Journal, rr4];
Gibson v. Minet, I H. Black. 569.)
The findings of the referee that the plaintiff in good faith
believed that the names of the payee repre ent d real persons,
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entitled to receive from them the amount of the check in each case,

having been led to believe this by the fraudulent contrivances of

Bedell, and that they intended that Bedell should deliver the check

to a real payee therein named and that they did not intend that

they should go into circulation or be paid by defendant otherwise

than through a delivery and indorsement by the payee named ;

and that plaintiffs gave no authority to Bedell to indorse the name

of the payee, or to put the checks into circulation, and that no one

in fact relied on any appearance of authority, derived from the

plaintiffs, in Bedell to indorse the payee's name upon the checks

or to put them in circulation, disposes of the question. The

indorsement of the names of the fictitious payees upon the checks,

with intent to deceive and to put the checks in circulation, .con-

stituted the crime of forgery by means of which, and without any

fault of the plaintiffs, payment was obtained thereon. The defend -

ant does not o cgjjpy^nj^jfferen t position with reference to the ' t

checks payable to fictitious payees than it does with referenc e_to.

those paya b le to real parties whose indorsements were forged.

Bedell of course knew that the payees were fictitious, but

he was not_acting within the sc ope of his employment, but in
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carrying out a scheme of fraud upon the plaintffs, and under such

circumstances his knowledge cannot be imp uted to his principals .

{Frank v. Chemical Nat. Bank, supra; Weisser v. Denison, supra;

Welsh v. German American Bank, supra; Cave v. Cave, L. R.

[15 Ch. Div.], 643, 644.)

The case presents another and peculiar question. It seems

that ten of the eleven checks which were made payable to the

order of real persons were made good by Bedell to the several

payees, and the defendant has set up these facts in its answer as

a partial equitable defense. The referee made no findings on

the subject, but Bedell so testified and was not contradicted, and

the question arises upon a request by the defendant to find in

substance that the amount of these ten checks having been made

good by Bedell to the several payees, the plaintiffs having sus-

tained no loss by reason of the payment thereof, are not entitled

to recover in this action against the defendant any sum on account

of or by reason of the payment by defendant of the same. The

request was refused and the defendant excepted. Keeping in

view the theory of this action and regarding the evidence before

the referee, we cannot perceive that there was any error in

refusing the request.

Bedell testified, in substance, that at the time of the com-

mencement of the action the plaintiffs were liable to clients to the

entitl ed to receive from them the amount of the check in each case,
ha ing been 1 d to believe this by the fraudulent contrivance of
d 11, and that they int nd d that Bedell should deliver the check
t a r al payee therein named and that they did not intend that
t hey hould go into circulation or be paid by defendant otherwise
than through a d livery and indorsement by the payee named;
a nd that plaintiffs gave no authority to Bedell to indor e the name
of th pay e, or to put the checks into circulation, and that no one
in fact relied on any appearance of authority, d rived from the
plaintiffs, in Bedell to indorse the payee' name upon the checks
or to put them in circulation, disposes of the question. The
indorsement of the names of the fictitious payees upon the checks,
with intent to deceive and to put the checks in circulation, ,contituted the crime of forgery by means of which, and without any
fault of the plaintiff , payment was obtained thereon. The defendant doe not o_ccu
any different position with reference to the ,
checks payable to fictitious payees than it doe with reference to
those a able to real parties whose indorsements were for<Yed.
B dell of course knew that the payees were fictitious, but
he was not actinrr within the scope of his employment, but in
carrying out a scheme of fraud upon the plaintffs, and under such '
circumstances his knowledge cannot be imputed t~ his principals.
(Frank v. Chemical Nat. Bank, supra; Weisser v. Denison, supra·
Welsh v. Gernian American Bank, supra; Cave v. Cave, L. R.
[15 Ch. Div.], 643, 644.)
The ca e presents another and peculiar question. It seems
that ten of the eleven checks which were made payable to the
order of real persons were made good by Bedell to the several
payees, and the defendant has set up these facts in it answer as
a partial equitable defense. The referee made no findings on
the subject, but Bedell so testified and was not contradicted, and
the qu stion arises upon a request by the d fendant to find in
ub tance that the amount of these ten check having been made
good by Bedell to the several payee , the plaintiff having sustained no los by rea on of the payment thereof, are not entitled
to recover in this action again t the defendant any sum on account
of or by reason of the payment by defendant of the same. The
r quest was refu ed and the defendant excepted. Keeping in
view the theory of this action and regarding the evidenc before
the referee, we cannot perceive that there was any error in
r fusing the request.
Bedell testified, in ubstance, that at the time of the commencement of the action the plaintiffs were liable to clients to the
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extent of $264,000 on account of his frauds. There were $200,000

in fabricated mortgages which had been delivered by Bedell to

clients on account of an equal sum of money paid by the clients

to plaintiffs for investment, and which Bedell had converted to his

own use. The $64,000 was obtained through other frauds upon

clients which the plaintiffs were liable to be called upon to make

good. One of the plaintiffs testified that his firm had actually

paid to clients on account of Bedell's frauds over $242,000. It

was not shown by what funds or in what manner Bedell made

good to the payees the amount of the checks intended for them.

None of the money paid by him was traced to the defendant. The

plaintiffs' action was not upon the checks, nor for damages by

reason of their payment, but on defendant's implied promise to

pay the money deposited to the plaintiffs or upon their order. The

plaintiffs' case was made out without the checks at all, except so

far as they were necessary as proof to open the account stated.

In substance the referee was asked to hold that by reason of the

payment by Bedell of the amount of the checks to the persons

named therein, without any reference to the source from which

the money came, they were to be charged to the plaintiffs the
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same as if paid by their authority. The proof given did not jus-

tify this conclusion. As it was not shown that such payment was

made at the expense or to the injury of the defendant, or that the

plaintiffs were benefited by it, beyond their whole loss, the cause

of action stated in the complaint was not affected by the fact.

It is, no doubt, true that payment or indemnity to the payees of

checks diverted as these were, made by the wrong-doer, might,

under_ certain circn msranre s. constitute a basis for equitable relief

in an action of this kind, but the proof did not go far enough to

warr an t it in this case.

The very recent case of Vagliano v. Bank of England occu-

pied such a prominent place in the discussion of the questions

involved in this appeal by the courts below, and it is now so

earnestly pressed upon our attention by the learned counsel for

the defendant as a controlling authority in support of his views

that we consider it necessary to refer to it and point out, so far as

we can, the rule or principle which it decides. In the magnitude

of the sum involved, the boldness and ingenuity with which a

clerk perpetrated a stupendous fraud upon his employer, and, in

many other respects, that case, doubtless, bears a very strong

resemblance to this. The question there was whether the defend-

ant was entitled to debit the plaintiff, one of its depositors, with

forty-three forged bills of exchange, amounting in the aggregate

extent of $264,000 on account of his frauds. There were $200,000
in fabricated mortgag s which had b en delivered by Bedell to
client n account of an equal um of money paid by the clients
to plaintiff for investm nt, and wh ich edell had conv rted to his
own u . The $64,000 was obtained through other frauds upon
clients which the plaintiffs were liabl to be called upon to make
good. On of the plaintiff te tified that his firm had actually
paid to cli ents on account of edell's frauds over $242 ,000. It
was not hown by what funds or in what manner eclell made
good to the payees th e amount of the checks intend d for them.
None of the money paid by him was traced to the defendant. The
plaintiffs action was not upon th e checks, nor for damages by
reason of their payment, but on defendant's implied promise to
pay the money deposited to the plaintiffs or upon their order. The
plaintiffs' case was made out without the checks at all , except so
far as they were necessary as proof to open the account stated.
In substance the referee was asked to hold that by reason of the
payment by Bedell of the amount of the checks to the persons
named therein, without any reference to the source from which
the money came, they were to be charged to the plaintiffs the
same as if paid by their authority. The proof given did not justify this conclusion. As it was not shown that such payment was
made at the expense or to the injury of the defendant, or that the
plaintiffs were benefited by it, beyond their whole lo s the cau e
of action tated in the complaint was not affected by the fact.
It is, no doubt, true that payment or indemnity to the payees of
checks diverted as these were, made by the wrong-doer, might,
under certain circnmstances constitute a basis for equitable relief
in an action of this kind , but the proof did not go far enough to
warrant it in this case.
The very recent case of Vagliano v. Bank of England occupied such a prominent place in the discussion of the questions
involved in this appeal by the courts below, and it is now o
earnestly pressed upon our attention by the learned coun el for
the defendant as a controlling authority in support of his views
that we consider it necessary to refer to it and point out, so far as
we can, the rule or principle which it decide . In th magnitude
of the sum involved, th boldnes and inaenuit with which a
clerk perpetrated a tupendous fraud upon hi emplo er and, in
many other respects, that case, doubtle , bear a ver strong
re emblance to this. The question th re wa whether the defendant was entitled to debit the plaintiff, one of it depo itors, with
forty-thre forged bill of exchanae, amountino- in the ao-areaate
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to 71,500 pounds, which it had paid, upon a genuine acceptance

by the plaintiff, but procured by fraud under substantially the

following circumstances: Vagliano, the plaintiff, was a merchant

and foreign banker in London, with correspondents in various

parts of the world and transacting an enormous business with the

defendant, his general banker. He employed in his office a con-

siderable number of clerks, and among them one Glyka, who had

charge of the foreign correspondence. One Vucina, a merchant

and banker at Odessa, was, and for thirty years had been, one of

Vagliano's correspondents, transacting with him a large business

and having practically unlimited credit. For many years he had

drawn drafts for large amounts, when necessary, upon the plain-

tiff, payable sometimes to his own order, but more frequently to

the order of a payee named therein. The course of business in

the office was well known to Glyka, who procured specimens of

Vucina's letters of advice, which always preceded the drafts, and

specimens of the drafts themselves. Having done so he had

paper prepared identical in general appearance and texture with

that upon which Vucina's genuine letters and bills were written.

This enabled him to forge letters of advice and drafts with
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Vucina's name as drawer, which he executed with extraordinary

skill, and in each case he wrote upon the face of the bill, as payees,

the name of C. Petridi & Co., a firm who carried on business at

Constantinople, and had business relations with Vucina, but had

no connection whatever with the fabricated drafts. Glyka caused

these forged letters of advice and drafts to be laid before Vagliano,

his principal, who, being deceived by the skillful manner in which

the papers were prepared and the confidence he reposed in his

clerks, wrote a genuine acceptance on the face of each bill as it

was put before him from time to time during a period of some

four months, payable in every case at the Bank of England.

These fabricated bills, having been thus accepted, were placed

with the other and genuine bills in a box in the office to be deliv-

ered according to the usual course of business to the proper party

when called for. Glyka stole the bills from the box, forged the

indorsement of the payees thereon, presented them at the counter

of the bank and received the money thereon. By the English

Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 (45 and 46 Vict., Ch. 61, §7,

subd. 3), it was enacted with reference to bills of exchange, that

"where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing person, the bill

may be treated as payable to bearer." The bank defended upon

two grounds — first, that they were protected by this statute, and

secondly, that the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence as pre-

t

71 ,500 pound

which it had paid, upon a o-enuine acceptance
plaintiff, but procur d by fraud und r ub tantially the
foll vving circum lane
agliano, the plaintiff, wa a merchant
and for ign banker in L ndon, vYith orr pond nt in variou
part f the world and tran actin an enormou bu in
with the
def ndant, hi g n ral banker. He employ d in hi offic a conid rabl numb r of clerk , and amon th m one lyka who had
charge of th f reign corr pond nc . On
ucina, a m rchant
and bank r at de a, was, and for thirty year had be n, one of
Va lian ' corre pond nt , tran acting with him a large busin s
and having practically unlimited credit. For many years he had
drawn draft f r laro-e amount , when nee ary, upon the plaintiff, payable ometimes t hi own order, but more frequently to
the ord r of a payee named therein. Th course of bu iness in
the offic wa well known to Glyka, who procured pecimens of
ucina' letter of advic , ·w hich alway preceded the drafts, and
pecimen of the draft th m elves. Having done o he had
paper prepared id ntical in eneral appearance and texture with
that up n which Vucina' genuine letter and bill were written.
This enabled him to foro-e letter of advice and draft with
ucina' name a drawer, which he executed with extraordinary
ski ll, and in each ca e he wr te upon the face of the bill, a payee ,
the name of C. etridi & o., a firm who carried on busines at
Con tantinople, and had bu ine relation with Vucina, but had
no connection ·whatever with the fabricated draft . Glyka caused
Lhe e forged letter of advice and draft to be laid before Vagliano,
hi principal, who, being deceived by the killful manner in which
the paper w re prepared and the confiden e he reposed in his
clerk , wrote a o-enuin acceptance on th face of each bill as it
wa put before him from time to time during a period of ome
four m nth , payable in v ry ca
at th Bank of England.
The e fabricate 1 bill , having been thu ace pted, wer placed
with the oth r and genu in bill in a box in the office to b delivered according t the u ual course of bu in
to th proper party
wh n called for.
lyka tole th bill fr m th box forged the
indor ment of the 'pay es thereon, pre nted them at th count r
of the 1 ank and rec ived the mon y th r on. By the English
ill of Exchan e Act of 1882 (45 and 46 Viet., Ch. 61, § 7,
sub I. 3), it wa enacted with ref rence to bill of exchange, that
"where th payee i a fictitiou or non-exi tin per on, th bill
may b treated a payabl to 1 ar r." The bank lefended upon
tw ground -fir t, that th y were protect d by thi tatute, and
secondly, that th e p aint iff wa
uilty of uch negligence as preby th
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eluded him from claiming that the payment made upon these bills

were without authority. On the trial of the action before Mr.

Justice Charles, the plaintiff recovered. (L. R. [22 Q. B. D.], 103.)

On appeal, the judgment was affirmed, the master of the rolls

alone dissenting, on the ground that the bank was protected by

the Bills of Exchange Act. (L. R. [23 Q. B. D.] 243.) Thus far

the view of the courts in both hearings were in harmony with the

contention of the plaintiffs in the case at bar, both as to the con-

struction of the statute and the facts bearing on the question of

negligence. The judgment, however, has recently been reversed

by the House of Lords, and we have been furnished with copies

of the opinions given upon the final decision of the appeal, and

have given to them the careful consideration which the high

authority of the tribunal from which they emanate and the

importance of the case seems to demand. The main point upon

which the case turned in the review by the House of Lords, as

we understand the opinions, was the construction to be given to

the Bills of Exchange Act. It was held, contrary to the opinions

below, that whenever the name inserted as payee is without any

intention that payment shall be made only in conformity there-
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with, the payee then becomes a fictitious person within the mean-

ing of the act, and, therefore, the forty-three bills were within the

statute, though Petridi & Co. were in fact existing and real per-

sons. When this conclusion was reached, the plaintiff's case

necessarily failed, as it was but another way of stating that the

bank paid the fabricated bills according to their legal tenor and

effect and according to the plaintiff's directions, that is, to bearer.

It is hardly necessary to add that if we could follow that case

in giving construction to our statute, the same result would follow

in this case. But it is quite obvious that we cannot. The language

is different. Our statute is a codification of the common law,

while the English statute is, and was intended to be, a departure

from it . In so far as the opinions deal with the facts of the case

upofTfhe question of negligence, it is difficult to deduce from them

any abstract rule or principle. Moreover, there is, as it seems to

us, a material difference in some respects between the facts of

that case and the one at bar. Vagliano, through the contrivances

of his clerk, had put before him a fabricated bill, the spurious

character of which he failed to .detect, and he fixed to it a genuine

acceptance, thereby accrediting it to the bank as a genuine instru-

ment. He left the bill thus accepted in a place where the dis-

honest clerk could easily purloin it. The manner in which the

business was conducted was such as to enable the clerk to possess

eluded him from claiming that the payment made upon these bills
were without authority. On th trial of the action before Mr.
Ju tice harl , th plaintiff r cov r d. (L. R. (22 Q. B. D.], 103.)
On appeal, the judgm nt was affirmed, the ma ter of the roll
alone di enting, on th ground that the bank wa protected by
the Bill of Exchange ct.
L. . (23 Q. . D.] 243.) Thu far
the view of the court in both h arings were in harmony with the
contention of th plaintiffs in the ca e at bar, both a to the construction of the statute and the facts b aring on th question of
neglirrence. The judgment, howev r, has recently been reversed
by the House of Lord , and we have been furni h d with copie
of the opinions given upon the final decision of the appeal, and
have rriv n to them the careful consideration which the high
authority of the tribunal from which they emanate and the
importance of the case seems to demand. The main point upon
which th case turned in the review by the House of Lord , as
we under tand the opinions, was the construction to be given to
the Bill of Exchange Act. It was held, contrary to the opinions
below, that whenever the name inserted as payee is without any
intention that payment shall be made only in conformity therewith, the payee then becomes a fictitious per on within the meaning of the act, and, therefore, the forty-three bills were within the
tatute, though Petridi & Co. were in fact exi ting and real persons. When this conclu ion was reached, the plaintiff's ca e
nece sarily failed, as it was but another way of stating that the
bank paid the fabricated bills according to their legal tenor and
effect and according to the plaintiff' directions, that i , to bearer.
It is hardly nece ary to add that if we could follow that case
in givino- construction to our tatut , the ame re ult would follo\
in thi case. But it i quite obviou that w cannot. The languarre
is different. Our statute is a codification of the common law.
;yhile the English statute i , and was intended to be. a departure
from it. In so far a the opinions d al with th fact of the ca e
upon e question of n gligence, it i difficult to deduce from them
any abstract rule or principle. Moreover, there i , a it eem to
us, a material difference in some re pects between the fact
f
that ca e and the one at bar. Va liano, through the contrivance
of hi clerk, had put before him a fabricated bill th
puriou
character of which he failed to .detect, and he fix d to it a genuine
acceptance, thereby accrediting it to the bank a a genuine in trument. He left the bill thu ace pt d in a place where the di honest clerk could ea ily purloin it. The manner in which the
busine s was conducted wa uch a t nabl th lerl- to po e
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himself of the means whereby the fraud was successfully carried

out without check or detection. The view of the case taken in

the opinions delivered in the House of Lords, aside from the

question of the construction of the statute, may very well be

attributed to a different shading in the facts, and to the further

consideration which can be inferred from the record, that that

tribunal is not confined, as we are, to a review of the courts below

upon questions of law only. For these reasons, the Vagliano case

cannot be regarded as authority adverse to the conclusion at

which we have arrived in this. We have examined the other

exceptions appearing in the record to which our attention has been

directed, and we are of the opinion that none of them can be

sustained.

The judgment should be affirmed.

All concur, Gray, J., in result.

Judgment affirmed.

V"
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him elf of the means whereby the fraud wa successfully carried
out ' ithout check or detection. The view of the ca e taken in
the opinions delivered in the House of Lords, aside from the
iu tion of the con truction of the statut , may very well be
attribut d to a different hading in the fact , and to the further
con ideration which can be inferred from the record, that that
tribunal i not confined, as we are, to a review of the court below
upon questions of law only. For these rea ons, the Vagliano case
cannot be regarded a authority adverse to the conclusion at
which we have arrived in this. We have examined the other
exception appearing in the record to which our attention ha been
directed, and we are of the opinion that none of them can be
su tained.
The judgment should be affirmed.
All concur, GRAY, ]., in result.
Judgment affirmed.
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96.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit

~ ~-

Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.

It was an action brought by the bank upon two bills of

exchange, one dated on the 18th of August, 1857, at Pittsburgh,

drawn by L. O. Reynolds & Son upon J. S. & R. E. Neal, at

Madison, Indiana, requesting them to pay, four months, after date

§ 16:

FILLING UP BLANKS.

of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,) to the order of L. O.

Reynolds, at the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, at

Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, two thousand one hundred and

sixty-eight dollars. Reynolds endorsed this bill to L. Wilmarrh

The Bank of Pittsburg v.

eal et al. (1859),

22

How. (63 U. S) .

96.

& Co., who endorsed it to the bank. The bill was accepted by J.

S. & R. E. Neal.

The other bill sued upon was similar in all its circumstances,

except that it was dated on the 1st of August, 1857, payable four

months after the date of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,)

for thirteen hundred and fifty dollars. It was endorsed and

accepted like the other.

In order to present a distinct view of the transactions which

led to this suit and the nature of the defence, it seems necessary

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit
Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.
It was an action brought by the bank upon two bills of
exchange, one dated on the 18th of August, 1857, at Pittsburgh,
drawn by L. 0. Reynolds & Son upon ]. S. & R. E. Neal, at
Madison, Indiana, reque ting them to pay, four month . after date
of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,) to the order of L. 0.
eynolds, at the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, at
Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, two thou and one hundred and
ixty-eight dollar . Reynolds endorsed thi bill to L. Wilmarth
& o., who endor ed it to the bank. The bill was accepted by J.
. & R. E. Neal.
The other bill sued upon wa similar in all it circum tances,
exc pt that it wa dated on the 1 t of Augu t 1 57, payable four
month after the date of thi second of exchange (first unpaid,)
for thirt n hundred and fifty dollars. It wa endor ed and
accepted like the other.
In order to pre ent a distinct view of the transactions which
led t thi uit and the nature of the defence, it eems necessary
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to state particularly all the bills mentioned in the proceedings,

designating each bill by a letter, which is the reporter's mark, and

used for easy reference.

In June, 1857, J. S. & R. E. Neal, residents of Madison,

Indiana, for the purpose of raising money, delivered to L. O.

Reynolds, of Pittsburgh, the four following bills, viz. :

Exchange for $ .

after of this first of exchange, (second unpaid,)

pay to the order of L. O. Reynolds dollars, value received,

without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.

To- .

Accepted : J. S. & R. E. Neal.

(This bill we will call A.)

Exchange for $ .

after of this first of exchange, (second unpaid,)

pay to the order of L. O. Reynolds dollars, value received,

without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.

To .

Accepted : J. S. & R. E. Neal.

(This bill we will call B.)
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Exchange for $ .

after of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,)

pay to the order of L. O. Reynolds dollars, value received,

without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.

To- .

Accepted : J. S. & R. E. Neal.

(This bill we will call C.)

Exchange for $ .

after of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,)

pay to the order of L. O. Reynolds dollars, value received,

without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.

To .

.Accepted: J. S. & R. E. Neal.

(This bill we will call D.)

With these bills, instructions were sent to Reynolds to have

them filled up for sums not less than $1,500, nor more than $3,000

each, to have them discounted at Pittsburgh, and remit the pro-

ceeds to J. S. & R. E. Neal, at Madison, Indiana.

In July, 1857, four other bills like the preceding were sent

to Reynolds. These last bills were sent to Reyolds at his request,

and intended for his use, as accommodation acceptances of the

Neals.

These bills we will call E, F, G. H.

to state particularly all the bills mentioned in th proceedings,
de it>nating each bill by a letter, which i the r porter's mark, and
u d for easy reference.
In Jun , 1857, J. S. & R. E. Neal, res id nt of Madi on,
Indiana, for the purpo e of rai ing money, delivered to L. 0.
Reynold , of Pitt burgh the four following bill , viz. :
Exchange for $--.
- - after - - of thi first of exchange, (second unpaid,)
pay to the order of L. . Reynolds - - dollars, value received,
witl-iout any r lief from valuation or appraisement laws.
To--.
Accepted: J. S. & R. E. NEAL.
(Thi bill we will call A.)
Exchange for $--.
- - after - - of this first of exchange, (second unpaid,)
pay to the order of L. 0. Reynolds - - dollars, value received,
without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.
To--.
Accepted : J. S. & R. E. NEAL.
(This bill we will call B.)
Exchange for$--.
- - after - - of this second of exchange, (first unpaid,)
pay to the order of L. 0. Reynolds - - dollars, value received,
without any r-elief from valuation or appraisement laws.
To--.
Accepted: J. S. & R. E. NEAL.
(This bill we will call C.)
Exchange for $--.
- - after - - of this econd of exchange, (fir t unpaid,)
pay to the order of L. . Reynold - - dollars, value received,
without any relief from valuation or appraisement laws.
To--.
. Accepted: J. S. & R. E. NEAL.
(This bill we will call D.)
With these bills, in tructions were sent to R nold to have
them filled up for um n t le than $1,500, nor more than $3,000
each, to have them di counted at itt burO'h, and remit the proceeds to J. S. & R. E. eal, at Madi on, Indiana.
In July, 1857, four other bill like the pr ceding were ent
to Reynold . Th se la t bill w r
nt to Re old at hi reque t,
and intended for hi u , as accommodation acceptance of the
Neals.
These bills we will call E F, G, H.
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A was filled up by Reynolds as follows: Date, July 1st;

amount, $1,965; time, four months; drawers, L. O. Reynolds &

Son ; drawees, J. S. & R. E. Neal. Thus filled up, it was nego-

tiated by Reynolds to the Mechanics' Bank of Pittsburgh. Reyn-

olds failed to remit the proceeds according to instructions. When

the paper matured, the defendants, as acceptors, paid it.

B was filled up as follows: Date, July 10th ; time, four

months; amount, $2,035; drawers, L. O. Reynolds & Son;

drawees, J. S. & R. E. Neal. Thus filled up, it was negotiated

by Reynolds to the Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank of Pitts-

burgh. The proceeds of this bill were remitted by Reynolds to

the defendants. Before the commencement of this suit, the

Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank, as holder and owner of the

bill, recovered judgment on it against the acceptor in the Jeffer-

son Circuit Court of the State of Indiana. C and D were for

the present retained by Reynolds in his own possession.

E, being similar to A, was filled up as follows: Date, July

30th ; time, four months ; amount, $2,450 ; drawers, L. O. Reynolds

& Son ; drawees, J. S. & R. E. Neal. Thus filled up, it was nego-

tiated by Reynolds to the Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank of
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Pittsburgh, Reynolds retaining the proceeds. The holders of this

bill brought suit against the defendants, as acceptors, in the Jef-

ferson Circuit Court, Indiana, which action was still pending when

the pleas in this case were filed.

F, being similar to B, was filled up by Reynolds as follows :

Date, July 24th ; time, four months ; amount, $2,750 ; drawers,

L. O. Reynolds & Son ; drawees, J. S. & R. E. Neal. Thus filled

up, it was negotiated by Reynolds to the Citizens' Bank of Pitts-

burgh, Reynolds retaining the proceeds. John Black & Co. became

the holders, and after its maturity, and before the commencement

of this suit, they recovered judgment against the acceptors of

the bill for its full amount in the Jefferson Circuit Court of

Indiana.

Thus the bills A, B, E, F, being the first of exchange, (sec-

ond unpaid,) are accounted for. What became of G and H, the

record did not show. Let us now account for C and D.

C was filled up as follows: Date, August 1st; time, four

months; amount, $1,350; drawers and drawees, as above.

D was filled up as follows: Date, August 18th ; time, four

months; amount, $2,t68; same drawers and drawees. These bills

were both negotiated to the Bank of Pittsburgh, and were the

ones sued on in this case. Tt will be observed that they were both

second of exchange, (first unpaid,) and that the sums of money

A was filled up by Reynolds a follow : Date, July 1st;
amount, $I 965 ; time, four months; drawe r , L. . Reynolds &
on; drawee , J. . & R . E. Neal. Thu fill d up, it was negotiat d by Reynold to the M chanics' Bank of Pittsburgh. Reynolds failed to remit the proc d according to in tructions. \!Vhen
the paper matured, th defendants, as acceptor , paid it.
B was filled up as follow : Date, July rnth; time, four
month ; amount, $2,035; drawers, L. 0 . Reynolds & Son;
drawees J. S. & R. E. Neal. Thus filled up, it was negotiated
by R ynolds to the Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank of Pittsburgh. The proceeds of this bill were remitted by Reynolds to
the defendants. Before the commencement of thi suit, the
Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank, as holder and owner of the
bill, recovered judgment on it against the acceptor in the J efferon Circuit Court of the State of Indiana. C and D were fo r
the pre ent retained by Reynolds in his own possession.
E, being imilar to A, was filled up as follows: Date, July
30th; time, four month ; amount, $2,450; draw rs, L. 0 . Reynolds
on; drawees, J. . & R. E. Neal. Thus filled up, it was negotiated by Reynolds to the Merchants and Manufacturers' Bank of
Pittsburgh, Reynolds retaining the proceeds. The holders of this
bill brought uit against the defendants, as acceptor , in the J efferson Circuit Court, Indiana, which action was still pending when
the pleas in this case were filed.
F, being similar to B, wa fi lled up by Reynolds as fo llows:
Date, July 24th; time, fo ur months; amount, $2,750; drawers,
L. 0. Reynolds & Son; drawee , J. S. & . E. Neal. Thus filled
up, it was ne otiated by Reynold to the Citizens' Bank of Pittsburgh, Reynolds retaining the proceeds. J ohn Black & o. became
the holder , and after its maturity, and before the commencement
of this suit, they recovered judgment against the acceptors of
the bill for its full amount in the Jefferson Circuit Court of
Indiana.
·
Thu the bills A, B, E, F, being the fir t of exchange, (second unpaid,) are accounted for . What b came of G and H, the
record did not show. Let us now account fo r C and D.
ugust rst; time, four
was filled up as follows: Date,
months; amount, $1,350; drawers and drawees, as above.
D was filled up as follow : Date, · ugu t 18th; time, four
months· amount, $2, 168; sam drawer and drawees. These bills
were both negotiated to the ank of P ittsburgh, and were the
ones ued on in this case. It will be obs rved that they were both
econd of exchange, (first unpaid,) and that the sums of money
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did not correspond in amount with any of those for which the first

of exchange had been filled up, nor in date, time, or place of

payment.

There were four counts in the declaration, and eight pleas,

which were all demurred to except the plea of the general issue.

It is not necessary to state these pleadings, because they were

only intended to raise the questions of law which arise from the

statement of facts given above. The court overruled the plaintiffs'

demurrers, so that judgment went for the defendant; and upon

this ruling upon the demurrers, the case was brought up by the

plaintiff to this court.

Mr. Stanton and Mr. Walker, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Thompson and Mr. Dunn, for defendants.

Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court.

did not correspond in amount with any of those for which the first
of xchange had been filled up, nor in date, time, or place of
payment.
There were four counts in the declaration, and eight plea ,
which were all demurred to except the plea of the general i sue.
It is not nee ary to tate the pl adings, becau e they were
only intended to rai e th qu tion of law which ari e from th
tatement of fact given above. The court overruled the plaintiffs'
demurrers, so that judgment went for the defendant; and upon
thi ruling upon the demurrers, the case was brought up by the
plaintiff to thi court.
•

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United

States for the district of Indiana. All of the questions presented

in this case arise upon the pleadings and the facts therein dis-

closed. It was an action of assumpsit, brought by the plaintiff in

Mr. Stanton and Mr. Walker for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Thompson and Mr. Dimn for defendants.
1

1

error as the holder of two certain bills of exchange, against the

defendants as the acceptors. An amendment to the declaration
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was filed after the suit was commenced. As now exhibited in the

transcript it contains four counts. Two of the counts were drawn

up on the respective bills of exchange, and are in the usual form

of declaring in suits, by the holder of a bill of exchange against

the acceptor. Those contained in the amendment are special in

form, setting forth the circumstances under which the respective

bills of exchange were drawn, accepted, and negotiated, and

averring that these acts were subsequently ratified by the defend-

ants. To the merits of the controversy the defendants pleaded the

general issue, and filed seven special pleas^l in bar of the action.

Demurrers were filed by the plaintiff to each of the special pleas,

which were duly joined by the defendants, and after the hearing,

the court overruled all of the demurrers. Those filed to the pleas

responsive to the first and second counts were overruled upon the

ground that the pleas were sufficient, and constituted a good bar

to the action; but those filed to the fifth, sixth, seventh, and

eighth pleas were overruled, upon the ground that the third and

fourth counts, to which those pleas exclusively applied, were each

insufficient in law to maintain the action. Whereupon, the plain-

tiff abiding his demurrers, the court directed that judgment be

entered for the defendants, and the plaintiff sued out a writ of

error, and removed the cause into this court. It being very prop-

Mr. J u TICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of rror to the Circuit Court of the United
State for the district of Indiana. All of the questions presented
in thi ca e ari e upon the pleadings and the fact therein disclo ed. It wa an action of a sumpsit, brought by the plaintiff in
error as the holder of two certain bills of exchange, aaain t the
defendants as the acceptors. An amendment to the declaration
was filed after the uit was ·commenced. As now exhibited in the
tran cript it contains four count . Two of the count were drawn
up on the respective bills of exchange, and are in the u ual form
of declaring in suit , by the holder of a bill of exchange again t
the acceptor. Tho e contained in the amendment are pecial in
form, etting forth the circum tances under which the respective
bill of exchange were drawn, accepted, and negotiated, and
averring that the e act' wer ub equently ratified by the defendants. To th merit of the controver y the defendant pleaded the
general i ue, and filed even pecial plea ~ in bar of the action.
Demurrer ' ere fil ed by the plaintiff to each of the pecial plea ,
which were duly join d by the defendant and after the hearing,
the court ov rruled all of the d murrer ~ . Tho e filed to th plea
re pon ive to the fir t and ec nd count were overruled upon the
ground that the plea ' re ufficient. and on tituted a aood bar
to the acti n; but tho e fil ed to the fifth, ixth eventh, and
eighth pleas were overruled, upon the around that the third and
fourth count to which tho plea exclu ively ap lied "ere each
insufficient in law to maintain the action. \ h r up n, the plaintiff abiding hi demurr r the court directed that j udament be
entered for th d fendant and the plaintiff ued out a writ of
error, and removed the cau e into thi court. It b ina v ry prop-
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erly admitted, by the counsel of the defendants, that the first and

second counts of the declaration are in the usual form, it is not

necessary to determine the question as to the sufficiency of the

third and fourth, and we are the less inclined to do so, from the

fact that the counsel on both sides expressed the wish, at the

argument, that the decision of the cause might turn upon the ques-

tion, w hether the plaintiff , on the facts disclosed in the pleadings,

was _entitled t o recover against the defen dants. That question is

the main one presented by the pleadings ; and inasmuch as it might

well have been tried under the general issue, we think it quite

unnecessary to consider any of the incidental questions which do

not touch the merits of the controversy. Special, .pleading in

suits on_bills_ of excha nge _and_i>romissory notes ought not to be

encouraged, except in eases where by law the defence would

otherwise be excluded or rendered unavailing. Full and clear

statements of the facts as disclosed in the pleadings, were pre-

sented to the court, at the argument, by the counsel on both

sides. They are substantially as follows: In June, 1857, the[

defendants, residents of Madison, in the State of Indiana, being

desirous of procuring a loan of money, made their certain accept-
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ances in writing of two blank bills of exchange, in sets of two

parts to each bill, and transmitted the four blanks, thus accepted,

to their correspondent, Lot O. Reynolds, then and still residing

at Pittsburgh, in the State of Pennsylvania. Both sets of blanks

were in the form of printed blanks usually kept by merchants for

bills of exchange in double sets, except that each of the four was

made payable to the order of the correspondent to whom they

were sent, and was duly accepted on its face by the defendants,

in the name of their firm. They were in blank as to the names

of the drawers and the address of the drawees, and as to date,

and amount, and time, and place of payment. When the defend-

ants forwarded the acceptances, they instructed their correspond-

ent to perfect them as bills of exchange, by procuring the signa-

tures of the requisite parties, as accommodation drawers and

endorsers, and to fill up each with the appropriate date, and with

sums not less than fifteen hundred nor more than three thousand

dollars, payable at the longest period practicable, and to sell and

negotiate the bills as perfected, for money, and remit the proceeds

to the defendants. Afterwards, in the month of July, of the same

year, the defendants, at the request of the person to whom those

acceptances were sent, made four other similar acceptances, and

delivered them to him, to be sold and negotiated as bills of

exchange, in double sets, for his own use, and with power to retain

rly admitted, by the counsel of the defendants, that the first and
ond
unt of th d claration are in th u ual form, it i not
n ce ary t d termin the que tion as to the sufficiency of the
third a nd fourth, and v e are th les inclin d to do so, from the
fact that the coun el on both sides expr ed the wi h, at the
arg um ent, that th d ci ion of the caus might turn upon the question, whether the plaintiff, on the facts di clo ed in the pl adings,
wa entitl d to recover again t the defendants. That que tion is
the main on pre ented by th pleadings; and inasmuch a it might
well have b en tried under the general issue, we thin! it quite
unnecessary to con ider any of the. incidental que tions which do
not touch the merit of the controversy. S ecial leadi
·
uits on bill of exchan e nd rom1 sor notes ou ht not to be
~coura ed, except in cases where by law the defence would
otherwise be excluded or ren lered unavailing. Full and clear
tatements of the facts as disclosed in the pleadings, were preented to the court, at the argument, by the counsel on both
ides. They are sub tantially as follow : In June, 1857, the 1
defendant , re idents of Madi on, in the State of Indiana, being
desirous of procuring a loan of money, made their certain acceptances in writin()'" of two blank bills of exchange, in sets of two
parts to each bill, and transmitted the four blank , thus accepted,
to their correspondent, Lot . Reynold , then and still residing
at Pittsburgh, in the State of ennsylvania. Both sets of blanks
were in the form of printed blanks usually kept by merchants for
bills of exchang in double sets, except that each of the four was
made payable to the order of the correspondent to whom they
were sent, and was duly accepted on its face by the defendants
in the name of their firm. They were in blank as to the names
of the drawer and the addr s of the drawees, and as to date,
and amount, and time, and place of payment. When the defendant forwarded the ace ptance , they in tructed their correspondent to perfect them as bills of exchange, by procuring the signatur
of the r qui ite partie as accomrnodati n draw r and
endorsers, and to fill up each with the appropriate date, and with
um not le s than fifteen hundred nor more than three thousand
dollars, payabl at the lonD""C t period practicabl , and to sell and
negotiate the bill a p rf cted, for mon y, and r m'it th proceeds
t the def ndants.
fterwards, in the month f July, of the same
year, th defendant , at the r quest of th p r on to whom tho e
ac ptances were sent, mad four other similar acceptances, and
d liv red th m to him to b sold and negotiated a bills of
exchanD'"e, in double sets, for hi own u
and with power to retain

/_;
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and use the proceeds thereof for his own benefit. They were in

all respects the same, in point of form, as the four acceptances

first named, and, like those, each of the four parts were mack-

payable to the order of the person at whose request they were

given, and was duly accepted by the defendants in the name of

their firm. When they delivered the sets last named, they author-

ized the payee to perfect them as bills of exchange, in two parts, in

reasonable amounts, and with reasonable dates. Eight acceptances

were thus delivered by the defendants to the same person, corre-

sponding in point of form to four bills of exchange, but with

blanks for the names of the drawers and the address of the

drawees, and for the respective amounts, dates, and times and

places of payment. Four contained, in the printed form of the

blanks, the words, "first of exchange, second unpaid ;" and the

other four contained in the corresponding form the words, "second

of exchange, first unpaid ;" but in all other respects they were

alike. All of the first class were perfected by the correspondent

as bills of exchange of the first part, and were sold and negotiated

by him at certain other banks in the City of Pittsburgh. He per-

fected them by procuring L. O. Reynolds & Son to become the
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drawers, addressed them to the defendants, endorsed them him-

self in blank, and procured another individual or firm to become

the second endorser. They were filled up by him for sums vary-

ing from about two thousand to three thousand dollars, with

dates corresponding to the times when they were negotiated, and

were respectively made payable in four months from date. Con-

trary to his instructions, he retained the proceeds of the one first

negotiated, which he had been directed to remit; and he also

retained in his possession, but without inquiry or complaint on

the part of the defendants, the other four acceptances, consti-

tuting the second class. On the first day of August, 1857. he

perfected and filled up as a separate bill of exchange one of the

last-named acceptances, and sold and negotiated it to the plaintiff

for his own use and benefit. He also perfected and filled up, on

the eighteenth day of the same month, another of the same class,

in the same manner, and for the same purpose, and on the same

day sold and negotiated it to the plaintiff. Both of these last-

mentioned bills of exchange vary from those of the first class,

not only in dates and amounts, but also as to time and place of

payment, and are in all respects single bills of exchange. They

were each received and discounted by the plaintiff, without ac-

knowledge whatever that either had been perfected and filled up

by the payee without authority, or of the circumstances under

and use the proceeds thereof for hi own benefit. They were in
all respects the am , in point of form, as the four acceptances
fir t nam d, and, like tho , ea h f the four part w re mad e
payable to th ord r of th p r n at who e requ t th y w re
given, and wa duly ace pled by th d fendant in th nam of
their firm. When they delivered the t la t named, th y auth rized th paye to p rf ct th m a 1 ill of xchang , in two parts, in
rea onable amount , and with rea onabl dates. Eight acceptance
were thu delivered by th defendant to the ame per on, corr spondino- in point f form to four bills of xchan e, but with
blanks for th name of the draw r and the addre s of the
drawee , and for the r pective amounts, date , and time and
places of payment. Four contained, in the print d form of the
blanks, the word , 'fir t of xchange, second unpaid;" and the
other four contained in the corresponding form the words, "second
of exchange, fir t unpaid;" but in all other respects th ey were
alike.
ll of the fir t cla s wer perfected by the correspondent
as bill of exchange of the first part, and were old and negotiated
by him at certain other banks in the City of Pitt burgh. He perfected them by procuring L. 0. Reynolds & Son to become the
drawer addressed them to the defendants, endor d them himself in blank, and procured another individual or firm to become
the econd endor er. They were filled up by him for um varying from about two thou and to three thousand dollar , with
dates correspondino- to the times when they were negotiated, and
were r pectively made payabl in four month from date. Contrary to hi in truction , he retained the proceed of the on fir t
negotiated, which he had been di·re ted to remit; and h al o
retained in hi pos e i n but without inquiry or complaint on
the part of the defendant , the other four acceptance , con titutino- the second cla . On the fir t day of u u t, 1857, he
perfected and filled up as a separate bill of exchan e one of th
last-named acceptance , and old and n gotiat d it t the plaintiff
for his own u e and hen fit. He al o perfected and filled up on
the ei hteenth day of th ame month, another of th ame cla ,
in the ame manner, and for th sam purpo , and on the am
day old and negotiated it to th plaintiff.
th of the e la tmentioned bill of exchano- var from tho
of the fir t cla ,
not only in dat s and amount , but al
a to tim and pla e of
payment, and are in all r p ct ingl bill of xchano-e. Th y
"ere each received and di count d by th plaintiff \ ith ut any
knowledge whatever that eith r ha I b n perf t d and fill d up
by the payee "ithout authorit , or of the ircum tance under
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which they had been intrusted to his care, unless the words, "sec-

ond of exchange, first unpaid," can be held to have that import.

In all other respects, the bills must be viewed precisely as

th ey would be if they had been perfect ed and filled up by the

defendants, and for two reasons, deducible Irom the decisions of

this_£Ojirl :

First . Because, where a party to a negotiable instrument

mtrusts it to the cust ody of another with blanks not filled up,

whether it be tor the purpose to accommodate the person to whom

it was intrusted, or to be used for his own benefit, such negotiable

instrument carr i es on its face an implied authority to fill up the

blanks~and perfect the instrument ; and as between such party

and innocent third parties, the person to whom it was so intrusted

must be deemed the agent of the party who committed such

instrument to his custod y — or, in other words, it is the act of the

principal, and he is bound by it. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How.,

361 ; Violet v. Patton, 5 Cran., 142.

Secondly . Because a bona fide holder of a negotiable instru-

ment, for a valuable consideration, without notice of the facts

which i mpeach its validity between the antecedent parties , it he

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

takes it under an indorsement made before the same becomes due,

holds the title unaffected bv these facts, and may recover thereon,

although, as between the antecedent parties, the transaction may

be without any legal validity. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 15;

Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 363.

Applying these principles, it is obvious that the only ques-

tion^ that arises on this branch of the case js as to the effect of

the words, "secon d of exchange, first unpaid, " which appear on

trie Tace oFthebills. That question, under the circumstances of

this case, is a question of law, and not of fact for the jury. Three

decisions of this court sustain that proposition ; and in view of

that fact, we think it unnecessary to do more than refer to those

decisions, without further comment in its support. Andrczvs v.

Pond and al., 13 Pet., 5: Fowler v. Brantly, 14 Pet, 318; Good-

man v. Simonds, 20 How., 366.

Another principle, firmly established by this court, and closely

allied to the question under consideration, will serve very much

to elucidate the present inquiry. In Dozvnes and al. v. Church,

13 Pet., p. 207, this court held, that either of the set of bills of

exchange may be presented for acceptance, and if not accepted,

that a right of action presently arises, upon due notice, against

all the antecedent parties to the bill, without any others of the set

being presented ; for, say the court, it is by no means necessary

\: hich they had been intrust d to hi care, unle the words, "second of exchange, fir t unpaid," can be held to have that import.
In all other re p ct the bill mu t be viewed precisely as
the would be if they had been p rfected and filled up by the
def ndants, and for t\ o rea on , deducible from the decisions of
Qii court:
Fir t.
ecau e, where a party to a negotiable instrument
intru t it to the custody of another with blank not filled u
wh ther 1t e or t 1e purpo e to accommodate the per on to whom
it wa intru ted, or to be u ed for his own benefit, uch negotiable
in trument carries on it
· li
h rit t fi 1
the
blank an perfect the in trument i and a between uch party
and innocent third partie . the person to whom it was so intrusted
mu t be d em d the agent of the party who committed such
in trument t hi cu tody-or, in other words, it is the act of the
principal, and h i bound by it. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How.,
361; Violet v. Patton, 5 Cran., 142.
~condl .
cau e a bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument, for a valuable consid ration. without notice of the facts
which impeach it validity betwe n the antecedent partie , if he
takes it under an indorsement made befor the ame becomes due,
hold the title unaffected by these fact . and may recover thereon,
although, a between the antecedent parties, the transaction may
be without any legal validity. S'wift v. Tyson, 16 Peter , 15;
Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 363.
Applying the e principle , it is obvious that j:he only question that ari e on thi branch of the ca e i a to the effect of
the word , "second of exchange, fir t unpaid," which appear on
tne. ace of the bill . That que tion, under the circum tances of
thi case, is a question of law, and not of fact for the jury. Three
decision of thi court ustain that propo ition · and in view of
that fact, we think it unnecessary to do more than refer to those
deci ions, without further comment in it upport. Andrews v.
Pond and al., 13 et., S; Fo~ ler v. Brantly, 14 et., 318; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How., 366.
Another principle, firmly e tabli hed by this court and clo el;
allied to the que tion under consid ration will erv very much
to elucidate the pre ent inquiry. In Do'i 1nes and al. v. Church,
13
t., p. 207 thi court held, that either of the et of bill of
exchange may be pre ented for acceptan e, and if not accepted,
that a right of action pre ently ari e , upon due notice, against
all the antecedent parti to the bill, without any others of the set
being pre ented; for, ay the court. it i by no means necessary
1
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that all the parts should be presented for acceptance before a right

of action accrues to the holder.

Now, if either of the set may be presented, and when not

accepted a right of action immediately ensues, it is difficult to

see any reason why, if upon presentation the bill is accepted, it is

not competent for the endorsee to negotiate it in the market ; and

clearly, if the endorsee may properly negotiate the bill, a bona fide

holder for value, without notice, may acquire a good title. In

this connection, Mr. Chitty says, that "unless the drawee has

accepte d an o ther pa rt of a bill, he may safely pay any part that

js presented to jhi m, and that a ..payment of that part will annul

the effect of the others ; but if one of the parts has been accepted,

the paym ent of another unaccepted part will not liberate the

acceptor from liability to pay the holder of the accepted part , and

such acceptor may therefore refuse to pay the bearer of the

unaccepted part ;" from which he deduces the rule, that a drawee

of a bill drawn, in sets should only accept one of the set . Chitty

on Bills, (10 Am. ed., by Barb.,) 155.

Mr. Byles says: "The drawee should accept only one part,

for if two accepted parts should come into the hands of different
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holders, and the acceptor should pay one, it is possible that he

may be obliged to pay the other part also;" which could not be,

unless it was competent for the holder of a second part to nego-

tiate it in the market. Byles on Bills, p. 310.

Where the drawee accepted and endorsed one part to a cred-

itor, as a security, and afterwards accepted and endorsed another

part for value to a third person, but subsequently substituted

another security for the part first accepted, it was held, in Holds-

worth v. Hunter, 10 Barn, and Cress., 449, that, under these cir-

cumstances, the holder of the part secondly accepted was entitled

to recover on the bill ; and Lord Tenterden and Baron Parke held

that the acceptor would have been liable on the part secondly

accepted, even if the first part had been endorsed and circulated

unconditionally.

Judge Story says, in his work on bills of exchange, that the

bon a Me hol der of any one of the set, if accepted, may recover

the amount from the acceptor, who wou l d not be bound to pay-

any other ~of th~e~set which was held by another person, although

he might be the fir sThoIder. Story on Bills, sec. 226.

No authority is cited, for the defendant, to impair the force

of those already referred to; but it is not necessary to express

any decided opinion upon the point at the present time. Suffice

it to say, that in the absence of any authority to the contrary, we

that all the parts should be pres nted f r acceptance b fore a right
of acti n accru to th hold r.
Now, if ither of the t may b pr ented, and when not
accept d a right of action immediately en ue , it i difficult to
any r a on why, if upon pr entation th bill i accept d, it is
n t comp tent for the endor
to negotiate it in the mark t; and
clearly, if the endorse may prop rly n gotiate the bill, a bona fide
holder f r valu , without notice, may acquire a good title. In
thi connection, Mr. Chitty ay , that "unle s th draw e ha
accepted another part of a bill. he may safely pay any part that
i present d to him, and that a payment of that part will annul
the effect of the other ; but if one of the parts ha been accepted,
the a ment of another uqacce t d art will not liberate the
acceptor from 1a 1 ity to pay the holder of the accepted part, and
uch acceptor may ther fore refuse to pay the b arer of the
unaccept d part;" from which he deduces the rule, that a drawee
of a bill drawn in ets hould oniy accept one of the et. Chitty
on Bills, ( ro Am. ed., by Barb.,) 155.
Mr. Byles says: "The drawee should accept only one part,
for if two accepted parts hould come into the hands of different .
holders, and the acceptor should pay one, it is pos ible that he
may be obliged to pay the other part al o ;" which could not be,
unle s it "'as competent for the holder of a second part to negoyles on Bill , p. 310.
tiate it in the market.
Where the drawee accepted and endor ed one part to a creditor, as a ecurity, and afterwards ace pted and endorsed another
part for valu to a third person, but sub equently ub tituted
another ecurity for the part first accepted, it wa held, in Holds" orth v. Hunter, ro arn. and Cre ., 449, that und r the e circum tanc , th holder of the part econdly accepted wa entitl d
to recover on the bill; and Lord T nt rden and Baron Parke held
that the acceptor would have been liable on the part econdl
accepted, even if the fir t part had been ndor ed and circulated
unconditionally.
Jud
tory say , in hi v ork on bill f exchan e that the
bona fide hold r of any one of th
t, if accepted. may recov r
the amount from th a pt r, who would not be bound t pay
any other of the t which v.. a held by another per on, although
tory on ill , e . 22 .
he might be th fir t hold r.
No authority i cit d for th defendant to impair the force
of tho alr ady r f rr d to; but it i not nece ar t expr
any decid d opinion upon the point at the pre ent time.
u:ffice
it to say, that in the ab enc of any authorit to the contrary, ' e
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are strongly inclined to think that the correct rule is stated by

Mr. Chitty, and that such is the general understanding among

mercantile men.

But another answer may be given to the argument for the

defendant, which is entirely conclusive against it ; and that is,

that the bills described in th e first and second counts were not

parts of set s of bills of exchange. They were perfected, filled up,

and" negotiated^~rjy~ the correspondent of the defendants, to whom

the blank acceptances had been intrusted as single bills of

exchange ; and for the_acts_of_the ir correspondent, in that behalf,

^ipjdefendants are responsible _1 q. a bona fide holder for value,

without notice that the acts were performed without authority.

When the transaction is thus viewed, as it must be in con-

templation of law, it is clearly brought within the operation of

the same rule as it would be if the defendant himself had improvi-

dently accepted two bills for the same debt. In such cases, it is

held, that the acceptor is liable to pay both, in the hands of inno-

cent holders for value. Davidson v. Robertson, 3 Dow. P. C, 228.

Lord Eldon said, in that case: "Here were two bills for the

same account, and supposed to be for the same sums; they who
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were to pay them had a right to complain that there were two,

and yet they were bound to pay both, in the hands of bona fide

holders, if accepted by them or by others for them, having author-

ity to accept."

To suppose, in this case, that the words "second of exchange,

first unpaid," import knowledge to the plaintiff that the bills were

drawn in sets, would be to give them an effect contrary to the

averments of the defendants' pleas, as well as contrary to the

admitted fact that they were not so drawn ; and for those reasons

the theory cannot be sustained.

In view of all the facts as disclosed in the pleadings, we think

th e case clearly falls with in the o peration of the rule, generally

ap plicable in cases of agency, that where one of two innocent

parties mu st sufferTThrough th e fraud or negligence of a third

party, the loss shall fall up on him who gave the credit. Fitzher-

bert v. Mathen, 1 Term., 16, per Buller ; Androscoggin Bank v.

Kimball, 10 Cush., 373; Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. L. and

Eq., 516.

Business men who place their signatures to blanks, suitable

for negotiable bills of exchange or promissory notes, and intrust

them to their correspondents, to raise money at their discretion,

ought to understand the operation and effect of this rule, and not

are trono-ly inclined to think that the correct rul e is stated by
1r. bitty, and that such i the general und r tanding among
mercantile men.
But anothe r an wer may be given to the argum nt for the
defendant, which i entir ly conclu ive again t it ; and that is,
that the bill d scrib d in the fir t and econd counts we re not
parts of set of bill of exchange. Th y w re p rfected, filled up,
and negotiated by th corr pondent of the defendants, to whom
the blank acceptance had bee n intru ted as ingle bill .of
exchange · and for the act of their correspondent, in that behalf,
the defendan
e ponsihl e o a bona fide holder for valu 1
Wlthout notice that th e act were performed without authority.
When the tran acti n i thus viewed, as it mu t be in contemplation of lavv, it i clearly brought within the operation of
th same rul as it would be if the defendant him elf had improvidently accepted two bills for the same debt. In such ca es, it i
held, that the acceptor i liable to pay both, in the hands of innocent holders for value. Davidson v. Robertson, 3 Dow. P . C. 1 228 .
Lord Eldon said, in that ca e : " H ere were two bills for the
same account, and supposed to be for th e same sums; they who
were to pay th em had a right to complain that there were two,
and yet they were bound to pay both , in the hand of bona fide
holders, if accepted by them or by others for them, having authority to accept."
To suppo e, in this case, that the word "second of exchange,
first unpaid," import knowledge to the plaintiff that the bills were
drawn in ets, would be to give them an effect contrary to the
averments of the defendants' plea , a well as contrary to the
admitted fact that they were not so drawn ; and for those reasons
the theory cannot be su tained.
In view of all the facts as disclosed in the pleadings, we think
the case clearly fall within the operation of the rule, generally
applicable in ca es of agency, that where one of two innocent
parties must u:ffer, through the fraud or negligence of a third
party, the los shall fall upon him who gave the credit. Fitzherbert v. Mathen, I Term. , 16, per Buller· Androscoggin Bank v.
Kimball, IO Cush., 373; Montague v. Perkins, 22 Eng. L. and
Eq., 516.
Business men who place their ignatures to blanks, suitable
for negotiable bills of exchange or promissory note , and intrust
them to their correspondents, to rai e money at their discretion,
ouo-ht to understand the operation and effect of this rule, and not
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to expect that courts of justice will fail in such cases to give it

due application.

According to the views of this court, the demurrers to the

several pleas filed to the first and second counts of the declaration

should have been sustained. Having come to that conclusion, it

is unnecessary to examine the other propositions submitted on

,behalf of the defendants.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed,

with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judg-

ment for the plaintiff, as upon demurrer, on the first and second

counts of the declaration. .

V

INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENT NOT DELIVERED. § 1 7.

Baxendale v. Bennett {1878), L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525.

Action commenced on the 10th July, 1876, on a bill of

to expect that courts of ju tice will fail in such cases to give it
du application.
Ac ording to the view of thi court, the demurrer t the
everal pl a filed to the first and second counts of the declaration
hould have b en su tained. Having come to that conclu ion, it
unn e ary to examine the other propo ition
ubmit d on
,behalf of the defendant .
Th judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore reversed,
with costs, and the cau e remanded, with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff, as upon demurrer, on the first and econd ,
counts of the declaration.

exchange, dated the nth of March, 1872, for 50/. drawn by W.

Cartwright and accepted by the defendant, and of which the

plaintiff was the holder, and for interest.

At the trial before Lopes, J., without a jury, at the Hilary

Sittings in Middlesex, the following facts were proved: The

INCOMPLETE I

STRUMENT NOT DELIVERED.

§ 17.
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bill, dated on the nth of March, 1872, on which the action was

brought, purported to be drawn by one W. Cartwright on the

Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 525.

defendant, payable to order at three months' date. It was indorsed

in blank by Cartwright, and also by H. T. Cameron. The plain-

tiff received the bill from Cameron on the 3d of June, 1872, and

was the bona fide holder of it, without notice of fraud, and for

a valuable consideration.

One J. F. Holmes had asked the defendant for his acceptance

to an accommodation bill, and the defendant had written his

name across a paper which had an impressed bill stamp on it, and

had given it to Holmes to fill in his name, and then to use it for the

purpose of raising money on it. Afterwards Holmes, not requir-

ing accommodation, returned the paper to the defendant in the

same state in which he had received it from him. The defendant

then put it into a drawer, which was not locked, of his writing

table at his chambers, to which his clerk, laundress, and other

persons coming there had access. He had never authorized Cart-

wright or any person to fill up the paper with a drawer's name,

and he believed that it must have been stolen from his chambers.

On these facts the learned judge found that the bill was stolen

Action commenced on the 10th July, 1876, on a bill of
exchange, dated the IIth of March, 1872, for 5ol,. drawn by W.
Cartwright and accepted by the defendant, and of which the
plaintiff was the holder, and for intere t.
At the trial before LOPES, J ., without a jury, at the Hilary
ittings in Middlesex, the following facts were proved : The
bill, dated on the r rth of Ma.rch, I 72, on which th action wa
brought, purported to be drawn by one W. Cartwright on the
defendant, payable to order at three months' date. It was indor ed
in blank by Cartwright, and al o by H. T. Cameron. The plaintiff received the bill from Cameron on the 3d of June, 1872 and
v a the bona fide holder of it, without notice of fraud, and for
a valuable consideration.
One J. F. Holmes had asked the defendant for hi acceptance
to an accommodation bill, and the defendant had written hi
name aero s a paper which had an impre ed bill stamp on it, and
had given it to Holmes to fill in hi name, and then to u e it for the
purpose of rai ing money on it. Aft n ard Holm , not requiring accommodation, returned the paper to the defendant in th
ame tate in which he had received it from him. Th defendant
then put it into a dra\ er, which wa not locked f hi \ ritinotable at his chambers, to which hi clerk, laundre
and other
had never authorized Cartperson coming there had ace
wright or any person to fill up t11 paper with a drav er' name
and he beli ved that it mu t have b n tolen from hi hambers.
On the e fact the learned judo- found that th bill ' a stolen
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from the defendant's chambers, and the name of the drawer after-

wards added without the defendant's authority; but that the

defendant had so negligently dealt with the acceptance as to have

facilitated the theft; he therefore ruled upon the authority of

Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, and Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B.

I X. S.) 82; 28 L. J. (C. P.) 294, that the defendant was liable,

and directed judgment to be enacted for the plaintiff for 50/. and

from the defendant' chamb r , and th name of the drawer after\\' r I added with ul th
l f ndant' auth rity · but that the
def ndant had o ne li · ntly d alt ' ith th a c ptan a t have
facilitat d th th fl· h th r f r rul d up n the authority of
J'owia v. rot 4 ing. 253, and Ing/1am v. Primrose) 7
(~
2; 2 L. J.
.) 2 4 that the def ndant \a liable,
an 1 dir ct d j udgm nt to b nact d f r th plaintiff for 50/. and
costs.
T.

costs.

nittlcson (RoIIand, with him), for the defendant.

Jcune, for the plaintiff.

July 2. The following judgments were delivered: —

'

.)

B ittleson (Rolland with him), for th defendant.
Jeune) for th plaintiff.

Bramwell, L.J. I am of opinion that this judgment cannot

be supported. The defendant is sued on a bill alleged to have

been drawn by W. Cartwright on and accepted by him. In

very truth he never accepted such a bill ; and if_jie_ is to be held

July

li able, it can only he on the ground that he is e stopped to deny

that he did so accept such a bill. Estoppels_are odious, and the

doctrine should n ever_be a pplied witho ut a. necessity tor it. Jt_

never can be applied except injeases j Amere, .thr nprsnn a gainst

od a^X^q^- whom it is us^dJia s_so conducted himsdf^e ither i n what he has
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iaiQ^or^orTeTor failed to" say or do. that he would"! .unless estoprj ed/

r>e~sa ying som ethin ^"1coht.rary_tohis tormer ^conduct in what ""He p

HaT^aTcTor~(T5ne. or J ailg^saj^rjdorTi that th~e case Fere?

CeTus examine TEeTacts! The defendant drew a bill (or what

would be a bill had it had a drawer's name) without a drawer's

name, addressed to himself, and then wrote what was in terms

an acceptance across it. In this condition, it, not being a bill,

was stolen from him, filled up with a drawer's name, and trans-

ferred to the plaintiff, a bona fide holder for value. It may be

that no crime was committed in the filling in of the drawer's

name, for the thief may have taken it to a person telling him it

was given by the defendant to the thief with authority to get it

filled in with a drawer's name by any person he, the thief, pleased.

This may have been believed and the drawer's name bona fide

put by such person. T do not say such person could have recov-

ered on the bill ; T am of opinion he could not, but what I wish

to point out is that the bill might be made ajgrnr^eJ^rMmmgnt.

without the commission of anv_cri me in the completion. But a

crime was committed in this case bv the stealing of the document,

and without that crime the bill could not Jiave. bee n c om ple te.

and no one could have been defrauded. Why is not the defendant

at l!be"rtylo "shew this? Why is he stopped ? What has he said

nSjul

b

2.
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or done contrary to the truth, or which should cause any one to

believe the truth to be other than it is? Is it not a rule that every

on e has a right to suppose that a crime will not be committed ,

and~to"act on that belief? Where is the limit if the defendant is

estopped here? Suppose he had signed a blank cheque, with no

payee, or date, or amount, and it was stolen, would he be liable

or accountable, not merely to his banker the drawee, but to a

holder? If so, suppose there was no stamp law, and a man simply

wrote his name, and the paper was stolen from him, and some-

body put a form of a cheque or bill to the signature, would the

signer be liable ? I cannot think so. But what about the authori-

ties? It must be admitted that the cases of Young v. Grote, 4

Bing. 253, and Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 82; 28

L. J. (C. P.) 294, go a long way to justify this judgment; but .

in all those cases , and in all the others where the alleged maker @ Tw- v

or acceptor_has_ been held liable, he has volu ntarily parted with, ^-^S^»\

the instrument ; it has not been eot from hjm _bx.., t h e co mm i ssion— (JljlXaj^/vw

of a crime. This, undoubtedly, is_a_distiact.ion, and a real dis^

tinction. The defendant here has not voluntarily put into any

one's hands the means, or part of the means, for committing a
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crime.

But it is said that he has done so through negligence. I

confess I think he has been negligent ; that is to say, I think if (^T) '^^f^

he had had this paper from a third person, as a bailee bound to ,^$3; <cW

keep it, with ordinary care, he would not have done so. But e^ y-v^~~6 x -

then this ne gligence is not the proximate or_ effective cause of ^jg^^^JL. v\

the fraud A prime w as necessary for its completion. Then the ^^ V^^J^u

Bank of Ireland v. Evans 1 Trustees, 5 H. L. C. 389, shews under ^^ V*

such circumstances there is no estoppel. It is true that was not

the case of a negotiable instrument; but those who complained

of the negligence were the parties immediately affected by the

forged instrument.

Brett, L.J. In this case I agree with the conclusion at which

by Brother Bramwell has arrived, but not with his reasons. The

defendant signed a blank acceptance and gave it to a person who

wanted money that he might get it discounted ; that person sent

the blank acceptance back to the defendant, who put it into a

drawer in his room ; the room was not a place of general resort,

and the drawer into which the acceptance was put was left

unlocked ; somebody, not a servant of the defendant, stole it, and

it was filled up by a different person from him to whom the

acceptance was originally given and who had returned it. On

these facts, Lopes, J., held that the defendant had been guilty of

or done contrary to the truth , or which hould cause any one to
believe the truth to be oth r than it i ? I it not a rul that ever
that a crim will n t b committed,
ne ha a right to uppo
and to act on that beli f? Wher i th limit if th d f ndant i
estopped her ?
uppo h had i ·ned a blank cheque, with n
payee, or lat , or amount, and it wa tolen, w uld h b lial 1
or accountable, not m r ly to hi banker th e drawe , but to a
hold r? If o, suppos th r wa n tamp law, and a man imply
wrote hi name, and the paper wa t len from him, and somebody put a form of a cheque or bill to the signatur , would the
igner be liable? I cannot think so.
ut what about the authoritie ? It mu t be admitted that the case of Young v. Grote) 4
Bing. 253, and lngha11i v. Prinirose) 7 C. B. ( . . ) 82; 28
L.]. (C. .) 294, go a long way to ju tify thi judo-ment; but
in all tho e ca es, and in all the other where the alleged maker r
"fW" ~ ·
or acceptor ha been held liable. he ha voluntarily parted with ~
the in tn1ment; it has not been got from him by the commission ~
of a crime. This, undoubtedlYi_ is a di tinction, and a real di - - ~
tinction. The defendant here ha not voluntarily put into any
one's hand the means, or part of the means, for committing a
cnme.
But it is said that he ha done o throuo-h negligence. I
•·
confess I think he has been negligent; that is to ay, I think if (9 ~
he had had this paper from a third person, as a bailee bound to ~ ~
keep it, with ordinary care, he would not have done so. But ~ ~
then this negligence is not the proximate or effective cause of
the fraud A crime was necessary for its completion. Then the ~ "\
Ba'f'!-k of Ireland v. Evans Trustees) 5 H. L. C. 3 9, hew under ~ ~
such circum tance there i no e toppel. It is tru that v. ra not
the case of a negotiable in trument; but tho e who complained
of the negligence were the partie immediately aff cted by the
forged instrum nt.
BRETT, L.J. In this case I agre \Yith the conclu ion at which
by Brother Bramwell ha arrived, but not with hi r ason . The
defendant signed a blank acceptanc and ga e it to a per on who
wanted money that he might g t it di counted; that p r on ent
the blank acceptance back to the d f ndant, ' ho put it into a
drawer in hi room; the room ' a not a place f a neral re ort,
and the drawer into which the acceptanc wa put ' a left
unlocked; omebody, not a ervant of the d fendant, tole it and
it was filled up by a diff rent p r on from him to whom the
acceptance wa originally given and who had return d it. On
these fact , Lopes, J. held that th d fendant had be n o-uilty of
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negligence, and was therefore liable on the bill to the plaintiff.

Bramwell, L.J., says that the defendant is not liable, because

if he be guilty of negligence, the negligence is not the proximate

or effective cause of the fraud. It seems to me that the defendant

never authorized the bill to be filled in with a drawer's name, and

he cannot be sued on it. I do not think it right to say that the

defendant was negligent. The law as to the liability of a pe rson

who accepts a bill_in blank , is that he gives an apparent a uthority

to the person to _wjigmJie_issu£5. it to fill it. upjojth e amount that

tin- stamp will coyer; he does not strictly authorize him, but

enables him to fill it up to a greater amount than was intended.

Where a man has signed a blank acceptance, and has issued it,

and has authorized the holder to fill it up, he is liable on the bill,

whatever the amount may be, though he has given secret instruc-

tions to the holder as to the amount for which he shall fill it up ;

he has enabled his agent to deceive an innocent party, and he is

liable. Sometimes it is said that the acceptor of such a bill is

liable because bills of exchange are negotiable instruments, cur-

rent in like manner as if they were gold or bank notes; but

whether the acceptor of a blank bill is liable on it depends upon
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his having issued t he acceptance JnjggdJag-iL-to be used. No case

has been decided where, the acceptor has been held liable if the

instrument has not been delivered by the acceptor to another per-

son.

In this case it is true that the defendant after writing his

name across the stamped paper sent it to another person to be used.

When he sent it to that person, if he had filled it in to any amount

that the stamp would cover the defendant would be liable, because

he sent it with the intention that it should be acted upon; but it

was sent back to the defendant, and he was then in the same con-

dition as if he had never issued the acceptance. The case is this :

the defendant accepts a bill and puts it into his drawer, it is as

if he had never issued it with the intention that it should be filled

up ; it is as if after having accepted the bill he had left it in his

room for a moment and a thief came in and stole it. He_has_

never intend ed that the J^_shciuld^eJHled_u_p by anyd3Qdy_and_

no person was his agent to fill it up.

Then it has been said that the defendant is liable because he

has been negligent ; but was the defendant negligent ? As observed

by l.lackburn, J., in Swan v. North British Australasian Com-

pany, 2 H. & C. 175; 32 L. J. (Ex.) 273, there must be the

neglect of some duty owdng to some person — here how can the

defendant be negligent who owes no duty to anybody — against

neCYligencc, and was therefor liable on th bill to the plaintiff.
)ramwell, L.J., ay that th def ndant i not liabl b cau e
if h b guilty of n lig nc , the neglig nc i not th proximate
or [[ cli cau
f th fraud. It
m to me that the def ndant
ne r authoriz d the bill to b filled in with a drawer' name, and
h cannot b u d on it. I d not think it right to say that the
cl f nclant wa n CYlig nt. Th law a t the liability of a p r on
wh accept a bill in blank, i that h CYive an a
rent
·
t th per on to whom he i tl! it to fill it ttµ to_th_e amount that
th tamp will coyer; h do not strictly authorize him, but
enable him to fill it up to a greater amount than wa intended.
\ \ h r a man ha igned a blank acceptance, and ha i ued it,
and ha authorized the holder to fill it up, he i liable on the bill,
what ver the amount may be, though he ha
iven s cret instructi n to the holder as to the amount for which he hall fill it up;
he ha enabled his agent to d ceive an innoc nt party, and he is
liabl .
om time it i said that the acceptor of such a bill is
liable becau e bills of xcha1io-e are negotiable in trument current in like manner as if they were gold or bank notes; but
whether the ace ptor of a blank bill i liabl on it depends upon
No ca e
his havin i ued the acceptance intendino- i
ha been decided where the acceptor ha been held liable if the
in trument ha not been delivered by the acceptor to another person.
In thi ca e it is true that the defendant after writing his
name across the tamped paper sent it to anoth r per on to be used.
When he ent it to that per on, if he had filled it in to any amount
that the stamp would cover th defendant would b liabl , because
he ent it with the intention that it hould b acted upon; but it
wa ent back to the defendant and h wa then in th ame condition as if he had never issu d the ace ptanc . The ca e i thi :
the defendant accepts a bill and put it int hi draw r, it i a
if h had nev r is ued it with the intention that it hould be filled
up; it is a if after having a c pted the 1 ill h had left it in hi
room for a moment and a thi f came in and stole it. He has
..!!_ v r intend g that the bill hould be jl.ll _d u
~
y and
no per on wa hi a cnt t
11 i u .
Then- it ha been aid that the d f ndant is liable becau e he
has been negligent; but was the defendant ne ligent?
ob erved
by Blackburn, J., in Swan v. North British Australasian Conipany, 2 H. & . r75; 32 L. J. (Ex.) 273, there must be the
n glect of som duty owing to om p r on-here how can the
defendant be negligent who owes no duty to anybody-against
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whom was the defendant negligent, and to whom did he owe a

duty ? He put the bill into a drawer in his own room ; to say

that was a want of due care is impossible ; it was not negligence

for two reasons, first, he d id not owe any duty to any one. and a

secondly, he did not act otherwise than in a way which an ordi-

whom was the defendant negligent, and to whom did he owe a
duty?
put the bill into a draw r in his own room; to say
that wa a want of du car is impo sibl ; it wa not ne li
for two r asons, first, h did not ow an
u
one

1 ) a r y careful man would ac t

As to the authorities that have been cited ; in S chults v. Ast- ^f^jS^J^^-

ley, 4 Bing. N. C. 544, the blank acceptance had been filled up

by a stranger and a fraud had been committed ; nevertheless, the

acceptor was held to be liable. There, however, the acceptance

had been issued and it was intended that it should be filled up by

someone; but Crompton, J., in Stoessiger v. South Eastern Ry.

Co., 3 E. & B. at p. 556, said that case had gone to the utmost

extent of the law. I do not think that the doctrine there laid

down ought to be extended. In Ingham v^ Primruie, 7 C. B. (N. crv> JUxrN> *-* A

S.) 82 ; 28 L. J. (C. P.) 294, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, with

the intention of cancelling it, tore it into two pieces and threw

them into the street, they were picked up by the indorser, joined

together, and the bill was put into circulation. The acceptor was

held liable because, said the court, although he did intend to
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cancel it, yet he did not cancel it. It seems to me to be difficult

to support that case, and the correct mode of dealing with it is to - • .

say we do not agree with it. In Young v. Gr ote, 4 Bing. 253, w^-**- (^

Young left a blank cheque with his wife and in filling up the

cheque for fifty pounds the word fifty was written in the middle

of the line, ample space being left for the insertion of other words.

By a forgery, before the word fifty, the words "three hundred

and" were inserted. Notwithstanding the forgery the court held

Young liable. It is said that the case may be upheld on the

ground that Young owed a duty to his own bankers, and that

he was guilty of negligence in not drawing his cheques on them

with ordinary care, but that_cas_e does not govern the present, it

only. .applies^ to cases between bankers and mere customers. In

Bank of Ireland v. Evans' Charity Trustee, 5 H. L. C. 389, Parke,

B., in delivering the opinion of the judges in the House of Lords

remarks, with reference to Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, "In that

case it was held to have been the fault of the drawer of the

cheque that he misled the banker on whom it was drawn by want

of proper caution in the mode of drawing the cheque, which

admitted of easy interpolation, and consequently that the drawer,

having thus caused the banker to pay the forged cheque by his

own neglect in the mode of drawing the cheque itself, could not

complain of that payment." He then gives instances in which a

nary careful man would act.
A to th authoriti that have b n cited· in Schultz v. Ast- ~
fey, 4 ing.
. . 544, th blank ace ptanc had b en filled up
by a t·r ang r and a fraud had been committed ; nev rtheles , the
acceptor wa held to be liable. There, however, the acceptance
had been i ued and it was intended that it hould be filled up by
someone; but Crompton, J., in Stoessiger v. South Eastern Ry.
Co., 3 E. & . at p. 556, said that case had gone to the utmost
extent of the law. I do not think that the doctrine there laid
" _ _ _ t" t-down ought to be extended. In Ingham v. Primra.s.e, 7 C. B. (N. ~~
. ) 82; 28 L. J. (C. P.) 294, the acceptor of a bill of exchange, with
the intention of cancelling it, tore it into two pieces and threw
them into the treet, they were picked up by the indorser, joined
together, and the bill was put into circulation. The acceptor was
held liable because, said the court, although he did intend to
cancel it, yet he did not cancel it. It seems to me to be difficult
to support that case, and the correct mode of dealing with it i to
, ·
·
say we do not agree with it. In Y 01.mg v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, ~
Young left a blank ch que with his wife and in filling up the
cheque for fifty pounds the word fifty wa written in the middle
of the line, ample space bein(J" left for the insertion of other word .
By a forgery , before the word fifty, the words 'three hundred
and ' were in erted. N otwith tanding the forD"ery the court held
Young liable. It is aid that the ca
may be upheld on the
ground that Young owed a duty to hi own banker , and that
he was guilty of negli nee in not drawing hi cheques on them
with ordinary care, but that
e doe not govern the pre ent, it
onl
·
es
een ban.!< _r ~nd m~r-~-~__t_o mer .. In
Bank of Ireland v. Evans' Charity Trnstee, 5 H. L. . 389 Parke
B., in delivering the opinion of the jud e in th Hou e of Lord
remarks, with reference to Young v. Grote, 4 ing. 253, 'In that
case it wa held to have been the fault of th drawer of th
cheque that h mi 1 d the banker on whom it ' a dra\ n b want
of proper caution in the mode of dra' in(J" the cheque, ' hich
admitted of ea y interpolation and c n quentl that the drawer,
having thu caused th banker to pay the forO' d cheque by hi
own neglect in the mode of drawin(J" th ch qu it If, could not
complain of that payment." He th n giv in tance in which a
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person would not be liable and which govern the present case.

"I i a man should lose his cheque book or neglect to lock his desk

in which it is kept and a servant or stranger should take it, it is

impossible, in our opinion, to contend that a banker paying his

forged cheque would be enabled to charge his customer with that

payment. Would it be contended that, if he kept his goods so

negligently that a servant took them and sold them, he must be

considered as having concurred in the sale and so be disentitled

to sue for their conversion on a demand and refusal?" Lord

Cranworth, speaking of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, says that

case went upon the ground, whether correctly arrived at in point

of fact is immaterial, that in order to make negligence a good

answer there must be something that amounts to an estoppel or

ratification — "that the plaintiff was estopped from saying that he

did not sign the cheque," and then he says the doctrine of ratifi-

cation is well illustrated by Coles v. Bank of England, 10 A. & E.

437. I think the observations made by the Lords in the case of

Bank of Ireland v. Brans' Charity Trustees, 5 H. L. C. 389, have

shaken Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, and Coles v. Bank of Eng-

land, 10 A. & E. 437, as authorities. In the present case I think
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_there was no estoppel, no ratification, and no negligence, and that

the defendant is entitled to our judgment.

Baggallay, L.J., concurred that the judgment ought to be

entered for the defendant.

Judgment [or the defendant .

Ledwich v. McKim (1873), 53 N. Y. 307.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Superior

Court of the city of New York in favor of plaintiff, entered upon

an order denying motion for a new trial and directing judgment

on a verdict.

This action was brought to recover back the purchase-money

alleged to have been paid to defendants by plaintiff's assignor,

William B. Scranton, upon the purchase of certain railroad

bonds, upon the ground of failure of title.

p r on would not be liable and which govern the pre ent case.
"If a man hould 1
hi cheque book or neglect to lock his desk
in whi h it i kept and a ervant or trang r hould take it, it i
impo ible, in our pinion, to cont nd that a banker paying his
foro-ed cheque would be enabled to charge hi cu tomer with that
payment. Would it be contended that, if he k pt hi good so
ne ligently that a ervant took them and old them he must be
con idered a having concurred in the ale and o be di ntitled
to ue for their conver ion on a d mand and refusal?" Lord
Cranworth, peaking of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, say that
case went upon the ground, whether correctly arrived at in point
of fact i immaterial, that in ord r to make negliaence a good
an wer there mu t be omething that amount to an estoppel or
ratification-"that the plaintiff wa estopped from aying that he
did not ign the ch qu ," and then he ay the doctrine of ratification i well illustrated by Coles v. Bank of England, IO A. & E.
437. I think the ob ervation made by the Lords in the case of
Bank of Ireland v. Evans' Charity Tritstees, 5 H. L. C. 389, have
haken Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, and Coles v. Bank of England, IO A. & E. 437, as authorities. In the pre ent ca e I think
there was no estoppel. no ratification, and no negligence, and that
the defendant is entitled to our judgment.
BAGGALLAY, L.J., concurred that the judgment ought to be
entered for the defendant.
Judgment for the defendant.

On the 16th of October, 1865, William B. Scranton, plain-

tiff's assignor, bought of defendants ten instruments, purporting

to be bonds of the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad

Company, each bearing date September Tst, 1857, and professing

to bind the company to pay to bearer "the sum of either two

Ledwich v. McKim (1873), 53 N. Y. 307.
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Superior
Court of the city of ew York in favor of plaintiff, entered upon
an order denying motion for a new trial and directing judgment
on a verdict.
Thi action was brought to recover back the purchas -mon y
alleged to have been paid to def ndant by plaintiff' a ignor,
William
. Scranton, upon the purchase of certain railroad
bond , upon the ground of failure of titl .
n the 16th of ctober, 1865, William B. Scranton, plaintiff' assignor, bouaht of def ndant t n in truments, purporting
to be bond of the Vick burg
hr veport and Texas Railroad
ompany, each bearing date eptemb r I t, 1857, and prof s ing
to bind the company to pay to b arer "the sum of either two
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hundred and twenty-five pounds sterling, or one thousand dollars,

lawful money of the United States of America, to wit: two

hundred and twenty-five pounds sterling, if the principal and

interest are payable in London, and one thousand dollars, lawful

money of the United States of America, if the principal and

interest are payable in New York or New Orleans." To each

of the instruments were attached forty interest warrants or

coupons for the payment of "nine pounds sterling" each if pay-

able "in London," or forty dollars if payable in "New York or

New Orleans," the first of said coupons falling due on the ist of

March, 1858, and one falling due every six months thereafter.

In the body of each instrument it is provided that "the president

of the company is authorized to fix by his indorsement the place

of payment of the principal and interest, in conformity with the

tenor of this obligation." Indorsed on each instrument were the

words :

"I hereby agree that the within bonds and the interest

coupons thereto attached shall be payable in .

"C. G. Young, President."

Scranton on the same day on which he purchased the bonds
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of defendants sold them to Scott, Zerega & Co. It subsequently

v.
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hundred and twenty-fiv pound terling, or one thousand dollars,
lawful money of the Unit d tat
of merica, to wit: two
hundred and tv nty-five pound
t rling, if th principal and
intere t ar payable in London and one thou and dollar , lawful
mon
of the United tate of America, if the principal and
intere t are payable in Ne\ York or New
rlean . ' To each
of the in trument wer attach d forty intere t warrants or
coupon for the payment of ' nin pound terling' each if payable "in London," or forty dollar if payable in ' New York or
New rl an ," the fir t of aid coupon falling due on the r t of
March, r 5 and one falling du every ix month thereafter.
In the body of each in trument it is provided that "the pre ident
of the company i authorized to fix by hi indor ement the place
of pa) ment of the principal and intere t, in conformity \vith the
tenor of thi obligation." Indorsed on each instrument were the
words:

transpired that the bonds had never been issued by the railroad

company; that during the war, viz., in April, 1864, the company's

office, at Monroe, Louisiana, had been forcibly entered by United

States soldiers, its safe broken open, and the contents, including

the bonds in question, carried off. As soon as practicable the

' I hereby agree that the within bonds and the intere t
coupon thereto attached shall be payable in - - "C. G. YouNG, President."

company advertised the loss of the bonds, giving notice of the

manner of their abstraction, and warning the public that they

would not be paid. On learning these facts Scranton, as he tes-

tified, called on defendants, tendered them the bonds (which

Scott, Zerega & Co. had placed at his disposal), and demanded

a return of the consideration money, which tender and demand

defendants refused to accept or comply with. Recognizing his

liability to refund to Scott, Zerega & Co. the price which they

had paid him for the bonds, Scranton assigned to plaintiff his

claim against defendants arising out of the facts above mentioned.

Other facts appear in the opinion.

Plaintiff recovered a verdict for the amount paid for the

bonds and interest. Exceptions were ordered to be heard at first

instance at General Term.

Samuel Hand, for the appellants.

James Clark, for the respondent.

Scranton on the same day on which he purcha ed the bond
of defendants sold them to Scott, Zerega & Co. It sub equently
tran pired that the bonds had never been issued by the railroad
company; that during the war, viz., in April, .1864, the company'
office, at Monroe, Loui iana, had been forcibly entered by United
States oldiers, its afe broken open, and the contents, including
the bond in question, carried off. As oon a practicable th
company advertised the lo s of the bonds, giving notice of the
manner of their ab traction, and ' arning the public that they
would not be paid. On learning the e fact Scranton, a he te tified, called on def ndant , tend r d them the bonds which
cott, Zerega & Co. had placed at hi di po al), and demanded
a return of the consideration money, hich tender and demand
defendant refu ed to accept or compl with. Recoanizina hi
liability to refund to cott Zereaa & o. the pri e ' hich they
had paid him for the bonds, Scranton a ianed to plaintiff hi
claim a ain t defendant ari ina out of the fact above mention d.
Other fact appear in the opinion.
Plaintiff recovered a verdict for the amount paid for the
bond and intere t. Exceptions were ordered to be heard at fir t
instance at General Term.

Samuel Hand, for the appellant .
I anies Clark, for the re pondent.
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Folger, J. The plaintiff puts his right of action upon the

ground, that the defendants sold to his assignor these instru-

ments, being personal property, without having any title thereto,

and that hence they are liable upon their implied warranty of

title. It is not to be disputed that, if these papers are other than

negotia ble instruments, there was in th e_^ale_ of them by the

dj^fgnd ants an implied warranty of their title to them, and that

on a failure of title they are liable . The defendants insist, how-

ever, that they only impliedly warrant the genuineness of the

execution of the instrument. In this they err. (Murray v. Judah,

6 Cow. 484.) The seller warrants the genuineness of the instru-

ment, and that it is what it purports to be. (Gurncy v. IVomcrs-

ley, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 256; see Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202.)

It is established by the proofs and verdict, that the instru-

ments were stolen from the railroad corporation, whose obliga-

tions they purport to be. It follows that the defendants could

acquire no title to them, unless they bring them and br ing them-

sdves,~witHjn the rules which pro tect theTbona fide ho lder tor

value oT commer cial pape r. The bonds of a railroad corporation,

if they possess the requisites for negotiable paper, fall into that
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class of instruments, and are to be dealt with and disposed of by

an application of the same legal principles. But jLJiej^otiable,

instrument must be a complete and pe rfect instrument when it is.

issued, or then^rn^stJjejmtiTpn^ one, afterward

to supply anything nee ded to make it perf ect. (The Norwich

Bank v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; Exon v. Russell, 4 M. & S. 505;

Woodzvorth v. Bank of America, 19 J. R., 391.) It is evident

upon the face of these papers that they were meant to have a

specific place of payment, and that the kind of national money

in which they were to be paid and the amount thereof were also

to be specific, and that all of this was yet to be specified when

they came into and out of the hands of the defendants. Now ,an

exart place of payment, when a place of payment is meant to be

fi x pd,_and_an exact amount to be paid, are essential parts of a

negotiable instrument. (See cases last cited, supra.) In Welch

v. Sage (47 N. Y. 143), cited by the defendants, the bonds were

perfect and negotiable without the certificate which had been

detached. (Seepage T48.) These instruments w ere not p erfect

wheriJheypa^sjd_from_the possession of tin- defendan t s to thai

of the plaintiff's assignor. It was" "noFThen "SeterrnTnecl where

they were to be paid nor in what national money they were to be

paid, neither the principal nor the interest. This was uncertain,

until by lawful authority, a space left for the purpose, was filled
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FOLGER, J. The plaintiff put his right of action upon the
round, that the cl f ndants sold to hi a ignor th s in trum nt , b in p r nal p roperty, without having any tit] th reto,
and that henc th y ar liable upon th ir implied warranty of
title. It i not t be di put d that, if th e a er are oth r than
n otiabl in trum nts th re wa in the ale of th em b the
d f ndant an im lied war rant ()[ fh ir title to th m, and that
on a failure of title they are liable. The defendants in ist, howof th
r, that th y only impli dly warrant the genuinene
ex cution of th instrum ent. In thi th y err. (Murray v. Judah ,
6 ow. 484.) The II r warrant th
enuinene s of the in trumen t, and that it i wha t it purports to be. (Gurney v. TVomersley, 2 -< ng. L. & Eq. 256; see Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 202.)
It i establi h d by the proof and verdict, that the instrument w re tol n from th e railroad corporation, whose obligati n th y purport to be. It follows that the defendants could
acquire no title to them, unle they bring them and bring themelve wit m t e ru es w ich rotect t ·e bona fide holder for
valUe- of comm rcial paper. The bond of a railroad corporation,
if they po s
th r equi ite for negotiable paper, fall into that
cla of instrum nts, and are to be dealt with and di po ed of by
an application of the same 1 gal principl . But a negotiabl
instrument mu t be a complete and erfect in trument when it is
iued,o-;-th e~- must .be atrthorlt re
.in
e one, aft rward
to u ly . anythin_g ne <:_~ed to make it erfect. (The N Or'l ich
Banli v. Hyde, 13 Conn. 279; E :1:on v. Russell, 4 M. & S. 505;
Woodworth v. Bank of A11ierica, 19 J. R. 39i.) It i evident
upon the fa
of th se paper that they wer meant to have a
pecific place of payment, and that the kind of national money
in which th y wer to 1 e paid and the amount ther of were al o
t be pecific, an 1 that all of thi s wa yet to be specifi d v;h n
th y came into and out of th hands of the defendants. Now .an.
exact plac~o f a m nt wl).en a lace of payment i m ant to be
fi x d, and_gn ~a_ct amount to be paid, are s ential part of a
negotiabk_instrument. ( e ca es la t cited , supra.) In Welch
v. Sage (47 N. Y . 143), cit d by the d fendant , the bond were
p rfect and n otiable without th e c rtifica te vvhich had been
detach d. ( e page 148.) The in trum nt w r n t erfect
" hen they pa sed from th po e ion
~f th-plai ntiff' asSTg!iOf."" t wa no
en et rmin cl where
th y wer to be paid nor in what nati nal money they w re to be
paid , neith r the principal nor th int r st. This was unc rtain,
unti l y law fol authority, a pac 1 ft for the purpo e, wa filled
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with the name of the place of payment. The corporation had

given power to their president to fill this blank, which power he

had not exercised in fact. This was apparent to the defendants

and to all others dealing with them. It was plain that the instru-

ments were still imperfect and incomplete, and that they were so

when they left the possession of the railroad corporation. It is

incumbent then upon the defendants, to show that there is right-

ful authority elsewhere than in the corporation or its president

to fill the blanks and make these bonds perfect instruments. • The

defendants .. contend that they or any holder of these instruments,

seeing the indorsement of the president in blank, would undoubt-

edly and justly regard themselves as authorized to fill the blank.

Cases are cited to sustain this proposition. In all of them, how-

ever, there is an authority from the party to be bound, to him to

whom the paper was intrusted, for the fi l ling of the blank , or an

actual intrusting of it to him upon some confidence as to its use

or disposition. This authority is either express, or it is implied

from an actual delivery for future use, of the instrument, though

still in its imperfect condition. As to an express authority there

can be no question or doubt. The implied authority is found in
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the fact of delivery for use. For as it is not to be presumed that

the delivery for use was meant to be a nugatory and unavailing

act, and as it is apparent that it would be, if the instrument may

not be perfected before put to use, the law implies an intention and

hence an authority, that he to whom it is thus delivered, may

supply all needs for making it a perfect and binding negotiable

instrument. But this authority is not implied from t he fact alone,

thatjhe_pape r is in hands other than those of him who is to be

bound, but from the fact joined with this other fact, that it has

been by him intrus ted to those hands for the p urpose and with

the intent that it shall go into use and circulation . And an express

authority, though it be limited, if it be exceeded by the one in

whom confidence has been reposed, renders the party to the

instrument liable to a bona fide holder for value, on the principle

that of two, one of whom must suffer by the wrongful act of a

third, it should be he who has enabled the wrongful act to be

done. But there cannot be an enabling of the wrongful act, unless

there be assisting action of the party to the instrument who is

sought to be bound, and there must be that in his conduct, in

relation to the paper, which shows a parting with the possession

of it for use, or with a confidence in him to whom it is delivered.

The liability of the maker of the instrument is put upon his

act in sending it into the world in its imperfect form (Cruchley v.

with the name of the place of paym nt. The corporation had
o-iv n · power to their pre ident t fill thi blank, which pow r he
had not xerci ed in fact. This wa apparent to th defendants
and t all other dealin with th m. It was plain that the in trument "" r till imp rfect and incompl te, and that they were so
when th y left the po
ion of the railroad corporation. It i
incumb nt then upon the defendant , to show that there is rightful authority elsewh r than in th corporation or it pr ident
to fill the blank and make the e bonds perfect instruments .. The
defendants contend that they or any holder of th e e in truments,
eeing the indor ement of the pre ident in blank, would undoubtedly and ju tly reo-ard them elv a authorized to fill the blank.
Ca e are cit d to su tain thi proposition. In all of them, however, there i an authority from the party to be bound, to him to
whom the paper wa intru ted, for the filling of the blank, or an
actual intru ting of it to him upon some confidence as to its use
or di po ition. Thi authority is either express, or it is implied
from an actual delivery for future use, of the instrument, though
still in its imperfect condition. As to an express ·authority there
can be no question or doubt. The implied authority is found in
the fact of delivery for use. For as it is not to be pre urned that
the delivery for use was meant to be a nugatory and unavailinoact, and a it is apparent that it would be, if the instrument may
not be perf cted before put to use, the law implie an intention and
hence an authority, that he to whom it is thus delivered, may
supply all need for making it a perfect and binding negotiable
in trument. But thi authority i not implied from the fact alone,
that the paper is in hands other than tho e of him who is to be
bound, but from the fact joined with this other fact, that it has
been by him intru ted t__ those hand for the ur ose and with
the intent that it shall go into u e and circulation. And an expre
authority, though it be limited, if it be exceeded by the one in
whom confidence ha b en repo ed render th party to the
instrument liable to a bona. fide holder for value on the principle
that of two, one of whom must uff r b the wrono-ful act of a
third, it hould be he who ha enabled the ' rono-ful act to be
done. But there cannot be an enabling of the \ r no-fu] act, unl
there be a isting action of the party to the in trument who i
ought to be bound, and there mu t be that in hi
onduct. in
relation to the paper, which how a parting ' ith the pos e ion
of it for use, or with a confidenc in him to whom it i d liv red.
The liability of the maker of the in trum nt i put upon hi
act in sending it into the v.rorld in it imperfect form ( Cruchley v.
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Clarancc, 2 M. & S., 90), or upon an authority given or confidence

reposed in the one put into possession of the instrument, that he

should do that with it which should set it afloat on the currents

of business. {Van Duzcr v. Howe, 21 N. Y., 531.) In the last

case cited, Denio, J., says, that the principle which lies at the

foundation, is that th ejnaker, who by puttin g jiis paper in ci rcular;

tion has invited the public to receive it of any one having - it in

possession with apparent titlej is estopped to urge t he actual defect

of title against a bona fide holder . So far has this gone, that it

has been held that this authority is revoked by the death of the

party sought to be bound, so that one taking paper indorsed by

him, and intrusted by him to another for use while yet in an imper-

fect state, may not recover on it against the estate of the deceased

indorser. {Mich. Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt, 11.) And this

court has held that when a negotiable instrument is in hands

to which , prima f acie, it has not c ome in the regular course of bus-

in ess, it Ts taken by a third party at his peril . {Central Bank v.

Hammctt, 50 N. Y., 158.) No authority has been cited, which

decides that the maker of an instrument, negotiable but for some

lack susceptible of being supplied, so that it is yet imperfect, who
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has not by his own act, or by the act of another authorized or

confided in by him, put it in circulation, confers a power upon even

a bona fide holder to supply that lack. He must have been himself

instrumental in its leaving his possession and control and passing

into that of another, and have been so with the purpose of its

becoming effectual for circulation, or with some trust in the per-

son to whom committed, before he can be held liable. He must

in some way and for some purpose have created an agency in some

one to act with or to hold the paper ; and to find an authority in

a subsequent holder to make perfect the imperfect paper, this

agency must first be established. The remarks of Byles, J., in 2

Hurlst. & Colt., 184, cited and relied upon by the defendants, are

qualified by him in Foster v. MacKinnon (4 L. R. Com. PL, 709),

where he says, that if they be right, it can only be with reference

to a complete instrument. There was no such instrumentality

on the part of this railroad corporation. On the contrary, it

appears that it had no part in the bonds going out of its possession,

but was despoiled of them by superior force.

The defendants claim that there was a failure of the proof

to sustain the allegations of the complaint, and that their motion

to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. The com-

plaint, they say, substantially averred a cause of action arising

from false representations, which is an action ex delicto; and that

2 ~1.

& S., go), or upon an authority given or confidence
repo ed in the on put into po e ion of the in trument, that he
hould do that with it which should set it a.float on the currents
of busines . (Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y., 53r.) In the lat
case cited, Denio, ]., ays, that the principle which lies at the
foundation, i that the maker, who by putting his paper in circulation has invited the public to receive it of any one having- it in
po ession with apparent title, i e topped to urge the actual defect
of title again t a bona fide holder. So far has this gone, that it
has been held that this authority is rev.oked by the death of the
party sought to be bound, so that one taking paper indorsed by
him, and intrusted by him to another for use while yet in an imperfect tate, may not recover on it against the estate of the decea ed
indor er. (lvlich. Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt., rr.) And this
court has h Id that when a negotiable instrument is in hand
to which, prima facie, it has not come in the regular course of busme , it is taken b a third art at his eril. (Central Bank v.
amniett, 50 N. Y., I 5 . )
0 authority nas been cited, which
decides that the maker of an instrument, negotiable but for some
lack usceptible of being supplied, so that it is yet imperfect, who
has not by his own act, or by the act of another authorized or
confided in by him, put it in circulation, confers a power upon even
a bona fide holder to supply that lack. He must have been himself
in trumental in its leaving his posses ion and control and pa ing
into that of another, and have been so with the purpo e of it
becoming effectual for circulation, or with some tru t in the peron to whom committed, before he can be held liable. He must
in some way and for some purpose have created an agency in ome
one to act with or to hold the paper; and to find an authority in
a subsequent holder to make perfect th imperfect paper, this
agency mu t fir t be establi hed. The remarks of Byle , J., in 2
Hurl t. & Colt., r 4, cited and relied upon by the d fendant , are
qualified by him in Faster v. M acK innon ( 4 L. R. Com. Pl., 709),
where he ays, that if they be right, it can only be with reference
to a complete in trument. There was no such instrumentality
on the part of this railroad corporation. On the contrary, it
appears that it had no part in the bonds going out of its po es ion,
but wa de poil d of th m by up rior force.
The defendant claim that th r wa a failure of the proof
to u tain the all gation of the complaint, and that their motion
to dismiss the complaint hould have been granted. The complaint, they ay, sub tantially averr d a cau e of action arising
from false representations, which is an action e.-c delicto; and that
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proof of a breach of an implied warranty of title, being matter of

contract, will not sustain a complaint for the cause averred. It

is true that the complaint avers that the defendants represented

these instruments to be the bonds of the railroad corporation,

issued by and binding upon it, and that the plaintiff's assignor

relied upon these representations. But the summons is not for

relief. It is for money. The complaint avers the facts which

were proven and which make out a cause of action in contract.

The presence of the averment as to the representations, even were

they averred to have been false and fraudulent, do not make the

action one ex delicto. (See Co naughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y., 83.)

The defendants also moved to dismiss the complaint, on the

ground that no damages had been proven to have been sustained

by the plaintiff. Whatever other answer might be made to this

motion, it did appear that the mortgage, given by the railroad

company as a security for the bonds of which these instruments

were supposed to be a part, had been foreclosed, and the property

covered by it sold and moneys realized thereon. If these instru-

ments had been genuine, the plaintiff or his assignor would have

had a right to share in a division of this sum among the bond-
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holders. It would doubtless have been a small dividend which

would have been received ; but however small, if appreciable, the

plaintiff was entitled to it, and entitled to a verdict for that

amount. So that a motion to dismiss, for the reason stated, was

properly denied. And whatever the damages were, the plaintiff

had a right to them, as assignee (see Bordivell v. Collie, 45 N.

Y., 4^4), and though he should receive them not for himself, but

for others, represented by him, who were the real parties in inter-

est, he being a trustee of an express trust. To the rule of dam-

ages, as stated to the jury in the charge of the court, there was

no exception taken.

The defendants offered to read in evidence, certain papers

which it was claimed would show a submission of this contro-

versy to arbitration, and an award in favor of the defendants.

These were not competent to be admitted in bar of the plaintiff's

action. The jury have found, upon the question being submitted

to them, that the plaintiff's assignor bought the instruments for

himself. As it was not claimed that he was a party to the sub-

mission, the papers were not competent evidence against him in

direct bar of his action. They were not competent as admissions

of a party in interest, until it was established that he by whom

they were made was such ; nor could they until then be received

to assist in establishing the fact of his interest. The immediate

proof of a breach of an implied warranty of titl , being matter of
contract, will not u tain a complaint for the cau e averred. It
is true that the complaint aver that the def ndant repre ented
the e instrum nts to be the bonds of the railroad corporation,
issued by and binding upon it, and that the plaintiff' a ignor
relied upon the e representations.
ut the ummon i not for
relief. It is for money. The complaint aver the facts which
were proven and which make out a cause of action in contract.
The presence of the averment a to the repre entations, even were
they averred to have been fal e and fraudulent, do not make the
action one ex delicto. (See Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y., 83.)
The defendants al o moved to di miss the complaint, on the
ground that no damage had been proven to have been sustained
by the plaintiff. Whatever other answer might be made to this
motion, it did appear that the mortgage, given by the railroad
company as a security for the bonds of which these instruments
"ere uppo ed to be a part, had been foreclosed, and the property
covered by it sold and moneys realized thereon. If the e instruments had been genuine, the plaintiff or his a signor would have
had a right to share in a division of this sum among the bondholders. It would doubtless have been a mall dividend which
would have been received; but however small, if appreciable, the
plaintiff was entitled to it, and entitled to a verdict for that
amount. So that a motion to dismiss, for the rea on tated, was
properly denied. And whatever the damages were, the plaintiff
had a right to them, a a ignee (see Bordwell v. Collie, 45 N.
Y., 494), and though he hould receive them not for him elf, but
for others, represented by him, who were the real partie in intere t, he being a trustee of an expre tn.: t. To the rule of damages, a stated to the jury in the charge of the court there was
no exception taken.
The defendants offered to read in evidence, certain papers
which it wa claimed would how a ubmi ion of thi controver y to arbitration, and an award in favor of th defendant .
These were not competent to be admitted in bar of the plaintiff'
action. The jury have found, upon the que tion beina ubmitt d
to them, that the plaintiff's a sio-nor bourrht the in trument for
him elf. A it "'a not claimed that he "a a party to the ubmi ion, the paper were not compet nt evidence arrain t him in
irect bar of his action. They were not comp t nt a admi ion
of a party in intere t, until it wa e tabli h d that he by whom
they were made wa such; nor could the until then be received
to as ist in establi hing the fact of hi intere t. The immediate
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issue was, what were the mutual rights of the plaintiff's assignor

and of Zarega & Co. at the time of. the purchase hy the former

of these instruments, neither of them being parties on the record

in this action. The rule is, that this inquiry lets in such evidence

as would have been receivable between those persons. ( I Phil.

on Ev., 465, [490], chap. 8, § 10.) The declarations of Zarega

would not have been competent in his favor against the plaintiff's

assignor, and were not admissible.

But it is claimed that, if not competent in bar of the plain-

tiff's action, they were admissible on the collateral issue of the

credibility of the witness Zarega. He had testified that his house

did not buy the bonds from the defendants, but did buy them of

Scranton, the plaintiff's assignor. One defence set up in the

answer was that the bonds were sold by the defendants to that

house, and that afterward, on claim by it, there was a submission

to arbitrators and award in the defendants' favor. It was material

to this issue, the testimony he had given, and it was on a material

point that the defendants now claim that they sought to contradict

him. And the papers offered, if shown to have been signed by

or with the knowledge of Zarega, or to have come to his knowl-

this.
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edge, were pertinent for that purpose ; but there was no proof of

The defendants' request to charge, it was not error for the

court to refuse. There was testimony by Scranton from which

the jury could find that he tendered a return to the defendants

of the same instruments purchased of them.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs t© the

lespondent-

All concur. Judgment affirmed.

SIGNING IN TRADE OR ASSUMED NAME. § 20.

Jones v. Home Furnishing Co. (1896), A pp. Div. Rep. (N. Y.)

103, 41 N. Y. Sup p. 7T.

Appeal by the defendant, the Home Furnishing Company,

from three judgments of the County Court of the County of

Kings, entered in the office of the clerk of the County of Kings on

the 1 st day of April, 1896, upon the decision of the court affirm-

ing three judgments rendered by a justice of the peace of the

City of Brooklyn.

R. W. Newhall, for the appellant.
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and of Zarega & Co. at th time of. th purcha e by the form r
of th e e instrument , neither of them being partie on the record
in thi action. Th rul i , that thi inquiry let in uch evidence
a \\'Ould have been recei able b twe n tho e p r on . ( r Phil.
on Ev., 465, [ 490], chap. , § 10.) The declaration of Zarega
would not hav b en competent in hi favor again t the plaintiff'
a ignor, and w re not adrnis ible.
But it i claimed that, if not competent in bar of the plaintiff' action they \Yer admi ible on the collateral i ue of the
credibility of the witness Zar ga. He had testified that his house
did not buy th bond from th defendants, but did buy th m of
cranton, the plaintiff a ignor. One defence
t up in the
an wer wa that the bond were old by the defendants to that
hou e, and that afterward, on claim by it, there wa a ubmi ion
tC' arbitrator and award in the defendants' favor. It was material
t0 thi i ue, the te timony he h:id given, and it was on a material
point that th defendant no'' claim that they ought to contradict
him. And th paper offered, if shown to have been signed by
or with the knowledg of Zarega, or to have come to his knowledge, were pertinent for that purpose; but there was no proof of
thi .
The defendant ' request to charge, it was not error for the
court to refuse. There was testimony by Scranton from which
, the jury could find that he tendered a return to the defendant
of th ame instrument purchased of them.
The judgment should be affirmed, with co ts t© the
I espondentAll concur.
Judgment affirmed.
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John B. Green, for the respondent.
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IOJ, 4I N. Y. Supp. 7 I.
Appeal by the defendant, the Home Furnishing Company,
from three judgments of the County Court of the County of
King , ent r d in the office of the clerk of the County of Kings on
the r t day of pril, 1896, upon the decision of the court affirm ing three judgments rendered by a justice of the peace of the
City of Brooklyn.

R. W. Newhall, for the appellant.
John B. Green, for the respondent.
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Hatch, J. : Separate actions were brought upon three prom-

issory notes. The notes, which were made payable to the order

of "National Publishing Company," and were signed by the

defendant through its president, were each in the same form.

excepting the dates and amounts. The defendant is a domestic

corporation, having its place of business in Brooklyn. The Na-

tional Publishing Company is a name assumed by plaintiff in

carrying on his business, and represents nothing beyond that

assumption. It is conceded that the notes were each given for a

valuable consideration received by the defendant from the plain-

tiff, but the claim is made that the notes were made payable to a

company that had no existence, and that, therefore, the paper was

fictitious; and that as the indorsement was fictitious and spuri-

ous no title passed to the notes. This defense savors of delay

and the us e of legal remedies to prevent collection of a bona^

fide debt. The notes were as much payable to Jones when they

were made payable to the name under which he carried o n his

b usiness as though he had been named therein. It was not in

legal contemplation a fiction, but it was the plaintiff under this

business name and represented him. When the notes were made
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and delivered to plaintiff under these conditions they created a

liability against the defendant in plaintiff's favor; and had the

complaint set out the fact that the payee was the plaintiff's busi-

ness name, and that the notes were so made payable on account

thereof, there would be little doubt that defendant would not have

had the temerity to interpose a defense. Atthe most, the question

now here is one of pleading, as plaintiff has made the usual alle-

gation of delivery to the payee and indorsement by it to the

plaintiff. But the facts were all known before issue was joined

and when the trial was had. The complaint, therefore, will be

deemed amended in accordance with the facts. The notes in

plaintiff's hands are subsisting liabilities against the defendant in

his favor. (Mechanics' Bank v. Straiten, 3 Keyes. 365; Maniort

v. Roberts, 4 E. D. Smith, 83.) These not e s having been given

for bona fide debt_s , and delivered to the plaintiff, defe ndant is

estoppe djfrom setting up as against plaintiff that they were made

payable to a fictitious pavce^Jf by such averment the notes would

be~defeated in plaintiff's hands. (Irving Nat. Bank v. Alley, 79

N. Y. 536.)

The judgments appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.

All concurred.

Judgments affirmed, with costs.

HATCH, ]. :
eparate acti n w r brought upon three promi ory not . The n t , \ hich w r made payabl to the order
of ' ational
ubli hing ompany," and w r
igned by the
def ndant throtwh it pre i<l nt, -v r each in th
am f
excepting the date and am unt . Th def ndant i a <lorn
corporati n, havin it plac of bu in
in r klyn. Th
ational ublishing
mpany i a name as um d l>y plaintiff in
carryin
n hi busin , and r pr ents nothin 1 eyond that
a umption. It i con <l d that the not w r ach iv n for a
valuabl consideration r c ived by the d fendant from th plain tiff, but th claim i mad that th n te wer made payable to a
company that had no exi t nee, and that, theref r , the paper wa
fictitiou · and that a th indor ment wa fi titiou and pnriou no title pa ed to the note . Thi defen
avor of delay
and the u
of 1 al remedie to pr vent coll ction of a bona
fide __gebt. The note v re as much payable to Jone when they
\Vere made payabl to the name under which h carried on hi
bu in
a though he had been named therein. It wa not in
le al contemplation a fiction, but it wa the plaintiff under thi
bu in
name and represented him. When the notes were made
and delivered to plaintiff under these condition th y created a
liability aaain t the defendant in plaintiff' favor· and had the
complaint et out the fact that the payee wa th plaintiff' bu iness name, and that the note were o made payable on account
thereof, there ' ould b little doubt that defendant would not hav
had the t merity to int rpo e a defen e. _b.t th mo t, the que tion
now her i on of pl ading, as plaintiff ha made the u ual alleo-ation of delivery to the payee and indorsem nt by it to the
plaintiff.
ut the ·fact were all kn wn before i u ' a joined
and when the trial wa had. Th complaint, th refore will be
ordanc with the fact . The note in
i tincr liabiliti again t th d fendant in

traiton, 3 K _ , 365; 1 aniort
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app al d from hould be affirm d. ' ith o t .

!11d cr 111 nts affirJ11ed. 1.vitlz costs.
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signature by procuration. § 23.

Attwood et al. v. Mannings {1827), 7 B. & C. 278, 4 Eng. Rid.

Cos. 364.

SIGNATURE BY PROCURATION.

Assumpsit by the plaintiffs, as indorsees, against the defend-

ant, as acceptor of a bill of exchange for 1560/. Plea, the general

issue. At the trial before Lord Tenderden, C. J., at the Lon-

don sittings after Michaelmas term, 1823, a verdict was found

Attwood et al. v. Mun'nings ( I827), 7 B. & C. 278, 4 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 364.

for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of this court on the fol-

lowing case :

The plaintiffs were bankers carrying on business in the city

of London ; the defendant was a merchant engaged in extensive

mercantile business, and also, in joint speculations to a consider-

able amount, with Thomas Burleigh, Messrs. Bridges and Elmer,

S. Howlett, and W. Rothery. In the year 1815 the defendant went

abroad on the partnership business, and remained abroad till after

the bill upon which this action was brought became due. By a

power of attorney, dated the 18th of May, 1816, the defendant

granted power to W. Rothery, T. Burleigh, and S. Munnings, his

wife, jointly and severally for him, and in his name, and to his

use, to sue for and get in monies and goods, to take proceedings,
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and bring actions, to enforce payment of monies due, to defend

actions, settle accounts, submit disputes to arbitration, sign receipts

for money, accept compositions ; "indorse, negotiate, and discount,

or acquit and discharge the bills of exchange, promissory notes,

or other negotiable securities which were or should be payable to

him, and should need and require his indorsement ;" to sell his

ships, execute bills of sale, hire on freight, effect insurances;

"buy, sell, barter, exchange, export and import all goods, wares,

and merchandises, and to trade in and deal in the same, in such

manner as should be deemed most for his interest ; and generally

for him and in his name, place, and stead, and as his act and deed,

or otherwise, but to his use, to make, do, execute, transact, per-

form, and accomplish all and singular such further and other acts,

deeds, matters, and things as should be requisite, expedient, and

advisable to be done in and about the premises, and all other his

affairs and concerns, and as he might or could do if person-

ally acting therein." By another power of attorney, dated the

23d of July, 1 81 7, and executed by the defendant when abroad,

he gave to his wife, S. Munnings, power to do a variety of acts

affecting his real and personal property ; "and also for him and

Assumpsit by the plaintiffs, as indorsees, against the defendant, a acceptor of a bill of exchange for I 56ol. Plea, tl1e general
i ue. At the trial before Lord Tenderden, C. J., at the London itting after M ichael1nas term, 1823, a verdict was found
for the plaintiff , subject to the opinion of this court on the following case :
The plaintiff were bankers carrying on business in the city
of London; the defendant ·was a merchant engaged in extensive
mercantile bu ine , and al o, in joint peculations to a considerable amount, with Thomas Burleigh, Me srs. Bridges and Elmer~
. Howlett, and W. Rothery. In the year 1815 the defendant went
abroad on th partner hip bu ine s, and remained abroad till after
the bill upon which thi action was brought became due. By a
power of attorney, dated the 18th of May, 1816, the defendant
granted power to W. Rothery, T. Burleigh, and S. Munnings, his
\Yife, jointly and everally for him) and in his name) and to his
use) to sue for and get in monies and goods, to take proceeding ,
and bring actions, to enforce payment of monies due, to defend
actions, settle accounts, submit dispute to arbitration, ign receipts
for money, accept compo ition ; "indorse, negotiate, and discount,
or acquit and di charge the bill of exchange, promi ory note ,
or other negotiable ecurities which were or hould be payable to
him, and should n ed and require hi indor ement ;" to ell his
hip , execute bill of ale hire on freight, eff ct in urance ;
"buy, ell, barter, exchange, export and import all goods, wares,
and merchandi e , and to trade in and deal in the same, in uch
manner as hould be deemed mo t for hi intere t; and generally
for him and in hi name, place, and tead, and a bi act and deed,
or otherwi , but to his use, to make, do, execute, tran act, perform, and accompli h all and singular uch further and other acts,
deed , matter , and things a hould be requi ite, expedient, and
advi able to be done in and about the premi es, and all other hi
affair and concern , and a he might or could do if per anally acting therein." By another pow r of attorney, dated the
23d of July, 1817, and executed by th defendant when abroad,
he gave to hi wife, S. Munnings, power to do a variety of acts
affecting hi real and personal property ; "and al o for him and
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on his behalf, to pay and accept such bill or bills of exchange as

should be drawn or charged on him by his agents or correspond-

ents as occasion should require, &c. ; and generally to do, nego-

tiate, and transact the affairs and business of him, defendant,

during his absence, as fully and effectually as if he were present

and acting therein." T. Burleigh corresponded with the defend-

ant, and acted as his agent, both before and after the receipt of

this power. The defendant, while abroad, employed part of the

produce of the joint speculations in his individual concerns, and

during his absence, T. Burleigh, for the purpose of raising money

to pay creditors of the joint concern, who were become urgent, drew

four bills of exchange for 500/. each upon the defendant, dated May

22d, 1819. The proceeds of those bills were applied in payment

of partnership debts; they were accepted by the defendant by

procuration of S. M., his wife. The bill in question was after-

wards, in order to raise money to take up those bills, drawn and

accepted in the following form : — "Six months after date pay to

my order 1 560/., for value received: T. Burleigh. Accepted per

procuration of G. G. H. Munnings. — S. Munnings." This bill

was discounted by the plaintiffs. The defendant returned to Eng-
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land in October, 1821, and he, and each of the partners to the

joint speculations, claimed to be a creditor on that concern.

Bayley, J. This was an action upon an acceptance import-

ing to be by procuration, and, therefore, any person taking the

bill would know that he had not the security of the acc eptor s

signature, but of the party professing to ac t in pursuance of an

authority from him. A person taking such a bill, ought to exer~

cise due caution, for he must take it upon the credit of the party

who assumes the authority to accept, and it would be only reason-

able pru dence torequire the pro duction of that authority. The

plaintiff in this case relies on the authority given by two powers

of attorney, which are instruments to be construed strictly. By

the first of the powers in question the defendant gave to certain

persons authority to do certain acts for him, and in his name, and

to his use. It is rather a power to take than to bind ; and, looking

at the whole of the instrument, although general words are used,

it only authorizes acts to be done for the defendant singly ; it

contains no express power to accept bills, nor does there appear

to have been an intention to give it : the first power, therefore,

did not warrant this acceptance. The second power gave an

express authority to accept bills for the defendant and on his

behalf. No such power was requisite as to partnership transac-

tions, for the other partners might bind the firm by their accept-

on his behalf, to pay and accept uch bill or bills of exchange a
hould be drawn r charged n him by hi ag nt or corre pondent a occa ion hould require, &c.; and g nerally to do, negotiate, and tran act th e affair and bu ine of him, defendant,
during his ab ence, as fully and eff ctually as if he were pre ent
and acting therein." T. Burleigh corre pond d with the defendant, and acted as hi agent, both before and after the receipt of
thi power. The defendant, \ hile abroad, employed part of the
produce of the joint peculations in his individual concern , and
during his ab ence, T. urleigh, for the purpose of rai ing money
to pay creditor of the joint concern, who were become urgent, drew
four bill of xchange for 5ool. each upon the defendant, dated May
22d, 1819. Th proceed of tho e bill were applied in payment
of partnership debts; they were accepted by the defendant by
procuration of S. M., hi wife. The bill in que tion wa after'vard , in order to rai e money to take up tho e bill , drawn and
accepted in the following form :-"Six months after date pay to
ID) order l56ol., for value received: T. Burleigh. Accepted per
procuration of G. G. H. Munnings.-S. Munnings." Thi bill
wa di counted by the plaintiffs. The defendant returned to England in October, 1821, and he, and each of the partners to the
joint speculations, claimed to be a creditor on that concern.
BAYLEY, J. This wa an action upon an acceptance importing to be by procuration, and, therefore, any per on taking the
bill would know that he had not the security of the acceptor.,...
iO'nature, but of the art
rofe inO' to act in pur uance of an
authority from him. A person taking such a 1 , oug 1t to exersise due caution, for he mu t take it upon the credit of the party
who assum the authorit to acce t and it ' ould be onl r rea oncili' e pru ence to require the production of that authority. The
plaintiff in thi case relie on the authority 1ven by two pO\Yer
of attorney, \Yhich are in trument to be con trued trictly. B
the fir t of the power in que tion the defendant O'ave to certain
per on authority to do certain act for him, GJzd in his na1J1e and
to his use. It i rather a pow r to tak than to bind· and, l okinO'
at the whole of the in trument althouO'h O'en ral word are u ed
it only authorizes act to be done f r the defendant inaly; it
contain no expre s po' er to accept bill , nor doe there appear
to have been an int ntion to give it: th fir t power therefore
did not warrant thi ac eptance. Th
ec nd PO\ er O'a' e an
expre authority to accept bill for the dcfe11dant a11d 01l his
behalf. No uch P°' er wa requi ite a t partner hip tran actions, for the other partner might bind th firm b their accept-
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ance. The words, therefore, must be confined to that which is

their obvious meaning, viz., an authority to accept in those cases

where it was right for him to accept in his inn^du^xapaciU:.

Besides, the bills to be accepted are those drawn by the defend^

ant's agents or correspondents ; but the drawer of the bill in ques-

tion was not lias agent quoad hoc. The bills are to be accepted,

too, "as occasion shall require." It would be dangerous to hold

that the plaintiff in this case was not bound to enquire into the

propriety of accepting. He might easily have done so by calling

for the letter of advice ; and I think he was bound to do so. For

these reasons, I am of opinion that judgment of nonsuit must be

entered.

Holrovd, J. I agree in thinking that the powers in question

did not authorize this acceptance. The word procuration gave due

notice to the plaintiff s, and they were bound to ascertain, before

they took the bill, that the acceptance was agreeable to the authority

given. The case does not state sufficient to show that this bill

was drawn by an agent in that capacity, but rather the contrary ;

for it appears that it was drawn to raise money for the joint con-

cern in which the drawer was a partner ; it does not, therefore,
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come within the special power. Then, as to the general powers.

These instruments do not give general powers, speaking at large,

but only where they are necessary to carry the purposes of the

special powers into effect.

Littledale, J. I am of the same opinion. It issaid that

third persons are not bound to enquire into the making of a

bill; but that is not so where the accepta n ce appears to be by

procuration. The question then turns upon the authority given.

The first power of attorney contains an authority to indorse, but

not to accept bills ; the latter, therefore, seems to have been pur-

posely omitted. Neither is this varied by the general words, for

they cannot apply to any thing as to which limited powers are

given. The second power gives authority "to accept for me and

in my name, bills drawn or charged on me by my agents or corre-

spondents, as occasion shall require." The latter words, as to the

occasion, do not appear to me to vary the question ; and, reading

the sentence without them, it authorizes the acceptance of bills

drawn by an agent. The present bill was not drawn by Burleigh

in his character as agent, and therefore the "acceptance was with-

out sufficient authority, and the plaintiff cannot recover upon it.

Postea to the defendant.

~

~~
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anc . The word , therefore mu t b confined to that which is
their ob iou meanin viz., an auth rity to accept in tho e ca e
'' h re it was ri ht for him t ace t in his indiyidua
·
Bes id , the bill to be accepted are tho
ra wn y t 1e e en ant' agent or c rrespondents · but the draw r of the bill in que ti on wa not his ag nt q 1toad lzoc. Th bill ar to be accepted,
too "a occasion hall require." It would be dan erou to hold
that the plaintiff in this ca e wa not bound to enquir into the
propriety of acceptina. He might ea ily hav don
by allin a
fo r the letter of advice ; and I think he wa bound to do o. For
the e rea on I am of opinion that judoment of non uit mu t be
entered.
HOLROYD, J. I a ree in thinking that the pO\vers in que tion
did not authorize this acceptanc . The word procuration gave due
notice to the plaintiff , and they were bound to ascertain, before
they t k the bill, that th acceptance wa agreeable to the authority
given. The ca e does not tate ufficient to show that this bill
was drawn by an agent in that capacity, but rather the contrary;
for it appear that it was drawn to rai money for the joint concern in which the dra·w er was a partner; it does not, therefore,
come within the special power. Then, a to the general power .
The e in trument do not give o-eneral power , peaking at large
but only where they are nece sary to carry the purpose of the
pecial power into effect.
LITTLEDALE, J.
I am of the same opinion. It is aid that
..!hiu! ersons are not bound to en uire into the makina of a
bill; but that is not ~he re the acceptance a
ar to be b
procuration. The que tion then turns upon the authority given.
The first power of attorney contain an authority to indor e, but
not to accept bill ; the latter, therefore, s m to have b n purpo ely omitted. Neither is thi varied by th o-eneral word , for
they cannot apply to any thin a to which limited power are
given. The second power o-ive authority "to accept for me and
in my name, bills drawn or charo-ed on m by my agent or correp ndents, as occa ion hall require. ' Th latter word , a to th
occa ion, do not appear to me to vary th qu tion · and, readin
the entence without them, it authorize th acceptanc of bill
drawn by an a ent. The pre ent bill wa not draV\ n by urleigh
in hi charact r a agent, and th r fore th ace ptance wa without sufficient authority, and the plaintiff cannot recover upon it.

Postea to the defenda;nt.
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EFFECT OF INDORSEMENT BY INFANT. § 24.

In re Soltykoff (i8pi), i Q. B. Div. 413.

EFFECT OF IND RSEMENT BY INFANT.
Appeal against the dismissal of a bankruptcy petition pre-

sented against Prince Alexis Soltykoff.

The petitioner was the indorsee for some bills of exchange

In re Soltyko ff (1891)

l

Q. B. Div. 413.

which had been accepted by the Prince when he was an infant.

There was evidence that the bills had been given in payment for

goods supplied to the Prince by the drawer. It was assumed for

the purpose of the argument that the goods were necessaries.

The registrar held that an infant__could not make himself

liable f or acc epting a bill of e xchange, even though he accepted

The bill in order to pay for nece ssaries supp lied to him by the

drawer .

The petitioner appealed.

Bigham, Q. C, and Henry Kisch, for the appellant.

F inlay, Q. C, and Herbert Reed, for the respondent, were

not called upon.

Lord Esher, M. R. The claim of the petitioning creditor is

founded upon a debt alleged to be due to him as the indorsee of

some bills of exchange accepted by the respondent, who at the
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time of the acceptance was an infant. The petitioner is not a per-

son who supplied necessaries to the respondent when he was an

Appeal against the di missal of a bankruptcy petition preented again t Prine
lexi
oltykoff.
The petitioner was th indor ee for ome bill of exchange
which had been accepted by the rince when h was an infant.
There was evidence that th e bill had been giv n in payment for
goods upplied to the P rince by th e drawer. It wa as urned for
the purpose of the aro-um nt that the goods were necessaries.
The registrar held that an infant could not make himself
liable for acce ting a bill of exchan e, even thou h he cce
t e bill in order to- pay -for necessaries
lied to him b
drawer.
The petitioner appealed.

infant. He supplied no necessaries to the infant ; he is only the

indorsee of some bills of exchange accepted by him. As regards

an indorsee of a bill of exchange it is immaterial whether there

was any consideration for the bills as between the drawer and the

acceptor ; he can sue the acceptor as the indorsee of the bills, and

nothing else. The question, therefore, whether necessarie s were

Bigham, Q. C., and Henry Kisch, for the appellant.
Finlay, Q. C., and Herbert Reed, for the respondent, were
not called upon.

supplied to the infa nt by the drawer of th e bill, is immaterial.

It has been held in a long series of cases that an infant can-

not make himse lf liable by the custom of merchants" either by a

bill of exchange or by a promissory note. It is said that those"

decisions are not binding on this Court. That may be so. But, in

my opinion, it would be absolutely wrong at the present day to

overrule those cases, which have been so long accepted as law.

But I do not wish to rest my decision solely upon case law. The

principle long established by English law is this — that an infant

cannot make himself liable upon any contract whatever, except a

contract for a supply of necessaries. I will go further and say this,

LORD EsHER, M. R. The claim of the petitioning creditor is
founded upon a debt alleged to be due to him as th e indor ee of
some bills of exchange accepted by the respondent, who at the
time of the acceptance was an infant. The petitioner is not a person who supplied necessaries to the re pondent when he was an
infant. He supplied no necessaries to the infant; he is only the
indorsee of ome bills of exchange accepted by him. A regard
an indorsee of a bill of exchange it i immaterial whether there
was any consideration for th e bill a between the drawer and the
acceptor; he can sue the acceptor as the indor ee of the bill , and
nothing else. The question, therefore, whethe_r nece sarie were
lied to the infant b the raw er f the bill, i immaterial.

r
ss r no e.
1s ai
i o exc an e or
decisions are not inamg on this Court. That ma b o. But, in
my opinion, it would be absolute} wrono- at the pre ent day to
o errule those cases, hich have b en o Iona- accepted a law.
But I do not wish to re t my deci ion olely upon ca law. The
principle long established by Engli h law i thi -that an infant
cannot make himself liable upon any contract whatever except a
contract for a supply of necessaries. I will go further and say thi ,
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that the principle of the cases goes to this extent, that, if an infant

accepted a bill of exchange or gave a promissory note for the

price of necessaries supplied to him, and he were sued upon the

bill or the note by the man who had supplied the necessaries, and

the plaintiff relied only on the bill or note, and gave no evidence

of the supply of necessaries, the infant would not be liable. He

is not liable upon a bi ll of exchange or a promisso]XJLOie_undex

any circumstances . It is not necessary for the protection of per-

sons dealing with an infant that he should be liable on such a

contract. The person who has supplied an infant with necessaries

can always sue on that contract for the price of what he has s ur>_

plied. Whether such a debt would support a bankruptcy petition

I will not decide at present. The cases cited are against the

appellant, and so is the established principle of English law. I

think the Infants' Relief Act is also against him ; it seems to me

to assume that an infant is not liable upon a bill of exchange or a

promissory note. I think this is a necessary implication from that

Act, and also from the Bills of Exchange Act. In my opinion,

the decision of the registrar was quite right.

Bo wen, L. J. I am entirely of the same opinion. The peti-
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tion i s founded _on_jh^_comra£L_c j:eated by the bills : not on the

original contract for the supply of goods, even if that were a

co utract for the supply of necessaries . The Infants' Relief Act is

clear that an infant cannot be made liable on such a contract, and

the Bills of Exchange Act assumes the same thing.

EFFECT OF IND R ' DIE~T 8\'
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that the princ iple £ th ca c rroc to thi extent, that, if an infant
a ·cept d a bill of xchan c r aave a promi ory note for the
price of n c arie uppli d to him, and h v er e u d upon the
bill or the i10t by the man who had suppli d the n ce arie , an d
th plaintiff relied only on the bill or not and gav n evidence
f th e upply f nece arie , the infant would not b liable. H
i · not lial le u on a bill of xchange or a promi or note unde
a n · circum tance . It i not n ce ar for the protection of peron deal ing_ with an infant that he hould be liable on uch a
contract. The per on wh ha u lied an il~
fa:!:..!n.ut~.1.1·.u...l..U...l~~~::?...
u on that contract fo r the price of what h ha upplied. \ Vh ther uch a debt would upport a bankruptcy petition
I will not decide at pre ent. The ca e cited ar again t the
appellant, and o i the e tabli hed principle of Enali h law . I
th in k the Infant ' Relief ct i al o again t him; it eem to me
to a ume that an infant i not liable upon a bill of exchanae or a
promi ory note. I think thi i a nece ary implication from that
ct and al o from the Bill of Exchang
ct. In my opinion
the deci ion of the regi trar wa quite right.

Lopes, L. J. The petitioner is suing by virtue of the custom

of merchants as indorsee of some bills of exchange. The question

whether necessaries were supplied to the infant does not arise.

But, even if the proceedings were between the original parties to

1 the bills, the answer to the claim would be, that an infant cannot

render himself liable upon a bill of exchange or a promissory note.

This is no hardship upon a person who supplies necessaries to

an infant, for he is entitled to sue the infant upon the original

contract. All the authorities are in favour of this view of the law,

and both the Infants' Relief Act and the Bills of Exchange Act

point in the same direction.

Appeal dismissed.

LOPES, L. J. The petition er i suina by virtue of the custom
of merchant a indorsee of ome bills of exchanae. The qu e tion
whethe r n ce aries were upplied to th e infant doe not ari e.
But, even if the proceeding w re betwe n the original partie to
th bill , the an wer to the claim ·w ould b , that an infant cannot
r nder himself liable upon a bi ll of exchang or a promi ory note.
hi i no hard hip upon a per on who upplie nece arie to
an infant, for he i entitled to ue the infant upon the ori inal
11 the auth riti e ar in favour of this view of the law,
cont ract.
and both th e Infant ' Relief ct and th
ill of Exchanae Act
point in the ame direction.

Appeal disnn:Ssed.
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Beattie v. National Bank (1898), 17 '/ ///. j/i, 66 Am. St. Rep.

FORGED SIGN TURES.

318.

There is no controversy as to the facts. The case was tried

upon a stipulation as to the facts, which were substantially as

follows: On September 15, 1891, one George P. Bent of No.

Beattie v . National Bank (1898), 174 Ill. 571, 66 Am. St. Rep.
318.

223 Canal Street, Chicago, sent for collection to the First National

Bank of Council Bluffs, Iowa, a note for $133.50, made by a man

by the name of Max Bournicus. On September 28, 1891, the

First National Bank of Council Bluffs collected the note, and on

the same day made its draft for $133.25 on the National Bank of

Chicago, Illinois, to the order of George A. Bent, Chicago. The

draft was made payable to the order of George A. Bent, instead of

George P. Bent, by mistake. It was mailed to George A. Bent, Chi-

cago, Illinois. George P. Bent was intended to be made the payee in

the draft ; George A. Bent never had any business transactions with

appellee, the drawee, or with the First National Bank of Council

Bluffs, the drawer of the draft. The latter bank was never indebted

to George A. Bent. A man, named George A. Bent, received the

draft from the postoffice, and endorsed upon it his own name,
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George A. Bent, and sold it to the appellant. The facts tend to show,

that the appellant purchased the draft in good faith, relying upon

one Beach, a broker, whom he knew, although he was not acquain-

ted with George A. Bent, the supposed payee in the draft. After

purchasing the draft the appellant deposited it for his own account

in the Bank of Commerce in Giicago, which cleared through the

Union National Bank of Chicago. The draft was paid by the appel-

lee bank through the Union National Bank. The appellee returned

the draft to the National Bank of Council Bluffs, and it was there

discovered that George A. Bent had received the draft intended

for George P.. Bent. Affidavits, setting up the facts and the mis-

take which had occurred, were made and attached to the draft ; and

the draft, with the affidavits so attached, was returned to the appel-

lee. The appellee returned the draft to the Union National Bank,

which redeemed it under the rules of the clearing house. The Union

National Bank presented it to the Bank of Commerce, and the

latter bank took it up, and required the appellant to make the same

good. The appellant took the draft to the appellee bank, and,

ascertaining that the appellee had funds in its hands belonging

to the First National Bank of Council Bluffs, the drawer of the

draft, demanded payment ; but payment was refused by appellee

Th r i no controv r y a to the fact . Th case v a tried
upon a tipulation a to the fact , which were ub tantially as
ptember rs, I l, one eorge . Bent of o.
follow :
n
223 anal treet, hicago, ent for coll ction to th Fir t National
Bank of ouncil luffs, Io, a, a note for $133.50, made by a man
by the name of Max ournicu .
n eptembcr 2 , r89r, the
Fir t :National Bank of ouncil luffs collected the note, and on
the ame day made its draft for 133.25 on the National Bank of
Chicaa , Illinoi , to the ord r of eorge A. Bent
hicaao. The
draft wa made payabl to the order of George . Bent, in tead of
Geora . ent, by mi take. It wa mailed to Georae A. Bent, Chicaao, Illinoi . George P. Bent wa intended to be made the payee in
the draft· George . Bent never had any bu ine tran action witli
appellee the drawee, or with the Fir t National Bank of ouncil
Bluff , the drawer of the draft. The latter bank wa never indebted
to Georae . Bent. A man, named eorge A. Bent received the
draft from the po toffice, and endor ed upon it hi O\ n name,
Georae
ent, and old it to the appellant. The fact tend to how,
that the appellant purcha ed the draft in good faith, relyinO' upon
one Beach a broker whom he knew, although he ' a not acquainted with Georae . Bent, the uppo d payee in the draft. After
purcha ing the draft the appellant d po it d it for hi O\ n account
in the Bank of Commerce in ChicaO' , which cl ared throttO'h the
Union National Bank of Chicago. The draft' a paid by the appellee bank throuO'h th Union ational ank. The appelle returned
the draft to the National ank of Council Bluff and it wa there
di cov r d that eor e
ent had received th draft intended
for eowe P., Bent. Affidavit
ttinO' up th fact and th mi take which had occurred, w re mad and attached to the draft; and
the draft with the affidavit o atta h d, \\'a r turn d to the appellee. Th appell e r turn d the draft to the nion ational ank,
' hich r d erned it und r th rul of the 1 arinO' h u e. Th
nion
)J ational
ank pr ented it to th
ank of ommer e, and the
latter bank took it up, and requir cl th a11 ellant to mak th ame
good. Th appellant t k th draft to the app 11
bank, and,
J. certaininO' that the app llee had fund
in it hand
elono"ina
t th Fir t
ational ank of oun il luff , th dra\ er of the
draft d manded payment· but pa ment wa r fu e b appellee
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on the alleged ground that the endorsement of the payee was a

forgery.

Six propositions were submitted by the appellant, the plain-

tiff below, to the trial court to be held as law in the decision of

the case. Two of these were marked held, two were marked

refused, and two were modified. The trial court, of its own

motion, made in writing and held affirmatively a proposition, hold-

ing that no right of action existed against the appellee, the Na-

tional Bank of Illinois, and declined to hold whether or not the

First National Bank of Council Bluffs was liable. Proper excep-

tions were taken to the action of the court.

Harry Vincent, for appellant.

Arnold Heap, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Magruder delivered the opinion of the court :

on th alleged ground that the endorsement of the payee was a
forg ry.
ix propo ition v:ere ubmitted by the appellant, th plaintiff below, to the trial court to be held a law in the deci ion of
the ca e. T\ o of the e were marked h ld, two were marked
r fu ed, and two wer modified. The trial court, of its own
motion, made in writing and held affirmatively a proposition, holding that no right of action existed against the appellee, the National ank of Illinois, and declined to hold whether or not the
Fir t National Bank of ouncil Bluffs was liable. Proper exceptions were taken to the action of the court.

The question, presented by this record, is within a very nar-

row compass. It is, whether a party, holding a draft under a

forged endorsement of the payee therein, or what amounts to a

forged instrument, can compel the drawee to pay him the draft.

Harry Vincent, for appellant.
Arnold Heap , for appellee.

It is established clearly by the evidence, that the George A.

Bent, who took the draft from the postoffice and endorsed his name
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upon the back of it, was not the real payee, to whom the drawer

of the draft intended to make it payable. It is true, that the real

and intended payee and real owner of the draft was named George

P. Bent ; but the fact, that the name of the real owner and the

name of the fraudulent possessor of the draft differ, so far as the

middle letter of the name is concerned, does not make the case

other than a case, where the name of the real payee and the na me

of the assumed payee are the same. This is so, because the law

does not regard the mi ddle initial letter as a part of a person's

name, but only recognizes one Chris ti an name of a party.

(Thompson v. Lee, 21 111. 241 ; Erskine v. Davis, 25 id. 251 ;

Miller v. People, 39 id. 457; Bletch v. Johnson, 40 id. 116; Hum-

phrey v. Phillips, 57 id. 132).

Where a bill is payable to th e order of a perso n and another

person of the name of the payee gets hold of it. a nd endorses it

to" a jpar ty who takes it in good faith and for value, such p arty

acqui res no title to. the bill. . Cochran v. Atchison, 27 Kan. 728.

If the endorsement so made by a person who is not the real

payee, but has the same name as the real payee, is made by such

person with full knowledge that he is not the real payee, and

with intent to perpetrate a fraud, his endorsement cannot be

regarded otherwise than as a forgery.

JUSTlCE

delivered the opinion of the court :
The que tion, presented by this record, i within a very narrow compa . It is, whether a party, holding a draft under a
forged endor ement of the payee therein, or what amounts to a
forged in trument, can compel the drawee to pay him the draft.
It is established clearly by the evidence, that the George A.
Bent, who took the draft from the postoffice and endorsed his name
upon the back of it, wa not the real payee, to whom the drawer
of the draft intended to make it payable. It is true, that the real
and intended payee and real owner of the draft was named George
P. Bent; but the fact, that the name of the real owner and the
name of the fraudulent possessor of the draft differ, so far as the
middle letter of the name is concerned, does not make the case
other than a case, where the name of the real payee and the name
of the as urned ayee are the same. Thi is . o, because the law
does not regar'd -theffi'iddle mit1a letter as a part of a person's
name, but only recognizes one Christian name of a party.
(Thompson v. Lee, 21 Ill. 241; Erskine v. Davis, 25 id. 251;
Miller v. P eo ple, 39 id. 457; Bletch v. Johnson, 40 id. II6 · Huniphrey v. Phillips, 57 id. 132).
Where a bill is payable to th order of a
rson and anoth r
person of the name of the_pa ~~ ets hold of it and endorses it
to
part]: who takes it in good faith and for value such art
acquire no title to th bill. Cochran v. Atchison 27 Kan. 728.
IT the endorsement so made by a per on who i not the real
payee, but has the ame name as the real payee, is made by such
person with full knowledg that he is not the real payee, and
with intent to perpetrate a fraud, his endorsement cannot be
regarded otherwise than a a foro-ery.
Mr.
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In Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127, it was held that, where

there were two persons of the same name, and one of them

signed that name to certain notes with the intention that the

notes might be used in trade as the notes of the other, it was a

forgery.

Blackstone (4 Com. 247) defines forgery to be the fraud-

ulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another

man's right. "One may Be guilty of forgery if he fraudulently

signs his name, although it is identical with that of the person

who should have signed. Thus, if a bill of exchange is payable

to A B, or order, and it comes to the hand of a person named

A B who is not the payee, and who fraudulently endorses it for

the purpose of obtaining the money, this is a forgery." (United

States v. Long, 30 Fed. Rep. 678.) Where an endorsement is made

for the purpose of being fraudulently used as the endorsement

of another person, it is falsely made. The falsity of the act con-

sists in the intent that the endorsement shall pass and be received

as that of some other party, and in such case, the charge of

forgery can be maintained, although the signature is of a name,

which might lawfully be used by the person, who put it on the
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draft or bill of exchange. Commonwealth v. Foster, 114 Mass.

In People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. 73, where certain coal was

consigned to George Peacock of New York, and arrived there,

and was claimed by another of the same name, who resided in

the same city, but was not the true consignee ; and he, knowing

this, obtained an advance of money on endorsing the permit for

the delivery of the coal with his own proper name, it was held

that this was forgery.

In Barfield v. Sta;te, 29 Ga. 127, it was held that, where
there were two per on of th
am nam , and one of them
sign d that name to certain not
with the int ntion that the
notes might be used in trade as th notes of the other, it was a
forgery.
lackstone ( 4 om. 247) define forgery to b the fraudulent making or alt ration of a writing to th pr judice of another
man's ri ht. "One may be uilty of forgery if he fraudulently
signs his name, although it is identical with that of th per on
who should have signed. Thus, if a bill of exchange is payable
to A B, or or der, and it come to the hand of a per on named
A B who is not the payee, and who fraudulentl y endorse it for
the purpose of obtaining the money, this is a forgery." (United
States v. Long, 30 Fed. Rep. 678.) Where an endor ement i made
for th purpo e of being fraudulently used as the endor ement
of another person, it is falsely made. The falsity of the act consists in the intent that the endorsement shall pa and be received
as that of some other party, and in such case, the charge of
forge ry can be maintained, although the signature is of a name,
which might lawfully be used by the person, who put it on the
draft or bill of exchange. Commonwealth v. Foster, l 14 Ma s.

Nothing is better settled than that _a forged endorsement

doe s not pass title to commercial paper ne g otiable only by endorse-

ment, and does not justify the payment of such paper . Here,

whether the endorsement of the payee's name was technically a

forgery, or was merely a spurious and false endorsement, in either

case it was inoperative_tQ_ chan ge the title to the instrument.

(Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 \ T . Y. 205.) In Graves

v. American Exchange Bank, supra, it was held that the drawee

of a bill of exchange is bound to ascertain that the person to

whom he makes payment is the genuine payee, or is authorized

by him to receive it ; that it is no defense against such a pavee,

that the drawee, in the regular course of business with nothing to

excite suspicion, paid the bill to a holder in good faith and for

value under an endorsement of a person bearing the same name

31r.
In People v. P eacock, 6 Cow. 73 , where certain coal wa
con igned to George Peacock of New York, and arrived there,
and was claimed by another of the ame name, who re ided in
the same city, but was not the true con ignee; and he, knowing
this, obtained an advance of money on endorsing the permit for
the delivery of the coal with hi own proper name, it was held
,t hat this was forgery.
Nothing is better ettled than that .a forged end or ment
does not pass title to commercial paper negotiabl only by endor ement, and does not justify the payment of uch paper. Here,
whether the endorsem~nt_Qf_the a _ ' na~ wa technically a
forgery, or was merely a puriou and fal e endor ement in either
· t ument.
case it was ino e ·
(Graves v. American Exchange Bank, 17 . Y . 205.) In Grav s
v. American E.xchan(Te Bank, supra it wa held that the dra\. e
of a bill of exchan e is bound to a certain that the per on to
whom he makes paym nt i th g nuine payee, r i authorized
by him to receive it; th at it is no def n e a ain t uch a payee
that th drawee, in the reo-ular cour
f bu in
with nothino- to
excit uspicion paid th bill to a holder in o-ood faith and for
value under an endor em nt of a per on b aring th am name
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as the payee. There it was said by the court : "The defendants,

on whom the draft was drawn, paid it upon the endorsement of

another Charles F. Graves, residing at or near LaSalle, who

wrongfully took it from the postoffice at Mendota. Such a pay-

ment, although made in good faith, did not divest or impair the

title of the true owner, who had not seen or endorsed the paper."

In Mead v. Young, 4 Term Rep. 28, the action was brought

by the endorser of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, the

bill having been drawn by one Christian on the defendant in Lon-

don, payable to Henry Davis or order ; and, having been put into

the foreign mail enclosed in a letter from Christian, it got into

the hands of another Henry Davis than the one in whose favor

it was drawn ; the defendant accepted the bill, and it was dis-

counted by the plaintiff; it was held, that it was competent for

the defendant to prove that the person, who endorsed to the

plaintiff, w r as not the real payee, though he was of the same name,

and though there was no addition to the name of the payee on

the bill ; and it was also held that, if a bill of exchange payable to

A or order got into the hands of another person of the same

name with the payee, and such person, knowing that he was not
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the real person in whose favor it was drawn, endorsed it, he was

guilty of a forgery. In that case, Ashhurst, J., said: "In order

to derive a legal title to a bill of exchange it is necessary to

prove the handwriting of the payee, and, therefore, though the

bill may come by mistake into the hands of another person though

of the same name with the payee, yet his endorsement will not

confer a title." In the same case, Bullard, J., said : "I am of

opinion that it is incumbent on the plaintiff, who sues on a bill

of exchange, to prove the endorsement of a person to whom it is

really payable. * * * Now here it is clear, that the endorse-

ment was not made by the same H. Davis to whom the bill was

made payable ; and no endorsement by any other person will give

any title whatever."

In the case at bar, when the appellant presented the draft

for payment to the appellee, the latter had a right to know that

the appellant held the draft under a genuine endorsement. When

the appella nt presented the draft for paym ent, it had been ascer-

tained_that t he endorsem e nt was forged, or at all events spurious

and false, and was therefore void. No title passed by it, and if

the appellee had made payment to the appellant, appellee could

have been compelled again to pay the draft to the true owner

thereof. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments, says :

"The maker of a note or the acceptor of a bill must satisfy him-

a the payee. There it was said by the court: "The defendants,
on whom th e draft wa drawn, paid it upon the endorsement of
anoth er Charles F. Grave , residing at or near LaSalle, who
wrong fully took it from the postoffice at Mendota. Such a paym nt, although made in good faith, did not dive t or impair the
title of the true owner, who had not seen or endorsed the paper."
In M ead v. Young, 4 Term Rep. 28, the action was brought
by the endor er of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, the
bill having been drawn by one Chri tian on the defendant in London, payable to Henry Davis or order; and, having been put into
the foreign mail enclosed in a letter from Christian, it got into
the hands of another Henry Davis than the one in whose favor
it was drawn; the defendant accepted the bill, and it was discounted by the plaintiff; it was held, that it was competent for
the defendant to prove that the person, who endorsed to the
plaintiff, was not the real payee, though he was of the ame name,
and though there was no addition to the name of the payee on
the bill; and it was also held that, if a bill of exchange payable to
A or order got into the hands of another per on of the same
name with the payee, and such person, knowing that he was not
the real person in whose favor it was drawn, endorsed it, he wa
guilty of a forgery. In that case, Ashhurst, J., said: "In order
to derive a legal title to a bill of exchange it is necessary to
prove the handwriting of the payee, and, therefore, thouo-h the
bill may come by mistake into the hands of another person though
of the same name with the payee, yet his endorsement will not
confer a title." In the same case, Bullard, J., said: "I am of
opinion that it is incumbent on the plaintiff, who sues on a bill
of exchange, to prove the endorsement of a person to whom it is
really payable. * * * Now here it is clear, that the endorsement was not made by the same H. Davis to whom the bill wa
made payable; and no endorsement by any other person will give
any title whatever."
In the case at bar, when the appellant presented the draft
for payment to the appellee, the latter had a right to know that
the appellant held the draft under a genuine endorsement. When
the appellant presented the draft for payment, it had b en ascertained that the enctorsement wa orged, or at all events s urious
and fal e, and was therefore void. No title passed by it, and if
the appellee had made payment to the appellant, appellee could
have been compelled again to pay the draft to the true owner
thereof. Daniel, in his work on N eo-otiable Instruments, says:
"The maker of a note or~~ -~~~~tor of a bill must satisfy him-
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self, vyhen it is presented for payment, that the owner traces his

title through genuine endorsements; for if there is a forged"

endorsement, it is a nullity, and no right passes by it. And pay- 1 "

ment toa holder under a forged endorsement would be invalid

as against th e true owner, who mightTTreqnire it to he paid "

again . * * * The payor should also satisfy himself of the

identity of the holder ; for he cannot defend himself against the

real payee by showing, that he paid the amount of the bill or note

to another person of the same name in good faith and in the usual

course of business." (2 Daniel on Neg. Inst., 4th ed., sec. 1225.)

So, also, Randolph, in his work on Commercial Paper, says :

"Where a bank holds a note or bill for collection under a forged

endorsement and collects and pays it over to its principal, it will

still be liable to the real owner for the amount collected. * *

So, if a bill is endorsed by another person in the payee's name

and paid to the holder under such endorsement, the payee may

recover such payment." (3 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 1469).

It follows from the authorities thus referred to, that the

ap pellant, having no title to the dr aft^was not entitled to recover

the amount thereof from the appellee.
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If, without knowledge of the real character of the endorse-

ment of the draft by the supposed payee named therein, the

appellee had paid the amount of the draft to the appellant, it

could have recovered such amount back from the appellant.

This results from the fact that " the endorser contracts that the

bilLor _note is iq. every respect genuine, and neither forged. fictJT

tious nor" altered. "■ (1 Daniel on IN eg. Inst, 4th ed., sec. 672.)

Tiedeman, in his work on Commercial Paper, says: "Inasmuch

as the endorser also warrants that he has a perfect title to the

paper by endorsement, and is liable if his title proves defective,

and since no title passes on a forged endorsement, it follows as

a necessary consequence that the endorser must warrant the gen-

uineness of the prior endorsements." (Sec. 259.) Randolph, in

his work on Commercial Paper, says: "Since the endorser war-

rants the genuineness of prior endorsements, payment, made by

the drawee to an endorser holding under a forged endorsement,

may be recovered from such holder." (Sec. 1469.) It was

held in Chambers v. Union Nat. Bank, 78 Pa. St. 205, that the

holder of a draft, which is endorsed and passed by him. guaran-

tees the prior endorsements. In Cochran v. Atchison, supra,

where a bill was payable to W. W. Owens and one W. W. Owen

obtained possession of it and wrongfully endorsed it. it was held

that a subsequent endorser could not relieve himself from liability

self, when it i re ent d for a m nt, that the owne r traces his
title through genuine ndor m nt~ for if there -i - a forged
en<lor ment, it is a nullity, and n ri<Yht pa e by it.
nd ~~
m nt t a holder und r a forg d ndor ement would b invalid
a agam t the true owner, wh mi ht
·
·
b
aid
again. * * * The payor houl<l al o ati fy him If of the
identity of the hold r; for h cannot defend him elf against the
r al payee by hov ing, that h paid th amount of th bill or n te
to an th r per n of th am name in o-ood faith and in the u ual
cour of bu ine ." (2 ani 1 on Neo-. In t., 4th d., ec. 1225.
o, al o, Randolph, in hi ' ark on Commercial Paper, ay :
'Wh re a bank hold a note or bill for collection under a for ed
endor ement and coll ct and pay it over to it principal, it will
still be liable to th r al owner for the amount collected. * * *
o, if a bill i ndor d by anoth r per on in the payee' name
and paid to the holder under uch endor ement, the payee may
recov r uch paym nt.
(3 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 146g).
It follow from the authoritie thu referred to that the
appellant, having no title to the draft, was not entitled to recover
th amount thereof from the appellee.
If, without knowledge of the real character of the endorsement of the draft by the uppo ed payee named therein the
appellee had paid the amount of the draft to the appellant, it
could have recovered uch amount back from the appellant.
Thi re ults from the fact that "the endorser contract that the
bill or not i i ever re ect a- nuine and neit r f o-ed ficti O".
n t. 4th ea., ec. 72.
tiou nor altered." (I Darnel on
Tiedeman, in hi work on ommercial Pap r, ay : Ina much
a the endor er al o warrant that he ha a perfect titl to the
paper by endor ement, and i liable if hi title prove def ctive
and ince no title pa e on a f r d endor em nt, it follow as
ary con equ nee that th ndor er mu t warrant the o-enuinene of the prior ndor ement ." ( ec. 25 .
Randolph in
hi "ark on omm rcial aper, ay : ' ince the endor er warrants the o-enuinene of prior ndor ement , paym nt, mad by
the draw e to an endor er holdino- under a foro- d endor ement
may b rec ver d from uch hol l r.'' (
1469.
It wa
t. 205 that the
held in Chambers v. nion I\ at. BG11k, 7
hold r of a draft which i endor d and pa
y him, uarantee the prior ndor m nt . In ochra11 "· Atchison, 11pra,
' h r a bill wa pa ab! to W. ·vv. w n and n V\ . Vv. wen
obtained po se ion of it and \HOngfully end r
it, it wa held
that a ub equent ndor er ould n t reli v him If from liability
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to his immediate endorsee on the ground that the latter was

guilty of negligence in taking the paper without the name of the

actual payee endorsed thereon, upon the grounds that the endorser

guarantees the genuineness of the signature of the payee, and

that the difference in pronunciation between Owens and Owen

was so slight as not to amount to a variance. The court held

generally in that case, that an endorser war ra nts the genuineness

of endo rsem ents on a bill of exchange . If, therefore, it be true

that, upon payment of the amount of the draft to appellant by

appellee, a recovery could be had by appellee from the appellant

of the amount so paid, upon the ground that appellant by his

endorsement had guaranteed the genuineness of the previous

endorsement by George A. Bent, it would be useless to hold that

a right of recovery exists in favor of the appellant against the

appellee. To require the appellee to pay an amount, which it

could hereafter recover back again, would be an idle ceremony.

Counsel for appellant claims, that he has a right of action

for negligence against the First National Bank of Council Bluffs,

Iowa, because of the alleged carelessness of that bank, which was
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the drawer of the draft, in not mailing it properly to the payee

named therein. In other words, it is said that, instead of address-

ing the letter enclosing the draft to George A. Bent of Chicago,

it should have addressed it to George P. Bent of 223 South Canal

Street, Chicago. We do not deem it necessary to decide, whether

or not an action will lie in favor of the appellant against the Iowa

bank. This action is against the appellee bank, and it is sufficient

to say that, so far as this record shows, the appellee was guilty

of no negligence.

The judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming the judg-

ment of the Circuit Court, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

V **v

Robertson v. Coleman et al (1886), 141 Mass. 231.

Contract to recover the amount of a bank check for $91.08,

signed by the defendants, dated March 31, 1883, and payable to

the order of Charles Barney. Trial in the Superior Court, before

Knowlton, J., who reported the case for the determination of this

court, in substance as follows:

On March 27, 1883, a young man went to the Metropolitan

hotel in Boston, of which the plaintiff was the proprietor, and

registered his name as Charles Barney. On that or the next day

FORGED

IGNATURES

to hi immediate endorsee on the ground that the latter was
guilty of negligence in taking the pap r without the name of the
a tual payee endorsed th reon, upon the grounds that the endor er
guarantee the g nuinen s of the signature of the payee, and
that th e difference in pronunciation betw en Owens and Owen
wa o light a not to amount to a variance. The court held
generally in that ca e, that an endor er warrants the genuineness
of endor ement on a bill of exchange. If, therefore, it be true
"""" c:._.....o...A- " \
that, upon payment of the amount of the draft to appellant by
~ . ~ appellee, a recovery could be had by appellee from the appellant
;4~
of the amount o paid, upon the ground that appellant by hi
.5'~
endorsement had guaranteed the genuineness of the previous
endorsement by Georae A. Bent, it would be useless to hold that
~~ a right of recovery exi t in favor of the appellant against the
~'~ appellee. To require the appellee to pay an amount, which it
~ v---could hereafter recover back again, would be an idle ceremony.
~ ~
Coun el for appellant claims, that he has a right of action
for
negligence
against the First National Bank of Council Bluffs,
~
Iowa, because of the alleged carele ne of that bank, which was
the drawer of the draft, in not mailing it properly to the payee
named therein. In other words, it is said that, instead of addressing the letter enclosing the draft to George A. Bent of Chicago,
it should have addressed it to George P. Bent of 223 South Canal
Street, Chicago. We do not deem it necessary to decide, whether
or not an action will lie in favor of the appellant against the Iowa
bank. This action is against the a.ppellee bank, and it i sufficient
to say that, so far as thi record hows, the appellee was guilty
of no negligence.
The judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, is affirmed.
Judgment a:ffirmed.

t

~~-

Robertson v. Coleman et a.L (1886), 141 Mass. 231.

Contract to recover the amount of a bank check for $gr.o8,
igned by the defendant , dated March 3r, 1883, and payable to
the order of Charle Barney. Trial in the uperior ourt, before
Knowlton, J., who reported the ca e for the d termination of this
court, in ub tance a follows:
On March 27, 1883, a young man went to the Metropolitan
hotel in o ton of which the plaintiff wa the proprietor, and
registered his name as Charles Barney. On that or the next day
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he took to the place of business of the defendants, who sold prop-

erty as auctioneers, a team, of which he represented himself to be

the owner, and which he desired them to sell on his account. He

gave his name there as Charles Barney. In reply to an inquiry

regarding him, they received a message by telegraph that Charles

Barney, of Swanzey, was a responsible and trustworthy man.

Believin g him to be Charles Barney, of Swanzev, they sold the

horse and carriage for him, and three days afterwards gave him,

in payment of the money received, the check declared on. On

March 31, he left the plaintiff's hotel, where he had been staying

in the mean time under the name of Charles Barney, and, before

going, he gave the check to the plaintiff in payment of his board

bill of $16.75, and received the balance of its amount in cash from

the plaintiff At the same time he indorsed it in blank with the name

of Charles Barney. It turned out that Charles Barney was not

his true name, and there was no evidence that he had ever gone

by that name before registering at the plaintiff's hotel. The

defendants discovered that he had stolen the team which he left

with them, and, by their order, the bank upon which the check

was drawn refused to pay it. It was in evidence that there was
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a person in existence by the name of Charles Barney, of Swanzey.

It appeared that the plaintiff made no further inquiry as to the

identity of the payee than for information which was founded

upon the representations of his said lodger.

Upon these facts, the judge instructed the jury as follows :

"If the person who took the team to the defendants' place of bus-

iness left it there under the name of Charles Barney, and the

defendants, in receiving it, dealt with him as Charles Barney, and

sold the team for him, and three days afterwards gave him the

check in the belief that he was Charles Barney, of Swanzey, and

was the owner of the team, and said person had in the mean time

been boarding at the plaintiff's hotel under that name, and had

gone by that name while at said hotel, the plaintiff, upon the

receipt from him of said check in good faith, for a valuable con-

sideration, with his indorsement upon it, acquired a good title to

it as against the defendants."

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. If the instruc-

tion was correct, judgment was to be entered upon the verdict ;

otherwise, such order to be made as law and justice might require.

6". /. Thomas & C. P. Sampson, for the defendants.

C. F. Kittredgc, for the plaintiff.

he took to the plac of bu ine
f th d f ndant , who sold proprty a auction r , a t am, of v hi h he repr nt d him lf to be
th own r, and ' hich h de ir cl th m to ell n hi account.
e
gav hi name th r as harl
arney. In r ply to an inquiry
regarding him, th ey r c ived a m age by t legraph that harle
Barn y, of ·wanzey, wa a re pon ible and tru tworthy man.
Beli ving him to be
arney, of wanzey, they old the
hor e and carriag for him, and tlir e days afterward gave him,
n
in paym nt of the mon y r ceived, the check declareJ on.
Ha rch 31, he left th plaintiff's hotel, where h had been taying
in the mean time und r the nam of Charle
arney, and before
going, he gave the check to th plaintiff in payment of hi board
bill of $16.75, and rec ived the balance of its amount in ca h from
the plaintiff At the ame time he indorsed it in blank with the name
of harles arney. It turned out that Charle
arney was not
hi true name, and there ·was no evidence that he had ever gone
by that name before regi tering at the plaintiff' hotel. The
defendant discovered that he had stolen the team which he left
with them, and, by their order, the bank upon which the check
was drawn refused to pay it. It was in evidence that there wa
a per on in existence by the name of Charles Barney, of Swanzey.
It appeared that the plaintiff made no further inquiry as to the
identity of the payee than for information which was founded
upon the representations of his aid lodger.
Upon these facts, the judge instructed the jury as follows:
' If the person who took the team to the defendant ' place of bu arne and the
ine s 1 ft it ther und er the nam of Charle
defendant ,. in receiving it, dealt with him a
harle Barn y and
old the team fo r him, and thr e day afterward aave him th e
check in the belief that he was harl s Barney of wanzey and
wa the owner of the t am , and aid per on had in th mean time
been boarding at th plaintiff' hotel under that name and had
gon by that name \ bile at aid hot 1, th plaintiff upon the
receipt from him of aid check in aDod faith, for a valuabl conideration with hi indor ement upon it, acquir d a aood title to
it a a ain t the defendant .
The jury return d a verdict for the plaintiff. If the in truction wa correct, judgment wa to b enter d upon the v r ict;
othen i , uch order to be made a law and ju tic miaht require .
. J. Thomas & C. P. Sampson , for th

C. F. Kittred e, for th plaintiff.

def ndant .
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Field, J. The name of a person is the verbal designation by

which he is known, but the visible presence of a person affords

surer means of identifying him than his name. The defendants,

for a valuable consideration, gave the check to a person who said

his name was Charles Barney, and whose name they believed to

be Charles Barney, and they made it payable to the order of

Charles Barney, intending thereby the person to whom they gave

the check. The plaintiff received this check for a valuable con-

sideration, in good faith, from the same person, whom he believed

to be Charles Barney, and who indorsed the check by that name.

It appears that the defendants thought the person to whom they

gave the check was Charles Barney, of Swanzey, a person in

existence, but it does not appear that they thought so from any

representations made by the person to whom they gave the check,

although this, perhaps, is immaterial. It is clear from these facts,

that, although the defendants ma y haye_b^nnustakejij.n_U2e_soil

of man the perso n they dealLwith_was t Jh is person was the person

intended by them as _the_payee of the check, designat ed by the

najr^hf-jwia s raljpri in thp t rans action, and that his indors e ment of

it was the indorsement of the paye e of the check bv that name.
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The contract of the defendants was to pay the amount of the

check to this person or his order, and he has ordered it paid to

the plaintiff. If this _ person obta ined the check±roriLihe_jkfend :

ant s by fraudujeji^e^resentation^ JLh^jila.intiJL-tQpk it in g°°d

faith and for value . (See Samuel v. Cheney, 135 Mass. 278;

Edmunds v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283.)

Judgment on the verdict.

BILLS IN A SET. §§ l8o 185.

Walsh v. Blatchlcy (1853), 6 wis - 4 J 3-

Appeal from Marquette Circuit Court.

The plaintiff declared in trespass on the case upon promises,

for money lent; money laid out and expended; money paid and

received by the defendants for the use of the plaintiff, &c. ; also

gave notice of the cause of action, the indorsement by defendants

upon the bill of exchange, copied, and served with the declaration,

as follows:

J.

The name of a person i the verbal designation by
\ hich he is known, but the vi ible pr enc of a per on affords
ur r means of identifying him than hi name. The defendant ,
for a valuable con ideration, gave the check to a per on who said
hi name wa
harles Barn y, and whose name they believed to
be Charle Barney, and they made it payable to the order of
Charles Barn y, intending thereby the person to whom they gave
the check. The plaintiff rec ived this check for a valuable conideration, in good faith, from the same per on, v horn he believed
to be Charle Barney, and who indorsed the check by that name.
It appears that the defendant thought the per on to whom they
gave the check was Charles Barney, of Swanzey, a person in
exi tence, but it does not appear that they thought so from any
representations made by the person to whom they gave the check,
although thi , perhap , is immaterial. It is clear from these facts,
that, although the defendants may have been mistaken in the sort
of man the person they dealt with ~as 1 this person was the person
intended by them as the a ~uf the check, de ignat d b ~
name he was calJerl in the tran action, and that his indorsement of
it was the indorsement of the payee of the check by that name.
The contract of the defendants was to pay the amount of the
check to this person or his order, and he has ordered it paid to
the plaintiff. If this person obtained. the check from the defendant by fraudulent re resentatior
laintiff took it in ood
faith and for value. (See Samitel v. Cheney, I35 Mass. 278;
Edmunds v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283.)
FIELD,

Judgment on the verdict.

~~-
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§§ I80-185.

Walsh v. Blatchley ( 1853), 6 Wis. 413.
Appeal from Marquette Circuit Court.
The plaintiff declared in tre pa s on the case upon promises,
for money lent; money laid out and xpended; money paid and
r ceived by the d fendant for th u of the plaintiff, &c.; also
gave notice of the cau e of action, the indorsement by defendants
upon the bill of exchange, copied, and served with the declaration,
as follows:

WALSH V. BLATCHLEY
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"Express Exchange Office,

"Adams & Co. "Downieville, San Francisco.

"Exchange for $250. Oct. 6, 1854.

"No. 9,917."

"Express Exchange Office,
"Adams & Co.
'Downieville, an Franci co.
"Exchange for $250.
ct. 6, I854.

"At sight of this 2d of exchange — first and third unpaid —

" pay to the order of Phcebe Blatchley, two hundred and fifty

"No. 9,917."

" dollars value received, and place to account of exchange.

"Adams & Co.

"To Messrs. Adams & Co., New York,

(Countersigned,)

"S. W. Langworthy, C. B. Macy, Agents."

Indorsed by Phcebe Blatchley to Henry Dart or order, and

"At sight of this 2d of exchange-first and third unpaid' pay to the order of Phrebe Blatchley, two hundred and fifty
" dollars value received, and place to account of exchange.
"ADAMS & Co.

by J. Henry Dart to P. O. Strang or order, and by Strang to P.

Walsh or order.

The defendants plead the general issue ; and by mutual agree-

ment of counsel, the cause was tried before the circuit judge,

without the intervention of a jury, who found, and reported in

"To Messrs. Adam & Co., New York,
(Countersigned,)
"S. W. Lang' orthy, C. B. Macy, Agents."

writing with his decision, the facts and conclusions, and recited

in full in the opinion of the court therein.

Orton, Hopkins and Firman, for appellant.
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Smith and Keyes, for respondent.

By the Court, Cole, J. This case was tried by the court

without the intervention of a jury, and the judge found the

Indor ed by Phrebe Blatchley to Henry Dart or order, and
by J. Henry Dart to P. 0. Strang or order, and by Strang to P.
Wal sh or order.

following facts :

First. That the action is brought upon the bill of exchange

introduced in evidence, and described in the plaintiff's declara-

tion. That this bill, which is the second of the set, was indorsed

by the defendants on a Sunday.

Second. That the first of the set was sold by defendants to

plaintiff about the 1st of January, 1855. That the plaintiff with-

The defendants plead the general issue· and by mutual agreement of counsel, the cause was tried before the circuit judge,
without the intervention of a jury, who found, and reported in
writing with his decision, the facts and conclusions, and recited
in full in the opinion o_f the court therein.

out delay, sent the same by mail to his correspondent in New

York city, the residence of the drawee, for presentation and pay-

ment. That by some delay in the mail the letter did not reach

New York until the 9th of April following, at which time, the

Orton, Hop kins and Fir11ian, for appellant.
Smith and Keyes, for respondent.

letter with inclosure, was duly received by the said correspondent.

That the bill was not presented for payment.

Third. That in the last of March, the plaintiff, fearing the

By the Court, COLE, J. This case was tried by the court
without the intervention of a jury, and the judge found the
following facts :
First. That the action is brought upon the bill of exchange
introduced in evidence, and de cribed in the plaintiff' declaration. That thi bill, which i the second of the et, wa indor ed
by the defendants on a unday.
Second. That the fir t of the et \Va old b def ndant to
plaintiff about the I t of January, I 55. That the plaintiff without delay ent th
ame by mail t hi corre pondent in Ne,
York city, the re idence of the dra' ee, for pre entation and payment. That by ome delay in the mail the lett r did not reach
New York until the 9th of pril follO\ in at ' hich time the
letter with inclo ure, ~a dul received by the aid corre pondent.
That the bill wa not pre ent d for pa ment.
Third. That in the la t of farch the plaintiff, fearincr the
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said first bill was lost, procured the defendants to indorse and

deliver to him the second of the set, and had it presented on the

third day of April following for payment, to the drawee, and

payment was refused. The bill was duly protested, and proper

notice given to the defendants who were indorsers.

The conclusions of law which the court drew from these

facts, were, "ist. That the liability in this action, if any at all,

is upon the second bill of the set, and not on the first ; 2d. That

because the said bill was indorsed on Sunday, that therefore such

indorsement was absolutely void."

We have examined with considerable care the authorities,

and have not been able to find a case precisely like the present,

although it would seem as if the point must have frequently arisen

in the courts in this country, and in England. The case of

Perreira v. Jcpp et al., cited in a note on page 449, 11 B. and C,

would seem to have a strong bearing upon the case at bar. It

was there held that he to whom any part of the set is first trans-

ferred, acquires a property in all the other parts, and may main-

tain trover even against a bona tide holder, who subsequently,

by transfer, or otherwise, gets possession of another part of the
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set. That is, deciding that the first in dors ement of one of the

set vests in the indorsee Jlie_a^s^^t£_right_to the possession of

the whole set . And we suppose it would follow, from thisdoc-

trine, that the indorsement of the second in this case was entirely

unnecessary. Th e liability of t he indo rser aro se from indorsing

the first of the set for value . We think her liabil ity was not

incre ased one jot or tittle by indors ing the s econd_pf ,_the _jset^

Suppose she had indorsed all of them in January, at the time she

indorsed the first, is it not obvious that her liability would not

have been different from what it is? It is conceded that the

indorsement of the first was good, and this indorsement was

entirely adequate to carry with it the second and third. (See

Edwards on Bills, 304 and 162 ; Holdiuorth v. Hunter, 10 B. & C.

449; Kentworthy v. Hopkins, 1 Johns. Cas. 107.) Either of the

set may be presented for acceptance, and, if not accepted, a right

of action arises upon due notice, against the indorser. Downes

and Co. v. Church, 13 Peters, 205. The bill upon which the pro-

test was made was declared on and produced, and it also appeared

that the first had not been presented for payment. The court

says, and we think properly and correctly, that if the first had

been presented for payment and protested, even as late as April

9th, that upon proper notice the indorser would have been held,

for the delay in the mail would have been a sufficient excuse for

said fir t bill was lost, procured the d fendants to indorse and
d liver to him the second of the set, and had it pr sent d on the
third <lay of April following for paym nt, to the drawe , and
payment was refu ed. Th bill was duly prate ted, and proper
notice given to the defendant who were indorser .
The conclusions of law which the court drew from these
fact , were, " 1 t. That the liability in' this action, if any at all,
is upon the second bill of the set, and not on the first; 2d. That
because the said bill was indorsed on Sunday, that therefore such
indors ment was absolutely void."
We have examined with considerable care the authorities,
and have not been able to find a case precisely like the present,
although it would seem as if the point must have frequently arisen
in the courts in this country, and in England. The case of
Perreira v. J epp et al., cited in a note on page 449, I I B. and C.,
would seem to have a strong bearing upon the case at bar. It
wa there held that he to whom any part of the set is first transferred, acquire a property in all the other parts, and may maintain trover even against a bona fide holder, who subsequently,
by transfer, or otherwise, g~ts possession of another part of the
set. That is, deciding that the first indor ement of one of theet ve ts in the indors_~_t'.! the absolute right to the po se s1on o
the whole set. And we suppose it would follow, from this doctrine, that the indorsement of the second in this case was entirely
unnece sary. The liability of the indors.~I_ - arose from indor ing
the fir t of the set for ~· vVe think her liability was not
increased one jot or tittle by indorsing the ~C?!!9 of tl;g~~~
Suppose she had indorsed all of them in January, at the time she
indorsed the first, i it not ol viou that her liability would not
have been different frorp what it is? It i conceded that the
indorsement . of the first was aood, and this indorsement was
entirely ad quate to carry with it the econd and third. (See
Edwards on Bills, 304 and 162; H oldworth v. Hunter, IO . & C.
449; Kentz orthy v. Hop kins, I Johns. Cas. 107.) Either of the
et may be pre nted for acceptance, and, if not accepted, a right
of action ari e upon due notice, against the indor er. Downes
and Co. v. Church, 13 P ter , 205. Th bill upon which the protest was mad was declared on and produc d, and it al o appeared
that the fir t had not b en pre ented for payment. The court
ay , and we thinl ~ properly and corr ctly, that if the first had
be n presented for payment and prote t d, ev n as late as April
9th, that upon proper notice the indor r would have been held,
for the delay in the mail would have been a sufficient excuse for
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the apparent neglect in not presenting it for acceptance before.

The case might have been relieved from all doubt and difficulty,

had the indorsee declared upon the first of the set, and produced \

on the trial the second, which had been presented for acceptance jL

and dishonored. Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wend. 527. This he \\

did not see fit to do, but we think he was entitled to recover even J

as the facts appeared before the court.

The judgment is reversed, and a new trial ordered. .

Section III — Delivery.

DELIVERY ESSENTIAL TO COMPLETION OF CONTRACT. § 1 8.

Burson v. Huntington {1870), 21 Mich. 415, 4 Am. Rep. 497.

Action on the following instrument:

"Schoolcraft, Mich., Apr. 12th, 1866.

"Ninety days from date, for value received, I promise to pay

A. N. Goldwood, or order, one hundred and twelve dollars, and

fifty cents, with interest. John W. Burson/'

Indorsed on the back, — "A. N. Goldwood."

It appeared on the trial that Goldwood had come to the

house of Burson to finish some negotiations in respect to which

the note in suit was to be given ; that the note was there written
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by Goldwood and signed by Burson ; that the arrangement was

that some other person should sign the note as surety with Bur-

son ; that Burson left the room with the avowed purpose of get-

ting his uncle as surety, telling Goldwood as he went out not to

touch the note 'till he came back because the negotiations were not

finally settled ; that while Burson was out Goldwood took the

note and went away with it in spite of the remonstrance of Bur-

son's sister, who was present when Burson said to Goldwood not

to take the note ; that Goldwood subsequently indorsed the note

to Huntington, who sues as a holder in due course ; that the note

was not stamped when Goldwood took it. Judgment for plaintiff.

The further facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Christiancy, J. (after passing upon questions of evidence

and practice) As a general rule, a negotiable promissory note,
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like any other written contract, has no legal inception or valid

existence, as such, until it has been delivered in accordance with

the purpose and intent of the parties. See Edwards on B. & N.,

775, and authorities cited, and I Pars, on B. and N., 48 and 49,

and cases cited, and see Thomas v. Wat kins, 16 Wis. 549; Mahon

v. Sawyer, 18 Ind. 73 ; Carter v. McClintock, 29 Mo. 464.

D elivery is an essent ial part of_ _the making or execut ion of

the note, and it takes effect only from delive ry (for most pur-

poses) ; and if this be subsequent to the date, it takes effect from

the delivery and not from the date. 1 Pars., ubi supra. This is

certainly true as between the original parties.

But nego tiable paper differs from ordinary writte n contracts

in this respect : that even a wro ngful holder, between whom and

the maker or indorser th e_note_or in dorsement would not be valid,

may yet transfer to an innocent party, who takes it i n good faith,

without notice and for_value, a good title as against the makef

or indorser. And the question in the present case is, how far

this principle will dispe nse wit h delivery bv the maker .

When a note payable to bearer, which has once become oper-

ative by delivery, has been lost or stolen from the owner, and has
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subsequently come to the hands of a bona tide holder for value,

the latter may recover against the maker, and all indorsers on

the paper when in the hands of the loser ; and the loser must sus-

tain the loss. In such a case there was a complete legal instru-

ment ; the maker is clearly liable to pay it to some one ; and the

question is only to whom.

But in the case before us, where the note had never been

delivered, and therefore had no legal inception or existence as a

note, the question is whether he is liable to pay at all, even to an

innocent holder for value.

The wrongful act of a thief or a trespasser may deprive the

holder of his property in a note which has once become a note,

or property, by delivery, and may transfer the title to an innocent

purchaser for value. But a note in the hand s of the maker before

delivery is not property, nor th e subject of ownership, as such :

it is, in law, but a blank piece of paper. Can the theft or wrong-

ful seizure of this paper create a valid contract on the part of the

maker against his will, where none existed before? There is no

principle of the law of contracts upon which this can be done,

unless the facts of the case are such that, in justice and fairness,

as between the maker and the innocent holder, the maker ought

to be estopped to deny the making and delivery of the note.

But it is urged that this case falls within the general prin-

like any other written contract, has no legal inception or valid
exi tenc , a uch, until it has been delivered in accordance with
th purpose and intent of the parties. See Edwards on B. & N.)
175, and authorities cit d, and l Pan. on B. and N .) 48 and 49)
and case cited, and ee Thomas v. Watkins) 16 Wi . 549; lvlahon
v. Sm yer) 18 Ind. 73; Carter v. M cClintock) 29 Mo. 464.
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the delivery and not from the date. l Pars.) ubi supra. This is
certainly true as between the original parties.
But riegotiabl paper differs from ordinary written contracts
in thi respect: that even a wrongful holder, between whom and
the maker or indorser the note or indorsement would not be valid,
.!!lay yet tran fer to an innocent party, who takes it in good faith.
without notice and for value. a good title as against the maket'
or inclor r. And the question in the present case is, how far
this principle will di pense with delivery by the maker.
When a note payable to bearer, which has once become operative by delivery, has been lost or stolen from the owner, and has
ubsequently come to the hands of a bona fid e holder for value,
the latter may recover against the maker, and all indorser on
the paper when in the hands of the lo er; and the loser must sustain the loss. In such a case there was a complete legal instrument; the maker is clearly liable to pay it to some one; and the
que tion is only to whom.
But in the case before us, where the note had never been
delivered, and therefore had no legal inception or existence as a
note, the question is whether he is liable to pay at all, even to an
innocent holder for value.
The wrongful act of a thief or a trespasser may deprive the
holder of his property in a note which has once become a note,
or property, by d livery, and may tran fer the title to an innocent
purchaser for value. But a note in the hands of the maker before
delivery is not property, ~or the subject of owner hiP, as uc li; it is, in law, but a blank piece of paper. Can the theft or wrongful seizure of thi paper create a valid contract on the part of the
maker against his will) where none existed befor e? There i no
principle of the law of contracts upon which this can be done,
unless the facts of the case are such that, in justic and fairness
a between the maker and the innocent holder, the maker ought
to be estopped to deny the making and delivery of the note.
But it is urged that this case falls within the general prin-
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ciplc which has become a maxim of law, that when one of two

innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has

enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it.

This is a principle of manifest justice when confined within its

proper limits. But the principle, as a rule, has many exceptions;

and the point of difficulty in its application consists in determining

what acts or conduct of the party sought to be charged, can prop-

erly be said to have "enabled the third person to occasion the

loss," within the meaning of the rule. If I leave my horse in the

stable, or in the pasture, I cannot properly be said to have enabled

the thief to steal him, within the meaning of this rule, because

he found it possible to steal him from that particular locality.

And upon examination it will be found that this rule or maxim

is mainly confined to cases where the party who is made to suffer

the loss, has reposed a confidence in the third person whose acts

have occasioned the loss, or in some other intermediate person

whose acts or negligence have enabled such third person to occa-

sion the loss ; and that the party has been held responsible for the

acts of those in whom he had trusted upon ground analogous

to those which govern the relation of principal and agent ; that
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the party thus reposing confidence in another with respect to

transactions, by which the rights of others may be affected, has,

as to the persons to be thus affected, constituted the third person

his agent in some sense, and having held him out as such, or

trusted him with papers or indicia of ownership which have

enabled him to appear to others as principal, as owner, or as pos-

sessed of certain powers, the person reposing this confidence is,

as to those who have been deceived into parting with property

or incurring obligations on the faith of such appearances, to be

held to the same extent as if the fact had accorded with such

appearances.

Hence, to confine ourselves to the question of delivery, the]

authorities in reference to lost or stolen notes which have become

operative by delivery, have no bearing upon the question. If the

maker or indorser, before delivery to the payee, leave the note

in the hands of a third person as an escrow, to be delivered upon

certain conditions only, or voluntarily deliver it to the payee, or

(if payable to bearer) to any other person for a special purpose

only, as to be taken to, or discounted by a particular bank, or to

be carried to any particular place or person, or to be used only

in a certain way, or upon certain conditions not apparent upon

the face of the paper, and the person to whom it is thus entrusted

violate the confidence reposed in him, and put the note into cir-
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culation ; this, though not a valid delivery as to the original

parties, must, as between a bona fide holder for value, and the

maker or indorser, be treated as a delivery, rendering the note

or indorsement valid in the hands of such bona fide holder ; or if

the note be sent by mail, and get into the wrong hands ; as the

party intended to deliver to some one, and selects his own mode

of delivery, he must be responsible for the result. These prin-

ciples are too well settled to call for the citation of authorities,

and manifestly it will make no difference in this respect, if the

note or indorsement were signed in blank, if the maker or indorser

part with the possession, or authorize a clerk or agent to do so,

and it is done. / Parsons on Bills and Notes, 109 to 114, and

cases cited, especially Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. 45, which was

decided expressly upon the ground of the confidence reposed in

the third person, as to the filling up, and in the clerks as to the

delivery.

And when the maker or indorser has himself been deceived

by the fraudulent acts or representations of the payee or others,

and thereby induced to deliver or part with the note or indorse-

ment, and the same is thus fraudulently obtained from him, he
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must, doubtless, as between him and an innocent holder for value,

bear the consequences of his own credulity and want of caution.

He has placed a confidence in another, and by putting the papers

into his hands, has enabled him to appear as the owner, and to

deceive others. Cases of this kind are numerous, but they have

no bearing upon the wrongful taking from the maker, when he

never voluntarily parted with the instrument. Much confusion,

however, has arisen from the general language used in the books

and sometimes by judges, in reference to cases where the maker

has voluntarily parted with the possession, though induced to do

so by fraud ; when it is laid down as a general rule, that it is no

defense for a maker, as against a bona fide holder, to show that

the note was wrongfully or fraudulently obtained, without

attempting to distinguish between cases where the maker has

actually and voluntarily parted with the possession of the note,

and those where he has not.

We do not assert that the general rule we are discussing —

that "where one of two innocent parties must suffer," etc. — must

be confined exclusively to cases where a confidence has been placed

in some other person (in reference to delivery) and abused.

There may be cases where the culpable negligence or recklessness

of the maker in allowing an undelivered note to get into circula-

tion, might justly estop him from setting up non-delivery; as if
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he were knowingly to throw it into the street, or otherwise leave

it accessible to the public, with no person present to guard against

its abduction under circumstances when he might reasonably

apprehend that it would be likely to be taken.

I 'pun this principle the case of Ingham v. Primrose {J C. B.

(N. S.)i 82) was decided, where the acceptor tore the bill into

halves (with the intention of canceling it) and threw it into the

street, and the drawer picked them up in his presence, and after-

wards pasted the two pieces together and put them into circula-

tion. See also bv analogy Foster v. Mackinnon, Law Rep., 4

Com. B., 704.

But the case before us is one of a very different character.

No actual delivery by the maker to any one for any purpose.

The evidence tends to show that when he left the room in

his own house, the not e^being on the table, and Tils sister re main-

ing there, he did not confide it to the custody of the payee, but

told him not to take it, and no final agreement between them had

yet been made, and no consideration given. Under such circum-

stances he can no more be said to have trusted it to the payee's

custody or confidence, than that he trusted his spoons or other
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household goods to his custody or confidence ; and there was no

more apparent reason to suppose he would take and carry off

the one, than the other.

The maker , therefore, canno t be hel d responsible for any

negligence ; there was nothing to prove negligence, unless he was"

bound tcTsuspect, and treat as a knave, a thief or a criminal, the

man who came to his house apparently on business, because he

afterwards proved himself to be such. This, we think, would be

preposterous.

We, therefore, see no ground upon which the defendant could

be held liable on a note thus obtained, even to a bona fide holder

for value. He was guilty of no more negligence than the plaintiff

who took the paper, and the plaintiff shows no right or equities

superior to those of the defendant.

Such, we think, must be the result upon principle. We have

carefully examined the cases, English and American, and are sat-

isfied there is no adjudged case in the English courts, so far as

their reports have reached us, which would warrant a recovery

in the present case. Some dicta may be found, the general lan-

guage of which might sustain the liability of the maker ; such as

"hat of Alderson, Baron, in Marston v. Allen (8 M. & W., 494),

cited by Duer, J., in Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer, 260, and that used

by Williams, J., in Ingham v. Primrose, 7 C. B. (N. S.), 82. But
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a reference to the cases will show that no such question was

involved, and that these remarks were wholly outside of the case.

On the other hand, Hall v. Wilson, 16 Barb., 548, 555, and

556, contains a dictum fully sustaining the views we have taken.

There are, however, two recent American cases, where the

note or indorsement was obtained without delivery, under cir-

cumstances quite as wrongful as those in the present case, in one

of which the maker, and in the other the indorser, was held liable

to a bona fide holder for value : Shipley v. Carroll et al., 45 111.,

285 (case of maker) and Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer., 266. But in

neither of these cases can we discover that the court discussed or

considered the real principle involved; and we have been unable

to discover anything in the cases cited by the court to warrant the

decision. It is possible that the case in Illinois may depend some-

what upon their statute, and the note being made as a mere matter

of amusement, and the making not being justified by any legiti-

mate pending business, the maker might perhaps justly be held

responsible for a higher degree of diligence, and therefore more

justly chargeable with negligence under the particular circum-

stances, than the maker in the present case.
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There is another case ( Worcester Co. Bank v. Dorchester &

Milton Bank, 10 Cush., 488), where bank bills were stolen from

the vault of the bank, which though signed and ready for use,

had never been yet issued, and on which a bona fide holder for

value was held entitled to recover. This, we are inclined to think;

was correct. The court intimated a doubt whether the same rulej

should apply to bank bills as to ordinary promissory notes, and as

to the latter, failed to make any distinction between the question

of delivery and questions affecting the rights of the parties upon

notes which have become effectual by delivery. But we think

bank bills which circulate universally as cash, passing from hand

to hand perhaps a hundred times a day, without such inquiries

as are usual in the cases of ordinary promissory notes of indi-

viduals, stand upon quite different grounds. And, considering

the temptations to burglars and robbers, where large masses of

bank bills are known to be kept, and the much greater facility of

passing them off to innocent parties, without detection or identi-

fication of the bills or the parties, and that the special business

of banks is dealing in, and holding the custody of, money and

bank bills ; it is not unreasonable to hold them to a much higher

degree of care, and to make them absolutely responsible for their

safe keeping. We do not therefore regard this case as having

any material bearing upon the case before us.
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should apply to bank bills as to ordinary promissory notes, and as
to the latter, failed to make any distinction between the question
of delivery and questions affecting the rights of the parties upon
notes which have become effectual by delivery. But we think
bank bills which circulate universally as cash, passing from hand
to hand perhaps a hundred times a day, without such inquirie
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We think the Circuit Court erred in refusing to charge upon

this point, as requested by the defendant below.

We do not think there was any error in refusing to charge

that the want of a stamp on the note would be such circumstance

of suspicion as to put the indorsee upon inquiry in taking the note.

Under our decisions the note would be valid and could be enforced

in our courts without a stamp.

Some other minor questions were raised, but we do not think

they will be likely to arise upon a new trial.

The judgment must be reversed with costs, and a new

trial awarded. ) \o\ .

The other justices concurred. \y \J

Kinyon v. Wohlford {1871), 17 Minn. 239, 10 Am. Rep. 165.

Action on a promissory note. Judgment on a verdict for the

defendant. Appeal by plaintiff from order denying a new trial.

Wheelock & Cogswell, for appellant.

We think the Circuit Court erred in refu ing to charge upon
thi point, as reque t d by th d fendant bel w.
W do not think ther wa any error in r fu ing t charge
that the want of a stamp on th note would b such circumstance
of u picion as to put the indor ee upon inquiry in taking th not .
nd r our decision the not would be valid and could b nforced
in ur courts without a tamp.
ome other minor que tion were raised, but we do not think
they will b likely to arise upon a new trial.

The judgment must be reversed with costs, and a new
trial awarded.
1 __ --' n L
The other justices concurred.

rW'"

\.A,,)V'\) '

Gordon E. Cole, for respondent.

Berry, J. This is an action upon a promissory note payable

by its terms to C. W. Stevens, or bearer, and signed by defendant.

There was plenary evidence showing that the plaintiff is a
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bona fide holder of the note, having purchased the same before

Kinyon v. Wohlford (1871), 17 Minn. 239,

IO

Am. Rep. 165.

maturity, in good faith, without notice and for value.

The only defense urged here is that there was no delivery

of the note to any person by or on behalf of the defendant ; that

for want of delivery it is not the note of defendant, and he is not

ction on a promissory note. Judgment on a verdict for the
defendant. Appeal by plaintiff from order denying a new trial.

liable thereon even to a bona fide holder. "A bona fide holder for

value, without notice, is entitled to recover upon any negotiable

instru mejit which he has received before it has become due, not-

Wheelock & Cogswell, for appellant.
Gordon E. Cole, for respondent.

withsta nding any defect or infirmity in the tit le of th e person from

who m he derived it; as. for examp le, even though such person

may have acquired it by fraud, or even by theft, or by robbery,. "

Story on Prom. Notes, § 191 ; 2 Gr. Ev., § 171 ; Swift v. Tyson,

16 Pet. 1 ; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 Howard, 365 ; Raphael v.

Bank of England, 17 C. B. 162; Wheeler v. Guild, 20 Pick. 545;

Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 249; Powers v. Ball, 27 Vt., 662;

Catlin v. Hause, 1 Duer, 325 : Gould v. Segee, 5 Duer, 268; Mars-

ton v. Allen, 8 Mees. & Welsby, 494; Smith's Lead. Cases, 597

et. seq. ; 1 Ross Lead. Cases 205 et. scq.

BERRY, J. This i an action upon a promis ory note payable
by its terms to C. W. tevens, or bearer, and signed by defendant.
There was plenary evidence showing that the plaintiff is a
bona fide holder of the note, having purchased the same before
maturity, in good faith, without notice and for value.
The only defen
urged h r i that th re v a no delivery
of the note to any person by or on behalf of th defendant ; that
for want of delivery it i not the note of d fendant and he i not
liable thereon even to a bona fide holder. " bona fide holder for
value, without notic , i ntitled to recover upon any negotiable
in trument which he has received before it ha become due, notwith tanding any def ct or infirmity in the ti~le of the per on from
whom he derived it; as. for example, e en though uch p r Q!l
may hav acquired it by fraud, or ven by th ft. or by robber)!_. '
tory on Prom. Jot s, § 191; 2 r. v., 171; 7: ift v. Tyson ,
16
t. l; Goodman v. Simond , 20 HO\ ard, 65; Rapha l v.
Bank of England, 17 C. B. 162; T11heeler v. Gllild 20 Pi k. 545;
Magee v. Badger, 34 N . Y. 2..J. ; Poi 1ers v. Ball, 27 \ t., 62 ·
Catlin v. Hause, I Duer 325; Gould v. Sege , 5 u r, 26 ; Mars597
ton v. Allen, 8 Me s. & Wel by, 494; mith L ad. a
et. seq. · r Ross Lead. Ca e 205 t. seq.
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The_fact t hat there h as been no d elivery of the instrument by

or for the maker, or by or for an indorser through whom the

holder must claim, is a defect or infirmity of title within the

meaning of t he rule abo ve cited , a rule which is said to be laid

up amonglhe fundamentals of the law. Worcester County Bank

v. Dorchester & Melton Bank, 10 Gushing, 488; Edwards on Bills

and Notes, 188; Gould v. Segee, supra; Ingham v. Primrose, 7

C. B. (N. S.) 82; Shipley v. Carroll, 45 111. 285; Clark v. John-

son, 54 111. 296.

The order denying a new trial must be reversed.

Lj^ ^Sl*a^

PRESUMPTION OF DELIVERY.

Mass. Nat. Bank v. Snow (1905), 18 j Mass. 159.

The fact that there ha been no deliv ry of th e instrument by
or for the maker, or by Or or an indorser through whom the
holder mu t claim, i a def ct or infirmity of title within the
meaning of the rule . abov cited a rule which i aid to be laid
up among th fundamental of the la\ . Worcester County Bank
v. Dorchester & ~[ elton Bank, IO Cu hing, 488; Edward on Bill
and Note , 188; Gould v. Seg~e, supra; Ingha11i v. Primrose, 7
C. . ( . . ) 2; hipley v. Carroll, 45 Ill. 285; Clark v. Johnson, 54 Ill. 296.
The order den3 ing a new tr ial m:nst be reversed.
1

18.

~~~·

Contract on three promissory notes, each for $2,432.33, dated

December 9, 1899, payable to and indorsed by the defendant and

discounted by the plaintiff, as described in the first paragraph of

the opinion. Writ dated April 25, 1900.

At the trial in the Superior Court before Harris, J., the jury

returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged

PRES

::\f PTIO

OF DELIVERY.

§ 18.
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exceptions, raising the questions stated by the court.

E. P. Carver & F. H. Smith, Jr., for the plaintiff.

S. L. Whipple & E. M. Brooks, for the defendant.

Mass. Nat. Bank v . Snow (1905), 187 Mass. 159·

Knowlton, C.J. This is an action of contract on three

promissory notes, signed H. G. and H. W. Stevens, payable to

the order of the defendant, indorsed by him in blank and dis-

counted by the plaintiff. They severally bear date December 9,

1899, and the rights of the parties are accordingly governed by

the St. 1898, c. 533, sometimes called the negotiable instruments

act, which is now embodied in R. L. c. 73, §§ 18 to 212, inclu-

sive. In referring to different provisions of this statute it may

be convenient to cite the sections of the Revised Laws, rather

than those of the original act.

Contract on three promissory notes, each for $_2,432.33 , elated
December 9, r 99, payable to and indor ed by the defendant and
di counted by the plaintiff, as described in the fir t paragraph of
the opinion. Writ dated April 25 , 1900.
t the trial in the Superior Court before Harri , J., the jury
returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged
exceptions, raising the questions stated by the court.

The maker of the notes, H.« W. Stevens, who did business

under the name of H. G. and H. W. Stevens, has deceased, and

the defendant introduced evidence tending to show that, after

the defendant had indorsed the notes, they were taken from his

E. P. Carver & F. H. Smith, Jr. , for the plaintiff.
S. L. Whipple & E. M. Brooks, for the defendant.

possession by the maker, without his knowledge or consent, and

K OWLTO , C.J. This is an action of contract on three
promi sory notes, signed H. G. and H. VI/. Stevens, payable to
the order of th e defendant, indor ed by him in blank and discounted by the plaintiff. They everally bear date December 9,.
1899, and the rights of the parties are accordin ly governed by
the t. 1898, c. 533, ometimes called the negotiable in trum ents
act, which i now embodied in R. L. c. 73, § l to 212, inclu sive. In r ferrino- to different provi ion of thi tatute it may
be convenient to cite th e ections of the Revised Law , rather
than tho e of th e ori inal act.
The mak r of the note , H: W. teven , who did bu in e
under the name of H. G. and H. W. teven ha decea ed, and
the defendant introduced evidence tending to how that, after
the defendant had indor ed the note , they were taken from his
po e ion by the maker, without his knowledge or ·consent, ~nd
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discounted at the plaintiff bank, and that they were altered by

the insertion of the words "seven per cent" after the words

"with interest." The defence is founded on this evidence. The

defendant's counsel stated that he made no contention that the

bank had actual knowledge of any infirmity in the instruments,

or defect in the title to them, or that it took them in bad faith.

Nor was it contended by the defendant that in discounting the

notes the bank acted otherwise than in the regular and usual

course of business. But upon the defendant's testimony it might

be found that the notes were given to him by the maker in pay-

ment of indebtedness, that after he had indorsed them in blank

and put them in his desk for collection or discount he was called

out of his office, leaving the maker Stevens there, and that

Stevens then took them without right, and three days later car-

ried them to the plaintiff bank and caused them to be discounted

for his own benefit. The plaintiff made many requests for rulings,

which were refused subject to its exception, among which were

the following :

"First. That on all the evidence judgment should be for the

plaintiff for the full amount declared upon in its declaration, with
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interest at seven per cent from December 9, 1899."

"Fourth. That if the plaintiff shows it took the notes declared

upon in its declaration as a holder in due course, judgment should

be entered for the plaintiff for the full amount of said notes with

interest at the rate stated in the same from December 9, 1899."

"Fifth. That when an instrument is in the hands of a holder

in due course a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him

so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed."

"Eighth. That the notes declared upon by the plaintiff in its

declaration are complete and regular, and were taken before they

were due, and for value."

"Ninth. That a holder of a note is deemed prima facie to be

a holder in due course and that to constitute notice of an infirmity

in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating

the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must have had

actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such

facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad

faith."

"Fifteenth. That there is no evidence in the case to warrant

a jury in finding that the plaintiff was possessed of facts which

put it upon its guard as to the tile of the person delivering the

notes declared upon or which ought to have led the plaintiff to

inquiry concerning the same."

discounted at the plaintiff bank, and that th y w r altered by
the insertion of th e words " v n per c nt" after the word s
"with int r t." The def nee i founded on thi evidence. The
d f ndant's counsel stated that he made no cont ntion that the
bank had actual knowledge of any infirmity in the in trument ,
or defect in the title to th m, or that it took th m in bad faith.
N or was it contend d by th d f ndant that in discounting th
not s the bank acted otherwis than in th regular and u ual
cour e of bu ine s. But upon the defendant' te timony it might
be found that the not s were given to him by the maker in payment of ind btedness, that after he had indor ed them in blank
and put th m in his de k fo r collection or discount he was called
out of hi office, leaving the maker Stevens there, and that
tev ns then took them without right, and three days later carried them to the plaintiff bank and caused them to be di counted
for his m n benefit. The plaintiff made many requ est for rulings,
which were refu ed sub ject to its exception, among which were
the fo llowing:
"First. That on all the evidence judgment should be fo r the
plaintiff for the full amount declar d upon in its declaration, with
interest at seven per cent from D ecember 9, 1899."
" Fourth. That if the plaintiff hows it took the notes declared
upon in its declaration as a holder in due cour e, judgment hould
b entered for the plaintiff for the full amount of said note with
int re t at the rate tated in the same from December 9, 1899. '
"Fifth. That wh n an in trument is in the hands of a holder
in due course a valid delivery thereof by all partie prior to him
so as to make them liable to him i conclu ively pr urned. '
"Eighth. That the note declar d upon b the plaintiff in it
declaration are complete and regular, and were taken before they
were due, and for value."
"Ninth. That a holder of a note i deemed pri11ia facie to be
a holder in due cour and that to con titute notice of an infirmity
in the instrument or defect in th e title of the per on neo-otiatin
the ame, the per on to whom it i n gotiate mu t have had
a tual knowledge of the infirmity or d feet or knowl dge of u h
fa t that hi action in taking the in trument amounted to bad
faith.'
'Fifteenth. That there i no evid nee in th a e to warrant
a jury in finding that the plaintiff wa po e ed f fa t which
put it upon · it o-uard as to the tile of the p r on d li erin the
notes declared upon or ' hich ou ht to hav 1 th plaintiff to
inquiry concerning the am ."
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"Nineteenth. That when an instrument has been materially

altered and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party

to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to

its original tenor."

"Twenty-third. That even if the jury should find that the

words 'seven per cent' were added to the face of said notes after

they were indorsed by the defendant, and without his authoriza-

tion or ratification, yet, on all the evidence in the case, the verdict

must be for the plaintiff for the full amount of said notes, with

interest at six per cent from December 9, 1899."

The plaintiff also excepted to the following instructions, given

at the request of the defendant :

"'Fourth. If the jury find that the notes were taken from the

defendant wrongfully and that the same were never delivered

by the defendant to Stevens, the plaintiff gained no title to the

notes by the negotiation of the same by Stevens, and the plaintiff

cannot recover.

"Fifth. The burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the

notes were delivered by the defendant to Stevens or some other

person authorized to negotiate them at the plaintiff bank."
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"Seventh. Or in the alternative, if the jury find that the

notes in question were altered by the addition of the words 'seven

per cent' thereto after the same were indorsed by the defendant,

such an alteration is a material and wrongful one, destroying the

validity of the notes, and upon the notes or any one of them thus

altered the plaintiff cannot recover."

The notes, beingf indorsed in blank, were payable to bearer

within the meaning of the statute. R. L. c. 73, § 26, cl. 5. When

the nek's were taken to the plaintiff for discount Stevens was the

bearer . R. L. c. 73, § 207. The presentation of such notes for

discount _r aised a presum ption of 1 fact that the bearer was the

owner of them. Pctte v. Pront, 3 Gray, 502. Upon the undis-

puted evidence and upon the defendant's admission that the plain -

tiff took them in good faith and d iscounted, them without knowl-

e dge of a n y infirmity in them or defec t_of_liLl e in Stevens ) _the

"plaintiff be came a holder in due cou rse, within the definiti on of

the statute . R. L. c. 73, §§ 69, j6. Boston Steel & Iron Co. v.

Steuer, 183 Mass. 140. There was not even anything to put the

plaintiff upon inquiry, for the rate of interest was the same that

Stevens had been paying on his loans from the bank for two

years. The uncontradicted evidence, as well as the defendant's

admission, makes it plain that the plaintiff had no notice of any.

infir mity in the instruments or defect in the title of Stevens, under

'' Tineteenth. That when an instrument has been materially
altered and i in the hand of 3. holder in du cour , not a party
t the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to
it original t nor. '
''Twenty-third . That even if the jury hould find that the
word '
n per c nt' were added to th face of aid note after
they were indor ed by th defendant, and without hi authorization or ratification, yet, on all the evidence in the ca e, the verdict
mu t be for the plaintiff for the full amount of aid note , with
intere t at ix per cent from December 9, 1899."
The plaintiff al o xcepted to th following in truction , given
at the r qu t of th defendant:
·'Fourth. If the jury find that the note were taken from the
defendant wrongfully and that the same were never delivered
by the defendant to teven , the plaintiff gained no title to the
note by the negotiation of the same by Stevens, and the plaintiff
cannot recover.
' Fifth. The burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the
nc,tes were delivered by the def ndant to Stevens or some other
per on authorized to negotiate them at the plaintiff bank."
' eventh. Or in the alternative, if the jury find that the
notes in que tion were altered by the addition of the words ' even
per cent' thereto after the same were indorsed by the defendant,
uch an alteration is a material and wrongful one, destroying the
validity of the notes, and upon the notes or any one of them thus
altered the plaintiff cannot recover."
The note , being indorsed in blank, were payable to bearer
within the meaning of the statute. R. L. c. 73, § 26, cl. 5. When
the notes were taken to the plaintiff for discount Stevens wa the
~er. R. L. c. 73, § 207. The pre entation of uch note for
discount rai ed a presum tion of' fact that the bearer wa the
owner of them. Fette v. Prout, 3 Gray, 502. Upon the undisputed evidence and upon the defendant' admission that the plaintiff took them in good faith and di counted them without knowl th
edge of an infirmit in them or defect of ·tl
p aintiff became a holder in due cour e, within the definition of
the statute. R. L. c. 73, §§ 6g, 76. Boston Steel & Iron Co . v.
Steuer, 183 Mass. 140. There was not even anything to put the
plaintiff upon inquiry, for the rate of int rest was the same that
tevens had been paying on his loans from the bank for two
year . The uncontradicted evidence, as well as the defendant's
admission, makes it plain that the laintiff had no notice of an
infirmity in the instruments or defect in the title of Stevens, under
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the rule prescribed by the statute. R. L. c. J$, § 73. This rule,

namely, that to co nstitute such notice the person to whom the note

is negotiated must hav e hacT actual knowledge of~ffie~ lh~h r mity or

defect , jpr knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the

instru me nt amounted to bad faith , is the same as prevailed in

this Commonwealth before the enactment of the statute. Smith

v. Livingston, 1 1 1 Mass. 342 ; Lee v. Whitney, 149 Mass. 447 ;

International Trust Co. v. Wilson, 161 Mass. 80, 90.

The defendant's contention that after the notes had been deliv-

ered to the defendant and endorsed by him they were stolen by

Stevens, brings us to the question whether, under the negotiable

instruments act, a holder in due course of a note payableto

bjarer_,_jthat has ..been sto len, rap acq uire a in xxT litle from the

thief. Even before the enactment of the statute, while the "deci-

sions were not uniform, the weight of authority was in favor

of an affirmative answer to the question. Wheeler v. Guild, 20

Pick. 545, 550, 553 ; Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester &

Milton Bank, 10 Cush. 488; Wyer v. Dorchester & Milton Bank,

11 Cush. 51, 53; Spooner v. Holmes, 102 Mass. 503; London

Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892] A. C. 201, and cases cited.
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Smith v. Union Bank of London, 1 Q. B. D. 31 ; Goodman v.

Simonds, 20 How. 343, 365; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall, no;

Hotchkiss v. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 21 Wall. 354; Kin-

yon v. Wohlford, 17 Minn. 239; Clarke v. Johnson, 54 111. 296;

Seybel v. National Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 288; Evertson v.

National Bank of Newport, 66 N. Y. 14; Kuhns v. Gettysburg

National Bank, 68 Penn. St. 445.

The following specific language of the statute touching this

question, as well as its provisions in other sections, was intended

to establish the law in favor of holders in due course. "But

where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course

a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so as to make

them liable to him Js conclusively presumed/' R. L. c. 73, §33.

This conclusive presum ption exists as we lj_ wheri_Jhe_ note is

taken from a thief ~as ~in any other case . Of course this^ rule

does ^ noF"apj> ly to ~an i nstrument whic h is jncomplete. But in

reference to a complete, negotiable promissory note payable to

bearer, it is a wholesome and salutary provision. See Grccser v.

Sugarman, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922. Upon the defendant's state-

ment and the counsel's theory of the case, the rule is applicable.

The note not only was completej n form and in execution, but,

upon his testimony, it jr ad bee n delivered, to him by the maker

as a binding instrument , and had afterwards been indorsed by

the rule pre cribed by the statut . R. L. c. 73, § 73. This rule,
namely that t con titut uch notic th p r on to whom the note
i n gotiated mu t have Ii.a_ictualknowr ill o
e m rm1ty or
defect, or knowledge of uch fact that hi action in taking the
in trument amount d to bad faith is the ame as prevailed in
ommom ealth b for the nactment of the tatute. Smith
thi
v. Lir. ingston, I I I Ma s. 342; Lee v. Whitney, 149 Ma s. 447;
International Trust Co. v. vVil on, 161 Ma . 80, go.
The defendant contention that after the notes had been delivered to the defendant and endor ed by him they were tolen by
St ven , bring u to the que tion whether, under the negotiable
instrument act, a h Ider in due cour e of a note payable to
bearer that ha Deen
uire a ood title from th e
thief. Even before the enactment of the tatute, while the ec1Sloi1 were not uniform, the weight of authority wa in favor
of an affirmative an wer to the que tion. Wheeler v. Guild, 20
Pick. 545, 550, 553; Worcester County Bank v. Dorchester &
Nlilton Bank, IO u h. 488; Wyer v. Dorchester & iJ!lilton Bank,
II Cu h. 5I, 53· pooner v. Holmes, 102 Mas. 503; London
Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892] A. C. 201, and ca es cited.
Smith v. Union Bank of London, 1 Q. B. D. 3I; Goodman v.
Sinionds, 20 How. 343, 365; Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. IIO ·
Hotchk iss v. ational Shoe & L eather Bank, 2I Wall. 354; Kinyon v. Wohlford, I7 Minn . 239; Clarke v. Johnson, 54 lll. 296·
Seyb el
ational Currency Bank, 54 N. Y. 2 8; Evertson v.
National Bank of ewport, 66 N. Y. 14; Kuhns v. GettysbHrg
National Bank, 68 enn. St. 445.
The following sp cific language of the tatute touching this
question, a well as its provi ion in other ections, wa intended
to e tablish the law in favor of holder in due cour e. "But
'" here the in trument is in the hand of a holder in due cour e
a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him o a to make
R. L. c. 73 § 33,
them liable to him i conclu ively presumed.
This conclusive pre umption exi t a well when the
is
taken from a t ie as in any other case. Of cour e thi rule
does not a I to an in trument which is incom l~ But in
reference to a comp! te, neo-otiable prom1 ory note pa able to
ee Gr eser .
bearer, it is a whole ome and salutar pro i ion.
Sitgarman, 76 N. Y. Supp. 922. Upon the defendant
tatement and the coun el's theory of the case the rule i applicable.
The note not only was complete in form and in execution but,
upon his testimony, it had been deliver d to him b the maker
as a bindin instrument, and had aften ards been indor ed by
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him. Therefore the first sentence of the R. L. c. 73, § 33, "Every

contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable

until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect

thereto," was inapplicable. The instrument had taken effect, and

subsequently was negotiated by the bearer to the plaintiff as a

holder in due course. That the bearer was also the maker was

immaterial after the instrument had been so indorsed as to become

payable to bearer.

Upon the plaintiff's theory of the facts, there was no theft,

but an ordinary accommodation indorsement by the defendant for

the benefit of the maker, and none of these questions arise.

We are of opinion that the judge erred in giving the fourth

and fifth instructions requested by the defendant, and in refusing

other instructions requested by the plaintiff, founded upon a dif-

ferent view of the statute.

There also was error in the instructions given as to the

alleged alteration of the notes. By the R. L. c. J^, § 141, it is

provided that "when an instrument has been materially altered

and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the

alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its
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original tenor." This language is directly applicable to the pres-

ent case. See Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough, [1894] 2. Q.

B. 660; [1895] 1 Q. B. 536; [1896] A. C. 514; Schwartz v.

Wilner, 90 Md. 136, 143.

We understand that the instructions were given independ-

ently of any question of pleading, and we therefore do not deem

it necessary to determine, at this stage of the case, whether the

plaintiff should amend its declaration by inserting counts upon

the notes as they were before the alleged alteration, if it wishes

to recover upon them as notes bearing interest at only six per

cent. See Mutual Loan Association v. Lesser, 78 N. Y. Supp.

629. Nor do we consider other questions which are not likely

to arise upon a second trial.

Exceptions sustained.

X^t- >aSlj»^v*>->-

him. Therefore the first sent nee of the R. L. c. 73, § 33, "Every
ontract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and r vocable
until delive ry of the instrument for the purpo e of givin effect
th reto," wa inapplicabl . The instrum nt had taken ff ct, ~nd
ub equently wa negotiat d by th bearer to th plaintiff as a
holder in due course. That the bearer was also the maker was
immaterial after the instrument had be~n so indorsed as to become
payable to bearer.
Upon the plaintiff' theory of the fact's ,, there was no theft,
but an ordinary accommodation indorsement by the defendant for
the benefit of the maker, and none of these questions ari e.
We ar of opinion that the judge erred in giving the fourth
and fifth instructions requested by the defendant, and in refusing
oth r in tructions reque ted by the plaintiff, founded upon a diff rent view of the statute.
There also was error in the instructions given as to the
alleged alteration of the notes. By the R. L. c. 73, § 141, it is
provided that "when an instrument has been materially altered
and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the
alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its
original tenor." This languarre is directly applicable to the present case. See Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough, [ 1894] 2. Q.
B. 66o; [1895] I Q. B. 536; [1896] A. C. 514; Schwartz v.
Wilner, 90 Md. 136, 143·
We understand that the instructions were rriven independently of any question of pleading, and we therefore do not deem
it neces ary to determine, at this stage of the case, whether the
plaintiff should amend its declaration by inserting counts upon
the notes as they w re before the alleged alteration, if it wishes
to recover upon them as notes bearing interest at only six per
cent. S e Mutual Loan Association v. Lesser, 78 N. Y. Supp.
629. Nor do we consider other questions which are not likely
to arise upon a second trial.

Exceptions sustained.
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Section IV — Consideration.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSIDERATION. §26.

ECTI N

Averett's Adm'r v. Booker (1859), 75 Graft. 163, 76 Am. Dec. 203.

IV-

0

ID .

TI

This was an action of assumpsit in the Circuit Court of the

city of Lynchburg, brought by William T. Booker against Wil-

PRES MPTIO

liam B. Averett's administrator. The plaintiff declared upon the

F

0

T

'IDERATIO

following paper, which he averred was made for value received.

$1,080.59 Lynchburg, December 8, 1852.

A" eretrs Adm'r v. Booker (1859), 15 Graff. 163, 76 Am. Dec.

203.

The trustee of Norvell and Averett will pay to William T.

Booker the sum of one thousand and eighty dollars and fifty-nine

cents, with interest from 1st of March, 1850, out of any moneys in

his hands belonging to me.

Wm. B. Averett.

On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff introduced in evidence

the foregoing paper, and also proved that it was presented and

Thi was an action of assunzpsit in the
ourt of the
ilcity of Lynchburrr, br ught by William T. o k r again t
verett' admini trat r. Th plaintiff declared up n the
liam
following paper, which he averred wa made for value received.

v

not paid ; and that there were no effects out of which the order

could, at the time of the trial, be paid. And this being all the

evidence in the cause, the court, at the instance of the plaintiff,

instructed the jury that they might infer from the paper afore-

said, a consideration moving from the plaintiff to the defendant's
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intestate, which entitled him, without further evidence than the

paper itself, to recover in this case.

To this opinion of the court the defendant excepted : And

there having been a verdict and judgment against him, he applied

0.59
LY CHB RG, December 8 I 52.
The tru tee of orvell and verett will pay to William T.
Booker the um of one thousand and eighty dollar and fifty-nine
cent , with inter t from I t of March, 1850, out of any moneys in
hi hand b longing to me.
WM. B. AVERETT.
1,0

to a judge of this court for a supersedeas; which was allowed.

Green, for the appellant.

Garland, for the appellee.

Lee, J. The only question in this case is that raised by the

instruction asked for by the defendant in error upon the trial.

The declaration unlike that in Jackson v. Jackson, 10 Leigh 448,

sufficiently avers a consideration for the draft or order which it

describes, but as when it was produced at the trial no considera-

tion was expressed upon its face and it was not stated to have

been made "for value received," the question made was whether

the jury could from the paper alone infer such a consideration

moving from the defendant in error to the plaintiff's intestate

as would entitle him to recover without further evidence.

n the trial of th cau e, the plaintiff introduced in evidence
the foregoing paper, and al o pr ved _that it wa pre ented and
not pai 1; and that th re were no effects out of which the order
could, at the time of the trial, b paid. And thi beino- all the
evidence in the cau e, the court at the in tance of the plaintiff.
in tructed th jur that they mio-ht infer from th paper aforeaid, a con ideration moving from th plaintiff to the defendant'
inte tate which entitled him, without further evidence than the
paper it If, to recov r in thi ca e.
To thi opinion of the court the d fendant e rcepted:
nd
there havino- been a verdict and jud ment a ain t him, he applied
to a judg of thi court for a supersedeas · which ' a allo ed.

Green for the appellant.
Garland, for the appellee.
LEE J. Th only que tion in thi ca e i that rai d b) the
in truction a ked for by the d f ndant in rror upon th trial.
The declaration unlik that in Jackson v. Jackson IO L i h 44
ufficiently aver a on id ration for th draft or ord r whi h it
de cribe , but a wh n it ' a produc d at th trial no on ideration wa xpre ed upon it fac and it wa n t tate to have
been made for valu r c ived,' th qu tion mad wa wh th r
the jury could from th paper alon inf r u h a on id ration
movino- from th d f ndant in rror to th pl inti.ff' int tate
a would entitle him to reco er without forth r
id n .
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If the order in question were good as a bill ofj2XC_hjinge it

cannot be questioned that the party might have rec overed upon_

u without averring in his declaration or proving at the trial that_

any value had _been received for it, as such a bill is presumed to

stand o^ valuable_ consideration _an_d prima facie to import it.

i f'.ayly on Bills, ch. i, § 13, p. 40: Macleed v. Snee, 2 Str. K. 762;

Poplewell v. Wilson, 1 Id. 264; Philliskirk v. Blackwell, 2 Maule

& Sel. 395; Wilson v. Coalman's ex' or, 3 Cranch's R. 193, 207;

Hatch v. Trayes, 1 1 Adolph & El. 702 ; 39 Eng. C. L. R. 207 ;

Jones v. Jones, 6 Mees. & Welsb. 84; Bayly on Bills, ch. 9, p.

390; Coombe v. Ingram, 4 Dowl. & Ryl. 211.) But I think it

clear that this paper can not be regarded as a bill of exchange,

nor as carrying with it the exemption pertaining to that class of

securities from the necessity of both averring and proving a

sufficient consideration as the condition of recovering upon it.

To constitute a good bill of exchange, the sum to be paid must

not onTy be in money and certain in amount, but it must be pay-

able absolutely and at ..ajl__events. I f it be payable out of a par-

ticular fund or upon an event w hich is c onti ngent, or if it be_

otherwise conditional, it is not_jn_co ntemplation of law a bill of__
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exchange. (Roberts v. Peake, 1 Burr, R. 323 ; Carlos v. Fanconrt,

5 T, R. 482; Chitty on Bills, ch. 5, p. 152, ct seq.; Bayly on Bills,

ch. 1, § 6, p. 16, et seq.; Story on Bills, § 46; Crawford v. Bully,

Wright's R. 453 ; Van Vacter v. Flack, 1 Smedes & Marsh. R.

393; Hamilton v. Myrick, 3 Pike's R. 541.) Here the sum t o be

paid is not payable absolutely_and at all events . _It is payable out

of_a ^particular fund, to wit, the moneys, if any, in the hands of

the drawee belonging to the drawer. The draft therefore cannot

be treated as a bill of exchange, nor can a recovery be had upon

it as such.

So, again, if the paper in question contained an express

promise to pay the sum mentioned upon which an action of debt

might be maintained under our statute, I incline to think that the

recovery might be had without further proof of consideration. If

debt would lie upon the paper, it would be evidence of such

indebtedness as would be a sufficient consideration for the pur-

pose to pay in the action of assumpsit. The case of Jackson v.

Jackson, above cited, so far as it is of any authority, having been

decided by a court equally divided, shows that it is not necessary

in such a case even to aver a consideration. For the declaration

without averring such consideration was sustained by the court

below, and that judgment was affirmed by the division of this

court. But it is unnecessary to go into this question in this case,

If the order in question were good a a bill of exchan e it
cannot be que tioned that the - arJ migh~ 1ave recovered u on
it without av:~rri~ ip l:!is declaration or proving at the trial that
any valu had been received .for it -as such a bil!C presumed to
tand on valuable con ideration_ nd rima facie to import it.
( Dayly on Bill , ch. l, § 13, p. 40; M acleed v. Snee, 2 tr. R. 762;
Poplewell v. liVilson, l Id. 264; Philliskirk v. Blackwell, 2 faule
& el. 395; Wilson v. Codnwn's ex' or, 3 Cranch' R. 193, 207;
Hat ch v. Trayes, l l Adolph & El. 702; 39 Eng. C. L. R. 207;
Jones v. Jones, 6 Mees . & \!Velsb. 84; ayly on ill, ch. 9, p.
390; Coombe v. Ingram, 4 Dowl. & Ryl. 21 r.) But I think it
clear that this paper cannot be regard d as a bill of exchange,
nor as carrying with it the exemption pertaining to that clas of
curities from the nece sity of both averring and proving a
ufficient con ideration a the condition of recovering upon it.
To constitute a good bill of exchange, the sum to be paid must
not only be in money and certain in amount, but it mu t be payable absolutel and at all events. If it b payable out of a particular fund or upon an event which i contingent, or if it be
otherwise conciltwnal it is not in contemplation of law a bill of
exchange. (Roberts v. Peake, l Burr. . 323; Carlos v. Fancourt,
5 T. R. 482; Chitty on Bills, ch. 5, p. 152, et seq.; Bayly on Bills,
ch. l, § 6, p. 16, et seq.; Story on Bills, § 46; Crawford v. Bitlly,
Wright's R . 453; Van Vacter v. Flack, l Smedes & Marsh. R .
393; Hamilton v. 1ll }Wick, 3 Pike' R. 54r.) Here the um to be
paid is ~ot a able ab olutely and at all event . It is payable out
of a articul
un.d., to wit, the moneys, if any, in the hand of
the drawee belonging to the drawer. The draft t herefore cannot
be treated as a bill of exchange, nor can a recovery be had upon
it a such.
So, again, if the paper in que tion contained an expre s
promi e to pay the sum mentioned upon which an action of debt
might be maintained under our tatute, I incline to think that the
recovery might be had without further proof of con ideration. If
debt would lie upon th paper, it w uld b evid nee of such
indebtedne s as would be a ufficient consideration for the purpo e to pay in the action of asswnpsit. The ca e of Jaclison v.
Jackson, above cited, so far a it i of any authority, having been
decided by a court equally divided, ho\\ that it i not n ce ary
in such a case even to aver a consideration. For the declaration
without averring uch con ideration wa u tained by the court
below, and that judgment vvas affirmed by the division of this
court. But it is unneces ary to go into this que tion in this case,
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because whilst the declaration in all its counts sufficiently avers

a consideration, i t is not pretended that th e paper offered in e vi-

dence contained any thing that could b y any construction b Theld

tojie an express promise to pay the sum of money mention e d in

jt. And not being a bill of exchange, no promise is raised by law

in f avo r of the payee a gainst the drawer from the failure of the

draw ee to accept or to pay, (Tosceline v. Lasserrc, Fortesc. R.

28] ; S. C. 10 Mod. R. 294, 316; Jenny v. Herlc, 1 Stra. R. 591 ;

S. C. 2 Ld. Raym. R. 1361 ; Hay dock v. Lynch, 2 Ld. Raym. R.

1563; Banbury v. Lissct, 2 Stra. R. 121 1 ; Dazi'kes v. DeLorane,

3 Wils. R. 207; S. C. 2 Wm. Black. R. 782; Nichols' adm'r v.

Davis, 1 Bibb's R. 490; Mcrshon v. Withers, Id. 503; Carlisle v.

Dubrec, 3 J. J. Marsh. R. 542.)

The case of Jolliffe v. Higgins, 6 Munf. 3, might seem at

first blush from the reporter's syllabus of the point decided, to

be somewhat in conflict with the principles above stated ; but

upon closer examination, I think the decision will be found to

be in perfect harmony with them and to be abundantly sustained

upon the case itself. No reasons are assigned by the court for

affirming the judgment, but upon the report of the case, I think
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we can see ample grounds on which to vindicate its correctness

without disturbing any of the principles to which I have averted.

The action was assumpsit and the declaration counted specially

on the draft or order set out, and also for money had and received

by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff. The plea was the

general issue; and at the trial, the defendant demurred to the

evidence. This consisted of the draft or order described in the

declaration by which the drawer (the defendant) directed the

drawee (Waite) to pay to the plaintiff the sum of one hundred

and eight dollars and eighty-five cents which the order stated he

(the drawer) had lodged in the hands of the drawee and was the

property of the payee as guardian &c, with proof of non-payment

by the drawee, and protest therefor, and notice to the drawer ;

and also that the drawer had never deposited any such funds or

other funds whatsoever with the drawee. Now, I do not think

it by any means clear that the order was not good as a bill of

exchange. Mr. Wickham for the plaintiff in error, it is true,

contended that it was not because it was not made payable to

order, and was drawn on a particular fund : and this Mr. Leigh

appears to have conceded. Formerly it was doubted whether j t^

wa_s_jigt_essen tial to the character of a bill _ol_ey^ bnngp that it

_s hould be payable, e. g., t o A or his order or to bear er. But it is

now well settled that it is not essential to the character either

b cause whilst th declaration in all it count
avers
a con ideration, it i not r t nd d that the a er off red in evid nee contained any thing that could
any construction be heia
to b an ex re s promi t
the sum of mo
m ntioned in
it. And not being a bill Ofexchang , no promi e i raised by law
in favor of the payee against the drawer from the failure of the
draw e to accept or t pay. (Joscelme v. Lasserre, Fortesc. R.
281 ·
. IO Mod. R. 294, 316; Jenny v. H erle, l tra. R. 591;
. 2 Ld. Raym. R. 1361; Haydock v. Lynch, 2 Ld. Raym. R.
1563; Banbury v. Lisset, 2 tra. R. I2II; Dawkes v. DeLorane,
3 Wils. R. 207; S. . 2 Wm. Black. R. 782; Nichols' adrn/r v.
Davis, l Bibb's R. 490; J.1,1 erslwn v. Withers, Id. 503; Carlisle v.
Dubree, 3 J. J. Mar h. R. 542.)
The case of Jolliffe v. Higgins, 6 Munf. 3, might seem at
fir t blu h from the reporter's yllabus of the point decided, to
be somewhat in conflict with the principles above stated; but
upon clo er examination, I think the deci ion will be found to
be in perfect harmony with them and to be abundantly su tained
upon the case it elf. No rea ons are a igned by the court for
affirming the judgment, but upon the report of the case, I think
we can ee ample grounds on which to vindicate its correctne s
without disturbing any of the principles to which I have averted.
The action wa assumpsit and the declaration counted specially
on the draft or ord r et out, and al o for money had and received
by the defendant to the u e of the plaintiff. The plea wa the
aeneral i ue · and at the trial the defendant demurred to the
evidence. Thi con i ted of the draft or order de cribed in the
declaration by which the drav,• r (the defendant) directed the
drawee (V\Taite) to pay to the plaintiff the um of one hundred
and ight dollar and iahty-five cent which the order tated he
(the dra\~ er) had lodged in the hand of the dra\\ e and was the
property of the pa)'ee as guardian &c., with proof of non-payment
by the drawee, and prate t there£ r, and notice to the drawer·
and al o that the drawer had never depo ited an
uch fund or
other fund what oever with th drawee.
0\
I do not think
it by any mean cl ar that the order wa not aood a a bill of
exchanae.
1r. vVickham for the plaintiff in error it i true
cont nded that it wa not becau e it wa not made payabl to
order and wa drawn on a parti ular fund; and thi Mr. Leiah
appear to have conced d. Formerly it wa doubted \\ hether li.
ential to the chara t r of a bill of e~chanae
that it
d
a able, e. g.i to
or hi order or t9___Qear r. But it i
ettled that it i not
ential to the character either
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of a bill of exchange or of a promissory note that it should be

negotiable. (Chadwick v. Allen, Str. R. 706; Smith v. Kendall,

6 T. R. 123 ; Tlte King v. Box, 6 Taunt. R. 325 ; Burchcll v. Slo-

cock, 2 Ld. Raym. R. 1545; Bayly on Bills, ch. 1, § 10, p. 33;

of a bill of exchange or of a promissory note that it should be
n gotiable. ( Ch(]Jdwick v. Allen tr. . 70 ; Smith v. Kendail
T. R. 123; The King v. Box 6 Taunt. R. 325; Burchell v. Slocock1 2 Ld. aym. R. 1545; ayly on ill , ch. l, § IO, p. 33;
hi tty n Bill , ch. 5, p. 181 ; tory on Bill , § 6g.)
nd it may
with areat force be contended that the order to pay wa neither
onditional nor restricted to any particular fund, but as well as
can be a certained from the stat m nt of the ca e, wa ab elute
and unconditional t pay the amount. It i true it v a added
that the drawer had lodg d the amount in the hand of the drawee
and that it was the property of the payee. Whether this statement wa true or fal e would not affect the character of the
order. The theory of every bill of exchange is that the drawer
ha fund in the hand of t.he drawee ubject to his order, and
whether thi be true or false the character of the bill i the ame.
tory on Bill , § 13.) The rea on given for making the draft
(S
would not n ce arily change the absolute character of the order,
or wheth r true or fal , affect its legal character and incident .
It would eem to fall rather within a cla s of ca e which are
carefully distingui hed from tho in which the order i to pay
out of a particular fund, although at fir t glance they might seem
to be of them. Thu a bill drawn by a freighter payable to a
per on entitled to receive the freight "on account of fr ight," i
good, for it is not payable out of a particular fund but me rely
show to what account it is to be applied or what is the value
that has been receiv d. (Pierson v. Dunlop Cowp. R. 57i.) So a
bill for money a "the draw r' quarter 1 half pay by advance"
is good; for it is not payable out of a particular fund but is to be
paid in advance; and will be payable whether the half pay ever
1 ecome due or not. (Macleed v. nee 2 Stra. R . 762.)
nd o
p cifying the fund in any other manner out of which the value
wa received for which the bill i drawn will not vitiate the bill;
thu
tating "value received out of the premi e in Rose11iary
Lane/ or "being a portion of a valu , a und r, depo it d in
security of payment hereof;" or "on account of wine had by me"
(the drawer) ; or "being o much du by m to A . at Lady-day
next." In th se cases the bill i not payabl out of a particular
fund, but it only pecifies the value r ceiv d and th occa ion of
the draft. ( e Haussoullier v . Hartsinck 1 7 T. R. 733. Bayly
on Dill , p. T ; tory on ill , § 47.)
But if th order could not be t reated a a bill of exchange,
certainly from it t rms it miaht b fairly and legitimately
inferred that the defendant had had in hi hands money belong1

1

1

Chitty on Bills, ch. 5, p. 181 ; Story on Bills, §69.) And it may

with great force be contended that the order to pay was neither

conditional nor restricted to any particular fund, but as well as

can be ascertained from the statement of the case, was absolute

and unconditional to pay the amount. It is true it was added

that the drawer had lodged the amount in the hands of the drawee

and that it was the property of the payee. Whether this state-

ment was true or false would not affect the character of the

order. The theory of every bill of exchange is that the drawer

has funds in the hands of the drawee subject to his order, and

whether this be true or false the character of the bill is the same.

(See Story on Bills, § 13.) The reason given for making the draft

would not necessarily change the absolute character of the order,

or whether true or false, affect its legal character and incidents.

It would seem to fall rather within a class of cases which are

carefully distinguished from those in which the order is to pay
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out of a particular fund, although at first glance they might seem

to be of them. Thus a bill drawn by a freighter payable to a

person entitled to receive the freight "on account of freight," is

good, for it is not payable out of a particular fund but merely

shows to what account it is to be applied or what is the value

that has been received. (Picrson v. Dunlop, Cowp. R. 571.) So a

bill for money as "the drawer's quarters half pay by advance"

is good ; for it is not payable out of a particular fund but is to be

paid in advance ; and will be payable whether the half pay ever

become due or not. (Maclccd v. Snee, 2 Stra. R. 762.) And so

specifying the fund in any other manner out of which the value

was received for which the bill is drawn will not vitiate the bill ;

thus stating "value received out of the premises in Rosemary

Lane," or "being a portion of a value, as under, deposited in

security of payment hereof ;" or "on account of wine had by me"

(the drawer) ; or "being so much due by me to A. at Lady-day

next." In these cases the bill is not payable out of a particular

fund, but it only specifies the value received and the occasion of

the draft. (See Haussoullier v. Hartsinck, 7 T. R. 733. Bayly

on Bills, p. 18; Story on Bills, § 47.)

But if the order could not be treated as a bill of exchange,

certainly from its terms it might be fairly and legitimately

inferred that the defendant had had in his hands money belong-

1

1

1

1
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ing to the plaintiff which he had failed to pay over to him and

which he falsely pretended by the order he had lodged in Wake's

hands for him. The amount therefore would clearly he recover-

able in an action for money had and received and the demurrer

to the evidence could not avail the defendant.

The court may therefore have thought either that the order

in this case was good as a bill of exchange, or that the evidence

was sufficient to sustain the second count of the declaration, and

that the judgment was therefore right, and should be affirmed.

All contracts by our law must be either contracts by specialty

or contracts by parol. If not by sealed instrument, they are

parol whether verbal or in writing, and if in writing, whatever

"" may be the rule of the civil law, or whatever the doubt created

by the remarks of Lord Mansfield and Justice Wilmot in Pillans

v. Mierop, 3 Burr. R. 1668, et seq., there must be in general a

sufficient consideration to support them, just as if they were

proved by parol evidence only. The authorities for this propo-

sition are numerous and familiar, and I deem it unnecessary to

stop to cite any. Commercial paper and perhaps promises in
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writing for the payment of money on which debt would lie under

our statute, constitute exceptions to the rule, but otherwise it is

universal and pervading. Accordingly, the defendant in error

recognizing the rule and its applicability to this case, asked the

court to instruct the jury that they might infer the consideration

from the paper itself, and the court gave the instruction asked.

The whole case then is resolved into the enquiry whether_the I

paper d oes of itself , ^u^rmsji_proof_of a legal promise and a suffi-J

cient consi deration ?

Now I apprehend that a paper of this character can o nly be

saici jo furnish , such proof, where the consid eration is stat ed in it

or it_is___ stated to be for value received, o r some equival ent^ or

where the terms m. which it is expre ssed are_ inc onsistent with

anv_other theory than that it was upon a consideration . If those

terms are just as consistent with the theory of a total want of

consideration as they are with that of its existence, it would seem

impossible to say that they afford such a legal presumption that

the paper was founded on a consideration as would justify the

jury in finding it as a fact. In the paper i 1 1 qiiesUoiVJio^ojisidex:

ation is stated nor is the draft stated to be made "for value

received," nor are any eq uivalent terms used sh owing that it

was made for a consideration And taking all the terms of the

paper together they are at least as consistent with the theory of

an ab sence of all consideration as they are with that of any value_

received. The terms of the order would admit equally well of

ing to the plaintiff which he had fail d t pay ov r to him and
which he fal ly pret nd d by th ord r he had I dged in
aite'
hand for him. The amount th r f r woul cl arly b r c v rable in an action for mon y had and r c iv d and the d murrer
to the evidence could not avail th d f ndant.
The court may ther for hav th ught ither that th
rder
in thi case v a good as a bill of xchang , or that the vidence
wa uffici nt to su tain th ec nd count of th d claration, and
that the judgm nt wa ther f r right, and hould be affirmed.
All contract by ur law must be ith r contract by p cialty
or contract by parol. If not by sealed instrument, th y are
µarol ' hether v rbal or in writing, and if in v riting, whatever
may be th rul of the civil law, or whatev r the doubt created
by the remarks of Lord Man field and Ju tice Wilmot in Pillans
v. Jvlierop, 3 Burr. . 1668, et seq., there mu t be in general a
ufficient con ideration to support them, just a if they were
proved by parol vid nee only. The authoritie for thi propoition are numerous and familiar, and I deem it unnece ary to
top to cite any. Commercial paper and perhaps promise in
writing for the payment of money on which debt would lie under
our tatute con titute xceptions to the rule, but otherwi e it i
universal and p rvading.
ccordingly, the d f ndant in error
recognizing the rule and it applicability to thi ca e, a ked the
court to in truct th jury that th y mio-ht infer the con ideration
from the pap r it elf, and the court gave th in truction a ked.
Th whole ca
th n i r olv d~to _the enguir · \ hether the~
flap r does f it elf, furni h roof of a le al promi e and a uffi- J
cient consideration?
I apprehend that a paper of thi character can only be
i
h roof \\ h r the con id ration i tated in it
tated to be for valu r c iv d or om
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several different constructions. The drawer might have known

that he had just such a sum in the hands of the drawee and

intended merely to give authority to the latter to deliver the same

to the payee for him. Or without knowing whether the trustee

had received funds for him or not, might have merely given the

order if he had, to authorize the payee to receive them for him

as his agent. The counsel for the defendant in error, it is true,

asserts that the order was drawn at a time and at a place at which

the plaintiff's intestate might have as conveniently drawn his

funds from the hands of the drawee himself as Booker the payee

could do it for him. Nothing of this however appears in the

record, nor does it appear, as is also alleged, that the intestate

was a partner of the firm of Norvell & Averett. If these facts

would have influenced the case they were not before the jury,

there being, as has been stated, no evidence whatever except the

order itself, and proof of non-payment, and that there were no

effects out of which it could be paid. So, it is perfectly in con-

sistence with the terms of the order, that it may have been drawn

for the purpose of loaning the amount to the payee if the drawer

had the funds in the hands of the drawee, or of making a gift
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to him of the amount if it could be had. Either of these hypoth-

eses and others that might be suggested are just as reasonable

as that insisted on by the defendant in error that the order was

given in discharge of a debt due him from the payee; and I

cannot think the circumstance that the order calls for interest

on the sum named from a given day is of such conclusive import

as is attributed to it by the counsel. Whilst it is strictly consis-

tent with the existence of a debt that was thereby settled, it is

not inconsistent with either of the ojier hypotheses suggested.

The court having given the instructions asked for, ignored

all the other hypotheses than that of a debt due to the payee from

the drawer or of value received by the latter; and as the jury

were told they might infer a consideration from the paper itself,

they could only regard it as peremptory to them to make that

inference, because if they might infer it, it was their duty to infer

it; and to say that they might infer it was equivalent to saying

that they must infer it because it was a matter not depending on

the weight of evidence or force of circumstance but simply upon

the legal import of the paper itself.

I think the Circuit Court erred in giving the instruction

asked for. and am of opinion to reverse the judgment.

Allen, P. and Daniel J. concurred in the opinion of Lee, J.

Moncure, J., concurred in the result.

Judgment reversed.

V- °b-

ev ral differ nt construction
The drawer might have known
that h had ju t uch a um in the hands of the drawee and
intended mer ly to give authority to the latter to deliver the same
to the payee for him. Or without knowing whether the tru tee
had received fund for him or not, might have m rely given the
ord r if he had, to authorize the payee to receive th m for him
a his agent. The coun el for the defendant in error, it is true,
a serts that the order wa drawn at a tim and at a place at which
the plaintiff's intestate might have as conveniently drawn his
fund from th hand of the drawee him elf as Booker the payee
could do it for him. Nothing of this however appear in the
record, nor d
it appear, a i al o alleged, that the inte tate
wa a partner of the firm of Norvell & Averett. If these fact
would have influenced the case they were not before the jury,
there being, a ha been stated, no evidence whatever except the
order it elf, and proof of non-payment, and that there were no
effect out of which it could be paid.
o, it i perfectly in coni tence with the term of the order, that it may have been drawn
for the purpose of loaning the amount to the payee if the drawer
had the funds in the hands of the drawee, or of making a gift
to him of the amount if it could be had. Either of the e hypothe es and others that might be sugge ted are just as rea onable
as that insisted on by the defendant in error that the order wa
given in discharge of a debt due him from the payee; and I
cannot think the circum tance that the order calls for interest
on the um named from a given day i f such conclusive import
a is attributed to it by the coun el. Whilst it is strictly consistent with the existence of a debt that was thereby ettled, it i
not inconsistent with either of the 6)1er hypothe e sugge ted.
The court having given the instructions asked for, ignored
all the other hypothc es than that of a debt due to the payee from
the drawer or of value receiv d by the latter; and a the jury
w r told they might infer a consideration from the paper it elf,
they could only reg ard it a p r mptory to th m to make that
inference, because if they mio-ht infer it, it wa their duty to infer
it; and to say that they mio-ht infer it wa equival nt to saying
that they mu t infer it becau e it was a matter not d pending on
the weig ht of vidence or fore of circum tance but imply upon
the legal import of the paper it elf.
I think the Circuit Court erred in givino- the instruction
a ked for, and am of opinion to rev r the judgment.
ALLE ' P. and D A JIEL J. concurr d in the opinion of LEE, Jr
Mo CURE, J., concurred in the re ult.

Judgment reversed.

Conm

TON

.

BA v

171

CODDINGTON V. BAY 171

WHAT CONSTITUTES CONSIDERATION. § 2"].

Coddington v. Bay {1822), 20 Johns. 636, 11 Am. Dec. 342.

WHAT CONSTITUTES CO SIDERATIO •.

Appeal from the Court of Chancery. The bill, filed June 15,

1819, by the respondent against the appellants, stated, that in

April, 1819, being the owner of a vessel called the Express, he

Coddington v. Bay (1822) ·, 20 Johns. 636,

employed R. & S., who were merchants and copartners in trade,

II

Am. Dec. 342.

in New York, to sell her, on a credit, and instructed them to take

good approved notes in payment, and to transmit them forthwith

to him, with an account of their charges, which should be immedi-

ately paid, with which instructions R. & S. engaged to comply.

That R. & S. sold the vessel for 3,875 dollars, and on the 3d of

June, 1819, received from the purchaser, six promissory notes,

dated May 5, 1819, at two, four and six months, payable to R. &

S., or order, which they refused to deliver to the respondent.

That R. & S. became insolvent, and delivered the notes to the

appellants, J. J. & J. C. Coddington, who were under large

advances and responsibilities for R. & S. The bill charged, that

the appellants, when they received the notes of R. & S., knew

that they had been given in payment for the vessel belonging to

the respondent, which had been sold for his account by R. & S.
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The bill prayed, that the appellants might be decreed to deliver

up, and account to the respondent for the notes. The answer

admitted that R. & S. had stopped payment when they delivered

the notes to the appellants, who admitted, that when they received

the notes, R. & S. were not actually indebted to them, otherwise

than that they were under large gratuitous responsibilities for R.

& S., as endorsers of notes for their accommodation, payable at

different times, but subsequent to the 12th of June, 1819, and

which they were, afterwards, obliged to take up as they fell due.

The appellants denied all knowledge of the manner in which the

notes had come to the hands of R. & S., and they alleged, that

they believed them, at the time, to be the exclusive and bona fide

property of R. & S., and received them, with others, to indemnify

them, as far as they would avail, for their responsibilities. That

three days after the notes were delivered to them, they disposed

of some of them for cash ; and did not know, until several days

afterwards, that they belonged to the respondent, as stated in his

bill. R. & S., in their answer, say, that when they received the

notes of the purchasers of the vessel, they gave their guaranty

against any demands existing against the vessel previous to the

Appeal from the Court of Chancery. The bill, filed June I 5,
19, by the r spond nt again t the appellants, tated, that in
pril, 1819, being the owner of a vessel called the Express, he
employed R. & S., who w r m rchants and copartners in trade,
in New York, to sell her, on a er dit, and instructed them to take
good approved note in payment, and to transmit them forth\ ith
to him, with an account of their charges, which hould be immediately paid, with v hich instructions R. & S. engaged to comply.
That R. & S. sold the ves el for 3,875 dollars, and on the 3d of
June, 1819, received from the purchaser, six promissory notes,
dated May 5, 1819, at two, four and six months, payable to R. &
., or order, which they refu ed to deliver to the re pendent.
That R. & S. became insolvent, and delivered the notes to the
appellants, J. J. & J. C. Coddington, who were under large
advai:ices and respon ibilities for R. & S. The bill charged, that
the appellants, when they received the notes of R. & S., knew
that they had been given in payment for the ve el belongin to
the respondent, which had been old for hi account by R. &
The bill prayed, that the appellants might be decreed to deli\ er
up, and account to the re pondent for the note . The an wer
admitted that R. & S. had topped payment when they delivered
the note to the appellants, who admitted, that ' hen they received
the notes, R. & S. were not actually indebted to them, otherwi e
than that they were under large gratuitou re ponsibilitie for R.
& ., as endorsers of note for their accommodation, payable at
differ nt time , but subsequent to the 12th of June r 19 and
which they were, afterwards, obliged to take up a the fell due.
The appellants denied all knowledo-e of the manner in ' hich the
note had come to th hand of R. & S. and the alle ed that
they believed them, at the time, to be the exclu i e and bona fide
property of R. & ., and received them "' ith other , to indemnif
th m, a far as they would avail, for their re p n ibilitie . That
three days after the notes were delivered to th m, they di p ed
of ome of them for ca h; and did not know until e eral <la)
afterv ard , that they b Ion ed to th re p nd nt a tat d in his
received the
bill. R. & S., in th ir an wer, ay, that ' hen th
note of the purcha r of th
I, th y o-ave their o-uaranty
again t any demand xi ting again t the e el pre iou to the
I
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sale, and paid her bills in New York, amounting to 48 dollars and

14 cents, and that their commissions on the sale amounted to 96

dollars and 87 cents, and that they had received no counter secur-

ity for their guaranty. Replications were filed to the answers,

but no proofs were taken in the cause, which was brought to a

hearing on the pleadings; and on the 8th of January, 1821, the

chancellor decreed, that the appellants were not entitled to the

notes, or the proceeds thereof, as against the respondent, who

was the lawful owner of them when they were transferred to the

appellants ; inasmuch as they did not receive the notes in the

course of business, nor in payment, in whole, or in part, of any

then existing debt, nor for cash, or property advanced, or debt

created, or responsibility incurred on the credit of the notes ;

and he directed a reference to a master to compute the amount

of the notes, with interest ; and that the appellants, and R. & S.,

or some, or one of them, pay to the respondent the sum that should

be reported as the amount of the notes and interest, in thirty days

after the report was filed, and notice thereof, &c. ; and that R. &

S. pay to the respondent his entire costs of suit, to be taxed, and

that he give credit upon those costs for the charges and commis-
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sions due from him to R. & S., on the sale of the vessel, and that

the respondent have execution for the balance; but that no costs

be allowed to the respondent, or the appellants, J. J. & J. C. Cod-

dington, as against each other. From this decree an appeal was

entered to this court.

Van Buren, for the appellants.

S. Jones, contra.

Woodworth, J. Randolph & Savage were the agents of the

respondent, and, as such, held certain promissory notes belonging

to him, which they, on the 12th of June, 1819, fraudulently, and

without authority, passed to the appellants. It is stated, in the

answer, that at the time the notes were received by the appellants,

Randolph & Savage were not, in a strict legal sense, indebted to

them in any amount whatever ; but that the appellants were under

al and paid her bill in r w York, amounting to 48 dollars and
q. c nt , and that their commi ion on th ale amounted to 96
dollar and 7 c nts, and that they had recei d no count r ecurity for thei r g uaranty. R plication w re filed to the an wer ,
but no proof "" re taken in the cau e whi h v a brou ht to a
th of January, 1 21, the
h arino- on th pleading ; and on th
chanc llor decreed, that th e appellants were not ntitled to the
not , r the proceeds thereof, a a ainst the re pondent, who
wa the lawful. owner of them when they wer tran £er red to the
appellant ; inasmuch a th ey did not r eceive the note in the
cour e of bu ine s, nor in payment, in whole, or in part, of any
then exi ting debt, nor for ca h, or property advanced, or debt
created, or re pan ibility incurred on the credit of the not
and he directed a r ference to a ma ter to compute the amount
of th e note with int re t; and that the appellants, and R. & .,
or ome, or one of th m, pay to th re pondent the sum that hould
b reported a the amount of the note and intere t, in thirty day
after the report wa fil ed, and notice thereof, &c. ; and that R. &
. pay to the re pond nt his entire co ts of uit, to be taxed, and
that he g ive credit upon those co t for the charge and commi ion due from him to R. & ., on the ale of the ves el, and that
the re pondent have xecution for the balance; but that no costs
be allowed to the respondent, or the appellants, J. J. & J. C. Coddin gton, as against each other. From thi decree an appeal was
entered to thi court.

engagements and responsibilities for them, having endorsed cer-

tain notes for R. & S., and lent them their own notes to a large

amount, none of which had then fallen due. That the appellants

received the notes in question as a guaranty and indemnity against

V an Buren, for the appellants.
S. Jones, contra.

the responsibilities they were under, (all of which were then con-

tingent,) and without notice of any interest, right or title of the

respondents.

WOODWORTH, J. Randolph & avage were the agents of the
r e pondent, and, a uch, held certain promi ory note belonging ·
to him which they, on the 12th of June, 1819, fraudulently, and
without authority, pa d to the app llant . It is tated, in the
a n wer, that at the time the not s were receiv d by the appellant ,
Randolph & avage were not, in a strict leaal sense, indebted to
th m in any amount whatever; but that the appellant w re under
nga ement and re pan ibilitie for them having endorsed certain note for . & S., and lent them 'their own note to a laro-e
amount, non of which had then fall n du . That the appellants
r c ived the note in question as a o-uaranty and indemnity against
th re pan ibilitie th y w re under, (all of which were then contingent,) and without notice of any interest, right or title of the
r pondents.
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The prayer of the bill is, that the notes so received be deliv*

ered to the respondent, or the amount paid to him.

This brief statement presents a case of hardship, let the loss

fall as it may, inasmuch as no fraud is imputable to either of the

parties concerned in this appeal. The question is one of strict

law, in the decision of which, the community at large, and more

especially the commercial part, have a deep interest. Any fluctua-

tion in the law relating to bills of exchange and promissory notes,

would be a serious evil, and necessarily affect the circulation of

this species of paper: distrust, and want of confidence, would

embarrass mercantile operations, unless the rule to be applied be

stable and uniform. With this view, I have carefully examined

the cases cited on the argument. The general rule laid down

seems to be this, that where negotiable paper is transferred for a

valuable consideration, and wiU ioutjiotice^anyJ^aud^ he right

of the holder shall prevai l ag a inst the tru e ownerj all the

cases substantially agree in this. In the application of the rule,

this question arises, What is that valuable consideration intended,

which shall protect the holder as against the drawer of the note?

Is the rule satisfied, if enough is shown to make out a considera-
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tion, as between the holder and the agent, who assigned or trans-

ferred the paper? If nothing more is required, the appellants

must prevail ; for the notes were passed for the indemnity of the

appellants, and, so far as Randolph & Savage are concerned, that

formed a valid consideration. The right to hold against the

owner, in any ca se, is an exc eptionjojthe_gg neral rule of law ; it

Is founded on principles of commercial poli cy. The re ason of

Mich la~ruIe~w ould seem to be, tha tthe innoc ent holder, having

incurred loss "by giving c redit to the paper, and having paid a

fair equivalentl s entitled to protection. But what superior equity

haTthe holde r,~who made no advances, nor incurred any respon-

"sibilityoi rthe cr e dit of the paper he received, whose situation will

Joe i mpro ved, if he is allowed to retain, but, if not, is in the condi-

tion hewasj^ejorg. the paper was passed ? To allow such a state

of f acts as sufficient to res i st the title of the real owner, woWbe

pr< xluctiyejf rn anifesTlnTustice,, a nd is not ~~required by any rule

of policy ; it is enough if the holder be secure when he advances

his funds, or makes himself liable on the credit of the paper he

receives. In coincidence with this principle, it appears to me,

all the cases have been decided ; for, although the rule is laid down

generally, and the holder will be protected where the bill or note

is taken in the usual course of trade, and for a fair and valuable

consideration without notice, in every case I have met with, where

The prayer of the bill i , that th notes so received be deliv~
ered to th re pondent, or the amount paid to him.
Thi brief tatem nt pr ent a ca e of hard hip, 1 t the lo s
fall a it may, inasmu h a n fraud i imputabl e to ith r of the
partie concern d in thi app al. The que tion i one of trict
law, in the deci ion of which, the community at large, and more
e pecially the commercial part, have a deep intere t.
ny fluctuation in the law relating to bill of exchange and promi ory notes,
would be a eriou vil, and n ce arily affect the circulation of
this pecies of paper: di tru t, and want of confidence, would
embarra mercantil ope ration , unles the rule to be applied be
table and uniform. With thi vi w, I have carefully examined
the ca e cited on the argument. The general rule laid down
eems to be this, that \Yhere negotiable paper is transferred for a
valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the right
of the holder shall prevail against the true owner; all the
ca e ub tantially agree in thi . In the application of the rule,
this uestion ari e What is that valitable consideration intended,
which shall protect the holder a agamst t e rawer o the note?
Is the rule atisfied, if enough i shown to make out a con ideration, as between the holder and the agent, who a signed or tran £erred the paper? If nothing more i required, the appellant
mu t prevail; for the notes were pa sed for the indemnity of the
appellant , and, o far as Randolph & avage ar concerned that
formed a valid con ideration. The right to hold again t the
ovm r, in any case, is an exception to the o-eneral rule of w · it
1 oun e on principle of commercial policy:. The rea on of
uch a rule would eem to b , that the innocent holder having
incurred loss by CTiving credit to the paper, and havmCT aid a
faireqllivalent, i ntitled to protection.
ut what u erior equity
has the o er, who made no advance , nor incurred an re on4Sl 1 1ty on t e credit of the pap r he received, who e situation \\ill
,be improved, if he i allowed to retain, but. if not. i in the condition he wa before the paper wa pa ed? To allow uch a tate
of fact as sufficient to re i t th title of the real m ner \\ ou
e
productive of manifest inju tic and 1 not required by any rule
of olic ; it i enoucrh if the holder be ecure when he advan es
hi fund , or make him elf liable on the credit of the paper he
receive . In coincidence with thi principle it ap ear t me,
all th case have b en decid d; for alth0twh th rul i laid dm n
en rally, and the holder will b pr t cted ' her th bill or note
is taken in the u ual cour e of trad and for a fair and aluable
consideration without notice in every ca I ha met ith where
;J
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the owner failed to recover, it appeared that the holder gave credit

to the paper, received it in the way of business, and gave money

or property in exchange. In Miller v. Race (i Burr. Rep. 452)

it is stated, that the mail was robbed, a bank note taken out, and

afterwards passed to the plaintiff, an inn-keeper, who took it bona

fide, in his busiiicss, for a valuable consideration, and without

notice ; it was held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the note.

In Grant v. Vaughan, (3 Burr. Rep. 1526) the plaintiff took a bill

of exchange that had been lost, and paid the value of it ; it

was held that he was entitled to the bill. Mr. Justice Wilmot,

in that case, observes, ''Though both the claimants were innocent,

yet, as Grant took the note in the course of trade, bona fide, and

upon a valuable consideration, Grant has the better equity." Upon

what is this better equity founded ? Because Grant parted with

his property for the bill, and was an innocent holder. In Peacock

v. Rhodes, (Doug. Rep. 633) it was held, that an innocent endor-

see might recover on a bill of exchange with a blank endorsement,

which had been stolen and negotiated ; but it appeared, that the

person who transferred the bill, bought cloth and other articles in

the way of the plaintiff's trade, as a mercer, and received the
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value. Lord Mansfield says, "The jury have found that the bill

was received in the course of trade, and, therefore, the case is

clear, and within the principle of all the cases, from that of Mil-

ler v. Race, downwards." So, also, in the case, of Collins v. Mar-

tin, (1 Bos. & Pull. 648) it was held, that if A. deposit bills

endorsed in blank with B., his banker, to be received when due,

and the latter raises money on them, by placing them with C.,

and, afterwards, becomes bankrupt, A. cannot maintain trover

against C. for the bills. In that case, as in all the preceding, the

holder paid value for the bill ; an advance was made in money ;

had that not been made out, it is evident to my mind that the

holder would not have been protected. Chief Justice Eyre, in

giving the opinion of the court, observes, "If the holder gave no

value for the bill, he would be affected by everything which would

affect the first holder." What is meant by giving value for the

bill, must be collected from the whole case of which he is speak-

ing. The holder, in that case, advanced his money on the credit

of the bill. The language of the court cannot be mistaken : some-

tlnngjriustjiave beenjDaid in money or property ^or some existing

debt satisfied thereby, or sonic new responsibility incurred in con-

sequence of the transfer ; this would be payin g value, and m aking

out a good consideration within the reason and meaning of the

jrile. In such a case, the holder of a bill of exchange or promis-

the owner failed to recov r, it appeared that the holder gave credit
t the paper, r ceiv d it in the way of bu ine , and gave money
or property in exchang . In Miller . Race ( r Burr. Rep. 452)
it i tat d, that the mail wa robbed, a bank note taken out, and
aftenYards pa d to the plaintiff, an inn-k per, who took it bona
fide) in his business) for a valuable consideration) and without
notice; it wa held, that the plaintiff wa entitled to the note.
In Grant v. Vallghan) (3 Burr. Rep. 1526) the plaintiff took a bill
of exchange that had been lo t, and paid the valu of it; it
was held that he wa entitled to the bill. Mr. Ju tice W il mot,
in that ca e, ob erv , "Thoug h both the claimants we re innocent,
yet, as Grant took the note in the course of trade, bona fide) and
upon a valuable con ideration, Grant has the better equity." Upon
what i thi better equity founded? Becau e Grant parted with
hi property for the bill) and was an innocent holder. In Peacock
v. Rhodes) (Doug. ep. 633) it was held, that an innocent endoree might recover on a bill of exchange ·with a blank endorsement,
which had be n tolen and neo-otiated; but it appeared, that the
person who tran f rred the bill, bought cloth and other articles in
the way of the plaintiff's trade, as a mercer, and received the
value. Lord !fansfield ays, "The jury have found that the bill
was received in the course of trade, and, therefore, the case i
clear, and within the principle of all the case , from that of Miller v. Race) downwards." So, also, in the ca e, of Collins v. lYlartin) (I Bos. & Pull. 648) it was held, that if A. deposit bills
.e ndor ed in blank with B., his banker, to be received when due,
and the latter raises money on them, by placing them with C.,
and, afterwards, becomes bankrupt, A. cannot maintain trover
against C. for the bills. In that case, as in all the preceding, the
holder paid value for the bill; an advance was made in money;
had that not been made out, it is evident to my mind that the
holder would not have been protected. Chief Justice Eyre, in
giving the opinion of the court, ob erves, "If the holder gave no
value for the bill, he would be affected by everything which would
affect the first holder." What i meant by giving value for the
bill, must be collected from the whole case of which he is speaking . The holder, in that case, advanced his money on the credit
of the bill. The language of the court cannot be mi taken : somethin must have b en aid in mone or pro ert , or some existing
debt satisfied thereb or some new res onsibilit incurredinCOilsequence of the transfer; this would be paying value, and making
out a good consi erat10n wit m t e reason and meanin of the
rule. In such a case, the holder of a bill of exchange or promis-
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sory note, is not to be considered in the light of an assignee of

the payee, and bound to take the thing assigned, subject to

all the equity to which the original party was subject; but he

stands on the ground of an innocent purchaser of negotiable

paper, who, having parted with his property, is entitled to the

benefit resulting from his purchase, in opposition to the right

owner. So, also, in Lawson v. Weston, (4 Esp. N. P. Rep. 56)

where a lost bill had been discounted, the plaintiff recovered.

Lord Kenyon considered the point settled by the case of Miller v.

Race, and observed, "If there was any fraud in the transaction,

f 1 :' 1 .>na tide consideration had not been paid for the bill b\

jtlie p laintiffs, they could not recover. " The general rule is to be

understood as applicable to cases of this description ; there does

not seem to be any necessity to go further. The credit of bills and

notes cannot be impaired, or their circulation impeded, if the

right of the holder is limited and restricted in this manner. He

still retains all the rights that the law intended to confer on him,

or that commercial policy can reasonably require. To deny the

relief prayed for by the respondent, would introduce a new rule,

not warranted by any of the adjudged cases.
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Every man who takes negotiable paper, is supposed to know,

that he doejTno t acquire an indefeasible rig ht. A note given for

money won at play, or upon a usurious consideration, may be

inquired into in the hands of an innocent endorsee. Does this

obstruct the circulation of bills or notes ? So every holder knows,

or is presumed to know, that the title of the right owner cannot

be divested, unless value has been given, or liability incurred. The

rule, then, as I conceive, is well established, and must govern the

present case. The question is, whether the appellants are within

its provisions. Randolph & Savage had stopped payment, and

were insolvent, which was known to the appellants at the time

they received the notes. They were not then indebted to the

appellants, for none of the notes were due ; the liability of the

appellants was still contingent, although it was admitted there

was good reason to believe it would soon become absolute. No

respo nsibility was incurred in consequence of taking the notes j

they were received as an indemnity ; the situation of Randolph

and Savage was desperate, and no doubt the appellants were

anxious to get hold of anything that had the semblance of

security. If the notes became effectual in their hands, then so

much was gained ; if not, they remained in statu quo. The mere

probability that the notes would be valid in their hands, was

inducement enough to seize on them with avidity ; it might be the
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means of rescuing something from the shipwreck. Very different

is the case of a holder for value paid ; he makes the advance on

the credit of the paper ; if that fails, his loss is certain. But it h as

been urged, that if the appellants had not reposed themselves on

the rule now contended for, they might have obtained other secur-

ity, and, consequently, they are prejudiced by the decree. This

argument cannot be listened to ; it only proves that the appellants

may sustain an injury in consequence of mistake as to the rule

of law. With this the court has no concern. The true question

is, Have they paid value for the notes, or made any new engage-

ments as the consideration of the transfer ? This is not pretended.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that the decree of his honor the chan-

cellor ought to be affirmed. j, oft^Ow.-

Platt, J., concurred. ^^ *

Decree of affirmance.

6
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United States for the Southern District of New York.

This action was instituted in the Circuit Court upon a bill
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of exchange, dated at Portland, in the State of Maine, on the

first day of May, 1836, for one thousand five hundred and thirty-

six dollars and thirty cents, payable six months after date, drawn

by Nathaniel Norton, and Jairus S. Keith, upon and accepted by

Swift v. Tyson (1842), 16 Pet. (41 U.S.),

l.

the defendant, the bill having been drawn to the order of Nathan-

iel Norton, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff. The principal

and interest on the bill, up to the time of trial, amounted to one

thousand eight hundred and sixty-two dollars and six cents. The

On a certificate of divi ion from the Circuit Court of the
United State for the Southern District of New York.

defence to the action rested on the answers to a bill of discovery

filed by the defendant against the plaintiff ; by which it appeared

that the bill had been received by him from Nathaniel Norton,

with another draft of the same amount in payment of a protested

note drawn by Norton and Keith, and which had been paid by

him to the Maine Bank. When the draft was received by the

plaintiff, it had been accepted by the defendant, who resided in

New York. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the consideration

which had been received for the acceptance, and had no other

transaction with the defendant. He had received the drafts and

acceptances in payment of the protested note, with a full belief

that the same were justly due, according to their tenor ; and he

had no other security for the payment of the protested note except

This action wa in stituted in the Circuit Court upon a bill
of exchange, dated at Portland, in the State of Maine, on the
first day of May, i836, for one thousand five hundred and thirtyix dollars and thirty cents, payable six months after date, drawn
by Nathaniel Norton, and Jairus S. Keith, upon and accepted by
the lefendant, the bill having been drawn to the order of Nathaniel Norton, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff. The principal
and intere t on th bill, up to the time of trial, amounted to one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-two dollar and six cents. The
def nee to the action re ted on the answers to a bill of di covery
filed by the defendant ao-ainst the plaintiff; by which it appeared
that the bill had b en received by him fr om Nathaniel Norton,
with another draft of the ame amount in payment of a prote ted
not drawn by Norton and Keith, and which had be n paid by
him to the faine Bank. Wh n the draft was r ceived by the
plaintiff, it had been accept d by the def ndant, who r ided in
New York. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the con ideration
which had be n r ceived for the acceptance, and had no other
tran action with th defendant. He had rec ived the drafts and
acceptances in payment of the protested note, with a full belief
that the same were justly due, according t"' their tenor; and he
had no other ecurity for the payment of the protested note except
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the drafts, nor had he any knowledge of any contract or dealing

between the defendant and Norton, out of which the said draft

arose.

The defendant then offered to prove that the bill of exchange

was accepted by him as part consideration for the purchase of

certain lands in the State of Maine, of which Keith and Norton,

the drawers of the bill, represented themselves to be the owners,

and represented them to be of great value, made certain estimates

of them which were warranted by them to be correct, and also

contracted to convey a good title to the land ; all of which repre-

sentations were in every respect fraudulent and false ; and that

said Keith and Norton have never been able to make a title to

the lands: whereupon the plaintiff, by his counsel, objected to the

admission of said testimony, or any testimony, as against the

plaintiff, impeaching or showing the failure of the consideration

on which said bill was accepted, under the facts aforesaid admit-

ted by the defendant, and those proven by him, by reading said

answers in equity of the plaintiff in evidence. And the judges

of the Court divided in opinion on the point or question of law,

whether, under the facts last mentioned, the defendant was

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

entitled to the same defence to the action as if the suit was

between the original parties to the bill, that is to say, the said

Norton, or the said Norton and Keith, and the defendant. And

whether the evidence so offered in defence and objected to was

admissible as against the plaintiffs in this action.

And thereupon the said point or question of law was, at the

request of the counsel for the said plaintiff, stated as above

under the direction of the judges of this Court, to be certified

under the seal of this Court to the Supreme Court of the United

States, at the next session thereof to be held thereafter; to be

finally decided by the said last mentioned Court.

Fessenden, for the plaintiff.

Dana, for the defendant.

Story, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause comes before us from the Circuit Court of the

southern district of New York, upon a certificate of division of

the judges of that Court.

The action was brought by the plaintiff, Swift, as endorsee,

against the defendant, Tyson, as acceptor, upon a bill of exchange

dated at Portland, Maine, on the first day of May, 1836, for the

sum of one thousand five hundred and forty dollars, thirty cents,

payable six months after date and grace, drawn by one Nathaniel
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Norton and one Jairus S. Keith upon and accepted by Tyson, at

the city of New York, in favour of the order of Nathaniel Norton,

and by Norton endorsed to the plaintiff. The bill was dishon-

oured at maturity.

At the trial the acceptance and endorsement of the bill were

admitted, and the plaintiff there rested his case. The defendant

then introduced in evidence the answer of Swift to a bill of dis-

covery, by which it appeared that Swift took the bill before it

became due, in payment of a promissory note due to him by

Norton and Keith ; that he understood that the bill was accepted

in part payment of some lands sold by Norton to a company in

New York ; that Swift was a bona fide holder of the bill, not

having any notice of anything in the sale or title to the lands, or

otherwise, impeaching the transaction, and with the full belief

that the bill was justly due. The particular circumstances are

fully set forth in the answer in the record ; but it does not seem

necessary farther to state them. The defendant then offered to

prove, that the bill was accepted by the defendant as part con-

sideration for the purchase of certain lands in the State of Maine,

which Norton and Keith represented themselves to be the owners
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of, and also represented to be of great value, and contracted to

convey a good title thereto; and that the representations were in

every respect fraudulent and false, and Norton and Keith had

no title to the lands, and that the same were of little or no value.

The plaintiff objected to the admission of such testimony, or of

any testimony, as against him, impeaching or showing a failure

of the consideration, on which the bill was accepted, under the

facts admitted by the defendant, and those proved by him, by

reading the answer of the plaintiff to the bill of discovery. The

judges of the Circuit Court thereupon divided in opinion upon

the following point or question of law : Whether, under the

facts last mentioned, the defendant was entitled to the same

defence to the action as if the suit was between the original

parties to the bill, that is to say, Norton, or Norton and Keith,

and the defendant ; and whether the evidence so offered was

admissible as against the plaintiff in the action. And this is the

question certified to us for our decision.

There is no doubt, that a bona fide holder of a negotiable

i nstrument for a valuable consideration, without any notice of

W*> facts whic h impeach its valid ity as between the an t ecedent pa rties.

if he takes it under an endorsement made before the same

becomes due, holds the title unaffected by these facts, and may

recover thereon, although as between the antecedent parties the

Norton and one Jairus S. Keith upon and accepted by Tyson, at
the city of New York, in favour of the order of Nathaniel Norton,
and by Norton endorsed to the plaintiff. The bill was dishonoured at maturity.
At the trial the acceptance and endorsement of the bill were
admitted, and the plaintiff there rested his case. The defendant
then introduced in evidence the answer of Swift to a bill of discovery, by which it appeared that Swift took the bill before it
became due, in paym nt of a promis ory note due to him by
Norton and Keith; that he understood that the bill was accepted
in part payment of some lands sold by Norton to a company in
New York; that Swift was a bona fide holder of the bill, not
having any notice of anything in the sale or title to the lands, or
otherwise, impeaching the transaction, and with the full belief
that the bill was justly due. The particular circumstances are
fully set forth in the answer in the record; but it does not seem
necessary farther to state them. The defendant then offered to
prove, that the bill was accepted by the defendant as part consideration for the purchase of certain lands in the State of Maine,
which orton and Keith represented themselves to be the owners
of, and also represented to be of great value, and contracted to
convey a good title thereto; and that the representations were in
ever} respect fraudulent and false, and Norton and Keith had
no title to the lands, and that the same were of little or no value.
The plaintiff objected to the admission of such testimony, or of
any testimony, as against him, impeaching or showing a failure
of the consideration, on which the bill was accepted, under the
facts admitted by the defendant, and those proved by him, by
reading the answer of the plaintiff to the bill of discovery. The
judges of the Circuit Court thereupon divided in opinion upon
the following point or question of law: Whether, under the
facts last mentioned, the defendant was entitled to the same
defence to the action as if the suit was between the original
parties to the bill, that is to say, Norton, or Norton and Keith,
and the defendant; and whether the evidence so offered was
admissible as against the plaintiff in the action. And this is the
question certified to us for our decision.
There is no doubt, that a bona fide holder of a negotiable
in trument for a valuable consideration, without any notice of
fact which impeach it validity as between the antecedent parties,
if he takes it under an endorsement made before the same
becomes due, holds the title unaffected by these facts, and may
recover thereon, although as between the antecedent parties the
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transacti on may be without any legal validit y. This is a doctrine

so long and so well established, and so essential to the security

of negotiable paper, that it is laid up among the fundamentals of

the law, and requires no authority or reasoning to be now brought

in its support. As little doubt is there, that _the_hqlder_of _any

negotiable paper, before it is due, is not bound to prove that he is .

a bona fid e holder fo r a valuable consideration, without notice ;

for the law will presume that, in the absence of all rebutting

proofs, and therefore it is incumbent upon the defendant to estab-

lish by way of defence satisfactory proofs of the contrary, and

thus to overcome the prima facie title of the plaintiff.

In the present case, the plaintiff is a bon a fide holder without

notice, for what the law deems a good and valid consideration,

that is, for a pre-existing debt ; and the only real question in the

cause _ ig, whether, under the circumstances of the present case,

such^ a pre-existing debt constitutes a valuable co nsideration in

the sense of the general rule applicable to negotiable~lnstru-

ments. We say, under the circumstances of the present case, for

the acceptance having been made in New York, the argument on •

behalf of the defendant is, that the contract is to be treated as a
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New York contract, and therefore to be governed by the laws of

New York, as expounded by its courts, as well as upon general

principles, as by the express provisions of the thirty-fourth sec-

tion of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20. And then it is further

contended, that by the law of New York, as thus expounded by

its courts, a pre-existing debt does not constitute, in the sense of ,

the general rule, a valuable consideration applicable to negotiable

instruments.

In the first place, then, let us examine into the decisions of

the courts of New York upon this subject. In the earliest case,

Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. R. 289, the Supreme Court of New

York appear to have held, that a pre-existing debt was a sufficient

consideration to entitle a bona fide holder without notice to

recover the amount of a note endorsed to him, which might not,

as between the original parties, be valid. The same doctrine was

affirmed by Mr. Chancellor Kent in Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns.

Chan. Rep. 54. Upon that occasion he said, that negotiable paper

can be assigned or transferred by an agent or factor or by any

other person, fraudulently, so as to bind the true owner as against

the holder, provided it be taken in the usual course of trade, and •"

for a fair and valuable consideration without notice of the fraud.

But he added, that the holders in that case were not entitled to

the benefit of the rule, because it was not negotiated to them in

transaction may be without any legal validity. This is a doctrine
o long and so well e tabli hed, and so essential to the security
of negotiable paper, that it is laid up among the funda.m ntals of
the law, and requires no authority or reasoning to be now brought
in it support. As little doubt i there, that the holder of an
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the usual course of business or trade, nor in payment of any

antecedent and existing debt, nor for cash, or property advanced,

debt created, or responsibility incurred, on the strength and credit

of the notes ; thus directly affirming , that a pre -existing debt was_

a fair and valuable consideration within the protection of the

general rule. And he has since affirmed the same doctrine, upon

a, full review of it, in his Commentaries, 3 Kent. Comm., sec. 44,

p. 81. The decision in the case of Bay v. Coddington was after-

wards affirmed in the Court of Errors, 20 Johns. R. 637, and the

general reasoning of the chancellor was fully sustained. There

were indeed peculiar circumstances in that case, which the Court

seem to have considered as entitling it to be treated as an excep-

tion to the general rule, upon the ground either because the

receipt of the notes was under suspicious circumstances, the

transfer having been made after the known insolvency of the

endorser, or because the holder had received it as a mere security

for contingent responsibilities, with which the holders had not

then become charged. There was, however, a considerable diver-

sity of opinion among the members of the court upon that occa-

sion, several of them holding that the decree ought to be reversed,
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others affirming that a pre-existing debt was a valuable consid-

eration, sufficient to protect the holders, and others again insist-

ing, that a pre-existent debt was not sufficient. From that period,

however, for a series of years, it seems to h ave b een_ held by the

Supreme Court of .the sta te, that a p re-existing de bt was not a

sufficient consideratio n to shut o ut the_eguities of the, original

par^es^fa^IFoTt he holders. Bu i-HQ_gase to. that ef fect has

ever been decided in the Court of Errors. The eases cited at the

bar, ancTespecially Roosa v. Brother son, 10 Wend. R. 85 ; The

Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. R. 593; and Payne v.

Cutler, 13 Wend. R. 605, are directly in point. But the more

recent cases, The Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Wend. R. 490,

and The Bank of Sandusky v. Scoinlle, 24 Wend. R. 115, have

greatly shaken, if they have not entirely overthrown those deci-

sions, and seem to have brought back the doctrine to that promul-

gated in the earliest cases. So that, to say the least of it, it admits

of serious doubt, whether any doctrine upon this question can at

the present time be treated as finally established ; and it is certain,

that the Court of Errors have .noL.JL r J>nounced any pos itive

opinion up on it.

• " But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled in New York,

it remains to be considered, whether it is obligatory upon this

Court, if it differs from the principles established in the general.
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of the notes; thu direct} affirmin that a re-existing debt wa
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p. 8I. T he deci ion in the case of Bay v. Coddington wa afterward affirmed in the ourt of Errors, 20 Johns. R. 637, and the
gen ral r a oning of the chancellor was fully su tained. There
were ind ed peculiar circum tances in that case, which the Court
e m to have considered as entitling it to be treated as an exception to the general rul e, upon the ground either because the
receipt of the notes was under uspicious circumstance , the
tran fer having been made after the known insolvency of the
endor er, or b cau e th e holder had .received it as a mere security
for contingent respon ibilities, with which the holders had not
then become charged. There wa , however, a considerable diversity of opinion among the members of the court upon that occaion, several of them holding that the decree ought to be rever ed,
others affirming that a pre-existing debt was a valuable consideration, sufficient to protect the holders, and others again insistincr, that a pre-existent debt was not sufficient. From that period,
however, for a series of years, it seems to have been held by the
Su r~me Cour~_o_f _the state that a re-ex1stm deb.!_~ as not a
ufficient con ideration to shut out the e uities of the original •
.12_a_Iti~~n favou!_Q_t e holders.
ase to th~ effect has
ever been decided in the Court of Errors. The cases cited at the
bar, an especially Roosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. R. 85; .Yhe
Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. R. 593; and Payne v.
Cutler, 13 Wend. R. 605, are directly in point. But the more
recent ca es, The Bank of Salina v. Bahcock, 21 Wend. R. 490,
and The Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. R. IIS, have
greatly shaken, if they have not entirely overthrown tho e decision , and seem to have brought back the doctrine to that promulgated in the earliest cases. So that, to say the least of it, it admits
of serious doubt, whether any doctrine upon this qu tion can at
the present time be treated a finally established· and it is certain ,
that th Court of Err rs have _.not ronounced any positiv~
opinion upon it.
- -- - - ut, admitting the doctrine to be fully sett! d in New York,
•it remains to be considered, whether it i obligatory upon this
Court, if it differs from the principles established in the general •
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commercial law. It is observable that the courts of New York

do not found their decisions upon this point upon any local statute,

or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage ; but they deduce the doc-

trine from the general principles of commercial law. It is, how-

ever, contended, that the thirty-fourth section of the judiciary

act of 1789, ch. 20, furnishes a rule obligatory upon this Court to

follow the decisions of the state tribunals in all cases to which

they apply. That section provides "that the laws of the several - ^

states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the y

United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be

regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts ■

of the United States, in cases where they apply." In order to^

maintain the argument, it is essential, therefore, to hold, that the

word "laws," in this section, includes within the scope of its

meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In_th e_ordinary use

of languagej^ jvill hardly __be_cont ended that the decisio ns _of

co urts constitute laws . They are, aFmost, only evidence ofwhaF

the laws are; and are not of themselves laws. They are often

re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the courts themselves,

whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or
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otherwise incorrect. The laws of a state are more usually under-

stood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the

legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs

having the force of laws. In all the various cases which have

hitherto come before us for decision, this Court have uniformly

supposed, that the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section

limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to

the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof

adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things

having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real

estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their

nature and character. It never has been supposed by us, that

the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a

more general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or

local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example,

to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instru-

ments, and especially to questions of general commercial law,

where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like

functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reason-

ing and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract

or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles

of commercial law to govern the case. And we have not now

the slightest difficulty in holding, that this sectio n, upon its true

commercial law. It is observable that the courts of New York
do not found their decision upon this point upon any local statute,
or po itive, fixed, or ancient local u age; but th y de uce the doctrine from the general principl of commercial law. t is, however, contended, that the thirty-fourth section of th judiciary
act of 17 9, ch. 20, furni h a rule obligatory upon this Court to
follow the decisions of the state tribunals in all cases to which .
they apply. That section provide ' that the laws f the several\
state , except where the Con titution, treaties, or statutes of ther
•~
United States shall otherwise r quire or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of deci ion in trials at common law in the court
of the United States, in case where they apply." In order to
maintain the argument, it is e ential, therefore, to hold, that the
word 'law ," in this section, includes within the scope of it
meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use
of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
court con titute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what
the law are; and are not of themselves laws. They are often
re-examined, rever ed, and qualified by the courts them elves,
whenever they are found to be either defective, or ill-founded, or
otherwise incorrect. The law of a state are more usually undertood to mean the rules and enactment promulgated by the
legi lative authority thereof, or long established local cu tom
having the force of laws. In all the various ca es which ha e
hitherto come before u for deci ion, this Court have uniformly
uppo ed, that the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth ction
limit d it application to state laws trictly local that is to ay to
the po itive statute of the tate, and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunal , and to right and title to thing
having a perman nt locality, uch as the right and titles to real
e tate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in ·their
nature and character. It never has been suppo ed by u , that
the ection did apply, or wa d io-ned to apply to que tion of a
more general nature, not at all dependent upon local tatutes or
local u ages of a fix d and permanent operation, a for example,
to the construction of ordinar contracts or other written in trument , an e pecially to que tion of a-eneral commer ial la\
where th state tribunal ar called upon to perform the like
functions as our Iv , that i , to a certain up n a- neral rea onina- and legal analogies what i the tru expo ition of the contract
or in trument, or what i th ju t rul furni hed b the principle
of commercial law to a-ov rn the ca e.
nd w have not now •
the lightest difficulty in holding that ~~ction . upon it true
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intendment and construction, is_strictly li mited to local statutes

and local usages of the character before stated^ and does not

extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature^

the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not

in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles

and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the

decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to,

and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this

Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive

authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and

governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be

truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mans-

field in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great meas-

ure, not the law- of a single country only, but of the commercial

world. Non erit alia lex Romcc, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia

posthac, sed ct apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eadem-

que lex obtencbit.

It becomes necessary for us, therefore, upon the present occa-

sion to express our own opinion of the true result of the commer-

cial law upon the question now before us. And we have no
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hesitationin saying, th al_ a_ pre-existing debt does constitute a .

yalu abTe~consideration in the~ sense of the general rule already "

stjLtegZai lapp instrummtsi Assuming it to

be true, (which, however, may well admit of some doubt from

the generality of the language,) that the holder of _a n egotiable

mstrumenX is unaff ected with-. the equities be tween the antece-

dent jpa^tie^-jrfjyhirii he has no notirp, only where he receives it .

in the usual course of trade and bus iness for a valuable consid-

eration, before it be com es due : we are prepared to say, that

receiving it in payment of or as security for a pre-existing debt,

is according to the known usual course of trade and business.

And why upon principle should not a pre-existing debt be deemed

such a valuable consideration? It is for the benefit and conve-

nience of the commercial world to give as wide an extent as

practicable to the credit and circulation of negotiable paper, that

it may pass not only as security for new purchases and advances,

made upon the transfer thereof, but also in payment of and as

security for pre-existing debts. The creditor is thereby enabled

to realize or to secure his debt, and thus may safely give a pro-

longed credit, or forbear from taking any legal steps to enforce

his rights. The debtor also has the advantage of making his

negotiable securities of equivalent value to cash. But establish

the opposite conclusion, that negotiable paper cannot be applied

intendment and constructionJ is stric!ly limited to local statutes
and local u a~s of the character before tated, and due not
~xtend to contract . nd h
nstrurnents 0 a commercial nature,
th true interpretation and effect whereof ar to e soug t, not
in th decisions of the local tribunal , but in th general principles
and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.
ndoubtedly, the
d ci ions of the lo al tribunal upon such ubjects are entitled to,
and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this
ourt; but th y cannot furni h po itive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and
governed. The law respecting negotiable in truments may be
truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Lulu v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law. of a single country only, but of the commercial
world. Non erit alia lex Romce, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia
posthac, sed et apud omnies gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtenebit.
It becomes necessary for us, therefore, upon the present occasion to expre s our own opinion of the true result of the commercial law upon the question now before us. And we have no
re-ex1stmo- debt does constitute a .
hesitation in sa in th
valua le consideration in the en e o
o n
state as a 1ca
be true, (which, however, may well admit of some doubt from
the generality of the language,) that the holder of a negotiable
een the anteceinstrument is unaffe ed
dent arties, of which he ha
where he receives it
in the ust;"al cour e of trade and business for a valuable consid~ion, before it becom
we are prepared to say, that
receiving it in payment of or a security for a pre-existing debt,
is according to the known usual course of trade and business.
And why upon principle should not a pre-exi ting debt be d emed
such a valuable consideration? It is for the benefit and convenience of the commercial world to give as wide an extent a
practicable to th credit and circulation of negotiable pap r, that
it may pass not only as security for new purchases and advances,
made upon the transfer ther of, but al o in payment of and as
security for pre-existing debts. The creditor is thereby enabled
to r alize or to secure hi debt, and thu may afely o-ive a prolonged credit, or forbear from taking any legal steps to enforce
hi rights. The debtor al o has the advantage of making his
negotiable securities of equivalent value to cash. But establish
the pposite conclu ion, that negotiable paper cannot be applied
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in payment of or as security for pre-existing debts, without letting

in all the equities between the original and antecedent parties,

and the value and circulation of such securities must be essentially .

diminished, and the debtor driven to the embarrassment of

making a sale thereof, often at a ruinous discount, to some third

person, and then by circuity to apply the proceeds to the payment

of his debts. What, indeed, upon such a doctrine would become

of that large class of cases, where new notes are given by the

same or by other parties, by way of renewal or security to banks,

in lieu of old securities discounted by them, which have arrived

at maturity? Probably more than one-half of all bank transac-

tions in our country, as well as those of other countries, are of

this nature. The doctrine wo uld strike _ a fatal blow at all dis-

counts_ qf_ n egotiable securities for pre-existing debts..

This question has been several times before this Court, and

it has been uniformly held, that it makes no difference whatso-

ever as to the rights of the holder, whether the debt for which the

negotiable instrument is transferred to him is a pre-existing debt,

or is contracted at the time of the transfer. In each case he
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equally gives credit to the instrument. The cases of Coolidgc v.

Payson, 2 Wheaton, R. 66, 70, 73, and Townsley v. Sumrall, 2

Peters, R. 170, 182, are directly in point.

In England the same doctrine has been uniformly acted

upon. As long ago as the case of Pillans and Rose v. Van Mcirop

and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1664, the very point was made and the

objection was overruled. That, indeed, was a case of far more

stringency than the one now before us ; for the bill of exchange,

there drawn in discharge of a pre-existing debt, was held to bind

the party as acceptor, upon a mere promise made by him to accept

before the bill was actually drawn. Upon that occasion, Lord

Man sfield , likening the case to that of a letter of credit, said r that

a lette r_of_cre dit may be given for money already adv ancedj_as_

well as for money to be advanced in future; and the whole court

held the plaintiff entitled to recover. From that period downward

there is not a single case to be found in England in which it has

ever been held by the court, that a pre-existing debt was not a

valuable consideration, sufficient to protect the holder, within the

meaning of the general rule, although incidental dicta have been

sometimes relied on to establish the contrary, such as the dictum

of Lord Chief Justice Abbott in Smith v. De Witt, 6 Dowl. &

Ryland, 120, and De la Chaumcttc v. The Bank of England, 9

Barn. & Cres. 209, where, however, the decision turned upon very

different considerations.

in payment of or as security for pre- xisting debts, without letting
betwe n the original and ant c dent parties,
in all the equiti
and the value and circulation of such s curities mu t be essentially .
dimini hed, and the debtor driven to the embarras ment of
making a sale thereof, often at a ruinous discount, to some third
person, and then by circuity t apply the proc d to the payment
of his debts . What, ind d, upon such a doctrin would become
of that large cla s of ca s, wh r n w notes are given by the
same or by other parties, by way of renewal or ecurity to banks,
in lieu of old ecurities di counted by them, which have arrived
at maturity? Probably more than one-half of all bank tran actions in our country, as w 11 a tho e of other countries are of
this nature. Th doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing debts.
This que tion has been several times before this Court, and
it has be n uniformly held, that it makes no difference whatsoever as to the rights of the holder, whether the debt fo r which the
negotiable instrument is transferred to him is a pre-existing debt,
or is contracted at the time of the transfer. In each ca e he
equally gives credit to t he instrument. The cases of Coolidge v.
Payson, 2 Wheaton, R. 66, 70, 73, and Townsley v. Sumrall, 2
Peters, R. 170, 182, are directly in point.
In England the same doctrine ha been uniformly acted
upon. As long ago as the case of Pillans and Rose v. V oo }If eirop
and Hop kins, 3 Burr. 1664, the very point wa made and the
objection was overruled. That, indeed, wa a ca e of far more
tringency than the one now before us; for the bill of exchange,
there drawn in di charge of a pre-existing debt, v a held to bind
the party as ace ptor, upon a mere promi e made by him to accept
befor e the bill was actually drawn. Upon that occa ion, Lord
M ansfield, likening the ca to that of a letter of credit aid . that
g. letter o f credit may be giv n for money already advanced, as
well as for money to be advanced in future: and the whole court
held the plaintiff entitled to recover. From that period d wnward
there is not a single case to be found in En land in ' hich it has
ever been held by the court, that a pre-exi tin d bt " a not a
valuable consideration, sufficient to protect the holder, within the
meaning of the general rul althotwh incid ntal dicta have been
uch a the dictum
ometimes relied on t o e tabli h the contrar
of Lord Chief Ju tice Abbott in mi.th v. D lVitt 6 Do-v I. &
Ryland, 120, an d De la Chamnette v. The Batik of England 9
Barn. & Cres. 209 where, howev r, the deci ion turned upon very
different considerations.
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Mr. Justice Bayley, in his valuable work on bills of exchange

and promissory notes, lays down the rule in the most general

terms. " The want of considerat i on," says he, "in toto or in part^

cannot be insisted o n, if the plainti ff or any intermediate party ^

between him and the defendant, took the bill or note bona tide

and upon a valid consideration/' (Bayley on Bills, p. 499, 500,

5th London edition, 1830.) It is observable that he here uses

the words "valid consideration," obviously intending to make

the distinction, that it is not intended to apply solely to cases,

where a present consideration for advances of money on goods

or otherwise takes place at the time of the transfer and upon the

credit thereof. And in this he is fully borne out by the author-

ities. They go farther, and establish, that a. transfer as security

for past, and even for future responsibilities, will, for this pur-

pose, be a sufficient, valid, and valuable consideration Thus, in

the case of Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Starkie, R. 1, it was held by

Lord Ellenborough, that if a banker be under acceptances to an

amount beyond the cash balance in his hands, every bill he holds

of that customer's, bona fide, he is to be considered as holding for

value ; and it makes no difference though he hold other collateral
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securities, more than sufficient to cover the excess of his accept-

ances. The same doctrine was affirmed by Lord Eldon in Ex

parte Bloxham, 8 Ves. 531, as equally applicable to past and to

future acceptances. The subsequent cases of Haywood v. Wat-

son, 4 Bing. R'. 496, and Bramah v. Roberts, 1 Bing. New Ca.

469, and Percival v. Brampton, 2 Cromp. Mees. & Rose, 180, are

to the same effect. They directly establish that a b ona tide holder,

t a k i n g a negotiable note in payment of or as security for a pre?

existing debt, is a holder for a valuable consideration, euiuled trr

protection against all the equities between the antecedent parties?

And these are the latest decisions, which our researches have

enabled us to ascertain to have been made jri^ the English courts^

Upon this subject.

In the Ame rican , courts., so far as we have been able to trace

the decisions, the same doctrine seems generally b ut not univer-

sally to p reyaij. In Brush v. Scribncr, 11 Conn. R. 388, the

Supreme Court of Connecticut, after an elaborate review of the

English and New York adjudications, held, upon general prin-

ciples of commercial law, that a pre-existing debt was a valuable

consideration, sufficient to convey a valid title to a bona fide "

holder against all the antecedent parties to a negotiable note.

There is no reason to doubt, that the same rule has been adopted

and constantly adhered to in Massachusetts; and certainly there

WHAT CONSTITUTES CON IDERATION

Mr. Justice Bayley, in his valuable work on bills of exchange
and promi ory note , lay down th rule in the mo t gen ral
term . ''Th \ ant of consideration" says he, in toto or in art
cannot be in i t d on, if th
laintiff or any i;rtermediate part
between him and th defendant too th
ill or note bona fide
and u12on a valid con ideration." ( - ayl y on Bills, p. 499, 500,
5th London dition, 1830.) It is ob rvable that he here us s
the words "valid con ideration," obviously int nding to make
th di tinction, that it i not intended to apply solely to cases,
where a pre ent consideration for advances of money on goods
or otherw i e tak plac at the time of the tran fer and upon the
credit thereof. And in this he is fully borne out by the authoriti . The go farther, and establish, that a transfer ~ securit
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the case of Bosanquet v. Dudman, l Starkie, R. l, it was held by
Lord Ellenborough, that if a banker be under acceptances to an
amount beyond the cash balance in his hands, every bill he holds
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SWIFT

v.

TYSON

185

Swift v. Tyson 185

is no trace to be found to the contrary. In truth, in the silence

of any adjudications upon the subject, in a case of such frequent

and almost daily occurrence in the commercial states, it may fairly

be presumed, that whatever constitutes a valid and valuable con^

sideration in other cases of contract to support titles of the most

solemn nature, is held a fortiori to be sufficient in cases of nego-

tiable instruments, as indispensable to the security of holders, and

the facility and safety of their circulation. Be this as it may, we

entertain no doubt, that a bona fide holder, for a pre-existing

debt, of a negotiable instrument, is not affected by any equities/

between the antecedent parties, where he has received the same

before it became due, without notice of any such equities. We

are all, therefore, of opinion, that the question on this point, pro-

pounded by the Circuit Court for our consideration, ought to be

answered in the negative; and we shall accordingly direct it so

to be certified to the Circuit Court.

Mr. Justice Catron said :

Upon the point of difference between the judges below, X

concur, that the extinguishme nt of a debt, and the giv in g a post

consideratiotL_such a s the record presents, will protect the pur -
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■chaser_and assignee of a negotiable note from the infirmity affect-

· is no trace to be found to the contrary. In truth, in the silence
of any adjudications upon the subject, in a case of such fr quent
and almost daily occurrence in the commercial states, it may fairly
be pr urned, that whatev r con titutes a valid and valuable con~
sideration in other cases of contract to support titles of the most
solemn nature, is held d fortiori to b sufficient in cases of negotiable instrument , as indispensable to the security of holders, and the facility and safety of their circulation. Be this as it may, we{
entertain no doubt, that a bona fide holder, for a pre-existing
debt, of a negotiable instrument, is not affected by any equities ...
between the antecedent parties, where he has received the same
before it became dueJ without notice of any such equities. We
are all, therefore, of opinion, that the question on this point, propounded by the Circuit Court for our consideration, ought to be
answered in the negative; and we shall accordingly direct it so
to be certified to the Circuit Court.

ing "the instrument before it was negotiated . But I am unwilling

to sanction the introduction into the opinion of this court, a doc-

trine aside from the case made by the record, or argued by the

counsel, assuming to maintain, that a negotiable note or bill

pledged as_collater al security for a previous debt, is taken by the

creditor in the due course of trade ; and that he stands on the foot

of him who purchases in the market for money, or takes the

Instrument in extinguishment of a previous debt . State courts of

high authority on commercial questions have held otherwise ;

and that they will yield to a mere expression of opinion of this

court, or change their course of decision in conformity to the

recent English cases referred to in the principal opinion, is

improbable: whereas, if the question was permitted to rest until

it fairly arose, the decision of it either way by this court, prob-

ably, would, and I think ought to settle it. As such a result is not

to be expected from the opinion in this cause, I am unwilling to

embarrass myself with so much of it as treats of negotiable instru-

ments taken as a pledge. I never heard this question spoken of

as belonging to the case, until the principal opinion was presented

last evening ; and therefore I am not prepared to give any opinion,

even was it called for by the record.

Mr. JUSTICE CATRON said:
Upon the point of difference between the judges below, l
concur, that the extin ui ment of a debt and the 1vm a
st •
consideration, such as the record presents, will protect the purcha er and as ignee of a negotiable note from the infirmity affecting the instrument before it was negotiated. But I am unwilling
to sanction the introduction into the opinion of this court, a doctrine aside from the case made by the record, or argued by the
counsel, assuming to maintain, that a negotiable note or bill
led ed as collateral ecurit for a revious debt is taken b the
creditor in the due cour e of trade; and that he stands on the foot
of him who purchases in the market for money. or takes the
i nstrument in extinguishment of a previous debt. State court of
high authority on commercial qu stions have held otherwise;
and that they will yield to a mere expression of opinion of this
court, or change their course of decision in conformity to the
recent Engli h ca es referred to in the principal opinion, i
improbable: whereas, if the question was permitted to rest until
it fairly arose, the decision of it either way by this court probably, would, and I think ought to settle it. As such a result i not
to be €xpected from the opinion in this cau e I am unwilling to
embarrass myself with so much of it as treat of negotiable in truments taken as a pledge. I never heard this question spoken of
as belonging to the case, until the principal opinion was pre ented
last evening; and therefore I am not prepared to give any opinion,
even was it called for by the record.
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This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the south-

ern district of New York, and on the point and question on which

the judges of the said Circuit Court were, opposed in opinion, and

which were certified to this court for its opinion, agreeably to the

act of Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued

by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this

court, that the defendant was not, under the facts stated, entitled

to the same defence to the action as if the suit was between the

original parties to the bill ; that is to say, the said Norton, or the

said Norton and Keith and the defendant: and that the evidence

offered in defence and objected to, was not admissible as against

the plaintiff in this action. Whereupon it is now here ordered

and adjudged by this court, that an answer in the negative be

certified to the said Circuit Court.

-V"

V Sutherland v. Mead et al. (1903), 80 App. Div. (N. Y.) 103, 80

N. Y. Supp. 504.

Appeal from Special Term, New York County.

Action by George R. Sutherland against Charles H. Mead

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
r ecord from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the southern di stri ct of ew York, and on the point and question on which
t he judg of the aid Circuit ourt w re. oppo ed in opinion, and
' hi ch wer certified to this court for it opinion, agreeably to the
act of ongr
in uch ca e made and provided, and wa argued
by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of thi
court, that the def ndant was not, under the facts tated, entitled
to the same defence to the action as if the suit was between the
original parties to the bill· that i to say, the said Norton, or the
aid Norton and Keith and the defendant: and that the evidence
offered in defence and objected to, was not admissible as against
t he plaintiff in this action. Whereupon it is now here ordered
and adjudged by thi court, that an answer in the negative be
certified to the said Circuit Court.
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and Thomas Taft, impleaded. From an order denying a motion

to vacate and set aside the judgment, or, in the alternative, to

modify it by reducing it to $150, with interest, defendants Mead

and Taft appeal. Reversed.

Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Hatch, McLaugh-

lin, O'Brien, and Ingraham, JJ.

A. H. F. Sceger, for appellants.

Sutherland v. Mead et al. (!903), 80 App. Div. (N. Y.) 103, 80
N. Y. Supp. 504.

Edward Hassett, for respondent.

Hatch, J. This action was brought to recover upon a prom-

issory note made by the defendant Deshong, upon which the

appellants were accommodation indorsers. It appeared upon the

hearing of the motion that the defendant Palleske was indebted

to the appellants upon a promissory note for the sum of $1,000;

that as such note was about falling due, and on the 15th day of

April, 1902, Palleske requested the appellants to accept in pay-

ment of such note the promissory note executed by Deshong, set

forth in the complaint in the action ; that they refused so to accept

the same unless Palleske could procure it to be discounted, and

would deliver the proceeds thereof to the appellants, and for such

Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
,
Action by George R. Sutherland against Charles H. Mead
and Thomas Taft, impleaded. From an order denying a motion
to vacate and set aside the judgment, or, in the alternative, to
modify it by reducing it to $150, with interest, defendants Mead
and Taft appeal. Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, McLAUGHLIN, O 'BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.

A. H. F. S eeger, for appellants.
Edw ard Hassett, for respondent.
HATCH, J. Thi action was brought to recover upon a promi sory note made by the defendant D shong, upon which th e
appellants were accommodation indorsers. It appeared upon the
hearing of the motion that the defendant Palleske was indebted
to the appellants upon a promissory note for the sum of $1,000;
that as such note was about falling du , and on the 15th day of
April, 1902, Palle ke reque ted the appellants to accept in payment of such note the promissory note executed by De hong, set
forth in th e complaint in the action · that they refu ed so to ace pt
the same unless Palleske could procure it to be discounted, and
would deliver the proceeds thereof to the appellants, and for such
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purpose the appellants indorsed said note in their firm name, and

the defendant Palleske took the same, and agreed to return the

proceeds thereof to the appellants. Instead of discounting the

note, Palleske transferred the same to the plaintiff in the action,

who paid thereon the sum of $150 cash, and, as further con-

sideration, took and held th e same as collateral securit y for an

indebtedness then due and owing by Palleske to the plaintiff in

a sum exceeding $3,000, the whole of which still remains due and

unpaid. This action was brought by the plaintiff to enforce the

note. All of the defendants made default in answering. Judg-

ment was thereupon entered by the plaintiff for the full amount

secured to be paid by the note, with interest. Thereafter the

accommodation indorsers, the appellants herein, made a motion

to open the default, and for leave to serve an answer. The court

denied such motion upon the ground that the answer which accom-

panied the motion papers, and which was proposed to be served

as a defense to the note, was insufficient for such purpose, in that

it failed to aver the fraudulent diversion of the note in suit, and

for this reason the motion was denied. It is clear that the court

made a correct disposition of such motion, and placed the denial
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upon a proper ground. There was no statement in the answer

which raised any issue of a fraudulent diversion. Consequently

the plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment thereunder.

The fraudulent diversion of the note constituted an affirmative

defense, and the_jefendants ^ in order to avail themselves of it,

were required to ple ad the sa me. (Met. Nat. Bank v. Loyd, 90

N. Y. 530 ; Grant v. Walsh, 145 N. Y. 502, 40 N. E. 209, 45 Am.

St. Rep. 626.) Thereupon, without obtaining leave so to do, the

appellants made a motion to set aside the judgment, or, in the

alternative, to modify the same by reducing the recovery upon

the note in suit to the sum of $150, with interest thereon from the

day of its date. This motion was based upon the facts and cir-

cumstances connected with the delivery of the note to Palleske,

as has been previously stated, and also upon an affidavit made by

the plaintiff in the action that he had only paid to Palleske for

the note $150 in cash, and held the same as collateral security

for the payment of a pre-existing debt. It was made to appear

by the moving papers that the appellants herein were ignorant of

the consideration paid by the plaintiff for the note prior to the

time when the application was made to open the default, when

the affidavit was read. Upon learning these facts, the appellants

caused an answer to be prepared, setting up the facts and circum-

stances connected with the delivery of the note, the indorsement

purpose the appellants indorsed said note in their firm name, and
the defendant Palleske took the ame, and agreed to return the
proceeds thereof to the appellant . In t ad of discounting the
note, alleske transferred the sam to the plaintiff in the action,
who paid thereon the um of $150 cash, and, as further consideratiOn, took and held the same as collateral curity for an
indebtedn ss then due and owing by alle ke to the plaintiff in
a sum exceeding $3,000, the whole of which still remains due and
unpaid. This action was brought by th plaintiff to enforce the
note. All of the defendants made default in answering. Judgment was thereupon entered by the plaintiff for the full amount
secured to be paid by the note, with interest. Thereafter the
accommodation indor er , the appellants herein, made a motion
to open the default, and for leave to serve an answer. The court ·
denied such motion upon the ground that the answer which accompanied the motion papers, and which was proposed to be served
a a defense to the note, was in ufficient for such purpose, in that
it failed to aver the fraudulent diversion of the note in suit, and
for this reason the motion was denied. It is clear that the court
made a correct disposition of such motion, and placed the denial
upon a proper ground. There was no statement in the answer
which rai ed any issue of a fraudulent diversion. Consequ ently
the plaintiff would have been entitled to judg ment thereunder.
The fraudulent diver ion of the note constituted an affirmative
defep e~nd tbe defendants, in order to avail themselves of it, ·•
~ required to plea the same. (Met.
af. Bank v. Loyd, 90
N. Y. 530; Grant v. Walsh, 145 N. Y. 502, 40 N. E. 209, 45 Am.
St. Rep. 626.) Thereupon, without obtaining leave so to do, the
appellants made a motion to set a ide the judgment, or, in the
alternative, to modify the ame by reducing th recovery upon
the note in suit to th e sum of $150, with interest thereon from the
day of its date. This motion was ba ed upon the facts and circum tances connected with the delivery of the note to Palleske,
as has been previously stated, and al o upon an affidavit made by
the plaintiff in the action that he had only paid to Palleske for
the note $150 in ca h, and held the same a collateral securit
for the payment of a pre-exi ting debt. It was made to appear
by the moving papers that the appellants herein -v ere ignorant of
the consideration paid b the plaintiff for the note prior to the
time when the application was made to open the default, \ hen
the affidavit was read. Upon learning the e fact the appellants
caused an answer to be prepared, etting up th fact and circumstances connected with the delivery of the note, the indorsement
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by the appellants, the fraudulent diversion of the same by Pal-

leske, and the consideration paid therefor by the plaintiff. This

motion, upon these papers coming on to be heard, was denied,

and from the order entered thereon, this appeal is taken.

The motion to vacate or reduce the judgment was an entirely

different motion from the one made to open the default. That

was based solely upon the fraudulent diversion of the note, and

upon an insufficient answer to raise such question. The present

facts were wholly unknown to the appellants at the time when

the motion was made. The present motion is for an entirely dif-

ferent purpose, viz., to set aside the judgment, based upon a state

of facts, showing that the plaintiff was only entitled to enforce

the payment of the note to the extent to which he had parted with

value therefor, and, upon the conceded facts, he was not entitled „

to the judgment which had been entered, unless entitled to enforce

the note for the full amount. These facts did not before appear,

and were unknown to the moving party. This application was

accompanied by a verified answer setting up these facts. It is

evident, therefore, that the motion was entirely different from the

first motion, made for entirely different relief, and was based
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upon papers which fully and completely set forth the appellants'

defense. It was therefore properly made, and the former motion

was no bar to the court's entertaining the same. It is said, how-

ever, that the negotiable instrument law has changed the rule in

respect to what constitutes consideration for a promissory note;

it being claimed that a pre-existing indebtedness is a good con-

sideration, and renders the holder thereof a holder for value of a

note taken as security therefor, as against accommodation indors-

ers, even though the note has been fraudulently diverted from the

purpose for which it was given, and the indorsers have received

no value. Since 1822, when Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636,

11 Am. Dec. 342, was decided, it has been the settled law of this

state that accommodation makers or indorsers of negotiable paper

were not liable to a holder thereof, where the same had been

fraudu lentl y diverted from the purpose for which it was made, ±

or the i ndorsement given, and the holder had received it solely

as colla teral se curity for an antecedent debt. (Comstock v. Hier,

73 N. Y. 269, 29 Am. Rep. 142.) In other words,' the surety has

the right to impose such liability upon his obligation as he sees

fit, and he is not to be made liable outside of the terms of his

engagement, in the case of negotiable paper, except for the benefit

of a bona fide holder, who parted with value, and was misled to

his prejudice. (United States Nat. Bank v. Ewing, 131 N. Y.
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by the appellants, the fraudulent diver ion of the same by Palle ke, and the con id ration paid therefor by the plaintiff. This
motion, upon the papers coming on to be heard, was denied,
and from th order entered thereon, this app al is taken.
The motion to vacate or reduce the judgment was an entirely
different motion from the one made to open the default. That
wa based olely upon the fraudulent diversion of the note, and
upon an insuffici nt an wer to raise such question. The present
fa t wer wholly unknown to the appellants at the time when
the motion was made. The present motion is for an entirely diff rent purpo , viz., to et aside the judgment, based upon a state
of facts, howino- that the plaintiff was only entitled to enforce
the payment of the note to the xtent to which he had parted with
value therefor, and, upon the conceded facts, he was not entitled _
t the jud ment which had been entered, unless entitled to enforce
th note for the full amount. These facts did not before appear,
and were unknown to the moving party. This application wa
accompanied by a verifi d answer setting up these facts. It is
evident, therefor , that the motion was entirely different from the
fir t motion, made for entirely different relief, and was based
upon paper which fully and completely set forth the appellants'
defen e. It was ther fore properly made, and the former motion
was no bar to the court's entertaining the same. It is said, how.-'
ever that the negotiable instrument law has changed the rule in
re pect to what constitutes consideration for a promissory note;
it being claimed that a pre-existing indebtedness is a good consideration, and renders the holder thereof a holder for value of a
n t taken as security therefor, as against accommodation indorser , even though the note has been fraudulently diverted from the
purpose for which it was given, and the indorsers have received
no value. Since 1822, when Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636,
I I Am. Dec. 342, was decided, it has been the settled law of this
state that accommodation makers or indorsers of negotiable paper
w re not liable to a holder thereof, where the same had been
raudulently diverted from the purpose for which it was made, 4
or the indorsement given, and the holder had received it solely
as collat ral security for an antecedent debt. (Comstock v. Hier,
73 N. Y. 26g, 29 Am. Rep. 142.) In other words; the surety has
the right to impose such liability upon his obligation as he sees
fit, and he is not to be made liable outside of th terms of his
engC\ ement, in the case of negotiable paper, except for the benefit
of a bona fide holder, who parted with value, and was misled to
his prejudice. (United States Nat. Bank v. Ewing, 131 N. Y.
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506, 30 N. E. 501, 27 Am. St. Rep. 615.) Whatever may have

been the rule with respect to this question in other jurisdictions,

it has been the law of this state, uniformly enforced during this

period of time, and still is the law, unless the negotiable instru-

ment law has changed the same. Section 51 of such act provides:

"Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple

contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value;

and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand

or at a future time."

Standing alone, this provision has not changed the existing

law. It was always the law of this state that a consideration suffi-

cient to support a simple contract constituted a good consideration

for the instrument. This declaration, therefore, upon this sub-

ject, added nothing whatever to the law as it existed and had

existed from time immemorial. So, also, an antecedent or pre-

existing debt constituted value, and was sufficient in considera-

tion of an instrument, either negotiable or otherwise, as between

the parties thereto. Moreover, it was always the law that the

actual paymen t and discharge of a pre-existing debt constituted

The same a val uable consideration for the transfer . pj^ommercial m

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

paperTlmdsh ut off prior equities existing^ againsLit. Such was

the TuTe^announced in Coddington v. Bay, supra, and has since

been enforced by the courts of this state. (Mayer v. Heidclbach,

123 N. Y. 332, 25 N. E. 416, 9 L. R. A. 850; Spring Brook Chem-

ical Co. v. Dunn, 39 App. Div. 130, 57 N. Y. Supp. 100; Blair

v. Hagemeyer, 26 App. Div. 219, 49 N. Y. Supp. 965.) There

is nothing contained in this enactment, therefore, which has

changed the rule of law respecting the consideration of commer-

cial paper, as it had previously existed ; and the language of the

statute is quite insufficien t to annul the rule wh ich has obtained

with respect to the f raudulent diversion of commercial paper, as

against accommodation indorsers thereon . Such rule, therefore,

cannot be considered as changed, unless it be by virtue of the

other provisions of the statute, showing that such defense is cut

off, and indicating a clear intent to change the rule.

Section 52 of the negotiable instruments law defines what

constitutes a holder for value :

"Where value has at any time been given for the instrument,

the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties

who became such prior to that time."

And by section 55 an accommodation party is made liable

on the instrument to a holder for value, although such holder at

the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accom-

506, 30 N. E. 501, 27 Am. St. Rep. 6!5.) Whatever may have
be n the rule with respect to this question in other jurisdictions:
it has b en the law of this tate, uniformly enforc d during this
period of time, and still is th law, unless the negotiable instrument law has changed th ame.
ection 51 of such act provides:
'Value is any con ideration ufficient to support a simple
contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt con titutes value;
and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand
or at a future time."
Standing alone, thi provision has not changed the existing
law. It was alway the law of thi state that a con ideration sufficient to support a imple contract constituted a good consideration
for the instrument. This declaration, therefore, upon this ub ·
ject, added nothing whatever to the law as it existed and had
existed from time immemorial. So, also, an antecedent or preexi ting debt constituted value, and was sufficient in consideration of an instrum nt, either negotiable or otherwise, as between
the parties thereto. Moreover, it was always the law that~
actual payment and discharge of a pre-existing debt constituted
the same a valuable consideration for the transfer of commercial
paper, and shut off rior e uities existin
· . Such was
the rue announced in Coddington v. Bay, supra, and ha ince
been enforced by the courts of this state. (Mayer v. Heidelbach,
123 N. Y. 332, 25 N . E. 416, 9 L. R. A. 850; Spring Brook Chemical Co. v. Dunn, 39 App. Div. 130, 57 N. Y. Supp. roo; Bla;ir
v. H age11ieyer, 26 App. Div. 219, 49 N. Y. Supp. 965.) There
is nothing contained in this enactment, therefore, which h2s
changed the rule of law respecting the con ideration of commercial paper, as it had previously existed; and the language of the
statute i uite insu ·
annul the rule which h s obt ine
!Yith respect to th fraudulent div rsion of commercial paper, as
against accommodation indorser thereon. Such rule, ther for
cannot be considered as changed, unless it be by virtue of the
other provi ions of the tatute howing that uch defen e i cut
off, and indicating a clear intent to chano-e the rule.
Section 52 of the negotiable in trument law define what
constitutes a holder for value:
"Where valu has at any time been given for the in trument,
the holder is deemed a holder for value in re p ct to all parties
who became such prior to that time."
And by section 55 an accommodation part i made liable
on the instrument to a holder for value althou h uch holder at
the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accom-
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modation party. Section 91 defines a holder in due course to be

a person who has taken the instrument under the following con-

ditions :

"(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) that

he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without

notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the

fact; (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4) that

at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any

infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person

negotiating it."

Section 94 defines when the title is defective in the person

who has negotiated the instrument as follows :

"When he obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto,

by fraud, duress or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or

for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of

faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."

Section 95 provides that the holder must have "actual knowl-

edge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that

his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." By

section 96 the rights of a holder in due course are defined to be :
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"A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any

defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available

to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of

the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties

liable thereon."

"By section 98 it is provided :

"Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due

course ; but when it is shown that the title of any person who

has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on

the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims

acquired the title as a holder in due course."

It is evident from these provisions that the Legislature did

not intend to wipe out the defenses to a promissory note where

the same had been procured from the maker by fraud, or where

the indorsement has been given for a specific purpose, and a fraud-

ulent diversion of the paper has been had. If the holder took

the same with notice of such facts or circumstances as charged

him with notice, or if he parted with no value, it constitutes a

good defense to such note. As the definition of value for a prom-

issory note has not added anything to the law upon that subject

beyond such as was previously recognized, we ought not to con-

clude that the Legislature intended to change the rule with respect

thereto, nor to permit frauds to be perpetrated thereunder. Whe n

modation party. Section 91 defines a holder in due course to be
a per on \ ho has taken the in trument under the following condition :
" ( r) That it is com pl te and regular upon its face; ( 2) that
he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without
notic that it had been previou ly di honored, if such was the
fact; (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4) that
at th time it wa negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it."
Section 94 defines when the title is defective in the person
who has negotiated the instrument as follow :
"When he obtained th in trument, or any signature thereto,
by fraud, duress or force and fear, or other unlawful mean , or
I r an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of
faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."
Section 95 provides that the holder mu t have "actual knowldge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts th~t
his action in taking th in trument amounted to bad faith." By
section 96 the rights of a holder in due course are defin d to be:
"A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any
defect of title of prior parties and free from defenses available
t prior partie among themselves, and may enforce payment of
the instrument for the full amount 7hereof against all parties
liable thereon."
"By section 98 it is provided:
"Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
cour e; but when it is shown that the title of any person who
has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on
the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
acquired the title as a holder in due course."
It is evident from these provisions that the Legislature di<l
not intend to wipe out the defen e to a promissory note where
the ame had been procured from the maker by fraud, or where
the indorsement has b en given for a specific purpo e, and a fraudulent diversion of the paper has been had. If the holder took
the same with notice of uch fact or circum tance a charged
him with notice, or if he part d with no value, it constitutes a
good defen e to such pote. A the definition of value for a promissory note has not added anythin<Y to the law upon that subject
beyond such as was previously recogniz d w ought not to conlude that the Legislature intended to change the rule with respect
thereto, nor to permit frauds to be perpetrated thereunder. When
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the_ Legislature defines jtde^cd^title^jt^ states in express ^ errns^

th at a fraudulent diversion is such. All of these sections can be

harmonized, in their entirety, without any subtle refinement of

reasoning, by construing section 51 to mean that, to constitute

an antecedent or pre-existing debt a valuable consideration in

support of a promissory note that has been fraudulently diverted,

as valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, the latter must have

canceled, and, in legal effect, paid and discharged, the antecedent

or pre-existing debt. By still holding the debt, he in fact parts

with no value. It was not intended thereby that where a debt

cont inu ed to remain in existence, and enforceable as such, and

the note is taken as collateral security for its payment, such debt .

undischarged, cons ti tutes a valuable consideration, or the holder

of th e note one in due course, as against the accommodation

maker or indorser who has been defrauded by the negotiation

of the instrument We are not to impute to the Legislature an

intent to change a rule of law which has existed in uniform

course of enforcement for over three-quarters of a century, with-

out a clear and unequivocal expression so to do. The rules of

law which have been laid down in England, covering such ques-
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tion, or the reasons assigned for a different rule in other juris-

dictions in this country, do not furnish controlling reasons for

changing the law of this state so as to bring it into harmony with

such views, in face of the fact that in the commercial center of

this country these rules have been applied for this length of time

without damage to business interests or harm to commercial

usages, and during its operation a period of commercial activity

and prosperity has existed, heretofore unknown in the world's

history. We may take judicial notice that the commission

appointed to revise and codify the statutes was created, in the

main, to codify existing laws, and not make new rules ; and cer-

tainly it was never intended that settled usages in respect of com-

mercial paper, founded upon decisions covering a period of 80

years, and uniform in application, should be overthrown in the

construction of ambiguous and obscure expressions used by such

body. The harmony of these provisions of the statute is in no

measure disturbed by a construction which causes them to read

that an antecedent and pre-existing deb t must he. paid and dis-

charged, in or der to constitute the holder o f commercial paper,

_which Tias be en fraudulently diverted, a bona fide holder, and, as^

such, capable of enforcing the same, as against the accommoda-

tion maker or indorser. Merely taking such paper as collateral

security for the payment oT a pre-existing or antecedent, "

the Le islature defines a defective title it states in ex ress terms
that a fraudulent 1v rsion i such. All of these ections can be
harmonized, in their entirety, without any subtle refinement of
rea oning, by construing section 51 to mean that, to constitute
an antecedent or pre-existing debt a valuable consideration in . .,_
upport of a promissory note that has been fraudulently diverted,
as valid in the hand of a bona fide holder, the latter must have
canceled, and, in legal effect, paid and discharged, the antecedent
or pre-existing debt. By still holding the debt, he in fact parts
with no value. It was not intended thereby that where a debt
continued to remain in existence, and enforceable as such, and
!_E"e note is taken as collateral security for its payment. such debt,
undi char ed, constitut a valuable consideration, or the holder
of the note one in ue course, as against the accommo ation
maker or irrdorser wlio has been defrauded b the negotiation
Of the in trument.
e are not to impute to the Legislature an
intent to change a rule of law which has existed in uniform
course of enforcement for over three-quarters of a century, without a clear and unequivocal expression so to do. The rules of
law which have been laid down in England, covering such que tion, or the reasons assigned for a different rule in other jurisdiction in this country, do not furnish controlling rea ons for
changing the law of this state so as to bring it into harmony with
such views, in face of the fact that in the commercial center of
thi country these rules have been applied for this length of time
without damage to business intere ts or harm to commercial
usages, and during its operation a period of commercial activity
and pro perity ha exi ted, heretofore unknown in the world's
history. We may take judicial notice that the commission
appointed to revi e and codify the statutes wa created, in the
main, to codify existing laws, and not make new rules; and certainly it was never intended that settled u ages in re pect of commercial paper, founded upon decisions covering a period of 8o
years, and uniform in application, hould be overthrown in the
construction of ambiguous and obscure expres ion used by such
body. The harmony of these provi ion of the tatute is in no
measure disturbed by a construction which cau es them to read
that an antecedent and
d bt mu t b
·

s
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not constitute such debt value, within the meaning of t his statute.

This matter docs not seem to have been the subject of discussroTT,

beyond that had at Special Term in the case of Brewster v.

Shrader, 26 Misc. Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606, where a different

rule was laid down. The authority cited therefor in the opinion

is contained in the reviser's note by the author of the law, in

which it is stated that section 51 was designed to change the rule

in Coddington v. Bay, supra, and the opinion of James W. Eaton,

Esq., instructor upon the law of bills and notes in the Albany Law

School, wherein he says, in his published edition of the negotiable

instruments law, in referring to section 51, "It is to be inferred

that the above statute extends the New York rule to include

instruments given merely as collateral security." We are not

disposed to adopt this construction of the law. Settled principles

ought not to be overturned by imputing a legislative intent where

the language upon which it is based is equivocal in expression,

and when the language used which it is claimed changes the rule

may be naturally harmonized with the decisions of the courts,

which have settled the law plainly and conclusively, and with

respect to which commercial dealings have been governed in this
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state for over 80 years. But even though we should be wrong

in our construction of this statute, nevertheless it does not change

the rule of law to be applied in the particular case. As we have

seen by section 98, above quoted, the burden is placed upon the

holder of every promissory note, fraudulently diverted, to show-

that he acquired title thereto as a holder in due course. Nothing

which appears in these papers tends to controvert the fact that the

note in question was fraudulently diverted. The proof upon such

subject, submitted in the moving papers, is clear and unequivocal.

The answer sets it up as a defense. Bef ore the plaintiff, there-

fore^ could jrecoyer^Jie must shojw_that he acquired the paper in

due course, and without knowledge of any infirmity attending

upon Tt. "Under the pleadings an issue of fact upon this question

may be presented, and these appellants are not to be made to

suffer through the fraud that has been perpetrated upon them,

if the plaintiff had notice of such fact, and the appellants ought

to have an opportunity to be heard upon this subject. Th e doc-

trine of estoppel, b a sed upon the certificate th at the n ote~was~a

genuineTT jusiness note, given for value received, and that there

was no defense to the same, either in law or in equity, does not

estop the appellants from interposing the defense of fraudulent

diversion. The certificate was in harmony with the facts. TT

was genuine business paper, executed for a particular purpose,

not con ti ute su_ch_debt value V'lithin .tfil_m_g_nin of this statute.
~ matter oes not se m o ave een
e su 3ec o isc
,
beyond that had at pecial Term in the case of Brewster v.
Shrader, 26 Misc. Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 6o6, where a different
rule was laid down. The authority cited therefor in the opinion
is contained in the revi er's note by the author of the law, in
which it is tated that ection 51 was de igned to change the ruie
in Coddington v. Bay, supra, and the opinion of James W. Eaton,
E q., in tructor upon the law of bill and notes in the Albany Law
chool, wh rein he say , in his publi bed edition of the negotiablf'
in truments law, in referring to section 5 r, " It is to be inferred
that the above statute extends th New York rule to include
instrument g iven merely as collateral ecurity." We are not
dispo ed to adopt this construction of the law. Settled principles
ought not to be ov rturned by imputing a legislative intent where
the laPlguage 'Llpon which it is based is equivocal in expres ion,
and when the language used which it i claimed changes the rule
may be naturally harmonized with the deci ion of the courts,
which have settled the law plainly and conclu ively, and with
respect to which commercial dealings have been governed in this
tate for over 80 years. But even though we hould be wrong
in our construction of this statute, neverthele s it does not change
the rule of law to be applied in the particular case. As '"'e have
een by section 98, above quoted, the burden is placed upon the
holder of every promissory note, fraudulently diverted, to show
that he acquired title thereto as a holder in due course. Nothing
which appears in these papers tends to controvert the fact that the
note in question was fraudulently diverted . The proof upon such
ubj_ect, submitted in the moving papers, is clear and unequivocal.
T he answer sets it up as a defen e. Before the plaintiff, therethat he acquired the a er in
fore could r
he
due course, and without knowled e of an infirmit attendiJ..!.g_
u on it.
nder the pleadings an issue of fact upon this que tion
may be presented, and these appellants ar not to be made to
uffer through the fraud that has b en perpetrated upon them,
if the plaintiff had notice of uch fact, and the appellants ought
to have an opportunity to be heard upon this subject. The doctrine of e
el based u on the certificate that the note was a
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and, in the hands of a holder in due course, may be enforced, hi

prderjo constit ute an estoppel i n pais , it mu st appear that the act

which concludes the party was expressly designed to influence

the conduct of anotherTand did so influence him, and when a

denial of the act will operate to the in jury of the holder {Payne v.

Burnham, 62 N7Y. 69.) Such is the doctrine of the cases cited

by the respondent. They are without application in the present

case, for the reason that the certificate can add nothing to the

rights of the present holder of the note. If the note had been Yyt^A, <-^ rv/ ^

delivered to him without consideration, he could not have enforced , $ __

it against these accommodation indorsers, as he would not have '^ vXA -

been misled or injured by the certificate which w r as given. To t** - ^7 x

the extent that he parted with value, he is entitled to enforce the o^^-j^- ^

note, with or without the certificate. In holding it as collateral ^^^^J*^.

security for the payment of his pre-existing debt, the certificate ^1^^^ «<-

in no wise prejudices him, as he has suffered nothing thereby, *• Tmw

and parted with no value on account thereof. *-^<^>^ > ^^

If these views be correct, it follows that the order should be-^^^C^""

reversed, and the judgment set aside, upon payment of costs and >>Y Ays ^ s ~''~

disbursements of the action, and $10 costs of the motion, to the"^ ****- "^^
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respondent, and defendants allowed to answer. As the defendant /\ cK^> oL&*

appellants, however, admit liability to the extent of $150 interest;^- Y^-*^*^

and costs, the plaintiff in the action may, if he so elects, stipulate ^a>j rv^ t^>

to reduce the judgment to such amount, in which event the judg- §_jbSs^j*t^~

ment, to that extent, should be permitted to stand, and be enforced. t ^_^-n-^>--* 3 S

Ten dollars costs and disbursements of this appeal to the appel- Cn-o^^r^iA

lants. All concur. See Crawford's Ann. Neg. Inst. Law, p. 32 ; ^-<~» V-~~>-

Roseman v. Mahony, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 377. Until a deci- 'vo^'^n^^K^

sion of the Court of Appeals on the point involved, the construe- SUk^o a -vv~aj?>

tion of the statute adopted bv this case will be open to question. -x>-o3: c*r^

WHAT CONSTITUTES HOLDER FOR VALUE. § 20.^^

Hoffman & Co. v. Bank of Milwaukee {1870), 12 Wall (79

U.S.) 181.

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Wisconsin ; the

case being thus :

Chapin & Miles, a forwarding and commission firm in Mil-

waukee, were engaged in moving produce to Hoffman & Co., of

Philadelphia, for sale there. The course of their business was

thus : They first shipped the produce, obtaining a bill of lading
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and, in the hands of a holder in due course, may be enforced. In
order to constitute an estoppel in ais i!__must a ear that the ~
~ hich concludes the party was express!
designed to influence
the conduct o ano er, an did so influence him, and when a
g~nial of the act will op rate to the injury of the ho~ (Paynh
Burnhani, 62 N . Y. 69.) Such is the doctrine of the case cited
by the re pondent. They are without application in the present
case, for the reason that the certificate can add nothing to the
rights of the present holder of the note. If the note had been )'\, , ~
delivered to him without consideration, he could not have enforced ~ Git against these accommodation indorsers, as he would not have
been misled or injured by the certificate which was given. To Wv- ~
the extent that he parted with value, he is entitled to enforce the ~ .._... ~
note, with or without the certificate. In holding it as collateral ~;
security for the payment of his pre-existing debt, the certificate ~ ~
in no wi e prejudices him, as he has suffered nothing thereby, ~~ ~
and parted with no value on account thereof.
a-\"".~ · If these view be correct, it follows that the order should be~.~
reversed, and the judgment set aside, upon payment of cost and ~ (
disbur ements of the action, and $10 costs of the motion, to the~ tA>.:J.- ~
respondent, and defendants allowed to answer. As the defendant v'l ~ ~
appellant , however, admit liability to the extent of $r 50 intere tv- ~ ·C)-vand co ts, the plaintiff in the action may, if he o elects, stipulate~ P..... u>to reduce the judgment to such amount, in which event the judg- ~
ment, to that extent, should be permitted to stand, and be enforced.~
Ten dollar costs and disbursements of this appeal to the appel- ~
lants. All concur. See Crawford,.s Ann. Neg. Inst. Law, p. 32 ; ~ ~
Roseman v. Mahony, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 377. Until a deci- ""'j -~
sion of the Court of Appeals on the point involved, the construe-~,~
tion of the statute adopted by this case will be open to que~~ ~

--~ ~·

WHAT CONSTITUTES HOLDER FOR VALUE.

~~~
~ \'O ((/\
§28.~~
~~

Hoffman & Co. v. BGlnk of Milwaukee (1870), 12 Wall (79
u. S.) 181.
Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Wi consin ; the
case being thus:
Chapin & Miles, a forwarding and commi ion firm in :Milwaukee, were engaged in moving produce to Hoffman & Co., of
Philadelphia, for sale there. The cour e of their bu ine was
thus: They first shipped the produce, obtaining a bill of lading
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therefor, to which they attached a draft drawn by them on their

consignee for about the value of the grain, and then negotiated the

draft with bill of lading attached, to some bank in Milwaukee,

and obtained the money. It was understood that the draft was

drawn upon the credit of the property called for by the bill of

lading, and would be paid by the consignee upon receipt of the

bill of lading; and — with perhaps a single exception where the

bills of lading, not being obtained during bank hours, was sent

otherwise than with the draft — the drafts were accompanied by

such bills. The Philadelphia firm, however, rarely knew what

flour belonged to any particular bill of lading ; not being obliged

by the railroad clerks at Philadelphia, where they were known,

to exhibit any bill of lading in order to get the flour, and their

custom being, on getting notice from the railroad office that flour

had arrived for them, to pay the charges, give receipts, and send

their drayman for it, and bring it away. It was the practice of

the Milwaukee firm to advise their Philadelphia correspondents

by letter of shipments made and drafts drawn, which advisements

were acknowledged with a promise "to honor the drafts." When

flour was "slow" in going forward they corresponded with the
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Milwaukee house about it, but did not on that account refuse

acceptance or payment of any bill.

Having been thus dealing for about sixteen months, Chapin

& Miles drew three drafts on Hoffman & Co., in the ordinary

way, and attaching to them bills of lading which they had forged,

negotiated, in the ordinary course of business, the drafts, with the

forged bills of lading attached, to the City Bank of Milwaukee,

getting the money for them. The bank knew nothing of the for-

gery of the bills of lading. The ordinary correspondence between

the two houses took place. That in regard to one draft will

exhibit its character.

"Milwaukee, February 26th, 1869.

"Messrs Hoffman & Co., Philadelphia.

"Dear Sirs : We ship to you today 200 bbls. 'Prairie Flour,'

and draw at s't for $1100, which please honor. Will draw for $5

only when we can, but must crowd $5^4 part of the time.

"Yours truly,

"Chapin & Miles."

therefor, to which they attached a draft drawn by them on their
con ignee for about the value of the grain, and then negotiated the
draft with bill of lading attached, to some bank in Milwaukee,
and obtained the money. It was understood that the draft was
drawn upon the credit of the property called for by the bill of
lading, and would be paid by the consignee upon receipt of the
bill of lading; and-·with perhaps a single exception where the
bills of lading, not being obtained during bank hours, was sent
otherwi e than with the draft-the drafts were accompanied by
such bills. The Philadelphia firm, however, rarely knew what
flour belonged to any particular bill of lading; not being obliged
by the railroad clerks at Philadelphia, where they were known,
to exhibit any bill of lading in order to get the flour, and their
custom being, on getting notice from the railroad office that flour
had arrived for them, to pay the charges, give receipts, and send
their drayman for it, and bring it away. It was the practice of
the Milwaukee firm to advi e their Philadelphia correspondents
by letter of shipments made and drafts drawn, which advisements
were acknowledged with a promise "to honor the drafts. n When
flour was "slow" in going forward they corresponded with the
Mi lwaukee house about it, but did not on that account refuse
acceptance or P'i!-yment of any bill.
Having been thus dealing for about sixteen months, Chapin
& Miles drew three drafts on Hoffman & Co., in the ordinary
way, and attaching to them bills of lading which they had forged,
negotiated, in the ordinary course of busine , the drafts, with the
forged bills of lading attached, to the City Bank of Milwaukee,
getting the money for them. The bank knew nothing of the forgery of the bills of lading. The ordinary correspondence between
the two houses took place. That in regard to one draft will
exhibit its character.
"MILWAUKEE, February 26th, 1869.
"Messrs Hoffman & Co., Philadelphia.
"DEAR Srns: We ship to you today 200 bbls. 'Prairie Flour,'
and draw at s't for $1 roo which plea e honor. Will draw for $5
only when we can, but must crowd $50 part of the time.
"Yours truly,
"CHAPIN

&

MILES."
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"Philadelphia, March 2d, 1869.

"Messrs. Chapin & Miles.

"Gentlemen: Yours 26th ult. here. Your draft $1100,

will be paid, but we think you should try to keep them down to $5

per barrel. We advise sale of 100 Prairie, at $7, and 54, at $7.25.

"Yours respectfully,

"Hoffman & Co."

No flour was forwarded. The Milwaukee bank forwarded the

drafts, however, with the forged bills of lading attached, to their

correspondent, the Park Bank in New York, for collection. The

Park Bank forwarded the same to its correspondent, the Common-

wealth Bank of Philadelphia, for the same purpose, and the latter

bank presented the draft and bill of lading to the drawees, Hoff-

man & Co., who, knowing the drafts to be genuine, and not sup-

posing that the bills of lading were otherwise, paid the drafts to

the Philadelphia bank, which remitted the money back to the

Park Bank to the credit of the Bank of Milwaukee.

No flour coming forward, Hoffman & Co. discovered that

the bills of lading were forged, and Miles & Chapin being insol-

vent, they sued the Bank of Milwaukee to recover the amount
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paid, as above stated.

The declaration in the case contained the common counts in

assumpsit, with a notice, attached, to the defendant, "that he

action was brought to recover $3100, money paid by the plaintiff,

under mistake of fact, upon drafts and bills of lading (of which

copies were annexed), the mistake being that the plaintiffs paid

the money upon the belief that the said bills of lading were genu-

ine instruments ; whereas, in fact, they were forged ; the amount

of money paid being the amount called for by the drafts, which

was paid upon the credit and inducement of the bills of lading."

Neither the name of the defendant, the Milwaukee bank, nor

of any of its officers or agents, appeared in or upon the bills of

lading in question, and had it not been for extrinsic evidence, it

could not have been told from those bills that the bank had had

anything to do with them. Nor had the bank had any dealings

or correspondence of any kind with the Philadelphia house, rela-

tive to the shipments of flour by Chapin & Miles, or relative to

the drafts drawn by them.

On this case the court below directed the jury to find for the

bank, defendant in the case, and the plaintiffs brought the case

here.

Mr. M. H. Carpenter, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. J. W. Cary, contra.

"PHILADELPHIA, March 2d, I86g.
" Messrs. Chapin & M iles.
"GENTLEMEN: Yours 26th ult. here. Your draft $I IOO,
will be paid, but we think you should try to keep them down to $5
per barrel. We advise sale of IOO rairi , at $7, and 54, at $7.25.
" Your respectfully,
"HOFFMAN & Co."
No flour was forward d. The Milwaukee bank forwarded the
drafts, however, with the forged bills of lading attached, to their
correspondent, the Park Bank in N w York, for collection. The
Park Bank forwarded the ame to its correspondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Philadelphia, for the ame purpose, and the latter
bank presented th draft and bill of lading to the drawees, Hoffman & Co., who, knowing the drafts to be genuine, and not supposing that the bills of lading were otherwise, paid the drafts to
th e Philadelphia bank, which remitted the money back to the
Park Bank to the credit of the Bank of Milwaukee.
No flour coming forward, Hoffman & Co. discovered that
the bills of lading were forged, and Miles & Chapin being insolvent, they sued the Bank of Milwaukee to recover the amount
paid, as above atated.
The declaration in the case contained the common counts in
a ump it, with a notice, attached, to the defendant, "that he
acti on was brought to recover $3IOO, money paid by the plaintiff,
under mistake of fact , upon drafts and bills of lading (of which
copies were annexed) the mistake being that the plaintiffs paid
the money upon the b lief that the aid bill of lading were genuine instrument ; whereas, in fact, they were forged; the amount
of money paid being the amount called for by the drafts, which
"'as paid upon the er dit and inducement of the bills of lading."
Neither the nam of the defendant, the Milwaukee bank, nor
of any of its officers or agents, appeared in or upon the bills of
lading in question, and had it not been for extrinsic evidence, it
could not have been told from those bill that the bank had had
anything to do with them. Nor had th bank had any dealing
or correspondence of any kind with the Philadelphia house, relative to the shipments of flour by Chapin & Miles, or relative to
the drafts drawn by them.
On this case the court below directed the jury to find for the
bank, defendant in the case, and the plaintiffs brought the case
here.
Mr. M. H. Carpenter, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. J. W. Cary, contra.
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Mr. Justice Clifford delivered the opinion of the court.

Acceptors of a bill of exchange, by the act of acceptance,

admit the genuineness of the signatures of the drawers, and the

competency of the drawers to assume that responsibility. Such

an act imports an engagement, on the part of the acceptor, to the

payee or other lawful holder of the bill, to pay the same, if duly

presented, when it becomes due, according to the tenor of the

acceptance. He engages to pay the holder, whether payee or

indorsee, the full amount of the bill at maturity, and if he does

not, the holder has a right of action against him, and he may also

have one against the drawer. Drawers of bills of exchange, how-

ever, are not liable to the holder under such circumstances, until

it appears that the bill was duly presented, and that the acceptor

refused or neglected to pay the same according to the tenor of the

instrument, as their liability is contingent and subject to those

conditions precedent.

Three bills of exchange, as exhibited in the record, were

drawn by Chapin, Miles & Co., payable to the order of the defend-

ants, and the records show that they, the defendants, received

and discounted the three bills at the request of the drawers.
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Attached to each bill of exchange was a bill of lading for two

hundred barrels of flour, shipped, as therein represented, by

the drawers of the bills of exchange, and consigned to the plain-

tiffs; and the record also shows that the drawers, in each case,

sent a letter of advice to the consignees apprising them of the

shipment, and that they would draw on them as such con-

signees for the respective amounts specified in the several bills of

exchange. Prompt reply in each case was communicated by the

plaintiffs, acknowledging the receipt of the letter of advice sent

by the shippers, and promising to honor the bills of exchange, as

therein requested. Evidence was also introduced by the plaintiffs

showing that the defendants indorsed the bills of exchange and

forwarded the same, with the bills of lading attached, to the

National Park Bank of the city of New York, their regular cor-

respondent ; that the same were subsequently indorsed by the

latter bank, and forwarded to the Commonwealth Bank of Phila-

delphia for collection ; that the Commonwealth Bank presented

the bills of exchange, with the bills of lading attached, to the*

plaintiffs, as the acceptors, and that they paid the respective

amounts as they had previously promised to do, and that the

Commonwealth Bank remitted the proceeds in each case to the

National Park Bank, where the respective amounts were credited

to the defendants. Proof was also introduced by the plaintiffs

Mr. J USTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Acceptors of a bill of exchange, by the act of acceptance,
admit the genuineness of the signatures of the drawers, and the
competency of the drav ers to a sume that respon ibility. Such
an act imports an engagement, on the part of the acceptor, to the
payee or other lawful holder of the bill, to pay the same, if duly
pre ented, when it becomes due, according to the tenor of the
acceptance. He engages to pay the holder, whether payee or
indor ee, the full amount of the bill at maturity, and if he does
not, the holder has a right of action against him, and he may also
have one against the drawer. Drawers of bills of exchange, however, are not liable to the holder under such circum tances, until
it appears that the bill was duly presented, and that the acceptor
refused or neglected to pay the same according to the tenor of the
instrument, as their liability is contingent and subject to those
conditions precedent.
Three bill of exchange, as exhibited in the record, were
drawn by Chapin, Miles & Co., payable to the order of the defendants, and the records show that they, the defendants, received
and discounted the three bills at the request of the draweTs.
Attached to each bill of exchange was a bill of lading for two
hundred barrels of flour, shipped, as therein represented, by
the drawers of the bills of exchange, and consigned to the plaintiffs; and the record also shows that the drawers, in each case,
sent a letter of advice to the con ignees apprising them of the
shipment, and that they would draw on them as such consignees for the re pective amounts specified in the several bills of
exchange. Prompt reply in each case was communicated by the
plaintiffs, acknowledging the receipt of the letter of advice sent
by the shippers, and promising to honor the bills of exchange, as
therein requested. Evidence was al o introduced by the plaintiffs
showing that the defendants indorsed the bills of exchange and
forwarded the same, with the bills of lading attached, to the
National Park Bank of the city of New York, their regular correspondent; that the ame were ub equently indorsed by the
latter bank, and forwarded to the Commonwealth Bank of Philadelphia for collection; that the Commonwealth Bank presented
the bills of exchange, with the bills of lading attached, to the
plaintiffs, as the acceptors, and that they paid the respective
amounts as they had previously promised to do, and that the
Commonwealth Bank remitted the proceeds in each case to the
National Park Bank, where the respective amounts were credited
to the defendants. Proof wa also introduced by the plaintiffs
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showing that each of the bills of lading was a forgery, and that

the plaintiffs, before the commencement of the suit, tendered the

same and the bills of exchange to the defendants, and that they

demanded of the defendants, at the same time, the respective

amounts so paid by them to the Commonwealth Bank. Payment

as demanded being refused, the plaintiffs brought an action of

assumpsit against the defendants for money had and received,

claiming to recover back the several amounts so paid as money

paid by mistake, but the verdict and judgment were for the

defendants, and the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error, and

removed the cause into this court. Testimony was also introduced

by the defendants tending to show that the shippers were millers ;

that they made an arrangement with the plaintiffs to ship flour

to them at Philadelphia for sale in that market, the plaintiffs

agreeing that they, the shippers, might draw on them for advances

on the flour, to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the sales ,'

that for more than a year they had been in the habit of shipping

flour to the plaintiffs under that arrangement and of negotiating

drafts on the plaintiffs to the banks in that city, accompanied by

bills of lading in form like those given in evidence in this case;
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that the drafts, with the bills of lading attached, were sent for-

ward by the banks, where the same were discounted, and that the

same were paid by the plaintiffs ; that the drawers of the drafts in

every case notified the plaintiffs of the same, and that the plain-

tiffs, as in this case, answered the letter of advice and promised

to pay the amount. They also proved that the drawers of the

drafts in this case informed their cashier that the same would

always be drawn upon property, and that the bills of lading would

accompany the drafts, and that they had no knowledge or intima-

tion that the bills of lading were not genuine. Instructions were

requested by the plaintiffs, that if the jury found that the respec-

tive bills of lading were not genuine, that they were entitled to

recover the several amounts paid to the Commonwealth Bank,

with interest ; but the court refused to give the instruction as

prayed, and instructed the jury that if they found the facts as

shown by the defendants, the plaintiffs could not recover in the

case, even though they should find that the several bills of lading

were a forgery.

Money paid under a mistake of facts, it is said, may be recov-

ered back as having been paid without consideration, but the

decisive answer to that suggestion, as applied to the case before

the court, is that money paid, as in this case, by the acceptor of

a bill of exchange to the payee of the same, or to a subsequent

showing that ach of the bills of lading was a forgery and that
the plaintiffs, b fore th commenc ment of the suit, t ndered the
ame and the bill of exchang to the d f ndant , and that they
demanded of the def ndant , at the same tim , the re pective
amounts so paid by th m to the Commonwealth Bank.
ayment
as demanded being refu d, the plaintiffs brought an action of
a sump it again t the defendants for money had and received,
claiming to recover back the s veral amounts so paid as money
paid by mi take, but th verdict and judgment were for the
defendants, and th plaintiffs sued out a writ of error, and
removed the cause into thi court. Testimony was also introduced
by the defendants tending to show that the shippers were miller ;
that they made an arrang ment with the plaintiffs to ship flour
to them at Philadelphia for sale in that market, the plaintiff
agreeing that they, the shippers, might draw on them for advances
on the flour, to be reimbur ed out of the proceeds of the ale ;
that for more than a year they had been in the habit of shipping
flour to the plaintiff under that arrangement and of negotiating
drafts on the plaintiff to the banks in that city, accompanied by
bills of lading in form like those given in evidence in this case;
that the drafts, with the bills of lading attached, were sent forward by the banks, '\here the ame were discounted, and that the
ame were paid by the plaintiffs· that the drawer of the draft in
every ca e notified the plaintiff of the same, and that the plaintiff , as in this case, an wered the letter of advice and promi ed
to pay the amount. They also proved that the dra' ers of the
drafts in thi ca e informed their ca hier that the ame would
always be drawn upon property, and that the bills of lading would
accompany the draft , and that they had no knowledo-e or intimation that the bills of lading were not genuine. In tructions were
reque ted by the plaintiff , that if the jury found that the respective bill of ladino- were not genuine, that they were entitled to
recover the everal amount paid to the Commonwealth Bank
with intere t; but the court refu ed to give the in truction a
prayed, and instructed th jury that if they found th fact a
shown by the defendant the plaintiffs could not r cover in the
ca e even though they hould find that the several bill of lading
were a forgery.
Money paid und r a mi take of fa t , it i ai may be recovered back as havino- been paid ' ithout con id ration but the
deci ive an w r to that u gestion, a applied to the case before
the court i that money paid 1 as in thi ca e, by the acceptor of
,a bill of exchange to the payee of the same, or to a subsequent
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indorsee, in disc harge of h is legal obligation as su ch, is not a

p ayment by _mistak e nor without consideration, unless~lt be _shown

t hat the instrument was fr audulent in its inception, o r that the.

ron si derati on was illegal, or that the facts_and circumstances

which jmpeach the tr ansactio n , as betwee n the jcceptor ju kT

drawei^ jwere known to th e pa yee o r subsequ ent indorsee at the

time he be ^ame^thj^hgjd er of the instrument. (Fitch v. Jones,

5 l^llis & Blackburn, 238; Arbouin v. Anderson, 1 Adolphus &

Ellis, N. S. 498; Smith v. Braitie, 16 Id., N. S. 244; Hall v.

Featherstone, 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 287).

Such an instrument, as between the payee and the acceptor,

imports a sufficient consideration, and in a suit by the former

against the latter the defence of prior equities, as betw een the

accept or and drawer, is not jjpen unless it be shown that the

payee, at the time he became the holder of the instrument, had

knowle dge of th os e facts a ncLdxcjirn^tanrpg .

Attempt is made in argument to show that the plaintiffs

accepted the bills of exchange upon the faith and security of the

bills of lading attached to the same at the time the bills of

exchange were discounted by the defendants. Suppose it was so,
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which is not satisfactorily proved, still it is not perceived that the

concession, if made, would benefit the plaintiffs, as the bills of

exchange are in the usual form and contain no reference what-

ever to the bills of lading, and it is not pretended that the defend-

ants had any knowledge or intimation that the bills of lading were

not genuine, nor is it pretended that they made any representation

upon the subject to induce the plaintiffs to contract any such

liability. They received the bills of exchange in the usual course

of their business as a bank of discount and paid the full amount

of the net proceeds of the same to the drawers, and it is not even

suggested that any act of the defendants, except the indorsement

of the bills of exchange in the usual course of their business,

operated to the prejudice of the plaintiffs or prevented them from

making an earlier discovery of the true character of the transac-

tion. On the contrary, it distinctly appears that the drawers of

the bills of exchange were the regular correspondents of the

plaintiffs, and that they became the acceptors of the bills of

exchange at the request of the drawers of the same and upon

their representations that the flour mentioned in the bills of lading

had been shipped to their firm for sale under the arrangement

before described.

Beyond doubtJhe_ bills o f lading gave some credit to the bills

ofexchange beyond what was created by the pecuniary standing

indorsee in dischar<Te of his le al obligation as such, is not a
payment by mistake nor without cons1 eration, un ss 1t be shown
that the instrument wa fraudulent in its inception, or that the
·11.eg.al, or that the facts and circumstances
con ideration
;-hich im each the transaction, as between the · acceptor and
drawer were known to the payee or subsequent indorsee at the
time he became the holder of the instrument. (Fitch v. Jones,
5 Elli & Blackburn, 238; Arbouin v. Anderson) I Adolphus &
Ellis, N. S. 498; Smith v. Braine) 16 Id., N. S. 244; Hall v.
Featherstone) 3 Hurlstone & Norman, 287).
Such an instrument, as between the payee and the acceptor,,
imports a sufficient consideration, and in a suit by the former
against the latter the defence of prior equities. as between the
acceptor and drawer, is not open unle s it be shown that the
payee, at the time he became the holder of the instrument, had
knowledge of those facts and circumstances.
Attempt is made in argument to show that the plaintiffs
accepted the bills of exchange upon the faith and security of the
bills of lading attached to the same at the time the bills of
exchange were discounted by the defendants. Suppose it was so,
which is not satisfactorily proved, still it is not perceived that the
concession, if made, would benefit the plaintiffs, as the bills of
exchange are in the usual form and contain no reference whatever to the bills of lading, and it is not pretended that the defendants had any knowledge or intimation that the bill of lading were
not genuine, nor is it pretended that they made any representation
upon the subject to induce the plaintiffs to contract any such
liability. They received the bills of exchange in the usual course
of their business as a bank of discount and paid the full amount
of the net proceeds of the same to the drawers, and it is not even ·
suggested that any act of the defendants, except the indorsement
of the bills of exchange in the usual course of their business,
operated to the prejudice of the plaintiffs or prevented them from
making an earlier discovery of the true character of the transaction. On the contrary, it distinctly appears that the drawers of
the bill of exchange were the regular correspondents of the
plaintiffs, and that they becam the acceptors of the bills of
exchange at the request of the drawers of the same and upon
their representations that the flour mentioned in the bills of lading
had been shipped to their firm for sale under the arrangement
before described.
e ond doubt the bills of ladin
ave some credit to the bills
£! exchange beyond what was created by the pecuniary standing
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of the parties to the same, but i t is clear t hat theyji re n ot a part

of those instr uments nor are they referred to either in the bocry^

of the bill s or in the acceptance, and they cannot be regarded in

any more_ fa vorable light for the plaintiffs tha n as" collateral

securitx ac companying the bills of exchange.

Sent forward, as the bills of lading were, with the bills of

exchange, it is beyond question that the property in the same

passed to the acceptors when they paid the several amounts there-

in specified, as the lien, if any, in favor of the defendants was

then displaced and the plaintiffs became entitled to the instru-

ments as the muniments of title to the flour shipped to them for

sale and as security for the money which they had advanced under

the arrangement between them and the drawers of the bills of

exchange. Proof, th ere fore, that the bills of lading were forgeries

could not operate to discharge the liability of the plaintiffs, as

acceptor s, to pay the amounts to the payees or their indorsees, as

the payees were innocent holders, having paid value for the same

in the usual course of business . (Leather v. Simpson, Law

Reports, n Equity, 398).

Different rules apply between the immediate parties to a
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bill of exchange — as between the drawer and the acceptor, or

between the payee and the drawer — as the only consideration as

between those parties is that which moves from the plaintiff to

the defendant ; and the rule is, if that consideration fails, proof

of that fact is a good defence to the action. Bu t the rule is other-

wise betw een the remote parties to the bill, as, for example,

between the payee and the acceptor, or between the indorsee and

the acceptor, as two distinct considerations come in question in

every such case where the payee or indorsee became the holder

of the bill before it was overdue and without any knowledge of

the facts and circumstances which impeach the title as between

the immediate parties to the instrument. Those two considera- ^ c

tions are as follows : First, that which the defendant received for T

his li ability, and, secondly, that which the plaintiff gave for his

title, and the rule is well settled that the action between the

remote parties to the bill will not be defeated unless there be an

absence or failure of both these considerations . (Robinson v.'

Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 202 ; Same v. Same, in error, lb. 210 ; Byles on

Bills [5th Am. Ed.], 124; Thiedcmann v. Goldschmidt, 1 De Gex,

Fisher & Jones, Ch. App. 10).

Unless both co nsiderations fai l in a suit by the payee against

the ac ceptor, it is clear that the action may be maintained, and ^, p-^i\^c^

many decided cases affirm the rule, where the suit is in the name X^> oj^w^v^

of the arties to the same, but it is clear that th
are not a part
of thos in trum nts nor are they r f rred to either in the body
~ the bills or in the acceptance, and the cannot e re arded in
an more favorable light for th plaintiffs t an as collateral
ecurit accom an ing the i s o · exchan e.
S nt forward, as the bills of lading were, with the bills of
exchange, it is beyond que tion that the property in the same
passed to the acceptors when they paid the several amount thereln specified, as the lien, if any, in favor of the defendants was
then displaced and the plaintiff b came entitled to the instruments as the muniments of title to the flour shipped to them for
sale and as security for the mol'ley which they had advanced under
the arrangement between them and the drawers of the bills of
exchange. Proof therefore that the bills of ladin were for enes
could not operate to discharge the liability of the plaintiffs, as
acceptor , to pay the amounts to the a ees or their indorsees, as
Jhe payees v ere innocent alders, having paid value for the ame
in the usual course of business. (Leather v. Simpson, Law
Reports, I I Equity, 398).
Different rules apply between the immediate parties to a
bill of exchange-as between the drawer and the acceptor, or
between the payee and the drawer-a the only consideration as
between those partie is that which moves from the plaintiff to
the defendant; and the rule i J if that consideration fail , proof
of that fact is a good defence to the action. But the rule is otherwise between the remot parties to the bill as for example,
between the payee and the acceptor, or between the indorsee and
the acceptor, as two di tinct con iderations come in que tion in
every uch case where the payee or indor ee became the holder
of the bill before it was overdue and without any knowledge of
the facts and circumstances which impeach the title as between
t?e immediate parties ~o the in tru:n nt. Tho e two co~ ideraV'I ~
tions are as follovvs : Fir t. that which the defendant received for~
· ~
.his liability, and, secondly, that which the plaintiff gave for hi ~
title, and the rule is well settled that the action between the k o- ~
remote parti to the bill will not be d feated unle there be an
~\
Robinson v. ~ ~ ~
absence or failure of both these con iderations.
Reynolds, 2 Q. B. 202 · Same v. am in rror, lb. 210 · B) le on ~ p h _
Bills [5th Am. Ed.], 124; Thiedemann v. Goldschniidt I De Gex, ~ o...
Fisher & Jones, Ch. App. IO).
l ~ 9 & ,"- .le-<
Unless both considerations fail in a suit b the a e ao-ain t ~ 1 ~
the acceptor, it 1s clear that the action ma b maintain d an
v, ~
many deci e cases affirm the rul e, where the uit is in the name ~
~
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of a remote indorsee against the acceptor, that if any intermediate

holder between the defendant and the plaintiff gave value for the

bill, such an intervening consideration will sustain the title of

the plaintiff. (Hunter v. Wilson, 4 Exchequer 489; Boyd v. Mc-

Cami, 10 Maryland, 118; Howell v. Crane, 12 Louisiana Annual,

126; Watson v. Flanagan, 14 Texas, 354).

Where it was arranged between a drawer and his corres-

pondent that the latter would accept his bills in consideration of

produce to be shipped or transported to the acceptor for sale,

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, (Craig v. Sibbett et al.,

15 Pennsylvania, 240), that the acceptor was bound to the payee

by his general acceptance of a bill, although it turned out that

the bill of lading forwarded at the same time with the bill of

exchange was fraudulent, it not being shown that the payee of

the bill was privy to the fraud. Evidence was introduced in that

case showing that the payee knew what the terms of the arrange-

ment between the drawer and the payee were, but the court held

that mere knowledge of the fact was not sufficient to constitute

a defence, as the payee was not a party to the arrangement and

was not in any respect a surety for the good faith and fair dealing
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of the shipper.

Failure of consideration, as between the drawer and acceptor

of_a_ bHT of exchange, is no defence to an action brought by the

payelfa gajnsVt he acceptor, if the accept ance wa s unconditional in

its terrn~sTano r Tr a^pxaj ^_ihat the plaintiff paid value for the^bill,

even though the acceptor was_ defraudcil Ly^ jhe_ drawer, unless rt

]5e~ shown that TEHp a yee had knowledge of the fraudulent acts

gf__tHe 3rawer bejo^ejhej^irl snrh valnp a nd became the holder.

of the instrument . (United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15

PetersT393).

Testimony to show that the payees were not bona fide holders

of the bills would be admissible in a suit by them against the

acceptors, and would constitute, if believed, a good defence, but

the evidence in this case does not show that they did anything

that is not entirely sanctioned by commercial usage. They dis-

counted these bills and they had a right to present them for

of a remote indorsee against the acceptor, that if any intermediate
holder between the defendant and the plaintiff gave value for the
bill, such an intervening consideration will sustain the title of
the plaintiff. (Hunter v. Wilson, 4 Exchequer 489; Boyd v. McCann, IO Maryland, II8; Howell v. Crane, 12 Louisiana Annual,
126; ~Vatson v. Fla.nagan, 14 Texas, 354).
Where it was arranged between a drawer and his correspondent that the latter would accept his bills in consideration of
produce to be shipped or transported to the acceptor for sale,
the upreme Court of Pennsylvania held, (Craig v. Sibbett et al.,
15 Pennsylvania, 240), that the acceptor was bound to the payee
by hi general acceptance of a bill, although it turned out that
the bill of lading forwarded at the same time with the bill of
exchange was fraudulent, it not being shown that the payee of
the bill was privy to the fraud. Evidence was introduced in that
case hawing that the payee knew what the terms of the arrangement between the drawer and the payee were, but the court held
that mere knowledge of the fact was not sufficient to constitute
a defence, as the payee was not a party to the arrangement and
was not in any respect a surety for the good faith and fair dealing
of the shipper.
Failure of consideration, as between the drawer and acceptor
of a bi o excfiange. is no defence to aI1aCtion broug t y t e
payee-a-gam t the acceptor, if t e acceptance was uncon 1t10na m
1 s erms, an 1t a ears hat t
lain ·
aid v
or t e 1
even thou
t 1e ·acce tor

acceptance, and having obtained the acceptance they have an

undoubted right to apply the proceeds collected from the acceptors

to their own indemnity. (Thiedemann v. Goldschmidt et al., 1

De Gex, Fisher & Jones, Ch. App. 10; Robinson v. Reynolds, 2

Q. B.211).

Forgery of the bills of lading would be a good defence to an

action on the bills if the defendants in this case had been the

eters, 393).
Testimony to show that the payees were not bona fide holders
of the bills would be admissible in a suit by them against the
acceptors, and would constitute, if believed, a good defence, but
the evidence in this case does not show that they did anything
that is not entirely sanctioned by commercial usao-e. They discounted these bills and they had a right to present them for
acceptance, and havin obtained the acceptance they have an
undoubted right to apply the proceeds collected from the acceptors
to their own indemnity. ( Thiedemann v. Goldschmidt et al., l
De Gex, Fisher & Jones, Ch. App. ro; Robinson v. Reynolds, 2
Q. B. 211).
Forgery of the bills of lading would be a good defence to an
action on the bills if the defendants in this case had been the
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drawers, but they were payees and holders for value in the reg-

ular course of business, and the case last referred to, which was

decided in the Exchequer Chamber, shows that such an accept-

ance binds the acceptor conclusively as between them and every

bout tide holder for value.

Very many cases decide that the drawee of a bill of exchange

is bound to know the handwriting of his correspondent, the

drawer, and that if he accepts or pays a bill in the hands of a

bona tide holder for value, he is concluded by the act, although

the bill turns out to be a forgery. If he has accepted he must pay,

and if he has paid he cannot recover the money back, as the

money, in such a case, is paid in pursuance of a legal obligation

as understood in the commercial law. (Goddard v. Merchants'

Bank, 4 Comstock, 149; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Id.

234; Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheaton,

348; Price v. Neal, 3 Burrow, 1355).

Difficulty sometimes arises in determining whether the plain-

tiff, in an action on a bill of exchange, is the immediate promisee

of the defendant, or whether he is to be regarded as a remote

party, but it is settled law that the payee, where h e disc ounts
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the bill at thejgque st of the drawer, is regarded as a stranger

teethe ac ceptor in respect to the consideration for the acceptance ;

consequently, if the acceptance is absolute in its terms and the

bill is received in good faith and for value, it is no answer to an

action by him that the defendant received no consideration for

his acceptance or that the consideration therefor has failed ; and

it is immaterial in that behalf whether the bill was accepted while

in the hands of the drawer and at his request, or whether it had

passed into the hands of the payee before acceptance and was

accepted at his request. (Parsons on Bills, 179; Munroe v. Bor-

dier, 8 C. B. 862).

Certain other defences, such as that the payments were volun-

tarily made, and that the title to the bills at the time the payments

were made was in the National Park Bank, were also set up by

the defendants, but the court does not find it necessary to exam-

ine those matters, as they are of the opinion that the payments

if made to the payees of the bills, as contended by the plaintiffs,

were made in pursuance of a legal obligation and that the money

cannot be recovered back. Judgment affirmed.

drawers, but they were payees and holders for value in the regular course of busin , and the case last referred to, which was
<l cid d in the Exchequer Chamber, shows that such an acceptance binds the acceptor conclusiv ly a between them and every
bont fide holder for value.
Very many ca
d cide that the dra-v ee of a bill of exchange
is bound to know th hand\ riting of his corre pondent, the
drawer, and that if he ace pt or pays a bill in the hands of a
bona fide holder for valu , he is concluded by the act, although
the bill turn out to be a forgery. If h has accepted he must pay,
and if he has paid h cannot recover the money back, as the
money, in such a case, i paid in pur uance of a legal obligation
as under toad in the commercial law. ( Goddarrd v. Merchants'
Bank, 4 Comstock, 149; Bank of Co11imerce v. Union Bank, 3 Id.
234; Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, IO Wheaton,
348; Price v. Neal, 3 Burrow, 1355).
Difficulty ometimes arises in determining whether the plaintiff, in an action on a bill of exchange, is the immediate promisee
of the defendant, or whether he is to be regarded as a remote
party, but it is ettled law that the payee, where he discounts
the bill at the regue t of the drawer, is regarded as a stranger
to the acceptor in re pect to the consideration for the acceptance ;
70n equently, if the acceptance is absolute in its terms and the
bill i received in good faith and for value, it is no an wer to an
action by him that the defendant received no consideration for
hi acceptance or that the consideration therefor ha failed; and
it i immaterial in that behalf whether the bill was accepted while
in the hand of the drawer and at his request, or whether it had
passed into the hands of the payee b fore acceptance and was
accepted at hi reque t. (Parson on Bills, 179; Mitnroe v. Bordier, 8 C. B. 862).
Certain other defences, such as that the payment were voluntarily made, and that the title to the bills at the time the paym nt
were made wa in th National Park Bank, were al o et up b
the defendants, but the ourt does not find it neces ary to examine tho e matters, as th y are of the opinion that the payment
if made to the payees of the bill , as conten d b the plaintiff
' ere made in pur uance of a legal obligation and that the money
Judgnient affirm d.
cannot be recovered back.
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§29-

Stoddard v. Kimball (1830), 6 Cush. (Mass.) 469.

§ 29.

O. P. Lord, for the plaintiffs.

N. J. Lord, for the defendant.

Stoddard v. Kimball (1850), 6 Cush. (Mass.) 469.

Shaw, C.J. This was a suit brought by the plaintiff as

indorsee of a promissory note, against the defendant as indorser.

The defence relied on was, that the defendant indorsed the note,

0. P. Lord, for the plaintiffs.
N . J. Lord, for the defendant.

at the request and for the accommodation of the maker, for a

special purpose, that of taking up another note on which he was

indorser, and that it was not so applied, but was negotiated to the

plaintiffs, as collateral security for a debt due to them. The

defendant also contended, that the plaintiffs, at the time of taking

the note, had notice of the misapplication of the same, as above

stated ; but this fact was left to the jury, who found that the

pj^hitiffsjiad^no such notice .

It further appeared, that some payments had been made by

the maker of the note to the plaintiffs, towards the discharge of

the debt, for securing which to the plaintiffs this note was

received, and also that the maker being insolvent, the plaintiffs
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proved this debt against his estate, and received a dividend.

The defendant contended, that if liable at all, he was liable

only for the balance of the debt due the plaintiffs, if less than

the amount of the note, and the judge, who tried the cause, so

ruled, subject to the opinion of the whole court, and in case they

should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover

the whole amount, the verdict is to be altered and amended

accordingly.

We think the direction was right. An indorser of an accom-

modation note, passed by indorsement to a bona fide holder, in

due course of business, is effectually bound to all the liability, .-to

which, by law, the indorser of a business note is liable. He stip-

ulates to take on himself the qualified obligation of one, who

indorses and puts in circulation a note taken by himself for value

in the course of business.

If indeed an accommodation note is obtained from another,

by fraud, deception, or false practices, or having been obtained for

one purpose, is fraudulently misapplied to another, and it is nego-

tiated to one, even for value, with full notice of the fraud in obtain-

ing or misusing it, he cannot recover ; he is not a bona fide holder ;

an attempt to recover it would make him a partaker in the fraud ;

and the same would be true of a business note.

SHAW, C.J.
This was a suit brought by the plaintiff as
indor ee of a promi sory note, against the defendant as indorser.
The defence relied on was, that the defendant indorsed the note,
at the request and for the accommodation of the maker, for a
special purpose, that of taking up another note on which he was
indor er, and that it was not so applied, but was negotiated to the
plaintiffs, as collateral security for a debt due to them. The
defendant also contended, that the plaintiffs, at the time of taking
the note, had notice of the mi application of the same, as above
stated; but this fact was left to the jury, who found that the
plaintiff had no such notice.
It further appeared, that some payments had been made by
the maker of the note to the plaintiffs, towards the discharge of
the debt, for securing which to the plaintiffs this note was
received, and also that the maker being insolvent, the plaintiffs
proved this debt against his estate, and received a dividend.
The defendant contended, that if liable at all, he was liable
only for the balance of the debt due the plaintiffs, if less than
the amount of the note, and the judge, who tried the cause, so
ruled, subject to the opinion of the whole court, and in case they
should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover
the whole amount, the verdict is to be altered and amended
accordingly.
We think the direction was right. An indorser of an accommodation note, passed by indorsement to a bona fide holder, in
due course of business, is effectually bound to all the liability, .to
which, by law, the indorser of a business note is liable. He tipulates to take on himself the qualified obligation of one, wh o
indorses and puts in circulation a note taken by himself for valu e
in the course of business.
If indeed an accommodation note is obtained from another,
by fraud, deception, or false practices, or having been obtained for
one purpose, is fraudulently misapplied to another, and it is neo-otiated to one, even for value, with full notice of the fraud in obtaining or misusing it, he cannot recover; be i not a bona fide holder;
an attempt to recover it would make him a partaker in the fraud ~
and the same would be true of a business note.
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In the present case. jt_a rjpearing that the note was negotiated

to_the plainti ffs before it was due, for a valuable considerati on^

and the jury having found that they took it without notice of__

thejriisapplication by the maker, it is clear that they have a r ight

to r ecover; and the _only_ remaining g^estionjSj_for what am ount

they may recover . In general, the holder of an indorsed note

yvill b e entitled to recover the whole amount of the face of the

note, because the presumption of fact, in the absence of counter

proof, is, that he gave the full value for it, or that he took it

from some other holder for value, to collect the amount, receive

a certain part to his own use, and account to the party from whom

he took it for the surplus. Having taken it to secu re a pre-

existing debt, of a less amount, he is a holder for value in his

ow n right, only to the amount of the debt due him. If therefore

it appears in proof, that the plaintiff is not accountable to any

third person for any surplus, then there is no reason why he

should recover any more than the balance of the debt, for which

he is a bona fide holder for value. Here, it appears that the

plain tiff received this note of th e maker, for w hose ac commoda -

tion the jdefendan t indorsed it It being obvious, that the plaintiff
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can recover nothing as trustee for the party from whom lie

receive d it, he is liable over to nobody for the surplu s, and there-

fore can have judgment only for the amount due to himself, for

his own use and in his own right, which is so much of the note

as may be necessary to satisfy the balance of the debt, f or the

secunty__Q_f_ which he receiveTHt .

Judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff for the smalle r sum.

JiRedfern et al. v. Rosenthal et al. (1902), 86 L. T. R. 855.

This was an appeal by the defendants from a judgment of

the King's Bench Division (Channell and Bucknill, JJ.), affirm-

ing a decision of the judge of the Birmingham County Court.

The action was brought against the acceptors of a bill of

exchange, dated the 23d June, 1899, for 200/., payable four

months after date.

The facts appear in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls.

It may further be added that, on the 7th Oct., 1899, ^

appeared that the plaintiffs first learnt that the bill was an accom-

modation bill.

In the pre ent case, it a e r
· ed
to the laintiffs before it was d~u~~f>l.!r"----1<!!:-!.~~~~~~:.!...!:!:.~~
and the jury having found that th
ook_ it with.o_ut notice
the mi a lication b th maker it is clear that th
to recover j_ and the onl r mainin
uestion i for what am
~
o~
th
ma recover. In eneral the holder of an indorsed note
will be entitled to r cover the whole amount of the face of the
note, because the presumption of fact, in the ab ence of count r
proof, is, that he gav the full value for it, or that he took it
from some other holder for value, to collect the amount, rec ive
a certain part to his own u e, and account to the party from whom
he took it for the urplus. Havin taken it to secure a reexisting debt, of a le s amount, he is a holder for value in his
own right, only to the amount of the debt due him. If therefore
it appears in proof, that the plaintiff is not accountable to any
third p r on for any surplus, then there is no reason why he
hould recover any more than the balance of the debt, for which
he is a bona fide holder for value. Here, it appears that the
laintiff received thi note of the maker, for whose accommodation the de endant in or e it.It being obvious, that the plaintiff
~at] recover nothin
as trustee for the art from whom he
received it, he is liable over to nobody for the surplus. and therefore can have judgment only for the amount due to himself.!.. for
his own use and in his own right, which is so much of the note
as may be neces ary to satisfy th e balance of the debt, for the
securit
·
e1ve it.

Judgt.1"'ent on the verdict for the plaintiff for the smaller sum.

'j.Redfern et aJ.. v. Rosenthal et al. ( 1902), 86 L. T. R. 855.
This was an appeal by the defendants from a judoment of
the King's Bench Division (Channell and Bucknill, JJ. ) affirming a decision of the judge of the Birmingham County Court.
The action was brought against the ace ptor of a bill of
exchang , dated the 23d June, I 9 , for 2ool., pa able four
months after date.
The facts appear in the judgment of the Master of 'the Rolls.
It may further be added that, on the 7th
ct., 1899, it
appeared that the plaintiffs fir t learnt that the bill was an accommodation bill.
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The judgment of the King's Bench Division is reported 85

L. T. Rep. 313.

The Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 61) pro-

vides as follows :

Sect. 27, sub-sect. 3. Where the holder of a bill has a lien on

it, arising either from contract or by implication of law, he is

deemed to be a holder for value to the extent of the sum for which

he has a lien.

Collins, M.R. This is an appeal from a judgment of the

Divisional Court, consisting of Channell and Bucknill, JJ., who

affirmed a decision of the judge of the Birmingham County Court,

but on different grounds. The transaction which gave rise to

the action is somewhat complicated, but the facts are shortly these :

Rosenthal Brothers were desirous of raising some money, and

for this purpose sent to Bischoffswerder a bill of exchange, dated

the 23d June, 1899, payable four months after date accepted by

them, and they requested him to fill in his name as drawer, and

get the bill discounted for them. Bischoffswerder filled in his

name as drawer, indorsed the bill in blank, and handed it to a man

named Lewis, who agreed to get it discounted. Lewis then
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claimed a right to keep the bill, on the ground of Bischoffswerder

being in debt to him. The bill in Lewis' hands being a fully nego-

tiable instrument, Bischoffswerder at once in July instructed his

solicitors, Messrs. Redfern and Son, who are the plaintiffs in the

present action, to commence an action against Lewis in order to

stop him from negotiating it, and to get it back from him. An

interlocutory injunction was obtained, restraining Lewis until the

trial of the action from negotiating the bill. The action came on

for trial at Birmingham Assizes in Dec, 1899, so that by that

time the bill was overdue. Bischoffswerder obtained a verdict

and judgment for the recovery of the bill. At the end of the

trial the bill was handed over by Lewis to the managing clerk of

Messrs. Redfern and Son. The clerk showed the bill to Bischoff-

swerder and to Rosenthal Brothers, who were present in court,

but after looking at it they handed it back to the clerk, who said

that Messrs. Redfern and Son had a right to retain it as they

had a lien on it for their costs. The present action was then

brought by Messrs. Redfern and Son to recover the amount of

their costs in Bischoffswerder's action against Lewis. The action

is brought not only against Bischoffswerder, who is clearly liable

for the costs, but also against Rosenthal Brothers as acceptors of

the bill, for so much of the amount due upon the bill as will sat-

isfy the plaintiffs' claim for costs. The County Court judge held

The judgment of the King's Bench Division is reported 85

L. T. Rep. 313.
The Bill of Exchange Act 1882 ( 45 and 46 Viet. c. 61) provide as follow :
Sect. 27, ub-sect. 3. Where the holder of a bill has a lien on
it, ari ing either from contract or by implication of law, he is
deemed to be a holder for value to the extent of the sum for which
he ha a lien.
COLLIN , M.R. This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Divi ional Court, consisting of Channell and Bucknill, JJ., who
affirmed a decision of the judge of the Birmingham County Court,
but on different ground . The transaction which gave rise to
the action is somewhat complicated, but the facts are shortly these:
Ro enthal Brothers were desirous of raising some money, and
for this purpose sent to Bischoff werder a bill of exchange, dated
the 23d June, 18g9, payable four months after date accepted by
them, and they reque ted him to fill in hi name as drawer, and
get the bill discounted for them. Bischoffswerder filled in his
name as drawer, indor ed the bill in blank, and handed it to a man
named Lewis, who agreed to get it di counted. Lewis then
claimed a right to keep the bill, on the ground of Bischoff swerd r
being in debt to him. The bill in Lewis' hands being a fully negotiable instrument, Bischoffswerder at once in July instructed his
solicitors, Messrs. Redfern and Son, who are the plaintiffs in the
present action, to commence an action against Lewis in order to
stop him from negotiating it, and to get it back from him. An
int rlocutory injunction was obtained, restraining Lewis until the
trial of the action from negotiating the bill. The action came on
for trial at Birmingham Assizes in Dec., 1899, so that by that
time the bill was overdue. Bischoffswerder obtained a verdict
and judgment for the recovery of the bill. At the end of the
trial the bill was handed over by Lewis to the managing clerk of
Me rs. Redfern and Son. The clerk showed the bill to Bi choffswerder and to Rosenthal Brothers, who were present in court.
but after looking at it they handed it back to the cl rk, who said
that Messrs. Redfern and Son had a right to retain it as they
had a lien on it for their costs. The present action was then
brought by Messrs. Redfern and Son to recover the amount of
th ir costs in Bischoffswerder's action against Lewis. The action
is brought not only against Bischoffswerder, who is clearly liable
for the costs, but also against Rosenthal Brothers as acceptors of
the bill, for so much of the amount due upon the bill as will satisfy the plaintiffs' claim for costs. The County Court judge held
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that Rosenthal Brothers were liable upon the bill, under sect. 2J,

sub-sect. 3, of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, and that judg-

ment was affirmed by the King's Bench Division. Rosenthal

Brothers have appealed against this decision. Bischoffswerder is

no party to the appeal. Now, sect. 27, sub-sect. 3, provides that

where the holder of a bill has a lien on it, arising either from

contract or by implication of law, he is deemed to be a holder for

value to the extent of the sum for which he has a lien. The plain-

tiffs' argument was that they were holders of the bill, and as

they had a lien on it, they were holders for value, and were there-

fore entitled to recover in this action. Now, there was some

evidence at the trial of the action that Rosenthal Brothers and

Bischoffswerder, after some discussion with the plaintiffs' clerk,

had handed the bill to him for the purpose of Messrs. Redfern

and Son's lien so as to make him holder for value. A contro-

versy arose as to this evidence, and thereupon the plaintiffs said

that they did not wish to rely upon that ground, and that they

relied solely upon their common law rights of lien and on the

Bills of Exchange Act 1882. Now, upon these facts I am of

opinion that the plaintiffs have no right of action against Ros en-
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thal Br others. The bill was handed by Rosenthal Brothers to

Bischoffswerder for a speci fic purpose — nam ely, to get i t dis-

counted — and that purpose failed. When the bill came into the

plaintiffs' hands it was overdue. It was not a negotiable instru-

meni7 As between the plaintiffs and the defendants the bill never

was a living instrument. The plaintiffs when they first got pos-

session of the document as Bischoffswerder's solicitors knew all

these facts about it. Yet it was contended that by getting the

physical custody of this piece of paper and having done work as

solicitors they had acquired the rights of a holder for value under

the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and could sue the acceptors of

the bill. It seems to me jmrjos^ibleJix^a^J±LaLb^^tm^JioMjlL

an^oyerdue bill such as this they became holders forj Ealue. The

bill should have been re-issued in order to give them any rights

upon it. They have misconceived their position. Their rights

against the defendants in respect of their lien were no greater

than the rights of Bischoffswerder on the bill against the defend-

ants. Bischoffswerder, under the circumstances that I have men-

tioned, could not, with the plaintiffs' knowledge of the facts, give

them any rights on the bill qua bill. The instrument when they

received it was dead, and they could not treat it as a living one.

That is enough to decide this case. It is not necessary to give

any opinion as to what the plaintiffs' rights would have been if

that Rosenthal Brothers were liable upon the bill, un er sect. 27,
ub- ect. 3, of the ills of Exchange ct l 2 and that judgment was affirmed by the King's
ench
rv1s10n.
osenlhal
Brothers have app al d again t thi deci ion. Bi choffswerder is
no party to the app al.
ow, sect. 27 ub-sect. 3, provides that
wher th holder of a bill ha a lien on it, ari ing either from
contra t or by implication of law he i deemed to be a holder for
value to the extent of the um for which h ha a li n. The plaintiffs' argument \vas that th y w re holders of the bill, and as
they had a lien on it, th y were holders for value, and ' ere therefor
ntitled to recov r in, this action. Now, there was some
evidence at the trial of the action that Rosenthal Brothers and
Bischoff w rd r, after some di cu sion with the plaintiffs' clerk,
had handed the bill to him for the purpo e of Mess rs. Redfern
and on' lien so a to make him holder for value. A controer y arose as to thi evidence, and thereupon the plaintiffs aid
that th y did not wi h to rely upon that ground, and that they
relied solely upon their common law rights of lien and on the
Bills of Exchange ct 1882. Now, upon these facts I am of
opinion that the plaintiffs have no right of action again t Ro enthal rother . The bill was handed by Ro enthal Brothers to
Bischoffsvverder for a specific purpose-namely. to get it di counted-and that purpo e failed. When the bill came into the
laintiff ' hands it wa overdue. It was not a negotiable in tru1!@1.t. A b tween the plaintiffs and the defendant the bill never
v as a living instrument. The plaintiff wh n they fir t got possession of the document as Bi choff werder' olicitor knew all
the e fact about it. Yet it wa contended that by o-etting the
physical cu tody of thi piece of paper and having done work as
solicitors t hey had acquired the rights of a holder for alue under
the Bill s of Exchange Act 1882 and could sue the acceptor of
th e bill. I t eems to me impossible ta say that by getti ng bold of
an overdue bill such a thi the b am holders fo
The
bill should have been re-i ued in order to give them an r io-ht
upon it. Th y have mi conceiv d their po ition. Their ri ht
again t th e defendants in resp ct of th ir lien were no o-r at r
than the right of i chaff werd r on the bill again t the d f ndants. B i chaff wer der, under th cir um tance that I hav mentioned, could not, with th plaintiff knO\ led e of the fact , o-ive
th em any rig hts on the bill qua bill. The in trum nt wh n the
receiv d it was dead, and th y could not t reat it a a Ii ino- one.
1 hat i enough to decid thi ca . It i not nee ary to o-ive
any opinion a to what th e plain tiffs ri o-ht \ ould ha e been if
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the document had been a living bill. The appeal must therefore

be allowed. In the Divisional Court Channel, J., seems to have

given judgment with great hesitation, and I think he accepted an

inference of fact which was not supported by the evidence. The

court seems to have lost sight of the view that at the time .when

the plaintiffs' supposed lien came into existence, the instrument

had, under ^Ee~arcumstances,'"ceased to be a n egotiable^jnstnr:

ment.

Mathew, LJ. I am of the same opinion. It is said that

the effect of the judgment in the action by Bischoffswerder against

Lewis to restrain the negotiation of the bill was to restore a nego-

tiable character to the bill and give the plaintiffs a right to sue

upon it. That would be a very extraordinary result. When the

bill wa s given up it was a security for nothing. It was jnere_

waste paper. It was dead in law, as the plaintiffs must have

known. Yet it is contended that the document by being handed

to the plaintiffs acquired a new lease of life, and became a nego-

tiable instrument. The plaintiffs _jobtajned_no JHQrej-ight against

the defendants than Bischoffswerder ha d : and tha t_was none at

all The only difficulty in the case has been caused by some
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uncertainty as to what were the actual findings of the County

Court judge. I agree that the appeal must be allowed.

Cozens-Hardy, L.J. I am of the same opinion. Many

interesting points have been raised, but on the actual facts of the

case I see no great difficulty. The ^oj^itorsjiad _ allien o n their

client's interest in the bill, but wh en they got, poss ession of the,

bill_ Bischoffswerder had no rights against the defendants. The

docum ent ha d ceased to be a real bilk It was recovered by

Bischofr^werHer in his action against Lewis for the very purpose

of preventing its being negotiated. The plaintiffs are in no better

position than Bischoffswerder, who had no rights on the bill

against the defendants. It is unnecessary to give my opinion on

what the rights of the plaintiffs might have been if the bill had

not been overdue when they got possession of it. i^_ *~*\-

Appeal allowed.

the document had been a living bill. The appeal must therefore
be allowed. In the Divisional Court Channel, J., seems to have
given judgment with great hesitation, and I think he accepted an
inference of fact which wa not supported by the evidence. The
court seems to have lost sight of the view that at the time when
the plaintiffs' supposed lien came into existence the i
had, under t e c1rcilmstances, -ceasedtobe a ~eg~tiable instrument.
1ATHEW, L.J. I am of the same opinion. It is said that
the effect of the judgment in the action by Bischoff swerder against
Lewi to re train the neaotiation of the bill was to restore a negotiable character to the bill and give the plaintiffs a right to sue
upon it. That would be a very extraordinary result. When the
bill was given up it wa a security for nothing. It was mere
waste a er. It wa dead in law, as the plaintiffs must have
known. Yet it is contended that the document by being handed
to the plaintiffs acquired a new lease of life, and became a negotiable instrument. The plaintiffs obtained no mar~ right against
the defendants than Bi_sch<?.ffswerder bad; and that was none at
..fill The only difficulty in the case has b en caused by some
uncertainty as to what were the actual findings of the County
Court judge. I agree that the appeal must be allowed.
CozENS-HARDY, L.J. I am of the same opinion. Many
interesting points have been raised, but on the actual facts of the
case I see no great difficulty. The solicitors had a lien on t ·
ot possession of the
client's interest in the bill, but when the
bill Bischoffswerder had no rights against the defendants. Ik
document had ceased to be a real bill. It was recovered by
Bischo swerder in his action against Lewis for the very purpose
of preventing its being negotiated. The plaintiffs are in no better
position than Bischoffswerder, who had no rights on the bill
against the defendants. It is unnecessary to give my opinion on
what the rights of the plaintiffs might have been if the bill had
not been overdue when they got possession of it.
~ ~·
~

Appeal a~lowed.
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Section V. — Contract of Primary Parties.

CONTRACT OF THE MAKER. § 62.

Walton v. Mascall (1844), 13 M. & W. 452.

SECTION

V.-

ONTRACT OF

RIMARY

p ARTIES.

This was an action on an agreement in writing, whereby the

defendant in consideration that the plaintiff would accept the

CONTRACT

F THE MAKER.

§ 62.

promissory note of one Johnson, payable six months after date,

for a debt due from Johnson, guarantied and undertook to pay

the amount to the plaintiff, provided the note was not duly hon-

Walton v. Mascall (1844), 13 M. & W. 452.

oured and paid by Johnson at maturity.

The defendant, being under terms to plead issuably, pleaded

a plea denying presentment to Johnson, and a plea denying notice

of the dishonour of the note to him the defendant.

Pollock, C.B. I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled

to the judgment of the Court. With respect to the last objection,

the declaration shows expressly, not only that the plaintiff did

give time by receiving the note, but that he took it under circum-

stances which compelled him to give time. The case of Kearslake

v. Morgan, 5 T. R. 513, establishes, that a creditor who receives

a neg otiable instrument "for and on account of" his debt is taken

to have received it in present satisfaction, and the rec eip t of it
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^operates as a su spension of the remedy upon the debt. As to the

other question, it turns a good deal upon what the parties are

This was an action on an ao-reement in writing, whereby the
defendant in consideration that the plaintiff would accept the
promis ory note of one Johnson, payable six months after date,
for a debt due from John on, guarantied and undertook to pay
the amount to the plaintiff, provided the note was not duly honoured and paid by John on at maturity.
The defendant, being under terms to plead issuably, pleaded
a. plea denying pr entment to John on, and a plea denying notice
of the dishonour of the note to him the defendant.

to be taken to have meant by the words "duly honoured and

paid" ; and it seems to me that those words, if they be any thing

more than mere tautology, must mean, honoured by being paid on

the day when the note became due, or paid at any time afterwards.

I cannot help thinking that the word "honoured" meant that the

note should be presented at any time, and, if paid at any time,

then the defendant should be discharged from liability. The real

question we have to decide is, whether the averment of a request

to pay has a different meaning in a declaration against the maker

of a note, and in a declaration against a guarantor for the maker.

It seems to me that it means the same thing in both cases ; it

would lead to much inconvenience to hold the contrary. Now,

against the maker of the note, that allegation would be mere form :

it must be sufficient to say that he had not paid the sum of money

in the note specified according to the tenor and effect thereof.

POLLOCK, C.B. I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled
to the judgment of the Court. With re pect to the last objection,
the declaration shows expressly, not only that the plaintiff did
give time by receiving the note, but that he took it under circumstance which compelled him to give time. The ca e of Kearslake
v. Morgan S T. . S13, e tablishes, that a creditor who receives
a negotiable instrument "for and on account of' hi debt i taken
to have received it in pre ent ati faction, and the receipt of it
operate a a su pen ion of the remedy upon the debt. A to the
other que tion, it turn a good deal upon what the parties are
to be taken to have meant by the word "duly honoured and
paid' ; and it seem to me that tho e word , if they be any thing
more than mere tautolo y, mu t mean, honoured by beino- paid on
the day when the not became due, or paid at any time afterwards.
I cannot help thinking that the word 'honoured ' meant that the
note hould be pre ented at any time, and if paid at any time,
thep the defendant should be di char d from liabilit . The real
question we have to decide i , whether the a erment of a reque t
to pay has a different meaning in a declaration again t the maker
of a note, and in a declaration aO"ain t a guarantor for the maker.
It eem to me that it means the ame thing in both ca e ; it
-v ould 1 ad to much inconvenience to hold the contrar . Now
again t the maker of the note, that all ation \ ould be mere form;
it mu t be sufficient to say that h had not pai the um of money
in the note specified according to th tenor and effect thereof.
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And if that would be sufficient as against him, it must be equally

so against the guarantor. T he real contract is, th at the makers

of the note shall pay it according _to_its tenor_and effect : an d it is

clear_that _they are bound to find out the h older_and^ pay him the

amount, w h en the note becomes due. It appears to me, therefore,

that a : _j)re sentment and request are immaterial ; and that our

judgment must be for the plaintiff.

Parke, B. I am of the same opinion. The first question

which arises in this case is as to the validity of the plea. The

declaration is on a guarantie, which states that, in consideration

that the plaintiff would receive the promissory note of two per-

sons therein mentioned, and thereby give time for the payment of

a debt due from one of those persons, the defendant promised to

pay the plaintiff the amount of the debt, if the note were not

''duly honoured and paid." The declaration then avers, that,

before the commencement of the suit, the note became due and

payable according to its tenor and effect, and that the makers,

although requested so to do, have not paid it, of which the defend-

ant had notice. The plea traverses the allegation of the request

to pay ; and to that there is a general demurrer. Now, it is clear
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that a request for the payment of a debt is quite immaterial, unless

the parties to the contract h ave stipulated that it shall be made :

if they have not, the law requires no notice or request ; but the

debtor is bound to find out the creditor and pay him the debt

wh en due. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant was bound

to pay the amount of the promissory note when it had become due

and was dishonoured, unless there was some condition precedent

to be performed by the plaintiff, which has not been performed.

It is argued, that this condition precedent is that the note shall

be presented for payment when due. But it seems to me that the

words "duly honoured and paid" are merely tautologous, and mean

simply that the note shall be paid when it becomes due. What I

am reported to have said in the case of Lezvis v. Gompertz, when

taken in connexion with the facts of that case, I hold to be per-

fectly correct. There can be no doubt that a mercantile man,

reading the notice of dishonour which was given in that case,

would necessarily infer that the bill had been duly presented for

payment when it became due. But no request or presentment is

ne cessary to charge the acceptor of a bill or the maker of a note ;

he is bound to pay it at maturity, and to find out the holder for

that purpose. Upon this contract of guarantie, therefore, it seems

to me that the word "honoured" means no more than the words

"duly paid," and that, inasmuch as this note has not been paid r

And if that '' ould be suffici ent as against him, it must be equally
o against th gua rantor. The real contract is, that the makers
of the n
l 1 a it accordin to its tenor and effect; and it is
clear that they are bound to find out the h~ md pay him the
amount, wh n the not becomes due. It appears to me, therefore,
that a resentment and re uest are immaterial; and that our
judgment mu t e or the plaintiff.
PARKE, B.
I am of the same opinion. The first question
which arises in this case is as to the validity of the plea. The
declaration i on a guarantie, which states that, in consideration
that the plaintiff would receive the promissory note of two perons ther in mentioned, and thereby give time for the payment of
a debt due from one of those per ons, th e defendant promised to
pay the plaintiff the amount of the debt, if the note were not
' duly honoured and paid." The declaration then avers, that,
before the commencement of the suit, the note became due and
payable according to its tenor and effect, and that the makers,
although requested so to do, have not paid it, of which the defendant had notice. The plea traverses the allegation of the request
to pay; and to that there is a general demurrer. Now, it is clear
that a request for the payment of a debt is uite immaterial, unle s
the parties to the contract 1ave stipulated that it shall be ma e:
if they have not, the law requires no notice or request; but the
debto r is bound to find out th e creditor and pay him the debt
when due. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant wa bound
to pay the amount of the promissory note when it had become due
and was dishonoured, unless there was some condition precedent
to be performed by the plaintiff, which has not been performed.
It is argued, that this condition precedent is that the note shall
be presented for payment when due. But it seems to me that the
words "duly honoured and paid" are merely tautologous, and mean
simply that th e note shall be paid when it becomes due. What I
am reported to have said in the case of Lewis v. Gowip ertz, when
taken in connexion with the facts of that case, I hold to be perfectly correct. There can be no doubt that a mercantile man ,
reading th e notice of dishonour which was given in that case,
would necessarily infer that the bill had been duly pre ented for
payment when it became due.
ut no request or presentment is
nece sary to charge the ac eptor of a bill or the maker of a note :
he is bound to pay it at maturity, and to find out the holder for
that purpose. Upon this contract of guarantie, therefore, it seems
to me that the word "honoured" means no more than the words
"duly paid," and that, inasmuch as this note has not been paid,.
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the defendant is chargeable. With respect to the other point, the

giving of a negotiable security for and on account of a debt

operates prima facie to suspend payment of the debt until it

becomes due. I think the declaration is perfectly sufficient, and

that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.

Gurney, B., and Rolfe, B., concurred.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

v.
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the defendant is chargea le. With respect to the other point, the
giving of a negotiable security for and on account of a debt
perate prima facie to su pend paym nt of the debt until it
b comes due. I think the declaration is perfectly sufficient, and
that th plaintiff is ntitl d to judgm nt.
URNEY, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred.

Gumz v. Giegling (1896), 108 Mich. 295.

Judgment [or the p~aintiff.

Error to Manistee. McMahon, J.

Assumpsit by Rudolph Gumz and others, as copartners, doing

business under the firm name of R. Gumz & Co., against Henry

J. Giegling and Cornelius A. Waal, on a promissory note. From

a judgment for plaintiffs on verdict directed by the court, defend-

ant Waal brings error. Affirmed.

This suit was brought upon a promissory note for $700

Gumz v. Giegling (1896), 108 Mich. 295.

dated August 14, 1893, payable to the order of R. Gumz & Co.,

one year from date, indorsed by defendant Waal. The defendant

Waal pleaded the general issue, with notice that the note was

Error to Mani tee.

McMahon,

J.

given for a prior indebtedness of defendant Giegling; that Waal,

when applied to by plaintiffs to indorse the note, refused to do
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so, and was induced to indorse the same on the representation

of plaintiffs that his signature was to be a matter of form, and

not for the purpose of creating any liability on his part, but was

to be used only to enable them to have an additional argument

and lever to use upon Giegling to induce him to pay the note;

and that plaintiffs promised that no claim or demand should be

made on him for payment, and that his signature should not be

considered as creating any liability. At the conclusion of the

proofs, the court directed a verdict in plaintiffs' favor.

George L. Hillikcr, for appellant.

Dovel & Smith, for appallees.

Grant, J. (after stating the facts). Plaintiffs had sold meat

to defendant Giegling, who kept a meat shop in Manistee. The

account was an open one, and had been running between four and

five months previous to the date of the note. They refused to

sell him any more goods unless the account was paid or secured.

Giegling was unable to pay, and Mr. Schaaf, plaintiffs' agent,

Assumpsit by Rudolph Gumz and others, a copartners, doing
I usines under the firm name of R. Gumz & Co., against Henry
J. Giegling and Cornelius A. Waal, on a promi sory note. From
a judgment for plaintiffs on verdict directed by the court, defendant Waal brings error. Affirmed.
This suit wa brought upon a promissory note for $700
dated Au ust 14, 1893, payable to the order of R. Gumz & Co.,
one year from date, indor ed by defendant Waal. The defendant
Waal pleaded the general i sue, with notice that the note wa
given for a prior indebtedness of defendant Giegling · that Waal,
when applied to by plaintiffs to indor e the note, refu ed to do
so, and wa induced to indor e the ame on the repre entation
of plaintiffs that his signature was to be a matter of form and
not for the purpose of creating any liability on hi part, but wa
to be u ed only to enable them to have an additional aro-ument
and lever to use upon Giegling to induce him to pay the note;
and that plaintiffs promised that no claim or demand should be
made on him for payment, and that hi signature hould not be
t the conclusion of the
considered as creating any liability.
proof , the court directed a verdict in plaintiff favor.

George L. Hilliker, for appellant.
Dovel & Smith, for appallee .
GR NT, J. (after tatino- the fact ) . Plaintiff had old meat
to defendant Giegling, who kept a meat shop in Mani tee. The
account was an open one, and had b en running bet\ een four and
five months previou to the date of the note. Th y refu ed to
sell him any more oods unless the account was pai or ecured.
Giegling was unable to pay and Mr. chaaf, plaintiffs agent,

210
210 Admissions of the Maker

asked him to give a note with an indorsement. Mr. Giegling

suggested that they see defendant Waal, and that he might indorse

a note for him. The two went together to Mr. Waal's office.

Mr. Waal gave evidence to sustain the facts set up in his notice.

It, however, conclusively appears from his own testimony, as

well as that of Mr. Schaaf and Mr. Giegling, that all the con-

versation upon which he relies as a defense occurred before the

note was made out and signed. It is therefore sought to vary

the terms of a plain written contract by parol evidence of what

took place before its execution. Mr. Waal himself testified,

"After the talk was had all around, we all came in there ; and the

note was drawn up and signed at once, and handed over to Mr.

Schaaf." Time for the payment was extended one year. Gieg-

ling told Mr. Waal that, if plaintiffs got this note, they would

sell him more meat.

Waal was not the payee upon the note, and indorsed it before

ftwas uttered, and be fore thejgay^hadjndo rsed it. He i s there-

fore a~j oint maker. Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150. If the

note had been exe cuted by Giegling, and delivered to plaintiffs^

and they had afterwards s ecured the indorsement of Waal, with-
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out considera tion, this defense would have been open to him,

"under the authority of Kulenkamp v. Groff, 71 Mich. 675. That

decision, however, expressly holds that under the _jaf.ts of this,

cas e the d efe nse cannot be sustained. See, also, Aultman & Tay-

lor Co. v. Gorham, 87 Mich. 233.

The learned circuit judge was correct in directing a verdict

for plaintiffs.

The other Justices concurred.

The judgment is affirmed.

ADMISSIONS OF THE MAKER. §62.

Wohlke et al. v. Kuhne (1886), 109 Ind. 313.

From the Allen Superior Court.

IV. G. Colerick, H. Colerick, W. S. Oppenheimer and P. B.

Colerick, for appellants.

T. E. Ellison, for appellee.

Elliott, C.J. Wohlke, as principal, and Trentman, as

surety, executed the promissory note in suit, payable to the order

of "f. W. Woollen, Attorney General."

ADMISSION

OF THE MAKER

asked him to give a note with an indorsement. Mr. Giegling
suggested that they see defendant Waal, and that he might indorse
a note for him. The two went together to Mr. Waal's office.
Mr. Waal gave evidence to sustain the facts set up in his notice.
It, however, conclu ively appears from his own testimony, as
well a that of Mr. Schaaf and Mr. Giegling, that all the conversation upon which he relies as a defense occurred before the
note was made out and signed. It is therefore sought to vary
the terms of a plain written contract by parol evidence of what
took place before its ex cution. Mr. Waal himself testified,
"After the talk was had all around, we all came in there; and the
note was drawn up and signed at once, and handed over to Mr.
chaaf ." Time for the payment was extended one year. Giegling told Mr. Waal that, if plaintiffs got this note, they would
sell him more meat.
Waal wa not the payee upon the note, and indorsed it before
it was uttered, and before the payee had indorsed it. He is therefore a joint maker. R othschild v. Gri~-r 1 31 Mich. 150. If the
note had been executed by Giegling, and delivered to plaintiffs
and they had afterwards secured the indorsement of Waal, without consideration, this defense would have been open to him,
under the authority of Kulenkanip v. Groff 71 Mich. 675. That
decision, however, expressly holds that under the facts of this
case the defense cannot be sustained. See, also, Aultman & Taylor Co. v. Gorham 87 Mich. 233.
The learned circuit judge was correct in directing a verdict
for plaintiffs.
The other Justices concurred.
The judgment is affirmed.
1

1

1
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§ 62.

Wohlke et al. v. Kuhne (1886), zo9 Ind. 313.
From the Allen Superior Court.
W. G. Colerick, H. Colerick 1 W. S. Oppenheimer and P. B.
Colerick for appellants.
T. E. Ellison, for appellee.
ELLIOTT C.J.
Wohlke, as principal, and Trentman, as
surety, executed the promissory note in suit, payable to the order
of "T. W. Woollen, Attorney General."
1

1
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There is evidence very satisfactorily showing that Kuhne

became the owner of the note in good faith, for value, and with-

out notice of any defence, before its maturity.

We incline to the opinion that jhe words added to the name

of the payee are merely descriptive of the person, and can not,

in any event, trammel the righ ts of a bona fide holder . Jackson

School Tp v. Farloiv, 75 Ind. 118; Hayes v. Matthews, 63 Ind.

412; Hays v. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260; Means v. Swormstedt, 32

Ind. 87 (2 Am. R. 330) ; Kenyon v. Williams, 19 Ind. 44; Hobbs

v. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; Shepherd v. Evans, 9 Ind. 260.

We are clearly of the opinion that the appellants are not in

a situation to dispute the authority of the payee to accept and

transfer the note executed by them. Whatever may be the right

of the State, it is certain these appellants can not successfully

present the question of the authority of T.' W. Woollen to take

or transfer the note executed to him. That is a question between

him and the State, with which these appellants have no concern,

for they have executed a commercial note, fair on its face and

complete in all its parts, and they can not defeat it in the hands

of a bona fide holder. New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365.
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The makers of a note negotiable under the law merchant

wa rrant the capacity of the payee to transfer it in the usual course

of business. Mr. Bigelow thus states the rule: "The execution

o f a negotiable note is a_w_a jranty of the existing capacity of the

pavee_t o endorse the pap er." Bigelow Estop. 512. Another

author says: "The person to whose order a bill or note is made

payable, is generally vested with the right to transfer the same

by endorsement ; and it does not lie with the maker or acceptor

to dispute the power of the payee to endorse and transfer the

instrument. By making the note or accepting the bill, and issuing

it, the maker and acceptor assert to the world the competency of

the payee to negotiate and assign the paper; and they are not

afterwards permitted to gainsay the assertion so made." Edwards

Bills and Notes, section 363. An English author, whose work

has long been recognized as authority, in speaking of the acceptor

of a bill, says : "He moreover admits, and so does the maker of

a promissory note, the then capacity of the payee, to whose order

the bill or note is made payable, to endorse." Byles Bills, 202.

This well established principle rules the case against the

appellants. The decision in Union School Tp. v. First Nat' I

Bank, 102 Ind. 464, expresses the law correctly upon the case

then before the court, but it has no application to such a case

as this.

There is evidence very sati factorily showing that Kuhne
became the owner of the note in good faith, for value, and without notice of any defence, before it maturity.
We incline to the opinion that the words added to the name
of the payee are mer ly de criptive of the person, and can not,
in any event, trammel the rights of a bona fide holder. Jackson
School Tp v. Farloi, 75 Ind. II8; Hayes v. Matthews, 63 Ind.
412; Hays v. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 26o; Means v. Swornistedt, 32
Ind. 87 ( 2 Am. R. 330) ; Ken yon v. Williams, I 9 Ind. 44; Hobbs
v. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; Shepherd v. Evans, 9 Ind. 26o.
We are clearly of the opinion that the appellants are not in
a ituation to dispute the authority of the payee to accept and
transfer the note executed by them. Whatever may be the right
of the State, it is certain these appellants can not successfully
present the question of the authority of
W. Woollen to take
or tran fer the note executed to him. That is a question between
him and the State, with which these appellants have no concern,
for they have executed a commercial note, fair on its face and
complete in all its parts, and they can not defeat it in the hands
of a bona fide holder. New v. Walker, ro8 Ind. 365.
The makers of a note negotiable under the law merchant
warrant the capacity of the payee to transfer it in the usual course
of business. Mr. Bigelow thus state the rule: "The execution
of a negotiable note is a warranty of the existing capacity of the
payee to endorse the paper." Bigelow Estop. 512. Another
author says: "The per on to whose order a bill or note is made
payable, is generally ve ted with the right to transfer the same
by endorsement; and it does not lie with the maker or acceptor
to dispute the pO\\ er of the payee to endorse and tran fer the
instrument. By making the note or accepting the bill, and issuing
it, the maker and acceptor assert to the world the competency of
the payee to negotiate and a sign the paper · and they are not
afterwards permitted to gainsay the a sertion so made.' Edward
Bills and N ates, section 363. An Engli h author who e work
has long been recoanized as authority, in speaking of the acceptor
of a bill, says: " He moreover admits, and so do the maker of
a promissory note, the then capacity of the paye , to ' ho e order
the bill or note is made payable, to endor e.'
yle Bills, 202.
T his well established principle rule the case a ainst the
appellants. The deci ion in Onion School T p. v. First N at1l
Bank, 102 Ind. 464, expresse the law correctly upon the ca e
then before the court, but it has no application to such a case
as this.
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The only error in the instructions is, that they are more

favorable to the appellants than the law warrants.

We are inclined to think that the objection of the appellee,

that, as the complaint on which the case was tried is not in the

record, no question is properly presented, is well taken, but, as

the merits of the case are plain and decisive, we have not put

our decision upon that objection.

Judgment affirmed.

THE CONTRACT OF THE ACCEPTOR. § 64.

The only error in the instructions is, that they are more
favorable to the appellants than the law warrants.
W e are inclined to think that the objection of the appellee,
that, as the complaint on which the case was tried is not in the
record, no question is properly presented, is well taken, but, as
the merits of the case are plain and decisive, we have not put
our decision upon that objection.

Raborg et al. v. Peyton (1817), 2 Wheat. (15 U. S.) 385.

Judgment afiirmed.

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.

~ ~·

Jones, for plaintiffs in error.

Taylor, for defendant in error.

Story, J., delivered the opinion of the court :

This is an action of debt brought against the defendant in

THE CONTRACT OF THE ACCEPTOR.

error, as acceptor of a bill of exchange by the plaintiffs in error

as indorsees. The declaration alleges that the bill was drawn,

accepted, and indorsed, for value received. The only question is,

whether debt lies in such a case.

'R aborg et al. v. Peyton (1817),

2

Wheat. (15 U.S.) 385.

The general principle has been very correctly stated by Lord
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Chief Baron Comyn, that debt lie s up on every express contract

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.

to pay a sum certain : and he adds, also, that it lies though there_

be only an implied contra ct, (Com. Dig. debt, a. 8, a. 9.) But it

has been supposed that this principle does not apply to an action

on a bill of exchange, even where the suit is brought by the payee

Jones, for plaintiffs in error.

Taylor, for defendant in error.

against the acceptor, and a fortiori not where it is brought by the

indorsee. It is admitted that in Hardres, 485, the court held that

debt does not lie by the payee of a bill of exchange against the

acceptor. The reasons given for this opinion were, _first, that

there is no privity of contract between the parties; and, second,

that an acceptance is only in the nature of a collateral promise

or engagement to pay the debt of another, which does not create

a duty. It is very difficult to perceive how it can be correctly

affirmed that there is no privity of contract between the payee

and acceptor. There is, in the very nature of the engagement, a

direct and immediate contract between them. The consideration

may not always, although it frequently does, arise between them ;

J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an action of debt brought against the defendant in
error, as acceptor of a bill of exchange by the plaintiffs in error
as indorsees. The declaration alleges that the bill was drawn,
accepted, and indorsed, for value received. The only question is,
whether debt lies in such a case.
The general principle has been very correctly stated by Lord
Chief Baron Comyn, that . debt
.
lies upon every express contract
to pay a sum certain; and he adds, also, that it lies though there
be only an implied contract. (Com. Dig. debt, a. 8, a. 9.) But it
has been supposed that this principle do'es no~ apply to an action
on a bill of exchange, even where the uit is brought by the payee
against the acceptor, and a fortiori not where it is brought by the
indorsee. It is admitted that in Hardres, 485, the court held that
debt does not lie by the payee of a bill of exchang ao-ain t the
acceptor. The r asons given for this opinion were, first, that
there is no privity of contract between the parties· and, second,
that an acceptance is only in the natur of a collateral promi e
or engagement to pay the debt of another, which does not create
a duty. It is very difficult to perceive how it can be correctly
affirmed that there is no privity of contract between the payee
and acceptor. There is, in the very nature of the engagement, a
direct and immediate contract between them. The consideration
may not always, although it frequently does, arise between them;
STORY,

RABORU ET AL. V. PEYTON

213

Raborg et al. v. Peyton 213

but privity of contract may exist if there be an express contract,

although the consideration of the contract originated aliunde.

Besides, if one person deliver money to another for the use of a

third person, it has been settled that such a privity exists that the

latter may maintain an action of debt against the bailee. (Harris

v. De Bervoir, Cro. Jac. 687.) And it is clear that an acceptance

is evidence of money had and received by the acceptor for the use

of the holder. (Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174; Vcre v. Lewis,

3'T. R. 182.) It is also evidence of money paid by the holder

to the use of the acceptor. (Ibid, and Bailey on Bills, 164, 3d

edition.) Ajjrivi ty of contract, and a duty to pay, would j eem,

Jn_such ca se, to be completely established j^ a nd wherever the com-

mon law raises a duty, debtjies. The other reason would seem

not better founded. An acceptance is not a colla teral en gagement

to pay the debt of another: it is an ahsolnre engageme nt to pay

th e money to the holder of the bill ; and the engagements of all

the other parties are merely collateral. Prima facie, every accept-

ance^ a ffords a presumption of funds of the drawer in the hands

ofjhe_a cceptor, and is, of itself, an express appropriation of those,

funds for the use of the holder. The case may, indeed, be other-
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wise ; and then the acceptor, in fact, pays the debt of the drawer ;

but as between himself and the payee it is not a collateral, but an

original and direct undertaking. The payee accepts the acceptor

as his debtor, and he cannot resort to the drawer but upon a

failure of due payment of the bill. The engagement of the

drawer, therefore, may more properly be termed collateral. Yet

it has been held that debt will lie in favor of a payee against the

drawer in case of non-payment by the acceptor. (Hard's case,

Salk., 23 ; Hodges v. Steward, Skinn. 346 ; and see Bishop v.

Young, 2 Bos. & Pull. 78.)

The reasons, then, assigned for the decisions in Hardres are

not satisfactory; and it deserves consideration that it was made

at a time when the principles respecting mercantile contracts were

not generally understood.

The old doctrine upon this subject has been very considerably

shaken in modern times. An indebitatus assumpsit will now lie

in favor of the payee against the acceptor ; and it is generally true

that where such an action lies, debt will lie. And a still stronger

case is, that an acceptance is good evidence on a count upon an

msimul computassent (Israel v. Douglas, 1 H. Bl. 239), which

can only be upon the footing of a privity of contract.

But the most important case is that of Bishop v. Young (2

Bos. & Pull. 78). It was there held, in opposition to what was

but privity of contract may exist if there be an express contract,
although th consideration of th contract originated aliunde.
Besides, if one person deliver m n y to anoth r for the u e of a
third person, it has been s ttled that such a privity exists that the
latter may maintain an action of d bt against the bailee. (Harris
v. De Bervoir, Cro. Jae. 6 7.) And it is clear that an acceptance
is evidence of money had and receiyed by the acceptor for the use
of the holder. (Tatlocll v. Harris, 3 T. R. 174; Vere v. Lewis,
3 · T. R. · '182.) It i also evidence of money paid by the holder
to the use of the acceptor. (Ibid, and Bailey on ills, 164, 3d
edition.) A rivity of contract, and a duty to pay, would seem,
in such case, to be completely established; and wherever the common law raises a dut debt li
The other reason would seem
not better founded. An acceptance is not a collateral engagement
to pay the debt of another: it is an absolute engagement to pay
the money to the holder of the bill; and the engagements of all
the other parties are merely collateral. Pri11ia f acie, every acceptance affords a presumption of funds of the drawer in the hands
of the acceptor, and is, of itself, an express appropriation of those
funds for the use of the holder. The case may, indeed, be otherwise; and then the acceptor, in fact, pays the deb~ of the drawer;
but a between himself and the payee it is not a collateral, but an
orio-inal and direct undertaking. The payee accepts the acceptor
as his debtor, and he cannot resort to the drawer but upon a
failure of due payment of the bill. The engagement of the
drawer, therefore, may more properly be termed collateral. Yet
it has been held that debt will lie in favor of a payee against the
drawer in case of non-payment by the acceptor. (Bard's case,
Salk., 23; Hodges v. Steward, Skinn. 346; and ee Bishop v.
Y own(]'' 2 Bos. & Pull. 78.)
The reasons, then, a igned for the decisions in Hardres are
not satisfactory; and it deserves consideration that it was made
at a time when the principles respecting mercantile contracts were
not generally under toad.
The old doctrin upon this subject has been very considerably
shaken in modern times. An indebitatus assumpsit will nO\ lie
in favor of the payee again t the acceptor; and it i o-enerally true
that where such an action lie , d bt will lie.
nd a till tronger
case i , that an acceptanc is good evidence on a count upon an
insimitl computassent (Israel v. Douglas, I H. Bl. 239), which
can only be upon the footing of a privity of contract.
But the most important ca i that of Bishop v. Young (2
Bos. & Pull. 78). It was there held, in opposition to what was
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supposed to have been the doctrine of former cases, that debt

would lie by th e payee of a_ngte_against the maker, where the note

wase xpressed to be for value received . That decision was given

with measured caution, and the court expressly declined to give

any opinion upon any but the case in judgment. The case in

Hardres was there discussed, and although its reasoning was not

impugned, an authoritative weight was not attempted to be given

to it. In general, the legal predicament of the m aker of a note

is like that of the acc e ptor of a bill. Each is liable to the payee

for the payment of the note or bill in the first instance ; and after

indorsement, each bears the same liabilities. And if an action of

debt will lie in favor of the payee of a note against the maker,

it is not easy to perceive any sound principle upon which it ought

to be denied against an acceptor of a bill. The acceptance of a

bill is just as much an admission of a debt between the immediate

parties as the drawing of a note.

The case has been thus far considered as if the action were

brought by the payee against the acceptor. And this certainly

presents the strongest view in favor of the argument. But in

point of law every subsequent holder, in respect to the acceptor
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of a bill, and t he maker of a note, stands in the same predicamenT

'aTYhe^^payee^ An acceptance is as much evidence of money had

and TeceTveTby the acceptor to the use of such holder, and of

money paid by such holder for the use of the acceptor, as if he

were the payee. (3 T. R. 172; Id., 184, Grant v. Vaughan, 3

Burr. 1515.)

Upon the whole, we do not think that the authority in

Hardres can be sustained upon principle; and we see no incon-

venience in adopting a rule more consonant to the just right of

the parties as recognized in modern times. In so doing, we apply

the well-settled doctrine that debt lies in every case where the

common law creates a duty for the payment of money, and

in every case where there is an express contract for the payment

ofrnoney! We are therefore of opinion that debt lies upon a bill

of exc hange by an indorsee o f t he bill against"The"acceptor, when

ft is expresse"ono^bT"for value received^ The case at bar is sornF"

what strongTrTToFYhe declaration expressly avers that the bill

was drawn, indorsed, and accepted for value received, and the

demurrer admits the truth of the averment.

This opinion must be certified to the Circuit Court for the

District of Columbia.

From the view which has been taken of the case it is unneces-

sary to consider whether the statute of Virginia applies to it or

not. Certificate accordingly.

A^cr^- $£-*/w^

upp ed to have been the doctrine of former cases, that debt
would lie b ·the a ee of a note a ain t the maker, where the note
-;.;- e~ d to be for value received. That decision was given
with mea ured caution, and the court expressly declined to give
any opinion upon any but the case in judgment. The case in
Hard res was there discussed, and although its reasoning was not
impugned, an authoritative weight was not attempted to be given
to it. In general, the le al re~j_~ment of the maker of a note
is like that of the acceptor of a bill. Each is liable to the payee
for the payment of the note or bill in the first instance; and after
indorsement, each bears the same liabilities. And if an action of
debt will lie in favor of the payee of a note against the maker,
it is not easy to perceive any sound principle upon which it ought
to be denied against an acceptor of a bill. The acceptance of a
bill is just as much an admis ion of a debt between the immediate
partie a the drawing of a note.
The case has be n thus far considered as if the action were
brought by the payee against the acceptor. And this certainly
presents the strongest view in favor of the argument. But in
point of law ever subsequent holder, in res ect to the acceptor
of a bill, and the maker of a note, stand in the same pre 1cament
asthe payee. An acceptance is as much evidence of money had
and receive by the acceptor to the use of uch holder, and of
money paid by such holder for the use of the acceptor, as if he
were the payee. (3 T. R. 172; Id.) 184, Grant v. Vaughan) 3
Burr. 1515.)
Upon the whole, we do not think that the authority in
Hardres can be sustained upon principle; and we see no inconvenience in adopting a rule more consonant to the just right 0£
the parties as recognized in modern time . In so doing, we apply
the well-settl d doctrine that debt lies in every case where the
common law creates a duty for the payment of money and
Ln every case where there is an express contract for the payment
of mone . We are therefore of opinion that debt lies upon a bill
of xchan e b an indor e of the bill aa inst the acce tor when
It is expresse to e for value receive .
w 1at stronger; for the declaration expr ly avers that the bill
was drawn, indorsed, and accepted for value received, and the
demurrer admit the truth of the averm nt.
This opinion must be certified to the Circuit Court for the
Di trict of Columbia.
From the view which has been taken of the case it is unnecesary to consider whether the statute of Virainia applies to it or
not.
C ertincate accordingly.
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Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank v. Carter, etc., Co. (i8po), 152

Mass. 34.

Contract against the acceptor of a bill of exchange for $625.

Trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, before Mason, J.,

who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows :

Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank v. Carter, etc., Co. (1890), i52
Mass. 34.

The plaintiff is a national bank, having its usual place of

business in Chicago, where also the Clark & Longley Company,

an Illinois corporation, has its usual place of business. The

defendant is a Massachusetts corporation, having its place of

business in Boston. Before January 1, 1889, the defendant had

sold merchandise to the Clark & Longley Company, and on Jan-

uary 17, 1889, the Clark & Longley Company was indebted to

the defendant in the sum of about $1,400, for merchandise pre-

viously sold and delivered. On January 10, 1889, the Clark &

Longley Company wrote, requesting the defendant to accept a

draft for its accommodation, which request the defendant refused.

On January 17, the Clark & Longley Company again wrote to

the defendant, saying that it had been obliged to pay unusually

heavy bills for the months of November and December; that it

regretted that it had been obliged to make drafts upon the defend-
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ant so frequently of late ; that its collections had been slow, but

were much easier ; that it would not need to trouble the defendant

after that day ; and requested the acceptance of a draft for $625

for its accommodation, which it had drawn upon the defendant.

The defendant had within a short time previously accepted and

paid several accommodation drafts for the Clark & Longley

Company, which, like this, had been discounted before acceptance.

The Clark & Longley Company presented this draft for $625

to the plaintiff, in Chicago, on January 17; and the plaintiff

placed the amount of the draft, less the discount thereof, to its

credit. The amount thereof was on the same day drawn out by

check by the Clark & Longley Company ; and the draft was

forwarded, through the Freeman's National Bank of Boston, for

acceptance and collection. The draft was presented to the

defendant for acceptance on January 19, at its place of business,

and about 3 o'clock p. m. on January 21 the defendant accepted

the draft, dating the acceptance January 19, 1889, and relying

upon the representations contained in the letter of the Clark &

Longley Company of January 17, 1889. After 4 o'clock p. m. of

January 21, the Clark & Longley Company suspended, and con-

fessed judgment to the plaintiff in the sum of $22,000, which was

Contract against the acceptor of a bill of exchange for $625.
Trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, before Mason, J.,
who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows :
The plaintiff i a national bank, having its u ual place of
business in Chicago, where also the Clark & Longley Company,
an Illinois corporation, has it usual place of business. The
defendant is a Ma achu etts corporation, having its place of
busine s in Euston. B for January l, 1889, the defendant had
sold merchandise to the lark & Longley Company, and on January 17, 1889, the lark & Longley Company wa indebted to
the defendant in the sum of about $1,400, for merchandise previou ly old and delivered. On January 10, 1889, the Clark &
Longley Company wrote, requesting the defendant to accept a
draft for its accommodation, which request the defendant refused.
On January 17, the Clark & Longley Company again wrote to
the defendant, saying that it had been obliged to pay unusually
heavy bills for the months of November and December; that it
regretted that it had been obliged to make drafts upon the defendant so fr equently of late; that its collections had been slm , but
were much easier; that it would not need to trouble the defendant
after that day; and requested the acceptance of a draft for $625
for it accommodation, which it had drawn upon the defendant.
The defendant had "ithin a hart time previou ly accepted and
paid several accommodation drafts for the Clark & Lono-ley
Company, which, like this, had been di counted before acceptance.
The Clark & Lono-ley ompany presented this draft for $625
to the plaintiff, in Chicago, on January 17 · and the plaintiff
placed the amount of the draft les the di count thereof, to its
<:redit. The amount ther of ~a on th ame da drav n out by
check by the Clark & Longley ompany · and the draft ' a
forwarded , through the Freeman' National Bank of Bo ton for
acceptance and collection. The draft ' a pre ented to the
defendant for acceptance on January 19, at it place of busine ,
and about 3 o'clock P. L on J anuar 21 the defen ant accepte
and r lyinothe draft, dating the acceptance January 19, l
upon the repre entations contained in the letter of the Clark &
Longley Company of January 17, l
fter 4 o' lock P. r. of
January 21, the Clark & Longley
mpan u p nde , and confessed judgment to the plaintiff in the um of 22 ooo which ' as ·
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intended to cover certain indebtedness from the Clark & Longley

Company to the plaintiff, but did not cover all of the plaintiff's

claims, and did not cover the draft for $625. On the same day

an execution issued upon this judgment, and the plaintiff levied

upon the property of the Clark & Longley Company. On the

morning of January 22 the defendant first learned by telegram

from Chicago that the Clark & Longley Company had suspended,

and had confessed judgment to the plaintiff. The treasurer of

the defendant corporation at once went to the Freeman's National

Bank, where the draft was then held awaiting collection at matu-

rity, and asked the cashier to be permitted to cancel and with-

draw the defendant's acceptance of the draft. The cashier of the

bank refused to permit the treasurer to cancel and withdraw the

acceptance, but at his request telegraphed to the plaintiff that,

although the draft had been accepted, it would not be paid at

maturity. This telegram was the first intimation the plaintiff had

received that the draft had been accepted, and it made no advance

to the Clark & Longley Company on account of the draft after

it had been forwarded to the Freeman's National Bank. The

defendant had never promised either the Clark & Longley Com-
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pany or the plaintiff to accept this draft. The plaintiff did not

know that it was to be an accommodation acceptance, but believed

that the draft was a just claim of the Clark & Longley Company

against the defendant.

The defendant requested the judge to rule as follows :

"1. Upon the evidence in this case, there was no considera-

tion for the defendant's acceptance of the draft declared on.

"2. The plaintiff's action cannot be maintained unless there

was a valuable consideration for the defendant's acceptance.

"3. If the defendant accepted the draft without consideration

and for the accommodation of the drawer, and relying on the

drawer's representation that it was solvent and its affairs pros-

perous, and in ignorance of the fact that the drawer was insol-

vent, and had after the draft was drawn and before presentment

confessed judgment to the plaintiff, the defendant could revoke

its acceptance, unless the plaintiff had after the acceptance and

before notice of the defendant's revocation made an advance on

the draft to the drawer.

"4. The defendant could revoke its acceptance at any time

before notice of its acceptance had been given to the plaintiff."

The judge refused so to rule in terms, but ruled as follows :

"1. Upon the evidence, there was no consideration as between

the drawer and drawee, and no new consideration as between

intended to cover certain indebtedness from the Clark & Longley
Company to the plaintiff, but did not cover all of the plaintiff's
claims, and did not cover the draft fo r $625. On the same day
an execution issued upon this judgment, and the plaintiff levied
upon the property of the Clark & Longley Company. On the
morning of January 22 the defendant fir t learned by telegram
from Chicago that the Clark & Longley Company had suspended,
and had confe sed judgment to the plaintiff. The treasurer of
the defendant corporation at once went to the Freeman's National
Bank, where the draft was then held awaiting collection at maturity, and asked the cashier to be permitted to cancel and withdraw the defendant's acceptance of the draft. The cashier of the
bank refused to permit the treasurer to cancel and withdraw the
acceptance, but at his request telegraphed to the plaintiff that,
although the draft had been accepted, it would not be paid at
maturity. This telegram was the first intimation the plaintiff had
received that the draft had been accepted, and it made no advance
to the Clark & Longley Company on account of the draft after
it had been forwarded to the Freeman's
ational Bank. The
defendant had never promised either the Clark & Longley Company or the plaintiff to accept this draft. The plaintiff did not
know that it was to be an accommodation acceptance, but believed
that the draft was a just claim of the Clark & Longley Company
against the defendant.
The defendant requested the judge to rule as follows:
"r. Upon the evidence in this case, there was no consideration for the defendant's acceptance of the draft declareq on.
"2. The plaintiff's action cannot be maintained unless there
was a valuable consideration for the defendant's acceptance.
"3. If the defendant accepted the draft without consideration
and for the accommodation of the drawer, and relying on the
drawer's representation that it was solv nt and its affairs prosperous, and in ignorance of the fact that the drawer was insolvent, and had after the draft was drawn and before presentment
confessed judgment to the plaintiff, the defendant could revoke
its acceptance, unless the plaintiff had after the acceptance and
before notice of the defendant's revocation made an advance on
the draft to the drawer.
"4. The defendant could revoke its acceptance at any time
before notice of it acceptance had been given to the plaintiff."
The judge refused so to rule in terms, but ruled as follows :
"I. Upon the evidence, there wa no consideration as between
the drawer and drawee, and no new consideration as between
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the plaintiff and any party to the bill at or subsequent to the

acceptance, but prior to and at the time of the acceptance the

plaintiff was a bona fide holder for value, and want of consid-

eration as between drawer and drawee does not prevent its

recovery.

"2. The defendant could revoke its acceptance at any time

before the communication of such acceptance to the plaintiff or

to the plaintiff's agent, but could not revoke the acceptance after

delivering the same to the Freeman's National Bank, the agent

of the holder."

The judge found for the plaintiff; and the defendant alleged

exceptions.

IV. B. French, for the defendant.

W. A. Knowlton, for the plaintiff.

Field, J. It is clear that the first ruling made by the court

is correct, and that the first and second rulings requested were

the plaintiff and any party to the bill at or subsequent to the
acceptance, but prior to and at the time of th acceptance the
plaintiff was a bona fide holder for value, and want of consideration as between drawer and drawee does not prevent its
recov ry.
"2. The defendant could revoke its acceptance at any time
before the communication of such acceptance to the plaintiff or
to the plaintiff's agent, but could not revoke the acceptance after
deliv ring the same to the Freeman's National Bank, the agent
of the holder."
The judge found for the plaintiff; and the defendant alleged
exceptions.

rightly refused. (Arpin v. Owens, 140 Mass. 144; Heuertematte

v. Morris, 101 N. Y. 63.)

When the draft with the defendant's acceptance upon it was

delivered by the defendant to the Freeman's National Bank,
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yyjrich_ was the agent of t he plaintiff, the contract of acceptance

betwe en the plaintiff a n d the defendant became complete, and

the acceptance could not a fter th at be revoked unless the defend-

ant had the right to rescind the contract . The second ruling,

therefore, is correct, and the fourth ruling requested was rightly

refused, if these rulings relate to the revocation as distinguished

from a rescission.

The third ruling requested suggests that possibly the defend-

ant's counsel had it in mind to contend that the letter of the

17th of January from the Clark & Longley Company to the

defendant corporation, upon which it relied in accepting the draft,

contained a representation that the company was solvent; that

this representation was false; and that therefore, when the

defendant discovered that the representation was false, it had

the right to rescind the contract of acceptance, unless the plain-

tiff had after the acceptance "made an advance on the draft to

the drawer." Although the Clark & Longley Company suspended

payment on the 21st of January, the exceptions do not state that

the company was not solvent on the 17th of January, and it is

doubtful if the letter can be construed as containing any positive

representation of solvency, assuming that its contents are cor-

rectly stated in the bill of exceptions. This third request, more-

W. B. French, for the defendant.
W. A. Knowlton, for the plaintiff.
FIELD, J. It is clear that the first ruling made by the court
is corr ct, and that the first and second rulings requested were
rightly refused. (Arpin v. Owens, 140 Mass. 144; Heuertematte
v. Morris, IOI N. Y. 63.)
When the draft with the defendant's acceptance upon it was
delivered by the defendant to the Freeman's National Bank,
which was the agent of the plaintiff, the contract of acceptance
betwe n the plaintiff and the defendant became complete. and
the acceptance could not after that be revoked unless the defendant had the right to re cind the contract. The second ruling,
therefore, is correct, and the fourth ruling reque ted was rightly
refu ed, if the e rulings relate to the revocation as distingui bed
from a resci sion.
The third ruling reque ted suggests that possibly the defendant's counsel had it in mind to contend that the letter of the
l 7th of January from th
Oark & Longley ompany to the
defendant corporation, upon which it reli d in acceptin the draft
contained a representation that th company wa olvent · that
this representation wa false; and that therefore, \\hen the
defendant discovered that the repre entation wa fal e, it had
the rio-ht to rescind the contract of ace ptance unles the plaintiff had aft r the acceptance "made an ad an e on the draft to
the drawer." Althouo-h the Clark & Longley Company u pended
payment on the 21st of January, the exception d not tate that
the company was not olvent on the 17th of January and it i
doubtful if the letter can be constru d as containino- any positive
repre entation of solvency, as umino- that it contents are correctly tated in the bill of exceptions. Thi third reque t more-
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over, does not distinctly assume that the defendant was deceived

by any representations which the drawer made, and was thereby

induced to accept the draft. We have some doubt whether the

judge, who tried the case without a jury, understood that any

question of law was raised concerning the right of the defendant

to rescind the contract of acceptance on account of any fraud-

ulent misrepresentations of the drawer of the draft ; still we will

consider the question.

Whatever may be the distinction between such a case as the

Merchants' National Bank v. National Bank of the Common-

wealth, 139 Mass. 513, and the case of Merchants' Ins. Co. v.

Abbott, 131 Mass. 397, it is manifest that the making of a con-

tract, or the payment of money under a mistake of fact, as these

words are used in the law, is not always followed by the same

consequences as the making of a contract, or the payment of

money, by reason of the fraudulent misrepresentations of a third

person. Certainly the general rule is, that a contract made

between two persons on a valuable consideration cannot be

rescinded by one of the parties on the ground that a third person,

at whose request the party entered into the contract, made fraud-

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ulent misrepresentations to him on which he relied, if this third

person was not an agent of the other party, and the other party

had no knowledge of the fraud. See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145

Mass. 153. The contract of acceptance was made by the defend-

ant with the plaintiff on what the law considers a valuable

consideration ; namely, the consideration paid by the plaintiff to

the Clark & Longley Company in anticipation of the acceptance.

The Clark & Longley Company in inducing the defendant to

accept the draft acted on its own account and for its own ben-

efit, and the plaintiff is innocent of any knowledge of or par-

ticipation in any fraud of that company. There are practical

reasons of great weight why the rule we have stated should be

applied to negotiable paper. ^Acceptors of bills of exchange

should not be p ermitted to vary their liabi lity f rom that which

is apparent on the face of the bills, by setting up against bona_

T^Tiold ers for value, who took the bills b efore maturi ty, state-

ments m ade by the drawers to the drawees wTiereby they were

induced to accept the bills ; and we have been unable to find

that any distinction has been taken in this respect between

holders of bills who took them before acceptance and those who

took them afterwards.

Exceptions overruled.

^W-0">- V-*->~ V^wj •

o er, does not distinctly assume that the defendant was deceived
by any r presentations which the drawer made, and was thereby
induced to accept the draft. We have some doubt whether the
judge, who tried the case without a jury, understood that any
question of law was raised concerning the right of the defendant
to rescind the contract of acceptance on account of any fraudulent misrepresentations of the drawer of the draft; still we will
consider the question.
Whatever may be the distinction between such a case as the
Merchants' National Bank v. National Bank of the Commonwealth, 139 Mass. 513, and the case of Merchants' Ins. Co. v.
Abbott, 131 Ma s. 397, it is manife t that the making of a contract, or the payment of money under a mistake of fact, as these
' ord are used in the law, is not always followed by the same
consequences as the making of a contract, or the payment of
money, by reason of the fraudulent mi representations of a third
person. Certainly the general rule is, that a contract made
between two persons on a valuable consideration cannot be
rescinded by one of the parties on the ground that a third person,
at whose request the party entered into the contract, made fraudulent misrepresentations to him on which he relied, if this third
person was not an agent of the other party, and the other party
had no knowledge of the fraud. See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145
Mass. 153· The contract of acceptance was made by the defendant with the plaintiff on what the law considers a valuable
consideration; namely, the consideration paid by the plaintiff to
the Clark & Longley Company in anticipation of the acceptance.
The Clark & Longley Company in inducing the defendant to
accept the draft acted on its own account and for its own benefit, and the plaintiff is innocent of any knowledge of or particj_pation in any fraud of that companY.:_ There are practical
reasons of great weight why the rule we have stated should be
applied to negotiable paper. Acceptor of bills of exchange
should not be permitted to vary their liability from that which
is apparent on the face of the bills, by etting up again t bona
holders for value, who took the bill before maturity, statements made by the drawer to the drawees wher by they were
induc d to accept th bills· and w have been unable to find
that any distinction has been taken in this respect between
holders of bills who took them before acceptance and those who
took them afterwards.
Exceptions overruled.
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X Tucker Mfg. Co. v. Fairbanks et al. {1867), 98 Mass. 101.

See also § 22.

Contract against David Fairbanks & Co. as drawers of the

following bill of exchange :

X Tucker Mfg. Co. v. Fairbanks et al. (1867), 98 Mass. IOI.
See also § 22.

"$4,469.76. "Boston, March 23, 1866.

"Two months after date pay to the order of Messrs. Hiram

Tucker & Co. four thousand four hundred and sixty-nine 76/100

dollars, value received, and charge the same to the account of

Contract against David Fairbanks & Co. as drawers of the
following bill of exchang :

"David Fairbanks & Co.,

"Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co.

"To Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., So. Berwick, Me."

Across the face of the draft was written, "Accepted for the

Treasurer, David Fairbanks, President;" and on the back,

"Payable in Boston, Hiram Tucker & Co."

Trial by jury was waived, and the case heard by Foster, J.,

who found the following facts : The signatures of all the parties

to the bill were proved or admitted. It was actually made and

delivered to the officers of the plaintiff corporation, and accepted

by them on the 3d of April, 1866, in payment and satisfaction

"BosTON, March 23, 1866.
"$4,46g.76.
"Two months after date pay to the order of Messrs. Hiram
Tucker & Co. four thousand four hundred and six ty-nine 76/ 100
dollars, value received, and charge th same to the account of
"DAvrn F AIRBAN KS & Co.,
"Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co.
"To Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., So. Berwick, Me."

of the amount of a loss by fire, due on a policy of insurance
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effected by Hiram Tucker & Co. in the Piscataqua Fire and

Marine Insurance Company, which had been ascertained on the

23d of March, and was payable sixty days afterwards, and had

been assigned by Hiram Tucker & Co. to the plaintiffs on the

26th of March. The plaintiffs had full knowledge of all the

circumstances under which the bill was made. The insurance

company, at the time of delivering it, took from the plaintiffs'

treasurer this receipt :

"Piscataqua Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,

"Treasurer's Office,

"$4,469.76. "So. Berwick, Me., April 3, 1866.

"Received of the Piscatauqua Fire and Marine Insurance

Company forty-four hundred and sixty-nine and 76/100 dollars,

in full for loss and damage to my property by fire on the 19th of

March, 1866, insured by policy No. 16,907 in said company.

"Tucker Manufacturing Co.

"R. S. Fay, Treas."

No evidence was offered of any fraud attending the making

of the bill. The defendants offered parol evidence tending to

Across the face of the draft was written, "Accepted for the
Treasurer, David Fairbanks, President;" and on the back,
"Payable in Boston, Hiram Tucker & Co."
Trial by jury was waived, and the case heard by Foster, J.,
who found the following facts: The signatures of all the parties
to the bill were proved or admitted. It was actually made and
delivered to the officers of the plaintiff corporation, and accepted
by them on the 3d of April, 1866, in payment and satisfaction
of the amount of a loss by fire , due on a policy of insurance
effected by Hiram Tucker & Co. in the Piscataqua Fire and
Marine Insurance Company, which had been ascertained on the
23d of March, and was payable sixty days afterward , and had
been assigned by Hiram Tucker & Co. to the plaintiffs on the
26th of March. The plaintiffs had full knowledge of all the
circumstances under which the bill was made. The insurance
company, at the time of delivering it, took from the plaintiffs'
treasurer this receipt:
"Piscataqua Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
"Treasurer's ffice ,
"$4,46g.76.
"So. BERWICK, ME., April 3, 1866.
"Received of the Piscatauqua Fire and Marine Insurance
Company forty-four hundred and sixty-nine and 76/ 100 dollar ,
in full for lo s and damage to my property by fire on the 19th of
March, 1866, insured by policy No. 16 907 in aid com pan
"TucKER MANUFACTURING Co.
"R. S. FAY, Treas."
No evidence was offered of any fraud attendinCT the making
of the bill. The defendants offered parol evidence tending to
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show that it was not expected or intended that they should be

liable on the bill, that it was given only to settle the loss, and

was supposed and expected by both parties to create a debt

against no one but the insurance company. But the judge

excluded such evidence, and held that the question of the defend-

ants' liability must be determined by the instrument itself.

The insurance company were a corporation established by

the laws of Maine, having their office at South Berwick in that

state. The bill was never presented to them there for acceptance,

and no regular notice of its nonpayment was given to the defend-

ants. The defendants had no funds in the hands of the insurance

company when the bill was made or ever afterwards. It was

proved that the draft was made and delivered in Boston at the

office of the defendants, who were the general agents of the

insurance company, and one of them, David Fairbanks, its pres-

ident, and the agent appointed to receive service of process in

Massachusetts, under the Gen. Sts. c. 58, §68; that at the time

of its execution one of the defendants was asked where it would

be paid, and replied "in Boston," and requested the plaintiff to

keep it there and not send it to Maine for collection ; that before

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

it came due one of the defendants told the plaintiff that it would

not be paid at maturity, but he hoped it would be paid eventually ;

that on the last day of grace the defendants were informed by

the plaintiff that it was in the Union Bank in Boston, and one

of them answered that it would not be paid.

Upon these facts the presiding judge found that due present-

ment and notice had been waived by the defendants ; and reserved

the questions, whether the facts warranted this finding, whether

the defendants were liable personally as drawers on the face of

the bill, and whether the parol evidence offered by them should

have been received, for the consideration of the full court, accord-

ing to whose opinion judgment was to be entered for the plaintiff,

or for the defendant, or a new trial ordered.

C. Brotvne, for the plaintiffs.

H. A. Scudder, for the defendants.

Gray, J. 1. The facts proved at the trial were amply suffi-

cient to warrant the finding that presentment for_acceptance and

notice of nonpayment had been waived. The defendants knew^

that thp hi11_wnii1rj_nnr be paid at maturity, and so informed the

jglaintiff s ; and the plaintiffs had the right to rely upon the

information so received and omit a useless ceremony which could

be of no benefit to themselves or to the defendants. {Brett v.

show that it was not expected or intended that they should be
liable on the bill, that it wa given only to settle the lo s, and
"a
uppo ed and expected by both partie to create a debt
against no one but the insurance company. But the judge
excluded such evidence, and held that th que tion of the defendants' liability mu t be determined by the instrument itself.
The in urance company were a corporation established by
the laws of Maine, having their office at South Berwick in that
state. The bill was never presented to them there for acceptance,
and no regular notice of its nonpayment was given to the defendants. The defendant had no funds in the hand of the insurance
company when the bill was made or ever afterwards. It was
proved that the draft was made and delivered in Boston at the
office of the defendants, who were the general agents of the
insurance company, and one of them, David Fairbanks, its president, and the agent appointed to receive service of process in
Massachu etts, under th Gen. Sts. c. 58, § 68; that at the time
of its execution one of the defendants was asked where it would
be paid, and replied "in Boston," and r quested the plaintiff to
keep it there and not send it to Maine for collection; that before
it came due one of the defendants told the plaintiff that it would
not be paid at maturity, but he hoped it would be paid eventually;
that on the last day of grace the defendants were informed by
the plaintiff that it was in the Union Bank in Boston, and one
of them answered that it would not be paid.
Upon these facts the presiding judge found that due presentment and notice had been waived by the defendants; and reserved
the questions, whether the facts warranted this finding, whether
the defendants were liable personally as drawers on the face of
the bill, and whether the parol evidence offered by them should
have been received, for the consideration of the full court, according to whose opinion judgment was to be entered for the plaintiff,
or for the defendant, or a new trial ordered.

C. Browne, for the plaintiffs.
H. A. Scudder, for the defendants.
GRAY, J. I. The facts proved at the trial were amply sufficient to warrant the finding that presentment for acceptance and
notice of nonpayment had been waived. The defendants knew
!..hat the bill would
paid at maturity, and so informed the
plaintiffs ; and the plaintiffs had the right to rely upon the
information so received and Qmit a u less ceremony which could
be of no benefit to themselves or to the defendants. (Brett v.
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Levett, 13 East, 213; Barker v. Parker, 6 Pick. 80; Spencer v.

Harvey, \y Wend. 489.)

2. It is equally clear that the liability of the defendants as

drawers of a negotiable instrument must be determined from the

i nstrument itself. This is too well settled to admit of discussion.

There is no distinction in this respect between the drawer of a

bill of exchange and the maker of a promissory note. {Bank of

British North America v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567 ; Bass v. O'Brien,

12 Gray, 481 ; Slawson v. Loring, 5 Allen, 342; Barlow v. Con-

gregational Society in Lee, 8 Allen, 460; Arnold v. Sprague, 34

Verm. 402; Met. Con. 108.)

3. The question whether the defendants are liable upon the

face of the bill requires more consideration. The difficulty is

not in ascertaining the general principles which must govern

cases of this nature, but in applying them to the different forms

and shades of expression in particular instruments. In order to

exemp t an agent from liability upon an instrument executed by

him within the scope of his agency, he must not only name his

pripc ip al, but he must express by some form of words that the

writi ng is the act of the principal, though done by the hand of
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th e agent. If he expresses this, the principal is bound, and the

agent is not. But a^ mere description of the general relation or

office which the perso n signing the paper holds to another person_

or to~i~c orporation, without indicating that the particular s igna-

ture is made in the exe c ution of the office and agency r is not

suffic ient to charge the principal or to exempt the agent from

personal liability . Amid the great variety of language which

may be used by merchants in haste or thoughtlessness, ignorant

or unmindful of legal rules, or not anticipating the importance

of holding one party rather than the other responsible, it must

often happen that cases fall very near the dividing line ; and, in

order to maintain uniformity of decision, it is necessary for the

court to refer to the cases already adjudicated, especially within

its own jurisdiction.

The authority which at first sight seems most strongly to

support the position of the defendants is that of Ballon v. Talbot,

16 Mass. 461, in which a note signed "Joseph Talbot, agent for

David Perry," was held not to bind Talbot personally. That

case has since been recognized and followed in this Common-

wealth. (J efts v. York, 4 Cush. 372; Page v. Wight, 14 Allen,

182.) But the important and effective word in Ballon v. Talbot

was not the word "agent," nor the name of the principal, but the

connecting word "for," which might indeed indicate merely the

Levett, 13 East, 213; Barker v. Parker, 6 Pick. 80; Spencer v.
Harvey, 17 Wend. 489.)
2. It is .equally clear that the liability of the defendants as
drawers of a negotiable in trument must be determined from the
in trument itself. This is too well ettled to admit of discus ion.
There is no distinction in this respect between the drawer of a
bill of exchange and the maker of a promis ory note. (Bank of
British North America v. Hooper, 5 Gray, 567; Bass v. O'Brien,
12 Gray, 481; Slawson v. Loring, S Allen, 342; Barlow v. Congregational Society in Lee, 8 Allen, 46o; Arnold v. Sprague, 34
Verm. 402; Met. on. 108.)
3. The question ' hether the defendants are liable upon the
face of the bill requires more consideration. The difficulty is
not in ascertaining the general principle which must govern
cases of thi nature, but in applying them to the different forms
and shades of expression in particular instruments. In order to
exempt an agent from liability upon an instrument executed by
him within the scope of hi agency, he must not only name his
principal, but he must express by some form of words that the
writing is the act of the principal, though done by the hand of
the agent. If he expresses this, the principal is bound, and the
agent is not. ;But a. mere description of the general relation or
office which the person signing the paper hold to another person
or to a corporation, without indicating that the particular ignature i made in the execution of the office and agency, is not
sufficient to charge the principal or to exempt the agent from
personal liability. Amid the great variety of language which
ma be used by merchant in haste or thoughtles ness, ignorant
or unmindful of legal rule , or not anticipating the importance
of holding one party rather than the other respon ible, it must
often happen that ca es fall very near the dividing line· and, in
order to maintain uniformity of deci ion, it is nece ary for the
court to refer to the cases already adjudicated, especially within
its own jurisdiction.
The authority which at first sight seems mo t stronaly to
support the position of the defendants i that of Balloit v. Talbot,
16 Ma s. 461, in which a note signed 'Joseph Talbot agent for
David Perry," was held not to bind Talbot per onally. That
ca e has since been recognized and followed in thi Commonwealth. (! efts v. York, 4 Cush. 372 · Page v. Wight 14 Allen,
182.) But the important and effective word in Ballou, v. Talbot
was not the word "agent," nor the name of the principal, but the
connecting word "for," which might indeed indicate merely the
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relation which the agent held to the principal ; hut which was

equally apt to express the fact that the act was done in behalf

of the principal, in the same manner as if the words had been

transposed thus: "For David Perry, Joseph Talbot, agent."

(See Dcslandcs v. Gregory, 2 El. & El. 602.) This is made man-

ifest by considering that if the word "agent" had been wholly

omitted, and the form of the signature had been simply "Joseph

Talbot, for David Perry," or "For David Perry, Joseph Talbot,"

it would have been well executed as the contract of the principal,

even if it had been under seal, and of course not less so in the

case of a simple contract. (Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97; Emer-

son v. Providence Hat Manufacturing Co., 12 Mass. 237; Musscy

v. Scott, 7 Cush. 215; Met. Con. 105, no.)

On the other hand, in Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cowen, 31, a note

signed by two persons, with the addition "Trustees of Union

Religious Society, Phelps," (Who were a legal corporation,) was

held to bind the signers personally; and in Barker v. Mechanic

Insurance Co., 3 Wend. 94, a note signed "John Franklin, Pres-

ident of the Mechanic Fire Insurance Company," was held on

demurrer not to be the note of the company, although alleged
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to have been made within the authority of the president and the

scope of the legitimate business of the corporation ; the court

saying: "In this case, there is an averment that the president

was lawfully authorized ; but it does not appear that he acted

under that authority ; he does not say that he signs for the

company; he describes himself as president of the company,

but to conclude the company by his acts he should have con-

tracted in their name, or at least on their behalf." The variation

be tween the words " fo r" and "of" seems at first view slight;

but in the connection in which the y are used in signatures of

t his kind the difference is substantial. "Agent of" or "president

of" a corporation named simply designates a personal relation

of the individual to the corporation. "Agent for" a particular

person or corporation may designate either the general relation

which the person signing holds to another party, or that the

particular act in question is done in behalf of and as the very

contract of that other ; and the court, if such is manifestly the

intention of the parties, may construe the words in the latter

sense. But even "agent for" has been held under some cir-

cumstances a mere descriptio persona of the agent, as in

De Witt v. Walton, 5 Selden, 570, in which the name following

these words was not the proper name of the principal, but the

name of a newspaper which the agent carried on in the principal's

rela tion which the agent held to the principal; but which was
qually apt t expre the fact that the act was done in behalf
of the principal in the same manner a if the word had been
tran po ed thus: "For David Perry, Jo eph Talbot, agent."
( ee Deslandes v. Gregory, 2 El. & El. 6o2.) Thi i made manife t by con idering that if the word "ag nt" had been wholly
omitted, and the form of the signature had been imply "Jo eph
Talbot, for David Perry,' or "For avid erry, Jo eph Talbot,"
it would have be n well executed as the contract of the principal,
even if it had b n under seal, and of course not less so in the
case of a simple contract. (Long v. Colburn, I I Mass. 97; E11ierson v. Providence Hat Manufactitring Co., 12 Mass. 237; Mussey
v. Scott, 7 Cu h. 215; Met. Con. 105, no.)
On the other hand, in H1.lls v. Bannister, 8 Cowen, 31, a note
nion
signed by two persons, with the addition "Trustees of
Religious Society, Phelps," (Who were a legal corporation,) was
held to bind the igner personally; and in Barker v. Mechanic
Insi£rance Co., 3 Wend. 94, a note signed "John Franklin, President of the Mechanic Fire Insurance Company," was held on
demurrer not to be the note of the company, although alleged
to have been made within the authority of the pre ident and the
cope of the legitimate business of the corporation ; the court
aying: "In this ca e, there is an averment that the pre ident
was lawfully authorized; but it does not appear that he acted
under that authority; he doe not say that he sign for the
company; he describes himself as president of the company,
but to conclude the company by his acts he should have contracted in their name, or at least on their behalf." The variation
between the words "for" and "of" seem at first view slight;
but in the connection in which they are used in signature of
this kind the difference is sub tantial. "Agent of" or "president
of" a corporation named simply de ignate a personal relation
of the individual to the corporation. "Agent for' a particular
per on or corporation may de ignate either the general relation
which the person signing holds to another party, or that the
particular act in question is done in behalf of and as the very
contract of that other; and the court, if such is manife tly the
intention of the parties, may construe the word in the latter
en e. But even "agent for" ha been held under some circumstances a mere descriPtio personce of the agent, as in
De Witt v. Walton, 5 Selden, 570, in which the name following
these words was not the proper nam of the principal, but the
name of a newspaper which the agent carried on in the principal's
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behalf, and a note signed "David Hoyt, agent for The Church-

man," was held to be the note of Hoyt and not of his principal ;

and in Shattuck v. Eastman, 12 Allen, 369, in which it was held

that a paper in the form of a receipt, signed "Robert Eastman,

Agent for Ward 6, Lowell, Mass.," if executed under such cir-

cumstances as to amount to a contract, might be binding on the

agent personally. In Fiske v. Eldridgc, 12 Gray, 474, in a care-

ful review of the cases by Mr. Justice Dewey, the New York-

decisions above mentioned were quoted with approval, and a note

signed "John T. Eldridge, Trustee of Sullivan Railroad," was

held to be the personal note of Eldridge. In Haverhill Insurance

Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen, 130, a note signed "Cheever Newhall,

President of the Dorchester Avenue Railroad Company," was

held to bind Newhall personally, although given by him to an

insurance company (as was expressed in the note itself) in con-

sideration of a policy issued to the railroad corporation, which he

was in fact authorized to obtain and sign the note for. See also

Fullam v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1 ; Morrell v. Codding, 4

Allen, 403 ; Tanner v. Christian, 4 El. & Bl. 591 ; Parker v. Wins-

low, 7 El. & Bl. 942 ; Price v. Taylor, 5 H. & N. 540 ; Bottomley
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v. Fisher, 1 H. & C. 211.

This case is not distinguishable from those just stated. It

differs from Ballon v. Talbot, in omitting the word "for," (the

only evidence, contained in the note there sued on, that it was

made in behalf of the principal) leaving the words "Agts. Pisca-

taqua F. & M. Ins. Co." as a mere description of the persons

signing this bill. The cases of Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335,

Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manufacturing Co., 12 N.

H. 205, and Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627, cannot avail the

defendants against the latter decisions of this court. See 12 Gray,

476; 8 Allen, 461, 462. The name of the principal does not

appe ar in the bo d y of the bill. The address of the bill to the

corporation and the request to them to charge the amount to the

account of the drawers have certainly no tendency to show that

the drawers are the same as the corporation, the drawees. The,

fact that the bill was delivered to the plaintiffs by the insurance

c ompany, as shown by the contemporaneous receipt, does not

make it the less the promise of the signers. The defendants must

therefore be held personally responsible as the drawers of the bill.

Judgment for the

behalf, and a note signed "David Hoyt, agent for Th Churchman, ' was held to be the note of Hoyt and not of hi principal;
and in hattuck v. Eastman, 12 11 n, 3 , in which it wa held
that a paper in the form of a receipt, igned " Robert Ea tman,
Ag nt for Ward 6, Low 11, Ma s.," if ex cuted under uch circum tanc s as to amount to a contract, might b binding on the
agent p r anally. In Fiske v. Eldridge, 12 Gray, 474, in a careful review of the case by Mr. Ju tice D wey, the ew York
decisions above mentioned were quoted with approval, and a note
igned 'John T. Eldridge, Tru tee of ullivan Railroad," was
held to be the per onal note of Eldridge. In Haverhill Insurance
Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen, 130, a note signed "Cheever Newhall,
President of the Dorchester Avenue Railroad Company," was
held to bind Newhall per onally, although given by him to an
insurance company (as was expressed in the note itself) in conid ration of a policy issued to the railroad corporation, which he
was in fact authorized to obtain and sign the note for. See also
Fullam v. West Brookfield, 9 Allen, 1; Morrell v. Codding, 4
Allen, 403; Tanner v. _Christian, 4 El. & Bl. 591; Parker v. Winslow, 7 El. & Bl. 942; Price v. Taylor, 5 H. & N. 540; Bottoniley
v. Fisher, 1 H. & C. 211.
This case is not di tinguishable from those j.u t stated. It
differs from Ballou v. Talbot, in omitting the word "for," ( the
only evidence, contained in the note there sued on, that it was
made in behalf of the principal) leaving the words "Agts. Piscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co." as a mere description of the per on
igning this bill. The cases of Mann v. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335,
Despatch Line of Packets v. BeUamy Manufacturing Co., 12 N.
H. 205, and Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627, cannot avail the
defendant against the latter decisions of thi court.
ee 12 Gray,
476; 8 Allen, 461, 462. The name of the principal does not
appear in the body of the bill. The address of the bill to the
corporation and the reque t to them to charge the amount to the
account of the drawer have certainly no tendency to how that
the drawers are the same as the corporation, the drawee . ~
fact that the bill was delivered to the plaintiff by the in urance
company, as shown by the contemporaneou r ceipt. doe not
make it the less the promise of the igner . The defendant must
therefore be held personally responsible a th dra\ ers of th b.ill.

Judgment f o~r_:t:.h..::.e_L_:_.::.;..:..;~"-=-:. :
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admissions of the acceptor. § 64 — i.

Nat. Park Bank v. Ninth Nat. Bank; Same v. Fourth Nat. Bank

{187 1), 46 N. Y. 77, 7 Am. Rep. 310.

ADMISSI NS OF THE ACCEPTOR.

§ 64-1.

The first case is an appeal from judgment of the late Gen-

eral Term, of the first judicial district, reversing order of Special

Term sustaining demurrer to complaint, and also judgment

entered upon said order.

N at. Park Bank v. Ninth Nat. Bank; Same v. Fourth Nat. Bank
(1871), 46 N. Y. 77, 7 Am. Rep. 310.

The last is an appeal from judgment of General Term ; New

York Common Pleas, affirming judgment of Special Term of that

court overruling demurrer to complaint.

The complaint in the first case states in substance, that

on the 25th March, 1867, the Ridgely National Bank, of Spring-

field, Illinois, drew its draft, or bill of exchange on plaintiff, for

the sum of fourteen dollars and twenty cents, payable to the order

of Ely Shirly, and delivered the same to the payee. That after-

ward the amount of said draft was fraudulently changed to $6,-

300.00, and the name of the payee to E. G. Fanchon, Esq. That

the name of Wm. Ridgely, cashier, signed to said draft was

erased, and afterward re-written by the person making the eras-

ure. That the same was then discounted by the Lexington
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National Bank, and by it was endorsed to defendant. That after-

ward, and on or about April 12th, 1867, defendant presented said

draft to plaintiff, and said plaintiff paid thereon the sum of $6,300.

That plaintiff discovered the forgery May 10th, 1867, and forth-

with notified defendant thereof, and demanded re-payment of said

sum, less fourteen dollars and twenty cents, which was refused.

Defendant demurs, "that the complaint does not state facts suffi-

cient to constitute a cause of action."

In the last case the facts are similar, save as to amount and

names.

/. H. V. Arnold, for appellant, Ninth Nat. Bank.

S. K. Miller, for appellant, Fourth Nat. Bank.

F. C. Barlow, for respondent.

Allen, J. The checks paid by the plaintiffs, the drawees,

were forgeries throughout, as well the signatures, as the bodies.

The name of the signer, the cashier of the Ridgely Bank, was

not the genuine signature of that officer, and was not written by

his authority. The fact that a genuine check had been draw n,

and signed by the proper party, upon the same piece of paper ,

does notaffect the character of the instrument in its altered, and

The first ca e is an appeal from judgment of the late General Term, of the first judicial district, r versing order of Special
Term sustaining demurrer to complaint, and also judgment
entered upon aid order.
The last is an appeal from judgment of General Term; New
York Common leas, affirming judgment of Special Term of that
court overruling demurrer to complaint.
The complaint in the first case states in substance, that
on the 25th March, 1867, the Ridgely National Bank, of Springfield, Illinois, drew its draft, or bill of exchange on plaintiff, for
the sum of fourteen dollars and twenty cents, payable to the order
of Ely Shirly, and delivered th same to the payee. That afterward the amount of said draft was fraudulently changed to $6,300.00, and the name of the payee to E. G. Fanchon, Esq. That
the name of Wm. Ridgely, cashi r, signed to said draft was
erased, and aft rward re-written. by the person making the erasure. That the same was then discounted by the Lexi~on
National Bank, and by it was endorsed to defendant. That afterward, and on or about April 12th, 1867, defendant present d aid
draft to plaintiff, and said plaintiff paid thereon the sum of $6,300.
That plaintiff discovered the forgery May 10th, 1867, and forthwith notified defendant thereof, and demanded re-payment of said
sum, less fourteen dollars and twenty cents, which was refused~
Defendant demurs, "that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."
In the last case the facts are similar, save as to amount and
names.

!. H. V. Arnold, for appellant, Ninth Nat. Bank.
S. K. Miller, for appellant, Fourth Nat. Bank.
F. C. Barlow, for respondent.
ALLEN, J. The checks paid by the plaintiffs, the drawees,
were forgeries throughout, as well the signatures, as the bodies.
The name of the signer, th cashier of the Ridgely Bank, was
not the genuine signature of that officer, and was not written by
his authority. The fact that a genuine check had been drawn,
and signed b the ro er art u on the same iece of paper,
oes not affect the character of the instrument in its altered, an .
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for ged condition. The forger, by skillfully obliterating the gen-

uine signature, together with the words and figures indicating

the amount payable thereon, effectually destroyed the instrument,

and it was incapable of being restored to its original condition,

in the form of a check, and made available for any purpose.

It was but a blank form of a draft or bill, and the act of

signing the name of the cashier as drawer, with intent to utter and

pass the same as genuine, was a crime, and the signature a for-

gery, whether the check was for the same, or a different amount

from that for which the original and genuine bill had been drawn.

Whether the forger used the same paper on which the orig-

inal instrument had been written and signed, and manipulated it

to suit his purposes, or made and forged a check on another, and

different piece of paper is not material, so long as the signature

of the drawer was counterfeit.

The drafts paid bv the plaintiff were not merely raised

checks, that is, forged and altered by the obliteration and removal

of one sum, and the insertion of another, but were forged instru-

ments in every sense.

The drafts signed -by the cashier are not in existence in any
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form as drafts . The genuine signature was wanting, to make the

instruments the checks of the nominal drawer, for any amount.

The money was then paid by the plaintiff upon bills drawn upon

it, to which the name of its correspondent had been forged.

For more than a century it has been held and decided, with-

out question, that it is incumbent upon the drawee of a bill, to be

satisfied that the signature of the drawer is genuine, that he is

presumed to know the handwriting of his correspondent ; and if

he accepts or pavs a bill to which the drawer's name has been

fo rged, he is bound bv the act, and can neither repudiate the

acceptance nor recover the money paid.

The doctrine was broached by Lord Raymond in Jenys v.

Fawler (2 Strange, 946), the chief justice strongly inclining to

the opinion, that even actual proof of forgery of the name of the,

drawer, would not excuse the defendants against their acceptance.

In 1762 the principle was flatly, and distinctly decided by the

Court of King's Bench, in the leading case of Price v. Neal (3

Burrows, 1354), which was an action to recover money, paid by

the drawee to the holder of a forged bill. Lord Mansfield stopped

the counsel for the defendant, saying that it was one of those

cases that never could be made plainer by argument ; that it was

incumbent on the plaintiff, to be satisfied that the bill drawn

upon him was the drawer's hand, before he accepted and paid it,

v.
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forged condition. The forger, by skillfully oblit rating the genuin igna ur , tog ther ith th word and figure indicating
the amount payabl thereon, ffectually d troyed the instrument,
and it was incapabl of b ing r tor I to it original condition,
in th form of a check, and made available for any purpo e.
It was but a blanl· form of a draft or bill, and the act of
i ning the name of the a hi r a draw r, with intent to utter and
pas th ame a g nuin , wa a crim , and th ignature a forg ry, wheth r the check wa for the am , or a different amount
from that for which th riginal and g nuine bill had been dra\ n.
Wh ther the forger u d the same paper on which the original in trument had been w ritten and sign d, and manipulated it
to uit hi purpo e , or made and forged a check on another, and
different piece of pap r i not material, so long as the signature
of th e drawer wa counterfeit.
The drafts paid by the plaintiff were not merely rai ed
checks, that i , forged and altered by the obliteration an d removal
of one um, and the insertion of anoth er, ,but were forged in tr 1ments in eve ry sen e .
..- The drafts signed ·by the cashier are not in existence in an:i:'
form as drafts. The genuine signature was wanting, to make the
in truments the checks of the nominal drawer, for any amount.
The money was then paid by the plaintiff upon bill dra\\ n upon
it, to which the name of its correspondent had been foro-ed.
For more than a century it ha been held and decided, without qu stion, that it is incumbent upon the drawee of a bill, to be
satisfied that the ignatur of the draw er is genuine, that he is
presumed to lmo\\ th handwriting of his correspondent; and if
he accept or pay
bill to which th drawer name has been
forged, he is bound by the act, and can n ither repudiate the
acceptance nor recoyer the money paid.
The doctrine was broached b Lord Raymond in Jen:ys v.
Fawler ( 2 trang 946), the chi f ju tice strongly inclinino- to
the opinion, that even actual proof of foro-ery of the nam e of th~
drawer, would not xcu the defendant ao-ain t their acceptance.
In 1762 the principl wa flatly, and di tinctly decided by the
Court of King's Bench, in th e lea 1in
a of Price v. ea! ( 3
Burrows, 1354) , which wa an action to reco er mon y paid by
the drawee to the holder of a forged bill. Lord ~ an field stopped
the counsel for the defendant, sa ing that it wa one of those
cases that never could be made plainer by aro-ument · that it wa
incumbent on the plaintiff, to be sati fi d that the bill drawn
upon him wa the draw r' hand, before he ac pt d and paid it

a
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but it was not incumbent for the defendant to inquire into it. This

case has been followed and the doctrine applied, almost without

question or criticism, in an unbroken series of cases, from that

time to this, and it has been distinctly approved in very many

cases, which have not been within the precise range of the principle

decided. (See Archer v. Bank of England, 2 Doug., 639; Smith

v. Mercer, 6 Taunt., 76; Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C, 428;

Cook v. Masterman, 7 B. & C, 902 ; Cooper v. Meyer, 10 B. & C,

468; Saunderson v. Coleman, 4 M. & G., 209; Smith v. Chester,

1 D. & E. R., 655; Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & S., 15; Bank of Com-

merce v. Union Bank, 3 Comstock, 230; Goddard v. Merchants'

Bank, 4 Comstock, 149; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill,

287.)

Cases have been distinguished from Price v. Neal, and its

applicability to a transfer to a forged instrument, between persons

not a party to it, has not been extended to forgeries of indorse-

ments or handwriting of parties to negotiable instruments, other

than the drawer. But, as applied to the case of a bill to which

the signature of a drawer is forged, accepted or paid by the

drawee, its authority has been uniformly and fully sustained, and
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the rule extends as well to the case of a bill paid upon present-

ment, as to one accepted and afterward paid. (Bank of St.

Albans v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 10 Vermont, 141 ; Levy

v. Bank of the U. S., 4 Dallas, 234; Bank of U. S. v. Bank of

Georgia, 10 Wheat., 333; Young v. Adams, 6 Mass., 182; Glou-

cester Bank v. Bank of Salem, 17 Mass. 41.)

A rule so well established, and so firmly rooted and grounded

in the jurisprudence of the country, ought not to be overruled or

disregarded.

It has become a rule of right and of action among commer-

cial and business men, and any interference with it would be

mischievous. Judge Ruggles in Goddard v. Merchants' Bank,

supra, well says, "it should not be departed from, or frittered

away by exceptions resting on slight grounds, and cannot be

overruled, without overthrowing valuable, and well settled prin-

ciples of commercial law." In the first above entitled action, the

judgment of the General Term should be reversed, and that of

Special Term affirmed, and judgment absolute for the defendant

with costs; and in the other, the Judgment of the General and

Special Term should be reversed, and judgment for the defendant

with costs.

All concur.

Peckam, J., not voting. Judgment accordingly.

V-^v

but it wa not incumbent fo r the d fendant to inquire into it. This
ca e ha be n followed and the doctrine applied, almost without
qu tion or critici m, in an unbroken eri of ca e , from that
time to thi , and it ha been distinctl approved in very many
ca e , ·which have not b en within the preci e range of the principle
d cided . ( e Archer v. Bank of England, 2 Doug ., 639; Smith
v. Mercer,
Taunt., 76; Wilkinson v. Johnson, 3 B. & C., 428;
Cook v. ~Masterman, 7 B. & ., 902; Cooper v. Meyer, IO B. & C.,
46 · Saunderson v. Coleman, 4 M. & G., 209; Smith v. Chester,
l
. & E. R., 55; Bass v. Clive, 4 M. & ., 15; Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Comstock, 230; Goddard v. Merchoots'
Bank, 4 Com tock, 149; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, l Hill,
287.)
Ca e have 1 een di tinguished from Price v. Neal, and its
applicability to a tran fer to a forged instrument, between persons
not a party to it, ha not been extended to forgeries of indorsernent or handwriting of partie to negotiable instruments, other
than the drawer. But, as applied to the ca e of a bill to which
th
ignature of a drawer i foro-ed, accepted or paid by the
draw ee, its authority ha been uniforml y and full y sustained, and
the rule extend a well to th ca e of a bill paid upon presentment, a t one accepted and aft rwa rd paid. (Bank of St.
Albans v. Fanners' and M echanici' Bank, IO Vermont, 141 ; Levy
v. Bank of the U. S. , 4 Dallas, 234; Bank of U. S. v. Bank of
Georgia, IO Wheat., 333; Young v. A dams, 6 Mass., 182; Gloucester Bank v. Bank of Salem, 17 Mass. 4i.)
A rule so well established, and so firml y rooted and grounded
in the juri prudence of the country, ought not to be overruled or
di regarded.
It ha become a rule of right and of action among commercial and busines men, and any interference with it would be
mi chievou . Judge Ruggle in Goddard v. Merchants' Bank.
supra, w 11 say , " it should not b departed from, or frittered
away by exceptions resting on slight ground , and cannot be
overruled, without overthrowing valuable, and w II ettled principle of commercial law." In th first above entitled action, the
ju lament of the General T rm should b rever d, and that of
pecial Term affirmed, and judgment ab olute for the defendant
with costs; and in the oth r, the Judgment of the General and
pecial Term hould be reversed, and judgment for the defendant
with costs.
All concur.
PECKAM, J., not voting.
Judgnient accordingly.

~~-

FIRST NAT. BANK

v.

NORTHWESTERN NAT. BANK

227

First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat. Bank 227

First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Bank (1894), 152 III. 296.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; —

heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook

First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Bank ( 1894), 152 Ill. 296.

county; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, Judge, presiding.

The bank checks involved in this suit purported to be drawn

by the Central Union Telephone Company upon the Northwestern

National Bank of Chicago. Four of these checks were made

payable to the order of "F. P. Ross, Manager," and one was

drawn payable to the order of "C. H. Wilson, A. G., Supt."

These checks were received by appellant, the First National Bank,

in the regular course of business, being deposited with it by Cha-

pin & Gore, who were regular depositors. Appellant endorsed

them, "Pay through Chicago Clearing House only to First

National Bank," and they being by the clearing house presented

to appellee, were paid by it. Afterwards, it was discovered that

the signatures of the maker, the telephone company, and that of

the payees, Wilson and Ross, were forgeries. Thereupon the

Northwestern National Bank brought this suit against the First

National Bank. The other important facts are stated in the

opinion.
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Messrs. Remy & Mann, for the appellant.

Mr. Charles M. Sturges, for the appellee.

Mr. Justice Baker delivered the opinion of the court :

In this action of assumpsit brought by the Northwestern

National Bank of Chicago, against the First National Bank of

Chicago, the issues were tried before the Superior Court of Cook

county without a jury, and the court found the issues for che

plaintiff, and assessed its damages at $2,454, and rendered judg-

ment therefor against the defendant. Upon an appeal to the

Appellate Court for the First District the judgment was in all

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;heard in that court on app al from th
uperior ourt of ook
county; the Hon. ELLIOTT NTHONY, Judge, presiding.
The bank check invol d in thi uit purport d to be drawn
by the entral nion Telephone Company upon the Northwestern
National Bank of hicago. Four of the e check were made
payabl to the order of "F. P. Ross, Manager,' and one was
drawn payable to the order of "C. H. Wilson, A. G., Supt."
These checks wer received by appellant, the First National Bank,
in the regular course of bu ine s, being deposited with it by Chapin & Gore, who were regular depo itors. Appellant endorsed
them, "Pay through Chicago Clearing House only to First
National Bank," and they being by the clearing house presented
to appellee, were paid by it. Afterward , it was discovered that
the io-natures of the maker, the telephone company, and that of
the payees, Wil on and Ross, were forgeries. Thereupon the
Northwestern National Bank brought this suit against the First
National Bank. The other important facts are stated in the
op1mon.

things affirmed, and thereupon the First National Bank of Chi-

cago prosecuted this further appeal.

(Omitting questions of practice).

It may be well, in order to clearly understand the nature of

Messrs. Re11iy & Mann, for the appellant.
Mr. Charles M. Sturges, for the appellee.

the case upon which appellee relies, to briefly state the substance

of its declaration. The declaration contains ten counts, nine of

which are special, and each of these special counts describes a

different instrument in writing, and the tenth count is a common

indebitatus assumpsit count for interest. The first count avers

Mr. JUSTICE BAKER delivered the opinion of the court:
In this action of as ump it brought by the Northwestern
National Bank of Chicago, again t the Fir t National Bank of
Chicago, the i sue were tried before th
uperior Court of Cook
county without a jury, and the court found the i ues for che
plaintiff, and a ses ed it damage at $2 454, and rendered judo-ment therefor again t the defendant. Upon an appeal to the
Appellate Court for the Fir t Di trict the judgment \: a in all
things affirmed, and thereupon the Fir t National Bank of Chicago prosecuted thi forth r appeal.
(Omitting questions of practice).
It may be well in ord r to clearly understand the nature of
the case upon which appelle relie , to briefl tate the ub tance
of its declaration. The de laration contain ten ount , nine of
which are special, and each of the e p cial count describes a
different instrument in writin , and the tenth count i a common
indebitatus assumpsit count for interest. The fir t count avers
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that on May 17, 1887, "a certain person" made and drew, by and

under the name and style of "W, S. Chapman, Treas.," a certain

draft or order, in writing, for the payment of money, commonly

called a check on a bank, with the heading "Central Union Tele-

phone Company," and said check being numbered with the number

13,006, and caused said check to be countersigned by and under the

style of "Geo. L. Phillips, Prest.," and directed said check to the

appellee, and thereby requested it to pay $300 to C. H. Wilson, who

was described therein as "C. H. Wilson, A. G. Supt.," and that

afterwards some one to plaintiff unknown, intending to defraud C.

H. Wilson, and without the consent, knowledge or ratification of

Wilson, and without the knowledge of plaintiff, forged on said

check the name of "C. H. Wilson, A. G. Supt.," and caused said

check, so indorsed, to be placed in the hands of Chapin & Gore,

who in turn endorsed it "For deposit in the First National Bank

to the credit of Chapin & Gore," and delivered it to the appellant,

who in turn endorsed it "Pay through Chicago Clearing House

only to First National Bank," and through said clearing house

presented said check to appellee for payment, and thereby vouched

and warranted to appellee that the endorsement of C. H. Wilson
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on said check was the genuine endorsement of said Wilson, and

that appellee, confiding in said warranty of appellant, and in con-

sideration thereof, and being ignorant that said endorsement was

forged, paid said check to appellant and took up the check ; that

appellee did not discover the fact of such forgery until July 25,

1887, when it notified appellant, tendered to it the check, and

demanded that appellant should make good its warranty, and

should repay to appellee the amount of the check, by means

whereof appellant became liable to pay, promised to pay, and

afterwards refused, etc. The averments of the second count are

substantially the same as those of the first count, except that the

check is dated May 31, 1887, is numbered 13,051, and is for

$250. The averments of the third count are substantially the

same as those of the first count, except that the check is dated

June 13, 1887, is numbered 13,086, and is for $200. The aver-

ments of the fourth count are substantially the same as those of

the first count, except that the check is dated June 13, 1887, is

numbered 13,087, and is for $200, and except, further, that the

count contains the additional averment that on June 30, 1887,

appellee accepted said check and wrote on the face thereof these

words: "Accepted payable through Chicago Clearing House,

June 30, 1887. — Northwestern National Bank. — Sheahan, Teller."

The averments of the fifth count are substantially the same as

that on May 17, 1887, "a certain per on' made and drew, by and
under the name and tyle of "W. S. Chapman, Treas.," a certain
draft or order, in writing, for the payment of money, commonly
called a check on a bank, with the heading " entral Union Telephone Company," and said check being numbered with the number
13,006, and caused said check to be countersigned by and under the
tyle of " Geo. L. Phillips, rest.," and directed aid check to the
appellee, and thereby requested it to pay $300 to . H. Wilson, who
wa de cribed ther in as " . H. Wilson, . G. Supt.,' and that
afterwards ome one to plaintiff unknown, intending to defraud C.
H. Wilson, and without the consent, knowledge or ratification of
\Vilson, and without the knowledge of plaintiff, forged on said
check the name of "C. H . Wilson, A. G. Supt.," and cau ed said
check, so indorsed, to be placed in the hands of Chapin & Gore,
who in turn endorsed it "For deposit in the First National Bank
to the credit of Chapin & Gore," and delivered it to the appellant,
who in turn endor ed it "Pay through Chicago Clearing Hou e
only to First National Bank," and through said clearing house
presented aid check to appellee for payment, and thereby vouched
and warranted to appellee that the endorsement of C. H. Wilson
0n aid check was the genuine endorsement of aid \iVil on, and
that appellee, confiding in aid warranty of appellant, and in consideration thereof, and being ignorant that said endor ement was
forged, paid said check to appellant and took up the check; that
appellee did not discover the fact of such forgery until July 25,
1887, when it notified appellant, tendered to it the check, and
demanded that appellant should make good its warranty, and
hould repay to appellee the amount of the check, by means
whereof appellant became liable to pay, promised to pay, and
afterward refused, etc. The averments of the second count are
ub tantially the same as those of the first count, except that th e
check is dated May 31, 1887, is numbered 13,051, and i for
$250. The averments of the third count are sub tantiall y th e
ame as those of the first count, except that the check is dated
June 13, l 87, is numbered 13 o 6, and i for $200. The avermcnts of the fourth count are ub tantially the ame as tho e of
the first count, except that the check i dated June 13, 1887, i
numbered 13,087, and is for $200 and xcept, further, that the
count contains the additional averment that on June 30, 1887,
appellee accepted said check and wrote on the face thereof these
wor 1 : "Accepted payable through Chicago Clearing House,
June 30, 1887.-Northwe tern National Bank-Sheahan, Teller."
The averment of the fifth count are ubstantially the ame as
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those of the first count, except that the check is dated July 5, 1887,

is numbered 13,145, and is for $200, and except, also, that there

is no averment that it is countersigned by and under the style

of "Geo. L. Phillips, Prest." The averments of the sixth count

are substantially the same as those of the first count, except that

the payee named in the check is "F. P. Ross, M'gr.," and except

that the check is dated May 31, 1887, is numbered 13,049, and is

for $200. The seventh count is the same as the sixth count,

except that date of check is May 1, 1887, and its number is 13,050,

and it is for $300.10. The eighth count is the same as the sixth

count, except that date of check is June 18, 1887, and its number

is 13,085, and it is for $200. The ninth count is the same as the

sixth count, except that date of check is July 5, 1887, and its

number is 13,147, and its amount is $200, and except, also, that

it contains an additional averment that on July 13, 1887, appellee

accepted said check, and wrote on the face thereof: "Accepted

payable through Chicago Clearing House July 13, 1887. — North-

western Nat '1 Bank. — Sheahan, Teller."

The only plea filed to the declaration was that of the general

issue, and issue was joined thereon. But at the trial a stipulation
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was made that appellant might, under that plea, introduce evi-

dence to prove that the checks were otherwise forged, prior or in

addition to the endorsements alleged to have been forged, and

that such prior and other forgeries were on said checks when they

came to the hands of appellant, and without its knowledge, pro-

vided the court should hold proof of such matter competent as a

defense, and provided appellee might introduce, in reply, all mat-

ters in evidence, and provided the rulings of the court admitting

or rejecting such evidence should be subject to exception by

either party, other than on the point of its admissibility under the

pleadings.

The declaration proceeds upon the theory that it is imma-

terial, as between the parties to this suit, who, in fact, drew the

checks. The allegation in each of the special counts is, that "a

certain person" drew the check. In 2 Chitty's Pleading, (10th

Am. ed.) *i5o, it is said that it is not n ecess ary to state the names

of the parties to a bill of exchange, unless they be plaintiffs or

defendants. It may also be said that the declaration virtually

admits that the several checks were genuine checks of the tele-

phone company, and that the endorsements of the payees alone

were forgeries.

At the trial the court admitted evidence to show that the

signatures of the drawers of the checks were forgeries. That

tho e of th fir t count, except that the check is dated July 5, 1887,
i numbered 13,145, and i for $200, and except, al o, that there
i no av rment that it is countersigned by and und r the style
of 'Geo. L. Phillips, Pre t. ' The av rments of the sixth c unt
are ub tantially the ame a tho e of the first count, except that
the payee named in the check is "F. P. Ross, M'gr.," and except
that the ch ck i dated lay 31, 18 7, is numbered 13,049, and i
for $200. The seventh count is the same as the sixth count,
except that date of ch ck i May l, 1887, and its number is 13,050,
and it is for $300.IO. The eighth count is the same a the sixth
count, except that date of check is June 18, 1887, and its number
is 13,085, and it i for $200. The ninth count is the same a the
sixth count, except that date of check is July 5, 1887, and it
number i 13,147, and its amount is $200, and except, also, that
it contain an additional averment that on July l 3, 1887, appellee
accepted aid check, and wrote on the face thereof: "Accepted
payable through Chicago Clearing House July 13, 1887.-Northwe tern Nat 1 Bank.-Sheahan, Teller."
The only plea filed to the declaration was that of the general
i sue, and issue was joined thereon. But at the trial a stipulation
was made that appellant might, under that plea, introduce evidence to prove that the checks were otherwise forged, prior or in
addition to the endorsements alleged to have been forged, and
that uch prior and other forgeries were on said check when they
came to the hands of appellant, and without its knowledge, provided the court should hold proof of such matter competent as a
defen e and provided appellee miaht introduce, in reply all matters in evidence, and provided the rulings of the court admittinoor rejecting such evid nee hould be ubject to exception by
either party, other than on the point of its admissibility under the
pleadings.
The declaration proceeds upon the theory that it is immaterial, as between the partie to thi uit, who, in fact, drew the
checks. The allegation in each of the pecial count i , that a
certain per on" drew the check. In 2 Chitty' Pleadina, (10th
Am. ed.) *150, it is aid that it is not nece ary to tate the name
of the parties to a bill of exchange, unle they b plaintiff or
defendant . It may al o be aid that the declaration virtually
admits that the several check were enuine che k of the telephone company and that the endor ment of the payees alone
\\ ere fora ries.
t the trial the court admitted evidence to hO\ that the
signature of the drawer of the check were forgeries. That
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evidence was introduced over the objections and exceptions of

appellee, appellee specifying as grounds of objection that such

inquiry was irrelevant to the issues in the cause, and that under

the issues, and as between the plaintiff and defendant, the signa-

tures of the drawers of the checks were conclusively presumed

to be genuine. Appellee was right in its contentions. A check

payable to order is a bill of exchange payable to order on demand.

The drawee of a bill of exchange or of a bank check is conclu-

sively presumed to know the signature of the drawer, and if he

accepts or pays, in the usual course of business, a bill or check

whereon _the signature of the drawer is a forgery, he will be

estopped to afterward deny the genuineness of such signature.

(First Nat. Bank of Quincy v. Ricker, 71 111. 439; Bigelow on

Estoppel, (4th ed.) 498; 2 Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata,

Sees. 1006, 1008.) But the o peration of an estoppel is reciprocal,

for there can be no estoppel unless it be mutual. It must bind

both parties, and one who is not bound by it can not take advan-

tage of it. (2 Herman on Estoppel, Sec. 1295 ; Co. Lit. 352a; Grif-

fin v. Richardson, N. C. 11 Ired. L. 439; Gaunt v. Wainman, 3

Bing. N. C. 69, and 32 Eng. C. L. 42 ; Bcntley et al. v. Cleavcland,
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22 Ala. 814; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480.) And

so, .as, in respect to the transactions involved in the present litiga-

tion, appellee_is jpreclu ded from questioning the genuineness of

the signatures of the treasurer and president of the telephone

company to the nine check s, so also is ap pe llant estopped from so

doing. The case stands, as between the parties to this suit, just

as though the signatures of the drawers of the checks were^

authentic. To rule otherwise would be to disregard the maxim of

the law, allegans contraria non est audiendus, and to permit appel-

lant to blow both hot and cold with reference to the same transac-

tions.

In the present case, the admission of the incompetent testi-

mony seems to have worked no injury, for when the trial court

came to make its findings upon the issues, it manifestly disre-

garded such testimony, as being irrelevant.

The estoppel, however, of which we have spoken, applies

only to the case of the signature of the drawer, and of the drawer,

alone. A drawee is bound to know the signature of his own cus-

tomers, and a bank is bound to know the signatures of those who

deposit with it and draw checks against such deposits. But the

drawee or bank is not chargeable with knowledge of any other

sign ature i on* the bill ofexch ange or bank check, and bv accepting

oTpaying the bill or che ckHoes not admit the genuineness of any

evidence wa introduced over the objection and exception of
appellee, appellee pecifying a ground of objection that uch
inquiry was irrelevant to the i ue in the cau e, and that under
the i sues, and as behveen the plaintiff and defendant, the signatures of the drawer of the ch ck were conclu ively pre urned
to be genuine. Appellee \\'a right in it contentions. A check
payable to order i a bill of exchange payable to order on demand.
The drawee of a bill of exchange or of a bank check is concluively pre urned to know the 1gnature of the drawer, and if he
acce ts or a s in the u ual cour e of bu ine s, a bill or check
whereon the ignature of the rawer 1 a for er
he ·will be
e to ed to afterward den ' the enuinene
of uch i nature.
(First at. Bank of Quincy v. Ricker, 71 Ill. 439; 1gelow on
E toppel, (4th ed .) 498; 2 Herman on E toppel and Re Judicata,
ec . 1006, 1008.) But the operation of an estoppel is reciprocal,
for there can be no e toppel unle s it be mutual. It mu t bind
both partie , and one who is not bound by it can not take advantaa of it. ( 2 Herman on Estoppel, Sec. 1295; Co. Lit. 352a; Griffin v. Richardson, N. C. rr Ired. L. 439; Gaunt v. Wainman, 3
Bing. N. C. 69, and 32 Eng. C. L. 42; Bentley et al. v. Cleaveland,
22 A la. 814; TVella11d Canal Co. v. Hathawa3, 8 Wend. 4 o.) And
so, ..a§_, in respect to the transactions involved in the pre ent litigation, appellee is recluded from ue tionin the enuinene of
the ignat"ures of the treasurer and re ident of the tele h
com an to the nine check
9oing. The case tand , a between the parties to this uit, just
3s though the signatures of the drawer of the checks were
authentic. To rule otherwi e would be to di regard the maxim of
the law, allegans contraria non est a1ld·i endus, and to permit appellant to blow both hot and cold with reference to the same tran actions.
In the present ca e, the admis ion of the incompetent te timony seem to have worked no injury for when the trial court
came to make it findings upon the is ue , it manife tly di regarded such te timony, as being irrelevant.
The
toppel, however, of which we have poken, applie
only to the ca e of the ignature of the dra\ er, and of the drawer.
alone. A drawee is bound to know the ianature of hi own cu tamers, and a bank i bound to know the signatures of those who
d po it with it and draw ch cks again t uch deposits. But the
drawee or bank is not char eable ' ith knowled e of an-= other
1gnature on the ill of exchan e or bank check and
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e ndorsement on it. (2 Daniel on Neg. Inst., Sees. 1364, 1365;

Marine Nat. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 59 N. Y. App. 67; Canal

Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill, 287 ; Vagliano v. Bank of Eng-

land, L. R. 22 Q. B. Div. 103; Vagliano v. Bank of England, (on

appeal) L. R. 23 id. 243.) And even if a drawer draws a bill or

check payable to himself or his own order, and at once endorses

it, an acceptance or payment of it by the drawee admits only

the genuineness of the drawer's original signature, but not the

genuineness of his endorsement. (2 Parsons on Notes and Bills,

483 ; 2 Daniel on Neg. Inst., Sec. 1365 ; Beeman v. Duck, 11 Mees.

& Wels. 251 ; Williams v. Drexel, 14 Md. 566). -\\MJ,^

At the trial, C. H. Wilson testified for appellee, as follows :

"I lived in Columbus in May, June and July, 1887, and was assist-

ant general superintendent of the Central Union Telephone Com-

pany. That company, during those months, was accustomed to

draw checks on the Northwestern National Bank to my order,

under the designation of 'A. G. Supt.' The signature to the

endorsement of the checks mentioned in the first five counts of

the declaration, and now shown me, are not my signatures. They

are forgeries, — every one of them. I never authorized any one to
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sign my name to those checks, nor did I know they were signed,

nor have I ratified or approved the endorsements, or either of

them." And F. P. Ross testified as follows : "I reside at Colum-

bus, Ohio. Was manager of the Central Union Telephone Com-

pany Exchange there in May, June and July, 1887. Was accus-

tomed to receive, from time to time, checks drawn by the Central

Union Telephone Company to my order, as manager, on the

Northwestern National Bank of Chicago, generally resembling

the checks now shown me, described in the sixth, seventh, eighth

and ninth counts of the declaration. The endorsements on the

back of them are not my endorsements. They are forgeries. I

never authorized, consented, ratified or approved such endorse-

ments."

It is urged that the forgery of the endorsements is not suffi-

ciently proven. The claim, as we understand counsel, is, that it

does not appear that the checks were really drawn in favor of

Wilson and Ross, respectively, in the sense that they thereby

became the owners, respectively, of them, or that it was the inten-

tion of the drawer or drawers, by means of the checks, to pay them

money, or that the checks were delivered to them, but that, on the

contrary, it is logically deducible from the declaration and the

evidence that the checks were delivered to some person whose

name is not disclosed, and that it was the intention of the drawer

endorsement on it. (2 aniel on eg. Inst., Secs. 1364, 1365;
Marine Nat. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 59 N. Y. App. 67; Canal
Bank v. Bank of Albany, l Hill, 2 7; Vagliano v. Bank of England, L. R. 22 Q. B. iv. 103; Vagliano v. Bank of England, (on
appeal) L. R. 23 id. 243.) And even if a drawer draw a bill or
check payable to him elf or hi own order, and at once endor es
it, an acceptance or payment of it by the drawee admit only
the genuineness of the drawer's original signature, but not the
genuinene s of hi ndorsement. ( 2 Parson on N ates and Bills,
483; 2 Daniel on ea. Inst., Sec. 1365; Beeman v. Duck, I I Mees.
& Wels. 251; Willia11is v. Drexel, 14 Md. 566).
At the trial, C. H. Wilson testified for appellee, as follows:
"I lived in Columbus in May, June and July, 1887, and was as i tant general superintendent of the Central Union Telephone Company. That company, during those months, was accustomed to
draw checks on the Northwestern National Bank to my orde~,
under the designation of 'A. G. Supt.' The signature to the
endorsement of the checks mentioned in the first five counts of
the declaration, and now shown me, are not my signatures. They
are forgeries,-every one of them. I never authorized any one to
sign my name to those checks, nor did I know they were igned,
nor h;;tve I ratified or approved the endorsements, or either of
them." And F. P. Ros te tified as follow : "I re ide at Columbu , Ohio. Was manager of the Central Union Telephone Company Exchange there in May, June and July, 1887. Wa accustomed to receive, from time to time, check drawn by the Central
U nion Telephone Company to my order, as manager, on the
Northwestern National Bank of Chica o, generally re embling
the check now shown me, de cribed in the sixth, seventh, eighth
and ninth counts of the declaration. The endor ements on the
back of them are not my endorsement . They are forgerie . I
never authorized, consented, ratified or approved such endorsements."
It is urged that the forgery of the endorsement i not ufficiently proven. The claim, as we understand coun el, is, that it
does not appear that the checks were really drawn in favor of
Wilson and Ross, re pectively, in the en e that they thereb
became the owners, re pecti ely, of th m or that it wa the intention of the dra\ er or dra\ er , b) mean of the check , to pay them
money, or that the checks were delivered to them, but that, on the
contrary, it is logically deducible from the declaration and the
evidence that the checks were delivered to ome person ' ho e
name is not disclosed, and that it wa the intention of the drawer
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or drawers that such person should in fact receive the money, and

it is submitted, that in such state of the case it was not forgery

on the part of the holder of the checks to endorse the name of

Wilson, or that of Ross, on the checks payable to them, respect-

ively. The contention seems to be, that there can be no real payee

of a forged instrument, and no such thing as a forged endorse-

ment of the name of the ostensible payee of a check to which the

name of the drawer is forged. This argument is more specious

than sound. It is a complete answer to it to repeat what we have

already said in another connection : that, as between appellee and

appellant, b oth parties are estopped from claiming that the origi-

nal checks anT not genuineVor that the name of the drawer signed

to them is forged]

If further authority upon that point is desirable, it is afforded

by the recent (1889) judgment of the Court of Appeals in the

case of Vagliano v. Bank of England, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 243.

The amount there involved was about $350,000. In the bills of

exchange there in question, both the signatures of the drawer and

the endorsements of the payee were forged. In this respect it

was like the case at bar, and in respect to the questions at issue
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it was also singularly like it. It may be well to remark, by way

of explanation of some of the language that we shall quote, that

one of the questions under examination was whether a certain

sub-section 3 of a statute of 1882 was a mere codification of exist-

ing law or an alteration of it. The court there said : "The bank

can only justify the payment that has been made, by showing that

the documents were to be considered in the light of bills originally

payable to bearer, in which case the bank would be authorized to

pay the amount to the person who was the holder. Counsel for

the bank contended before us that the payee named, C. Petridi &

Co., were fictitious payees. A real and existing firm of that name

were, in fact, carrying on business at Constantinople, and had

been on previous occasions payees of genuine bills drawn by

Vucina upon Vagliano Bros. It was unquestionably intended by

Glyka that the acceptor should believe, and the acceptor in each

case did believe, that the payees indicated were the C. Petridi &

Co. in question, but it was urged by the appellant's counsel that as

Glyka, the forger, intended to forge C. Petridi & Co.'s names, and

never meant that they should have anything to do with the bills,

the payees were fictitious. * * * Before accepting such a

construction of the sub-section it is desirable to state with pre-

cision what was the previous commercial law upon the subject.

The law merchant seems to have been clear, and to have been

or drawers that such per on hould in fact r c ive the money, and
it is ubmitted, that in such tate of the ca e it was not forgery
on the part of the holder of th checks to ndor e the name oi
\\'ii on, or that of Ros , on the checks payable to th m, re pectiv ly. The contention eems to b , that th r can be no real payee
of a forged in trument, and no such thine· as a forg d endorsement of the name of the o ten ible payee of a check to which the
name of the drawer is forged. Thi aro-ument i more specious
than ound. It i a complete an wer to it to repeat what we have
already said in another connection: that, a between appellee and
appellant, both parti s are esto ed from claimin that the ori inTc 1ec are not genuin , or that the name of the drawer signed
to them is forged.
- - If further authority upon that point is de irable, it is afforded
by the recent (I 89) ju lgment of the Cou rt of Appe4l in the
ca e of Va a-liano v. Bank of England, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 243.
The amount there involved wa about $350,000. In the bills of
exchange there in que tion, both the signatures of the drawer and
the endor cments of the pay e were forged. In this re pect it
was like the case at bar, and in respect to the questions at is ue
it wa also ingularly like it. It may be well to remark, by way
of explanation of ome of the language that we hall quote, that
one of the que tions under examination was whether a certain
uh-section 3 of a statute of 1882 wa a mere codification of existing law or an alteration of it. The court there said: "The bank
can only justify the payment that ha been made, by showing that
the documents were to be consid red in the ligh t of bills originally
payable to bearer, in which ca e the bank would be authorized to
pay the amount to the person who was the holder. Counsel for
the bank contended before us that the payee named, C. Petridi &
Co., were fictitious payees. A real and existing firm of that name
were, in fact, carrying on bu ine at on tantinople, and had
been on previou occasions payee of enuine bill drawn by
Vucina upon Vagliano ro . It wa unque tionably intended by
lyka that the acceptor should b lieve, and the acceptor in each
case did believe, that the paye s indicated w r the . Petridi &
o. in que tion, but it was uro-ed by the appellant's coun el that a
tridi & Co.' name , and
lyka, the forger, intend d to faronever meant that th y hould hav anything to do with the bills,
the payees were fictitious. * * *
fore accepting uch aeon truction of the sub-section it i de irable to state with preci ion what was the previous commer ial law upon the sub ject.
The law merchant eems to have been clear, and to have been
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based throughout on the principle of the law of estoppel, which,

in its turn, is conformable with reason and business principles.

The genuineness of the endorsement of the payee was a matter

as to which, except in one special instance, no estoppel prevailed.

The one exception to the rule was the case described in Story on

Bills of Exchange, Sections 56 and 200. This exceptional rule in

the case of fictitious bills is based, as has been stated, on a special

application to a particular case of the principle of estoppel, which

plays so important a part in the law merchant." Then, after a

review of the cases, the court added : "Down, therefore, to the

date of the passing of the recent statute, the exception that bills

drawn to the order of a fictitious or non-existing payee might be

treated as payable to bearer, was based uniformly upon the law of

estoppel, and applied only against the parties who, at the time they

became liable on the bill, were cognizant of the fictitious character

or of the non-existence of the supposed payee. The principle that

lies at the root of the exception is, that a reasonable effect must be

given, in favor of bona fide holders, to the act of acceptance,

and that where it appears that although there was a named payee

he was so compl etely fictitious or non-existing that the acceptor
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_could not have intended to restrict payment to such payee or ms

orderTTHe acceptor, who must be taken to have intended tha t his

acceptan ce__sh_ ould have some commercial validity, was estopped"

from saving that the bill was not a bill payable to bearer. If the

exception is to be extended beyond this, it will rest upon no prin-

ciple at all, and this strange result would follow : that where, for

purposes of fraud, a payee's name is introduced, (whose signature

it is intended to forge) the acceptor, though innocent and ignorant,

will be bound to pay, and his bankers will be justified in paying

without any endorsement at all. The acceptor, in such cases, will

be a helpless victim. Ignorant, himself, of the fraud, believing

from first to last that he has accepted a bill payable only to a partic-

ular payee or to his order, he will be held, in law, nevertheless to

have accepted a bill payable to bearer. The word 'fictitious' must in

each case be interpreted with due regard to the person against

whom the bill is sought to be enforced. If the obligations of the_

acceptor are in question, and the accepto r is the pers o n against

whom the bill is to be so treated, fictitious must mean fictitious as

regards jjh e acceptor, and to his knowledge . Such an interpretation

is based on good sense and sound commercial principle. * * *

Petridi & Co. of Constantinople did not cease to be real persons

because Glyka meant to suggest, falsely, that they were to be the

payees, and meant himself to forge their names. According to the

based throughout on the principle of the law of e toppel, which,
in its turn, is conformable with rea on and bu ine principle .
The genuineness of the endorsement of the payee was a matter
as to which, except in on pecial in tance, no e toppel prevailed.
The one exception to the rule was the case described in tory on
Bill of Exchange, Section 56 and 200. This exceptional rule in
the ca e of fictitious bills i based, as has been stated, on a special
application to a particular ca e of the principle of e toppel, which
plays so important a part in the law merchant." Then, after a
review of the cases, the court added : "Down, therefore, to th
date of the passing of the recent statute, the exception that bill
drawn to the order of a fictitious or non-existing payee might be
treated a payable to bearer, was based uniformly upon the law of
estoppel, and applied only against the parties who, at the time they
became liable on the bill, were cognizant of the fictitious character
or of the non-existence of the supposed payee. The principle that
lie at the root of the exception is, that a reasonable effect must be
given, in favor of bona fide holders, to the act of acceptance,
and that where it appears that although there was a named payee
he was so completely fictitious or non-existing that the acceptor
could not have intended to restrict a ment to such payee or his
order, t e acceptor, who must be taken to have intended t at 1
acceptance should have some commercial validity, was estopped
from saying that the bill was not a bill payable to bearer. If the
exception is to be extended beyond this, it will rest upon no principle at all, and this strange result would follow: that where, for
purposes of fraud, a payee's name is introduced, (who e signature
it i intended to forge) the acceptor, though innocent and ignorant,
vYill be bound to pay, and his bankers will be justified in paying
without any endorsement at all. The acceptor, in such cases, will
be a helpless victim. Ignorant, him If, of the fraud, believing
from first to last that he ha accepted a bill payable only to a particular payee or to his order, he will be held, in law nev rtheless to
have accepted a bill payable to bearer. The word 'fictitiou 'mu tin
each case be interpreted with du r o-ard to th p r on ao-ain t
whom the bill is sought to be enforc d. If the obli ations of the
acceptor are in question an I the acceptor is th per on again t
whom the bill is to be so tr ated, fictitiou must mean fictitious a
regards the acceptor, and to his know! dg . uch an int rpretation
i based on good sense and ound comm rcial principl . * * *
Petridi & Co. of Constantinople did not cease to b r al person
because Glyka meant to suo-o-est, fal ely that th were to be the
payees, and meant himself to foro-e their name .
ccordino- to the
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ordinary sense of the English language the payees of these bills

were not fictitious, but real, persons, from first to last, and to con-

strue the law otherwise would be to render it the source of needless

disorder and confusion in business transactions. The instruments

in question were not, therefore, payable to bearer, and the bank

having paid upon forged endorsements, must, in the absence of

any other ground of defense, take the consequences."

When appellant e ndorsed t he nine checks, and collected from

ap pellee the sums of money called for by them, it warranted the

genuineness of all the preceding signatures endorsed on the respec-

tive chec ks, including the endorsements on the checks of the names

of the respective payees named in such checks . (2 Parsons on

Notes and Bills, 588 ; Williams v. Tishomingo Savings Institution,

57 Miss., 633 ; Story on Bills of Exchange, Sec. 225.) And where

a drawee or a bank pays a bill of exchange or a bank check to an

endorser who derives title through a prior forged endorsement,

he may recover back the money so paid, on discovery of the

forgery, provided he makes demand for repayment within a rea-

sonable time after the discovery of such forgery. (2 Daniel on

Neg. Inst., Sees. 1364, 1372; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1
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Hill, 287; Williams v. Tishomingo Savings Institution, supra.)

The evidence shows that appellee accepted two of the checks,

"payable through Chicago Clearing House," prior to the time that

they were transferred to Chapin & Gore. This makes no differ-

ence. An_acceptp_r : is_boujad to lo ok only at the face of the bill or

check, and an accep tance never proves an endorsement : and even

if the supposed endorsements of the payees of said two checks

were on them at the times when they were respectively accepted,

yet such acceptances did not admit the handwriting of the endors-

ers. {Smith v. Chester, 1 Term Rep. 654; Robinson v. Yarrow,

7 Taunton, 455 ; 2 Eng. Com. Law, 445.) In this case, the accept-

ance or certification of the two checks simply warranted the genu-

ineness of the signatures of the drawer, and that it had funds suffi-

cient to meet them, and engaged that those funds should not be

withdrawn from the bank by the drawer, and that the bank would

pay through the agency of the Chicago clearing house the amount,

if any, actually due on the check, to the person legally entitled to

receive it. The acceptance or certification did not warrant the

genuinene ss of the bodies of the checks, either as to the payees or

the a mounts, or warrant the genuineness of the endorsements on"

tHe"checks. (Marine Nat. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 59 N. Y. App.

67 ; Security Bank v. Nat. Bank, 67 id. 45^-)

The case made by the evidence introduced by appellee was in

ordinary sense of the English language the payees of these bills
we re not fictitious, but r al, person , from first to last, and to contru e th e law otherwise would be to render it the source of needless
disorder and confu ion in busine transaction . The instruments
in question were not, therefore, payable to bearer, and the bank
having paid upon forged endor ements, mu t, in the absence of
any other ground of defense, take the cons quences."
V hen appellant endorsed the nine ch cks, and collected from
appellee the sums of money called for by them, it warranted the
genuineness of all the precedin ignatures endorsed on the res ective c ec · , me u ing t 1e endorsements on t e c ec s of the names
of the respective payees named in such checks. ( 2 Parsons on
Notes and Bills, 588; Williams v. Tishomingo Samngs Institution,
57 Mi ., 633; Story on ills of Exchange, Sec. 225.) And where
a drawee or a bank pays a bill of exchange or a bank check to an
endor er who derives title through a prior forged endorsement,
he may recover back the money so paid, on discovery of the
forgery, provided he makes demand for repayment within a reasonable time after the discovery of such forgery. ( 2 Daniel on
Neg. In t., Secs. 1364, 1372; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, I
Hill, 287; Williams v. Tishomingo Sav ings Institittion, supra.)
The evidence shows that appellee accepted two of the checks,
" payable through Chicago Clearino- House," prior to the time that
they were tran £erred to Chapin & Gore. This makes no differlook only at the face of the bill or
ence. An acce tor i
check, and an acceptance never proves an endorsement; and even
if the supposed endorsements of the payees of said two checks
were on them at the times when they were re pectively accepted,
yet uch acceptances did not admit the handwriting of the endorsers. (Smith v. Chester, l Term Rep. 6 54 ; Ro bins on v. Yarrow,
7 Taunton, 455; 2 Eng. Com. Law, 445.) In this ca e, the acceptance or certification of the two checks simply warranted the genuineness of the signature of the drawer, and that it had fund sufficient to meet them, and engaged that tho e fund hould not be
withdrawn from the bank by the draw r, and that th bank would
pay through the agency of the Chicago clearin<Y house the amount,
if any, actually due on the check, to the p r on legally ntitled to
receive it. The acceptance or certification did not warrant the
genuineness of the bodie of the checks, ither as to the payees or
the amounts, or warrant the genuineness o the endorsements on
t e checks. (Marine Nat. Bank v. Nat. City Bank, 59 N. Y. App.
67; S ecurity Bank v. Nat. Bank, 67 id. 458.)
The case made by the evidence introduced by appellee was in
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substance as follows : Nine several checks, of different dates and

amounts, were made by some person, and signed and counter-

signed in manner and form as stated in the nine special counts

of the declaration, five of which were made payable to C. H.

Wilson, A. G. superintendent, and the remaining four to F. P.

Ross, manager, and directed said checks to the appellee bank. All

of these checks, each of them purporting to be endorsed by the

payee therein named, were transferred, for value, to Chapin &

Gore, who endorsed each of them "For deposit in the First

National Bank to the credit of Chapin & Gore," and delivered

them to appellant, and appellant also endorsed each of them "Pay

through Chicago Clearing House only to First National Bank,"

and through said clearing house presented them, so endorsed, to

appellee for payment, and received from it, in payment thereof,

the full amounts called for by said checks. None of said checks

were in fact endorsed by the payees therein respectively named,

but all of the endorsements purporting to be made by the payees

were forgeries, and appellee paid said checks in ignorance of such

forgeries. After business hours on Saturday, July 23, 1887,

appellee made discovery of the forgeries, and on the following
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Monday, July 25, 1887, it tendered the checks back to appellant

and demanded repayment of the money paid by it on the same,

but appellant refused to make such repayment. Two of said

checks, before they came into the hands of Chapin & Gore, had

been accepted by appellee, it writing on the face of each of them

these words : "Accepted payable through Chicago Clearing

House."

In our opinion these facts established, prima facie, a right of

action in appellee as against appellant, and it follows that the trial

court, in refusing to hold the eighth proposition submitted by

appellant, to the effect that under the evidence the finding and

judgment should, as a matter of law, be for appellant, committed

no error.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

W *^v 1/

ubstance as follows: Nin everal checks, of different dates and
amounts, were made by some person, and sign d and count rig ned in manner and form as stat~d in the nine pecial counts
of the declaration, five of wh ich w r made payable to . H.
Wil on, A. G. superint nd nt, and th remaining four to F . P.
Ro s, manager, and dir cted aid checks to the appell e bank. All
of these checks, each of th m purporting to be endor ed by the
payee therein named, were transferred, for value, to Chapin &
Gore, who endor ed each of them "For depo it in the Fir t
National Bank to the credit of ha pin & Gore," and delivered
them to appellant, and appellant also endorsed each of them "Pay
through Chicago Clearing House only to First N ational Bank,"
and through said clearing house presented them, so endor sed, to
appellee for payment, and received from it, in payment thereof,
th e full amounts called for by said checks. None of said checks
wer in fact endorsed by the payees therein respectively named,
but all of the endorsements purporting to be made by the payees
we re forgeries, and appellee paid said checks in ignorance of such
forgeries. After business hours on Saturday, July 23 , 1887,
appellee made discovery of the forgeries , and on the following
Monday, July 25, 1887, it tendered the checks back to appellant
and demanded repayment of the money paid by it on the ame,
but appellant refused to make such repayment. Two of said
checks, before they came into the hands of Chapin & Gore, had
been accepted by appellee, it writing on the face of each of them
these words: "Accepted payable through Chicago Clearing
House."
In our opinion these facts established, prima facie, a right of
action in appellee as against appellant, and it follows that the trial
court, in refu ing to hold the eiahth proposition submitted by
·appellant, to the effect that under the evidence the finding and
judgment should, as a matter of law, be for appellant, committed
no error.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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Heuertematte v. Morris (1883), 101 N. Y. 63.

The material facts are stated in the opinion.

F. R. Coudert, for appellants.

Heuertematte v. Morris (1885),

IOI

N. Y. 63.

C. E. Coddington, for respondent.

Ruger, Ch.J. In the discussion of this case it is unneces-

sary to consider particularly the agency of Hourquet & Poylo in

The material facts are stated in the opinion.

the transaction, as they acted solely as the gratuitous agents of

the plaintiffs, and had no interest in the subject of the business.

It may, therefore, be treated as a transaction occurring directly

F. R. Coudert, for appellants.
C. E. Coddington, for respondent.

between the plaintiffs and Ran Runnels, and concisely described,

was to the following effect : The plaintiffs were merchants doing

business at Panama, and one Christofel was a customer and debtor

of theirs, residing at San Juan del Sur, near Rivas, in the State

of Nicaraugua. Christofel was desirous of discharging his obli-

gations to the plaintiffs, but was embarrassed in doing so by the

infrequency of communication between Rivas and Panama, and

the want of a system of exchange enabling him to transmit funds

safely and expeditiously from one place to the other. Under these

circumstances the plaintiffs consulted Hourquet & Poylo, a busi-

ness firm at Panama, as to the best manner of collecting the debt.

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

The plaintiffs were informed by Hourquet & Poylo that Ran Run-

nels was a correspondent of theirs residing at Rivas, and that the

collection could probably be made through him, and offered to

transmit a draft on Christofel to Runnels, for that purpose. There-

upon the plaintiffs made their draft on Christofel at sixty days

for $1,000 payable to Hourquet & Poylo, who indorsed the same

to Runnels and forwarded it to him at Rivas for collection. In

due time it was received by Runnels, and at its maturity was paid

to him, in Columbian currency.

It becomes important now to determine the legal obligations

and duties of the parties toward each other at this stage of the

transaction. In the collection of the draft Runnels acted as the

mere agent of the plaintiffs, and had no interest in the proceeds

except, perhaps, a lien thereon for the value of his services in mak-

ing the collection. He had no right or authority to use such funds

for his individual purposes, and his sole duty in relation to them,

was that of their transmission to his principals. The nature of

the business impliedly authorized him, to make such transmission

according to the usages of trade, and in the absence of such usages

to do so by some other method which should, in the exercise of

RucER Ch.J. In the di cussion of this case it is unnece sary to consider particularly the agency of Hourquet & Poylo in
th transaction, a they acted solely a the gratuitous agents of
the plaintiffs, and had no interest in the subject of the business.
It may, therefore, be treated as a transaction occurring directly
between the plaintiffs and Ran Runnels, and concisely described,
was to the following effect: The plaintiffs were merchants doing
bu iness at Panama, and one Chri tofel was a customer and debtor
of theirs, residing at San Juan del ur, near Rivas, in the State
of Nicaraugua. Christofel was desirous of discharging his obligations to the plaintiff , but wa embarrassed in doing so by the
infrequency of communication between Riva and Panama, and -.....
the want of a ystem of exchange enabling him to transmit funds
afely and expeditiously from one place to the other. Under these
circum tances the plaintiffs consulted Hourquet & Poylo, a business firm at Panama, as to the best manner of collecting the debt.
The plaintiffs were informed by Hourquet & Poylo that Ran Runnels was a correspondent of theirs residing at Rivas, and that the
collection could probably be made through him, and offered to
transmit a draft on Chri tofel to Runnels, for that purpose. Thereupon the plaintiffs made their draft on Christofel at sixty days
for $r,ooo payable to Hourquet & Poylo, who indorsed the same
to Runnels and forwarded it to him at Rivas for collection. In
due time it was received by Runnel , and at its maturity was paid
to him, in Columbian currency.
It becomes important now to determine the legal obligations
and duties of the parties toward each other at this stage of the
transaction. In the collection of the draft Runnels acted as the
mere agent of the plaintiffs, and had no interest in the proceeds
except, perhaps, a lien thereon for the value of his ervices in making the collection. He had no ri ht or authority to use such funds
for his individual purpo es, and hi ole duty in relation to them,
wa that of their tran mi ion to his principal . The nature of
the business impliedly authorized him, to make such transmission
according to the usage of trade, and in the absence of such usages
to do so by some other method which should, in the exercise of
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reasonable care and prudence, promise to accomplish the object

intended. It was, therefore, open to him to transmit the funds

received in specie as they were collected, or he could have pur-

chased a bill of exchange, if opportunity served, at that place, and

transmitted that ; or he could remit them in any other way deemed

most safe, convenient and desirable to him, subject to the approval

by his principals, of the method adopted. It does not appear in

the case but that Runnels was a merchant or banker and accus-

tomed to sell exchange upon foreign places. However that may

be, he in fact sent to the plaintiffs, February 4, 1879, immediately

upon collection, the proceeds thereof, less cost of collection and

exchange, by the draft in suit. This was his own draft upon the

defendant Morris, at New York, at ninety days' sight. Upon the

receipt of this draft by the plaintiffs, it was accepted by them and

remitted to New York, for presentation to, and acceptance by the

drawee, and the same was accepted by him February 26, 1879.

The sole question in the case is whether the plaintiffs were

bona fid e hol ders for value of the draft. We cannot doubt but

that they were . If on receiving the funds in question Runnels

had purchased with them a bill of exchange draft from a mer-
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chant, or banker, according to the usages of trade, and trans-

mitted the same to the plaintiffs, no question could arise but that

he acted as their agent in the transaction, and they would have

been bona fide holders of such paper within all definitions of that

character, and we are unable to see the difference in principle

between such a case and the transaction in question. The funds

collected by Runnels were, until they consented to their appropria-

tion by him, at all times the property of the plaintiffs. Runnels'

sole duty in relation to them was that of transmission to the plain-

tiffs, and until that duty was legally performed he held them in

a fiduciary capacity for a specified purpose. His duty of trans-

mission could not be performed by remitting his own obligation,

payable at a future day, except by the consent and approval of the

plaintiffs. Until this consent and approval was given the funds

remained the property of the plaintiffs, and any use of them by

Runnels before that time would have constituted a violation of his

duty to his principals, which it cannot be presumed he committed.

Doubtless the lack of adequate facilities of exchange between

Rivas and Panama induced Runnels to offer, and the plaintiffs to

accept, the mode of remittance adopted, and it was entirely com-

petent for Runnels to propose, and for the plaintiffs to accept such

a solution of the inconveniences of the situation ; but no title to

the funds collected passed to Runnels, until the acceptance of the

reasonable care and prudence, promise to accomplish the object
intended. It ' a , ther for , open to him to tran mit th fund
received in specie as they w re collect d, or he could have purchased a bill of xchang , if opportunity erved, at that place, and
tran mitted that· or h could remit them in any other \ ay deem d
mo t afe, convenient and de irable to him, ubject to the approval
by his principals, of the method adopted. It doe not appear in
the ca e but that Runn 1 wa a merchant or banker and accu tamed to ell exchange upon foreign places.
owever that may
be, he in fact sent to the plaintiff , ebruary 4, 1879, immediately
upon collection, the proceed thereof, less co t of collection and
exchange, by the draft in uit. This was his own draft upon the
defendant Morris, at ew York, at ninety day ' ight.
pon the
receipt of this draft by the plaintiff , it wa accepted by them and
remitted to New York, for presentation to, and acceptance by the
drawee, and the ame wa accepted by him February 26, 1879.
The sole question in the case is whether the plaintiffs were
bona fide holder for value of the draft. We cannot doubt but
that they were. If on receiving the funds in question Runnels
had purchased with them a bill of exchange draft from a merchant, or banker, according to the u ages of trade, and tran mitted the same to the plaintiffs, no question could ari e but that
he acted as their agent in the transaction, and they \\i ould have
been b011a fide holders of uch paper \vithin all definition of that
character, and we are unable to ee the differ nee in principle
between uch a ca e and the transaction in que tion. The funds
collected by Runnels were until they con ented to their appropriation by him, at all times the property of the plaintiff . Runnels'
ole duty in relation to them was that of tran mi ion to the plaintiffs, and until that duty "a legally performed he held them in
a fiduciary capacity for a pecified purpo e. Hi duty of tran mission could not be performed by remittin()' hi own obli()'ation,
payable at a future day xc pt by the on ent and approval of the
plaintiff . Until this consent and approval wa O'iven the funds
remained the property of the plaintiff , and any u e of them by
Runnel before that time would have con titut d a violation of his
duty to hi principals, which it cannot be pre um d he committed.
Doubt!
the lack of adequate facilitie of xchan e between
Rivas and Panama induced Runnel to offer and the plaintiff to
accept, the mod of remittance adopted, and it wa entirel) competent for Runnels to propo e, and for the plaintiff to accept uch
a solution of the inconv nience of th ituation · but no title to
the funds collected passed to Runnel , until the ace ptance of th e
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draft by the plaintiffs. After that and not till then he was author-

ized to use those funds as his own.

By the original employment the plaintiffs contemplated no

credit to Runnels and he had no right to, and it does not appear

that he even supposed, he acquired any right to use the funds in

question for his own purposes, or that he ever did so use them.

The conventional relation of debtor and creditor never existed

between Runnels and the plaintiffs until the acceptance of his

draft upon Morris, and then those relations were governed by the

liabilities existing by force of the draft alone.

In accordance with the rule which precludes a court from

presuming a violation of duty by an individual, we must assume

that Runnels performed his duty, and his whole duty, to the plain-

tiffs as their agent. This required him to safely keep their funds

until he had transmitted them according to the usage of trade, or

in some other mode approved by them. The legal effect of the

method adopted was _ _to transfer the title to the funds collected^

to_Runnels simultaneously with the ac c eptance by the plaintiffs of

Runnels' draft upon Morris , and was the precise equivalent of the

payment of so much money in the immediate purchase of a draft
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or bill of exchange by one person from another. We are, there-

fore, of the opinion that the plaintiffs were the bona fide holders

for value of the draft in suit and are entitled to recover thereon.

The General Term conceded that the plaintiffs were bona fide

holders for value of the bill before acceptance, but deny them that

character after acceptance as against the acceptor. We think the

concession is fatal to the conclusion reached by that court.

It is said that the Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Empire

Stone Dressing Co. (5 Bosw. 290) is authority for the position.

It is true that some expressions of the learned judge writing in

that case may justify the citation, yet it should be considered that

those remarks were unnecessary to the decision of the case, and

the same court have twice since then refused to follow it.

We conceive the rule there laid down finds no support in the

doctrines of the text-writers or the reported cases. (Philbrick v.

Dallett, 2 J. & S. 370 ; First Nat. Bank of Portland v. Schuyler,

7 id. 440; Parsons on Bills and Notes, 323; Daniels on Neg. Inst.,

§ 534; Edwards on Bills [2d ed.], 410.)

If a party becom es a bona fide holder for val ue of a bill before

its acceptance, it is not essent ial to his right to enfor ce it against

^subsequ ent acceptor, that an additio nal consideration shoul d

procee d~irom h ihTlo the draw ee! The bill itself implies a repre-

sentation by the drawer that the drawee is already in receipt of

draft by the plaintiffs. After that and not till then he was authorized to use those funds a his own.
By the original employment the plaintiffs contemplated no
credit to Runnels and he had no right to, and it does not appear
that he even supposed, he acquired any right to use the fund in
question for his own purpose , or that he ever did so u e them.
The conventional relation of debtor and creditor never existed
between Runnels and the plaintiffs until the acceptance of his ·
draft upon Morris, and th n those relations were governed by the
liabilities existing by force of the draft alone.
In accordance with the rule which precludes a court from
pre urning a violation of duty by an individual, we must as ume
that Runnels performed his duty, and his whole duty, to the plaintiffs a their agent. This required him to safely keep their funds
until he had transmitted them according to the usage of trade, or
in some other mode approved by them. The legal effect of the
method adopted was to tran fer the title to the funds collected,
to Runnels simultaneously with the acceptance by the plaintiffs of
Runnels' draft upon Morris, and was the precise equivalent of the
payment of so much money in the immediate purcha e of a draft
or bill of exchange by one person from another. We are, therefore, of the opir1ion that the plaintiffs were the bona fide holders
for value of the draft in uit and are entitled to recover thereon.
The General Term conceded that the plaintiffs were bona fide
holders for value of the bill before acceptance, but deny them that
character after acceptance a against the acceptor. We think the
concession is fatal to the conclusion reached by that court.
It is said that the Farmers & M echauics' Bank v. Empire
Stone Dressing Co. (5 Bosw. 290) is authority for the position.
It is true that orne expressions of the learned judge writing in
that case may justify the citation, yet it should be considered that
those remarks were unnecessary to the decision of the case, and
the same court have twice since then refused to follow it.
We conceive the rule there laid down finds no support in the
doctrines of the text-writers or the reported cases. (Philbrick v.
Dallett, 2 J. & S. 370; First Nat. Book of Portland v. Schuyler1
7 id. 440; Parsons on Bills and Notes, 323; Daniels on Neg. Inst.,
§ 534; Edwards on Bills [ 2d ed.], 410.)
If a party becomes a bona fide holder for value of a bifl before
its acceptance, it is not essential to his ri ht to enforce it against
a su sequent acceptor, that an additional consideration should
proceed from him to the drawee. The bill itself implies a repre~
sentat10n by the drawer that the drawee is already in receipt of
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funds to pay, and his contract is that the drawee shall accept and

pay according to the terms of the draft. (Parsons on Bills, 323,

544; Arpin v. Chapin, Mass. Sup. Ct., Oct., 1885.) The drawee

can of course upon presentment refuse to accept a bill, and in that

event the only recourse of the holder is against the prior parties

thereto ; but in _case the drawee does accept a bill, he becomes pri-

marily liable for its payment, not only to its indorsees but also to

the drawer himself.

The delivery of a bill or check by one person to another for

value implies a representation on the part of the drawer that the

drawee is in funds for its payment, and the subsequent acceptance

of suc h check or bill constitutes an admission of the truth of the

representation, which the drawee is not allowed to retract . (Dan-

iels on Neg. Inst., 534; Parsons on Bills, 323, 544, 545.) By such

acceptance the drawee admits the truth of the representation, and

having obtained a suspension of the holder's remedies against the

drawer, and an extension of credit by his admission, is not after-

ward at liberty to controvert the fact as against a bona fide holder

for value of the bill.

The payment to the drawer of the purchase-price furnishes a
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good consideration for the acceptance which he then undertakes

shall be made, and its subsequent performance by the drawee is

only the fulfillment of the contract which the drawer represents

he is authorized by the drawee to make.

The rule that it is not competent for an acceptor to allege as

a def ense to an action on a b ill that it was done without considera-

tion, or for accommodation, as against a bona fide holder for value

c?f such paper, flows logically from the conclusive force given to

his admission of funds, and is elementary. (Daniels on Neg. Inst.,

§§ 53 2_ 534; Edwards on Bills, 410; Harger v. Worrall, 69 N. Y.

371 ; Com. Bk. of Lake Erie v. Norton, 1 Hill, 501 ; Robinson v.

Reynolds, 2 Q B. 196, 211; Hoffman v. Bank of Mihvaukee, 12

Wall. 181.)

Of course the case determined upon the ground that the pavee

of such paper received it to apply upon an antecedent debt, or that

it had been unlawfully diverted from the purpose for which it was

designed, have no application to the circumstances of this case.

The judgments of the courts below should, therefore, be

reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the result.

All concur.

Judgment reversed.
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funds to pay, and his contract is that the drawee shall accept and
ray according to the t rm of the draft. (Pa rson on ill , 323,
5-+4 · Arpin v. Chapin, Mas . up. Ct., Oct., 1885.) The drawee
can of1 course upon pr entment refu e to accept a bill, and in that
event the only recour e of the hold r i again t the prior parties
thereto; but in ca e the dravyee does accept a bill. h b come primarily liable for its payment, not only to its indorsees but also to
the drawer himself.
The delivery of a bill or check by one person to another for
value implies a representation on the part of the drawer that the
drawee is in funds for its a ment and the subse uent acce tance
of uc c ec or bill constitutes an admission of the truth of the
representation, which the drawee is not allowed to retract. (Dan1els on Neg. In t., 534; Par ons on Bills, 323, 544, 545.) By such
acceptance the drawee admits the truth of the representation, and
havina obtained a uspension of the holder's remedies against the
drawer, and an extension of credit by his admission, is not afterward at liberty to controvert the fact as against a bona fide holder
for value of the bill.
The payment to the drawer of the purchase-price furnishes a
good consideration for the acceptance which he then undertake
shall be made, and its subsequent performance by the drawee i
only the fulfillment of the cont~act which the drawer represents
he is authorized by the drawee to make.
The rule that it is not competent for an acceptor to allege as
a defense to an action on a bill that it was done without con ideration, or for accommodation, as against a bona fide holder for value
9£ such paper, flows logically from the conclusive force given to
his admi ion of funds, and is elementar . (Daniel on ea. In t.,
§§ 532-534; Edward on Bills, 410; Harger v. TVorrall, 69 . Y.
371; Com. Bk. of Lake Erie v. Norton, l Hill, 501 ·Robinson v.
Reynolds, 2 Q B. 196, 211; Hoffman v. Bank of Milwauku 12
Wall. l8i.)
Of course the case determined upon the around that the payee
of such paper received it to apply upon an antecedent debt, or that
it had been unlawfully diverted from the purpo e for "hich it ' a
de igned, have no application to the circum tance of thi ca e.
The judgments of the courts below hould therefore, be
reversed and a new trial ordered, with co t to abide the re ult.
All concur.
Judgnient reversed.
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contract of the certifier. § 1 89.

Union Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank (1904), 136 Mich. 460.

Error to Wayne ; Donovan, J.

co ~

TRACT OF THE CERTIFIER.

§ 189.

Assumpsit by the Union Trust Company, receiver of the City

Savings Bank of Detroit, against the Preston National Bank of

U11 ion Tntst Co. v . Preston

at. Bank (1904), 136 Mich. 460.

Detroit, to recover the amount of a deposit. From a judgment

for plaintiff on verdict directed by the court, defendant brings

error. Reversed.

Gecr, Williams & Halpin, and H. R. Martin, for appellant.

Walker & Spalding, for State Savings Bank (contending

with appellant).

Bowcn, Douglas, Whiting & MurUn {John C. Donnelly and

Frederick W. Whiting, of counsel), for appellee.

Carpenter, J. Plaintiff brought this suit to recover a con-

ceded balance of $21,585.11 owing by defendant to the City Sav-

Error to Wayne; Donovan, J .
A umpsit by the Union Trust Company, receiver of the City
ank of Detroit, against the Preston National Bank of
Saving
Detroit, to recover the amount of a depo it. From a judgment
for plaintiff on verdict directed by the court, defendant brings
error. Reversed.

ings Bank at the time plaintiff was appointed receiver. Defend-

ant sought to set off against this indebtedness the sum of $100,000,

represented by a check drawn on said City Savings Bank January

24, 1902, by F. C. Andrews, payable to defendant's order, and

certified in due form by the teller of the insolvent bank. It
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appeared that, at the time this check was certified, its maker,

Andrews, instead of having funds to his credit in said bank, had

overdrawn his account, as shown by the bank's books, "to the

Geer, ~Villia11is & Hal pin, and H. R. M OJYtin, for appellant.
iV alker & Spalding, for State Savings Bank (contending
with appellant).
B owell, Doug las, Whiting & Nlurfin (John C. Donnell) and
F rederick lV. iv hiting, of counsel), for appellee.

amount of $405,000." The' defendant offered to prove that it

received said check, after certification, on the day it was drawn,

in the usual course of business, and paid to said Andrews, the

maker, full value therefor, and at that time had no notice or

knowledge of any infirmity in said check, or of the fact that the

account of said Andrews was overdrawn. This evidence was

excluded, on the ground that said check was invalid in the hands

of a bona tide holder, and a verdict directed for the plaintiff for

the amount of the deposit in defendant's hands. The sole ques-

tion presented by this record relates to the correctness of this

holding.

It is authoritatively settled and conceded that at common law

the fact that the maker of a certifie d check had n o_f unds in the

bank_a ffords no defense, if the checl^ negotiable Inform, a s in

ibis case, has passed into the hands of a bonaj ide hol^eK See

Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604; Farmers' &

CARPENTER, J. Plaintiff brought this suit to r·ecover a conceded balance of $21,585.1 l owing by defendant to the City Savings Bank at the time plaintiff was appointed receiver. Defendant sought to set off against this indebtedne s the sum of $100,000,
represented by a check drawn on aid City Savings ank January
24, lgG2, by F. C. Andrews, payable to defendant's order, and
certified in due form by the teller of the insolvent bank. It
appeared that, at the time this check was certified, it maker,
Andrews, instead of having fund to hi credit in said bank, had
overdrawn his account, as shown by the bank's books, "to the
amount of $405,000." The · defendant offered to prove that it
received said check, after certification, on the day it was drawn,
in the usual course of busin ss, and paid to said Andrew , the
maker, full value therefor, and at that time had no notice or
knowledge of any infirmity in said check, or of the fact that the
account of said Andrews was overdra wn . This evid nee was
exclud d, on the ground that said check was invalid in th hands
of a bona fide hold r, and a v rdict directed for th plaintiff for
the amount of th depo it in d f ndant' hands. The ole question presented by this record r !ates to the correctness of this
holding.
It i authoritatively ettled and cone <led that at common law
the fact that the maker of a certified check had no funds in the
bank affords no d fen e, if th
h ck negotiable in form, as in
this case1 has passe into t e an s o a bona
e o er.
ee
111 erchants' Bank V. State
an , IO
a -. -- 04; Farmers' &
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Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 125

(69 Am. Dec. 678). This case is not, however, to be determined

solely by common-law principles. The correctness of the holding

of the trial court depends upon the proper construction of certain

statutory provisions in our banking act relative to the certification

of checks. Section 6108, 2 Comp. Laws, being section 19 of the

general banking act, reads :

"It shall not be lawful for any officer, clerk, agent, or

Co. v.
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Mechanics' Bank v. Bittcher.i & Drovers' Bank, l N. Y. 125
( 69 Am. Dec. 678). This case is not, however, to be determined
solely by common-law principles. The correctne s of the holding
of the trial court depends upon the prop r construction of certain
statutory provi ion s in our banking act relative to the certification
of checks. S ction 610 , 2 Comp. Laws, being section 19 of the
general banking act, read :

employee of a bank to certify a check, unless the amount thereof

actually stands to the credit of the drawer upon the books of the

bank or to resort to any device, or receive any fictitious obliga-

tions, direct or collateral, in order to evade the provisions of this

prohibition ; and any officer, clerk, agent, or employee who shall

attempt any such evasions shall, upon conviction thereof, be

deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished as provided in

section fourteen of this act."

Other sections of the banking act, viz., section 14 (section

6103, 2 Comp. Laws), section 18 (section 6107, 2 Comp. Laws),

and section 58 (section 6147, 2 Comp. Laws), make the violation
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of section 19 a crime.

In construing this act, we have not the benefit of decisions

"It shall not be lawful for any officer, clerk, agent, or
employee of a bank to certify a check, unless the amount thereof
actually stands to the credit of the drawer upon the books of the
bank or to resort to any device, or receive any fictitious obligations, direct or collat ral, in order to evade the provisions of this
prohibition; and any officer, clerk, agent, or employee who shall
attempt any such evasions shall, upon conviction thereof, be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished as provided in
section fourteen of this act."

of other courts construing a precisely similar act, for, with the

exception of the national banking act, which will be hereafter

referred to, there is no similar act.

It will thus be seen that t he certificatio n in question_was for^

biddenjby la w, and punishable as a crime. The statute does not,

however, expressly declare that the check so certified shall be

void in the hands of a bona tide holder. Indeed, it does not

expressly declare that it shall be void in the hands of one who

is not a bona tide holder. The fac t^howeyer, t hat the certification

is fo rbijddejq_aJld„maxki__a crime, compels the inference that the

legislature intended to avoid such certificatio n_be tween the origi-

nal parties (see Heffron v. Daly, 133 Mich. 6i3[95 N. W. 714 j ) ;

and this, it is almost unnecessajx t o say, av oids it in the_Jiands

of everyone no t a bona tide holder. It by no means follows, how-

ever, because a contract made in violation of law, common or

statutory, is void between the original parties, that, if given the

form of negotiable paper, it is void in the hands of a bona tide

holder. Indeed, it is the distinguishing characteristic of the law

of negotiable paper that, when a contract takes that form, it is

not, in the hands of a bona tide holder, subject to the defense

which avoided it in the hands of the original parties. Negotiable

»<

Other sections of the banking act, viz., section 14 (section
6103, 2 Comp. Laws), section 18 (section 6107, 2 Comp. Laws),
and section 58 (section 6147, 2 Comp. La.ws), make the violation
of section 19 a crime.
In construing this act, we have not the benefit of decisions
of other courts construing a precisely similar act, for, with the
exception of the national banking act, which will be hereafter
referred to, there is no similar act.
It will thus be seen that the certification in question was for.b idden by law, and punishable as a crime. The statute does not,
however, expressly declare that the check so certified shall be
void in the hands of a bona fide holder. Ind ed, it does not
expressly declare that it shall be void in the hands of one who
is not a bona fide holder. The fact, howev~ that the certification
is forbidden and made a crime, compels the infer nee that the
legislature intended to avoid such certification between the original parties (see Heffro n v. Daly, 133 Mich. 613 [95 N. W. 714));
1-nd this, it is almost unnecessary to ay, avoids it in the hands
of every one not a bona fid e holder. It by no means follows however, because a contract made in violation of law ommon or
statutory, is void between the orio-inal parties that, if given the
form of negotiable paper it is void in the hand of a bona fide
holder. Indeed, it is the distingui hing characteri ti of th law
of negotiable paper that, when a contract take that form , it is
not, in the hands of a bona fide holder, ubject to the defen e
which avoided it in the hands of the orio-inal parties. Negotiable
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paper in the hands of a bona tide holder is not open to the defense

that the contract from which it arose was illegal or forbidden by

the principles of the common law. A note given to compound a

felony is good in the hands of a bona fide holder. (Clark v.

Ricker, 14 N. H. 44; Wcntworth v. Blaisdell, 17 N. H. 275.)

Nothing less than a statutory enactment will subject negotiable

paper in the hands of a bona fide holder to the defense of illegality

in its inception.

What, then, is the effect of a statute which merely prohibits

the making of a particular contract, and punishes its making as a

crime? How shall we determine what consequences the legis-

lature intended should follow a violation of this law? Manifestly

by applying in its construction the principles of the common law.

"Statutes are not, and cannot be, framed to express in words

their entire meaning. They are framed, like other compositions,

to be interpreted by the common learning of those to whom they

are addressed, — especially by the common law, in which it

paper in the hands of a bona fide holder is not open to the defen e
that the contract from which it arose was illegal or forbidden by
th e principles of the common law. A note given to compound a
felony is good in the hands of a bona fide holder. (Clark v.
R icker, 14 N. H. 44; Wentworth v. Blaisdell, 17 N. H. 275.)
othing les than a statutory enactment will subject negotiable
paper in the hands of a bona fide holder to the defense of illegality
in its inception.
What, then, i the effect of a statute which mer ly prohibits
the making of a particular contract, and punishes it making as a
crime? How shall we determine what consequences the legislature intended should follow a violation of this law? Manifestly
by applying in its constructi~n the principles of the common law.

becomes at once enveloped, and which interprets its implications

and defines its incidental consequences. That which is implied

in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed." (2
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Suth. Stat. Constr. § 334).

In accordance with these principles, we would assume, and,

as heretofore stated, we do assume, that the legislature intended

to make such contract void between the parties ; and we would

likewise assume that it did not intend, if the contract took the

form of negotiable paper, to affect its validity in the hands of a

bona fide holder. But plaintiff's counsel contend that it is settled

by authority that, when a contract is prohibited and made a crime

by statute, such, a contract, if it takes the form of negotiable

"Statutes are not, and cannot be, framed to express in words
their entire meaning. They are framed, like other compositions,
to be interpreted by the common learning of those to whom they
are addre sed,-especially by the common law, in which it
become a,t once enveloped, and which interprets its implications
and defines it incidental consequences. That which is implied
in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed." ( 2
uth. Stat. Constr. § 334).

paper, is void in the hands of a bona fide holder; and they rely

upon the following authorities: 1 Clark & M. Priv. Corp. §225;

Endl. Interp. Stat. §449; 2 Suth. Stat. Constr. §336; Anson,

Cont. 172; Heffron v. Daly, 33 Mich. 613 (95 N. W. 714) ; State

Life-Ins. Co. v. Strong, 127 Mich. 346 (86 N. W. 825) ; Loranger

v. Jardine, 56 Mich. 518 (23 N. W. 203) ; Bowditch v. Insurance

Co., 141 Mass., at page 293 (4 N. E. 798, 55 Am. Rep. 474) ;

Union Nat. Bank v. Raihvay Co., 145 111. 208 (34 N. E. 135) ;

Cincinnati Mut. Health Assnr. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85 (8

Am. Rep. 626) ; Borough of Milford v. Milford Water C, 124.

Pa. St. 610 (17 Atl. 185, 3 L. R. A. 122) ; Edgerly v. Hale, 71 N.

H. 138 (51 Atl. 679) ; Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 152 (25 Am.

Rep. 671) ; McConncll v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430 (47 Am. Rep.

In accordance with these principles, we would assume, and,
as heretofore stated, we do assume, that the legislature intended
to make such contract void between the parties; and we would
likewi e assume that it did not intend, if the contract took the
form of negotiable paper, to affect its validity in the hands of a
bona fide holder. But plaintiff's counsel contend that it is settled
by authority that, when a contract is prohibited and made a crime
by statute, uch . a contract, if it takes the form of negotiable
pap r, i void in the hands of a bona fide holder; and they rely
upon the following authorities: l Clark & M. Priv. Corp. § 225;
Endl. Interp. Stat. § 449; 2 Su th. Stat. Constr. § 336; Anson,
ont. 172 ·Heffron v. Daly, 33 Mich. 613 (95 N. W. 714); State
Life-Ins. Co. v. trong) 127 Mich . 346 (86 N. W. 825); Loranger
v. Jardine) 56 Mich. 518 (23 N. W. 203) ·Bowditch v. Insurance
Co. ) 141 Mass., at page 293 (4 N. E. 7 8, 55 Am. Rep. 474) ;
Union at. Bank v. Railway Co., 145 Ill. 208 (34 N. E. 135);
Cincinnati Mut. Health Ass?tr. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill. 85 (8
Am. Rep. 626); Borouo}i of Milford v. Milford Water C., 124
a. St. 610 (17 Atl. 185, 3 L. R. . 122); Edgerly v. Hale, 71 N.
H. 138 (51 tl. 679); Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 152 (25 Am.
Rep. 671); McConnell v. Kitchens, 20
. 430 (47 Am. Rep.
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845) ; Texarkana, &c, R. Co. v. Lumber Co., 67 Ark. 542 (55 S.

W. 944) ; Snoddy v. Dank, 88 Tenn. 573 (13 S. W. 127, 7 L. R.

A. 705, 17 Am. St. Rep. 918).

None of these authorities, except Texarkana, etc., R. Co. v.

Lumber Co. and Snoddy v. Bank, which will receive attention

later in this opinion, related to a case of negotiable paper in the

hands of a bona fide holder. All that can justly be claimed for

these authorities, with the exceptions above referred to, is that

they hold that, when the making of a contract is prohibited and

made a crime by statute, it is void as between the original parties,

or — what is the same thing — as between parties who do not stand

in the attitude of a bona fide holder of negotiable paper arising

therefrom. It is true that many of these decisions say that such

a contract is void, and one of them (see Borough of Milford v.

Mil ford Water Co.) says that it "is utterly void, and there is no

power that can breathe life into such a dead thing." This lan-

guage must, however, in accordance with every just principle of

construction, be understood as applying to the case before the

court. It may not be improper to describe the particular contracts

under consideration as void, and as utterly void. But it by no
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means follows that negotiable paper issued on such contract would

be void in the hands of a bona tide holder for value. These

authorities cannot be regarded as authority for the proposition

for which plaintiff's counsel cite them. They are not inconsistent

with the rule (which we deem it our duty to undertake to show

is well settled by authority) that, though a contract is prohibited

and m ade a crime by statute, that contract, if it takes the form of

negotiable paper, is valid and enforceable in the hands of a bona

tide holder. Says Mr. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instru-

ments, § 197:

" The bona tide holder for value, who has received the paper

in the usual course of business, i s unaffected b y the fact that it

originated in an illegal consideration, without any disti nction

between cases of ill egality founded in moral crime or turpitude,

wEi eh are termed 'mala in se' and those founded in positive stat-

utor y prohibition, which are termed 'mala prohibita.' The law

extends this peculiar protection to negotiable instruments because

it would seriously embarrass mercantile transactions to expose

the trader to the consequences of having the bill or note passed to

him impeached for some covert defect."

In Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287. defendant was an accom-

modation maker of a negotiable promissory note dated on Monday,

but in fact made the preceding Sunday, contrary to the statute

845); Te.xarkcma, &c., R. Co. v. Lumber Co., 67 Ark. 542 (SS S.
W. 944); Snoddy v. Bank, 88 Tenn. 573 (13 S. W. 127, 7 L. R.
A. 705, 17 Am. St. Rep. 918).
None of these authorities, except Texarkana, etc., R. Co. v.
Dumber Co. and Snoddy v. Bank, which will receive attention
later in this opinion, related to a case of negotiable paper in the
hands of a bona fide holder. A ll that can justly be claimed for
these authorities, with the exceptions above referred to, is that
they hold that, when the making of a contract is prohibited and
made a crime by statute, it is void as between the original parties,
or-what is the same thing-as between parties who do not stand
in the attitude of a bona fide holder of negotiable paper arising
therefrom. It is true that many of these decisions say that such
a contract is void, and one of them (see Borough of Milford v.
Milford W Q,fer Co.) says that it "is utterly void, and there is no
power that can breathe life into such a dead thing." This language must, however, in accordance with every just principle of
construction, be understood as applying to the case before the
court. It may not be improper· to describe the particular contracts
under consideration as void, and as utterly voici But it by no
means follows that negotiable paper issued on such contract would
be void in the hands of a bona fide holder for value. These
authorities cannot be regarded as authority for the proposifion
for which plaintiff's counsel cite them. They are not inconsistent
with the rule (which we deem it our duty to undertake to show
is well settled by authority) that, though a contract is prohibited
and made a crime by statute, that contract, if it takes the form of
negotiable pap r, is valid and enforceable in the hands of a bona
fide holder. Says Mr. Daniel, in his work on Negotiable Instruments, § 197:
"The bona fide holder for value, who has received the paper
in the usual course of business, is unaffected by the fact that it
originated in an illegal consideration, without an di tinction
between cases of illegality founded in moral crime or turpitu e1
which are termed 'mala in se,' and those founded in positive statutory prohibition which are termed 'mala prohibita.' The law
extends this peculiar protection to negotiable instrutTI;nt because
it would seriously embarrass mercantile transactions to expose
the trader to the consequences of havin()" the bill or note passed to
him impeached for some covert d feet."
In Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287, d fendant was an accommodation maker of a negotiable prorni ory note <lat d on Monday,
but in fact made the preceding Sunday, contrary to the statute
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expressly prohibiting, under penalty of a fine, "any manner of

labor, business, or work, except only works of necessity and

charity." (See I Comp. Laws 1857, § 1574.) It was held that

the note was valid and enforceable in the hands of a bona fide

purchaser, because "the statute has not declared that notes made

contrary to the Sunday law shall be void under all circumstances.

Their invalidity is only to be implied from the prohibition of

Sunday business, and under such a statute a bona fide holder is

protected."

State Capital Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 369, is almost

precisely like the above case.

In New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365 (9 N. E. 386, 58 Am. Rep.

40), a negotiable note was taken in violation of a statute requir-

ing, under a penalty, to be stated therein, "Given for a patent

right." The court held this note valid in the hands of a bona fide

holder, saying (pages 374, 375) :

"Our opinion is that a statute making it a crime to take prom-

issory notes in a prohibited transaction does not make the notes

void in the hands of innocent purchasers, although the person who

violates the statute commits a crime. This conclusion is well
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sustained by authority," — citing, among other cases, Palmer v.

Minar, 8 Hun. 342, and Cook v. Weirman, 51 Iowa, 561 (2 N.

W. 386), which are similar to the principal case.

In Smith v. Bank, 9 Neb. 31 (1 N. W. 893), the court

expressed its disapproval of a statement in Kittle v. DeLamater,

3 Neb. 325:

"Or, if the note be founded upon an illegal consideration,

prohibited by some positive statute, no recovery can be had, even

though the indorsee may not be privy to the original transaction."

In Hart v. Machine Co., 72 Miss. 809 (17 South. 769). it

was held that. negotiable paper issued in violation of the statute

of Tennessee forbidding corporations doing business in that State

without compliance with its provisions was valid in the hands

of a bona fide holder, the court saying (pages 833, 834) :

"The statute, while forbidding foreign corporations from

doing business in the State without compliance with its conditions,

does not declare, by express terms, that any contracts made with

delinquent corporations shall be void, nor does it denounce as

invalid any securities given by or to it under such contracts.

The English and some of the American statutes against usury

and gaming declared that all assurances and securities given in

consideration thereof should be void. Under such declarations,

expressly prohibiting, under penalty of a fine, "any manner of
labor, business, or work, except only works of necessity and
charity." (See 1 Comp. Laws 1857, § 1574.) It was held that
the note was valid and enforceable in the hands of a bona fide
purchaser, because "the statute has not declared that notes made
contrary to the Sunday law shall be void under all circumstances.
Their invalidity is only to be implied from the prohibition of
Sunday business, and under such a statute a bona fide holder is
protected."
State Capital Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 369, is almost
precisely like the above case.
In New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365 (9 N. E. 386, 58 Am. Rep.
40), a negotiable note was taken in violation of a statute requiring, under a penalty, to be stated therein, "Given for a patent
right." The court held this note valid in the hands of a bona fide
holder, saying (pages 374, 375) :
"Our opinion is that a statute making it a crime to take promissory notes in a prohibited transaction does not make the notes
void in the hands of innocent purchasers, although the person who
violates the statute comm its a crime. Thi conclusion is well
sustained by authority,"-citing, among other cases, Palmer v.
Minar, 8 Hu n. 342, and Cook v. Weirmain, 51 Iowa, 561 (2 N.
W. 386), which are similar to the principal case.
In S mith v. Bank, 9 Neb. 31 (1 N. W. 893), the court
expressed its disapproval of a statement in Kittle v. DeLamater,
3 Neb. 325:
"Or, if the note be found ed upon an illegal consideration,.
prohibited by some positive statute, no recovery can be had, even
though the indorsee may not be privy to the original transaction. "
In Hart v. Machine Co., 72 Miss. 809 (17 South. 769) , it
was held that .negotiable paper issued in violation of the statute
of Tennessee forbidding corporations doing business in that State
without compliance with its provisions was valid in the hands
of a bona fide holder, the court saying (pages 833, 834) :
"The statute, whHe forbidding foreign corporations from
doing business in the State without compliance with its conditions,
does not declare, by expre s term , that any contract made with
delinquent corporations shall be void, nor doe it denounce as
invalid any securities given by or to it under uch contracts.
The English and some of the American statutes against usury
and gaming declared that all as urances and securitie given in
consideration th ereof hould be void. Under such declarations,.
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it has very generally been held that negotiable paper, even in the

hands of a bona fide holder, is void, because of the language of

the law. But where only the contract is declared void, and there

is no declaration of nullity against securities, it is held that while,

as between the parties, and those taking with notice or after

maturity, no recovery can be had, a bona fide holder will be

protected."

In Press Co. v. Bank, 7 C. C. A. 248, 58 Fed. 321, notes

issued in violation of a statute forbidding foreign corporations

doing business except in compliance with its terms were held

it has very generally been held that negotiable paper, even in the
hands of a bona fide hold r, is void, because of th language of
the law. But where only the contract is declared void, and there
is no d claration of nullity against securities, it is held that while,
as betwe n the parties, and tho e taking with notice or after
maturity, no recovery can be had, a bona fide holder will be
protected."

valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, the court saying (page

249, 7 C. C. A., page 322, 58 Fed.) :

"It is urged that public policy forbids a recovery; that to

hold otherwise will nullify the statute. We do not think so. If

the legislature intended the consequences claimed, we would

expect it to say so."

In Lynchburg Nat. Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652 (22 S. E. 487,

29 L. R. A. 827, 50 Am. St. Rep. 860), it was contended that a

note obligating the maker to pay usurious interest was void in

the hands of a bona fide holder. The court answered that con-
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tention by saying (page 659) :

"If the maker of a negotiable note contests the right of one

who has acquired it by indorsement, for value, before maturity,

and without notice of any defense, to recover of him the amount

of the note, he must, to prevail, be able to show a statute that in

express terms, or by necessary implication, declares the note to

be void."

So it has been held :

"If a statute declares a security void, it is void in whoseso-

ever hands it may come. If, however, a negotiable security be

In Press Co. v. Bank, 7 C. C. A. 248, 58 Fed. 321, notes
issued in violation of a statute forbidding foreign corporations
doing business except in compliance with its terms were held
valid in the hands of a bona fide holder, the court sayi11g (page
249, 7 C. C. A., page 322, 58 Fed.) :
"It is urged that public policy forbids a recovery; that to
hold otherwise will nullify the statute. We do not think so. If
the legi lature intended the consequences claimed, we would
expect it to say so."
In Lynchburg Nat. Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652 (22 S. E. 487,
29 L. R. A. 827, 50 Am. St. Rep. 860), it was contended that a
note obligating the maker to pay usurious interest was void in
the hands of a bona fide holder. The court answered that contention by saying (page 659) :

founded on an illegal consideration, — and it is immaterial whether

it be illegal at common law or by statute, — and no statute says

it shall be void, the security is good in the hands of an innocent

holder, or of any one claiming through such a holder." (Glenn v.

Bank, 70 N. C. 191 ; Smith v. Bank, 9 Neb. 31 [1 N. W. 893] ;

Grimes v. Hillenbrand, 4 Hun. 354; Hill v. Northrup, 4 Thomp.

& C. 120; Converse v. Foster, 32 Vt. 828; Lauter v. Trust Co., 29

C. C. A. 473, 85 Fed. 894; Hatch v. Burroughs, 1 Woods, 439

[Fed. Cas. No. 6,203]).

Other authorities hold that "when a statute, expressly or by

necessary implication, declares the instrument absolutely void, it

"If the maker of a negotiable note contests the right of one
who has acquired it by indorsement, for value, before maturity,
and without notice of any defense, to recover of him the amount
of the note, he must, to prevail, be able to show a tatute that in
expre s terms, or by necessary implication, declares the note to
be void."
So it has been held:
"If a statute declares a security void, it is void in who esoever hands it may come. If, however a negotiable security be
founded on an illegal con ideration,-and it i immaterial whether
it be illegal at common law or by statute,-and no statute says
it shall be void, the security is good in the hand of an innocent
holder, or of any one claiming through such a holder." (Glenn v.
Ba.nk, 70 N. C. 191; Smith . Ba11k,
Neb. 31 [1 N. Y..l. 93] ·
Grimes v. Hillenbrand, 4 Hun. 354; Hill v. orthrup, 4 Thomp.
& C. 120; Converse v. Foster, 32 Vt. 28; Lauter v. Trust Co., 29
. C. A. 473, 85 Fed. 894; Hatch v. Burroughs, I Woods, 439
[Fed. Cas. No. 6,203]).
Other authorities hold that "when a statute, expressly or by
neces ary implication, declare the in trument ab olutel void, it
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gathers no vitality by its circulation, in respect to the parties

executing it." (i Daniel, Neg. Inst., § 197; Pope v. Hankc, 155

111., at page 625 et seq. [40 N. E. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568] ; Thomp-

son v. Samuels, [Tex.] 14 S. W. 143)-

We have already referred to the fact that two of the author-

ities cited by plaintiff's counsel, viz., Snoddy v. Bank, 88 Tenn.

573 ( J 3 S- W. 127, 7 L. R. A. 705, 17 Am. St. Rep. 918), and

Texarkana, etc., R. Co. v. Lumber Co., 67 Ark. 542 (55 S. W.

944), arose upon negotiable paper in the hands of a bona fide

holder. Snoddy v. Bank is authority for this proposition : "Notes

given in consideration of a contract against morals, public policy,

and public statutes are void in any hands." This, as we have

already shown, and as we understand plaintiff's counsel to con-

cede, is opposed to almost unanimous authority, and cannot, there-

fore, be accepted as a correct declaration of the law. In Texar-

kana, etc., R. Co. v. Lumber Co., suit was brought upon a negoti-

able promissory note made by the plaintiff corporation, contrary

to the constitution and statutes of the State of Texas, for the

accommodation of its president. It was held that this note was

void in the hands of a bona fide holder. The argument of the
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court in support of this contention is this :

"A contract prohibited by the constitution or statute of a

state, although negotiable in form, is not so in fact, and no inno-

cence or ignorance on the part of the holder will make it enforce-

able. It is an absolute nullity," — citing 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst., § 807,

and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Texas.

The decisions referred to do not sustain the proposition for

which they are cited. The section of Daniel cited has reference

gathers no vitality by its circulation, in respect to the parties
xecuting it." (r Daniel, Neg. In t., § 197; Pope . Hanke, 155
Ill., at page 625 et seq. [40 N. E. 839, 28 L. R. A. 568] ; Thompson v. Samuels, [Tex.] 14 S. W. 143).
We have already referred to the fact that two of the authorities cited by plaintiff's counsel, viz ., Snoddy v. Bank, 88 T nn.
573 ( 13 S. W. 127, 7 L. R. A. 705, 17 Am. St. R p. 918), and
Texarkana, etc., R . Co. v. Limiber Co ., 67 Ark. 542 (SS S. W.
944), aro e upon negotiabl paper in the hands of a bona fide
hold r. Snoddy v. Bank is authority for this proposition: "Notes
given in consideration of a contract against moral , public policy,
and public statutes are void in any hands." This, as we have
already hown, and as we understand plaintiff's counsel to concede, is opposed to almost unanimous authority, and cannot, therefore, be accepted as a correct declaration of the law. In TexMkana, etc., R. Co. v. Lmnber Co., suit was brought upon a negotiable promissory note made by the plaintiff corporation, contrary
to the constitution and statutes of the tate of Texas, for the
accommodation of its president. It was held that this note was
void in the hands of a bona fide holder. The argument of the
court in support of this contention is this:

to cases where an express statutory provision declares a note void.

We cannot follow this authority without repudiating our own

decision of Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287, and the almost unani-

mous authority of other courts.

Plaintiff's counsel assert that the case at bar is not ruled by

decisions which hold that negotiable paper based upon an illegal

consideration is valid in the hands of a bona fide holder. They

insist that such cases are not authority, because the statute under

consideration in this case did not merely make the consideration

"A contract prohibited by the constitution or statute of a
state, although negotiable in form, is not so in fact, and no innocence or ignorance on the part of the holder will make it enforceable. It is an absolute nullity,"-citing l Daniel, Neg. Inst., § 8o7,
and d cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Texas.

illegal ; it actually "prohibited and penalized" the making of the

contract itself. We are unable to see that this circumstance, if it

affords a sound distinction, distinguishes the case at bar from

several of the cases above referred to. In Vinton v. Peck, supra,

The decisions referred to do not sustain the proposition for
which they are cit d. The ection of Daniel cited ha reference
to cases where an express statutory provision declares a note void.
We cannot follow this authority without repudiating our own
decision of Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287, and the almo t unanimous authority of other court .
laintiff's counsel assert that the case at bar is not rul d by
deci ions which hold that n gotiable paper ba ed upon an illegal
con ideration is valid in the hands of a bona fide hold r. They
insist that uch cases ar not authority, becau the tatut under
consid ration in this ca e did not merely make the consideration
illegal; it actually "prohibited and penalized" the making of .the
contract itself. We ar unable to see that this circumstance, if it
affords a ound distinction, distingui hes the ca e at bar from
s veral of the cases above referred to. In Vinton v. Peck, sitpra,
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the particular act which was prohibited and punishable by fine

was the making of the note in suit. It is true that the statute

did not in express terms prohibit the making of the note, but,

when it prohibited 'the doing of any business, it did prohibit the

making of the note, for, as was expressly said by the supreme

court of New Hampshire in State Capital Bank v. Thompson,

42 N. H., at page 370, —

"Under the construction of our statute prohibiting unneces-

sary labor on Sunday, the execution and delivery of a promissory

note upon Sunday has been declared 'business of a person's secu-

the particular act which was prohibited and punishal le by fine
was the making of the note in suit. It is true that the statute
did not in express terms prohibit the making of th note, but,
when it prohibited 'th doing of any business, it did prohibit the
making of the note, for, a was xpressly said by the supreme
court of N w Hampshir in State Capital Bank v. Thompson,
42 N. H., at page 370,-

lar calling;' * * * and, as such, is prohibited under a penalty."

So, in New v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365 (9 N. E. 386, 58 Am.

Rep. 40), a bona fide holder was allowed to recover on a note

given for a patent right in violation of a statute which prohibited,

under a penalty, the delivery of the note without the insertion of

the clause that it was "given for a patent right." It is idle to say

"Under the construction of our statute prohibiting unn ecessary labor on Sunday, the xecution and delivery of a promisso ry
note upon unday has been declared 'business of a person's secular calling; * * * and, as such, is prohibited under a penalty."

that the making of this note was not prohibited by a penal statute.

See, also, Palmer v. Minar, 8 Hun. 342; Cook v. Weirman, 51

Iowa, 561 (2 N. W. 386). The only distinction that can be drawn

between those cases and the case at bar is in the nature and extent
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of the punishment for making the contract prohibited by law.

Such an inconsequential distinction will not change a rule of law.

We conclude, therefore, that, though the making of a con-

tract is prohibited and made a crime by statute, yet that contract,

if it takes the form of negotiable paper, is valid in the hands of

a bona fide holder for value. We think it also settled that nego-

tiable paper in the hands of a bona fide holder for value is not

subject to any defense which would avoid it in the hands of the

original holder, unless some statute, either expressly or by neces-

sary implication, so declares. We affirm the proposition, denied by

plaintiff's counsel, that though the statute, "by necessary implica-

tion, make the contract made in violation thereof absolutely void as

to non-negotiable contracts, and as to negotiable contracts in the

hands of persons having knowledge of the defects, yet * * * the

statute will not be considered to have that effect should the con-

tract be negotiable in form, and be found in the hands of a bona fide

holder." No strength is added to the foregoing proposition by say-

ing that the statute, by implication, makes void all non-negotiable

contracts, and negotiable contracts in the hands of persons having

knowledge of the defect ; for it follows from elementary legal prin-

ciples that all such contracts are unenforceable if the original con-

tract in the hands of the first parties thereto cannot be enforced.

So, in ew v. Walker, 108 Ind. 365 (9 N. E. 386, 58 Am.
Rep. 40), a bona fide holder was allowed to recover on a note
given for a patent right in violation of a statute which prohibited,
under a p nalty, the delivery of the note without the insertion of
the clause that it was "given for a patent right." It is idle to say
that the making of this note was not prohibited by a penal statute.
See, also, Palmer v. Minar, 8 Hun. 342; Cook v. Weirman, 51
Iowa, 56I (2 N. W. 386). The only distinction that can be drawn
between those cases and the case at bar is in the nature and ext nt
of the punishment for making the contract prohibited by law.
Such an inconsequential distinction will not change a rule of law.
We conclude, therefore, that, though the makihg of a contract is prohibited and made a crime by statute, yet that contract,
if it tak s the form of negotiable paper, i valid in the hands of
a bona fide holder for value. We think it also settled that nerrotiabl paper in the hands of a bona fide holder for value is not
ubj ect to any defense which would avoid it in the hand of the
original hold r, unle s some statute, ith ·r expres ly or by necessary implication, so declares. We affirm th propo ition, denied by
plaintiff' coun el, that though the tatut , "by nee ary implication, make the contract mad in violation thereof ab olutely oid as
to non-n gotiabl contract , and a t n rrotiable contract in th
hand of per ons having knowl do-e of th defects et * * * the
tatute will not be con id r e I to hav that eff ct hould the contract be n gotiable in form, and be found in the hand of a bona fide
holder." No treno·th i add d t th f r goinrr propo ition b) sa ing that the statute, by implication make void all non-nerrotiable
contract and negotiabl contract in the hands of p r n having
knowledo- of the defect· for it follow from lementary l al principles that all uch contracts are un nforc able if th orio-inal contract in the hands of the first parties th r to cannot be enforced.
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Nor is strength added to the proposition by saying that such con-

tracts are "absolutely void." If they cannot be enforced in the

hands of the original holders, we see no reason for quarreling with

a person who chooses to call them absolutely void, though others

might describe them as voidable. See Thompson v. Samuels,

(Tex.) 14 S. W. 143. It follows that plaintiff's counsel deny

that negotiable paper can be enforced in the hands of a bona

fide holder for value, if it arises from a contract which, by

implication of law, is void or unenforceable between the original

parties. In our judgment, the principle so denied is a correct

statement of the law. If it were otherwise, all negotiable paper

arising out of illegal and forbidden transactions would be void in

the hands of bona fide holders for value, and yet nothing is better

settled, by principle and authority, as we have already shown,

than that such paper is valid.

There remains to be considered this question : Does the stat-

ute, by necessary implication, or by implication, even, make the

check void in the hands of a bona fide holder for value? We

have already seen that such implication cannot be found from the

circumstance that the certification is prohibited and made a crime.
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It is insisted, however, that the intent of the legislature to make the

check void in the hands of a bona fide holder is indicated by other

circumstances. It is contended that the purpose of the legislature

in enacting this law was "to protect the citizens, depositors, and

stockholders against such an act as was committed in the case at

bar," viz., an attempt to withdraw the funds of the bank by means

of a check falsely certified, and that, to make this purpose effect-

ual, the check must be held void in the hands of a bona fide pur-

chaser. If it were true that the sole purpose of the statute was

to protect the depositors and stockholders of a bank against the

criminal acts of its own officials, this argument would be very

forcible. Are we warranted in declaring that the sole purpose of

the legislature in passing this statute was to protect banks and

their depositors from the consequences of criminal misconduct

of their officials, and that there were not other purposes, which

would fail if plaintiff's construction of the act prevails? We

must bear in mind that the legislature, in passing this statute in

1887, had not learned the lessons taught by the disastrous failure

of the City Savings Bank in 1902, which occasions this litigation,

though counsel do not agree as to precisely what lessons are

taught by this failure. We shall not, therefore, be materially

aided — indeed, we are rather likely to be misled — if we look to

that disaster to throw light upon the legislative purposes. The

l ,. or i strength added to the proposition by saying that such contract are "absolutely void." If they cannot be enforced in the
hands of the original holders, we see no reason for quarreling with
a person who choo es to call them absolutely void, though others
might describe them as voidable. See Thompson v. Samuels,
(Tex.) 14 S. W. 143· It follows that plaintiff's counsel deny
that negotiable paper can be enforced in the hands of a bona
fide holder for value, if it arises from a contract which, by
implication of law, is void or unenforceable between the original
parties. In our judgment, the principle so denied is a correct
statement of the law. If it were otherwise, all negotiable paper
arising out of illegal and forbidden transactions would be void in
the hands of bona fide holders for value, and yet nothing is better
settled, by principle and authority, as we have already shown,
than that such paper is valid.
There remains to be considered this question : Does the statute, by necessary implication, or by implication, even, make the
check void in the hands of a bona fide holder for value? We
have already seen that such implication cannot be found from the
circumstance that the certification is prohibited and made a crime.
It is insisted, however, that the intent of the leg islature to make the
check void in the hands of a bona fide holder is indicated by other
ci rcumstances. It is contended that the purpose of the legislature
in enacting this law was "to protect the citizens, depositors, and
stockholders against such an act as was committed in the case at
bar," viz., an attempt to withdraw the fund of the bank by means
of a check fals ely certified, and that, to make this purpose effectual, the check must be held void in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. If it were true that the sole purpose of the statute was
to protect the depositors and stockholders of a bank against the
criminal acts of its own officials, this argument would be very
forcible. Are we warranted in declaring that the sole purpose of
the legislature in pa sing this statute was to protect banks and
their depo itors from the consequences of criminal misconduct
of their officials, and that there were not other purposes, which
would fail if plaintiff's con truction of the act prevails ? We
must bear in mind that the legislature, in passing this statute in
1887, had not learned the lessons taught by th disastrous failure
of the City Savings Bank in 1902, which occasions this litigation,
though counsel do not agree as to precisely what lessons are
taught by this failure. We hall not, therefore, be materially
ai 1 cl-indeed, we are rather likely to be misled-if we look to
that disaster to throw light upon the legislative purposes. The
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legislature has not, by this statute, expressly declared its purpose.

Its purpose, then, is to be inferred. While we are bound to infer

that one of its purposes was to protect the bank and its depositors

from the criminal conduct of its officials, it is likewise to be

inferred that there was a broader purpose, viz., to protect safe

banking generally. We may infer the legislative purpose on the

assumption that the law was made to be observed, as well as on

the assumption that it would be violated. If the law is observed,

we can readily see that it will benefit, and thus infer the legislative

purpose to benefit, not merely the depositors and stockholders of

banks whose officers are called upon to certify checks, but all

persons taking such checks. In other words, the observance of

this law tends to increase the certainty of the payment of certified

checks and to promote safe banking.

In the case at bar, the allowance of the certified check will

inure to the benefit of the stockholders of defendant bank, and

to the damage to the depositors of the City Savings Bank, repre-

sented by plaintiff. But the law we declare in this case will cer-

tainly apply to a case, if such a case should, as it may, arise, where

the allowance of such a check inures to the benefit of the depos-
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itors of the bank which takes it, and damages no one but the

stockholders of the bank whose officials criminally certified it.

Such a case would be presented here if the payment of the check

under the consideration would not sensibly impair the capital of

the City Savings Bank, and if the funds withdrawn by its means

from defendant had rendered it impossible for the latter to pay its

depositors. And in such a case, under plaintiff's contention, the"\

court should say that the legislature intended to prefer the interest (

of the stockholders of the bank whose officers were guilty of (

criminal misconduct, to that of the depositors of another bank

damaged by such misconduct. We do not think we are warranted

in imputing to the legislature such an intent. We think it not

improper to infer that it was the legislative purpose to protect the

interests of thejtockholde rs and depositors of all banks, and not

rnerebT the^ stockholders and depositors of particular banks whose

officials might be guilty of criminal misconduct.

^"The language of the statute prohibiting the certification does

not compel the conclusion that its sole purpose was to protect the

bank and its depositors against the criminal misconduct of its

officials. Certification of a check is prohibited and made a crime

"unless the amount thereof actually stands to the credit of the

drawer upon the books of the banks." It will thus be observed

that certification is forbidden even though the drawer has funds

legislature has not, by this statute, expressly declared its purpose.
Its purpose, then, i to b inferred. While w are bound to infer
that one of its purposes was to protect the bank and its depositors
from th criminal conduct of its officials, it is likewise to be
inferred that there wa a broader purpose, viz., to protect safe
banking generally. We may infer the legislative purpose on the
assumption that the law wa made to be observed, a well as on
the a umption that it would be violated. If the law is observed,
we can readily see that it will benefit. and thus infer the legislative
purpose to benefit, not merely the depositors and tockholders of
banks whose officer are called upon to certify checks, but all
per on taking uch checks. In other words, the observance of
this law tends to incr ase the certainty of the payment of certified
check and to promote safe banking.
In the case at bar, the allowance of the certified check will
inure to the benefit of the stockholders of defendant bank, and
to the damage to the depositors of the City Savings Bank, represented by plaintiff. But the law we declare in this case will certainly apply to a case, if such a case should, as it may, arise, where
the allowance of such a check inures to the benefit of the depositors of the bank which takes it, and damages no one but the
stockholders of the bank whose officials criminally certified it.
Such a case would be presented here if the payment of the check
under the consideration would not sensibly impair the capital of
the City Savings Bank, and if the funds withdrawn by its means
from defendant had r ndered it impossible for the latter to pay its
depositors. And in uch a case, under plaintiff' contention, the
court hould say that the leo-islature intended to prefer the interest
of the stockholders of the bank whose officers were guilty of
criminal mi conduct, to that of the depositors of another bank
damaged by such mi conduct. vVe do not think v e are warranted
in imputing to the legislature such an intent. We think it not
improper to infer that it wa the legi lative purpo e to protect the
interests of the stockhold r and depo itors of all bank , and not
£lerely the stockholders and d positor of particular banks whose
·
officials might be uilt of criminal misconduct.
The language of the statute prohibiting the certification does
not compel the conclu ion that its sole purpose ' a to protect the
bank and its depositors again t the criminal mi conduct of its
official . Certification of a check i prohibited and made a crime
"unless the amount thereof actually tand to the ere lit of th
drawer upon the books of the bank ." It will thu be observed
that certification is forbidden even thouo-h the drawer ha fr nds

250 Contract of the Certifier

250

CONTRACT OF THE CERTIFIER

in the bank which do not stand to his credit upon the bank's

books, and certification is not forbidden if the amount of the

certified check is credited upon the books, though that credit is

fictitious. In making the last statement, we have not forgotten

that plaintiff contends that the statute does forbid certification

where the entry upon the books is fictitious ; but, as stated above,

we do not agree with this contention. The statute in such case

forbids the fictitious entry ; it does not forbid the false certifica-

tion resulting therefrom. In many cases the distinction might be

unimportant ; in others it might be very important. Suppose the

bookkeeper or cashier of the bank made the fictitious entry, and

the teller, acting in the best of faith, relying thereon, certified a

check. No reasonable construction of the act would make this

certification a crime, or bring it within the statutory prohibition.

It will thus be seen that certification is prohibited in a class of

cases where the depositors and stockholders of the bank whose

officers violated the law cannot be injured, and it is permitted in

a class of cases where they are injured. If the sole purpose of the

act has been to protect the depositors and stockholders of the bank

whose officers were guilty of this misconduct, different language
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would have been used. We are not, therefore, warranted in saying

that this act was passed solely for the purpose of protecting the

bank and its depositors from the criminal misconduct of its offi-

cers. We are warranted in declaring that there was a legislative

purpose in passing this act which would be defeated by the con-

struction contended for by plaintiff.

If the section is construed as the plaintiff contends, — if checks

duly certified are void in the hands of bona fide holders because

the amount thereof did not stand to the credit of the drawer on

the books of the bank, — this consequence follows: Certified

checks, instead of being, as heretofore, the negotiable paper of

the bank, and passing as current upon the faith of the bank's

credit, will pass, if at all, only upon the credit of the particular

bank official who certified it. Every person to whom a certified

check is offered will be called upon to determine, not the credit

of the certifying bank, not the authority of the certifying official,

but the integrity and diligence of that official. Though one may

have all confidence in such integrity and diligence, he may hesitate

to take the check, because he fears that others to whom he may

wish to transfer it lack such confidence. It will result, therefore,

that certified checks, instead of being regarded in commercial

circles with credit and favor, as heretofore, will be regarded with a

degree of suspicion, and are likely to be discredited. If the legis-

in the bank which do not stand to his credit upon the bank's
books, and certification is not forbidd n if the amount of the
certified check is credited upon the books, though that credit is
fictitious. In making the la t statement, we have not forgotten
that plaintiff cont nds that the statut doe forbid certification
where the entry upon the books i fictitious· but, a stat d above,
we do not agree with this contention. The tatute in such case
forbids the fi titiou entry; it does not forbid the false certification resulting therefrom. In many cases th distinction might be
unimportant; in others it mio-ht be very important. Suppose the
bookkeeper or cashier of the bank made the fictitious entry and
the teller, acting in the best of faith, relyino- thereon, certified a
ch ck. No rea onable construction of the act would make this
certification a crime, or bring it within the statutory prohibition.
It will thus be seen that certification is prohibited in a class of
cases where the depo itors and stockholder of the bank whose
offic rs violated the law cannot be injured, and it i permitted in
a class of cases where they are injured. If the sole purpose of the
act has been to protect the depositors and stockhold rs of the bank
who e officers were guilty of this misconduct, different language
would have been used. We are not, therefore, warranted in aying
that this act was passed solely for the purpose of protecting the
bank and its depositors from the criminal misconduct of its officers. We are warranted in declaring that there was a legislative
purpose in passing this act which would be defeated by the construction contended for by plaintiff.
If the ection is con trued as the plaintiff cont nd ,-if checks
duly certified are void in the hands of bona fide holders because
the amount thereof did not tand to the er <lit of the drawer on
the books of th bank,-this consequence follows: Certified
check , in t ad of being, as heretofor , the negotiable paper of
the bank, and passin as current upon the faith of the bank's
er <lit, will pa s, if at all, only upon the credit of the particular
bank official who certified it. Every p rson to whom a certified
check is offered will be called upon to determine, not the credit
of the certifying bank, not the authority of the c rtifying official,
but the inte rity and dilig nee of that official. Thou h on may
have all confidenc in uch integrity and dilig nc , he may h itate
t take the check, becau e he f ars that oth rs to wh m he may
wish to transfer it lack uch confidenc . It will result, ther fore,
that certified checks, instead of being regarded in comm rcial
circles with credit and favor, a h retofor , will be regarded with a
degree of su picion, and are likely to be discr dited. If the legis-
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latnre intended this consequence, — and they must have intended it

if they intended that the act should receive the construction con-

tended for by plaintiff, — it seems strange that they left their intent

to be ascertained as a matter of doubtful inference ; it seems

strange that they still left to banks the power of certifying checks,

without any clear suggestion that such power was so greatly lim-

ited. "If the legislature intended the consequences claimed, we

should expect it to say so." (Press Co. v. Bank, 7 C. C. A., at

page 249, 58 Fed. 322).

It is suggested, rather than urged, by plaintiff's counsel, that

on the authority of Spitzer v. Village of Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234

(46 N. W. 400), the statute under consideration should be con-

strued as denying to the teller authority to bind his principal, the

bank, by the certificate under consideration. In Spitacr v. Village

of Blanchard it was held that bonds issued by a village in excess

of the amount authorized by its incorporation act are void in the

hands of a bona fide holder, the court saying (page 246) :

"The amount of the bonds to be issued was known, and

appears upon the face of the bonds. The assessed valuation and

the vote of the electors are matters of public record, and are open
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to all the world for inspection and ascertainment, and are as acces-

sible to intending purchasers as other persons. The limitation

of power upon the common council appears in the public statute,

and is presumed to be known by all dealing with corporate author-

lature intended this consequence,-and they must have intended it
if they intended that the act hould receive the con truction contended f r by plaintiff,-it ems trang that they 1 ft their intent
to be a certained as a matter of doubtful inferenc ; it eems
trange that they still left to banks the power of certifying check ,
v ithout any clear sugge tion that such power wa o greatly limit d. "If the legi lature intended th consequences claimed, we
hould xpect it to say so." (Press Co. v. Bank, 7 C. C. A., at
page 249, 58 Fed. 322).
It is uggested, rather than urged, by plaintiff's counsel, that
on the authority of Spitzer v. Villa:ge of Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234
( 46 N. W. 400), the statute under consideration should be contrued as d nying to the teller authority to bind his principal, the
bank, by the certificate under consideration. In Spitzer v. Village
of Blanchard it was held that bonds issued by a village in excess
of the amount authorized by its incorporation act are void in the
•
I
hand of a bona fide holder, the court saymg (page 246) :

ities or in corporate bonds."

To show the distinction between that case and the case at bar,

we quote from other language in that opinion (page 244) :

"Where there is a total want of power, under the law, in the

officers or board who issue the bonds, then the bonds will be void

in the hands of innocent holders ; the distinction being between

questions of fact and questions of law. If it is a question of fact,

and the board of officers are authorized by law to determine the

fact, then their determination is final and conclusive."

If it were necessary to further distinguish that case from the

case at bar, we cannot do better than quote the language of dis-

"The amount of the bonds to be issued was known, and
appears upon the face of the bonds. The assessed valuation and
the vote of the electors are matters of public record, and are open
to all the world for inspection and ascertainment, and are as accesible to intending purchasers as other persons. The limitation
of power upon the common council appears in the public statute,
and is presumed to be known by all dealing with corporate authorities or in corporate bonds."

tinguished jurists. Said Mr. Justice Selden in Farmers' &

Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 135

(69 Am. Dec. 678) :

"It is, I think, a sound rule that where the party dealing with

an agent has ascertained that the act of the agent corresponds in

every particular in regard to which such party has, or is presumed

To how the di tinction etween that case and th ca e at bar,
we quote from other language in that opinion (page 244) :
"Wher there i a total want of power, under the law, in the
officers or board who issue the bond s, th n the bond will be void
in the hands of innocent holders ; the di tinction being between
questions of fact and questions of law. If it is a que tion of fact,
and the board of officer ar authorized by law to d t rmine the
fact, then their determination is final and conclu ive. '

If it were necessary to further distinguish that ca e from the
case at bar, we cannot do better than quot the language of disIden in Farmers' &
tinguished juri ts. Said Mr. Ju tic
Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 16 N. Y. 135
(69 Am. Dec. 678):
"It is, I think, a ound rule that where the party dealing with
an agent has ascertained that the act of the agent corresponds in
every particular in regard to which such party has or i presumed
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to have, any knowledge, with the terms of the power, he may take

the representation of the agent as to any extrinsic fact which rests

peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and which cannot

be ascertained by a comparison of the power with the act done

under it."

Said Justice Davis in New York, etc., R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34

N. Y., at page 73:

to have, any knowledge, with the term of the power, he may take
the representation of the agent as to any extrin ic fact which rests
peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and which cannot
be a certained by a comparison of the power with the act done
under it."

"Where the principal has clothed his agent with power to do

an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact necessarily and

peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence

of which the act of executing the power is itself a representation,

aid Justice Davis in New York, etc., R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34
N . Y., at page 73:

a third person dealing with such agent in entire good faith pur-

suant to the apparent power may rely upon the representation."

If authority is needed for the proposition, which seems obvi-

ous, that the certification in question related to an act peculiarly

within the teller's knowledge, we refer to Oakland County Sav.

Bank v. State Bank of Carson City, 113 Mich. 284 (71 N. W.

453, 67 Am. St. Rep. 463).

It is also urged that it was the intention of the framers of the

general banking act to follow generally the provisions of the
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national banking law, and that we are warranted in inferring an

intent to avoid a check falsely certified, in the hands of a bona fide

holder, from certain changes, — particularly from the fact that,

when section 19 (2 Comp. Laws, § 6108) was framed, language

was omitted which in the corresponding section of the national

banking law, viz., section 5208, Rev. Stat. U. S., clearly indicated

the purpose of Congress to make such checks valid. This conten-

tion deserves attention. Section 5208, Rev. Stat. U. S., makes it

unlawful to certify any check, not, as provided in section 19,

unless the amount actually stands to the credit of the drawer on

the books of the bank, but unless the drawer "has on deposit

* * * an amount of money equal to the amount specified in

such check." Then follows the provision omitted from section

19: "Any check so certified by duly authorized officers shall be a

good and valid obligation against the association." It will be

observed that the language omitted in framing section 19, in form,

at least, and possibly in reality (see 1 Morse, Banking [4th Ed.],

§414), makes the prohibited check valid, even though not in the

hands of a bona tide holder. The omission of this sentence, there-

fore, in section 19, may well be attributed to some other purpose

than the intent to make such checks void in the hands of a bona

fide purchaser. We can well understand the reluctance of a legis-

" Where the principal has clothed his agent with power to do
an act upon the existence of some extrinsic fact nece sarily and
peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence
of which the act of executing the power is itself a representation,
a third person dealing with such agent in entire good faith pursuant to the apparent power may rely upon the representation."
If authority is needed for the proposition, which seems obvious, that the certification in question related to an act peculiarly
within the teller's knowledge, we refer to Oakland County Sav.
Bank v. State Bmik of Ca.rson City, 113 Mich. 284 (71 N. W.
453, 67 Am. St. Rep. 463).
It is also urged that it was the intention of the framers of the
general banking act to follow generally the provisions of the
national banking law, and that we are warranted in inferring an
intent to avoid a check falsely certified, in the hands of a bona fide
holder, from certain changes,-particularly from the fact that,
when section 19 (2 Comp. Laws, § 6108) was framed, language
was omitted which in the corresponding section of the national
banking law, viz., section 5208, Rev. Stat. U. S., clearly indicated
the purpose of Congress to make such checks valid. This contention de erves attention. Section 5208, Rev. Stat. U. S., makes it
unlawful to certify any check, not, as provided in section 19,
unless the amount actually stands to the credit of the drawer on
the books of the bank, but unless the drawer "has on deposit
* * * an amount of money equal to the amount specified in
such check." Then follows the provi ion omitted from ection
19: "Any ch ck so certified by duly authorized officers hall be a
good and valid obligation again t the association." It will be
observed that the languaae omitted in framing section 19, in form,
at least, and possibly in reality ( s e r Mor. e, Banking [4th Ed.],
§ 414), makes the prohibited check valid, even though not in the
hand of a bona fide holder. The omission of this sentence, therefore, in section 19, rriay well be attribut d to some other purpose
than the intent to make such check void in the hands of a bona
fid e pu rcha er. We can well understand the reluctance of a legis-
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lature to use language which, even by inference, made such checks

valid in whosesoever hands they might be.

It results from these views that the trial court erred in deny-

ing defendant the right to prove that it received this check after

certification, on the day it was drawn, in the usual course of bus-

iness, and paid full value therefor, without notice or knowledge

of any infirmity, or of the fact that the account of the drawer was

overdrawn.

The court has received unusual aid from the excellent argu-

ments and briefs of counsel representing the parties interested in

this litigation. Without such aid, we could not have reached so

speedy a decision.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.

Moore, C.J., Montgomery and Hooker, JJ., concurred.

Grant, J., did not sit.

fyen &x\

WHERE HOLDER PROCURES CHECK TO BE CERTIFIED. § I90.

First Nat. Bank v. Leach (1873), 52 N. Y. 550.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the first judicial department, affirming a judgment in
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favor of defendant, entered upon a verdict.

This action was brought upon a check drawn by defendant.

The check was drawn upon the Ocean National Bank, was dated

November 21st, 1871, for $1,410, payable on the 12th December,

1 87 1, to the order of James Dolby. It was delivered to the payee

and discounted for him by plaintiff - . At eleven o'clock a. m. of

the 12th December, plaintiff caused the same to be presented to

the drawee for certification, and it was certified as good. The

drawer had at that time on deposit sufficient to pay the check, and

the amount thereof was charged to him. Within an hour or two

thereafter the Ocean National Bank, the drawee, suspended, and

a receiver was appointed, who took possession afterward ; upon

the same day the check was presented for payment, and payment

being refused, the same was duly protested.

Upon this state of facts the court directed a verdict for

defendant, to which plaintiff's counsel duly excepted.

William F. Shepard, for the appellant.

Louis C. Waehner, for the respondent.
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Peckham, J. The defendant drew the check in controversy,

it was discounted by the plaintiff, and on the day it was due it

was presented by plaintiff to the drawee, the Ocean Bank, for

certification, was certified as good, and in the afternoon of the

same day was presented for payment, which was refused, because

between the time of its certificate and its second presentment the

drawee, the Ocean Bank, had failed and gone into the hands of

a receiver. Did this certification operate as a payment of the

check as between these parties?

The theory of the law is, that where a check is certified to

be goodby a bank, the amount thereof is then charged to the

account of the drawer in the bank certificate account Every well

regulated bank adopts this practice to protect itself.

The reason therefor is so strong that the law presumes it is

adopted by the banks. (Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171 ; Meads

v. The Merchants' Bk. of Albany, 25 id. 148; The Farmers' &

Mechanics' Bk. v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bk., 16 id. 125 ; Mer-

chants' Bk. v. State Bk., 10 Wall. 647.) It is found to have been

done in this case.

If a bank failed to keep such account and to make such
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entries, it would necessarily incur the peril of the failure of its

customers whose checks it certified, without any account of their

number or amount, although it would be liable to pay its certified

checks to bona fide holders, whether it had funds or not. (Farm-

ers' & Mech. Bk. v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bk., supra.)

It follows that, after a check is certified, the drawer of the

check cannot draw out the funds then in the bank necessary to

meet the certified check. That money is no longer his.

If he apprehended danger from the suspected failure of the

bank, he could not draw out that money, because it had already

been appropriated by means of the check thus certified ; as to him,

it was precisely as if the bank had paid the money upon that

check instead of making a certificate of its being good.

For~that reTs^rth^^r^weF'coiild have~nb remecly against

the bank, by any legal proceeding, to secure himself for the

amount of that check. Hence, if the drawer should get the

check back, he would strictly be entitled to get that money, not

by virtue of its original deposit, but solely by surrender of the

certified check, like any other holder.

But all that has been yet stated applies with equal force to

the acceptance of a time bill of exchange before due. Then,

when the drawee accepts, it is an appropriation of the funds,

pro tanto, for the service and use of the payee or other person

PECKHAM, J. The defendant drew the check in controversy,
it was di counted by the plaintiff, and on the day it was due it
wa pre ented by plaintiff to the drawee, the cean ank, for
certification, was certified as good, and in the afternoon of the
same day wa pr ented for payment, which was refus d, because
between the time of it certificate and it econd presentment the
dra\Yee, the cean Bank, had failed and gone into the hand of
id this certification operate as a payment of the
a receiver.
check as between the e parties?
The theory of the law is, that where a check is certified to
be ood b a bank the amount thereof is then char ed to the
account of th drawer in- the ban-k c~tificate account. Every well
reaulated bank adoptS thi practice to protect itselr
The rea on therefor i o strong that the law presumes it is
adopted by the bank . (Sm,ith v. Mille:, 43 N. Y. 171; Meads
v. The Merchants' Bk. of Albany, 25 id. 148; The Farmers' &
Mechanics' Bl?. v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bk., 16 id. 125; Merchan,ts' Bk. v. State Bk. 1 IO Wall. 647.) It is found to have been
done in this case.
If a bank failed to keep such account and to make such
entries, it would nece sarily incur the peril of the failure of its
cu tomers who e checks it certified, without any account of their
number or amount, although it would be liable to pay it certified
checks to bona fide holders, whether it had funds or not. (Farmers' & Mech. Bk. v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bk., supra.)
It follows that, after a check is certified, the drawer of the
. check cannot draw out the funds then in the bank necessary to
meet the certified check. That money is no longer his.
If he apprehended danger from the su pected failure of the
bank, he could not draw out that money, because it had already
been appropriated by means of the check thus certified ; as to him,
it was recisel as_ if the bank had paid the money u on tha.t
check instead of making a certlf1cafe of It bemg good.
For that reason, the drawer cou d ave no rem dy against
the bank, by any legal proceedina, to secure him elf for the
amount of that check. Hence, if th drawer should get the
check back, he would trictly be entitl d to get that money, not
by virtue of its original deposit, but sol ly by surrender of the
certified check, like any oth r holder.
But all that has been y t tated applies with equal force to
the acceptance of a time bill of exchange before due. Then,
when the drawee accepts, it is an appropriation of the funds,
pro tanto, for the service and use of the payee or other person
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holding the bill, so that the amount ceases henceforth to be the

money of the drawer, and becomes that of the payee or other

holder in the hands of the acceptor. (Story on Bills of Ex.,

§ 14; i Pars, on Notes and Bills, 323.)

It is entirely clear that the acceptance of a time draft, before

due, does not operate as a payment as respects the drawer. Its

only effect is to make the acceptor the primary party to pay the

draft.

But the parties to a certified check, due when certified,

occupy a different position. There the money is due and payable

when the check is certified. The bank virtually says that check

is good ; we have the money of the drawer here ready to pay it.

We will pay it now, if you will receive it. The holder says no.

I will not take the money ; you may certify the check and retain

the money for me until this check is presented.

The law will not pe rmit a check, when due, to be thus pr e-

sented and th e money to be left with the bank for the acco mmo-

datTo~h~~"bf the holder, without discharging the drawer.

The money being due and the check presented, it is his own

fault if the holder declines to receive the pay, and for his own
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convenience has the money appropriated to that check, subject

to its future presentment at any time within the statute of

limitations.

The acceptance of a time draft before due is entirely dif-

ferent ; there the holder has then no right to the money, and the

acceptor no authority to pay until the maturity of the bill. There

is no necessity for presenting a check for acceptance, like a time

bill, no authority for such presentment, although the holder has

the right to do it. The authority and the duty are to present

for payment.

If, however, the holder choose to have it certified instead of

paid, he will do so at the peril of discharging the drawer.

He cannot change the position and increase the risk of the

drawer without discharging him. (Smith v. Miller, supra.)

This would not discharge the drawer of a check, who him-

self procured it to be certified and then put it in circulation. The

reason of the rule fails to apply to him in such case.

I am not aware of any direct authority upon this question;

but upon principle it must be held that the ban k hol d s the money,

aft er ce rtification to. the holder, not at the risk of the drawer, but

of the holder of t he check.

The judgment must be affirmed.

All concur. Judgment affirmed. \^

~> \
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holdino- the bill, so that the amount ceases henceforth to be the
money of the drawer, and becomes that of th payee or other
holder in the hands of the acceptor. ( tory on Bills of Ex.,
§ 14; I Pars. on N ates and ills, 323.)
It is entirely clear that th acceptance of a time draft, before
due, do s not operate as a payment as respects the drawer. Its
only effect is to make the a~ceptor the primary party to pay the
draft.
But the parties to a certified check, due when certified,
occupy a different position. There the money i due and payable
when the check is certified. The bank virtually says that check
i good; we have the money of the drawer here ready to pay it.
\ e will pay it now, if you will receive it. The holder says no.
I will not take the money· you may certify the check and retain
the money for me until this check is presented.
The law will not permit a check, when due, to be thus preented and the money to be left with the bank for the accommodation of the holder without dischar in the drawer.
The money being due and the check presented, it is his own
fault if the holder declines to receive the pay, and for his own
convenience has the money appropriated to that check, subject
to its future presentment at any time within the statute of
limitations.
The acceptance of a time draft before due is entirely different; there the holder has then no right to the money, and the
acceptor no authority to pay until the maturity of the bill. There
i no necessity for presenting a check for acceptance, like a ti'me
bill, no authority for such pre entment, although the holder has
the rio-ht to do it. The authority and the duty are to present
for payment.
If, however, the holder choose to have it certified instead of
paid, he will do so at the peril of dischargincr the drawer.
He cannot change the position and increa e the risk of the
drawer without di charging him. ( Sniith v. Mill er supra.)
This would not discharge the drawer of a. check, who himself procured it to be certified and then put it in circulation. The
reason of the rule fails to appl y to him in uch ca e.
I am not a ware of any direct authority upon thi que tion ·
but upon principle it must be held that the bank holds the mane
after certification to the holder. not at the risk of the drawer but
-0f the holder of the check.
The judgment mu t be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. (
All concur.
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where drawer procures check to be certified. § 190.

Minot v. Russ \ (1892), 136 Mass. 458,32 Am.

\\' HERE DRA \\'ER PROCURES CHECK TO BE CERTIFIED.

§ 190.

Head ct al. v. Hornblowcr et al. j St. Rep. 472.

\ n* - Field, C.J. The first case is an appeal from a judgment

Jli11o t v. Russ
l_ (1892), I56Mass. 458,32Am.
Head et al. v. Hornblower et al. f
St. Rep. 47 2.

rendered by the Superior Court for the defendant, on his demur-

rer to the declaration. The defendant, on October 29, 1891, drew

a check on the Maverick National Bank, payable to the order of

the plaintiff, and, being informed by the plaintiff that the check

must be certified by the bank before it would be received, the

1

~ ~

dffenilant on the same day presented the check to the bank for

certification, and the bank certified it by writing on the face of

the check the following: "Maverick National Bank. Pay only

through Clearing-House. J. W. Work, Cashier. A. C. J., Paying

Teller." After it was certified, the check was, on Saturday, Octo-

ber 31, 1 891, delivered by the defendant to the plaintiffs, for a

valuable consideration. The declaration alleges that the bank

stopped payment on Monday morning, November 2, 1891, "before

the commencement of business hours on said day," and that on

that day payment w r as duly demanded of the bank, and notice of

non-payment was duly given to the defendant,
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a. ~A ot>-e-«. The second case is an appeal from a judgment rendered for

the defendants by the Superior Court, on an agreed statement

of facts. On Saturday, October 31, 1891, the defendants drew

their check on the Maverick National Bank, payable to the order

of the plaintiffs, and delivered it to them in payment of stocks

bought by the defendants of the plaintiffs. The check was

received too late to be deposited by the plaintiffs for collection

in season to be carried to the clearing-house on that day, but

during banking hours on that day the plaint jiff s presented the

check to the Maverick National Bank for certification, and the

bank certified it by writing or stamping on its face the following :

"Maverick National Bank. Certified. Pay only through Clear-

ing-House. C. C. Domett, A. Cashier. , Paying Teller."

At that time the defendants had on deposit sufficient funds

to pay the check, and the bank on certification charged to the

defendant's account the amount of the check, and credited it to

a ledger account called certified checks, in accordance with their

uniform custom. After certification, the plaintiffs, on the same

day, deposited the check in the Hamilton National Bank for

collection. It is agreed that if the check had been presented

~ ~ ~

FIELD, C.J.
The first case is an appeal from a judgment
rendered by the Superior Court for the defendant, on hi demurrer to the declaration. The defendant, on October 29, 1891, drew
a check on th 1averick National Bank, pa ya bl to the order of
the plaintiff, and, being informed by the plaintiff that the check
mu t be certified by the bank before it would be received, the
de fendant on th e ame day pre ented the check to the bank for
certification1 anc! the jank certified it by writing on the face of
the check the foll owing: "Maverick National Bank. Pay only
through Clearing-House. J. W. Work, Cashier. A. C. J., Paying
Tell r." After it wa certified, the check was, on Saturday, October 31, 1891, delivered by the defendant to the plaintiffs, for a
valuable consideration. The declaration alleges that the bank
stopped payment on Monday morning, ovember 2, 1891, "before
the commencement of bu iness hours on said day," and that on
that day payment wa duly demanded of the bank, and notice of
non-payment was duly given to the defendant.
The econd case is an appeal from a ju lgment rendered for
the defendants by the Superior Court, on an agreed tatement
of facts. On Saturday, October 31, 1891, the defendant drew
their check on the Maverick National Bank, payable to the order
of the plaintiffs, and delivered it to them in payment of stocks
bought by the defendant of the plaintiffs. The check was
received too late to be deposited by the plaintiff for collection
in sea on to be carried to the clearing-house on that day, but
during banking hours on that day the plaintiffs presented the
check to the Maverick Na ti on al Bank for certification, and the
bank certified it by writing or stamping on its face the followino-:
"Maverick National ank. Certified. Pay only through Clearing-House. C. C. Domett, A. Ca bier. - - , Paying Teller."
At that tim the defendants had on depo it sufficient funds
to pay the check, and the bank on certification charged to the
defendant's account the amount of the check, and credited it to
a ledger account call d certified checks, in accordance with their
uniform custom. After certification, the plaintiff , on the same
day, deposited the check in the Hamilton National Bank for
collection. It is agreed that if the check had been presented.
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for payment on Saturday, in banking hours, it would have been

paid; but the Maverick National Bank transacted no business

after Saturday, and on Sunday the Comptroller of the Currency

placed a national bank examiner in charge, and the bank was

put into the hands of a receiver. The clearing-house on Novem-

ber 2 refused to receive checks on the Maverick National Bank,

and the check was on that day duly presented for payment, and

due notice of non-payment was given to the defendants.

Each of the checks was in the ordinary form of checks on a

bank, and was payable on demand, and no presentment for accept-

ance or certification was necessary. In a sense, undoubtedly, a

check is a species of bill of exchange, and in a sense also it is a

distinct commercial instrument ; but according to the general

understanding of merchants, and according to our statutes, these

instruments were checks, and not bills of exchange. "A check is

an order to pay the holder a sum of money at the bank, on pre-

sentment of the check and demand of the money; no previous

notice is necessary, no acceptance is required or expected, it has

no days of grace. It is payable on presentment and not before."

Bullard v. Randall, i Gray, 605, 606. The duty of the bank
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was to pay these checks when they were presented for payment,

if the drawers had sufficient funds on deposit. The bank owed no

duty to the drawers to certify the checks, although it could certify

them if it saw fit, at the request of either the drawers or the

holders, and if it certified them it became bound directly to the

holders, or to the persons who should become the holders. In

either case, the bank would charge to the account of the drawer

the amount of the check, because by certification it had become

absolutely liable to pay the check when presented. When a

check payable to another person than the drawer is presented

by the drawer to the bank for certification, the bank knows that

it has not been negotiated, and that it is not presented for pay-

ment, but that the drawer wishes the obligation of the bank to

pay it to the holder when it is negotiated, in addition to his own

obligation. But when the payee or holder of a check presents

it for certification, the bank knows that this is done for the

convenience or security of the holder. The holder could demand

payment if he chose, and it is only because, instead of payment,

the holder desires certification, that the bank certifies the check-

instead of paying it. In one case the bank certifies the check for

the use or convenience of the drawer, and in the other for the

use or convenience of the holder. In the present case the checks

were seasonably presented to the bank for payment, and on the

for payment on Saturda), in banking hours, it would have been
paid; but the Maverick National ank transact d no bu iness
after Saturday, and on Sunday the Comptroller of the Currency
placed a national bank examiner in charge, and the bank was
put into the hands of a receiver. The clearing-hou e on November 2 refu ed to res"=ive checks on the Iaverick National Bank,
and the check was on that day duly pre ented for payment, and
due notice of non-payment was given to the defendants.
Each of the checks was in the ordinary form of checks on a
bank, and was payable on demand, and no presentment for acceptance or certification was nece sary. In a sense, undoubtedly, a
check is a species of bill of exchange, and in a sense also it is a
distinct commercial instrument; but according to the general
understanding of merchants, and according to our statutes, these
instruments were checks, and not bills of exchange. "A check is
an order to pay the holder a sum of money at the bank, on preentment of the check and demand of the money; no previous
notice is neces ary, no acceptance is required or expected, it has
no days of grace. It is payable on presentment and not before."
BitllMd v. Randall, r Gray, 6o5, 606. The duty of the bank
was to pay these checks when they were presented for payment,
if the drawers had sufficient funds on deposit. The bank owed no
duty to the drawers to certify the checks, although it could certify
them if it saw fit, at the request of either the drawers or the
holders, and if it certified them it became bound directly to the
holders, or to the persons who should become the holder . In
either ca e, the bank would charge to the account of the drawer
the amount of the check, because by certification it had become
absolutely liable to pay the check when pre ented. V\ hen a
check payable to another person than the drawer is pre ented
by the drawer to the bank for certification, the bank knows that
it ha not been negotiated, and that it i not pre ented for payment, but that the drawer wishe the obligation of the bank to
pay it to the holder when it is negotiated, in addition to hi own
obligation. But when the payee or holder of a check pre ents
it for certification, the bank know that thi is done for the
convenience or ecurity of the holder. The holder could demand
payment if he chose, and it is only becau e, in tead of payment,
the holder desires certification that the bank certifie the check
in tead of paying it. In one ca e the bank certifie th ch ck for
the use or conveni nee of the drawer and in the other for the
u e or convenienc of the holder. In the present a the checks
ere sea onably pre ented to the bank for pa) ment, and on the
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facts stated the defendants would be liable unless the certification

discharged them from liability.

It is argued that the certification of a check, whereby the bank

becomes absolutely liable to pay it at any time on demand, dis-

charges the drawer, because it is said that the check then becomes

in effect a certificate of deposit ; and it is also argued that the

certification is in effect only an acceptance of a bill of exchange,

and that if payment is duly demanded of the bank and refused,

and notice of non-payment duly given, the drawer is held. So

far as the question has been considered, it has been decided that

the certification of a bank check is not, in all respects, like the

making of a certificate of deposit, or the acceptance of a bill

of exchange, but that it is a thing sui generis, and that the

effect of it depends upon the person who, in his own behalf, or

for his own benefit, induces the bank to certify the check. The

weight of authority is, that if the drawer in his own behalf, or

for his own benefit, gets his check certified, and then delivers it

to the payee, the drawer is not discharged ; but that if the payee

or hol der, in his own behalf or for his own benefit, gets it -cer-

tified instea d_of getting it pa id, t hen the d r awer is discharged.
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(Bom v. First National Bank, 123 Ind. 78; Rounds v. Smith, 42

111. 245; Brown v. Leckie, 43 111. 497; Andrews v. German

National Bank, 9 Heisk. 211; First National Bank v. Leach,

52 N. Y. 350; Boyd v. Nasmith, 17 Ont. 40; Essex County

National Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193 ; First National

Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 345 ; Metropolitan National Bank

v. Jones, 27 N. E. Rep. 533 ; Continental National Bank v. Corn-

hauser, 37 111. App. 475 ; National Commercial Bank v. Miller,

77 Ala. 168; Larsen v. Breene, 12 Col. 480; Mutual National

Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. An. 933 ; Morse on Banking, §§ 414, 415.)

We are of opinion that this view of the law rests on sound

reasons. If it be true that the existing methods of doing business

make the use of certified checks necessary, the persons who receive

them can always require them to be certified before delivery. If

they receive them uncertified and then present them to the bank

for certification instead of payment, the certification should be

considered as discharging the drawer.

It may also be said, that in the second case the certification

amounted to an extension of the time of payment at the request

of the payees, without the consent of the drawers. Before the

certification the drawers could have requested the payee to pre-

sent the check for payment on Saturday, or could themselves

have drawn out the money and paid the check. After certifica-

•

fa ct stated the defendants would be liable unless th e certification
di charged them from liability.
I t is argued that th certification of a check, whereby the bank
become absolutely liable. to pay it at any time on demand, discharges the drawer, because it is said that the check then becomes
in effect a certificate of deposit; and it is al o argu ed that the
certification i in eff ect only an acceptance of a bill of exchange,
and that if payment is duly demanded of the bank and refused,
and notice of non-payment duly given, the drawer is held. So
far as the qu estion has been considered, it has been deci<ied that
the certification of a bank check is not, in all respects, like the
making of a certificate of deposit, or the acceptance of a bill
of exchange, but that it is a thing sui generis, and that the
effect of it depends upon the person who, in his own behalf, or
for hi own benefit, induces the bank to certify the check. The
weight of authority is, that if the drawer in his own behalf, or
for his own benefit, gets his check certified , and then delivers it
to th e payee, the drawer is not discharged; but that if the payee
or holder, in his own behalf or for his own benefit, gets it -certified instead of getting it paid, then the drawer is discharged.
( Born v. First Natio nal Bank, 123 Ind. 78; Rounds v. Smith, 42
Ill. 245; Brown v. L eckie, 43 Ill. 497; Andrews v. German
N ational Bank, 9 Heisk. 211; First National Bank v. Leach,
52 N. Y. 350; Boyd v. Nasmith, 17 Ont. 40; Essex County
N at·ional Bank v. Bank of Montreal, 7 Biss. 193; First National
Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343, 345; M etropolitan National Bank
v. Jo nes, 27 N. E. Rep. 533; Continental National Bank v. Cornhauser, 37 Ill. App. 475; National Commercial Bank v. Miller,
77 Ala. 168; Larsen v. Breene, 12 Col. 480; Mutual National
Bank v. Rotge, 28 La. An. 933; Morse on Banking,§§ 414, 415.)
We are of opinion that this view of the law rests on sound
rea ons. If it be true that the existing methods of doing business
make the u se of certified checks necessary, the persons who receive
them can always require them to be certified before delivery. If
they receive them uncertified and then present them to the bank
fo r certification instead of payment, the certification should be
considered as discharging the drawer.
I t may al o be said, that in the second ca e the certification
amounted to an extension of the time of payment at the request
of the payee , without the con ent of th drawers. Before the
certification the draw ers could have requested the payee to present the check for payment on Saturday, or could themselves
have drawn out the money and paid the check. After certifica-

Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh R. R. Co, 259

tion the amount of the check no longer stood to the credit of the

drawers, and the payees had accepted an obligation of the bank

to pay only through the clearing-house, which could not happen

before the following Monday. The result is that in the first case

the judgment is reversed, and the demurrer overruled, and in

the second case the judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

F. Bretvster, for the plaintiff in the first case. \ pJc oo-aj*-^ ^La*^-

F. R. Jones, for the defendant in the first case. 9~^-^A c^*-^, ^*\-

W. C. Loring, for the plaintiffs in the second case.

C. A. Williams, for the defendants in the second case.
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§§63, Il6— I.

Fairchild v. Ogdensburgh R. R. Co. (1857), 15 N. Y. 337, 69

Am. Dec. 606.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of

the plaintiff . The action was upon certain orders for the pay-

ment of money, the contention for the defense being that the

instruments were bills of exchange and were not enforceable

without proof of presentment to the drawee, demand of payment
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and refusal. Other facts are stated in the opinion.

T. Jenkins, for the appellant.

J. H. Reynolds, for the respondent.

Denio, C. J. The complaint contains a distinct averment

of an indebtedness by the defendant to the plaintiffs, for work

and labor to an amount equal to the sum claimed. The paper

which it is alleged was given for this indebtedness was not a

bill of exchange. The idea of a bill, under the law merchant,

supposes the existence of a party other than the drawee, to whom

the bill is addressed, and who is therein requested to pay the

amount to the holder on account of the drawer. Here the party

with whom the plaintiffs dealt was the corporation which, being

an artificial person, could only act by agents. The president was

one agent, and the treasurer was another, and as a convenient

method of keeping the accounts, the former, whose duty it was

to adjust the claims for labor, made his warrant in favor of the

plaintiffs on the treasurer, who was entrusted with the duty of
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keeping the money and paying it out on proper vouchers. Both

the drawee of the order and the party to whom it was addressed

represented the corporation ; and neither incurred, or were

expected to incur, any personal obligation. The default of either,

in performing any duty respecting the order, would be the default

of the corporation, and would not subject either of them to any

individual liability. The giving of the order for the debt of the

corporation, was a method suggested by motives of convenience

for transacting its business and keeping its accounts. To require

of the holder of such a draft, the kind of diligence which the

law exacts of the holder of commercial paper, would be a per-

version of its object. It is argued by the defendant's counsel,

that the plaintiffs having taken a draft on the defendant's treas-

urer, for his debt, they must be understood to have assented to

their forms of doing business, and should be holden to make a

presentment of the draft before suing the company. It would

certainly be wrong to allow the creditor in such a case to subject

the company to costs, when the funds are ready, and when the

money would be paid upon the presentation of the paper. But

the answer to the argument is, that the creditor will be defeated
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in his action, as to damages and costs, if the company are able

to show that its treasurer was furnished with funds, and would

have paid the demand if he had been called on. It becomes, then,

a question as to the onus probandi. In Wolcott v. Van Santvoord,

ly John. 248, it was settled, upon much consideration, that in an

action against the acceptor of a bill, or the maker of a note, pay-

able at a particular place, it is not necessary for the palintift" to

aver or prove a demand of payment at the time and place

appointed. This has been considered the unquestioned law ever

since the judgment in that case, a period of nearly forty years.

After such an acquiescence in a principle of such constant appli-

cation, and which relates to the most practical of subjects, the

effect of commercial paper, we cannot listen to the suggestion of

the defendant's counsel, that the prior cases in England are the

other way. If, upon examination, we found them to be so. we

should not depart from the rule as we find it settled and univer-

sally acted on in this state. The drafts which the plaintiffs

received for their debt against this corporation, are in the nature

of pro missory notes, payable at the office of the treasurer of the

company . Though in the form of bills, they contain an acknowl-

edgment in writing of their indebtedness to the plaintiffs in the

amounts mentioned in them, and an undertaking, in effect, to pay

these amounts at the treasurer's office. In Miller v. Thomson (3

keeping the money and paying it out on proper vouchers. Both
the drawee of the order and the party to whom it was addres ed
represented the corporation; and neither incurred, or were
expected to incur, any personal obligation. The default of either,
in performing any duty re pecting the order, would be the default
of the corporation, and would not subject either of them to any
individual liability. The giving of the ord er for the debt of the
corporation, was a method sugge ted by motives of convenience
for transacting its business and keeping its accounts. To require
of the holder of such a draft, the kind of diligence which the
law exacts of the holder of commercial paper, would be a perver ion of its object. It is argued by the defendant's counsel,
that the plaintiffs having taken a draft on the defendant' treasurer, fo r his debt, they must be understood to have assented to
their forms of doing bu iness, and should be holden to make a
presentment of the draft before uing the company. It would
certainly be wrong to allow the creditor in such a case to subject
the company to co ts, when the funds are ready, and when the
money would be paid upon the presentation of the paper. But
the answer to the argument is, that the creditor will be defeated
in his action, as to damages and co ts, if the company are able
to sh0w that its treasurer was furni hed with funds, and would
have paid the demand if he had been called on. It becomes, then ,
a question as to the onus probandi. In Wolcott v. Van Santvoord,
17 John. 248, it was settled, upon much consideration, that in an
action again t the acceptor of a bill, or the maker of a note, payable at a particular place, it is not necessary for the palintiff to
aver or prove a demand of payment at the time and place
appointed. This has been considered the unquestioned law ever
since the judgment in that 'case, a period of nearly forty years.
After such an acquiescence in a principle of such constant application, and which relates to the most practical of subject , the
effect of commercial paper, we cannot listen to the sugo-estion of
the defendant's counsel, that the prior ca es in England are the
oth er way. If, upon examination, we found them to be so, we
should not depart from the rule as we find it settled and universally acted on in this state. The drafts which the plaintiff
received for their debt a ainst this cor oration, are in t~1 e nature
of promissory note , payable at the office of the treasurer o the
company. Though in the form of bills, they contain an acknowledgment in writing of their indebtedness to the plaintiffs in the
amounts mentioned in them , and an undertaking, in ffect, to pay
the e amounts at the trea urer' office. In Miller v. Thomson ( 3
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Manning & Gr., 576), the Court of Common Pleas, in England,

determined that an instrument in the form of a bill of exchange,

drawn upon a joint stock bank, by the manager of one of its

branches, by order of the directors, might be declared upon as a

promissory note. The chief justice said there was the absence of

the circumstance of th ere being two distinct pa rti es, as drawer

and_dra_ wee, which, he said, was essential to _tlie_constitutipn_^f

aj bill of exchange. That being so, he added, the jj nly alte rnative

is__t hat this instrument is a promissory note, and is properly

d eclared upon as such. We adopt the principle of this case, which

is strictly applicable to the one before us. The issue, therefore,

which was joined upon the question whether these orders had been

presented for payment, was an immaterial one, and the Supreme

Court was right in its judgment.

Shankland, J., delivered an opinion to the same effect, and

all the judges concurred, except Comstock and Brown, who not

having heard the argument took no part in the decision.

Judgment affirmed. -t^. <oSL&s**-

CONTRACT OF DRAWER AS EXECUTOR OR TRUSTEE OF DRAWEE S

ESTATE. §§63,116 — 3.
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Caunt v. Thompson {1849), 7 M. G. & S. 400, 62 E. C. L. 399.

Cresswell, J., now delivered the judgment of the court.

This was an action of assumpsit by the endorsee, against the

drawer, of a bill of exchange.

The declaration alleged that the bill was drawn by the defend-

ant on J. Whitley, payable to the order of the drawer two months

after date, that the bill was accepted by Whitley, and endorsed

by the drawer to Tomlin, and by Tomlin to the plaintiff, and that

the bill, when due, was presented to Whitley, and dishonoured,

of which the defendant had notice.

The defendant pleaded, — first, that the bill was not duly pre-

sented to Whitley, — secondly, that the defendant had no notice

of the dishonour of the bill.

At the trial before Wilde, C J., at the sittings in Middlesex

after Michaelmas term, 1847, ^ appeared in evidence, that, before

the bill became due, the acceptor died, having made the defendant

(the drawer) his executor, and that he had proved the will; that,

when the bill became due, the plaintiff sent one of the witnesses

>
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262 Drawer as Executor or Trustee

to the house of the acceptor, to present the bill ; that the witness

there saw the defendant, to whom he presented the bill, saying, —

"I have brought a bill from Caunt's : you know what it is;" and

that thereupon the defendant said, — "I am executor of Whitley :

you must persuade Caunt to let the bill stand over a few days,

because Whitley has only been dead a few days : I shall see the

bill paid."

Upon this evidence, the plaintiff applied for leave to amend

his declaration, by averring the death of the acceptor, the appoint-

ment of the defendant as his executor, and the presentment of the

bill to him.

The lord chief justice allowed the amendment to be made,

and said that the proof of presentment to the executor was not

sufficient proof of notice of dishonour.

A verdict was thereupon taken for the plaintiff on the first

issue, and for the defendant on the second ; leave being reserved

to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict on that issue in his

favour, or for judgment non obstante veredicto; and leave being

likewise reserved to the defendant to move on the ground that

the amendment ought not to have been made.
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Cross rules were accordingly obtained in Hilary term, 1848.

At the argument, we disposed of the defendant's rule, think-

ing the amendment properly allowed : and now, after considera-

tion, we think that the plaintiff's rule, to enter a verdict in his

favour on the second issue, must be made absolute.

It may be assumed to be a settled rule, that knowledge of

the pro bability, ho wever strong, that a bill of exchange will be

dishonoured, cannot operatea£_a_noticc of dishonour, or dispense

with i t. Fothier, Contrat de Change, Part 1. c. 5, § 147, (citing

Savary, parer. 45) lays down the same rule with reference to

foreign ("Foreign" as opposed to "English," not as opposed to

"inland") bills, viz., that the notorious insolvency of the acceptor

of a bill does not dispense wi th protest for non-payment, and

notice to the prior pa rties, b ecaus e the insolvency of the acceptor,

howe ver no t orious, may not be known to them, or, in the absence

oTlwtic e^jhe v may supp ose that the acceptor, though insolvent,

has found m eans to take up the l.nH. So also it may be considered

as settled, that information that a bill has been dishonoured,

derived from a person not having authority to give it, does not

supply the place of notice. Hence it lias become usual to say that

knowled ge of the dishonour of a bill is not equivalent to notice.

fill! ill a ._r__r-^-;-p- , . ■ ■ m. ' ' ' - ~ , ~- -, . ■■■ ■ ~~~^ -

n such cases as those above mentioned, it certainly is not.

The law has not been so well settled as to the nature of the

to th hou e of the acceptor, to pres nt the bill; that the witness
th r av the d f ndant, t whom h pr ent d the bill, aying," I have brought a bill from aunt' : you know what it is;" and
that th r upon th d fendant said,-"I am x cutor of \i hitl y:
you mu t p r uade aunt to let th bill tand over a few days,
becau Whitley has only been dead a few day : I shall ee the
bill paid. '
pon this evid nee, the plaintiff applied for leave to amend
hi declaration, by averring the d ath of the acceptor, the appointment of the defendant a his executor, and the presentm nt of the
bill to him.
Th lord chi f ju tic allowed the amendment to be made,
and said that the proof of presentment to the executor was not
ufficient proof of notic of dishonour.
A verdict wa th ereupon taken for the plaintiff on the first
i ue, and for th d fondant on the second; leave being reserved
to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict on that issue in his
favour, or for judgment non obstante veredicto; and leave being
likewi e reserv d to the defendant to move on the ground that
the amendment ought not to have be n made.
Cross rules were accordingly obtained in Hilary term, 1848.
At the argument, we disposed of the defendant's rul , thinking the amendment prop rly allowed: and now, after consideration, we think that the plaintiff's rule, to nter a verdict in his
favour on the cond i sue, must b made ab olute.
It may be assumed to be a settl d rule, that _,,k nowledge of
the probability, how ver strong, that a bill of exchange will be
di honoured, cannot operate a a noti of di honour, or <lr pense
wit 1 .
ot ter, ontrat d Change, art . c. 5, 147, c1tmg
avary, parer. 45) lay down th same rule with refer nc to
for ign ("Foreign" as oppo ed to "Engli h,' not as opposed to
" inland") bill , viz., that the notoriou in olvency of th acceptor
of a bill doe not dispen e with prate t for non-payment. and
n tic to the prior parti s, becaus th in lvency of the ace ptor,
however notoriou , may not be known to th m. or, in the ab nee
of notice, they may uppo e that the acceptor, tbo11gh insolvent,
ha found m an to t<!..ke up tl}e bill.
al it may b con idered
as settled that information that a bill ha b en di honoured,
cl rived from a p r on not having authority to giv it, doe not
upply the plac of notic . H nee it ha b com u ual to ay that
knowled e of th dishon ur of a bill i not e uival nt t notice
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notice to be given. In Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 339, Abbott,

C. J., said : "There is no precise form of words necessary to be

used in giving notice of the dishonour of a bill of exchange ; but

the language used must be such as to convey notice to the party

what the bill is, and that payment of it has been refused by the

acceptor." Since that case was decided, there has been some fluc-

tuation of opinion on the subject. In Solarte v. Palmer, 7 Bingh.

notice to be given. In Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C. 339, Abbott,
C. J., said: "There is no precise form of words necessary to be
used in giving notice of the dishonour of a bill of exchange; but
the language used mus!_ b~s uch as to convey notice to the party
what the bill is, an that payment of it has been refused oy the
acceptor." Since that case was decided, there has been some fluctuation of opinion on the subject. In Solarte v. Palmer, 7 Bingh.
530, 5 M. & P. 475, l Tyrwh. 371, l C. & J. 417, which was finally
decided in the House of Lords ( l N. C. 194, l Scott l, 8 Bligh.
N. S. 874), a very strict rule was adopted; but that has not been
adhered to. In Burgh v. Legge, 5 M. & W. 418, Parke, B., says:
"There must be proof of a notice given frg!!l_ some J)arty entitled
to call for payment of this bill, and conveying in its terms intelligence of t&e presentment, dishonour, and parties to be held liable
in consequence." But, in Fitrze v. Sharwood, 2 Q. B. 388, and
King v. Bickley, 2 Q. B. 419, it was decided that the notice need
not, in terms, inform the party to whom it is given, that he is
looked to for payment: and, in Miers v. Brown, l l M. & W. 372,
these latter decisions were followed.
The rule does not differ in substance from that given by Ashhurst, J., in Tindal v. BroiPJn, l T. R. 167 :-"Notice means something more than knowledge,· because it is competent to the holder
to give credit to the maker. (The action was on a promissory
note.) It is not enough to say that the maker does not intend to
pay, but that he, the holder, does not intend to give credit." In
substance, these cases seem to establish, that, in order to make a
prior holder responsible, he must derive, from some person entitled
to call for payment, information that the bill has been dishonoured,
and that the party is in a condition to sue him, from which he
may infer that he will be held responsible. In Miers v. Brown,
Alderson, B., describes what is needful, in these terms: "Knowledge of the dishonour obtained from a communication by the
holder of the bill, amounts to notice."
In the present case, the defendant knew that the bill was dishonoured; and he knew it from the best source. namely, his own
personal act in dishonouring it whe!1 presented by the holder: and
he knew, from the same source, th.'!! time had not been iven to
the acceptor. He had, therefore, all the information which,
according to Ashhurst, J., the notice ought to convey: and, knowing that, he would know also that the holder had placed himself
in a situation to call upon him (the drawer) for payment, from
which,-to adopt the view of modern decisions,-he might infer
that he would be called upon. This . is very different from th::it
~

530, 5 M. & P. 475, 1 Tyrwh. 371, 1 C. & J. 417, which was finally

decided in the House of Lords (1 N. C. 194, 1 Scott 1, 8 Bligh.

N. S. 874) , a very strict rule was adopted ; but that has not been

adhered to. In Burgh v. Legge, 5 M. & W. 418, Parke, B., says :

"There must be proof of a notice given from some party entitled

to call for payment of this bill, and conveying in its terms intelli-

gence of the presentment, dishonour, and parties to be held liable

in consequence." But, in Furze v. Sharwood, 2 Q. B. 388, and

King v. Bickley, 2 Q. B. 419, it was decided that the notice need

not, in terms, inform the party to whom it is given, that he is

looked to for payment: and, in Micrs v. Brown, 11 M. & W. 372,

these latter decisions were followed.

The rule does not differ in substance from that given by Ash-
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hurst, J., in Tindal v. Brown, 1 T. R. 167 : — "Notice means some-

thing more than knowledge ; because it is competent to the holder

to give credit to the maker. (The action was on a promissory

note.) It is not enough to say that the maker does not intend to

pay, but that he, the holder, does not intend to give credit." In

substance, these cases seem to establish, that, in order to make a

prior holder responsible, he must derive, from some person entitled

to call for payment, information that the bill has been dishonoured,

and that the party is in a condition to sue him, from which he

may infer that he will be held responsible. In Miers v. Brown,

Alderson, B., describes what is needful, in these terms : "Knowl-

edge of the dishonour obtained from a communication by the

holder of the bill, amounts to notice."

T n the present case, the defendant knew that the bill was dis-

hono ured ; and he kne w it from the best source, namely, his own

personal ac t in dishonouring it w hen presented by the holder : and

he knew, from the same sour ce, that time had n ot been given to

t he acceptor. He had, t herefore, all the informatio n which,

according to Ashhurst, J., the notice ought to convey : and, know-

ing that, he would know also that the holder had placed himself

in a situation to call upon him (the drawer) for payment, from

which, — to adopt the view of modern decisions, — he might infer

that he would be called upon. This is very different from that

264 Drawer Without Right to Expect Acceptance

knowledge which has been spoken of as not equivalent to notice,

and is at least as much notice as the knowledge spoken of by

Alderson, B., in Miers v. Brown. Indeed, there would be some

absurdity in requiring that the plaintiff should have stated to the

defendant at the time when he dishonoured the bill, "Take notice

that this bill has been dishonoured by you." Lord Ellenborough

seems to have been of that opinion in the case of Porthouse v. Par-

ker, i Camp. 82, an action by the payee against the drawer of a

bill. It was drawn by one Wood as agent of George James and

John Parker, upon John Parker. There was no proof that Wood

had authority to draw : but evidence being given that the bill was

accepted by a duly-authorized agent for John Parker, Lord Ellen-

borough held that it was evidence of the bill having been regularly

drawn ; and that, the acceptor being likewise a drawer, there would

be no occasion for the plaintiff to prove that the defendants had

received express notice of the dishonour of the bill, as this must

necessarily have been known to one of them ; and the knowledge

of one was the knowledge of all.

Upon the authority of that case, and upon principle, we think

that the notice to the d efendant_ in this case was established, and
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that the verdict should be entered for the plaintiff on the issue on

the second plea.

Plaintiff's rule absolute.

Defendant's rule discharged.

i>^ *^JL^-A~V.

CONTRACT OF DRAWER WITHOUT RIGHT TO EXPECT ACCEPTANCE.

§ Il6— 4.

Cathell v. Goodwin {1827), 1 H. & G. (Md.) 468.

Assumpsit on an instrument, of which the following is a

copy:

Mr. Jno. Gooding —

Pay to the order of Mrs. Cathell five hundred dollars and

charge the same to your ob. st. Robt. M. Goodwin.

$500, June 24th, 1818.

Verdict and judgment for the defendant.

Plaintiff appealed.

Dorsey, J., at this term delivered the opinion of the court. To

support the opinion of the court below, the appellee's counsel have

relied on three positions, (either of which, if tenable, would be
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sufficient for their purpose) viz., i. That Mrs. Matilda Cathell

was not competent to demand payment of the bill. 2. That she

consented to receive a conditional acceptance, and thereby gave

time to the acceptor. 3. That the drawer had reasonable grounds

to expect that his bill would have been honoured.

There is nothing to sustain the first position. The defendant

has in express terms, authorised Mrs. Cathell to receive the

amount of the bill. To deny her the right to demand it, would be

sanctioning an absurdity for the mere purpose of working injus-

tice.

The second position is equally untenable. The facts stated in

the bill of exceptions would not have warranted the jury in finding

Mrs. Cathell's acceptation of a conditional acceptance of the bill,

much less are they of that conclusive, resistless character which

would authorise the court to assume the fact, to the ascertainment

of which a jury only were competent.

The third position was that most obstinately contended for,

which was conceived to be impregnably forfeited by that part of

the rule established in Eichelbergcr v. Finley & Van Lear, 7 Harr,

& Johns. 381, which dispenses with notice only where the drawer
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had no reasonable grounds to expect that his bill would be hon-

oured. The reasonableness of such expectation is matter for the

court, and not for the jury, to decide. If the facts, upon which

the question arises, be admitted or be undeniable, then the ques-

tion becomes exclusively a matter of law to be pronounced by the

court ; but if the facts be controverted, or the proof be equivocal

or contradictory, then it becomes a mixed question both of law

and fact, in which case, the court hypothetically instruct the jury

as to the law, to be by them pronounced accordingly as they may

find the facts. What are the facts to be found in this case justi-

fying the drawer's expectation that his draft would have been

paid? So far from having funds in the drawer's hands, he was

his debtor — no proof of such a commercial intercourse between

them as would imply a mutual credit — no previous promise bv the

drawee to accept this or any other draft for the drawer's accom-

modation — no consignment of goods to the drawee, which the

drawer had any reason to expect would be received in time to

meet his bill, but the only proof i s, that thejirawee informed the

paye e^that he expected funds of the drawer woul d _s_hortlv_com_e

tojnsliands, with which, when re ceive d, he would pay. That

funds afterwarcTsT did arrive, but whether in one month, or five

years after, does not appear. What may have been the expecta-

tions of the drawee, as to the receipt of funds from the drawer,

ufficient for their purpose) viz., I. That Mrs. Matilda Cathell
was not competent to demand payment of the bill. 2. That she
consented to receive a conditional acceptance, and thereby gave
time to the acceptor. 3. That the drawer had reasonable grounds
to expect that his bill would have been honoured.
There i nothing to u tain the first position. The defendant
has in express terms, authorised Mrs. Cathell to receive the
amount of the bill. To deny her the right to demand it, would be
sanctioning an absurdity for the mere purpose of working inju tice.
The second position is equally untenable. The facts stated in
the bill of exception would not have warranted the jury in finding
Mrs. Cathell s acceptation of a conditional acceptance of the bill,
much less are they of that conclusive, re istless character which
would authorise the court to assume the fact, to the ascertainment
of which a jury only were competent.
The third position was that most obstinately contended for,
which was conceived to be impregnably forfeited by that part of
the .!:.!!k established in Eichelberger v. Finley & Van Lear, 7 Harr,
& Johns. 381, which dispenses with notice only where the drawer
had no reasonable grounds to expect that his bill would be honoured. The reasonableness of such expectation is matter for the
court, and not for the jury, to decide. If the facts, upon which
the question arises, be admitted or be undeniable, then the question becomes exclusively a matter of law to be pronounced by the
court; but if the facts be controverted, or the proof be equivocal
or contradictory, then it becomes a mixed question both of la\\
and fact, in which case, the court hypothetically instruct the jury
a to the law, to be by them pronounced accordingly as they may
find the facts. \tVhat are the facts to be found in this case justifying the drawer's expectation that his draft would have been
paid? So far from having funds in the drawer's hands, he was
his debtor-no proof of such a commercial intercourse between
them as would imply a mutual credit-no previous promi e by the
drawee to accept this or any other draft for the drawer's accommodation-no consignment of goods to the drawee, which the
drawer had any reason to xpect would be received in time to
meet his bill, but the only proof is, that the drawee informed the
payee, that he expected fund of the drawer would hor
to his an s, wit w 11c , w en received he would a .
funds afterwards did arrive, but whether in one month, or five
years after, does not appear. \i\That may have been the expectations of the drawee, as to the receipt of fund from the drawer,
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is immaterial ; they are not even admissible evidence in this cause.

But if they were, they can have no influence on those of the drawer

— into whose expectations only is the enquiry to be made. The

facts in the cases of Lcgge v. Thorpe, 12 East, 170, and Claridge

v. Dalton, 4 Maule & Selw. 226, afford much stronger evidence

of a reasonable expectation in the drawers that their bills would

be honoured, than those in the present case ; yet there they were

adjudged insufficient. The "reasonable grounds" required by law

are not such as would excite an idle hope, a wild expectation, or

a remote probability, that the bill might be honoured, but such as

create a full expectation, a strong probability of its payment ; such

indeed as would induce a merchant of common prudence and ordi-

nary regard for his commercial credit, to draw a like bill. The

facts in this case constitute no such reasonable grounds. We

therefore think that the county court erred in instructing the jury

that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and consequently

reverse their judgment.

Judgment reversed, and procedendo awarded.

-^f*-*- rx^Qs^U^ -

Sec. VI. — Of Negotiation in General.
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Geary v. Physic (1826), 5 B. & C. 234; 11 E. C. L. 442.

Assumpsit by the plaintiff as indorsee against the defendant

as maker of a promissory note for the sum of 30/. payable two

i immaterial; they are not even admissible evidence in this ca.use.
ut if they were, they can have no influence on those of the drawer
- into whose expectations only is the nquiry to be made. The
facts in the case of Legge v. Thorpe, 12 East, 170, and ClMidge
v. Dalton, 4 faule & elw. 226, afford much stronger evidence
of a reasonable expectation in the drawers that their bills would
be honoured, than tho e in the present case; yet there they were
adjudged in ufficient. The "rea onable grounds" required by law
are not such as would excite an idle hope, a wild expectation, or
a remote probability, that the bill might be honoured, but such as
create a full ex ectation, a strona probability of it payment; such
indeed as would induc a merchant of common pru ence an ordinary regard for his commercial credit, to draw a like bill. The
fact in this ca e con titute no uch reasonable grounds. We
therefore think that the county court erred in instructing the jury
that the plaintiff wa not entitled to recover, and con equently
reverse their judgment.

months after date to the order of one Folder, and indorsed by him,

Folder, to one Kemp, who subsequently indorsed the note to the

Judgment reversed, and procedendo awa;rded.

~~-

plaintiff. At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the London sittings,

after Hilary term, 1825, it appeared that the indorsement by

Kemp, to the plaintiff was in pencil, and it was thereupon objected

that the plaintiff could not recover ; an indorsement in pencil not

being such an indorsement as the law and custom of merchants

recognizes to be sufficient to pass the interest in a bill of exchange,

SEC.

VL-OF

NEGOTIATION IN GENERAL.

and promissory notes being by the statute 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9, s. I,

assignable or indorsable in the same manner as unpaid bills of

INDORSEMENT AND DELIVERY.

exchange are according to the custom of merchants. The Lord

Chief Justice, thought it sufficient, and directed the jury to find a

verdict for the plaintiff, reserving liberty to the defendant's coun-

Geary v. Physic (1826), 5 B. & C. 234;

II

E. C. L. 442.

As ump it hy the plaintiff a indor ee again t the defendant
as maker of a promissory note for the sum of 3ol. payable two
months after date to the order of on Folder, and indor ed by him,
Folder, to one Kemp, who subsequently indor ed the note to the
plaintiff.
t the trial before Abbott, C. ]., at the London ittin ,
after Hilary term, 1825, it appear d that the indor ment by
K mp, to th plaintiff was in p ncil, and it was thereupon objected
that the plaintiff could not recover; an indor ement in pencil not
being such an indor em nt a the law and cu torn of merchants
recognizes to be ufficient to pass th intere t in a bill of exchange,
and promi ory note being by th ta tut 3 & 4 nn. c. 9, . I,
a signable or indorsable in the arne manner a unpaid bills of
exchange are according to th cu torn of merchant . The Lord
Chi f Ju tice, thought it sufficient, and directed th jury to find a
verdict for the plaintiff, re ervina lil rty to the def ndant's coun-

GEARY

v.

267
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Geary v. Physic 267

sel to move to enter a non-suit, if the court should be of opinion

that the indorsement of the promissory note in pencil, was not a

good and valid indorsement. F. Pollock, in last Easter term,

obtained a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit.

Thcsiger, now showed cause.

Abbott, C. J. There is no authority for saying that where

the law requires a contract to be in writing, that writing must be

sel to move to enter a non-suit, if the court should be of opinion
that the indorsement of the promis ory note in pencil, was not a
good and valid indorsement. F. Pollock, in last Easter term,
obtained a rule nisi to nter a nonsuit.
Thesiger, now showed cause.

i n ink ! The passage cited from Lord Coke, shows that a deed

must be written on paper or parchment, but it does not show that

ABBOTT,
it must be written in ink. That being so, I am of opinion that an

indorsement on a bill of pxrhangp may h^ hy wr iting in pencil?

There is not any great danger that our decision will induce indi-

viduals to adopt such a mode of writing in preference to that in

general use. The imperfection of this mode of writing , its being so

subject to obliteration, and the impossibility of proving it when it

is obliterated, will prevent its being generally adopted. There being

no authority to show that a contract which the law requires to be

in writing should be written in any particular mode, or with any

specific material, and the law of merchants requiring only that an

indorsement of bills of exchange should be in writing (see the

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

custom stated in Lutwidge, 878), without specifying the manner

with which the writing is to be made, I am of opinion that the

indorsement in this case was a sufficient indorsement in writing

within the meaning of the law of merchants, and that the property

in the bill passed by it to the plaintiff.

Bayley, J. I think that a writing in pencil is a writing within

the mea ning of that term at common law, and that it is a writing,

within the custom of merchants . I cannot see any reason why,

when the law requires a contract to be in writing, that contract

shall be void if it be written in pencil. If the character of the

handwriting were thereby wholly destroyed, so as to be incapable

of proof, there might be something in the objection ; but it is not

thereby destroyed, for, when the writing is in pencil, proof of the

character of the handwriting may still be given. I think, there-

fore, that this is a valid writing at common law, and also that it

is an indorsement according to the usage and custom of mer-

C. J. There is no authority for saying that where

the law require a contract to be in writin that writin must be
in in .
he pa age cited from Lord Coke, shows that a deed
must be written on paper or parchment, but it does nqt show that
it must be written in ink. That being so, I am of opinion that~
indorsement on a bill of e
.
enm
ere 1s not any great anger that our decision will induce individuals to adopt such a mode of writing in preference to that in
general use. The imperfection of this mode of writing, its being so
ubject to obliteration, and the impossibility of proving it when it
is obliterated, will prevent its being generally adopted. There being
no authority to show that a contract which the law requires to be
in writing should be written in any particular mode, or with any
specific material, and the law of merchants requiring only that an
indorsement of bills of exchange should be in writing (see the
custom stated in Lutwidge, 878), without specifying the manner
' ith which the writing is to be made, I am of opinion that the
indorsement in this case was a sufficient indorsement in writing
within the meaning of the law of merchants, and that the property
in the bill passed by it to the plaintiff.

chants ; for that usage only requires that the indorsement should

be in writing, and not that that writi ng should be made with any

s pecific materials .

Holroyd, J., concurred.

Rule discharged.

BAYLEY, J. I think that a writing in pencil is a writing within
the meanin of that term at common law, and that it is a writin
within the cu tom o merchants. I cannot see any reason why,
when the law requires a contract to be in writing, that contract
hall be void if it be written in pencil. If the character of the
handwriting were thereby wholly destroyed, so as to be incapable
of proof, there might be something in the objection· but it is not
thereby destroyed, for, when the writing is in pencil, proof of the
character of the handwriting may still be aiven. I think, therefore, that this is a valid writing at common law, and al o that it
and cu tom of meri an indor ement accordina to the usa
chants· for that usage only requires that the indor ement hould
be in writing, and not that that writing should be made with any
specific materials.
HOLROYD, J., concurred.

Rule discharged.

268

l NDORSE !ENT AND DELIVERY

268 Indorsement and Delivery

Brown v. The Butchers' & Drovers' Bank (1844), 6 Hill (N. Y.)

443-

Brown v. The Butchers' & Drovers' Bank (1844), 6 Hill (N. Y.)
443.

On error from the superior court of the city of New York,

where the Butchers & Drovers' Bank sued Brown as the endorser

of a bill of exchange, and recovered judgment. The endorsement

On error from the superior court of the city of New York,
where the Butchers & Drovers' Bank sued Brown as the endorser
of a bill of exchange, and recovered judgment. The endorsement
was made with a lead pencil, and in figures, thus, " r. 2. 8.," no
name being written. Evidence wa g iven strongly tending to
show that the figures were in Brown's handwriting, and that he
meant they should bind him as endorser; though it also appeared
he could write. The court below charged the jury that, if they
believed the figures upon the bill were made by Brown, as a substitute for his proper name, intending thereby to bind himself as
endorser, he was liable. Exception. The jury found a verdict
for the plaintiffs below, on which judgment was rendered, and
Brown thereupon brought error.

was made with a lead pencil, and in figures, thus, "1. 2. 8.," no

name being written. Evidence was given strongly tending to

show that the figures were in Brown's handwriting, and that he

meant they should bind him as endorser ; though it also appeared

he could write. The court below charged the jury that, if they

believed the figures upon the bill were made by Brown, as a sub-

stitute for his proper name, intending thereby to bind himself as

endorser, he was liable. Exception. The jury found a verdict

for the plaintiffs below, on which judgment was rendered, and

Brown thereupon brought error.

C. De Witt, for the plaintiff in error.

A. Schell, for the defendants in error.

- . . • By the court, Nelson, Ch. J. It has been expressly decided

"^^ that an endorsement written in pencil is sufficient; {Geary v.

Cer <c*a>— Physic, 5 Barn. & Cress. 234;) and also that it may be made by
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L-<»-^-i^ L-5~tA~-«Oc a m ark. . {George v. Surrey, 1 Mood. & Malk. 516). In a recent

Jc (vs-^fxAA^" case in the K. B. it was held that a mark was a good signing

o^KjijiLft. Ayv/A*«r within the statute of frauds ; and the court refused to allow an

enquiry into the fact whether the party could write, saying that

C. De Wit t, for the plaintiff in error.
A. Schell, for the defendants in error.

would make no difference. {Baker v. Dening, 8 Adol. & Ellis,

94; and see Harrison v. Harrison, 8 Ves. 186; Addy v. Grix, id.

504)-

These cases fully sustain the ruling of the court below. They

show, I think, that a person may become bound bv any mark or

desig nation he thinks proper to adopt, provided it be used as a

substitute for his name, and he intend to bind himself.

Judgment affirmed.

Day v. Longhurst {1893), Ch. Div. 41 W. R. 283.

~oSL-^-v>\

Motion.

This was a motion to commit the defendant Longhurst and

his solicitor, Young, for contempt of court.

On the 1st of July, 1892, an order was made in this action

restraining the defendant over the 8th of July from "negotiating,

~~~

By the court, NELSON, Ch. J. It has been expressly decided
that an endorsement written in pencil is sufficient; (Geary v.
:O- ~
Physic, 5 Barn. & Cress. 234 ;) and also that it may be made by
~ ~ ~ a mark. . (George v. Surrey, l Mood . & Matk. 516). In a recent
X, ~
case in the K. B. it was held that a mark was a good signing
(:...e..i- ~ ~w ithin the statute of frauds; and the court refused to allow an
~ "\:enquiry into the fact whether the party could write, saying that
~- ~ - would make no difference. (Baker v. D ening, 8 Adol. & Ellis,
-~II\~ - 94; and see Harrison v. HMrison, 8 Ves. 186; A ddy v. Grix id.
\ .

1

~ so4).

These cases fully sustain the ruling of the court below. They
show, I think, that a person may become bound by any mark or
de i nation he thinks proper to ado t rovided it be used as a
substitute or is name, and he intend to bind himself.
Judgment a$rmed.

~~~·
Day v. Longhurst (1893), Ch. Div. 41 W. R. 283.
Motion.
This was a motion to commit the defendant Longhurst and
hi olicitor, Young, for contempt of court.
On the lst of July, 1892, an order wa made in this action
restraining the defendant over the-8th of July from "negotiating,

..
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pledging, or disposing of" certain bills of exchange. This interim

order was from time to time continued down to the 22nd of

November, 1892. Previously to the commencement of the action

the bills in question (which were payable to the defendant's order)

had been deposited by him with Young by way of security for a

debt, but had not been indorsed, and they had since continued in

Young's possession. On the 5th of October, 1892, while the

interim order was in force, the defendant, at the request of Young,

indorsed one of them ; and the motion to commit the defendant

and his solicitor for contempt of court was thereupon made.

The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, provides, as follows : —

Section 2. — "Bearer" means the person in possession of a bill

or note which is payable to bearer. "Holder" means the payee

or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the

bearer thereof.

Section 31 (1). — A bill is negotiated when it is transferred

from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the

transferee the holder of the bill. Sub-section (3). — A bill pay-

able to order is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder

completed by delivery. Sub-section (4). — Where the holder of a
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bill payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it,

the transfer gives the transferee such title as the transferor had in

the bill, and the transferee, in addition, acquires the right to have

the indorsement of the transferor.

Hastings, Q.C., and Szvinfen Eady, for the plaintiff.

Buckley, Q.C., and Leans Edmunds, for the respondents.

Stirling, J., after referring to the definition of "bearer" and

"holder" in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 2, continued : —

Previously to the 5th of October, 1892, Young was neither

"bearer" nor "holder" of the bills in question. The former term

applies only to the person in possession of a bill or note payable

to bearer, which this was not, and the latter to a payee or indorsee

of a bill or note, which Young was not. [His lordship then read

pledging, or disposing of" certain bills of exchange. Thi interim
order wa from time to tim continued down to the 22nd of
November, 1892. Previously to the commencement of the action
the bills in que tion (which were payabl to the defendant's order)
had been d posited by him with Young by way of security for a
debt, but had not been indor ed and they had ince continued in
Young's possession. On the 5th of October, 1892, while the
interim order was in force, the defendant, at the request of Young,
indorsed one of them ; and the motion to commit the defendant
and his solicitor for cont mpt of court was thereupon ~ade.
The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, provides, as follows:Section 2.-"Bearer" mean the person in possession of a bill
or note which is payable to beel'rer. "Holder" means the payee
or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the
bearer thereof.
Section 3 l ( l) .-A bill is negotiated when it is transferred
from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the
transferee the holder of the bill. Sub-section (3) .-A bill payable to order is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder
completed by delivery. Sub-section ( 4) .-Where the holder of a
bill payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it,
the transfer gives the transferee such title as the transferor had in
the bill, and the transferee, in addition, acquires the right to have
the indorsement of the transferor.

section 31, sub-sections 1 and 3, and said: — ] Previously to the

5th of October, 1892, the bill had not been transferred to Young

so as to constitute him the holder of the bill, for he was not

"payee" or "indorsee," therefore the bill was not up to that date

Hastings) Q.C.) and Swinfen Eady) for the plaintiff.
Buckley, Q.C.) and Lewis Edniunds) for the respondents.

negotiated. On the 5th of O cto ber, 1892, the bill, being in the

possession of Young/ was for the first time indo rsed by the defend-

ant. Young, wh o up t o that time had been merely the transferee,

of the bill, now for the first time became the "holder" of it within

STIRL11rc, J., after referring to the definition of "bearer" and
"holder" in the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 2, continued:Previou ly to the 5th of October, 1892, Young wa£ neither
"bearer" nor "holder" of the bills in que tion. The former term
applies only to the person in pos e ion of a bill or note payable
to bearer, which this wa not, and the latter to a payee or indorsee
of a bill or note, which Younrr was not. [Hi lord hip then read
ection 31, uh-section I and 3, and said:-] Previou ly to the
5th of October, 1892, th bill had not been tran ferr d to Younrr
so as to con titute him the holder of the bill for he was not
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the meaning of the Hills of Exchange Act, and the bill was for

■the first time "negotiated^ within the meaning of sub-section I

of section 31; consequently the defendant by his act on the 5th

of October, 1892, converted Young from a mere transferee into

a holder of the bill, and, in my opinion, negotiated the bill, con-

trary to the interim order which had been made.

On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on sub-

section 4 of section 31. No doubt that sub-section shows that

Young had, prior to the 5th of October, 1892, the right to have

the indorsement of the defendant, and, consequently, to sue the

defendant if he refused to indorse the bill. That, however, did

not justify the defendant in violating the order of the court. If

proceedings were taken or threatened by Young, the defendant

ought to have applied either that the injunction might be removed,

so as to enable him to give effect to Young's rights, or else to

have Young made a party to the action. The latter alternative,

however, the defendant actually declined, in the course of the

hearing of the motion. In my opinion the defendant has violated

the order of the court. I do not, however, regard the case as one

of serious contempt, and as regards costs I think justice will be
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met if I order the defendant to pay those of the applicant and

leave Young to pay his own.

Motion dismissed.

IRREGULAR FORMS OF INDORSEMENT. § 33.

Markey v. Corey (1895), 108 Mich. 184, 36 L. R. A. 117, 62 Am.

St. Rep. 698.

Error to Wayne ; Lillibridge, J.

Assumpsit by Matthew M. Markey and Catherine Sundars

against Lorenzo Corey, impleaded with George H. Waldo and

Alden M. Varney, on a promissory note. From a judgment for

plaintiff's, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Edgar Weeks (Moore & Moore, of counsel), for appellant.

the meaning of the Bills of Exc~an
was for
.the fir t time negotiated" \vTthin the meanin of sub-section r
Ofsection 31; consequent y the defendant by hiSact on the 5th
of ctober, 1892, converted Young from a mere transferee into
a holder of the bill, and in my opinion, negotiated the bill, contrary to the interim order which had been made.
n behalf of the re pondents reliance was placed on subsection 4 of section 31.
o doubt that sub- ection hows that
Youna had, prior to the 5th of October, 1892, the right to have
the indor ement of the defendant, and, consequently, to sue the
defendant if he refu ed to indorse the bill. That, however, did
not ju tify the defendant in violating the order of the court. If
proceedinas were tak n or threatened by Young, the defendant
01wht to have applied either that the injunction might be removed,
so a to enable him to give effect to Young's rights, or else to
have Young made a party to the action. The latter alternative,
however, the defendant actually declined, in the course of the
h aring of the motion. In my opinion the defendant has violated
the order of the court. I do not, however, regard the case as one
of serious contempt, and as regards costs I think justice will be
met if I order the defendant to pay those of the applicant and
~ leave Young to pay his own.
~
Motion dismissed.

Ervin Palmer, for appellees.

Long, J. Defendant Corey entered into a written contract

with Waldo and Varney for the sale of certain personal property

at the sum of $2,500, payable $200 the first year, $500 the second,

and $600 each year thereafter, until the whole amount should be

IRREGULAR FORMS OF lNDORSEMENT.

Markey v. Corey (1895)) 108 l\!lich. 184) 36 L. R. A. II7, 62 Am.
St. Rep. 698.

Error to Wayne; Lillibridge, J.
Assumpsit by Matthew M. Markey and Catherine Sundars
again t Lorenzo Corey, impleaded with George H. Waldo and
Alden M. Varney, on a promi sory note. From a judgment for
plaintiffs, defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Edgar Weeks (Moore & Moore, of counsel), for appellant.
Ervin Palmer, for appellees.

Lo rG, J. Def ndant Corey entered into a written contract
with Wal do and Varney for the al of certain personal property
at the um of $2,500, payable $200 the first year, $500 the second,
and $6oo each year thereafter, until the whole amount should be
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paid, according to five promissory notes executed at the same

time. The contract also provided that certain stock should be

deposited by the purchasers as further security for the payments.

It was then provided :

"But in case said payments shall not be made as above pro-

paid, according to five promis ory note executed at the same
tim . Th contract also provided that certain stock should be
depo ited by the purchasers as further ecurity for the payments.
It was then provided:

vided, and in case either or any of said payments shall remain

unpaid for the period of 90 days, then the party of the first part

shall, at his option, have the right to declare the whole remaining

amounts represented by said notes to have become due and pay-

able."

On the face of each of the promissory notes was written :

"This note is given in accordance with the terms of a certain

contract under the same date, between the same parties."

Subsequently the plaintiffs received from defendant Corey an

"But in case said payments shall not be made as above provided, and in cas either or any of aid payments shall remain
unpaid for the period of 90 days, then the party of the fir t part
shall, at his option, have the right to declare the whole remaining
amounts represented by said notes to have become due and payable."

assignment of all his right, title, and interest in and to the con-

tract, stock, and notes. On the back of the note in suit was

On the face of each of the promissory notes was written :

indorsed :

"I hereby assign the within note to Matthew M. Markey and

Catherine Sundars."

"This note is given in accordance with the terms of a certain
contract under the same date, between the same parties."

This $500 note was not paid, and was protested, and the.;
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plaintiffs brought this suit upon it against Waldo and Varney as

makers, and Corey as indorser. The declaration was upon the

common counts in assumpsit, with a copy of the note attached.

On the trial, however, the court permitted the plaintiffs to amend

the declaration by averring the assignment of the contract and

note. The case proceeded to trial, and plaintiffs' counsel offered

Subsequently the plaintiffs received from defendant Corey an
assignment of all his right, title, and interest in and to the contract, stock, and notes. On the back of the note in suit was
indorsed:

in evidence the note and indorsement of assignment on it, together

with the certificate of protest. Defendant's counsel objected to

their introduction as against defendant Corey, claiming ( 1 ) that

"I hereby assign the within note to Matthew M. Markey and
Catherine Sundars."

the note in question was not a promissory note, and that plaintiffs

could not recover upon it against Corey as indorser, but that, if

they took any title to it, it was under the assignment; (2) that

the contract was evidenced by the note and the other writing, —

the contract of sale. Plaintiffs' counsel then put in evidence,

under objection, the contract of the sale. The court thereupon

directed a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for the amount of the note

and interest, from which judgment defendant Corey alone appeals.

It is insisted here, by counsel for defendant Corey:

1. That, if the plaintiffs took title to the note, it was under

the assignment, and that, therefore, they could not sue in their

This $500 note was not paid, and was protested, and the.:~.
plaintiffs brought this suit upon it against Waldo and Varney as
mak rs , and Corey as indorser. The declaration was upon the
common counts in assunipsit, with a copy of the note attached.
On the trial, however, the court permitterl. the plaintiffs to amend
the declaration by averring the as ignm nt of the contract and
note. The case proceeded to trial, and plaintiffs' counsel offered
in evidence the note and indorsement of a ignment on it, together
with the certificate of prate t. Defendants coun el objected to
their introduction as against defendant Corey, claiming (I) that
the note in question was not a promi ory note, and that plaintiffs
could not recover upon it again t Corey a indor r but that, if
they took any title to it, it was under th a ignm nt · ( 2 that
the contract was evidenced by the note and the oth r writino- the contract of sale. Plaintiffs' coun el then put in evid nee
under objection, the contract of the sale. The court thereupon
directed a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for th amount of th note
and intere t, from which judgment d f ndant Core alone appeal .
It is insisted here, by coun 1 for def ndant or
I.
That, if the plaintiffs took titl t the not it wa under
the a signment, and that, therefore, they ould not ue in their
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own names, but, if they had a right of action, it must be brought

2-·)
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n name , but, if they had a right of action, it must be brought
in th e nam of the original party to the contract.
2.
T hat the two papers must be tak n as constituting the
contract, and that the note wa not, there£ r , a promi ory note.
3. That Corey, by making the assignment to the plaintiffis,
was not the indorser of the note, and could not be held liable as
such.
The usual mode of transfer of a promissory note is by simply
writing the indorser's name upon the back, or by writing al o over
it the direction to pay the indorsee named, or order, or to him or
bearer. An indorsement, however, may be made in more enlarged
terms, and the indorser be held liable as such. In Sands v. Wood,
l Iowa, 263, the indorsement was, "I assign the '''ithin note to
Mrs. arah Coffin." In Sears v. Lantz, 47 Iowa, 658, the indo.rsem nt on the note was, "I hereby as ign all my right and title to
L oui M eckl ey." And in each case the party so assigning was
held as indorser, the court in the latter ca e saying of Sands v.
~V ood: "He used no words that, in and of them elves, indicated
that he had bound or made himself liable in case the maker, after
demand, failed to pay the note. But it was held the law, as a
legal conclusion, attached to the words used the liability that follows the indorsement of a promissory note." See, also, Duffy's
.--l d m'r v. O'Connor, 7 Baxt. 498; Shelby v. Judd, 24 Kan. 166;
Brotherton v. Street, 124 Ind. 599.
The rule of the American cases is well stated in Daniel on
Negotiable Instruments (section 688c) as follows :
O\

in the name of the original party to the contract.

2. That the two papers must be taken as constituting the

contract, and that the note was not, therefore, a promissory note.

3. That Corey, by making the assignment to the plaintiffs,

was not the indorser of the note, and could not be held liable as

such.

The usual mode of transfer of a promissory note is by simply

writing the indorser's name upon the back, or by writing also over

it the direction to pay the indorsee named, or order, or to him or

bearer. An indorsement, however, may be made in more enlarged

terms, and the indorser be held liable as such. In Sands v. Wood,

1 Iowa, 263, the indorsement was, "I assign the within note to

Mrs. Sarah Coffin." In Sears v. Lantz, 47 Iowa, 658, the indorse-

ment on the note was, "I hereby assign all my right and title to

Louis Meckley." And in each case the party so assigning was

held as indorser, the court in the latter case saying of Sands v.

Wood: "He used no words that, in and of themselves, indicated

that he had bound or made himself liable in case the maker, after

demand, failed to pay the note. But it was held the law, as a
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legal conclusion, attached to the words used the liability that fol-

lows the indorsement of a promissory note." See, also, Duffy's

Adm'r v. O'Connor, 7 Baxt. 498; Shelby v. Judd, 24 Kan. 166;

Brotherton v. Street, 124 Ind. 599.

The rule of the American cases is well stated in Daniel on

Negotiable Instruments (section 688c) as follows:

"The question arising in such cases is a nice one, and depends

upon rules of legal interpretation. The mere signature of the

payee, indorsed on the paper, imports an executed contract of

assignment, with its implications, and also an executory contract

of conditional liability, with its implications. The assignment

would be as complete by the mere signature as with the words of

assignment written over it. The conditional liability which is

executory is implied by the executed contract of assignment, and

the signature under it, which carries the legal title ; and the ques-

tion is, does the writing over a signature an express assignment,

which the law imports from the signature per se, exclude and

negative the idea of conditional liability, which the law also

imports if such assignment were not expressed in full ? We think

not. * * * When the thing done creates the implication o£

another to be done, we cannot think that the mere expression of

the former in full can be regarded as excluding its consequence,

when that consequence would follow if the expression were

omitted."

"The question arising in such cases is a nice one, and depends
upon rules of legal interpretation. The mere signature of the
payee, indorsed on the paper, imports an executed contract of
assignment, with its implications, and also an executory contract
of conditional liability, with it implications. The assignment
would be as complete by the mere signature as with the word of
assignment written over it. The conditional liability which is
executory is implied by the executed contract of assignment, and
the signature under it, which carries the legal title; and the question i , does the writing over a signature an express as ignment,
which the law imports from the signature per se, exclude and
negative the idea of conditional liability, which the law also
imports if such as ignment were not expres ed in full? W e think
not. * * * Wh n the thing done creates the implication of
another to be done, we cannot think that the mere expression of
the fo rm er in full can be regarded as excluding its consequence,.
when that consequence would follow if the expression were
omitted."

MARKEY
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The language used in the assignment to the note in suit does

not n eg ative the implication of the legal liability of the assignor

as indorser, and as the wor ds are to be construed, as strongly as

their sense will allow, against the assignor, he must be held as

indorser . This rule is fully supported in Hatch v. Barrett, 34

Ka-n. 230. See, also, Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me. 19.

In the case of Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171, the assign-

ment read as follows: "I hereby transfer my right, titie, and

interest of the within note to S. A. Yeomans." Mr. Justice Mars-

ton said in that case :

"The right or interest passing, therefore, under the usual and

customary indorsement, is much greater than the mere right, title,

and interest of the payee ; and where the transfer, as made, only

The language used in the as ignment to the note in suit does
not negative the implication of the l gal liability of the assignor
as indors r, and as the words ar to b c nstrued, as strongly as
their sens will allow, against the a signor. he must be held as
indorser. This rule is fully upported in Hat ch v. Barrett, 34
ee, also, Adams v. Blethen, 66 Me. 19.
Ka·n. 230.
In the ca e of Aniba v. Yeo111ans, 39 Mich. I 71, the assignment read a follows : "I hereby transfer my right, title, and
inter st of the within note to S. A. Yeomans." Mr. Justice Mar ton said in that case:

attempts to pass the title and interest of the payee of the note, no

greater right or interest than he then held can pass."

In other words, the learned justice seemed to think that the

words used limited the transfer to the right and title he then held.

While this holding appears to be at variance with the cases else-

where, we think it readily distinguishable from the present, as

here the words are, "I hereby assign the within note to Matthew
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M. Markey and Catherine Sundars," and do not purport to limit

the liability of Corey as an indorser.

In Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Mich. 307, the note sued upon was

negotiable in form, and made payable to Batchelder, and he

assigned it before maturity, as follows : "For value received, I

hereby assign all interest in and to this note to Ralph E. Watson."

Defendant insisted in that case that the plaintiff could not sue in

his own name, but should have sued in the name of the payee. It

was said by Justice McGrath : "I do not think the point is well

taken. * * * If Batchelder's indorsement did not affect its

negotiability, then Watson's indorsement entitled the plaintiff, as

holder of the note, to sue in his own name."

It must be held, therefore, that the memorandum on the n ole.

did not relie ve Corey from his liability as indorser.

The court was not in error in admitting the contract in evi-

dence, as its purpose was to show that the note was not in fact

limited by its provisions, and those prov isions of th e contract cited

did not destroy the nego tiabili ty of the note. (Daniel Neg. Inst.,

§48).

The judgment must be affirmed.

The other justices concurred. f) n

"The right or interest passing, therefore, under the usual and
customary indor ement, is much greater than the mere right, title,
and interest of the payee; and where the transfer, a made, only
attempts to pass the title and interest of the payee of the note, no
greater right or interest than he then held can pass."
In other words, the learned justice seemed to think that the
words used limited the transfer to the right and title he then held.
While this holding appears to be at variance with the ca es elsewhere, we think it readily distinguishable from the present, as
here the words are, "I hereby assign the within note to Matthew
M. Markey and Catherine Sundars," and do not purport to limit
the liability of Corey as an indorser.
In Stevens v. H annmi, 86 Mich. 307, the note sued upon was
negotiable in form, and made payable to Batchelder, and he
assigned it before maturity, as follows: "For value received I
atson."
hereby assign all interest in and to this note to Ralph E.
Defendant in i ted in that case that th plaintiff could not sue in
his own riame, but should have sued in the name of the payee. It
was said by Justice McGrath : "I do not think the point i well
taken. * * * If atchelder's indor ement did not affect it
negotiability, then Wat on's indorsement entitled the plaintiff, as
holder of the note, to sue in his own name."
It mu t be held, therefore, that the memorandum on the note
did not relieve Corey from his liability a indorser.
The court was not in rror in admitting the contract in evidence, as its purpose was to show that the note was not in fact
limited by its provisions, and tho e revision of the c ract cited
did not destroy the negotiabilTtYOf the note. (Daniel eg. Inst.,

§ 48).
The judgment 1nust be affirmed.
The other justices concurred.
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Spencer v. Hal pern (1896), 62 Ark. 595, 36 L. R. A. 120.

W. J. Mayo, N. W. Norton, and /. M. Prcwitt, for appellant.

M. ]. Manning, for appellee.

Spencer v. Halpern (1896), 62 Ark. 595, 36 L. R. A. 120.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Wood, J. Appellant made the following indorsement on two

promissory notes held by him, viz. : "For value received I hereby

transfer my interest in the within note to Isaac Halpern. (Signed)

W. J. Mayo, N. W. Norton, and!. M. Prewitt, for appellant.
M. !. M arming, for appellee.

Geo. Spencer." The maker having failed to pay at maturity upon

demand, is appellant bound as indorser after due notice?

Where a negotiable instrument is indorsed in blank, or in

The facts are ufficiently stated in the opinion.

full, the indorser contracts to pay the amount called for by the

instrument if it is not paid by the principal on demand at matur-

ity, provided notice of demand and non-payment is duly given. He

also contracts that the instrument is genuine, that it is valid, that

the parties are competent to make it, and that he has the title and

right to transfer it. (1 Dan. Neg. Inst., sec. 669a; Tiedeman,

Com. Paper, sec. 259). These rights of the indorsee and obliga-

tions of the indorser, under an indorsement in blank or in full in

the common form, are not expressed, but fixed by implication,

under the rules of the law merchant ; and when there is such an
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indorsement, there is nothing for construction. But when the

indorsement is in irregular form, and the contract is expressed,

it may become, says Mr. Daniel, "a nice question for legal inter-

pretation." But we cannot agree to his interpretation that an

indorsement containing an express assignment of "my interest"

over one's signature does not "exclude and negative the idea of

conditional liability, which the law also imports, if such assign-

ment were not expressed in full." (1 Dan. Neg. Inst., sec. 688c).

That would be true only if the effect of the signature per se did

nothing more than transfer the interest of the signer. But, as we

have seen, the indorsement in blank not only transfers the title

and interest of the indorser in the instrument, but it does more.

It confers the absolute title upon the indorsee, and gives him

rights against the maker which the payee himself might not have,

and imposes upon the signer all the legal obligations of an indorser

mentioned supra. (Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171).

We fail to see the applicatio n of the maxim "Expressio eorum

quae tacite insunt nihil operatur" in a case where all the implica-

tions of the law tollowing an indorsement in blank, or in full, in

the regular form, are not expressed. On the contrary, it seems.

Woon,]. Appellant made the following indorsement on two
promissory notes held by him, viz.: "For value received I hereby
tran fer my interest in the within note to I aac Halpern. (Signed)
Geo. Spencer." The maker having failed to pay at maturity upon
demand, is appellant bound as indorser after due notice?
Where a negotiable instrument i indor ed in blank, or in
full, the indorser contract to pay the amount called for by the
in trument if it i not paid by the principal on demand at maturity, provided notice of demand and non-payment i duly given. He
al o contract that the in trument is genuine, that it is valid, that
the parties are competent to make it, and that he has the title and
rio-ht to transfer it. ( r Dan. Neg. Inst., sec. 669a; Tiedeman,
Com. Paper, sec. 259). These rights of the indorsee and obligations of the indor er, under an indor ement in blank or in full in
th common form, are not expre sed, but fixed by implication,
under the rules of the law merchant; and when there is such an
indorsement, there is nothing for construction. But when the
indorsement is in irregular form, and the contract is expressed,
it may become, says Mr. Daniel, "a nice question for legal interpretation." But we cannot agree to his interpretation that an
indorsement containing an express assignment of "my interest"
over one's signature does not "exclude and negativ the idea of
conditional liability, which the law also imports, if such a signment were not expre ed in full." ( r Dan. Neo-. In t., sec. 688c).
That would be true only if the effect of the signature per se did
nothing more than transfer the interest of the igner. But, as ·we
have een, the indorsement in blank not only tran fer the title
and interest of the indorser in th instrument, but it does more.
It confers the absolut title upon the indor ee, and gives him
rights again t the maker which the payee him elf might not have,
and imposes upon the signer all the legal obligation of an indorser
mentioned supra. (Aniba v. Yeo11ians, 39 Mich. qr).
We fail to se the application of the maxim "Ex ressio eorum
quae tacite insunt ni i operatU? in a ca e where all the implication of the law following an ind r ement in blank, or in fu ll, in
the regular form are not expressed. On the contrarx, it seems

.
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clear to us that the payee, by expressing one only of the implica-

tions which the law attaches to an indorsement in blank or in full,

in the regular way, and that one, too, not imposing any personal

liability upon him, excludes every other . And the maxim "Expres-

sio umiis, etc., does apply. (Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536).

In Michigan the indorsement was "I hereby transfer my

right, title, and interest of the within note to S. A. Yeomans,"

signed by the payee. The Supreme Court held that such an'

indorsement gave the transferee the same rights that the payee

had, "but none other or greater." {Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich.,

supra). Mr. Tiedeman says: "The declaration that the payee

assigns or transfers all his right, title and interest in the paper

would seem to limit in a most effective way the rights acquired by

the transferee to those which the transferrer had therein, and thus

prevent the writing from operating as an indorsement." (Tiede-

man, Com. Paper, sec. 265).

To avoid the necessity for construction, and the probability

of misconstruction, it would always be better for the one desiring

to escape the liabilities of an indorser to add the words "without

recourse." But the question here is not what the appellee should
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have done, but what did he actually do? Why should we not let

the contract mean and have the effect that is plaintly expressed by

the terms "my interest" in their ordinary acceptation ?

HaoVth e payee intended to be bound as indo rser, why use so

many words ? Had the transferee expected mo re~ tFan the "inter-

est" of the transf er rer, why did he accept the instrument trans-

ferring only his "interest? " We must accept and interpret the

completed contract as the parties made it. They have seen proper

to express it at length, and have used unambiguous terms. Con-

struing the terms "my interest" most strongly against the trans-

ferrer, we do not feel authorized to say they mean anything more

than simply "my interest." They are clearly terms of limitation,

when used in an indorsement on a negotiable instrument. Com-

pare Reynolds v. Shaver, 59 Ark. 299.

Counsel for appellee cite us to cases which seem to hold the

contrary, but we find in some of these the language of the indorse-

ment is different from that under consideration, and, where sim-

ilar, the cases are not satisfactory. With due respect to these,

and to Mr. Daniel, we must conclude that their conclusions are

illogical, and the doctrine they announce unsound.

Reversed and remanded, with directions to sustain the demur-

rer to appellee's set-off.

Battle, J., absent. \r°^ o^^jJ^jdujvSL

clear to us that the payee, by expressing one only of the implications which the law attaches to an indorsement in blank or in full,
in the re ular wa and that one, too, not imposing any personal
xpresliability upon him, excludes ever ot . And the maxim
sio uniits, etc., does apply. (Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536).
In Michigan the indor ement was "I hereby transfer my
right, title, and interest of the within note to S. A. Yeomans,"
signed by the payee. The Supreme Court held that such an'
indorsement gave the tran feree the same rights that the payee
had, "but none other or greater." ( Aniba v. Yeonzans, 39 Mich.,
supra). Mr. Tiedeman says: "The· declaration that the payee
assigns or transfers all his right, title and interest in the paper
would seem to limit in a mo t effective way the rights acquired by
the transferee to those which the transferrer had therein, and thu
prevent the writing from operating as an indorsement." (Tiedeman, Com. Paper, sec. 265).
To avoid the necessity for construction, and the rrobability
of misconstruction, it would always be better for the one desiring
to escape the liabilities of an indorser to add the words "without
recourse." But the question here is not what the appellee should
have done, but what did he actitally do ? Why should we not let
the contract mean and have the effect that is plaintly expressed by
the terms "my interest}} in their ordinary acceptation?
Had the payee intended to be bound as indorser, why use so
many words? Had the transferee expected more than the "intered' of t>he transferrer, why did he accept the instrument transferring only his "interest?)} We must accept and interpret the
completed contract as the parties made it. They have seen proper
to express it at length, and have used unambiguous terms. Construing the terms "my interest}} most strongly against the transferrer, we do not feel authorized to ay they mean anything more
than simply "my interest.}} They are clearly terms of limitation,
when used in an indorsement on a negotiable instrument. Compare Reynolds v. Shaver, 59 Ark. 299.
Counsel for appellee cite us to cases which seem to hold the
contrary, but we find in some of these the lamruage of the indor ement is different from that under con ideration, and, where similar, the cases are not satisfactory. With due re pect. to these
and to Mr. Daniel, we must conclude that their conclu ions are
illogical, and the doctrine they announce un ound.
Reversed and renianded, with directions to sustain the demitrrer to appellee' s set-off.
BATTLE, J., absent.
~~
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lNDORSEMENT OF ENTIRE INSTRUMENT

indorsement must be of entire instrument. § 34.

Hughes v. Kiddell (1801), 2 Bay (S. C.) 324.

Motion for a new trial.

INDOR EMENT MUST BE OF ENTIRE INSTRUMENT.

§ 34·

This was an action against defendant as endorser on a note

of hand, in which there was a verdict for defendant. The note of

hand in question was given by David Bush, of Camden, to the

Hughes v. Kiddell (1801), 2 Bay (S. C.) 324.

defendant Kiddell, for 473/. sterling. Kiddell afterwards made

the following endorsement, viz. : "I assign over to Hudson

Hughes, the sum of 1,930 dollars and 50 cents, as part of this

note of hand.

"Signed, "Benjamin Kiddell."

Afterwards he made another endorsement, and assigned over

the residue of said note. (Signed, Benjamin Kiddell.)

Mr. Ford, for the motion, contended, that both these endorse-

ments ought to be taken together, and considered as one endorse-

ment, as it appeared to be one transaction, done at the same time,

on the same day, and made to the same person. He admitted,

that an endorsement of part was not good, but that the two parts

in this case, to the same person, made the whole good ; and as

such, the court was bound to give it a reasonable and liberal con-
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struction, as it would not subject the party to different actions;

which was the reason, why the law of merchants would not admit

Motion for a new trial.
This was an action against defendant as endorser on a note
of hand, in which there was a verdict for defendant. The note of
hand in que tion was given by David Bu h, of Camden, to the
defendant Kiddell, for 473l. sterling. Kiddell afterwards made
the following endorsement, viz.: "I as ign over to Hudson
Hughe , the sum of l,930 dollars and 50 cents, as part of this
note of hand.
" igned
"BENJ AMI KIDDELL."
fterwards he made another endorsement, and assigned over
the re idue of said note.
(Signed, BENJ AMI KrnDELL.)

of the splitting up contracts, and allow of different endorsements

on bills and notes.

Mr. Pringle, in reply, contended, that from the very nature

of the transaction, it must have been the intention of the defendant

to restrain the negotiability of this note, as well as to exempt him-

self from responsibility ; taking these endorsements either sever-

ally or jointly, they amount to no more than a bare authority to

receive the money, or a relinquishment of the defendant's right

to the note. It is not expressed for value received, so as to raise

an implied assumption at law ; but the law is clear that an endorse-

ment for part is bad. (Bailey on Bills, 34).

For if it were allowable for a man to endorse for part, he

might endorse 100 dollars to A, another 100 to B, and so on ;

and by that means, defendant might become liable to twenty dif-

ferent actions on the same bill. For these reasons, and to guard

against this monstrous inconvenience, the law of merchants has

established it as a rule, that a bill cannot be endorsed for part.

(Cunn. on Bills, 57).

Mr. Ford, for the motion, contended, that both these endorsements ought to be taken together, and considered a one endorsement, as it appeared to be one transaction, done at the same time,
on the same day, and made to the same person. He admitted,
that an endorsement of part was not good, but that the two parts
in this case, to the same person, made the whole good; and as
such, the court wa bound to give it a reasonable and liberal construction, as it would not subject the party to different actions;
which was th reason, why the law of merchant would not admit
of the splitting up contracts, and allow of different endorsements
on bills and notes.
Mr. Pringle, in reply, contended, that from the very nature
of the transaction, it mu t have been the intention of the defendant
to restrain the negotiability of this note, as well as to exempt himelf from re ponsibility; taking the e endor ements either severally or jointly, they amount to no mor than a bare authority to
receive the money, or a relinqui hment of the defendant' right
to the note. It is not expre sed for value rec ived, so a to raise
an impli d assumption at law; but the law is clear that an endorsement for part i bad. (Bailey on Bill 34).
For if it were allowable for a man to endorse for part, he
might endorse loo dollars to , anoth r 100 to B, and so on;
and by that means, defendant might become liable to twenty diff rent actions on the same bill. For the e rea on , and to guard
against this monstrous inconvenience the law of merchants has
e tablished it a a rule, that a bill cannot be endorsed for part.
( unn. on Bills, 57).
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Now it is clear, from the gentleman's own acknowledgment,

that the first endorsement for 1,930 dollars and 50 cents in part,

is bad ab initio; and if so, then the subsequent endorsement for

the residue never can give the first, legal validity ; as it is most

evident to reason and common sense, that two vitious or bad

endorsements can never constitute a good whole endorsement.

The court, after hearing the arguments, refused to grant a

new trial, on the ground that an endorsement for part of a note

or bill is bad. (Lex Mercatoria, 445 ; Carth. 466). And if so_

then two vitious endorsements can never constitute a good one.

Rule discharged.

Present, Grimke, Waites, Bay and Johnson. . .

INSTRUMENT INDORSED IN BLANK AND LATER INDORSED SPECIALLY.

S36.

Habersham v. Lehman (1879), 63 Ga. 380.

Lehman brought complaint against Habersham on a note for

$300.00 payable to the order of Eppinger & Russell, dated June

1 2th, 1878, and due at ninety days. It was indorsed as follows:

"Eppinger & Russell, by A. Cyraix, Attorney." "Pay C. H.

Dexter, cashier, or order, for collection on account of Atlanta
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Savings Bank of Georgia. (Signed) Lodovick J. Hill, Cashier."

The defendant pleaded the general issue, and specially the follow-

ing facts : The note sued on was fraudulently procured from

defendant in place of a non-negotiable note previously given by

him to the payees for certain improvements made on property of

his rented by the payees. At the time said payees obtained the

first note from defendant, a distress warrant against them in his

favor for $400.00 was pending, for the rent of certain wharf

property. The said note was given for improvements placed by

the payees upon this property, it being agreed that it should

remain in the hands of the payees until the termination of the

litigation on the distress warrant, so that if they were held liable

for the rent they could apply it in part payment of the judgment

which would be obtained. It was contracted that in no event

should they transfer the note, and to secure this end it was made

non-transferable. The litigation arising on the distress warrant

is still pending; but said payees, tired of keeping their contract,

came to defendant, and, by fraud, obtained the note sued on in

place of the first, and immediately transferred it to the plaintiff.

278 Instrument Indorsed in Blank
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Defendant further says that the plaintiff is only an agent of

the payees, who are thus seeking to avoid their contract under

the willing complicity of plaintiff as an innocent and bona fide

holder.

When the plaintiff offered the note sued on in evidence,

objection was taken on the ground that it showed no title out of

Eppinger & Russell, unless a power from them to "A. Cyraix,

attorney," be shown; and further, that the second indorsement

showed the note to be the property of the Atlanta Savings Bank.

The objections were overruled and defendant excepted.

Mr. Goodyear, of counsel for plaintiff, testified to the follow-

ing facts: In taking the first note defendant remarked that he

desired it made with time enough to reach over the approaching

May term of the court when the distress warrant would be tried.

Witness supposed it to be a negotiable note, and under this

impression delivered it to Russell, one of the payees. A few

weeks after, he returned it to witness and said he could do nothing

with it as it was not negotiable, though given as negotiable paper.

Witness told him that he had no doubt it was an oversight of

defendant's, and he would undertake to procure a negotiable
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instrument in its place. Defendant wanted additional time, so

witness drew the note sued on at three months and defendant

signed it. He had full opportunity to read it. The first note was

destroyed. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the conversations

or transactions referred to.

The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved

for a new trial on the following grounds :

ist. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.

2d. Because the court refused to charge as follows : "If the

jury find, from an inspection of the note, an indorsement of the

original payees' names, and also the following indorsement : 'Pay

to the order of C. H. Dexter, Esq., cashier, for collection on

account of Atlanta Savings Bank of Georgia. (Signed) Lodo-

vick J. Hill, Cashier,' and found no other indorsement on the note,

then the note without further evidence, would be presumed to be

the property of the said Atlanta Savings Bank and the plaintiff

could not recover from the defendant."

3d. Because the court erred in charging that when a plaintiff

in this class of cases, introduces a promissory note in evidence,

he is entitled to recover unless the defendant introduces evidence

to rebut the prima facie case thus made out.

4th. Because the court overruled the objections to the intro-

duction of the note sued on, as stated above.

Defendant further says that the plaintiff is only an agent of
the payee , who are thus seeking to avoid their contract under
the willing complicity of plaintiff as an innocent and bona fide
holder.
Wh n the plaintiff offered the note sued on in evidence,
objection was taken on the ground that it showed no title out of
Epping r & Russell, unless a power from them to 'A. Cyraix,
attorney," be shown; and further, that the second indor ement
showed the note to be the property of the Atlanta Savings Bank.
The objections were overruled and defendant excepted.
Mr. Goodyear, of counsel for plaintiff, testified to the following fact : In taking the first note defendant remarked that he
desired it made with time enough to reach over the approaching
May term of the court when the distress warrant would be tried.
Witness supposed it to be a negotiable note, and under this
impression delivered it to Ru sell, one of the payees. A few
weeks after, he returned it to witness and said he could do nothing
with it a it was not negotiable, though given as negotiable paper.
Witne s told him that he had no doubt it was an oversight of
defendant's, and he would undertake to procure a negotiable
instrument in its place. Defendant want d additional time, so
witness drew the note sued on at three months and defendant
signed it. He had full opportunity to read it. The first note was
destroyed. The plaintiff had no knowledge of the conversations
or transactions referred to.
The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved
for a new trial on the following grounds :
Ist. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
2d. Because the court refused to charge as follows: "If the
jury find, from an inspection of the note, an indorsement of the
original payees' names, and also the following indorsement: 'Pay
to the order of C. H. Dexter, Esq., cashier, for collection on
account of Atlanta Savings Bank of G orgia. (Signed) Lodovick J. Hill, Ca hier,' and found no other indorsement on the note,
then the note without further evidence, would be presumed to be
the prop rty of the said Atlanta avings Bank and the plaintiff
could not recover from the defendant."
3d. Because the court erred in charging that when a plaintiff
in this class of cases, introduces a promissory note in evidence,
he is entitled to recover unless the defendant introduces evidence
to rebut the prima facie case thus made out.
4th. Because the court overruled the objections to the introduction of the note sued on, as stated above.
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5th. Because the court charged the jury that the defendant's

plea of fraud in the procurement could not avail him unless his

evidence showed that the plaintiff was a party to, or was cognizant

of, the fact of the fraud; that fraud in the procurement, as con-

templated by law, related only to the original maker and payee,

or that notice of the fraud was brought home to him.

The motion was overruled, and defendant excepted.

Mabry & Crovatt, for plaintiff in error.

Goodyear & Harris, for defendant.

5th. Because the court charged the jury that the defendant's
plea of fraud in the procurement could not avail him unless his
evidence showed that the plaintiff was a party to, or was cognizant
of, the fact of the fraud; that fraud in the procurement, as contemplated by law, related only to the original maker and payee,
or that notice of the fraud was brought home to him.
The motion was overruled, and defendant excepted.

Beckley, Justice.

1. There were two grounds of objection to the introduction

of the note in evidence, one of them being that the second indorse-

ment showed the instrument to be the property of the Atlanta

Mabry & Crovatt, for plaintiff in error.
Goodyear & Harris, for defendant.

Savings Bank, whose cashier had indorsed it over to one C. H.

Dexter for collection. On the effect of an indorsement by the

payee in blank, followed by an indorsement in full by another per-

son, see 1 Daniel on Neg. Inst., § 696. Where a promissory note

is payable to a named person or order, or to the order of a named.

person~and is indorsed in blank, it is then, until the blank is filled,

payable to the holder, and any holder may receive payment, or
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sue and c ollect. The payee's order to pay to any holder is not

revolce d" or canceled by the order of some other person to pay to

a particular individual.

2. The other ground of objection was that the indorsement

of the payees purported to be executed by an attorney, and no

power of attorney or other evidence of authority to indorse was

produced. The Code, in section 2855, declares that "an indorse-

ment or assignment of any bill, bond or note, when the same is

sued on by the indorsee, need not be proved unless denied on

oath." A plaintiff who derives his title through an indorsement in

blank, is an indorsee, for he has the right to fill the blank and

takes the place of indorsee in express words, so long as he holds

the instrument. In strictness, the blank ought to be filled when,

or before, the instrument is tendered in evidence, but the prac-

tice is to treat that as done which can be done, and so a blank,

^indorse ment is consi dered, for most purposes of the suit, as an

expre ss indorsement to the plaintiff, if the latter has possession of

the paper. We think, too, the Code applies, and that J)roof_of_

t he ind o rsement is dispensed with, as well where the payees seem

to have indorsed by agent or attorney as wh ere the y purport to

have indorsed in person. And if an agent or attorney can indorse

for the~payees (than which nothing is more certain), to_t ake the

BECKLEY, Justice.
r. There were two grounds of objection to the introduction
of the note in evidence, one of them being that the second indorsement showed the in trument to be the property of the Atlanta
Savings Bank, whose cashier had indorsed it over to one C. H.
Dexter for collection. On the effect of an indorsement by the
payee in blank, followed by an indorsement in full by another peron, see r Daniel on Neg. Inst., § 696. Where a promissory note
i payable to a named person or order, or to the order of a named
person, and is mdorsed in blank, 1t 1s then, until the blank is filled,
payable to the holder, and any holder may receive payment, or
sue and collect. The a ee's order to a to an holder is not
1evo e or canceled by the order of some other person to pay to
a particular individual.
2.
The other ground of objection was that the indorsement
of the payees purported to be executed by an attorney, and no
power of attorney or other evidence of authority to indorse was
produced. The Code, in section 2855, declares that "an indorse-}
ment or a ignment of any bill, bond or note, wh n the same is
ued on by the indorse , need not be proved· unle s denied on
oath." A plaintiff who d riv hi~ title through an indorsement in
blank, is an indor ee, for he has the right to fill the blank and
takes the place of indorsee in expres word , o long a he hold
the instrum nt. In strictne
the blank ought to be filled · when
or before, the instrument is tendered in evidence, but the practice is to treat that as done which can be done and so a blank
jndorsement is considered, for most purpo es of th uit, a an
~xpress indor ement to the plaintiff, if th latter ha po e ion of
the paper. We think, too the Code applies, and that proof of
the indorsement is dispensed with, as w 11 where the payee eem
to have indor ed by agent or attorney as where they purport to
have indorsed in person. And if an agent or attome) can indorse
for the payees (than which nothing i more certain) , to take the
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indorsement for granted w it hout proof, is to tak e the authority

of the agent or attorney for granted without proof; for the

indorsement could not, when executed by~arl agent or attorney,

be the act of the payees unless it was duly authorized. We are

further of opinion, in the light of the known practice under the

Code, and under the statute prior to the Code, that the section

which we have quoted dispenses with the proof of the indorse-

ment, whether the action be against the indorser, upon the

indorsement itself, or against the maker, upon the note. Indeed,

this provision is more applicable in the latter than in the former

case; because, in the former, the general rule, found in sections

2851, 3454 and 3472, as to pleas of non est factum, would be

directly applicable, and would be enough to entitle the plaintiff

to go on against the indorser without proof of the indorsement,

unless it was denied on oath. In the present case, the plea, so

far from denying the indorsement, seems to admit it. We think

it does admit it, and then goes forward and makes a point upon

the motive and purpose of it.

3. The evidence did not rebut the legal presumption that

the plaintiff was entitled to the standing of a bona Me holder for
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value ; nor do we see that it made out any defense to the action

on the merits. The evidence of fraud in procuring the note orig-

inally, amounted to nothing. The plea was wholly unsustained.

Judgment affirmed.

CHANGING A BLANK INTO A SPECIAL INDORSEMENT. § 37.

X Martin v. Cole (1881), 104 U. S. 30.

Error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Henry M. Teller, for the plaintiff in error.

No counsel appeared for the defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error was plaintiff below, and brought his

action of assumpsit against the plaintiff in error, as indorser of a

promissory note, in the District Court of the First Judicial Dis-

trict of Colorado Territory, for the County of Arapahoe, the plain-

tiff below being the immediate indorsee.

A copy of the note sued on, with the indorsements, filed with

the declaration, is as follows: —

MARTIN
Martin v. Cole 281

"$1,414.15. Georgetown, C. T., July 17, 1868.

"On or before eighteen months after date, I promise to pay

to John H. Martin, or order, the sum of fourteen hundred and

fourteen 15/100 dollars, for value received, at George I. Clark &

Co.'s bank at Georgetown, with interest at the rate of three per

cent per month from date until paid.

(Signed) "John Webb."

[Indorsed on back.]

"Pay to the order of Luther A. Cole. Value received.

(Signed) "John H. Martin."

The declaration, besides the common money counts, contained

five special counts.

The plaintiff in error, in addition to the general issue, filed

'"$I,4I4.r5.

v. COLE

2 1

c.

GEORGETOWN,
T., July 17, 1868.
"On or before eighteen month after date, I promise to pay
to John H. Martin, or order, the um of fourteen hundred and
fourteen r5/100 dollars, for value received, at George I. Clark &
Co.'s bank at Georgetown, with interest at the rate of three per
cent per month from date until paid.
"JoHN WEBB."
( igned)
[ Indorsed on back.]
"Pay to the order of Luther A. Cole. Value received.
(Signed)
"JOHN H. MARTIN."

a special plea to the first and second counts of the declaration, the

substance of which is as follows : —

"And the said defendant avers that he made the said indorse-

ment when it was so made, in blank, that is to say, by writing his

name across the back of said promissory note, and that he made

•said indorsement with the express agreement by and between him

and the said plaintiff, the said Luther A. Cole, that the said
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indorsement should never be filled up so as to make this defendant

liable in any manner upon the said indorsement, but only to enable

the said plaintiff to sue the said note in his own name, if suit

therein should become necessary. And this defendant avers that,

relying upon the assurance of the said plaintiff that his indorse-

ment should not be filled up so as to render him liable as indorsee

[indorser] thereon, he signed his name upon the back of said

note, which without said assurance he would not have done."

To this plea there was filed a general demurrer, which was

sustained.

Afterwards, on June 6, 1874, the cause was submitted, by

consent of parties, without the intervention of a jury, when the

court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and rendered

judgment against the defendant for $2,478.17 damages and costs.

A bill of exceptions was taken, which sets out all the evidence

given and offered in the trial of the case. From that it appears

that the defendant below, Martin, being on the stand as a witness

in his own behalf, was asked to state under what circumstances

the note in suit was transferred by him to the plaintiff, Cole.

Objection being interposed, the defendant then stated to the court

that he offered to prove in defence a parol promise contempora-

neous with the indorsement of the note ; that he proposed to prove

The declaration, be ides the common money counts, contained
five special count .
The plaintiff in error, in addition to the general issue, filed
a special plea to the fir t and second counts of the declaration, the
substance of which is a follows:"And the said defendant avers that he made the aid indorsement \ h n it was so made, in blank, that is to say, by writing hi
name across the back of said promissory note, and that he made
·said indor ement with the express agreement by and between him
and the aid plaintiff, the said Luther A. Cole, that the said
indor ement should never be filled up so as to make this defendant
liable in any manner upon the said indorsement, but only to enable
the aid plaintiff to sue the aid note in hi own name, if suit
therein should become necessary. And this defendant avers that,
relying upon the as urance of the said plaintiff that his indorsement hould not be filled up so as to render him liable a indorsee
[ indor er] thereon, he signed his name upon the back of said
note, which without said assurance he would not have done."
To this plea there was filed a general demurrer, which was
sustained.
Afterwards, on June 6, r874, the cause was submitted, by
consent of parties, without the intervention of a jury, when the
court found the i sue in favor of the plaintiff, and rendered
judgment again t the defendant for $2 478.17 damao- and co ts.
A bill of exceptions wa taken, which ets out all the evidenc
given an 1 offered in the trial of th ca . From that it app ar
that the defendant below Martin, b ino- on the tand a a ' itne
in his own behalf wa a ked to tate under \ hat ircum tan
the note in suit \vas tran £erred by him to the plaintiff, Cole.
-Objection being interposed, the defendant then tated to the court
that he offered to prove in d f nc a parol promise contemporaneou "' ith the indorsement of the not ; that he propo ed to prove
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by the witness that the parol agreement set forth and stated in

the defendant's second plea was made by the parties. The court

sustained the objection, and the defendant excepted.

Thereupon the defendant offered to prove that at the time

the note was transferred by Martin to Cole it was expressly

agreed between them that Martin should indorse his name on

the note in blank to enable Cole to collect it in his own name,

and that Cole agreed then, in consideration of what he had given

for the note, that he (Martin) was never to be called upon as

indorser or guarantor of its payment in the event he failed to col-

lect it from the maker of the note; to which offer an objection,

interposed by the plaintiff, was sustained, and the defendant

excepted.

The defendant had previously testified that his name on the

back of the note was written by him, but that the words "Pay

to the order of Luther A. Cole, value ree'd," were not written at

the time of the indorsement and delivery of the note, nor by him

at any time.

The plaintiff below read in evidence the depositions of Wil-

liam L. Campbell, Levi H. Shepperd, and John T. Harris, tending
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to prove the insolvency of Webb, the maker of the note, at and

after its maturity. Objections were made to their depositions,

and overruled ; to which an exception was taken. The objections,

however, do not appear to be of sufficient importance to require

further notice.

The plaintiff also read in evidence the transcript of the record,

judgment, and proceedings in the action of Luther A. Cole against

John Webb, the maker of the note, together with the execution,

levy, and return, being the same referred to in the first count of

the declaration. From that it appears that the execution was

issued on May 9, 1870, returnable in ninety days from date, and

actually returned on June 7, 1870, showing the levy and sale

referred to in the pleadings.

There was other testimony, also, tending to prove the insol-

vency of Webb, the maker of the note, at and after its maturity,

and at the time of the bringing of this action.

An appeal was taken from the judgment of the District Court

of the First Judicial District of the County of Arapahoe to the

Supreme Court of Colorado Territory, in which, at the February

Term, 1875, errors were assigned, and the judgment was affirmed

in that court on March 28, 1876.

To reverse that judgment is the object of the present writ of

error.

by the ' itne that the parol agreement et forth and stated in
the defendant' econd pl a wa mad by the parti . The court
su tained th objection, and the def ndant xc pted.
Thereupon the defendant ffer d to prove that at the time
the not wa tran ferred by Martin to Cole it was expres ly
agreed betw en them that Martin hould indorse his name on
the note in blank to enable ole to coll ct it in his own name,
and that ole agreed then, in consideration of what he had given
for the note, that he (Martin) was nev r to be called upon as
indor r or guarantor of its payment in the event he fail d to collect it from th mak r of the note; to which offer an objection,
interpo ed by the plaintiff, was ustained, and the defendant
exc pt d.
The d fendant had previou ly testified that his name on the
back of the note was written by him, but that the word "Pay
to the order of Luther A. Col , value rec'd," were not written at
the time of the indorsement and delivery of the note, nor by him
at any time.
The plaintiff below read in evidence the depositions of William L. Campbell, Levi H. Shepperd, and John T. Harris, tending
to prove the in olvency of Webb, the maker of th note, at and
after its maturity. Objections were made to their depositions,
and overrule l; to which an exception was taken. The objections,
however, do not appear to be of sufficient importance to require
further notice.
The plaintiff also read in evidence the transcript of the record,
judgment, and proceedings in the action of Luther A. Col agai1 t
John Webb, the maker of the note, together with the execution,
levy, and return, being the same referred to in the first count of
the declaration. From that it appear that the execution was
issued on May 9, 1870, returnable in nin ty days from date, and
actually returned on June 7, 1870, showing the levy and sale
referred to in the pleadings.
There was oth r testimony, also, tending to prove the in olvency of Webb, the maker of th note, at and after its maturity,
and at the time of the brin in of thi action.
An appeal was taken from th judgment of the Di trict Court
of the First Judicial Di trict of the County of Arapaho to the
upreme Court of Colorado Territory, in which, at the February
Term, 1875, errors were as ign d and the judgment was affirmed
in that court on March 28, 1876.
To r verse that judgment i the ob ject of the present writ of
rror.
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The agreement set out and relied on in the plea was that

"the said indorsement should never be filled up so as to make

this defendant liable in any manner upon the said indorsement,

but only to enable the said plaintiff to sue the said note in his

own name, if suit thereon should become necessary." And the

defendant averred that ''he, relying upon the assurance of the

said plaintiff that his indorsement would not be filled up so as to

render him liable as indorser thereon, signed his name upon the

back of said note, which without said assurance he would not

have done." A s the indorsement in blank, admitted bv the defend-

ant to have been made by him, without being filled up by the

plaintiff at all, rendered him liable for the payment of the note

as an indorser, the breach by the plaintiff of the alleged agree-

ment was inconsequential, and could not, in law, result in any

actionable injury; for filling upthe blank indorsement in the,

manner in which it waTHone neither added to nor subtr acted from!

tTuTTiability which the detenclant assumed hy _ merel y writjngjrns"

rTarne~on the back of the nofE

The defendant belbw, however, further offered at the trial

to prove that at the time the note was transferred by Martin to
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Cole it was expressly agreed between them that Martin should

indorse his name on the note in blank, to enable Cole to collect

it in his own name, and that Cole agreed then, in consideration

of what he had given for the note, that he (Martin) was never

to be called upon as indorser or guarantor of its payment in

the event he failed to collect it from the maker of the note. No

question was made at the time, nor has been raised since, as to

the admissibility of such proof under a plea of the general issue ;

and waiving any objection on that account, the rejection by the

court below of this offer fairly raises the issue intended to have

been made by the special plea, whether it is competent, in an ^

action against an indorser by his immediate indorsee, upon an

indorsement made in blank of a negotiable promissory note, to

prove, as a defence, that as part of the transaction it was agreed

between the parties, but not in writing, that it should merely have

the legal effect of an indorsement expressed to be without

recourse.

It has never been contended that such a defence, based on

dealings between prior parties, could be maintained to defeat the

title of a bona fide holder for value of negotiable paper, acquired

before maturity, in the usual course of business, and without

notice ; for the protection of such a title is of the essence of the

policy of the law merchant, and inheres in the very definition of

The agreement set out and r eli d on m the pl ea wa that
"the aid indor ment hould never b fill d up o as to make
thi def ndant liabl e in any manner upon th e said indor ement,
but only to nabl th aid plaintiff t sue th e said note in his
own name, if suit th ereon should becom nece ary." And the
d f ndant averred that 'h , r elying upon the a urance of the
aid plaintiff that his indor m nt would not be fi lled up so a to
render him liable as indorse r th er eon, sig ned his n ame upon th e
back of said note, which with out aid a urance he would not
have done." As the indorsem nt in blank, admitted by the defendant to have been made by him, without being fill ed up by the
plaintiff at all, render ed him liable for th e payment of the note
a an indor er, th breach by the plaintiff of the alleg ed agreement wa inconsequential, and could not, in law . r esult in any_
actionable in j ury ; for filling up the blank indorsement in the
manner in which it wasCIOne neither added to nor subtracted from
the llabihtfr w hic; tp e defendant assumed by mere ly wntmg his
name on t
bac o the no~.
The defendant below,owever, further offered at the trial
to prove that at the t ime the note was trans ferred by Martin to
Cole it wa
xpressly agreed between them that Martin should
indor e hi name on the note in blank, to enable Cole to collect
it in his own name, and that Cole ag re d then, in consideration
of what he had given for the note, that he (Martin) was never
to be call d upon as indorser or guarantor of its payment in
the event he failed to collect it from th maker of the note. No
question wa made at the time nor ha been rai ed ince, as to
the admis ibility of such proof under a plea of the general issue·
and waiving any obj ection on that account, the rej ction by the
court b low of this offer fairl y raise th e issue intended to have
been made by the special plea, wheth r it i competent, in an
action against an indor er by his imm diate indorsee, upon an
indor sement made in blank of a ne ·otiabl promi ory note to
prove, a a defence, that a part of the tran action it wa aareed
between the partie , but not in writino-, that it hould merely have
the legal effect of an indorsement xpre sed to be without
r ecourse.
It ·has never been contended that uch a defence, ba ed on
dealings b tween prior parti , could be maintained to defeat the
title of a bona fi de holder for value of ne otiable pap r, acquir ed
before maturity, in the u ual cour e of bu in , and v ithout
notice; for th e protection of su ch a title i of th
nee of the
policy of the law merchant, and inhere in the very definiti on of

..J
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negotiability. Hence, in that case, a collateral but contempora-

neous written agreement between two prior parties to a bill or

note would not affect its validity in the hands of the holder, more

than if the agreement were unwritten. Whereas, between the

immediate parties, if the agreement relied on were in writing, its

terms would fix and determine their rights and obligations as

was decided by this court in Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 427" The

question is between them alone; and is, whether the same effect

will be given to such an agreement, not reduced to writing.

The ground of decision must be found in some other prin-

ciple or policy of the law than that which protects the title of a

remote innocent holder of negotiable paper.

Accordingly, Mr. Justice Washington, in Susquehanna

Bridge & Bank Co. v. Evans, 4 Wash. 480, after admitting proof

of such an agreement, in an action by the holder of a promissory

note against his immediate indorser, said, in his charge to the

jury:

"The reasons which forbid the admission of parol evidence

to alter or explain written agreements and other instruments do

not apply to those contracts implied by operation of law, such as
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that which the law implies in respect to the indorser of a note

of hand. The evidence of the agreement made between the plain-

tiffs and defendants, whereby the latter were to be discharged on

negotiabil ity. H ence, in that cas , a collateral but contemporan ou writt n agr m nt b t\ en two pri r parti to a bill or
note would not aff ct its validity in th hands of the holder, more
than if the ag reement were unwritten. V herea , between the
immediate parti , if th e agreement relied on were in writing, its
te rms would fix and determin their ri ht and obli ations, as
was decided by this court in Davis v. Bro ~ n, 94 U. . 427.
he
qu e tion is between them alon ; and i , whether the ame effect
will be given to uch an agreement, not reduced to writing.
The ground of deci ion must be found in some other principle or policy of the law than that which protects the title of a
r emote innoc nt holder of neo-otiable paper.
Accordingly, Mr. Ju tice Wa hington, in Susquehanna
Bridge & Bank Co. v. Evans, 4 Wash. 480, after admitting proof
of uch an agreement, in an action by the holder of a promis ory
note against his immediate indorser, said, in his charge to the
JUry:

the happening of a particular event, was, therefore, properly

admitted."

It is upon this distinction between contracts express and

implied that those judicial tribunals have proceeded, in which

such proof is held to be admissible. It is declared, for example,

by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Ross v. Epsy, 66 Pa.

St. 481, 483, that "the contract of indorsement is one implied

by the law from the blank indorsement, and can be qualified by

express proof of a different agreement between the parties, and is

not subject to the rule which excludes the proof to alter or vary

the terms of an express agreement."

So in an early case in New Jersey, Johnson v. Martinus,

9 N. J. L. 144, it was held by the Supreme Court of that state

that parol evidence was competent to overcome the implied con-

tract which results from a blank indorsement, on the ground that

such indorsement is an inchoate or imperfect contract and not a

written instrument, nor entitled to its effect, protection, or

immunity.

This case, however, was expressly overruled by the same

court in Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 id. 517, in which it is plainly

" The reasons which forbid the admis ion of parol evidence
to alter or explain written agreement and other instruments do
not apply to those contract implied by operation of law, such as
that which the law implie in respect to the indorser of a note
of hand. The evidence of the agreement made between the plaintiff and defendants, whereby the latter were to be discharged on
the happening of a particular event, was, therefore, properly
admitted."
It is upon this distinction between contracts exp ress and
implied that those judicial tribunals have proceeded, in which
such proof i held to be admi sible. It is declared, for example,
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Ross v. Epsy, 66 Pa.
St. 481, 483 1 that "the contract of indorsement is one implied
by the law from the blank indor ement, and can be qualified by
ex press proof of a different agreement between the partie , and is
not ubject to the rule which excludes the proof to alter or vary
th e terms of an express agreement."
o in an early case in New Jersey, Johnson v. M artinus,
9 N. J. L. 144, it was held by the Supreme Court of that state
that parol evidence wa comp tent to overcome th implied contract which results from a blank indorsem nt on the ground that
such indorsement is an inchoate or imp rfe t contract and not a
written instrument, nor entitled to its effect, protection, or
immunity.
This case, however was expre ly overruled by the same
court in Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 id. S17, in which it is plainly

MARTIN

v.

COLE

285

Martin v. Cole 285

indicated that the distinction attempted to be made, in some of

the cases, between indorsements in full and those which are in

blank, is untenable.

The contract created by the indorsement and delivery of a

negotiable note, even between the immediate parties to it, is a

c ommercial contract, and is not in any proper sense a contract

implied by the law, much less an inchoate or imperfect contract.

It is an express contract, and is in writing, some of the terms of

which, according to the custom of merchants and for the conveni-

ence of commerce, are usually omitted, but not the less on that

account perfectly understood. All its terms are certain, fixed,

and definite, and, when necessary, supplied by that common knowl-

edge, based on universal custom, which has made it both safe and

convenient to rest the rights and obligations of parties to such

instruments upon an abbreviation. So that_the_rnerg_na me of the

jndorser, signed upon the back of a negotiable instrument, con-

veys and expresses his meaning and intention as fully and com-

pletely as if he had written out the customary obligation of his

contract in full .

It is spoken of by Wharton, Law of Evidence, &c, Sec.
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1059, as a contract at short-hand. The same view is taken in

Daniels on Negotiable Instruments, Sec. 718, where the author

states, as a resulting conclusion that embodies the true principle

applicable to the subject, that, "in an action by immediate indorsee

against an indorser, no evidence is admissible that would not be

admissible in a suit by a party in privity with the drawer, against

him." If the commercial contract of indorsement is treated as a

contract in writing, this conclusion is undoubtedly correct. If it

is not, we have the anomaly of applying one rule between maker

and payee, and a different one between payee becoming indorser

and his immediate indorsee, without any difference to justify it,

in the relation of the parties to each other in the two cases.

The rule is tersely stated in Benjamin's Chalmer's Digest of

the Law of Bills of Exchange, &c, Art. 56, p. 63.

" The contracts on a bill, as interpreted by thelaw merchant^

are contracts in writing. Kxtrinsic~evrdence is not adm issible

tcTcontradict or vary their "effect. " Xitifig Abrey v. Crux, 5 Law

Rep. <J. f. 37.

The rule as declared by Mr. Justice Washington in the case

cited was expressly rejected by this court in Bank of the United

States v. Dunn, 6 Pet. 51, one distinct ground of its opinion being

that parol evidence is not admissible to vary a written agreement ;

citing the language of the court in Renncr v. Bank of Columbia,

indicated that the distinction attempt d to be made, in some of
the ca es, b tween indorsements in full and tho e which are in
blank, i untenable.
The contract created by the indors ment and delivery of a
negotiable note, even betw n the immediate parties to it, i a
commercial contract, and is not in any proper en e a contract
i;nplied by the law, much 1
an inchoate or imperfect contract.
It is an express contract, and is in writing, some of the terms of
\.vhich, according to th cu tom of m rchant and for the convenience of commerce, are u ually omitted, but not the less on that
account perfectly under tood. All its term are certain, fixed,
and definite, and, when necessary, supplied by that common knowledge, based on univ rsal cu tom, which ha made it both afe and
convenient to re t the rights and obligations of parties to such
in trum nts upon an abbreviation. So that the mere name of the
indorser, signed upon the back of a negotiable instrument, conveys and expresses hi meaning and intention as fully and completely as if he had written out the customary obligation of his
contract in full.
It i spoken of by Wharton, Law of Evidence, &c., Sec.
1059, as a contract at short-hand. The same view is taken in
Daniels on Neo-otiable Instruments, Sec. 718, where the author
states, as a resulting conclu ion that embodies the true principle
applicable to the subject, that, "in an action by immediate indorsee
aaainst an indorser, no evidence is admissible that would not be
admissible in a suit by a party in privity with the drawer, against
him." If the commercial contract of indorsement is treated as a
contract in writing, this conclusion is undoubtedly correct. If it
is not, we have the anomaly of applying one rule between maker
and payee, and a different one between payee becoming indorser
and his immediate indorsee, without any difference to justify it,
in the relation of the parties to each other in the two ca es.
The rule is tersely stated in Benjamin' Chalmer's Digest of
the Law of Bills of Exchange, &c., Art. 56, p. 63.
"The contracts on a bill as inter reted b the law merchant
are contracts 111 wntm .
to contradict or vary their e
Rep. C. P. 37.
The rule as declared by Mr. Justice Wash in ton in the ca e
cited was expressly rejected by thi c urt in Bank of the United
States v. Dunn, 6 Pet. 51, one distinct round of its opinion being
that parol evidence is not admi ible to vary a written a reement;
citing the language of the court in Renner v. Bank of Colwnbia,
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9 Wheat. 581, 587: "For there is no rule of law better settled or

more salutary in its application to contracts, than that which pre-

cludes the admission of parol evidence to contradict or substan-

tially vary the legal import of a written agreement. "

The authority of this case on this point has never been ques-

tioned in this court, the explanation and qualification in Davis

v. Brown, supra, having reference only to the rule as to the com-

petency of an indorser as a witness to impeach the validity of a

negotiable instrument to which he is a party. In the case last

referred to, the agreement relied on to qualify the instrument was

admitted because it was in writing and part of the transaction.

The case of Bank of the United States v. Dunn, supra, is cited

as an authority upon the point in Phillips v. Preston, 5 How. 278,

291, "because, in an action on a note, parol testimony is not com-

petent to vary its written terms, and probably not to vary a blank

indorsement by the payee from what the law imports."

It is also referred to in terms and followed in Brown v.

Wiley, 20 id. 442. In delivering the opinion of the court in that

case Mr. Justice Grier used this language:

"When the operation of a contract is clearly settled by gen-
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eral principles of law, it is taken to be the true sense of the con-

tracting parties. This is not only a positive rule of the common law,

but it is a general principle in the construction of contracts. Some

precedents to the contrary may be found in some of our states,

originating in hard cases ; but they are generally overruled by the

same tribunals from which they emanated, on experience of the

evil consequences flowing from a relaxation of the rule. There

is no ambiguity arising in this case which needs explanation. By

the face of the bill the owner of it had a right to demand accept-

ance immediately, and to protest it for non-acceptance. The

proof of a parol contract, that it should not be presentable till a

distant, uncertain, or undefined period, tended to alter and vary, in

a very material degree, its operation and effect. (See Thompson

v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 192)."

The action in this case, it is true, was between the payee and

drawer, upon a bill of exchange; but the obligation on which it

was founded, that the drawer would pay in the event of non-

acceptance by the drawee, notice of dishonor and protest, is one

not actually expressed in terms in the bill itself, but imported by

construction of law, as constituting the operation and effect of

the contract.

In Specht v. Howard, 16 Wall. 564, Mr. Justice Swayne,

delivering the opinion of the court, quotes from Parsons on Notes

\\'hea t. 5 l, 587: 'For there is no rule of law better settled or
more alutary in its application to contract , than that which precludes the admi ion of parol evidence to contradict or substantially vary the legal import of a written agreement.'
The authority of this case on thi point has never been question d in this court, the explanation and qualification in . Davis
v. Brown) supra) having reference only to the rule as to the competency of an indor er as a witness to impeach the validity of a
negotiable instrument to which he is a party. In the case last
r eferred to, the agreement relied on to qualify the instrument was
admitted because it was in writing and part of the transaction.
The case of Bank of the United States v. Dunn) supra) is cited
as an authority upon the point in Phillips v. Preston) S How. 278,
291, "because, in an action on a note, parol testimony is not competent to vary its written terms, and probably not to vary a blank
indorsement by the payee from what the law imports."
It is al o referred to in terms and followed in Brown ·v.
Wile y) 20 id. 442. In delivering the opinion of the court in that
case Mr. Ju tice Grier used this language :
"\Vhen the operation of a contract is clearly settled by general principles of law, it is taken to be the true sense of the contracting parties. Thi is not only a positive rule of the common law,
but it is a general principle in the construction of contracts. Some
precedents to the contrary may be found in some of our states,
originating in hard cases; but they are generally overruled by the
same tribunals from which they emanated, on experience of the
evil consequences flowing from a relaxation of the rule. There
is no ambiguity arising in this case which need explanation. By
the face of the bill the owner of it had a right to demand acceptance immediately, and to protest it for non-acceptance. 'fhe
proof of a parol contract, that it should not be presentable till a
distant, uncertain, or undefined period, tended to alter and vary, in
a very material degree, its operation and effect. (See Thompson
v. Ketchum) 8 Johns. 192)."
The action in this case, it is true, was between the payee and
drawer, upon a bill of exchange; but the obligation on which it
wa founded, that the drawer would pay in thP event of nonacceptance by the drawee, notice of di honor and prote t, is one
not actually expressed in terms in the bill itself, but imported by
construction of law, as con tituting the operation and effect of
the contract.
In Specht v. Howard) 16 Wall. 564, Mr. Ju tice Swayne,
delivering the opinion of the court, quotes from Parsons on Notes
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and Bills, 501, that "It is a firmly settled principle that parol")

evidence of an oral agreement alleged to have been made at the C

time of the drawing, making, or indorsing of a bill or note, can- \

not be permitted to vary, qualify, or contradict, to add to orj

subtract from, the absolute terms of the written contract."

The same quotation forms part of the opinion in Forsythe v.

Kimball, 91 U. S. 291, with the addition that, in the absence of

fraud, accident, or mistake, the rule is the same in equity as at

law.

The same principle, upon the authority of these cases, was

affirmed by this court in Brown v. Spoiford, 95 id. 474, and is

assumed to be the law in Cox v. National Bank, 100 id. 704, and

Brent's Ex'rs v. Bank of the Metropolis, 1 Pet. 89.

In view of this line of decisions, the question, as it arises in

this case, cannot now be considered an open one in this court.

It coincides with the rule adopted and applied in most of the

states, but the cases are too numerous for citation. They will be

found collected, however, in Bigelow, Bills and Notes, 168; Byles,

Bills (6th Am. ed.), Sharswood's note, 157; 1 Daniel, Negotitable

Instruments, Sees. 80, 717 et seq.; 2 Wharton, Evidence, Sec.
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1058 et seq. ; Benjamin's Chalmer's Digest of the Law of Bills

of Exchange, Art. 56, p. 63.

Of course there are many distinctions which, upon the cir-

cumstances of cases, determine the applicability of the rule, and

classes of cases which form apparent exceptions to it. It is not

necessary to refer to them here, further than to say that the limit-

ations of the rule ar perfectly consistent with it, and its application

in this, as in other proper cases, will not be considered as encroach-

ing upon them.

We find no error in the record.

Judgment affirmed.

THE QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT. § 40.

Corbett v. Fetzer (1896), 47 Neb. 269.

Error from the District Court of Douglas county. Tried

below before Irvine, J.

B. G. Burbank, for plaintiffs in error.

/. /. O'Connor, contra.

Post, C. J. This was a proceeding by Fetzer, the defendant

in error, in the District Court for Douglas county to foreclose

fifty-seven different mortgages executed by William B. Cowles

and Bills, 501, that "It i a firmly ettled principle that parolJ
evidence of an oral agr em nt alleged to have been made at the
time of the drawing, making, or indor ing of a bill or note, cannot be permitted to vary, qualify, or contradict, to add to or
subtract fr.om, the absolute t rms of the writt n contract."
The ame quotation forms part of the opinion in Forsythe v.
Kimball, 91 U . S. 291, with the addition that, in the. ab ence of
fraud, accident, or mistake, the rule is the same in equity as at
law.
The same principle, upon the authority of these cases, was
affirmed by this court in Brown v. Spofford, 95 id. 474, and is
assumed to be the law in Cox v . National Bank, 100 id. 704, and
Brent's Ex' rs v. Bank of the Metropolis, I Pet. 89.
In vi w of thi line of decisions, the question, as it arises in
this case, cannot now be considered an open one in this court.
It coincides with the rule adopted and applied in most of the
tates, but the cases are too numerous for citation. They will be
found collected, however, in Bigelow, Bills and Notes, 168; Byles,
Bills (6th Am. ed.), Sharswood's note, 157; I Daniel, Negotitable
Instruments, Secs. 80, 717 et seq.; 2 Wharton, Evidence, Sec.
1058 et seq.; Benjamin's Chalmer's Digest of the Law of Bills
of Exchange, Art. 56, p. 63.
Of course there are many distinctions which, upon the circumstances of cases, determine the applicability of the rule, and
classes of cases which form apparent exceptions to it. It is not
necessary to refer to them here, further than to say that the limitations of the rule ar perfectly consistent with it, and its application
in this, as in other proper cases, will not be considered as encroaching upon them.
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.

~ ~THE QUALIFIED INDOR EMENT.

§ 40.

Corbett v . Fetzer (1896), 47 Neb. 269.
Error from the Di trict Court of Douglas county. Tried
below before Irvine, J.
B. G. Burbank, for plaintiffs in error.
!. J. O'Connor, contra.
PosT, C. J. This wa a proceeding by Fetzer, the defendant
in error, in the District Court for Dou la count to foreclose
fifty-seven different mortgages executed by William B. Cowle
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and wife to Editha H. Corbett, upon certain property in North

Side Addition to the city of Omaha, to secure payment of as many

notes of even date therewith, payable by said Cowles to the order

of the mortgagee named. It is alleged in the petition that the

said Editha H. Corbett, Charles Corbett, Day & Cowles, and R.

W. Day, who were made defendants, indorsed said notes and thus

became liable thereon. The prayer is for a foreclosure of the

mortgages and for personal judgment against Day & Cowles, R.

W. Day, and the Corbetts for any balance remaining due on their

said indebtedness, after applying thereon the proceeds of the

mortgaged property. Of the defendants named the Corbetts

( husband and wife) only answered, admitting the allegations of

the petition, except as to their personal liability, and charging

that the notes above described were indorsed without recourse

upon them. The reply is a general denial. The district court,

upon the issues joined, found generally for the plaintiff, accom-

panied by a special finding that the Corbetts were liable as

indorsers of said notes, and a decree was entered in accordance

therewith, which has been removed into this court for review.

Practically the only question presented by the motion for a
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new trial and the petition in error relates to the liability of the

Corbetts as indorsers of the notes above described. On the back

and near the top of each of said notes appears the following:

"E. H. Corbett. Chas. Corbett. Without recourse on us. Day

& Cowles. R. W. Day." Said notes, according to the claim of

the Corbetts, had been pledged to Samuel R. Johnson, bearing

their indorsement in blank, as collateral security, and shortly

before the consummation of the sale thereof to Fetzer the words

immediately following their names, as shown above, were added

in order to limit their liability thereon. The transaction which

resulted in the purchase of the notes by Fetzer was conducted

on the part of the Corbetts by R. W. Day, one of the defendants

named, who testified that the indorsements "Day & Cowles" and

"R. W. Day" were made during such negotiations at the request

of the plaintiff, and that previous to such indorsement the words

"without recourse on us" were written thereon in his presence

by C. W. Johnson, a clerk in the office of Mr. Corbett, and in

which he is corroborated by both Johnson and Corbett. There

are observable from the records facts which tend strongly to sus-

tain the contention that the words of limitation were intended to

apply to the indorsement of the Corbetts rather than to that of

Day & Cowles or R. W. Day. They were in the first place written

with different ink, apparently at a different time, and certainly in.

and wife to Editha H. orbett, upon certain property in North
' icle Addition to the city of maha, to ecure paym nt of as many
no tes of even date ther vYith, payabl by said owl s to the order
of the mortgagee named. It i alleged in the petition that the
aid E ditha H. orbett, harles orbett, Day & Cowl es, and R.
\\. Day, who \Ver made defendants, indor ed said not and thus
became liable ther on. The prayer is for a foreclosure of the
mortgage and for personal judgment again t Day & owles, R.
\ . Day, and the Corb tts for any balance remaining due on th eir
aid ind btedness, after applying thereon the proceeds of the
mortgaged property. Of the defendants named the Corbetts
( husband and wife) only answered, admitting the allegations of
the petition, except as to their personal liability, and charging
that the notes above described were indorsed without recour e
upon them. The reply is a general denial. The district court,
upon the issues joined, found generally for the plaintiff, accompanied by a special finding that the Corbetts were liable as
indorsers of said notes, and a decree wa entered in accordance
therewith, which has been removed into this court for review.
Practically the only question presented by the motion for a
new trial and the petition in err r relate to the liability of the
n the back
Corbetts as indorsers of the note above described.
and near the top of each of said notes appears the following:
"E. H. Corbett. Chas. Corbett. Without recourse on us. Day
& Cowles. R. W. Day." Said notes, according to the claim of
the Corbetts, had been pledged to Samuel R. John on, bearing
their indorsement in blank, a collateral security, and shortly
before the consummation of the sale thereof to Fetzer the words
immediately following their name , as shown above, were added
in order to limit their liability thereon. The tran action which
resulted in the purchase of the notes by Fetzer was conducted
on the part of the Corbetts by R. W. Day, one of the defendants
nam d, who testified that the indorsements "Day & Cowles" and
"R. W. Day" were made during such negotiation at the request
of the plaintiff, and that previous to such indor ement the words
"without recourse on us" were written thereon in hi pre ence
by C. W. Johnson, a clerk in the office of Mr. orbett, and in
which he is corroborated by both John on and Corbett. There
are observable from the records fact which tend strongly to sustain the contention that th word of limitation wer intended to
apply to the indorsement of the Corbetts rather than to that of
I ay & Cowles or R. W. Day. They wer in the first place written
with different ink, apparently at a different time, and certainly in,
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a different hand from that employed in the subsequent indorse-

ments. They were also written by Corbett's clerk, by his order

and direction, pending the negotiations for the sale of the notes

and at a time when the question of their liability upon paper of

like character would naturally be uppermost in the minds of

solvent indorsers, as the Corbetts are shown to have been. John-

son was asked on cross-examination why the words "without

recourse" were not written over the names of the indorsers, to

which he answered, in substance, that Mrs. Corbett's name was

written so near the upper margin of the note as to leave no room

therefor, — an explanation which is shown by the record to be

entirely consistent with the facts. Again, the claim that the sub-

sequent parties, instead of the Corbetts, indorsed without quali-

fication finds support in the fact that both R. W. Day and the

firm of Day & Cowles were beneficially interested in the sale of

the notes, and the further fact that their absolute liability thereon

is established by the personal judgment entered against them in

this case by default, as also by the admission under oath of Day,

who testified in behalf of the defendants. On the part of the

plaintiff below, Fetzer, it is shown that when the notes were first
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exhibited to him by Day, four or five days previous to the close

of the transaction, they bore no indorsements aside from the

names of the Corbetts, and that when next seen by him they were

indorsed as now, except the name of Mr. Day, which was added

in his, Fetzer's, presence at the time they were delivered to him.

He testified also that he purchased the notes described, relying

upon the indorsements of the Corbetts, paying therefor seventy-

eight per cent of their face value, and that at the same time he

purchased other notes executed by Cowles and indorsed by the

Corbetts without recourse, at fifty-four per cent of the amount

due thereon. He is also corroborated to some extent by his

brother, William Fetzer, and Mr. Martin, who were present

during the several interviews with Day. A final analysis of the

evidence shows the following facts, as to which there is no sub-

stantial controversy: (i.) When the notes were first offered for

sale to Fetzer they bore the blank indorsement of the Corbetts.

(2.) Afterward, pending negotiations for the sale thereof, Charles

Corbett, for the purpose of limiting the liability of himself and

wife as indorsers of said notes, caused to be written thereon imme-

diately below their names the words "without recourse on us."

(3.) The names of the said Editha H. Corbett and Chas. Corbett

were written so near the margin of said notes and each of them

as to leave no room for the words quoted above their names.

a different hand from that employed in the sub equent indorsem nt . They were also written by Corbett s clerk, by his order
and direction, pending the negotiations for the sale of the notes
and at a time when the question of their liability upon paper of
lil e characte r would naturally be upp rmost in th minds of
solvent indorsers, as the Corbetts are shown to have been. Johnson ' as asked on era - xamination why the ' ords "without
recourse" were not written over the names of the indor er , to
which he an wered, in ub tance, that Mrs. orbett name '-"a
written so near the upper margin of the note as to leave no room
therefor,-an explanation which i shown by the record to be
entirely consistent with the facts. Again, the claim that the subequent parties, instead of the Corbetts, indorsed without qualification finds support in th fact that both R . vV. Day and the
firm of Day & Cowles were beneficially interested in the sale of
the note , and the further fact that their absolute liability thereon
is established by the personal judgment entered against them in
thi case by default, a also by the admi sion under oath of Day,
who testified in behalf of the defendants. On the part of the
plaintiff below, Fetzer, it i shown that '"'hen the notes were fir t
exhibited to him by Day, fo ur or five days previous to the close
of the tran action, they bore no indorsements aside from the
names of the Corbetts, and that when next seen by him they were
indorsed a now, except the name of Mr. Day, which was added
in his, Fetzer's, presence at the time they were delivered to him.
He te tified also that h pu rchased the notes described, relying
upon the indorsements of the Corbetts, paying therefor seventyeight per cent of their face value, and that at the ame time he
purchased other notes executed by Cowles and indorsed by the
Corbetts without recourse, at fifty-four per cent of the amount
due thereon. He i also corroborated to some extent by hi
brother, William Fetzer, and Mr. Martin, who were present
during the several interviews v ith Day. A final analy i of the
evidence shows the following facts, as to which there i no ubstantial controversy : (I.) When the notes were fi rst offered fo r
sale to F etzer they bore th blank indor em nt of the Corbett .
( 2.) Afterward, pending negotiations for the sale thereof Charl es
Corbett, for the purpose of limiting th liability of him 1f and
wife as indorsers of said notes, caused to be written thereon immediately below their names the word "..., ithout recour e n us. '
(3.) The names of the said Editha H. Corbett and Chas . Corbett
were written so near the margin of aid notes and ach of them
as to leave no room for the words quoted above their names.
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(4.) R. W. Day, one of the subsequent indorsers, has expressly

admitted his liability on said notes, and the absolute liability of

the firm of Day & Cowles thereon is established by the decree in

this case entered by default. (5.) That said notes, when finally

purchased by Fetzer, bore all the indorsements now appearing

thereon, except the name of R. W. Day, and were at said time

indorsed by said Day at his, Fetzer's, request. (6.) Fetzer pur-

chased said notes, paying therefor seventy-eight per cent of their

face value, relying upon the indorsement of the Corbetts, who

were then solvent.

The remaining questions merely involve the application of

the law to the facts above stated. A case in point is President of

Fitchburg Bank v. Greemvood, 84 Mass. 434. Upon the back of

the note produced at the trial of that case there appeared in three

successive lines the following indorsements : "Greenwood &

Nichols — without recourse — Asa Perley, 2d." Parol evidence

was offered by Greenwood & Nichols tending to prove that the

words "without recourse" were written by them for the purpose

of limiting their liability as indorsers and rejected in the absence

of an offer to prove notice by the plaintiff, a remote indorsee and
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alleged bona fide holder. In reversing the judgment of the lower

court Bigelow, C. J., said : " There is no rule of law which

requires a party to limit o r qualif y his indorsement by any writing

preceding his signature. Such qualification may and often does

follow the name of the party . Text-writers of approved authority

recognize this mode of limiting the liability of an indorser as

regular and appropriate." The doctrine of that case is sustained

by the following authorities therein cited : Chitty, Bills ( 10th

Am. ed.), 234, 235; Story, Promissory Notes, Sec. 138 and note;

and in 2 Randolph, Commercial Paper, Sec. 720, we observe it

is approved in the following emphatic language : "The words

'without recourse,' following the name of an indorser, A, and

preceding the name of indorser B, may be shown by A to apply

to his indorsement, even against a bona fide holder who supposed

it to apply to B's." It may be, as intimated, that there existed a

purpose, shared by Day and Corbett, to deceive the plaintiff by

inducing him to purchase the notes in the belief that the Corbetts

were liable thereon. Such a contention has, however, no founda-

tion either in the pleadings or the proofs, which show that he,

Fetzer, throughout the entire transaction, relied upon his own

judgment respecting the value of the paper in question; nor is

there any force in the objection that the evidence explanatory of

the indorsement of the notes by the Corbetts tends to change or

(4.) R. W. Day, on of the subsequent indorsers, has expressly
admitted his liability on said notes, and the absolute liability of
the firm of Day & Cowles thereon is established by the decree in
this ca e entered by default. (5.) That aid notes, when finally
purcha ed by Fetzer, bore all the indorsements now appearing
th reon, except th name of R. W. Day, and were at aid time
indorsed by said Day at his, Fetzer's, request. ( 6.) F tzer purcha ed aid note , paying therefor seventy-eight per c nt of their
face value, relying upon the indorsement of the Corbetts, who
were then olvent.
The remaining questions merely involve the application of
the law to the facts above stated. A case in point is President of
Fitchburg BamJ~ v. Greenwood) 84 Mass. 434. Upon the back of
the not produced at the trial of that case there appeared in three
ucce sive lin
the following indorsements: "Greenwood &
Nichols-without recourse-Asa Perley,. 2d." Parol evidence
was offered by Gre nwood & Nichols tending to prove that the
words "without recourse" were written by them for the purpose
of limiting their liability as indorsers and rejected in the absence
of an offer to prove notice by the plaintiff, a remote indorsee and
alleged bona fide holder. In reversing the judgment of the lower
court Bigelow, C. J., said: "There is no rule of law which
require a party to limit or qualify his indor ement by any writing
preceding his signature. Such qualification may and often does
follow the name of the party. Text-writers of approved authority
recognize this mode of limiting the liability of an indorser as
regular and appropriate." The doctrine of that case is sustained
by the following authorities therein cited: Chitty, Bills ( roth
Am. ed.), 234, 235; Story, Promissory Notes, Sec. 138 and note;
and in 2 Randolph, Commercial Paper, Sec. 720, we observe it
i approved in the following emphatic language: "The words
'without recourse,' following the name of an indorser, A, and
preceding the name of indorser B, may be shown by A to apply
to his indorsement, even against a bona fide holder who supposed
it to apply to B's." It may be, as intimated, that there existed a
purpo e, shared by Day and Corbett, to d ceive the plaintiff by
inducing him to purchase the note in the belief that the Corbetts
were liable thereon. Such a contention has, however, no foundation either in the pleadings or th proofs, which show that he,
Fetzer, throughout th entire tran action, r lied upon his own
judgment respecting the value of the paper in que tion; nor is
there any force in the objection that the evidence explanatory of
the indorsement of the notes by the Corbetts tends to change or
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vary their written obligation. As bearing upon that question, we

quote further from the opinion above cited : "It [the evidence

offered] had no ten dency to vary or control the written contract,

or to change the legal effect of the indorsement. It only proved

what the contract really was, at the time it was entered into by

the defendants . * * * The attempt in this case is not merely

to hold the defendants on a contract according to its meaning and

legal effect, but to fasten on them a contract into which they

never entered. If the plaintiffs mistook the application of the

words which were written for the purpose of qualifying the

indorsement of the defendants on the note, this fact furnishers

no ground for enlarging or changing their liability on the con-

tract into which they in fact entered." It will be remembered, too,

that this cause presents no question of fraud or estoppel, nor js

j:he a ction one between th e indorser and a bona tide holder of

commercial paper, but between the parties to the contract _oj_

indorsement, and, therefore, within the rule recognized in Holmes

v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 38 Neb. 326. It was held in the

case last cited that, as against a subsequent bona fide holder, the

liability created by the indorsement in blank of a bill or note can-

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

not be varied by parol evidence ; but that, as between the original

parties thereto, the precise terms of such contract is always a

subject of inquiry, and that parol evidence is admissible for that

purpose. The conclusion we reach is that the provision of the

decree of the district court for a deficiency judgment against Cor-

bett and wife is unsupported by the evidence, for which it should

be reversed and the cause dismissed as to the plaintiffs in error.

Reversed.

Irvine, C, not sitting. ^^

THE CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT. § 41.

Robertson v. Kensington (1811), 4 Taunt. 50.

This was an action of assumpsit, and the first count in the

declaration was on a bill of exchange, of which the following is

a copy, viz. :

"Edinburgh, 18th Nov. 1808. £180. sterling. At 45 days

after date, pay this first of exchange, to the order of Mr. Robert

Robertson, £180. sterling, value received, which place to account,

as advised, W. Forbes. J. Hunter and Co." "To Messrs. Ken-

vary their written obligation. As bearing upon that question, we
quote further from the opinion above cited : "It [the evidence
offered had no tendency to vary or control the written contract
or to change the lega
ec o t e mdorsement. It only proved
what the contract really was, at the time it was entered into by
the defendants. * * * The attempt in this case is not merely
to hold the def ndants on a contract according to its meaning and
legal effect, but to fast n on them a contract into which th y
never entered. If the plaintiffs mistook the application of the
words which were written for the J1Urpose of qualifying the
indor ement of the def ndants on the note, this fact furnishe_s
no ground for enlarging or changing their liability on the contract into which they in fact entered." It will be remembered, too,
that this cause presents no guestion of fraud or estoppel, nor is
the action one between the indorser and a bona fide holder of
.-:ommercial paper, but between the parties to the contract of
indorsem nt1 and, therefore, within the rule recognized in Holmes
v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 38 Neb. 326. It was held in the
case la t cited that, as against a subsequent bona fide holder, the
liability created by the indorsement in blank of a bill or note cannot be varied by parol evidence; but that, as between the original
parties thereto, the precise terms of such contract is always a
ubject of inquiry, and that parol evidence is admissible for that
purpose. The conclusion we reach is that the provision of the
decree of th di trict court for a deficiency judgment against Corbett and wife is unsupported by the evidence, for which it should
be reversed and the cau e dismissed as to the plaintiff in error.
Reversed.

sington, Styan, and Adams, bankers, London." "Accepted, Ken-

IRVINE,

C., not sitting.

~~-

THE CONDITION AL INDORSEMENT.

Robertson v. Kensington ( r8II), 4 Taunt. 30.
This was an action of assimipsit, and the first count in the
declaration was on a bill of exchange, of which the following is
a copy, viz.:
"Edinbnrgh, 18th Nov. 1808. £I8o. terling. At 45 days
after date, pay this first of exchano- , to the ord r of Mr. Robert
Robertson, .£180. sterling, value received, which place t account,
as advised, W. Forbes. !. Hunter and Co." "To 1 rs. Kensi11gton1 Styan, and Adams, bankers, London." ' ccepted, Ken-
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sington and Co. Entered, P. J. Raebum. Indorsed, Edinburgh,

19 Nov. 1808. Pay the within sum to Messrs. Clerk and Ross,

or order, upon my name appearing in the Gazette, as ensign .in

any regiment of the line, between the 1st and 64th, if within two

months from this date. R. Robertson. Clerk and Ross. J. Tin-

dale. Thomas Eyre and Sons. Thomas Nelson. Dudding and

Nelson. Bank of England."

The Plaintiff declared as payee, against the Defendants as

acceptors. The declaration also contained counts for money had

and received by the Defendants to the use of the Plaintiff, for

money paid by the Plaintiff to the use of the Defendants, on an

account stated, and for interest.

The plea was, the general issue. At the trial of this cause

before Mansfield C. J., and a special jury, at the sittings after

Hilary term 181 1, at Guildhall, a verdict was entered by consent

for the Plaintiff for the sum of 180/., subject to the opinion of the

Court on the following case. The bill, which was for 180/., was

drawn at Edinburgh on the 18th Noveynber 1808, by Sir Wm.

Forbes, J. Hunter and Co., upon the Defendants, who are bankers

in London, payable to the order of the Plaintiff, at 45 days date,
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for value received. The indorsements by the Plaintiff, and by

Clerk and Ross, as above set forth, were made before the bill was

presented to the Defendants for acceptance. The bill was deliv-

ered to Clerk and Ross, army agents in Edinburgh, being persons

then employed by the Plaintiff to procure for him by purchase

the commission of ensign above referred to. The bill, with those

indorsements upon it, was afterwards presented to the Defend-

ants for acceptance, and accepted by them in the usual course of

their business as bankers. It was afterwards indorsed and nego-

tiated by the other persons whose names appear as indorsers, and

finally with the Bank of England, who discounted it. At the

expiration of the 45 days specified in the bill as originally drawn,

and the days of grace, the Defendants paid the contents to the

Bank of England, who presented it to them for payment. The

Plaintiff, at the time of drawing the bill, paid the full value of

the same to Sir Wm. Forbes, J. Hunter and Co., the drawers, but

did not ask, or obtain, their consent, or that of the Defendants,

the acceptors, to make any alteration in the tenor of the bill by

indorsement, either as to the condition of the payment, or the

extension of time. The Plaintiff's name had never appeared in

the Gazette as ensign m any regiment of the line. The question

for the opinion of the Court was, whether the Plaintiff was

entitled to recover : if he was, the verdict was to stand ; if he

sing to11 and Co. Entered, P. J. Raeburn. Indorsed, Edinburgh,
19 ov. 1808. Pay the within sum to . . 1e r . Clerk and Ross,
or ord er, upon my name appearing in the Gazette, a n ign in
any r giment of the line, between the rst and 64th, if within two
months from this date. R. Rob ertson. Clerk and Ross. !. Tindale. Thomas Eyre and Sons. Thonias Nelson. Dudding and
Nelson. Bank of England."
The Plaintiff declared as payee, against the Defendants as
acceptor . The d claration also contained counts for money had
and received by the Defendants to the use of the Plaintiff, for
money paid by the laintiff to the use of the Defendants, on an
account stated, and for interest.
The plea was, the general issue. At the trial of this caus e
before Mans-field C. ]., and a special jury, at the sittings after
Hilary term r8II, at Guildhall, a verdict was entered by consent
for the laintiff for the sum of 18ol., subject to the opinion of the
Court on the following case. The bill, which was for r8ol., was
drawn at Edinburgh on the 18th November 1808, by Sir W111.
Forbes,!. Hunter and Co., upon the Defendants, who are bankers
in London, payable to the order of the Plaintiff, at 45 days date,
for value received. The indorsements by the Plaintiff, and by
Clerk and Ross, as above et forth, were made before the bill was
presented to the Defendants for acceptance. The bill was delivered to Clerk and Ross, army agents in Edinbitrgh, being persons
then employed by the Plaintiff to procure for him by purcha e
the commission of ensign above referred to. The bill, with those
indorsements upon it, was afterwards presented to the Defendants for acceptance, and accepted by them in the usual course of
their business as bankers. It was afterwards indorsed and negotiated by the other persons whose names appear as indorsers, and
finally with the Bank of England, who discounted it. At the
expiration of the 45 days pecified in the bill as originally drawn,
and the days of grace, the Defendants paid the contents to the
Bank of England, who pre ented it to th m for payment. The
Plaintiff, at the time of drawing the bill, paid the full value of
the same to Sir Wm. Forbes, J. Hunter and Co., the drawers, but
did not ask, or obtain, their consent, or that of th Defendants,
the acceptors, to make any alteration in th tenor of the bill by
indorsement, either as to the condition of the payment, or the
extension of time. The Plaintiff' name had never appeared in
the Gazette as ensign im any regiment of the line. The question
for the opinion of the Court was, wh ther the Plaintiff was
entitled to recover: if he was, the verdict was to stand; if he
1

EmE

& LAIRD v. EAST INDIA Co.

293

Edie & Laird v. East India Co. 293

was not entitled to recover, a verdict was to be entered for the

Defendants.

This case was argued by Lens Serjt. for the Plaintiff, who

contended, that it was competent for the Plaintiff by this special

indorsement to make only a conditional transfer of the absolute

interest in the bill-, which he had purchased for a full considera-

tion, and had vested in him by the delivery of the drawer. The

Defendants, by subsequently accepting the bill, had become parties

to that conditional transfer, and as the condition had never been

performed, the transfer was defeated, and they became liable,

after the expiration of the two months, to pay the Plaintiff, to

whom the property then reverted, the contents of the bill, of

which none of the indorsers could enforce payment against the

Defendants at the 45 days end, because they had all received the

bill subject to the condition, and were bound thereby. He cited

Anchor v. Bank of England, Doug. 638.

Shepherd Serjt. for the Defendant, contended that it was

immaterial whether the acceptance was before or after the con-

ditional indorsement. The acceptance admitted the hand-writing

of the drawer, but it did not mix itself with the conduct of the
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indorsers : it admitted nothing which was on the back of the bill.

The whole practice of the courts was accordingly ; for in an action

against the acceptor, it became unnecessary to prove the hand-

writing of the drawer, but it was necessary to prove the hand-

writing of the indorser.

The Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff .

THE RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT. § 38.

Edie & Laird v. East India Company (1761), 1 Wm. Blackstone,

295-

Action on two Bills of Exchange of 2000/. each, drawn by R.

Give on the East-India Company, at three hundred and sixty-five

Days after Date, payable to R. Campbell or Order. Campbell

indorsed one to Ogleby, or Order, the other to Ogleby, without

adding the Words or Order. But at the Trial, the Words or

Order appeared upon the Endorsement in another Hand- Writing.

was not entitled to recover, a verdict wa to be entered for the
Defendant .
Thi case was argued by Lens
rjt. for the laintiff, who
contended, that it was competent for the Plaintiff by this pecial
indor m nt to make only a conditional transfer of the abs lute
interest in the bill; which he had purchased for a full con ideration, and had ve ted in him by the delivery of the drawer. The
Defendants, by subsequently accepting the bill, had become parties
to that conditional tran f r, and a the condition had never been
performed, the tran fer wa defeated, and they became liable,
aft€r the expiration of th two month , to pay the Plaintiff, to
whom the property then reverted, the contents of the bill, of
which none of the indorsers could nforce payment against the
Defendants at the 45 days end, because they had all received the
bill subjec~ to the condition, and w re bound thereby. He cited
A1lcher v. Bank of England, Doitg. 638.
Shepherd- Serjt. for the Defendant, contended that it was
immaterial whether the acceptance was before or after the conditional indor ement. The acceptance admitted the hand-writing
of the draw r, but it did not mix itself with the conduct of the
indor ers: it admitted nothing which was on the back of the bill.
The whole practice of the courts was accordingly; for in an action
against the acceptor, it became unnece sary to prove the handwriting of the drawer, but it was necessary to prove the handwriting of the indor er.
The Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff.

The East-India Company accepted both Bills. Ogleby then

endorsed them to the Plaintiffs, and soon after became Insolvent.

The Company then refused Payment. The Jury found a Verdict

for the Plaintiffs on the first Bill, but for the Defendants on the

THE RE TRICTIVE INDOR EMENT.

Edie & Laird v. East India Company ( r76r),

I

Wm. Blackstone,

295.
Action on two Bill of Exchang of 20001. each, drawn by R.
Clive on the East-India ompany, at three hundred and i -t -five
Days after Date, payable to R. Ca11ipbell or Order. Campbell
indorsed one to 0 gleby, or rder, the oth r to 0 o.Zeby without
adding the Words or Order.
ut at th Trial, the
ord or
Order appeared upon the Endor ment in another Hand-\VritinCY.
The East-India Company accepted both
ill . 0 u { by then
endorsed th m to the Plaintiffs, and soon after b came Insolv nt.
The Company then refu ed ayment. The Jury foun a Verdict
for the laintiff on the first Bill, but for the D fendants on the
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second ; apprehending, that by the Usage of Merchants it was not

assignable, without the Words or Order in Campbell the Payee's

Endorsement.

Lord Mansfield Chief Justice. There can be no Dispute,

where the Indorsement is in Blank. There, you may write over

it, whatever you please. And it has been permitted to be done

even in Court. But for this there is no Occasion. Every thing

shall be intended upon such a blank Indorsement. The Point

relied on at the Trial for Defendants was, that where a special

Indorsement was made to A. B. and the Indorser omitted the

Words, or Order, this was equivalent to the most restrictive

Indorsement. Many Witnesses were examined by Defendants to

prove this Usage ; but it did not appear that in any one Fact, the

Indorsee of such special Indorsement, ever lost the Money, by

such Omission. The Evidence was only Matter of Opinion.

I told the Jury that upon the general Law (laying Usage out

of the Case) the Indorsement carried the Property to Ogleby;

and that the - Negotiability was a Consequence of the Transfer.

But if they found an established Usage among Merchants,

that where the Words or Order were omitted, the Bill was only
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negotiable on the Credit of the Indorsee, they should find for the

Defendants. If otherwise, or they were doubtful, then either for

the Plaintiffs, or make a Case of it. They found for the Defend-

ant on the Bill in question ; for the Plaintiff on the other, con-

cerning which there was no Dispute.

Now upon the best Consideration I have been able to give

this Matter, I am very clear of Opinion, that at the Trial, I ought

not to have admitted the Evidence of Usage. But the Point of

Law is here settled ; and, when once solemnly settled, no particular

Usage shall be admitted to weigh against it: This would send

every thing to Sea again. It is settled by two Judgments in

Westminster-Hall, both of them agreeable to Law and to Con-

venience. The two Cases I go upon are, Moore and Manning in

Comyns, and Acheson and Fountain in Strange. These Cases go

upon a general Proposition in Law, that an Indorsement to A.

implies or Order, and is negotiable.

The main Foundation is, to consider what the Bill was in its

Origin. The present Bill, in its original Creation, was not a bare

Authority, but a negotiable Draught. There are no restrictive

Words in it. And whatever carries the Property, carries the.

Power to assign it.

It were absurd, if the Merchants Opinion should prevail, that

this is now converted into a personal Authority. If it be such,

second ; apprehending, that by the Usage of Merchants it was not
a ignable, without the Words or Order in Campbell the Payee's
Endorsement.
Lord Mansfield Chief Justice. There can be no Dispute,
where the Indorsement is in Blank. There, you may write over
it, whatever you please. And it has been permitted to be done
even in Court. But for this there is no Occasion. Every thing
shall be intended upon such a blank Indorsement. The Point
relied on at the Trial for Defendants was, that where a special
Indorsement was made to A. B. and the Indorser omitted the
Words, or Order}. this was equivalent to the most restrictive
Indorsement. Many Witnes es were examined by Defendants to
prove this Usage; but it did not appear that in any one Fact, the
Indorsee of such special Indorsement, ever lost the Money, by
such Omission. The Evidence was only Matter of Opinion.
I told the Jury that upon the general Law (laying Usage out
of the Case) the Indorsement carried the Property to 0 gleby ;
and that th~ Negotiability was a Consequence of the Transfer.
But if they found an established Usage among Merchants,
that where the Words or Order were omitted, the Bill was only
negotiable on the Credit of the Indorsee, they should find for the
Defendants. If otherwise, or they were doubtful, then either for
the Plaintiffs, or make a Case of it. They found for the Defendant on the Bill in question; for the Plaintiff on the other, concerning which there was no Dispute.
Now upon the best Consideration I have been able to give
this Matter, I am very clear of Opinion, that at the Trial, I ought
not to have admitted the Evidence of Usage. But the Point of
Law is here settled; and, when once solemnly settled, no particular
Usage shall be admitted to weigh against it: This would send
every thing to Sea again. It is settled by two Judgments in
Westminster-Hall} both of them agreeable to Law and to Convenience. The two Cases I go upon are, Moore and M arming in
Comyns} and Acheson and Fountain in Strange. The e Cases go
upon a general Proposition in Law, that an Indor ement to A.
implies or Order, and is negotiable.
The main Foundation is, to consider what the Bill was in its
Origin. The present Bill, in its original Creation, was not a bare
Authority, but a m~gotiable D raught. There are no restrictive
Words in it. And whatever carries the Property, carries the
Power to assign it.
It were absurd, if the Merchants Opinion should prevail, that
this is now converted into a personal Authority. If it be such,
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that the Indorsee dies, it could not go to his Executors and

Administrators; in whom most clearly the Property of the Bill

does vest.

Upon this Ground, that the Point is settled both by King's

Bench and Common Pleas, and well settled, I think there should

be a new Trial. Otherwise also, I should be of the same Opinion.

Certainly, the Suggestion of Surprize, is not in all Cases a Reason

for a new Trial ; but in particular Cases, such as the present, it

may be. — The Question of Costs is very peculiar. There is a

Verdict in part for the Plaintiff, which already carries Costs for

him. But, for Form's Sake, we must set aside the whole Ver-

dict, which is usually done on Payment of Costs. But this will

be giving Defendants Costs, which they could not otherwise have,

merely because they have obtained an improper Verdict. There-

fore I think, that under these particular Circumstances, the Ver-

dict should be set aside without Costs.

Denison Justice. I am of the same Opinion. If the Words.

to A. B. onl y were inserted, I should think it would not be restric-

tiveT ~At least it should be left to a Jury. In Rawlinson and Stone ,

M. 20 Geo. 2. An Inland Bill of Exchange was drawn payable to
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A. or Order, who indorsed it to B. without adding any thing

more. The Question was, Whether there was such an Interest in

the Executor of the Assignee, as that he might assign it. The

Court held, upon Enquiry from Merchants, that it might be

indorsed thus: "C. Executor or Administrator of B." When_a_

Mat L says J _^Pay to A." the _Law savs. it is "to A._or J)rder." He

then says, I intend it should not be so. Wh at si gnifies what you

Intend? The Law intends o t herwise?. Same Opinion as to Costs.

Foster Justice. I am of the same Opinion. This is now the

settled Law, and ought not to have been left to a Jury, People

talk of the Custom of Merchants. This Word Custom is apt to

mislead our Ideas. The Custom of Merchants, so far as the Law

regards it, is the Custom of England: and therefore Lord Coke

calls it, very properly, the Law-Merchant. We should not con-

found general Customs with special local Customs. I think there

should be no Costs.

Wilmot Justice. There are two Questions. Whether the

Law is fully settled, and upon what Principles? It is certainly

now settled, and upon these Principles. The Original Contract

between the Drawer and Payee, is to pay to the Payee and his

Assigns, and the Assigns of such Assigns, in infinitum. There is

the same Privity, between the Drawer and the last Assignee, as

the first. The first assigns over that Chose in Action, which, in

that the Indorsee die , it could not go to hi Executors and
Admini trators; in whom most clearly the Property of the Bill
does vest.
Upon this Ground, that the Point is settled both by King1s
Bench and Common Pleas, and well settled, I think there should
be a new Trial. Otherwise also, I should be of the same Opinion.
Certainly, the Suggestion of urprize, is not in all Ca es a Rea on
for a new Trial ; but in particular Cases, such as the present, it
may be.-The Question of Costs is very peculiar. There is a
Verdict in part for the Plaintiff, which already carries Costs for
him. But, for Form' Sake, we must set aside the whole Verdict, which is u ually done on Payment of Costs. But this will
be giving Defendants Co ts, which they could not otherwise have,
merely because they have .obtained an improper Verdict. Therefore I think, that under these particular Circumstances, the Verdict should be set a ide without Costs.
Denison Justice. I am of the same Opinion. If the Words
to A. B. only were inserted, I should think it would not be restrictive: At least it should be left to a Jury. In Rawlinson and Stone,
M. 20 Geo. 2. An Inland Bill of Exchange was drawn payable to
A. or Order, who indorsed it to B . without adding any thing
more. The Question was, Whether there was such an Interest in
the Executor of the As ignee, as that he might as ign it. The
Court held, upon Enquiry from Merchants, that it might be
indorsed thus: "C. Executor or Administrator of B.
When a
Man says, "Pay to A,, the Law say . it is "to A. or Order.,, He
then says, I intend it should not be so. What si nifie what you
intend?
e aw intends otherwi e? Same Opinion a to Costs.
Foster Justice. I am of the ame Opinion. Thi i now the
settled Law, and ought not to have been left to a Jury, People
talk of the Cu tom of M rchant . This Word Custom i apt to
mislead our Ideas. The Custom of Merchants, so far as the Law
regards it, is the Cu tom of England; and therefore Lord Coke
calls it, very properly, the Law-M rchant. We should not confou nd general Customs with special local Customs. I think there
should be no Costs.
Wilmot J ustice. There are two Questions. Whether the
Law is fully settled, and upon what Principle ? It i certain!
now settled, and upon these Principles. The Ori ·nal ontract
between the Drawer and Payee, is to pay to the ayee and his
Assigns, and the Assigns of such Assigns, in infinitum. T here i
the same P rivity, between the D rawe r and th la t ssignee, a
the first. The first assigns over that Chose in Action, \\ hich in
11
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its Nature and by the express Permission of Law, is assignable,

with the same Privileges and Advantages, that it had when he

received it. It might be a considerable Question, whether a man

can limit and modify the Property or not, even by express Words

of Restriction, so as to check its Currency. By giving a bare

Authority, he may do it; as "Pay to A. for my Use;" — But if he

indorses it generally, I should have a great Doubt ; supposing it

purchased by a subsequent Indorsee, for a valuable Consideration.

In the present Case, I think assigning it to A. carries the Prop-

erty, with all its Qualities. It implies a Consideration to have

been given. I have a Note of Acheson and Fountain. Mr.

W ear g then cited a Case so determined in Common Pleas, prob-

ably that of Moore and Manning. Another Case shews the lib-

erality, with which Indorsements have been construed. Carth. 403.

The Question was, Whether Indorsement to the Order of A.

will enable A. to maintain an Action. Determined, that it will.

If so, a fortiori, an Indorsement to A. will enable him to indorse

it. Custom 'of Merchants is the general universal Law. Facts

must be reiterated to make such a Custom. The Opinion of Mer-

chants is nothing. Special Custom of Merchants has been con-
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trolled in a Case, where an Indorser had divided a Note and

indorsed it to several Persons. Carth. 466 Salk.

Held, that the Indorsor cannot vary the original Contract,

and split one Note into Twenty. Determined to be a void Custom,

though allowed to be the Custom of Merchants. Same Opinion

as to Costs.

Nezv Trial was granted without Payment of Costs.

V- ^

J&A^**^-' -

INDORSEMENT CONSTITUTING THE INDORSEE THE AGENT OF THE

INDORSER. § 38 2.

Locke v. Leonard Silk Company {1877), 37 Mich. 479.

Error to Wayne.

Assumpsit. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Moore & Moore, for plaintiff in error.

E. Y. Swift and Hoyt Post, for defendant in error.

Marston, J. Defendant in error commenced an action of

assumpsit in justice's court to recover the amount due on a prom-

issory note given by Locke to the company. * * * On the
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trial, the plaintiff recovered judgment. The cause was then

removed by certiorari to the circuit court, where the judgment of

the justice was affirmed. The case comes here on writ of error.

The note offered in evidence was endorsed "Pay H. A.

Redfield, cashier, or order, for collection," and it is claimed that

by this endorsement the plaintiff parted with all title and inter-

est in the note and was not therefore entitled to recover. This

position is not well taken; the endorsement is for a special

purpose, that of collectio n only. If paid, the proceeds would hav jT

belonged to the plaintiff ; the title to the note, and the p roceeHT

"ther eof, when collected, remained in the plaintiff? Sutherland

v. First National Bank, 31 Mich. 232.

Judgment reversed, but only on matters of practice.

Judgment reversed.

The other Justices concurred. -^Ltr- ^5L*><*~~

Smith v. Bayer et al. (1905) (Ore.), 79 Pac. Rep. 497.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah county.

M. C. George, Judge.

Action by Milton W. Smith against J. C. Bayer and another.

From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal.

trial, the plaintiff recovered judgment. The cause was then
removed by certiorari to the circuit court, where the judgment of
the justice was affirmed. The case comes here on writ of error.
The note offered in evid nee wa endorsed " ay H. A.
Redfield, cashier, or order, for collection, ' and it i claimed that
by this endorsement the plaintiff parted with all title and interest in the note and was not therefore entitled to recover. Thi
po ition is not well taken; the endorsement is for a special
pur ose, that of collection only. If paid, the proceeds would have
belon ed to the lainti ; t e tit
thereof, when collected, r mame m t e p amtt .
v. First ational Bank, 31 Mich. 232.
Judgment rever ed, but only on matters of practice.
Judgment reversed.
The other Justices concurred.
~ ~ _
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Reversed.

This is an action on a promissory note for $290, executed

and delivered by the defendants to the Concordia Loan & Trust

Company of Kansas City, Mo., on January 30, 1896, due on or

before August 1st following. The complaint alleges the execu-

Smith v. Bayer et al. ( 1905) (Ore.), 79 Pac. Rep. 497.

tion of the note, its indorsement to the plaintiff before maturity,

the making of certain payments thereon by defendants, and prays

judgment against them for the balance. The answer admits the

genuineness of the note, denies that it was indorsed to the plain-

tiff before maturity or at all, and affirmatively alleges that it

remained the property of the payee named therein until after

maturity, when it was transferred to the Fidelity Trust Company,

and that thereafter the defendants paid the note to the trust com-

pany and satisfied it in full. The reply denies the allegations of

the answer, and affirmatively pleads that at all the times men-

tioned the plaintiff was and now is the owner in his own right of

two-sevenths of the note, and since the 21st day of July, 1896,

has been and now is the owner of the remaining five-sevenths

for collection. Upon the trial plaintiff produced the note, with

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah county.
M. C. George, Judge.
Action by Milton \V. Smith against J. C. Bayer and another.
From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
This is an action on a promissory note for $z90, executed
and delivered by the defendants to the Concordia Loan & Tru t
Company of Kansas City, Mo., on January 30, r896, due on or
before ugust rst following. The complaint alleges the execution of the note, its indorsement to the plaintiff before maturity,
the making of certain payments thereon by defendants, and pray
judgment against them for the balance. The an wer admit the
genuinene s of the note, denies that it was indorsed to the plaintiff before maturity or at all, and affirmatively alleae that it
remained the property of the payee named therein until after
maturity, when it was transferred to the Fidelity Trust Company
and that thereafter the d fendant paid the note to the tru t company and ati fied it in full. Th reply denie the alleo-ation of
the an wer, and affirmatively plead that at all the times mentioned the plaintiff was and now is the own r in hi own ri o-ht of
two-sevenths of the note, and since th 21st day of July, 1896,
has been and now i the owner of th remamm five- eventh
for collection. Upon the trial plaintiff produced the note, with
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an indorsement thereon as follows: "Pay to the order of Milton

W. Smith for collection and return to Concordia Loan & Trust

Company, A. D. Rider, treasurer, OK, F. Amelung." He

testified that he received the note in due course of mail from

the loan and trust company, inclosed in a letter which the witness

produced, and which stated, in substance, that the note was

remitted for collection ; that he knew the signature to the letter,

had seen the handwriting, and knew that it was the signature of

the Concordia Loan & Trust Company, and the person signing it

had authority to represent the company ; that such person was

and had been employed by the company for a good many years,

doing business for it and exercising such authority ; that witness

knew that he had the right to make contracts in the name of and

for the company; that he (witness) knew the indorsement on the

note to be that of the payee; that Rider, who made it, was the

treasurer of the company, and had done business for it as such

for a good many years ; that witness knew him personally, had

seen him write, and knew that his signature to the indorsement

was genuine ; that the other name to the indorsement was simply

an "O. K." or ratification by some one ; that Rider is the treas-
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urer of the company, and has always done its business. The note

was then admitted in evidence over defendants' objection on the

ground that the indorsement did not transfer such title to the

plaintiff as would support an action thereon in his own name,

and because the genuineness of the indorsement had not been

sufficiently proved. The witness was also permitted to testify,

over defendants' objection and exception, that he was in fact the

owner in his own right of two-sevenths of the note, and the

court instructed the jury that any settlement made by the defend-

ants with the payee or owner of the note after the indorsement

thereof to the plaintiff would not be a defense against the plain-

tiff's two-sevenths interest therein, although it would be such

defense against the other five-sevenths. The verdict and judg-

ment were in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.

Ralph R. Duniway, for appellants.

Milton W . Smith, in pro. per.

Bean, J. (after stating the facts). The record bristles with

assignments of error. Indeed, it would seem that almost every

step in the progress of the trial was objected to by the defend-

ants, and exceptions saved to the rulings of the court. The

questions thus raised are embodied in the record and discussed

more or less in the brief. They are, however, mostly technical

an indorsement thereon a follows: "Pay to the order of Milton
W. mith for collection and r turn to oncordia Loan & Trust
ompany, A. D. Rider, treasurer,
K, F. Amelung." He
te tifi d that he received th note in due course of mail from
the loan and trust company, inclosed in a letter which the witness
prod uc d, and which tat d, in substance, that the note was
rem itted for collection; that he knew the signature to the letter,
had een the handwriting, and knew that it was the ignature of
the Concordia Loan & Trust ompany, and the person signing it
had authority to represent the company; that such person was
and had been employed by the company for a good many years,
doing bu in
for it and exerci ing such authority; that witness
knew that he had the right to make contracts in the name of and
for the company; that he (witness) knew the indorsement on the
note to be that of the payee; that Rider, who made it, was the
treasurer of the company, and had done business for it as such
for a good many years; that witness knew him personally, had
n him write, and knew that his signature to the indorsement
\Yas genuine; that the other name to the indorsement was simply
an " . K." or ratification by some one; that Rider is the treasurer of the company, and has always done its business. The note
was then admitted in evidence over defendants' objection on the
ground that the indorsement did not transfer such title to the
plaintiff as would support an action thereon in his own name,
and because the genuineness of the indorsement had not been
sufficiently proved. The witness wa also permitted to testify,
over defendants' objection and exception, that he was in fact the
owner in hi own right of two- evenths of the note, and the
court instructed the jury that any settlement made by the defendants with the payee or owner of the note after the indorsement
th reof to the plaintiff would not be a defense against the plaintiff's two-sevenths interest ther in, although it would be such
defen e again t the other five-sevenths. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendants appeal.
Ralph R. Duniway for appellants.
1

Milton W. Smith in pro. per.
1

J.

(after tating the fact ) . The record bristles with
a signments of erro r. Indeed, it would seem that almo t every
. t p in the progress of the trial wa obj cted to by the defend-·
ants, and exceptions saved to the ruling of the court. The
que tions thus raised are embodied in the record and discussed
more or less in the brief. They are, however, mostly technical
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and without merit. There was, in our opinion, sufficient proof

of the genuineness of the indorsement on the promissory note

offered in evidence to make a prima facie case in favor of the

plaintiff. The plaintiff, testifying in his own behalf, said that

he was familiar with the signature of the loan and trust company,

knew that the man who signed the indorsement was an officer of

the company and had been doing business for it for many years,

and that his signature to the indorsement was genuine. The

weight to be given to this testimony was, of course, for the jury.

The only points of real importance on this appeal are: (i)

Whether the indorsement, being on its face "for collection and

return" to the payee, vested plaintiff with such a title as will

enable him to maintain an action thereon in his own name; and,

if so, (2) whether the court erred in admitting parol testimony

tending to show that plaintiff was in fact the owner of two-

sevenths of the note, and in instructing the jury that, if such was

the case, any settlement with the payee or assignee subsequent

to the date of the indorsement to plaintiff would be no defense

as against plaintiff's two-sevenths. The indorsement of a prom-

issory note by the payee with the words "for collection." or the
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like, is not strictly a contract of indorsement - but rather the

creatio n of a power, the indorsee being the mere agent of the

indorser to receive and enforce payment for his use. The title

to the note and the proceeds thereof r emain in the payee, and he

may maintain s uitable actions and proceedings to enforce his

nghtT White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed. 250;

Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50,

13 Sup. Ct. 533, 37 L. Ed. 363; Sweeney v. Easter, 1 Wall. 166,

17 L. Ed. 681 ; Williams, Deacon & Co. v. Jones, yy Ala. 294;

People's Bank of Lewisburg v. Jefferson County Savings Bank,

106 Ala. 524, 17 South. 728, 54 Am. St. Rep. 59; Central Rail-

road v. First National Bank of Lynchburg, Virginia, 73 Ga. 383.

There is, in the absence of a statute, some conflict in the decisions

as to whether such an indorsee can sue in his own name. The

weight of authority seems to be in favor of his right to do so.

4 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 274; Freeman v. Exchange

Bank, 87 Ga. 45, 13 S. E. 160; Roberts v. Parrish, 17 Or. 583, 22

Pac. 136; Falconio v. Larsen, 31 Or. 137, 48 Pac. 703; Selover,

Bank Collections, § 28. And it is now so provided by statute in

this state. B. & C. Comp. §4439; Selover, Negotiable Instru-

ments Law, §155; Crawford, Neg. Inst. Law, §67. We are

therefore of the opinion that the present action was rightfully

brought in the name of the plaintiff. It was open, however, as

and without me rit. Ther was, in our opinion, sufficient proof
of the genuineness of th indors m nt on th promissory note
offered in evid nee to make a prim a f acie case in favor of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, t tifying in his own behalf, said that
he was fami liar with the signature of th loan and tru t company,
knew that the man who signed th indorsement was an offic r of
the company and had been doing business for it for many years,
and that his signature to the indors ment was genuine. The
weight to be given to this testimony was, of course, for the jury.
The only points of real importance on this appeal are: ( l)
Whether the indorsement, being on its face "for collection and
return" to the payee, vested plaintiff with such a title as will
enable him to maintain an action thereon in his own name; and,.
if so, (2) whether the court erred in admitting parol testimony
tending to show that plaintiff was in fact the owner of twoevenths of the note, and in instructing the jury that, if such was
the case, any settlement with the payee or assigne subsequent
to the date of the indorsement to plaintiff would be no defense
as again t plaintiff's two-sevenths. The indorsement of a promissory note by the payee with the words "for collection," or the
like, is not strictly a contract of indorsement, but rather the
creation of a power, the indorsee being the mere agent of the
indorser to receive and enforce a ment for his use. The title
to t e note and the proceeds thereof remain in the payee, and he
may maintain suitable actions and proceedin s to enforce hi
right.
ite v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed. 250;
Conimercial Bank of Pennsylvania v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50,
13 Sup. Ct. 533, 37 L. Ed. 363; Sweeney v. Easter, l Wall. 166,
17 L. Ed. 681; Williams, Deacon & Co. v. Jones, 77 Ala. 294;
People s Bank of Lewisbitra v. Jefferson Coitnty Savinas Bank,
106 Ala. 524, 17 South. 728, 54 Am. St. Rep. 59; Central Railroad v. First Nationa.l Bank of Lynchburg, Virginia, 73 Ga. 383.
There i , in the absence of a statut , ome conflict in the deci ions
as to whether such an indorsee can sue in his own name. The
weight of authority seems to be in favor of his right to do o.
4 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 274; Freeman v. Exchange
Bank, 87 Ga. 45, 13 S. E. 160; Roberts v. Parrish, 17 Or. S 3, 22
Pac. 136; Falconio v. Larsen, 31 r. 137, 48 Pac. 703 · Selover
Bank Collections, § 28. And it i now o provided b statute in
this state. B. & C. Comp. § 4439; Selover, Neo-otiable In truments L aw, § 155 ; Crawford, N g. In t. Law, § 67. \ e are
therefore of the opinion that the pre ent action wa rightfully
brought in the name of the plaintiff. It wa open, however as
1
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against him, to all defenses which could have been made if the

notes had remained in the hands of the indorser, and the action

had been brought by it. Wilson v. Tolson, 79 Ga. 137, 3 S. E.

900; Lcary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 269. The indorsement did not

pass theji tle. nor did it deprive the defendants of any defense

they may otherwise have against the note. It merely created the

plaintiff the agent of the payee for collection with the right to

sue in his own name. The plain meaning of such an indorse-

ment, as said by Mr. Justice Miller {White v. National Bank,

102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed. 250), is that the maker of the note "is

to pay it to the indorsee for the use of the indorser. The indorsee

is to receive it on account of the indorser. It does not purport

to transfer the title of the paper or the ownership of the money

when received. Both these remain, by the reasonable and almost

necessary meaning of the language, in the indorser." Such being

the effect of the restrictive indorsement and the character of the

title acquired by the plaintiff by reason thereof, it necessarily

follows that the court was in error in qd'"m'tting evidence to con-

tradictJ:he_ contract of in dorserrjeri t by sho wingjh at the note was

not transferred to the plaintiff for TO]]eclioiLa^_sliojyji.oriJtsJaxe u
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but that he a(VtnaTTy~?5wne33wo^sev enths the reolinJhis own right,

arid in insfructing the jury that a settlement made with the payee

after the indorsement to plaintiff would be no defense against

plaintiff's two-sevenths. The contract of indorsement is in

writing. The terms thereof are plain and unambiguous, and

parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict it. White

v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed. 250 ; Leary v. Blanch-

ard, 48 Me. 269; Howe v. Taylor, 9 Or. 288. The plaintiff's

action is based on the indorsement, and not on any interest he

may have in the note. He is made by the indorsement the mere

agent of the payee for its collection. The defendants' obligation,

notwithstanding the indorsement, is to the payee or subsequent

owner of the note, and not to the plaintiff. If they settled and

paid the note to the payee or assignee, such settlement is a com-

plete defense to art action thereon by plaintiff as a mere agent

for collection. It may be suggested that, because the jury found

a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the entire amount sued for,

they must have found that the settlement alleged as a defense

was never made, and therefore the error of the court in charging

the jury in relation thereto was harmless. The ruling of the

court upon this point and its instructions to the jury injected

into the case an issue not proper to be tried, the result of which

again t him,
which could hav been made if the
n te · had remain d in th hands of th indor r, and the action
had been brought by it. Wilson v. Tolson) 79 a. 137, 3 . E.
900; Leary v. Blanchard, 48 Me. 26g. The indor m nt did not
pa the titl , nor did it depriv the defendants of any d fense
they n;-ay oth rwi e have again t the not . It mer ly er at d the
plaintiff th ag nt of the payee for collection with the right to
ue in his own name. The plain meaning of uch an indor em nt, as said by Mr. Ju tice Miller (White v.
ational Bank,
102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed. 250), i that the maker of th note "i
to pay it to th indor ee for the use of the indorser. The indorsee
is to receive it on account of the indor r. It does not purport
to tran fer the title of the paper or the ownership of the money
wh n receiv d. Both these remain, by the r asonable and almost
nece ary meaning of the language, in the indorser." Such being
the effect of the r trictive indorsement and the character of the
title acquired by the plaintiff by reason thereof, it nee ssarily
follow that the court was in error in admitting evidence to contradict the contract of indor
t b showin that the note was
not transferred to the plaintiff for colle ion as shown on its fa e
but thaffle actua y owne ~venths thereof in his own right.
and in instructmg the jury that a settlement made with the payee
after the indorsement to plaintiff would be no defense against
plaintiff's two-sevenths. The contract of indorsement is in
wntmg. The terms thereof are plain and unambiguous, and
parol evidence is not admi sible to vary or contradict it. White
v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 26 L. Ed . 250; Leary v. Blanchard) 48 Me. 26g; Howe v. Taylor, 9 Or. 288. The plaintiff's
action is based on the indorsement, and not on any interest he
1}1ay have in the note. He is made by the indorsement the mer~
agent of the pay e for its collection. The defendants' obligation,
notwithstanding the indor ement, is to the payee or subsequent
owner of the note, and not to the plaintiff. If they settled and
paid the note to the pay e or assignee, uch s ttlement is a comp! te defense to an action thereon by plaint~ff as a mere agent
for collection. It may b suggested that, b cause the jury found
a verdict in favor of plaintiff for th entir amount sued for,
they must have found that the settlement alleged as a defense
was never made, and therefor the error of the court in charging
th jury in relation thereto wa harm! ss. The ruling of the
court upon this point and its instructions to the jury injected
into the case an issue not prop r to be tried, the result of which
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was to confuse and mislead the jury, and we do not think it can

be said that the error was harmless.

From these views it follows that the judgment of the court

below must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. Many of the

other questions argued in the briefs will probably not arise on a

retrial, and need not, therefore, be noticed at this time.

LtTL- |£&ft-~^-

INDORSEMENT VESTING TITLE IN INDORSEE IN TRUST. § 38 3.

Blaine et al. v. Bourne et al. {1875), 11 R. I. 119.

Brozvne & Van Slyck, for plaintiffs.

James M. Ripley, for defendants.

Assumpsit on a bill of exchange, heard by the court.

March 6, 1875. Potter, J. The draft in question was as

follows :

"Banking House of Blaine, Gould & Short,

"North East, Pa., August 16, 1873.

"Thirty days after date pay to the order of Frank Thayer

seven hundred dollars. "Frank Thayer.

"To Messrs. B. G. Chace & Co., Providence, R. I.

"Due September 18."
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Thayer was the agent in Pennsylvania to make purchases for

Chace & Co., of Providence, and he drew on them for payment.

This draft was indorsed by Thayer in blank, and was dis-

counted by the plaintiffs before acceptance. The plaintiffs

indorsed it as follows :

"Pay Jay Cooke & Co. or order on account of Blaine, Gould

& Short, North East, Pa. "Alfred A. Short, Cash'r."

By Jay Cooke & Co. it was sent to the defendants in Provi-

dence for collection, indorsed as follows:

"Pay to the order of Messrs. Bourne & Co.

"Jay Cooke & Co."

The draft was paid by Chace & Co. to the defendants about

noon of September 18. Jay Cooke & Co. stopped payment about

eleven a. m. of that day, and about one p. m. of the same day their

failure was generally known in Providence.

The draft was never the property of Jay Cooke & Co.. and
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was never credited by them to the plaintiff, but was merely

received by them for collection.

Jay Cooke & Co. were owing the defendants, and the defend-

ants credited it in their account with them, and claim that they

had a right so to do.

The rights of parties to bills forwarded for collection have

been a fruitful source of litigation. Questions of this sort have

generally arisen where some party becomes insolvent, and the

contention is who shall bear the loss.

When is the last holder of paper sent for collection bound to

look beyond the last remitter?

We are referred by defendants' counsel to one case only, Bank

of Metropolis v. New England Bank, \J Pet. 174; also in 1 How.

U. S. 234. In that case a bank had forwarded for collection

paper with a general or unrestricted indorsement to another bank,

which, with its own similar indorsement, had sent it to a third

bank for collection. The second or intermediate bank failed, and

on the day of its failure notified the third bank that the paper

was the property of the first bank. In a suit by the first against

the third bank to recover the proceeds, the court, while admitting
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that if it was a case of two banks acting as collecting agents for

each other, and where no consideration was paid or money

advanced, the paper would remain the property of the sender,

holds that in this case the third bank, which held the paper, not

having notice by the indorsement or otherwise that the paper

was not the property of the second bank, had a right to treat it

as theirs, and was not bound to inquire; and that where two

banks dealt together in this way for several years, kept an account

current, and mutually credited the collections, there was a lien

upon the paper so transmitted for the balance without regard to

who might be the real owner. The first bank, by indorsing the

paper in such a manner as to make it appear prima facie the prop-

erty of the failing bank, had no particular equity in its favor.

But this came again before the United States Supreme Court

in Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 6 How. U. S. 212,

where the court lays down its propositions more definitely ; that

if the collecting bank, at the time of the dealings, had notice that

the bill was not the preporty of the intermediate remitting bank,

but had been merely sent by them for collection as agent for

some other bank, then the collecting bank had no right to retain

for any balance due from the intermediate bank which had failed ;

even if the collecting bank had no notice, they could not retain as

against the real owner, unless credit had been given to the inter-

wa never credited by them to the plaintiff, but was merely
r ccived by them for collection.
Jay Cooke & Co. were owing the defendants, and the defendants credited it in their account with them, and claim that they
had a right so to do.
The rights of partie to bills forward d for collection have
been a fruitful source of litigation. Questions of this sort have
generally ari en where some party becomes insolvent, and the
contention is who shall bear the loss.
vVhen is the la t holder of paper sent for collection bound to
look beyond the last remitter?
V\Te are referred by defendants' counsel to one case only, Bank
of Metropolis v. New England Bank) 17 Pet. 174; also in l How.
U. S. 234. In that ca e a bank had forwarded for collection
paper with a general or unrestricted indorsement to another bank,
which, with its own similar indorsement, had sent it to a third
bank for collection. The second or intermediate bank failed, and
on the day of it failure notified the third bank that the paper
was the property of the first bank. In a suit by the first against
the third bank to recover the proceeds, the court, while admitting
that if it was a case of two banks acting as collecting agents for
each other, and where no consideration vvas paid or money
advanced, the paper would remain the property of the sender,
holds that in thi case the third bank, which held the paper, not
having notice by the indorsement or otherwise that the paper
was not the property of the second bank, had a right to treat it
a theirs, and was not bound to inquire; and that where two
banks dealt together in this way for several years, kept an account
current, and mutually credited the collections, there was a lien
upon the paper so transmitted for the balance without regard to
who might be the real owner. The first bank, by indorsing the
paper in such a manner as to make it appear prim.a facie the property of the failing bank, had no particular equity in its favor.
But this · came again before the United Stat s Supreme Court
in Banli of Metropolis v. New England Bank) 6 How. U. S. 212,
where the court lays down its propositions more definitely; that
if the collecting bank, at the time of the dealings, had notice that
the bill was not the preporty of the intermediate remitting bank,
but had been merely sent by them for collection a agent for
some other bank, then the collecting bank had no right to retain
for any balance due from the intermediate bank which had failed;
even if the collecting bank had no notice, they could not retain as
again t the real owner, unless credit had been given to the inter-
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mediate remitting bank, or what was equivalent, balances suf-

fered to remain to be met by such paper; but if the latter was

the case, and they had treated the intermediate bank as the owner,

and had no notice, then they might retain.

And there are further explanations of the decision in Wilson

v. Smith, 3 How. U. S. 763, 769. And see it criticised and

restricted in McBride v. Farmers' Bank of Salem, 25 Barb. S. C.

657, 661, which case was affirmed on appeal in McBride v. Farm-

ers' Bank, 26 N. Y. 450. See also Reeves et al. v. State Bank,

8 Ohio St. 465; Jones v Milliken & Son, 41 Pa. St. 252; Dick-

erson v. Wasson, 54 Barb. S. C. 230 ; also in 47 N. Y. 439. There

are some cases going still further in favor of the original remit-

ting bank, and allowing parol evidence to show the fact. Law-

rence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521, and cases there cited;

Bank of Washington v. Triplctt & Neale, 1 Pet. 25 ; Commercial

Bank of Clyde v. Marine Bank, 3 Keyes, 337 ; also in 1 Ab. Ct.

App. Dec. 405.

A general indorsement of bills is prima facie- evidence of

property in the indorsee, and even where it is subject to any equity

or trust between former parties, may change the legal property
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as to bona fide holders for value. Collins v. Martin, 1 B. & P.

648. But even where there is a general indorsement of paper

sent only for collection, it will still remain the property of the

sender as to all persons having notice.

The counsel for the plaintiffs say that the present case would

come under the head of what is in some places denominated a

"short entry." It would seem that in London it was a custom

{Giles et al. v. Perkins, et als., 9 East, 12, and counsel arguendo

in Ex parte Thompson, 1 Mont. & Mac. 102, no) for bankers to

receive bills for collection and to enter them immediately in their

customers' accounts, but never to carry out the proceeds in the

column to their credit until actually collected ; and this was called

a "short entry," or "entering short." And such bills always

continued the property of the customer, unless the contrary was

to be inferred from some course of dealing. Whereas country

bankers in England generally credited to their customers at once

all bills considered good, and generally allowed drafts upon the

proceeds. And even in the latter cases Lord Ellenborough held

such bills did not pass to the assignees in bankruptcy, if there

was a balance in favor of the customer over and above the bills.

(Giles et al. v. Perkins et als., 9 East 12; Ex parte Harford, 2

Rose, 163.) But Lord Eldon held that where they were with the

knowledge of the customer entered as cash, and the customer was
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mediate remitting bank, or what was quivalent, balances suffered to remain to b m t by such pap r; but if th latter was
the ca e, and they had treated the int rmediate bank a the owner,
and had no notice, then th y might retain.
And there are further explanations of the deci ion in vVilson
v. Smith, 3 How. U. S. 7 3, 76 . And see it criticised and
restricted in McBride v. Farmers1 Bank of Salem,, 25 Barb. S. C.
657, 661, which case was affirmed on appeal in McBride v. Farmers1 Bank1 26 N. Y. 450.
ee also Reeves et al. v. State Bank 1
8 Ohio St. 465; Jones v . Milliken & Son, 41 Pa. St. 252; Dickerson v. Wasson, 54 arb. S. C. 230; also in 47 N. Y. 439. There
are some cases going till further in favor of th original remitting bank, and allowing parol evidence to show the fact. Lawrence v. Stonington Bank, 6 Conn. 521, and ca es there cited;
Bank of Washington v. Triplett & Neale, l Pet. 25; Commercial
Bank of Clyde v. Marine Bank, 3 Keyes, 337; also in l Ab. Ct.
App. Dec. 405.
A general indorsement of bills is prima facie· evidence of
property in the indorsee, and even where it is subject to any equity
or trust between former parties, may change the legal property
as to bona fide holders for value. Collins v. Martin, l B. & P.
648. But even where there is a general indorsement of paper
sent only for collection, it will still remain the property of the
sender as to all persons having notice.
·
The counsel for the plaintiffs say that the present case would
come under the head of what is in some places denominated a
"short entry." It would seem that in London it -v as a custom
( Gnes et al. v. Perkins, et als., 9 East, 12, and coun el arguendo
in Ex parte Thompson, l Mont. & Mac. 102, l IO) for bankers to
receive bills for collection and to enter them immediately in their
customers' accounts, but never to carry out the proceeds in the
column to their credit until actually collected; and this was called
a "short entry," or "entering short." And uch bills alway
continued the property of the customer, unless the contrary was
to be inferred from some course of d aling. \ herea country
bankers in England generally credited to their cu tom rs at once
all bills considered good and generally allowed drafts upon the
proceeds. And even in the latter ca es Lord Ellenborou(Jh held
such bills did not pass to the as ignee in bankruptcy if there
was a balance in favor of the customer over and above the bills.
(Giles et al. v. Perkins et als., 9 Ea t 12; Ex parte Harford, 2
Rose, 163.) But Lord Eldon held that where they were with the
knowledge of the customer entered a cash, and the cu tomer was
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entitled to draw against them, he could not claim the specific bills.

(Ex parte Sargeant, i Rose, 153; Ex parte Thompson, 1 Mont.

'&. Mac. 102, A. D. 1828.) But even where the custom was to

enter short and it was not done, this would not change the prop-

erty, unless some act of the customer concurred. (Ex parte Sar-

geant, 1 Rose, 153; Ex parte Pease, 1 Rose, 232; and the Vice-

Chancellor's opinion in Ex parte Thompson, 1 Mont. & Mac.

102, 112).

But besides the ground that this was equivalent to a short

entry, and that the cases decided upon that point apply to it,

it is contended that in this case the effect of the restriction in the

indorsement was to give all subsequent holders express notice

of the trust, and we think this view of the plaintiff's counsel is

correct.

The indorsee is rather an agent of the indorser with pn wer of

substitution, and the bill is still in the possession of the indorser

by his agent. (Ex parte Sargeant, 1 Rose, 153.) The very mode

of indorsement in this case shows that it is not a case of ordi-

nary indorsement, and that no consideration has been paid for it.

(Eadie & Laird v. E. India Co., 1 W. Bla. 295; also in 2 Burr.
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1216.) The bill must be taken by the holder subject to the trust •

and, says Judge Story (On Agency, §211), if he voluntarily

conse nts to or ai ds in any other appropriation he is responsible •

and~says Judge Byles (On Bills, *I57), he holds the bill or

money as trustee for the restraining party, and is liable to the

party making the restriction. The words are notice that the

restricted indorsee has no property in th e_billj that he is a mere

trustee, and that he can appoint no sub-agent except for the pur-

pose of holding the bill or money on the same trust, a nd if the

holder pays it to t he intermediate agent, he becomes responsible

for its misapplication .

In the case of Sigourney v. Lloyd et als., 8 B. & C. 622 ; also

in 3 M. & R. 58, and in Dan. & LI. 132; 2 Chitty Jun. on Bills,

1412, 1439, it was contended that an indorsement, "Pay to B.

for my use," was a mere direction to B. as to the application of

the money; but Lord Tenterden said that if it meant no more

the words were useless ; as he would be so liable without those

words.

In that case the payee indorsed generally to A. A., the plain-

tiff, indorsed, "Pay B. or order for my use;" the defendants

discounted it and applied it to the credit of B. B. failed, and

it was held that the indorsement was sufficient notice to prevent

its transfer for the benefit of any other person; that all subse-

entitl d to draw again l th em, he could not claim th pecific bills.
(Ex parte Sargeant, l Ro e, 153; Ex parte Thonipson, 1 Mont.
'{Y. Mac. 102 , A. . 182 . ) But ven wh re th cu tom wa to
enter short and it wa not done, this would not change the property, unl e s some act of the cu tomer concurred. (Ex parte Sarg eant, l Rose, 153; Ex parte Pease, l Ro e, 232; and the Vicehancellor's opinion in Ex parte Tho11ipson, 1 Mont. & Mac.
102, 112).
ut be ides the ground that this was equivalent to a short
entry, and that the cases decid d upon that point apply to it,
it is contend d that in this case the effect of the restriction in the
indorsement was to give all subsequent holders express notice
of the trust, and we think this view of the plaintiff s counsel is
correct.
The indorsee is rather an agent of the indorser wjtb power of
ubstitution, ~ nd the bill is till in the po session of the indorser
by his agent. (E x parte Sargeant, 1 Rose, 153·) The very mode
of indor ement in thi case shows that it is not a case of ordinary ind? rsement, and that no consideration has been paid for it.
(E adie & Laird v. E. India Co., l W. Bla. 295; also in 2 Burr.
1216.) The bill must be taken by the holder subject to the trust;
and, says Judge Story (On Agency, § 211), if he voluntarily
consent to or aids in an other a ro riation he is res nsible ·
and says udge Byles (On Bills, *157), he holds the bill or
money as trustee for the restraining party, and is liable to the
party making the restriction. The word are notice that the
restricted indorsee has no property in the bill ; that he is a mere
trustee, and that he can appoint no sub-agent except for the purQOSe of holding the bill or money on the same trust, and if the
holder pays it to the intermediate a ent he becomes re on ible
for its mi app 1ca ion.
In th case of Sigourney v. Llo31d et als., 8 B. & C. 622; al o
in 3 M. & R. 58, and in Dan. & Ll. 132; 2 Chitty Jun. on Bills,
1 4 12, 1439, it wa
contended that an indor ement, "Pay to B.
for my use," wa a mere direction to B. a to the application of
th e money; but Lord Tenterden said that if it meant no more
the words w re useless; as he would be o liable without those
words.
In that case the payee indorsed generally to A. A., the plaintiff, indorsed, "Pay B. or order for my use;" the defendants
. failed, and
discounted it and applied it to the er dit of B.
it was held that the indor ement was sufficient notice to prevent
its transfer for the benefit of any other person ; that all subse-
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quent indorsees were trustees for the plaintiff; and that whoever

advanced any money on it did it at his peril. And on appeal

this judgment was confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber, the

court holding that the money to whomsoever paid was in trust

for the indorser. {Lloyd et al. v. Sigourncy, 5 Bing. 525; also

in 3 M. & P. 229, and 3 You. & Jer. 220, and Dan. & LI. 213).

This custom of restricted indorsing is not of late origin, but

is spoken of as usual in Snce ct al. v. Prescott et als., 1 Atk. 245,

249, A. D. 1743; the object being, as there stated, to prevent

the indorsement being filled up in such a manner as to pass the

interest in the bill.

If the defendants in the present suit had paid the cash to Jay

Cooke before hearing of the failure, it would have presented a

different question. But they hadjioji ght to apply the money of

the plaintiffs to the payment of a debt due to them ("the defend-

ants) frorrTTay Cooke . This is not such a payment as can pro-

tect them against a suit by the plaintiffs, the real owners. ( Truet-

tel v. Barandon, 2 Chitty Jun. on Bills, 1002; also in 8 Taunt.

100, and 1 Moore, 543 ; Thompson v. Giles, 2 Chitty Jun. on

Bills, 1 190; also in 2 B. & C. 422, and 3 D. & R. 733; Lloyd's
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note to Paley, quoted in full in Story on Agency, § 228, n. ; 1

Bell's Comm. *270, which work is praised by Mr. Warren as

being a "mine of commercial law."

Judgment for plaintiffs.

INDORSEMENT WITHOUT WORDS OF NEGOTIABILITY. § 38 3.

Leavitt v. Putnam. (See page p?.)

INDORSEMENT BY PARTNERS. § 43.

Estabrook v. Smith (1856), 6 Gray, 570, 66 Am. Dec. 443.

Action of contract upon a promissory note, made by the

defendant, payable to "Estabrook & Richmond or order," and

indorsed by Richmond in his own name, for the purpose of trans-

ferring his interest therein to his copartner, Estabrook, the plain-

tiff. The parties submitted to the decison of the court the

aoo
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question, whether this indorsement was sufficient to enable the

plaintiff to maintain an action thereon in his own name.

que tion, whether this indorsement was sufficient to enable the
plaintiff to maintain an action thereon in his own name.

D. Foster, for the plaintiff.

E. IVashburn, for the defendant.

Dewey, J. We take the rule to be uncontroverted, that ji_

promissory note payable "to A. B. or order" cannot be trans-

D. Foster, for the plaintiff.
E . W ashbitrn, for the defendant.

ferred, so as to give a right of action in the name of a holder,

not the original party, without an indorsement by the payee.

The application of this principle seems to be decisive against

the right of the plaintiff alone to maintain this action. The

action is brought by Estabrook upon a note made to a copartner-

ship, Estabrook & Richmond, promising them, by the name of

their copartnership, to pay them or order a certain sum of money.

That this_act ion canno t be maintained by the plaintiff, as payee

of the note , is obvious; as that would at once present a case

where there was an omission to join all the payees as plaintiffs,

which would be fatal to the action. The only question therefore,

is, whether this note is legally indorsed, so as to enable the plaintiff

to maintain the action as indorsee ?

The payees of the note are Estabrook & Richmond, who
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compose a partnership. An indorsement of the note by the

payees would therefore be an indorsement by Estabrook & Rich-

mond, and this would correspond with the form of the note, and

transfer the same to their indorsee. One partner might properly

transfer the note bv indorsement, but he must do it by indorsing

the partnership name . Any thing less than this seems to be an

irregularity, and a departure from the legitimate mode of transfer

of a negotiable note or bill, payable to the order of a copartnership.

It is not contended that the indorsement by Richmond alone

would have been sufficient to authorize an action in the name of

a third person as indorsee ; but it is urged that such indorsement

is sufficient to authorize an action by the other partner, Estabrook,

as indorsee. The position taken is, that Richmond, by his

indorsement, has parted with all his interest, and so vested the

entire note in Estabrook. This may be all true as between Rich-

mond and Estabrook, and might be quite sufficient to settle, as

between them, to whose use this money was to be held when

collected. But the question still recurs, as to the effect of such

an indorsement as against the maker of the note, and whether it

creates the legal relation of indorsee. As already remarked, Jhe

present actojfmaintainable at _all, is maintainable bv Estabrook

as indorsee of thelTote. To cons tituigjaJfilglJ^PrsqpTgnt, the

J.

W e take the rule to be uncontroverted, that~
promi sory not payable "to A. B. or order" cannot be transfe rred, so as to give a right of action in the name of a holder,
not the original party, without an indorsement by the payee.
The application of this principle seems to be decisive against
the right of the plaintiff alone to maintain this action. The
action is brought by Estabrook upon a note made to a copartnerhip, E stabrook & Richmond, promising them, by the name of
their copartnership, to pay them or order a certain sum of money.
That this action cannot be maintained by the plaintiff, as payee
of the note, is obvious; as that would at once present a case
where there was an omission to join all the payees as plaintiffs,
which would be fatal to the action. The only question therefore,
is, whether this note is legally indorsed, so as to enable the plaintiff
to maintain the action as indorsee?
The payees of the note are Estabrook & Richmond, who
compo e a partnership. An indorsement of the note by the
payees would therefore be an indorsement by Estabrook & Richmond, and this would correspond with the form of the note, and
transfer the same to their indorsee. One partner might properly
transfer the note by indorsement, but he must do it by indorsing
the partnership name. Any thing less than this seems to be an
irregularity. and a departure from the legitimate mode of transfer
of a negotiable note or bill, payable to the order of a copartnership.
It is not contended that the indorsement by Richmond alone
would have b en sufficient to authorize an action in the name of
a third person as indorsee; but it is urged that such indorsement
i sufficient to authorize an action by the other partner, Estabrook,
as indorsee. The position taken is, that Richmond, by hi~
indorsement, has parted with all his interest, and so vested the
entire note in Estabrook. This may be all true as between Richmond and E tabrook, and might be quite sufficient to settle, as
between them, to whose use this money was to be held when
c ll ected. But the question still recur , as to the effect of such
an indorsement as against the maker of the note, and whether it
create the legal relation of indorsee. As already remarked,~
nt action, if maintainable at all, is maintainable b Estabrook
o const1tut a le ~al indorsement. the
indor e of t 1e no e.
D EWEY,
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payees, E stabr pok & Richmond, must be the indorsers. But no

such in dorsement has ever been made. No one has professed to

indorse the note in the partnership name. The only indorsement

is that of Richmond individually ; and although it might be quite

competent for the payees, Estabrook & Richmond, in their part-

nership name, to have indorsed it to Estabrook, yet they have

not done so.

We have found no authority for maintaining an action by an

indorsee under such circumstances. The case of Goddard v.

Lyman, 14 Pick. 268, which seems to be the most favorable case

cited to sustain the position taken by the plaintiff, was widely

different from the present case. In that case, although the origi-

nal indorsement was by two only of three payees, and made to

the other payee and a third person, yet it was subsequently

indorsed by the third payee, and came to the hands of the plain-

tiff, who instituted the suit with the indorsement of all the payees.

That case, upon its facts, does not therefore furnish any pre-

cedent for this case ; although some of the remarks, as found in

the opinion of the court, might seem to indicate a broader doctrine

than the case required.
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The plaintiff then had leave to amend, on terms, by

joining the other partner, and had judgment for the

amount of the note. .

\^- &*\ ■

INDORSEMENT BY JOINT PAYEES NOT PARTNERS. § 43-

Dwight v. Pease (1842), 5 McLean, 94, Fed. Cas. No. 421/.

Mr. Talbot, for defendants.

Opinion of the Court. This action was brought upon the

following promissory note:

"Detroit, January 1st, 1837.

"Two years after date, I promise to pay to the order of
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payees, Estabrook & Richmond, must be the indorsers. But no
such indor ement has ever been made. No one has professed to
indorse the note in the partnership name. The only indorsement
is that of Richmond individually; and although it might be quite
competent for the payees, Estabrook & Richmond, in their partnership name, to have indorsed it to Estabrook, yet they have
not done so.
We have found no authority for maintaining an action by an
indorsee under such circum tance . The case of Goddard v.
Lym an, I4 Pick. 268, which seems to be the most favorable case
cited tv sustain the position taken by the plaintiff, was widely
different from the present case. In that case, although the original indor ement was by two only of three payees, and made to
the other payee and a third person, yet it was subsequently
indorsed by the third payee, and came to the hands of the plaintiff, who instituted the suit with the indorsement of all the payees.
That ca e, upon its facts, does not therefore furni h any precedent for this case ; although some of the remarks, as found in
the opinion of the court, might seem to indicate a broader doctrine
than the case required.
The plaintiff then had leave to amend, on terms, by
joining the other partner, and had judgment for the
amount of the note.

Walter Chester, and Pease, Chester & Co. one thousand and five

hundred dollars, for value received, at the Farmers' & Mechanics'

Bank of Michigan, with interest.

"[Signed] John Chester."

Indorsed: "Pease, Chester & Co. and also D. E. Jones in

INDORSEMENT BY JOINT PAYEES NOT PARTNERS.

§ 43·

blank."

The declaration contained three counts, to the first of which

Dwight v. Pease (1842), 3 McLean, 94, Fed. Cas. No. 4217.

there was a demurrer. This count states that one John Chester,

Mr. Talbot, for defendants.
OPINION OF THE CouRT. This action was brought upon the
.
following promissory note:
"DETROIT, January Ist, 1837.
"Two years after date, I promi e to pay to the order of
Walter Chester, and Pease, Chester & Co. one thou and and five
hundred dollars, for value received, at the Farmers' & Mechan ic '
Bank of Michigan, with interest.
" [Signed] JoHN CHESTER."
Indorsed: "Pease, Chester & Co. and also D. E. Jones m
blank."
The declaration containeq thre~ counts, to the first of which
there was a demurrer. This count states that one J ohn Chester,
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on the I st of January, 1837, made his note payable to order of

Walter Chester, and Pease, Chester & Co., and that Pease, Ches-

ter & Co., under their partnership name, indorsed and delivered

the said note to the plaintiff. John Chester, the maker, was a

member of the firm of Pease, Chester & Co. Demand of the

note when due, and notice to the defendants, was proved. Walter

Chester, one of the promisees in the note, seems not to have

indorsed it, and this is fatal to the right of the plaintiff. The

interest o f t he promisees is joint in the note, and not being in

partnership, they must each transfer the note . (Chit. Bills, 123;

Tayl. 55, Carvick v. Vickery, 2 Doug. 653 ; Jones v. Radford, 1

Camp. 83, note, 21 E. C. L. 41.) Only one-half of the note was

transferred by the indorsement of Pease, Chester & Co., and this

does not give a right to their or any subsequent assignee to sue on

the note. Recourse against the maker cannot thus be divided and

suits multiplied. The plaintiff seeks by this action to recover the

full amount of the note against the defendants, as indorsers. But

as he holds but one-half of the note under the assignment, the

indorsement, at most, can only be evidence of that amount. The

declaration is defective in not averring that Walter Chester, one
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of the payees, did indorse the note.

Demurrer sustained. The plaintiff dismissed his action.

V 1 - **Y

INDORSEMENT BY CASHIER OF BANK. § 44.

Folger et al. v. Chase et al, {1836), 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63.

This was assumpsit against the executors of Joseph Chase

to recover the amount of three promissory notes.

The first note, dated April nth, 1825, was made by E. Dixon,

for the sum of $867, payable to the order of the testator at the

Phcenix Bank in Nantucket, on demand, with interest, and was

indorsed by the testator to the President, Directors and Company

of the Phcenix Bank, the testator expressly waiving all right to

on the 1st of January, I 37, mad hi note payable to order of
\ Valt r he ter, and
a , h ster & Co., and that ca , he o., under their partner hip name, indor ed and deli r d
aid not to th plaintiff. John h t r, the mak r, v as a
m mber of th firm of P a , h ster & Co. Demand of the
n te ,..,h n du and notic to the def ndant , wa prov d. Waller
h t r, one of th promi
in the note, seem not to have
indor ed it, and this i fatal to th nght of th plaintiff. The
int rest of th promi e s is joint in th note, and not being in
partn rship, they mu t ach tran fer the note. (Chit. ill , 123;
Tay!. 55, Carvick v. Vickery, 2 Doug. 653; Jones v. Radford, l
amp. 83, note, 21 E. . L. 4r.)
nly on -half of the note was
tran f rred by the indorsement of Pease, Chester & Co., and this
does not give a rio-ht to their or any subsequent a signee to ue on
the note. R cour e against the maker cannot thus be divided and
suits multiplied. The plaintiff seeks by this action to recover the
full amount of the note again t the defendants, as indorsers. But
as he holds but one-half of the note under the assignment, the
indorsement, at most, can only be evidence of that amount. The
declaration is defective in not averring that Walter Chester, one
of the payees, did indorse the note.
Demurrer s-ustained. The plaintiff dismissed his action.

~~·

notice as such indorser. Upon a separate paper, annexed to this

note by a wafer, was the following indorsement : "P. H. Folger,

lNDORSEMENT BY CASHIER OF BANK.

Cashier."

The second note, dated January 18th, 1830, was made by

James Barker, for the sum of $1,235.92, and was payable to the

Folger et al. v. Chase et al. ( 1836), 18 Pick. (Mass.) 63.

order of the testator, at the Phcenix Bank, on demand, with inter-

est. The third note, dated September 21st, 1832, was made by the

testator, for the sum of $358.31, payable to the order of Edward

Chase, at the Phcenix Bank, on demand, with interest. These

This was assumpsit against the executors of Joseph Chase
to recover the amount of three promissory notes.
The first note, dated April l 1th, 1825, was made by E. Dixon,
for the sum of $867, payable to the order of the te tator at the
hrenix Bank in Nantucket, on demand, with interest, and wa
indorsed by the t tator to the President, Directors and ompany
of th Phrenix Bank, the te tator expres ly waiving all ri ht to
notice as such indorser. Upon a separate pap r, ann xed to this
note by a wafer, was the following indorsement: "P. H. Folger,
Cashier."
The second note, dated January 18th, 1830, was made by
James Barker, for the sum of $1,235.92, and was payable to the
ord er of the testator, at th
h nix ank on d mand, with intert. The third note, dat d ept ml er 21 t, l 32, wa made by the
l tator for the sum of $358.31, payabl to the ord r of Edward
hase, at th Phrenix Bank, on demand, with interest. These
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two notes were indorsed by the respective payees and by "P. H.

Folger, Cashier," the payees expressly waiving all right to notice

as indorsers.

309

two notes were indorsed by the respective payees and by "P. H.
Folger, a hier," the pay
expre ly waiving all right to notice
as indor ers.

Wilde, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an action on three promissory notes of hand, on two

of which the defendants are sued as executors of an indorser, and

they object to the plaintiffs' recovery on these notes, on the ground

that no demand has been made on the makers and no diligence

used to collect the debts of them. These notes, however, were

made payable at the Phoenix Bank, and were the property of the

bank. No demand was necessary except at the bank; and

although there is no express proof that the notes were there, and

some officer of the bank in attendance, at the time the notes fell

due, yet this must be presumed, and it was for the defendants to

show that the makers called at the place appointed, for the purpose

of making payment. The testator, by his indorsements, guaran-

tied that the makers would respectively be at the bank and pay

the notes according to their tenor. (Berkshire Bank v. Jones 6

Mass. R. 525).

In the next place it is objected, that the bank had no author-
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ity to indorse the notes in question, as the indorsement was made

after the charter of the bank had expired by its own limitation ;

and that the bank had no power to sell or indorse their notes by

virtue of St. 1819, c. 43. That statute provides, that all bodies

corporate and politic, whose powers would expire, either by

express limitation in their charters of incorporation, or otherwise,

should be continued bodies corporate and politic, for the term of

three years from and after the day on which their powers would

expire, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending all suits,

and of enabling them to settle and close their concerns and divide

their capital stock; but not for the purpose of continuing their

business.

This is a just and wise remedial law, and ought to be liberally

expounded. By the principles of the common law, upon the civil

death of a corporation, all its real estate remaining unsold, reverts

back to the original grantor and his heirs ; and the debts due to

and from the corporation are extinguished. The object of the

statute was effectually to guard against the inequitable conse-

quences of this rule of the common law. Now it appears, that

within three years after the expiration of the charter of the bank

these notes were indorsed, and we think the b ank had competent

authority, by virtue of the statute, to make the Indorsements. The

J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action on three promissory notes of hand, on two
of which the defendants are sued as executors of an indorser, and
they object to the plaintiffs recovery on the e notes, on the ground
that no demand has been made on the makers and no diligence
used to collect the debts of them. These notes, however, were
made payable at the Phrenix Bank, and were the property of the
bank. No demand wa necessary except at the bank; and
although there is no express proof that the notes were there, and
some officer of the bank in attendance, at the time the notes fell
due, yet this must be presumed, and it was for the defendants to
show that the makers called at the place appointed, for the purpose
of making payment. The testator, by his indorsements, guarantied that the makers would respectively be at the bank and pay ·
the notes according to their tenor. (Berkshire Bank v. Jones 6
Mass. R. 525).
In the next place it is objected, that the bank had no authority to indorse the notes in question, as the indorsement was made
after the charter of the bank had expired by its own limitation;
and that the bank had no power to sell or indorse their notes by
virtue of St. 1819, c. 43. That statute provides, that all bodies
corporate and politic, whose powers would expire, either by
express limitation in their charters of incorporation, or otherwise,
should be continued bodies corporate and politic, for the term of
three years from and after the day on which their powers would
expire, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending all suit ,
and of enabling them to settle and close their concerns and divide
t.heir capital stock; but not for the purpose of continuing their
business.
This is a just and wi e remedial law, and ought to be liberally
expounded. By the principles of the common law, upon the civil
death of a corporation, all its real estate remaining unsold, reverts
back to the original grantor and his heirs; and the debts due to
and from the corporation are extinguished. The object of the
statute was effectually to guard ao-ain t the inequitable consequences of this rule of the common law. Now it appears, that
within three years after the expiration of the charter of the bank
these notes were indorsed, and we think the bank had competent
authority, by virtue of the statute, to make the indor ements. The
WILDE,
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notes not having been collected, the bank had clearly a right to

sell them, or to dispose of them in any other reasonable and proper

manner, so as to wind up their concerns. The bank clearly had

a right to transfer the notes to the plaintiffs, and it is no concern

of the defendants how the money, when collected, is to be disposed

of.

As to the objection, that the indorsement is not made in the

name of the corporation, we think the indorsement by the cashier

in his official capacity sufficiently shows, that the indorsement was

made in behalf of the bank, and if mat is not sufficiently certain,

thTpTaintiffs have the right now to prefix the name of corporation.

The last objection is, that the indorsement on one of the notes

was not made on the back of the original note, and therefore

amounted only to an equitable transfer. The indorsement was

made on a paper attached to the back of the note by a wafer, and

it had been before thus attached for the purpose of entering

thereon indorsements of payments, the back of the original note

having been before covered with indorsements; and several pay-

ments had been indorsed on the attached paper, before the note

was transferred by indorsement to the plaintiff. This paper thus
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attached had become a part of the note, and no good reason can

be giv en why an indorsement made thereon should not be held a

v alid and legal transfer. The objection is, that such an indorse-

ment is not sanctioned by custom ; but we think it is supported by

the reasons on which the custom was originally founded. Bills

of exchange and promissory notes were indorsed on the back of

the bills and notes, because it was a convenient mode of making

the transfer, and in order that the evidence thereof might accom-

pany the note. Such an indorsement as this will rarely happen,

and no authority to support it could reasonably be expected ; but

there is no authority against it.

If a person write his name on a blank paper, to be used as an

indorsement of a note to be written on the other side, and it be

filled up as intended, the party would be held liable as indorser of

the note, although such indorsements are infrequent, and are not

according to the customary form of making a transfer ; but they

have been held to be within the reason of the custom, and are

supported by principle. (Bayley on Bills, 92; Violet t v. Patton,

5 Cranch, 142).

So in the present case, as there is no authority against the

validity of the indorsement, we think we shall violate no principle

in holding it to be a legal transfer of the note.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.

notes not having been collected, the bank had clearly a right to
11 them, or to dispose of them in any other reasonable and proper
manner, so as to wind up their concern . The bank cl arly had
a right to transfer the notes to the plaintiffs, and it i no concern
of the defendants how the mon y, when collected, is to b disposed
of.
As to the objection, that the indorsement is not made in the
name of th corporation, we think the indorsement by the ca hier
in his official capacity sufficiently sffows, that the mdorsement was
ma e m e a o
e an <, an i
a is no su c1en y cer
,
~intiffs have the right now to prefix the name of corporation.
The last objection i , that the indorsement on one of the notes
was not made on the back of the original note, and therefore
amounted only to an equitable transfer. The indorsement was
made on a paper attached to the back of the note by a wafer, and
it had been before thus attached for the purpose of entering
thereon indorsements of payments, the back of the original note
having been before covered with indorsements; and several payments had been indorsed on the attached paper, before the note
was transferred by indorsement to the plaintiff. This paper thus
attached had become a part of the note, and no good reason can
be given why an indorsement made thereon should not be held a
y_alid and legal transfer. The objection is, that such an indorsement is not anctioned by cu tom; but we think it is supported by
the reasons on which the custom was originally founded. Bills
of exchange and promissory notes were indorsed on the back of
the bills and notes, becau e it was a convenient mode of making
the transfer, and in order that the evidence thereof might accompany the note. Such an indor ment as this will rarely happen,
and no authority to support it could reasonably be expected; but
there is no authority against it.
If a person write his name on a blank paper, to be u ed as an
indorsement of a note to be written on the other side, and it be
filled up as int nded, the party would be held liable as indorser of
the note, although such indorsements are infrequent, and are not
according to the customary form of making a transfer; but they
have been held to be within th reason of the custom, and are
supported by principle. (Bayley on Bills, 92; Violett v. Patton,
5 ranch, 142).
So in the present case, as there is no authority against the
validity of the indorsem nt, we think we shall violate no principle
in holding it to be a legal transfer of the note.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
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continuation of negotiable character of instrument. § 49.

CONTINUATION OF NE
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HARA TER OF INSTRUMENT.

§ 49·

Leavitt v. Putnam.. (See page 97.)

Leavitt v. Putnam.. (See page 97.)

TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENT WITHOUT INDORSEMENT. § 51.

Osgood's Adm'rs v. Artt (1883), ij Fed. 575.

At Law.

W. H. Swift, for plaintiffs.

Edsall, Haivley & Edsall, for defendant.

Harlan, Justice. On the fourteenth day of May, 1856, the

TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENT WITHOUT INDORSEMENT.

§SI.

defendant, Artt, executed and delivered to the Racine & Missis-

sippi Railroad Company his note, whereby, for value received, he

promised to pay to that company or order, at the expiration of five

years from May 10, 1856, the sum of $2,500, together with interest

Osgood's Adm'rs v. Artt (1883), 17 Fed. 575.
At Law.

at the rate of 10 per cent per annum, payable annually on the

tenth day of May of each year, — principal and interest payable at

the office of the company in the city of Racine, Wisconsin. At

the same time, Artt, to secure the payment of the note, executed

W. H. Swift, for plaintiffs.
Edsall, Hawley & Edsall, for defendant.

to the company his mortgage upon certain real estate in Carroll

county,in this state. Subsequently, the company made its bond,

under date of June 10, 1856, acknowledging its indebtedness to

and promising to pay Charles Osgood, or bearer, $2,500 on the
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tenth of May, 1861, at its office in the city of New York, together

with interest from and after the tenth day of May, at the rate of

10 per cent per annum, payable semi-annually on each tenth day

of November and May, upon the presentation and surrender of

the interest coupons at the said office. That bond contained these

clauses :

"To the payment whereof the said company hereby bind

themselves firmly by these presents ; and, for the better security

of such payments being made to the holder thereof, the said com-

pany have assigned and transferred, and by these presents do

assign and transfer, to the said holder of this bond a certain note

for the sum of $2,500, executed by Robert Artt, of Carroll county,

together with a mortgage given collateral to and for the purpose

of securing the payment of the same, dated on the fourteenth day

of May, 1856, payable in five years from the tenth day of

May, 1856, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum,

which said note and mortgage are hereto appended, and arc trans-

HARLA 1 , Justice. On the fou rteenth day of May, 1856, the
defendant, rtt, x cut d and delivered to the Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company his note, whereby, for value received, he
promi ed to pay to that company or order, at the expiration of five
year from May IO, 1856, the sum of $2,500, together with interest
at the rate of IO per cent per annum, payable annually on the
tenth day of May of each year,-principal and interest payable at
the office of the company in the city of Racine, Wisconsin. At
the same time, Artt, to ecure the payment of the note, executed
to the company hi mortgage upon certain r al estate in Carroll
county,in this state. Subsequently, the company made its bond,
under date of June IO, 1856, acknowledging its indebtedne to
and promi ing to pay harles Osgood, or bearer, $2,500 on the
tenth of May, 1861, at its office in the city of New York, together
with interest from and aft r the tenth day of May, at the rate of
IO p r cent p r annum, payable emi-annually on each tenth day
of November and May, upon the presentation and surrender of
the intere t coupons at the aid office. That bond contained these
clauses :
"To the payment whereof the said company hereby bind
themselve firmly by th e pre ent ; and, for the better security
of such payments being made to the holder thereof, the aid company have assigned and trans{ erred and by these pres nts -do
assign and transfer, to th said h ld r of this bond a certain note
for the sum of $2,500, ex cuted by Robert rtt, of Carroll aunty,
together with a mortgage given collateral to and for the purpose
of ecuring the payment of the same dated on the fourteenth day
ar from the tenth da_ of
of May, 1856, pa able in five
May, 1856, with intere t at the rat of IO per cent per annum,
which said note and mortgage ar h r to appende , and ar trans-
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ferable in connection zvith this bond, and not otherwise, to any

parties or purchasers whomsoever. And the said company do

hereby authorize and empower the holder of this bond at any time,

in case said company shall fail to perform any of the foregoing

stipulations by neglecting to pay either principal or interest on

this bond when the same shall become due, to proceed and fore-

close the said mortgage, or take such other legal remedy on said

note and mortgage against said mortgagor, or against this com-

pany on this present bond, or on both, as shall seem proper and

expedient to said holder hereof."

Some time in the summer of 1857 the railroad company sold

the bond, delivering therewith the note and mortgages to plaintiffs'

intestate, — the bond, note, and mortgage being attached firmly

together with eyelets in the order in which they are named, the

bond on the top, next the note, and then the mortgage. The bond,

note, and mortgage each bears the number 1,964 written thereon

in ink. At the time of such purchase and delivery Osgood had no

notice of any defense to the note, nor of any of the matters alleged

in defendant's third plea. That plea states facts which are con-

ceded to show a good defense as between Artt and the railroad

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

company, viz., an entire failure of consideration, and also fraud,

upon the part of the company, in procuring the execution of the

note and mortgage. The note, bond, and mortgage, after their

delivery to deceased, remained attached in the manner just stated.

Upon the back of the note are the words "Racine & Mississippi

Railroad Company, by H. S. Durand, President," which is the

indorsement of the railroad company, placed thereon by its author-

ity. It had not, however, been placed there when Osgood pur-

chased and received the note, bond, and mortgage, but was made

at some date subsequent to June, 1859. Before the indorsement

was, in fact, made on the note, but after the purchase by Osgood,

he had notice as well of the fraud practiced by the railroad on

Artt, as of the failure of consideration in the note, as set out

in the defendant's third plea.

These facts have been specially found by a jury, and the sole

question for determination is whether, upon this finding, the plain-

tiffs are entitled to judgment. The only issue of fact made on the

third plea is whether Osgood, prior to the indorsement of the note,

had notice of the alleged fraud and failure of consideration.

1. It is a settled doctrine of the law-merchant that the bo na

_fof£j}urchaser for value of ne gotiable paper, payable to order, if

it be indorsed by the payee, takes the legal title unaffected by anv t

e quities which the payor may have a s, affainst the payee.

ferable in connection ivith this bond, and not otherwise, to any
partie or purchasers whom oever. And the said company do
h reby authorize and mpower the holder of this bond at any time,
in ca e said company shall fail to perform any of the foregoing
tipulation by negl cting to pay either principal or interest on
this bond when the same shall become due, to proce d and foreclo e the said mortgag , or take such other legal remedy on said
note and mortgage a ain t aid mortgagor, or again t this company on thi pre ent bond, or on both, as shall seem proper and
expedient to said holder hereof."
Some time in the summer of 1857 the railroad company sold
the bond, delivering therewith the note and mortgages to plaintiffs'
inte tate,-the bond, note, and mortgage being attached firmly
together with eyelet in the order in which they are named, the
bond on the top, next the note, and then the mortgage. The bond,
note, and mortgage each bears the number l,964 written thereon
in ink. At the time of such purchase and delivery Osgood had no
notice of any defen e to the note, nor of any of the matters alleged
in defendant's third plea. That plea states facts which are conceded to show a good defense as between Artt and the railroad
company, viz., an entire failure of consideration, and also fraud,
upon the part of the company, in procuring the execution of the
note and mortgage. The note, bond, and mortgage, after their
delivery to deceased, remained attached in the manner just stated.
Upon the back of the note are the words "Racine & Mississippi
Railroad Company, by H. S. Durand, President," which is the
indorsement of the railroad company, placed thereon by its authority. It had not, however, been placed there when Osgood purchased and received the note, bond, anq mortgage, but was made
at some date subsequent to June, 1859. Before the indorsement
was, in fact, made on the note, but after the purchase by Osgood,
he had notice as well of the fraud practiced by the railroad on
Artt, as of the failure of consideration in the note, as set out
in the defendant' third plea.
These facts have been specially found by a jury, and the sole
question for determination is whether, upon this finding, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. The only issue of fact made on the
third plea is whether sa-ood, prior to the indorsement of the note,
had notice of the alleged fraud and failure of consideration.
r. It is a settled doctrine of the law-merchant that the bona
fide purchaser for value of n a-otiable paper, a able to order if
it be in orse y t e payee, ta {es t 1e ega title unaffected by any.
e uitie which the a or ma have
the a ee.
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2. But it is equally well settled that the purchascr , _ if the

paperb e delivered to him without indorsement, takes, by the law-

merc hant, only the rights which the p ayee has, and there fore tak es

subject to any defense the payor may rightf ully asse rTTs against

the payee. The purchaser in such case becomes only the equitable

owner of the claim or debt evidenced by the negotiable security,

and, in the absence of defense by the payor, may demand and

receive the amount due, and, if not paid, sue for its recovery, in

the name of the payee, or in his own name, when so authorized by

the local law.

3. As a general rule the legal . title to negotiable paper, pay-

able to order, passes, according to the law-merchant, only by the

payee's indorsement on the_security itself . The only established

exception to this rule is where the indorsement is made on a piece

of paper, so attached to the original instrument as, in effect, to

become part thereof, or be incorporated into it. This addition is

called, in the adjudged cases and elementary treatises, an allonge.

That device had its origin in cases where the back of the instru-

ment had been covered with indorsements, or writing, leaving no

room for further indorsements thereon. But, perhaps, an indorse-
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ment upon a piece of paper, attached in the manner indicated,

would now be deemed sufficient to pass the legal title, although

there may have been, in fact, room for it on the original instru-

ment.

4. But neither the general doctrines of commercial law, no^

any established exception thereto, make words of mere assignment

and transfer of such paper — contained in a separate instrument,

executed for a wholly different and distinct purpose — equiva-

lent to an indorsement within the rule, which admits the payor

to urge, as against the holder of an unindorsed negotiable

security, payable to order, any valid defense which he has

against the original payee.

5. The transfer of the note in s uit, by words ofa s signment

in the body of the railroad company's b ond, djd rioTTiaThe judg-

ment of the cour t, amount to an indorsem ent of the' n ote, although

TheTjond, not e, and mortgage were originally fastened together by -

" eyelets." The facts set out in the third plea, and sustained by the'

special finding, constitute, therefore, a complete defense to the

action, unless, as contended by plaintiffs, the subsequent indorse-

ment, in form, by the railroad company, after Osgood was

informed of Artt's defense, has relation back to the time when

the former, without notice of such defense, purchased the note

for value then paid. If, at the time of Osgood's purchase, it had
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2.
But it i equally ' 11 settled that the purchaser, if the
paper be delivered to him without indor ement, tak , by the lawmerchant, onl the ri ht v hich th pay e ha , and therefore takes
subj ct to an d fense the pa or ma rig u y as rt as again t
ecomes on y e equitable
t e payee. Th purcha r in uch ca
owner of the claim or debt evidenced by the negotiable security,
and, in the absence of defen by the payor, may demand and
r ceiv the amount due, and, if not paid, sue for its recovery, in
the name of the payee, or in his own name, when so authorized by
the local law.
3.
s a general rule the legal title to negotiable paper, payable to order, pa ses, according to the law-merchant, only by the
payee' indor ement on the ecurity itself. The only established
exception to thi rule is ' here the indorsement is made on a piece
of paper, so attached to the original in trument as, in effect, to
become part thereof, or be incorporated into it. This addition is
called, i_n the adjudged ca es and elementary treati es, an allonge.
That device had its origin in case where the back of the in trument had been covered with indorsements, or writing, leaving no
room for further indor ements thereon. But, perhaps, an indorsement upon a piece of paper, attached in the manner indicated,
would now be deemed ufficient to pass the legal title, although
there may have been, in fact, room for it on the original instrument.
4. But neither the general doctrines of commercial law, nor
any e tabli hed exception thereto, make words of mere a signment
and tran fer of uch paper-contained in a eparate in trument,
executed for a wholly different and di tinct purpose-equivalent to an indor ement within the rule, which admits the payor
to uro-e, a against the holder of an unindor ed negotiable
ecurity, payable to order, any valid defen
which he has
against the original payee.
5. The tran fer of the note in suit, by words of as ignment
in the body of the railroad company' bond did not, m the j udg--:
ment of the court, amount t an indorsement otthe note althou 1i
t e on , note, and morto-a e wer ori ma y a ene too-ether by
eye e .
e facts set out in th third _l)lea, and u tained by t e
to the
special' finding, con titute, therefor , a complete d f n
action unless, a contended by plaintiff , the ub equ nt indorsement, in form, by the railroad compan , after
o-ood v a
informed of Artt' defen e, ha r lation back to the tim when
the forme r, without notic of u h def n e, purcha ed the note
for valu then paid. If, at the time of
o-ood · pur ha ,. it had

314
314 Transfer of Instrument Without Indorsement

been agreed that the company should indorse the note, but the

indorsement was omitted by accident or mistake or fraud upon

the part of the company, a different question would have been

presented. In such case, the company might, perhaps, have been

compelled to make an indorsement which would have been deemed

effectual as of the time when, according to the intention of the

parties, it should have been made. But no such case is presented

by the special finding. It is entirely consistent with the facts

found that the indorsement by the company was an afterthought,

induced by notice of Artt's defense, and was not within the con-

templation or contract of the parties when Osgood purchased the

bond. Moreover, and as a circumstance significant of an inten-

tion to restrict, in some degree, the assignability of the note and

mortgage, it is expressly stipulated, in the company's bond, that

they are transferable in connection with the bond, and not other-

wise.

I am of opinion that the facts which came to Osgood's knowl-

edge prior to the indorsement, and which, in substance, constitute

the defense set out in the third plea, furnished notice that the

company had, by reason of fraud and failure of consideration,
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lost its right to demand payment of the note from Artt. J3y__the_

indorsement, after such notice, Osgood could not a cquire any

greater rig hts than the company possessed. He did not become

The holder of the note by indorsement, as required by the law-

merchant, until after he had notice that the company could not

rightfully pass the legal title, so as to defeat Artt's defense.

While the adjudged cases are not in harmony upon some of

these propositions, the conclusions indicated are, in the opinion

of the court, consistent with sound reason, and are sustained by

the great weight of authority. (Chief Justice Marshall, in Hop-

kirk v. Page, 2 Brook. 41 ; Sturges' Sons v. Met. Nat. Bank, 49

111. 231 ; Melendy v. Keen, 89 111. 404; Haskell v. Brown, 65 111.

37; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 24; Bacon v. Cohca,

12 Smedes & M. 522; Grand Gidf Bank v. Wood, Id. 482; Clark

v. Whitaker, 50 N. H. 474 ; Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468 ;

Franklin v. Twogood, 18 Iowa 515; French v. Turner, 15 Ind.

59; Folger v. Chase, 18 Pick. 63; Whistler v. Forstcr, 14 C. B.

246, [108 E. C. L. 248] ; Harrop v. Fisher, 10 C. B. [N. S.] 196;

Gibson v. Minet, 1 H. Bl. s. p. 606; Story, Notes, § 120; Story,

Bills, §201; Chitty, Bills, [12th Amer. from 9th Lond.] 252; 2

Pars. Notes & Bills, 1, 17, 18; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. [3d Ed.]

§§ 664a, 689a, 690, 741, and 748a).

The facts specially found do not authorize a judgment for the

plaintiffs. ft k
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b n agreed that the company should indorse the note, but the
indorsement was omitted by accid nt or mistake or fraud upon
the part of the company, a different que tion would have been
pre ented. In such case, the company might, perhaps, have been
compelled to make an indorsement which would have been deemed
effectual as of the time when, according to the intention of the
parti s, it should have been made. But no such case is pre ented
by the special finding. It is entirely consistent with the facts
found that the indorsement by the company was an afterthought,
induced by notice of Artt's defen e, and was not within the contemplation or contract of the partie when Osgood purchased the
bond. Moreover, and as a circumstance significant of an intention to restrict, in some degree, the assignability of the note and
mortgage, it is expressly stipulated, in the company's bond, that
they are transferable in connection with the bond, and not otherwise.
I am of opinion that the facts which came to Osgood's knowledge prior to the indorsement, and which, in substance, constitute
the defense set out in the third plea, furni hed notice that the
company had, by rea on of fratJ.d and failure of consideration,
lost its right to demand payment of the note from Artt. By the
indorsement, after such notice, Osgood could not acquire any
greater rights than the company possessed. He did not become
the holder of the note by indorsenient, a required by the lawmerchant, until after he had notice that the company could not
rightfully pass the legal title, so as to defeat Artt's defense.
While the adjudged case are not in harmony upon some of
these propositions, the conc1usions indicated are, in the opinion
of the court, con istent with sound reason, and are ustained by
the great weight of authority. (Chief Justice Mar hall, in Hopkirk v. Page, 2 rook. 41; Sturges' Sons v. Met. Nat. Bank, 49
Ill. 231; Melendy v. Keen, 89 Ill. 404; Haskell v. Brown, 65 Ill.
37; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, roo Mass. 24; Bacon v. Cohea.,
12 Smedes & M. 522; Grand Gulf Ban!i v. Wood, Id. 482; Clarli
v. Whitaker, 50 N. H. 474; Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468 ;
Franklin v. Twogood, r8 Iowa 515; French v. Turner, 15 Ind.
59; Folger v. Chase, r8 Pick. 63; Whistler v. Forster, 14 C.
246, [ro8 E. C. L. 248]; Harrop v. Fisher, ro . B. [N. S.] 196;
Gibson v. Minet, r H. Bl. s. p. 606 · Story, Notes, § 120; Story
Bill , § 201; Chitty Bills, [12th Amer. from 9th Lond.] 252; 2
Pars. Notes & Bills, r, 17, 18; I Daniel, Neg. Inst. [3d Ed.]
§§ 64a, 689a, 690, 741, and 748a).

The facts specially found do not a?tthorize a judgment for the
plaintiffs.
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The Goshen Nat' I Bank v. Bingham et al (1890), 118 N. Y. 349.

The Goshen

at' l Bank v . Bingham et al. ( I890), I I8 N. Y. 349.

Bingham et al. v. The Goshen Nat'l Bank.

Appeals from judgments rendered by the General Term of

Bingham et al. ,. . The Goshen

at l Bank.

the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered upon

orders made March 31, 1887, which affirmed a judgment in the

action first above entitled in favor of defendants and a judgment

in action second above entitled in favor of plaintiffs, both of

which were entered upon the reports of a referee.

On November 27, 1884, Benjamin D. Brown applied to the

cashier of the Goshen National Bank, appellant, at Goshen, N. Y.,

to cash a sight draft for $17,000, drawn by him upon the firm of

William Bingham & Co., of New York, the individual members

of which firm are the respondents, accompanied by a quantity of

the bonds of the West Point Manufacturing Company, of the face

value of $17,000. Brown represented that he had negotiated a

sale of these bonds at their face value with William Bingham &

Co. ; that they had directed him to draw upon them at sight for

$17,000, the draft to be accompanied by the bonds, and that the

draft would be paid upon presentation. Such representations

were absolutely false. The bonds had no market value. Brown
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was a bankrupt and had no funds in the bank except such as

resulted from the credit given him upon the faith of the draft

on Bingham & Co., accompanied by the bonds. The cashier of

the Goshen National Bank, relying upon such representations,

cashed the draft of $17,000, and placed the proceeds to the credit

of Brown upon the books of the bank. He gave Brown sight

drafts on New York for $12,000, and certified a check drawn by

Brown to his own order, dated November 26, 1884, for $5,000.

On the morning of November twenty-eight, Brown called at

the office of William Bingham & Co., and stated that he wanted

to get some currency. Mr. Bingham passed the check to the

firm's cashier directing him to give Brown currency for the

amount. The cashier gave him a check drawn on the Corn

Exchange Bank for $5,000. Brown had the check cashed at the

Corn Exchange Bank. He also had the New York drafts cashed,

amounting to $12,000, which he had obtained from the Goshen

National Bank. After procuring the checks and drafts to be

cashed, he fled to Canada, where he remained at the time of the

trial of these actions. When Bingham & Co. took from Brown

the check certified by the Goshen National Bank it was not

indorsed.

The referee found in the action second entitled that "at the

App als from judgm nts rend ered by the
neral Term of
th Supreme ourt in th first judicial department, ntered upon
order made March 31, l 7, which affirm d a judgment in the
action first above ntitl d in favor of d fendant and a judgment
in action second above ntitl d in favor of plaintiffs, both of
which were entered upon th r port f a ref r .
On Nov mber 27, r8 4, Benjamin D. Brown applied to the
cashier of the Gosh n National ank, appellant, at o hen, . Y.,
to ca h a sight draft for $17 ooo, drawn by him upon the firm of
William ingham & o., of New York, the individual members
of which firm are the re pondents, accompanied by a quantity of
the bonds of the We t Point Manufacturing Company, of the face
valu of $17,000.
rown represented that he had negotiated a
sale of the e bond at their face value with William Bingham &
Co.· that they had directed him to draw upon them at sight for
$17,000, the draft to be accompani d by the bonds, and that the
araft would be paid upon presentation. Such representations
were ab olutely fal e. The bond had no market value. Brown
was a bankrupt and had no funds in the bank except such as
re ulted from the credit given him upon the faith of the draft
on Bina-ham & Co., accompanied by the bond . The cashier of
the o hen National Bank, relying upon such repre entation ,
cashed the draft of $17,000, and placed the proceeds to the credit
of rown upon the book of th bank. H a-ave rown io-ht
draft on ew York for $12,000 and certified a check dra"' n by
Brown to hi own ord r, dated November 26 l 4, for 5,000.
On the mornino- of November twenty-eight,
rown call d at
t he office of William Bingham & Co., and stated that he v anted
t o get some currency. Mr. Bin ham passed th check to the
fi rm's ca hier directing him to ive Brov\ n currenc for the
amount. The cashier a-ave him a check drawn on the orn
Exchange Bank for $5,000. Brown had th h ck cashed at the
Corn Exchano-e Bank. He also had th New York draft ca hed,
amounting to $12 ooo, which he had obtain d from the Go hen
Nati onal Bank. After procurino- th ch cks and draft to be
cashed, he fled to Canada, wher he r mained at the time of the
t rial of these actions. When ino-ham & Co. took from rown
t he check certifi ed by the Go h n National ank it v a not
indorsed.
The referee found in th e action second entitl d that "at the

316

TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENT WITHOUT lNDORSEMENT

316 Transfer of Instrument Without Indorsement

time of the transfer of the said certified check by Brown to the

plaintiffs, it was intended both by Brown and the plaintiffs that

said certified check should be indorsed by Brown, and it was

supposed by both parties that he had so indorsed it, and if the

plaintiff had known that it was not indorsed they would not have

paid the consideration therefor."

He found, in the action second entitled, "that Brown made

no statement to the defendants, or either of them, at the time of

the trensfer of the check that such check was indorsed."

And "prior to the commencement of the action of replevin

the defendants never requested Brown to indorse said check."

While Bingham & Co. held the check in question unindorsed,

a demand for its return to the bank, accompanied by a full expla-

nation of the circumstances under which the certification was

obtained, was made upon Bingham & Co., in behalf of the bank,

and upon their refusal to return it, an action to recover its pos-

session was commenced by the bank against Bingham & Co.

That action is, firstly, above entitled.

Subsequently, and on December sixteenth, Bingham & Co.

obtained from Brown a power of atterney to indorse the check.
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Pursuant thereto the check was indorsed and payment thereafter

demanded of the bank.

This was refused, and thereupon the action, secondly, above

entitled, was commenced by Bingham & Co., to recover the

amount of the check.

Henry Bacon, for appellant.

Joseph F. Mosher, for respondents.

Parker, J. As against Brown, to whose order the check

was payable, the bank had a good defense. But it could not

defeat a recovery by a bona fide holder to whom the check had

been indorsed for value. By an oversight on the part of both

Brown and Bingham & Co. the check was accepted and cashed

without the indorsement of the payee. Before the authority to,

indorse the name of the payee upon the check was procured and

time of the transfer of the said certified check by Brown to the
plaintiff , it was intended both by Brown and the plaintiffs that
said certified ch ck should be indorsed by Brown, and it was
supposed by both pa'rties that he had so indorsed it, and if the
plaintiff had known that it was not indorsed they would not have
paid the consideration therefor."
He found, in the action second entitled, "that Brown made
no statement to the defendants, or either of them, at the time of
the trensfer of the check that such check was indorsed."
And "prior to the commencement of the action of replevin
the defendant never reque ted Brown to indorse aid check."
While Bingham & Co. held the check in question unindorsed,
a demand for it return to the bank, accompanied by a full explanation of the circumstances under which the certification was
obtained, wa made upon Bingham & Co., in behalf of the bank,
and upon their refusal to return it, an action to recover its possession was commenced by the bank against Bingham & Co.
That action is, firstly, above entitled.
Subsequenqy, and on December sixteenth, Bingham & Co.
obtained from Brown a power of atterney to indorse the check.
Pursuant thereto the check was indorsed and payment thereafter
demanded of the bank.
This was refused, and thereupon the action, secondly, above
entitled, was commenced by Bingham & Co., to recover the
amount of the check.

its subsequent indorsement thereon, Bingham & Co. had notice

of the fraud which constituted a defense for the bank as against

Brown. Can the recovery had be sustained?

Henry Bacon, for appellant.
Joseph F. Masher, for respondents.

It is too well settled by authority, both in England and in

this country, to permit of questioning, that a purchaser of a

draft, or check, who obtains title without an indorsement by the

payee, holds it subject to all equities and defenses existing

between the original parties, even though he has paid full _con-

PARKER, J. As against Brown, to whose order the check
was payable, the bank had a good defense. But it could not
defeat a recovery by a bona fid e holder to whom the check had
been indorsed for value. By an oversight on the part of both
Brown and Bingham & Co. the check was accepted and cashed
without the indorsement of the payee. Before the authority to
indorse the name of the payee upon the check was procured and
its subsequent indorsement thereon, Bingham & Co. had notice
of the fraud which constitut d a defense for the bank as against
Brown. Can the recovery had be sustained?
It is too w 11 s ttled by authority, both in England and in
this country, to permit of questioning, that a purchaser of a
draft, or check, who obtains title without an indorsement by the
paye , holds it subject to all equities and defenses existing
between the original parties, even though he has paid full con-
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siderati on, without notice of the existence of su ch equities and

defenses. '(Harrop v. Fisher, 30 L. J. [C. L., N. S.] 283; Wh ist-

ler v. Forster, 14 C. B. [N. S.] 246; Savage v. King, 17 Me. 301 ;

Clark v. Callison, 7 111. 263; Haskell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 468;

Clark v. Whitaker, 50 N. H. 474; Calder v. Billington, 15 Me.

398; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor, 100 Mass. 18; Gilbert v.

Sharp, 2 Lans. 412; Hedges v. 5>a/y, 9 Barb. 214-218; Franklin

Bank v. Raymond, 3 Wend. 69 ; Raynor v. Hoagland, 7 J. & S.

1 1 ; M«//<?r v. Pondir, 55 N. Y. 325 ; Freund v. Importers &

Traders' Bank, 76 id. 352; 7>ms* Co. v. iVaf. £ajz&, 101 U. S.

68; Osgood v. ^/rtt, 17 Fed. Rep. 575.)

The reasoning on which this doctrine is founded may be

briefly stated as follows: The general rule is that no one can

transfer a better title than he possesses. An exception arises out

of the rule of the law-merchant, as to negotiable instruments.

It is founded on the commercial policy of sustaining the credit

of commercial paper. Being treated as currency in commercial

transactions, such instruments are subject to the same rule as

money. If transferred by indorsement, for value, in good faith

and before maturity, they become available in the hands of the
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holder, notwithstanding the existence of equities, and defenses,

which would have rendered them unavailable in the hands of a

prior holder.

This rule is only applicable to negotiable instruments which

are negotiated according to the law-merchant.

When, as in this case, such an instrument is transferred but

with out an indorsement, it is treated as a chose in action assigned

to th e purchaser. The assignee acquires all the title of the

assignor and may maintain an action thereon in his own name.

And like other choses in action it is subject to all the equities

and defenses existing in favor of the maker or acceptor against

the previous holder.

Prior to the indorsement of this check, therefore, Bingham

& Co. were subject to the defense existing in favor of the bank

as against Brown, the payee.

Evidence of an intention on the part of the pavee to indorse

does not aid the plaintiff. It is the act of indorsement, not the

jnt ention, which negotiates the instrument, and it cannot be said

that the intent constitutes the act.

The effect of the indorsement made after notice to Bingham

& Co. of the bank's defense must now be considered. Did it

relate back to the time of the transfer, so as to constitute the

plaintiffs holders by indorsement as of that time?
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sideration, without n tic
f th e x i tence of such e uiti s
de en . (Harrop v. Fisher, 30 L. J. [C. L. , N. .] 283; Whistler v. Forster, 14 . . [ . .] 24 ; Savage v. King, 17 Me. 301;
Clark v. Callison, 7 Ill. 2 3 ; H askell v. Mitchell, 53 Me. 46 ;
Clark v. Whitak er, 50 N. II. 474; alder v. Billington, 15 Me.
398; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Ta-ylor, roo Ma s. r ; Gilbert v.
Sharp, 2 Lans. 41 2; H edg s v. ealy, 9 arb. 214-218; Fran/din
Bank v. Raym ond, 3 W nd. 69 ; R aynor v. Hoagland, 7 J. &
r r; NJ uller v. P ondir, 55 N. Y. 325; Freund v. hnporters &
Traders' Bank, 76 id. 352 ; T r ust Co. v. N at. Bank, IOI U. S.
68; Osg ood v. Artt, 17 F ed. Rep. 575.)
The rea oning on which this doctrine is founded may be
briefly stated as fo llows : The general rule is that no one can
trans£ r a better titl than he po ses es. An exception arises out
of th rule of the law-merchant, as to negotiable instruments.
It is found ed on the commercial _policy of sustaining the credit
eing treated as currency in commercial
of com mercial paper.
transactions, sucli m truments are subject to the same rule as
money. If transferred by indorsement, for value, in good faith
and before maturity, they become available in the hands of the
holder, notwithstanding the existence of equities, and defenses,
which would have rendered them unavailable in the hands of a
prior holder.
Thi rule is only applicable to negotiable instruments which
are n o-otiated according to the law-merchant.
When, as in thi case. such an instrument is transferred but
without an indorsement, it is treated as a chose in action assig-ned
to the purchaser. The as ignee acquires all the title of the
a ignor anCl may maintain an action thereon in his own name.
nd like other chose in action it is subject to all the equities
and def nses existing in favor of the maker or acceptor against
the previous holder.
Prior to the indorsement of this check, therefore, Bingham
& Co. were subject to the defense exi ting in favor of the bank
as again t Brown, the payee.
Evidence of an intention on the part of the payee to indorse
does not aid the plaintiff. It is the act of indor ement. not th;
intention, which negotiates the instrument, and it cannot be aid
that the intent constitutes the act.
The effect of the indorsement made after notice to Bino-ham
& Co. of the bank's defense mu t now be con id red. Did it
relate back to the time of the transfer, o as to con titute the
plaintiffs holders by indorsement as of that time?
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While the referee finds that it was intended both by Brown

and the plaintiffs that the check should be indorsed, and it was

supposed that he had so indorsed it, he also finds that Brown

made no statement to the effect that the check was indorsed;

neither did the defendants request Brown to indorse it. There

was, therefore, no agreement to indorse. Nothing whatever was

said upon the subject. Before Brown did agree to indorse the

plaintiffs had notice of the bank's defense. Indeed, it had com-

menced an action to recover possession of the check.

It would seem, therefore, that having taken title by assign-

ment, for such was the legal effect of the transaction, by reason

of which the defense of the bank against Brown became effectual

as a defense against a recovery on the check in the hands of the

plaintiffs as well, that Brown, and Bingham & Co., could not,

by any subsequent agreement or act, so change the legal charac-

ter of the transfer as to affect the equities and rights which had

accrued to the bank. That the subsequent act of indorsement

could not relate back so as to destroy the intervening rights and

remedies of a third party .

This position is supported by authority. (Harrop v. Fisher;
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Whistler v. Forster; Savage v. King; Haskell v. Mitchell; Clark

v. Whitaker; Clark v. Callison; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor;

Gilbert v. Sharp, cited, supra.)

Watkins v. Maule (2 Jac. & Walk. 243) and Hughes v. Nel-

son (29 N. J. Eq. 547) are cited by the plaintiff in opposition to

the view we have expressed.

In Watkins v. Maule, the holder of a note, obtained without

indorsement, collected it from the makers. Subsequently the mak-

ers complained that the note was only given as a guarantee to the

payee who had become bankrupt. Thereupon the holder refunded

the money and took up the note upon the express agreement that

the makers would pay any amount which the holders should fail

to make out of the bankrupt payee's property. The makers were

held liable for the deficiency. Hughes v. Nelson did not involve

the precise question here presented. The views expressed, how-

ever, are in conflict with some of the cases cited but we regard it

in such respect as against the weight of authority. Freund v.

Importers & Traders' Bank (supra) does not aid the plaintiff. In

that case it was held "that the certification by the bank of a check

in the hands of a holder who had purchased it for value from

the payee, but which had not been indorsed by him, rendered the

bank liable to such holder for the amount thereof. By accepting

the check the bank took, as it had a right to do, the risk of the

While the referee finds that it was intended both by Brown
and the plaintiff that the check should be indorsed, and it was
suppo ed that he had so indorsed it, he also finds that Brown
made no statement to the effect that the check was indorsed;
neither did the defendants request Brown to indorse it. There
was, therefore, no agreement to indorse. Nothing whatever was
said upon the subject. Before Brown did agree to indorse the
plaintiffs had notice of the bank's defense. Indeed, it had commenced an action to recover possession of the check.
It would seem, therefore, that having taken title by assignment, for such was the legal effect of the transaction, by reason
of which the defense of the bank against Brown became effectual
as a defense against a recovery on the check in the hands of the
plaintiffs as well, that Brown, and Bingham & Co., could not,
by any subsequent agreement or act, so change the legal character of the transfer as to affect the equities and rights which had
accrued to the bank. That the subsequent act of indorsement
could not relate back so as to destroy the intervening rights and
remedies of a third party.
This position is supported by authority. (Harrop v. Fisher;
Whistler v. Forster; Savage v. King; Haskell v. Mitchell; Clark
v. Whitaker; Clark v. Callison; Lancaster Nat. Bank v. Taylor;
Gilbert v. Sharp, cited, supra.)
Watkins v. Maule (2 Jae. & Walk. 243) and H ughes v. Nelson (29 N. J. Eq. 547) are cited by the plaintiff in opposition to
the view we have expressed.
In Watk':'.ns v. Maule, the holder of a ncte, obtained without
indorsement, collected it from the makers. Subsequently the makers complained that the note was only given as a guarantee to the
payee who had become bankrupt. Thereupon the holder refunded
the money and took up the note upon the express agreement that
the makers would pay any amount which the holders should fail
to make out of the bankrupt payee's property. The makers were
held liable for the deficiency. Hughes v. Nelson did not involve
the precise question here presented. The views expres ed, however, are in conflict with some of the cases cited but we regard it
in such respect as against the weight of authority. Freund v.
Importers & Traders' Bamk (s'upra) does not aid the plaintiff. In
that case it was held "that the certifica,tion by the bank of a check
in the hands of a holder who had purchased it for value from
the payee, but which had not been indorsed by him, rendered the
bank liable to such holder for the amount thereof. By accepting
1he check the bank took, as it had a right to do, the risk of the
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title which the holder claimed to have acquired from the payee.

In such case the bank enters into contract with the holder by

which it accepts the check and promises to pay it to the holder,

notwithstanding it lacks the indorsement provided for, and it was

accordingly held that it was liable upon such acceptance upon the

same principles that control the liabilities of other acceptors of

commercial paper." (Lynch v. First National Bank of Jersey

City, 107 N. Y. 183). But one question remains.

The learned referee held, and in that respect he was sustained

by the General Term, that the bank by its certification repre-

sented to every one that Brown had on deposit with it $5,000;

that such amount had been set apart for the satisfaction of the

check, and that it should be so applied whenever the check should

be presented for payment, and that Bingham & Co., having acted

upon the faith of these representations and having parted with

$5,000 on the strength thereof, the bank is estopped from assert-

ing its defense.

The referee omitted an important feature of the contract of

certification. The bank did certify that it had the money ; would

retain it and apply it in payment, provided the check should be
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indorsed by the payee. (Lynch v. First National Bank of Jersey

~Ciiy, supra).

Ifjhe check had been transferred to plaintiffs by indorsement

the defendant would have had no defense, not because of the doc- ^

trine of estoppel, but upon principles especia lly applicabl e to nego-

HaT5Ie~Tnstruments. (Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R.

nCT3"N. Y.638).

If the maker or acceptor could ever be held to be estopped

by reason of representations contained in a negotiable instrument

he certainly could not be in the absence of a compliance with the

provisions upon which he had represented that his liability should

depend.

But it is well settled that the maker or acceptor of a negoti-

able instrument is not estopped from contesting its validity,

because of representation s contained in the instrument. In such

cases an estoppel can only be founded upon some separate and

distinct writing or statement. (Clark v. Session, 22 N. Y. 312;

Bush v. Lathrop, 22 id. 535; Moore v. Metropolitan Bank, 55 id.

41 ; Fairbanks v. Sargent, 104 id. 108; Mechanics' Bank v. N. Y.

& N. H. R. R. Co., supra).

The views expressed especially relate to the action of Bing-

ham & Co. against the bank and call for a reversal of the judg-

ment.
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title which the holder claimed to have acquired from the payee.
In such case the bank enters into contract with the holder by
wh ich it accepts the check and promises to pay it to the holder,
notwithstanding it lacks the indorsement provided for, and it was
accordingly held that it was liable upon such acceptance upon the
ame principles that control the liabilities of other acceptors of
commercial paper." (Lynch v. First National Bank of Jersey
.City, 107 N. Y. 183). But one question remains.
The learned referee held, and in that respect he was sustained
by the General Term, that the bank by its certification represented to every one that Brown had on deposit with it $5,000;
that such amount had been set apart for the satisfaction of the
ch ck, and that it should be so applied whenever the check should
be presented for payment, and that Bingham & Co., having acted
upon the faith of these representations and having parted with
$s,ooo on the strength thereof, the bank is estopped from asserting its defense.
The referee omitted an important feature of the contract of
~ertification. The bank did certify that it had the money; would
retain it and a ply it in a ment rovided the check should e
indorsed b~ the payee. (Lynch v. irst Nationa Ban o
=city, supra .
If the check had been transferred to plaintiffs by indorsement
the defendant would have had no defense, not because of the doctrine of esto
les
i 11 a hcable to ne
tia e mstruments.
Bank v. N. Y. & . H. R.
t 0.) l 3 N. y. 638) .
If the maker or acceptor could ever be held to be estopped
by reason of representations contained in a negotiable instrument
he certainly could not be in the absence of a compliance with the
provisions upon which he had represented that his liability should
depend.
But it is well settled that the maker or acceptor of a negotiable instrument is not estopped from contesting its validity,
because of representations contained in the instrument. In such
cases an estoppel can only be founded upon some separate and
distinct writing or statement. (Clark v. Session, 22 N. Y. 312;
Bush v. Lathrop, 22 id. 535; Moore v. lYI etropolitan Bank, 55 id.
41; Fairbanks v. Sargent, 104 id. 108; M echanfrs' Bank v. N. Y.
& N. H. R.R. Co., supra).
The views expressed e pecially relate to the action of Bingham & Co. against the bank and call for a rev r al of the judgment.
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We are of the opinion that the action brought by the bank

against Bingham & Co. to recover possession of the check cannot

be maintained, and in that case the judgment should be affirmed.

All concur, except Haight J., not sitting.

Judgments accordingly.

ir^
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TRANSFER BY DELIVERY

We are of the opinion that the action brought by the bank
against Bingham & Co. to recover poss ssion of the check cannot
be maintained, and in that ca the judgm nt hould be affirmed.
A ll concur, except HAIGHT J., not itting.
Judgments accor3,ingly.

~Ao\· --- ~~

Bitser v. Wagar (1890), 83 Mich. 223.

Error to Oceana. Dickerman, J.

§ 32.

TRANSFER BY DELIVERY·

Assumpsit. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The facts

are stated in the opinion.

W. E. Ambler, for appellant.

Bitzer v. Wagar (1890), 83 Mich. 223.

Fred J. Russell, for plaintiff.

Long, J. This action was brought in the circuit court for

Oceana county, upon a promissory note reading as follows :

"$100.00. Hart, Mich., March 20, 1889.

"Eight months after date I promise to pay to the order of

Marget A. Bitzer (or bearer) one hundred dollors, at the Oceana

Error to Oceana. Dickerman, J.
Assumpsit. Defendant brings error.
are stated in the opinion.

Affirmed.

The facts

County Savings Bank, value received, with interest at the rate of

6 per cent. "Bert Spellman.
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"G. A. Wagar."

W. E. Ambler, for appellant.
Fred J. Russell, for plaintiff.

On the trial the plaintiff had judgment. Defendant brings

error on the ground:

2. That the court erred in admitting in evidence the note

in question, for the reasons —

LONG, J. This action was brought in the circuit court for
Oceana county, upon a pr8missory note reading as follows:

a — That the note is payable to the order of Marget A. Bitzer,

and has never been indorsed or transferred by her to plaintiff, and

the title and ownership is still in Marget A. Bitzer, and not in

plaintiff.

b — That said note is not competent evidence, for the reason

that plaintiff has not shown that he owns or has property in said

note.

The note is plainly payable to bearer, and suit could be main-

tained t hereon in the name oTany holder .

The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

The other justices concurred. .

Day v. Longhurst. (See page 268.)

HART, MICH., March 20, I889.
"Eight months after date I promise to pay to the order of
Marget A. Bitzer (or bearer) one hundred dollars, at the Oceana
County Savings Bank, value received, with interest at the rate of
6 per cent.
"BERT SPELLMAN.
"G. A . w AGAR."
On the trial the plaintiff had judgment. Defendant brings·
error on the ground :
2.
That the court erred in admitting in evidence the note
in question, for the reasonsa-That the note is payable to the order of Marget A. Bitzer,
and has never been indorsed or transferred by her to plaintiff, and
the title and ownership is still in Marget A. Bitzer, and not in
plaintiff.
b-That said note is not competent evidence, for the reason
that plaintiff has not shown that he owns or has property in said
note.
The note is plainly payable to bearer, and suit could be maintair1ed thereon in the name of any holder.
The judgnient must be aflfrmed, with costs.
The other justices concurred.
"$100.00.

Day v. Longhurst.

(See page 268.)
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SECTION VII-CO N TRACT OF S E CON DARY

p ARTIES.

Whitehead v. Walker (1842), 9 M. & W. 505.

Assumpsit by the endorsee against the endorser of a foreign

CO NTRACT OF TH E DRAWER.

bill of exchange. The declaration stated, that heretofore, to wit,

on the 8th of August, 1834, and before the bankruptcy of Ben-

bow, in parts beyond the seas, certain persons made their bill of

exchange in writing directed to Messrs. Grayhurst and Company,

Whitehead v. fValker ( 1842) , 9 ]1. & W . 505.

and thereby requested them to pay to the defendant, ninety days

after sight, 721/. os. 3c?. value received: that the defendant en-

dorsed the said bill to W. Swainson, who endorsed it to Willis &

Co., who endorsed it to Benbow ; and that the said Grayhurst &

Co. had sight of the said bill, but had not paid the same. To this

declaration there were various pleas, the 8th of which was as

follows :

8th. — That before the said bill became due, or was presented

for payment, and after the endorsement to Willis & Co., and

before the endorsement to Benbow, the bill was presented to

Grayhurst & Co. for their acceptance, but that they refused to

accept the same, and the bill was thereupon protested for non-
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acceptance ; and that the defendant had not due notice of the

non-acceptance of the bill, or of its having been so protested ;

and that Benbow, as well as Willis & Co., at the time of the said

endorsement to Benbow, had notice that the bill had been so pre-

sented for acceptance, and refused and protested for non-accept-

ance.

Verification —

To the 8th plea, the plaintiff replied de injuria.

The judgment of the court was pronounced by

Parke, B. The question raised by the pleadings in this case

is, whether, if the endorsee of a foreign bill of exchange has pre-

sented it for acceptance, and (acceptance having been refused) has

duly presented it and given notice to the drawer, ( for the defend^

a nt, the endorser, is in the same situation) , and so has acquired

a right of action against him by reason of the non-acceptance, a

new right of action afterwards accrues to him on the subsequent

presentment of the bill for payment, and non-payment according

to its tenor. The plaintiff's, indeed, are not the endorsees who

Assumpsit by the endorsee against the endorser of a foreign
bill of xchang . The declaration tated, that heretofore, to wit,
on th 8th of August, 1834, and before the bankruptcy of Benbow, in parts beyond the eas, certain persons made their bill of
exchange in writino- dir cted to Mes rs. Grayhurst and Company,
and th reby reque ted th em to pay to the def ndant, ninety days
after io-ht, 721l. os. 3d. value r ceived: that the defendant endorsed the said bill to W. Swain on, who endorsed it to Willi &
Co., who endor ed it to Benbow; and that the said Grayhur t &
Co. had ight of the said bill, but had not paid the same. To this
declaration there were various pleas, the 8th of which was as
follows:
8th.- That before the said bill became due, or was pre ented
for payment, and after the endor ement to Willis & Co. and
before the endor ement to Benbow, the bill was presented to
Grayhur t & Co. for their acceptance, but that they refu ed to
accept the same, and the bill was thereupon prote ted for nonacceptanc ; and that th defendant had not due notice of the
non-acceptance of the bill, or of its having b en so protested;
and that enbow, as w 11 as Willis & Co., at the time of the said
endor ement to enbow had notice that the bill had been o preented for acceptance, and refused and protested fo r non-acceptance.
VerificationTo the 8th plea, the plaintiff replied de injuria.
The judgment of the court was pronounced by
B. The que tion rai d b the pleadino- in thi case
is, wheth r, if the endorsee of a foreign bill of exchange ha preented it for acceptanc , and (acceptance ha vino- been r fu ed has
duly pre ented it and giv n notice to the dra" er, (for the defen d=
~nt, the endorser is in t he ame ituati n), and o ha acqui re
a rio-ht of action again t him by rea on of the non-acceptan e a
new right of action afterward accru to him on th ub equ nt
presentment of the bill fo r payment, and non-paym nt according
to its tenor. The plaintiffs, ind ed are not the ndor es who
PARKE,
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presented the bill, but they are averred to have taken the bill with

notice of the fact of presentment and dishonour, and therefore

stand in the same situation, and are not to be considered as having

a title as innocent endorsees. (Dunn v. O'Kccfe, 5 M. & Selw.

pre ented the bill, but they are averred to have taken the bill with
notice of the fact of pre entment and dishonour, and therefore
stand in the same ituation, and are not to be con ider d a having
a title as innocent endor ees. (Dunn v. O' Keefe 5 M. & elw.
282) . The practical importance of the point in the pre ent ca e
:l rises from the delay of the holder in bringing his action. The
non-acceptance and the protest thereon occurred in eptember,
l 34.
The bill, according to its tenor, would not be payable till
the subsequent month of December, and this action wa commenced in November, 1840; so that if a right of action accrued in
December, r834, the Statute of Limitations cannot be successfully
pleaded; whereas, if there \Vas no right of action accruing subsequently to the protest for non-acceptance in September, r834, the
statute is a bar.
On the part of the plaintiff it was contended, that although
he undoubtedly might have brought an action in the month of
eptember, r834, founded on the non-acceptance, yet it was
optional with him to do so or not; that he might, if he thought
fit, waive that action, and proceed merely on the ground of the
subsequent non-payment in December, 1834. For the drawer of a
bili, it ).Vas contended, enters into a double engagement with the
payee, and through him with the successive holders of the bill,
namely, first that the drawee shall accept the bill when regularly
presented to him for acceptance; and secondly that he shall pay
the bill when regularly presented to him for payment. And if this
be a correct representation of the engagement entered into by the
drawer, the conclusion seems unavoidable, that whatever right of
action the holder might have acquired by the non-acceptance, he
certainly is not precluded from suing in respect of the default of
payment. But we are of opinion that the contract entered into by
the drawer is not such as is contended for by the plaintiff, and
that he in fact enters into one contract only; namely in the ca e
of a bill made a able after 1ght, that the drawee shall on the
bill ein presented to him in a r easonable time from the date,
avmg so accept d it, shall pay it when duly
accept the same, an
presented for payment according to its tenor; and in the case of a
bill a able after date, that t11 drawee hall acce t it if it i presented to him e ore the time of payment, and having so accepted
it, shall pay it when it i in due cour e pre ented for payment; or
if it is not pre ented for acceptance at all, then that he hall pay
it when duly pres nted for paym nt.
The coun el for the plaintiff, in upport of hi view of the law,
relied mainly on some passages which he cited from the work of
1

282). The practical importance of the point in the present case

arises from the delay of the holder in bringing his action. The

non-acceptance and the protest thereon occurred in September,

1834. The bill, according to its tenor, would not be payable till

the subsequent month of December, and this action was com-

menced in November, 1840; so that if a right of action accrued in

December, 1834, the Statute of Limitations cannot be successfully

pleaded ; whereas, if there was no right of action accruing subse-

quently to the protest for non-acceptance in September, 1834, the

statute is a bar.

On the part of the plaintiff it was contended, that although

he undoubtedly might have brought an action in the month of

September, 1834, founded on the non-acceptance, yet it was

optional with him to do so or not ; that he might, if he thought

fit, waive that action, and proceed merely on the ground of the
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subsequent non-payment in December, 1834. For the drawer of a

bill, it was contended, enters into a double engagement with the

payee, and through him with the successive holders of the bill,

namely, first, that the drawee shall accept the bill when regularly

presented to him for acceptance ; and secondly, that he shall pay

the bill when regularly presented to him for payment. And if this

be a correct representation of the engagement entered into by the

drawer, the conclusion seems unavoidable, that whatever right of

action the holder might have acquired by the non-acceptance, he

certainly is not precluded from suing in respect of the default of

payment. But we are of opinion that the contract entered into by

the drawer is not such as is contended for by the plaintiff, and

that he in fact enters into one contract on ly ; namely in the case

of a bill made payable after si ght, that the drawee shall, on the

biTTTjeing pr esented to him in a r easonable time from the date,

accept the same, and having so accepted it, shall pay it when duly

presented for payment according to jt s tenor ; and in the case of a_

bill payable a fter d ate, that the dr awee shall accept it if it is pre-

sented to him bef ore_lh£_l ime of payment, and having so accepte d

it, shall pay it when it is in due course presented for payment ; or

if _it is not presented for acceptance at all, then that he shall pay

it when duly present ed for payment.

The counsel for the plaintiff, in support of his view of the law,

relied mainly on some passages which he cited from the work of

1
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Marius on Bills of Exchange, some of which are adopted in Com-

yns' Digest, tit. "Merchant," (F. 8.) & (F. 9). But with respect

to those passages, we must remark that the work of Marius,

though undoubtedly one of authority in its way, is scarcely to be

looked at as a legal treatise on the subject of bills of exchange. It

is, as its title imports, a work giving good practical advice from

a practical man to persons receiving and negotiating bills of

exchange. The author was a public notary, who lived in the mid-

dle of the seventeenth century, when questions of mercantile law

were much less perfectly understood than they are now. In some

of his notions he was clearly mistaken ; as for instance, he con-

siders the holder of a bill of exchange to be in all cases bound to

present it for acceptance ; and it seems very doubtful whether he

supposed the effect of non-acceptance to be anything more than of

rendering it incumbent on the drawer to find better security for

the satisfaction of the holder. It is not, however, absolutely nec-

essary to decide that Marius is wrong, for he nowhere lays down

the proposition now insisted on, namely, that after a protest for

non-acceptance, a second right of action accrues to the holder on

the non-payment. He speaks, indeed, of the holder retaining the
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bill after non-acceptance, and applying for payment, and suing on

default of payment ; and this, as a matter of prudence, may prob-

ably be the wisest course which a party can pursue. In spite of

the non-acceptance, the drawer still may pay the bill when at

maturity, and the holder having by protest and notice on non-

acceptance put himself in a condition to sue the drawer, may very

reasonably, as a matter of prudence, retain the bill, and endeavour

to obtain payment when the bill is at maturity, and not involve

himself in litigation until there has been a failure of payment as

well as of acceptance. It by no means, however, follows, because

this is spoken of as being, what probably it still is, the usual course,

that any second right of action arises on the second default. For

let us consider what is the nature of the right which the holder

acquires on the default of the drawee to accept. It is clear (what-

ever might formerly have been considered on the subject) that by

the non-acceptance, followed by the protest and notice, the holder

acquires an immediate right of action against the drawer — a right

of action, be it observed, not in respect of any special damage from

the non-acceptance, but a right of action on the bill, i. e., a right

of action to recover the full amount of the bill. The effect of the

refusal to accept is, (according to the language of the Court of

King's Bench in Macarty v. Barrozv, as quoted by C. J. Wilmot,

in 3 Wils. 16), that the drawee says to the holder, "I will not pay

823

Mariu on Bills of Exchange, some of which are adopted in Comyn ' ige t, tit. " 1erchant, (F. 8.) & (F. 9). But with re pect
to tho e pa sages, we must r mark that the work of Marius,
though undoubtedly on of authority in its v ay, i carcely to be
looked at a a legal treatise on the subject of bills of exchange. It
is, as its title import , a work giving good practical advice from
a practical man to persons receiving and negotiating bills of
exchang . The author was a public notary, who lived in the middle of the seventeenth century, when que tions of mercantile law
were much le s perfectly understood than they are now. In some
of his notions he was clearly mistaken ; as for instance, he coniders the holder of a bill of exchange to be in all cases bound to
pre ent it for acceptance; and it eems very doubtful whether he
uppo ed the effect of non-acceptance to be anything more than of
rendering it incumbent on the drawer to find better security for
the ati faction of the holder. It i not, however, absolutely nece ary to decide that Marius is wrong, for he nowhere lays down
the propo ition now insisted on, namely, that after a protest for
non-acceptance, a second right of action accrues to the holder on
the non-payment. He speaks, indeed, of the holder retaining the
bill after non-acceptance, and applying for payment, and suing on
default of payment; and this, as a matter of prudence, may probably be the wi est course which a party can pursue. In pite of
the non-acceptance, the drawer till may pay the bill when at
maturity, and the holder having by protest and notice on nonacceptance put him elf in a condition to sue the drawer, may very
rea onably, as a matter of prudence, retain the bill, and .endeavour
to obtain payment ' hen the bill i at maturity, and not involve
him elf in litigation until there ha been a failure of payment as
well as of acceptance. It by no mean , however, follow , because
this is poken of as beina, what probably it still is, the u ual course,
that any second right of action aris s on the second d fault. For
let us con ider what is the nature of the right which the holder
acquire on the default of the drav ee to accept. It is clear (whatever mio-ht formerly have been considered on the ubject) that_Er
the non-acceptance, follov ed by the protest and notice, the holder
.?Cquire an immediate right of action again t the dra\ er-a right
of action, be it observed, not in re pect of any pecial dama e from
the non-acceptance, but a rio-ht of action on the bill i. . a ri ht
of action to recover the full amount of the bill. The effect of the
refu al to accept is, (according to the language of the Court of
K ino-' Bench in M acarty v. Barroi , as quoted by C. J. i\Tilmot,
in 3 Wil . 16), that the dra~ ee say to the holder, I w ill not pay
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your bill ; you must go back to the drawer, and he must pay you."

Th e holder thus acquires by the non-acceptance the most complete

right o f action against the drawer which the nature of the case

admits, and no subsequent act or omission of the drawee can give

him a more extensive right against the drawer than hejh as already

acquired. But further, on failure of acceptance, the holder is hound

to give immediate notice to the drawer, and if he omits to do so r he

forfeits all right of action against him, not only in respect of the

default of acceptance, but also in respect of the subsequent non-

payment. Now it is very difficult to reconcile this doctrine with

the notion that a new right of action arises from the non-payment ;

for if that were so, it could hardly be that such new right of action

could be destroyed by the previous neglect to give notice of a

matter unconnected with that out of which the second right of

action is supposed to arise. The argument of the plaintiffs must

be, that a second right of action on the bill arises from the default

of payment in those cases only in which the holder has duly given

notice of the non-acceptance, i. e., in those cases only in which the

holder, by the hypothesis, must have already acquired a right of

action precisely similar to and co-extensive with that which is
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thus supposed to vest in him by the default of payment. This

seems to us to be a proposition so much fraught with inconsis-

tency, and so entirely destitute of principle and authority, that we

cannot hold it to be law. It may be added, that if the law were as

is contended for the plaintiffs, this inconvenience would follow,

that the holder of a bill might at the same time be prosecuting two

actions on the same bill against the same party, for the recovery

of precisely the same sum.

On these grounds we are of opinion that there must be judg-

ment for the defendant on the demurrers to his 7th and 9th pleas.

With regard to the 8th plea, we think the replication de injuria is

good, and judgment on that plea will therefore be for the plain-

tiffs. Judgment accordingly.

ADMISSIONS OF THE DRAWER. § 63.

Kohn ct al. v. Watkins (1882), 26 Kan. 691.

Error from Douglas District Court.

Action brought by Solomon H. Kohn, Morris Kohn, and M.

W. Levy, partners as Kohn Brothers & Company, against Wat-

kins, upon certain drafts, copies of which are as follows:

your bill; you must go back to the drawer, and he must pay you."
T he holder thus acquires by the non-ace ptance the most complete
right of action against the drawer which the natur of the case
admit , and no ubs quent act or omi sion of the drawe can ~ive
him a more exten ive nght again t the drawer than he ha already
acq uired. But forth r, on failure of ace ptance, the holder is b01md
to give immediate notice to the drawer, and if he omit to do so he
fo rfeits all right of action against him, not only in re pect of the
default of acceptance, but al o in re pect of the sub equent nonpayment. Now it is very difficult to reconcile this doctrine with
the notion that a new right of action ari s from the non-payment ;
for if that were so, it could hardly be that such new right of action
could be destroy d by the previou neglect to give notice of a
matter unconnected with that out of which the second right of
action is supposed to arise. The argument of the plaintiff mu t
be, that a second right of action on th bill arises from the default
of payment in those cases only in which the holder has duly given
notice of the non-acceptance, i. e., in those cases only in which the
holder, by the hypothe i , must have already acquired a right of
action precisely similar to and co-exten sive with that which is
thus suppo ed to vest in him by the default of payment. This ,
seems to us to be a proposition so much fraught with inconsist ency, and so entirely destitute of principle and authority, that we
cannot hold it to be law . It may be added, that if the law vv re as
is contended for the plaintiffs, this inconvenience would follow,
that the holder of a bill might at the same time be prosecuting two
actions on the same bill against the same party, for the recovery
of precisely the same sum.
On these grounds we are of opinion that there must be judgment for the defendant on the demurrers to his 7th and 9th pleas.
With regard to the 8th plea, we think the replicatfon de injuria i
good, and judgment on that plea will therefore be for the plainJudgment accordingly.
tiffs.

~ ~ADMISSIONS OF THE ORA WER.

Kohn et al. v. Watkins (1882), 26 Kan. 691.
Error from Douglas District Court.
Action brought by olomon H. Kohn, Morris Kohn, and M.
W. L evy, partners as Kohn roth r & Company, against Watkins, upon certain drafts, copies of which are as follows :
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No. 6639. Office of J. B. Watkins & Co.,

No. 6639.

Lawrence, Kas., April 20, 1880.

Pay to the order of Geo. W. Cobb, three hundred and fifty-

five dollars. J. B. Watkins & Co.

$355. To Merchants' Bank, Lawrence, Kas.

[Indorsements:] Pay to the order of R. G. McLain.

Geo. W. Cobb.

R. G. McLain.

ay to the order of
five dollars.
T
$355·
[Indor ements :]

No. 6652. Office of L B. Watkins & Co.,

Lawrence, Kas., April 21, 1880.

Pay to the order of Michael A. Becker, three hundred and

fifty-five dollars. J. B. Watkins & Co.

$355. To Merchants' Bank, Lawrence, Kas.

[Indorsements:] Pay to the order of R. G. McLain.

Michael A. Becker.

R. G. McLain.

No. 6656. Office of J. B. Watkins & Co.,

Lawrence, Kas., April 21, 1880.

Pay to the order of Henry Greer, four hundred and forty-

four dollars. J. B. Watkins & Co.
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$444. To Merchants' Bank, Lawrence, Kas..

[Indorsements:] Pay to the order of R. G. McLain.

Office of J.B. Watkins & Co.,
LAWRE E, I s., pril 20, 1880.
eo. W. obb, thr e hundr d and fiftyJ. . W TKI Ts & Co.
M rchants' ank, Lawrenc , Ka .
ay to the order of R. G. McLain.
GEO. w. COBB.
R. G. McLAIN.

No. 6652.

Office of!. B. Watkins & Co.,
LAWRENCE, KAs., April 21, 1880.
ay to the ord r of Michael . Becker, three hundred and
fifty-five dollars.
J. B. WATKINS & Co.
$355·
To '.Ierchants' Bank, Lawrence, Kas.
[Indorsements:]
Pay to the order of R. G. McLain.
.
MICHAEL A. BECKER.
R. G. McLAIN.

Henry Greer.

R. G. McLain.

Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they are the bona fide

holders and owners of said drafts ; that they paid a valuable con-

sideration therefor, and that they are wholly unpaid.

The further facts sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Shtss & Hatton, for plaintiff's in error.

R. J. Borgholthaus, W. J. Patterson, and John Hutchings, for

defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Horton, C. J. Upon the record of this case two different

questions are presented for our decision. The first is, whether a

draft or bill of exchange payable to a real person known at the

time to exist, and present to the mind of the drawer when he

made it, as the party to whose order it is to be paid, must bear

the genuine indorsement of such payee in order that a bona fide

indorsee may recover thereon, when such bill has been drawn

without the knowledge or consent of the person named therein

as payee through the false representations of a party forging the

Office of!. B. Wa;tkins & Co.,
LAWRENCE, K s., pril 21, 1880.
Pay to the order of Henry Greer, four hundred and fortyfour dollars.
J. B. WATKINS & Co.
$444·
To Merchants' Bank, Lawrence, Kas .. ·
[Indorsements:]
Pay to the order of R. G. McLain.
HENRY GREER.
R. G. McLAIN.

No. 6656.

Plaintiffs alleged in their petition that they are the bona fide
holder and owners of aid drafts; that they paid a valuable consideration therefor, and that they are wholly unpaid.
The further facts sufficiently appear from th opinion.
Sluss & Hatton, for plaintiffs in error.
R. J. Borgholthaits, W. J. Patterson, and John Hutchings, for
defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered b
HORTON, C. J. Upon the record of thi ca e two cliff rent
questions are presented for our deci ion. The fir t is v heth r a
draft or bill of exchange payable to a real p r on known at th
time to xi t, and pre nt to the mind of th draw r when he
made it, a the party to who e ord r it i to b paid mu t b ar
the genuine indor m nt f uch pay in ord r that a bona fide
indor e may recov r th r on wh n uch bill ha b n drawn
without th knowledg
r con ent f th p r on named th r in
a paye throtwh the fal repr entation of a party foro-ino- the
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indorsement, who obtains it from the drawer by fraud and without

consideration? Second, if a drawer be induced by the fraudu-

lent representations of a party seeking to defraud him, to make

a draft or bill of exchange payable to a fictitious person, not

knowing the payee to be fictitious when he makes the bill and

intending that such bill shall be payable to a real person, may

the bona fide holder thereof recover on it against a drawer as

upon a bill payable to a fictitious payee ?

The first inquiry arises upon the findings of the trial court

in relation to the bill payable to the order of Michael A. Becker.

It appears that he was a former resident of Kingman county, and

therefore a person in esse ; that his name was forged to an appli-

cation transmitted to Watkins by R. G. McLain without the

knowledge or consent of Becker, asking for a loan of money

upon premises purporting to be situated in Kingman county. It

further appears that the defendant accepted the application trans-

mitted by McLain, believing it to be genuine, and undertook to

loan thereon the sum of $400, less commissions, and sent McLain

a blank note and mortgage together with the draft ; that McLain

forged the name of Becker upon the draft, indorsed thereon his
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own name, and negotiated the same, and received from the plain-

tiffs the money therefor. The plaintiffs received the draft in the

usual course of trade, and paid full value. It is argued by counsel

for plaintiffs, that as to this draft Becker is to be deemed a

fictitious person, because he had no knowledge of the draft, and no

interest or concern in it. We do not think the position sound.

The statute prescribes that to make a bill of exchange drawn pay-

able to order negotiable, it must contain the indorsement of the

person therein named as the payee. (Comp. Laws 1879, cn - x 4>

§1). And we suppose that counsel for defendant will concede,

as a general rule, that the plaintiffs could not recover as the

indorsees of the note without proving the indorsement of the

payee. Now while the authorities hold that when the drawer or

maker of a bill of exchange knows that the payee is a fictitious

person at the time he makes the draft, that a bona fide holder may

recover on it against him as upon a bill payable to bearer ; and,

while some of the authorities hold that it will be no defense

against a bona fide holder for the maker or drawer to set up that

he did not know the payee to be fictitious, yet none of these

authorities sustain the doctrine that if the payee be a real person,

and such person was present to the mind of the maker or drawer

when he made the draft as the party to whose order it is to be

paid, a recovery can be had thereon without the genuine indorse-

indorsement, who obtains it from the draw r by fraud and without
on iderati on?
econd, if a drawer be induc d by the fraudulent representations of a party seeking to defraud him, to make
a draft or bill of exchange payabl to a fictitious p rson, not
knowing the payee to b fictitious when he makes the bill and
intending that uch bill shall be payable to a real person, may
th e bona fide holder thereof recov r on it against a draw er as
upon a bill payabl to a fictitious payee?
The fir t inquiry arises upon the findings of the trial court
in relation to the bill payable to the order of Michael
cker.
It appears that he was a former resident of Kingman county, and
therefore a person in esse; that his name was forged to an application transmitted to Watkins by R. G. McLain without the
knowledge or consent of Becker, a king for a loan of money
upon premi es purporting to be situated in Kingman county. It
further appears that the defendant accepted the application transmitted by McLain, believing it to b g enuine, and undertook to
loan thereon the sum of $400, less commi sions, and sent McLain
a blank note and mortgage together with the draft; that McLain
forged the name of B ecker upon the draft, indorscd thereon his
own name, and negotiated the same, and received from the plaintiffs the money th erefor. The plaintiffs received the draft in the
usual course of trade, and paid full value. It is argued by counsel
for plaintiffs, that as to this draft Becker is to be deemed a
fictitious person, because he had no knowledge of the draft, and no
interest or concern in it. We do not think the position sound.
The statute prescribes that to make a bill of exchange drawn payable to order negotiable, it must contain the indorsement of the
person therein named as the payee. (Comp. Laws 1879, ch. 14,
§ l). And we suppose that counsel for defendant will concede,
as a general rule, that the plaintiffs could not r cover as the
indorsees of th note without proving the indors ment of the
pay e. Now whil the authorities hold that when the drawer or
maker of a bill of exchange knows that 'the payee is a fictitious
per on at the tim h makes the draft, that a bona fide hold r may
recover on it against him as upon a bill payable to bearer; and,
while some of the authorities hold that it will b no defense
against a bona fide holder for the maker or drawer to s t up that
he did not know the payee to b fictitiou , yet none of these
authorities sustain the doctrine that if th payee b a real person,
and such person was present to the mind of the maker or drawer
when he made the draft as th party to whose order it is to be
paid, a recovery can be had thereon without the genuine indorse-
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merit of the payee upon the mere indorsement of the party who

induced the drawer to make the bill by fraudulent representations.

Nor can such bill be considered as one running to a fictitious

payee, and as if drawn payable to bearer. If the principle con-

tended for by counsel be adopted, it would be wholly immaterial

whether the indorsement is genuine or not, so far as to give to

the instrument the character of negotiable paper when the indorser

himself is not actually sued. For it would always be open to

the dilemma, if he is a party, it is a genuine indorsement ; if he

is not, he is a fictitious payee and no indorsement is necessary.

(Dana v. Underwood, 19 Pick. 99; Rogers v. Ware, 2 Neb. 29).

In our opinion, the indorsement on the draft to Becker is a clear

forgery, and the holders, however innocent, cannot recover from

the drawer.

The second inquiry presents more difficulty. No such per-

sons as Henry Greer or Geo. W. Cobb, the payees mentioned in

two of the drafts, resided in Kingman county, or owned land as

purported by the applications transmitted by McLain. These

payees are fictitious. The finding upon this matter is, that these

applications (for loans) are wholly false and fraudulent, and were
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manufactured by McLain with the design and for purpose of

obtaining money thereon fraudulently. In the draft to Becker, a

real person was inserted as payee at the instance of McLain ; but

in the drafts to Greer and Cobb, fictitious names were transmitted

by McLain, and such names adopted by the drawer from the

applications so received by him from McLain; and these drafts,

therefore, are not payable to persons in esse.. Although the

defendant made the bills in ignorance of the fact that these parties

named as payees had no existence, yet, taking all the circum-

stances of the transaction together, we think the drafts to Greer

and Cobb are controlled by the line of decisions respecting bills

and notes made payable to fictitious payees. Daniel on Negotiable

Instruments, § 139, says :

"In the case of a note payable to a fictitious person, it appears

to be well settled that any bona fide holder may recover on it

against the maker as upon a note payable to bearer. It will be

no defense against such bona fide holder for the maker to set up

that he did not know the payee to be fictitious. By making it

payable to such person he avers his existence, and he is estopped,

as against the holder ignorant of the contrary, to assert the

fiction."

The authority to sustain the rule announced is. Lane v.

Krckle, 22 Iowa, 399. This authority, so far as the actual points
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ment of the payee upon th mer indorsement of the party who
induc d th draw rt make the bill by fraudul nt repre ntations.
or can such bill be con id red as ne running to a fictitious
pay , and as if drawn payabl to b ar r. If the principle cont nd d for by counsel b adopted, it would be wholly immaterial
wh ther the indor em nt i g nuine or not, o far as to give to
th in trument the charact r of n g tiable paper when the indorser
him If is not actually u d. For it would always be open to
the dilemma, if he is a party, it i a genuine indorsement; if he
i not, he i a fictitious pay e and no indor ement is nece sary.
(Dana v. Underwood, 19 Pick. 99; Ro uers v. Ware, 2 Neb. 29) .
In our opinion, the indor ement on th draft to ecker is a clear
forgery, and the holders, however innocent, cannot recover from
the drawer.
The second inquiry presents more difficulty. No such persons as Henry Gr er or Geo. W. Cobb, the payees mentioned in
two of the draft , resid d in Kingman county, or owned land as
purported by the applications transmitted by McLain. These
payee are fictitiou . The finding upon this matter is, that these
applications (for loans) are wholly false and fraudulent, and were
manufactured by McLain with the design and for purpose of
obtaining money thereon fraudulently. In the draft to Becker, a
real person wa in erted a payee at the instance of McLain· but
in the drafts to Greer and Cobb, fictitious names were tran mitted
by McLain, and such names adopted by the drawer from the
application o received by him from McLain· and the e drafts,
therefore, are not payable to person in esse.. Although the
defendant made the bill in ignorance of the fact that the e parties
named as payees had no exi tence, yet, takin()" all the circumtances of the tran action together, we think the draft to Greer
and Cobb are controlled by the line of deci ion re pecting bill
and notes mad payable to fictitious payee . Daniel on Negotiable
Instrument § 139, ays:
"In the ca e of a note payable to a fictitious person it appears
to be well ettled that any bona fide holder ma r cover on it
again t the maker as upon a note payable to bearer. It ' ill be
no defense again t such bona fide hold r for the mak r to et up
that he did not know the pay to b fictitiou .
makino- it
ri t nc and h i e topped
pa able to uch per on he av r hi
as against the hold r ignorant of th contrary to a ert the
fiction."
The authority to su tain th ml announced i . Lane
Krekle 22 Iowa, 399. Thi authority o far a th actual point
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necessary to have been decided in that case, hardly goes so far as

the text of the author, because the note in that action was made

payable to bearer, and Dillon, J., remarks at the commencement

of the opinion, "That this fact relieves the case of some difficul-

ties that would arise were it payable to the person named, or

order." Yet that learned judge, in the opinion, presents a strong

argument in support of the proposition stated by Daniel. He

says :

"Upon reason and principle we are clear that, if the plaintiff,

is a bona fide holder for value and without notice, the fact that the

note is made payable t o a fictitious person, is no defense. In such

caseTUTe defendant would be estoppe d, as against the plaintiff,

fr om setting up the fact. It was the defendant who made the

nole. By making it payable, as he did, he affirmed the existence

of such a person as the payee therein named ; and he should not,

against a person ignorant of that fact — one who may reasonably

be presumed to have acted upon the faith of the fact thus rep-

resented — be allowed to assert the contrary. This principle of

estoppel in pais has a very extended and just application in the

law of bills and notes, the doctrines of which are designed to
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give credit and circulation to negotiable paper, and to that end

throw its protection around the honest and fair holders thereof.

In respect to such a holder, the maker is bound to know that the

payee is a real person, or thereafter hold his peace."

In the case of Phillips v. Im Tharn, 114 Eng. C. L. 694, the

defense was that the payee was a fictitious person, in ignorance

of which fact the drawer drew the bill. It was decided by the

court that since the drawer would be estopped to set up the fact

that the payee was a fictitious name, the like estoppel would

apply to an acceptor for the honor of the bill. In Forbes v. Espy,

21 Ohio St. 474, the defendants drew upon their correspondents

in New York city in favor of Cochran, Holmes & Co., and by

An ns
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OF THE DRAWE R

n ce ary to have be n decid <l in that ca
hardly go
o far as
the te .. t of the autho r, beca u e the note in that action wa made
a} abk to bear r and Dillon J., r marks at the commencement
f the opinion, ''That this fact r lie
the ca e of ome difficultie that would ari e 'v r it payable to the per on named, or
order.'' Y t that 1 arned j udg , in the opinion, pr nt a strong
argument in upport of the propo ition tat d by ani I. Ile
ay :
'' pon rea on and principle \ e are cl ar that, if th e plaintiff_
i a bona fide hold r for value and without notice, th fact that the
note i mad payable to a fictitious er on is no defen e. In such
ca
t1
n ant wou
e estopped, as against the plaintiff,
from tting up th fact. It was the defendant who made the
y making it payable, as he did, he affirm d th exi tence
note.
of uch a person a the pay e therein named· and he should not,
again t a per n ig norant of that fact-one who may rea onably
be pre urned to hav acted upon the faith of the fact thus repre ente<l-be allowed to a ert the contrary. This principle of
e toppel hi ais ha a very extended and ju t application in the
law of bills and notes, the doctrines of which are designed to
giye credit and circulation to negotiable pap r, and to that end
throw it protection around the honest and fair holder thereof.
In re pect to such a holder, the maker is bound to know that the
payee i a real per on, or thereafter hold his peace."

them indorsed to Charles Clark (a fictitious name assumed by one

William Mara), and in that name indorsed in blank. Forbes &

King became the bona fide holders of the draft. It was presented,

payment refused by previous directions of the defendants, pro-

tested, and due notice given to the defendants. Mr. Justice Mc-

Ilvaine, speaking for the court, says that the defendants were

estopped from denying plaintiffs' title. In Chalmers' late Digest

of the Laws of Bills of Exchange, p. 144- the law is thus stated :

"B., at the request of X., makes a note payable to C.'s order. C.

is a fictitious person, but B. does not know this. X. indorses the

In the case of Phillips v. Im Thurn, II4 Eng. C. L. 694, the
defen was that the payee was a fictitious per on, in ignorance
of which fact the drawer drew the bill. It was decided by the
court that since th drawer would be estopped to set up the fact
that th payee was a fictitious name, th like estoppel would
apply to an acceptor for the honor of th bill. In Forbes v. Espy,
21
hio St. 474, the defendants drew upon their corre pondent
in )J" w York city in favor of ochran, Holme & o., and by
them indor ed t
harles lark (a fictiti0u name ass um d by one
\ Villiam Mara), and in that name indor ed in blank. Forbes &
King b came th e bona fide hold rs of the draft. It wa pr ented,
payment refu ed by previou direction of the defendant , prote ted, and due notic o-iven to the defendant . Mr. Ju tice McIlYaine speaking fo r th e court, ays that the defendants were
e topped from denying plaintiff ' title. In halmer ' lat Dig t
of the Laws of ills of Exchang p. 144, the law i thu tated:
., at the reque t of X., mak s a not payable to
rder.
i a fictitiou p r on, but . doe n t know this. X . indor e the
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note in C.'s name, and it is negotiated to D., a bona fide holder for

value, without notice. D. can sue B. Cooper v. Mayer (1830),

10 B. & C. 468; Beeman v. Duck (1843), 11 M. & W. 251;

Schultz v. Astley (1836), 2 Bing. (N. C.) 544."

Passing from these cases, and the authorities therein cited,

to the reasons for these two drafts being held as payable to

fictitious payees, we add, that of course if Watkins had not

intended that such payees should become parties to the transac-

tion, or, in other words, had knowledge of their non-existence,

there could be no question as to error in the judgment of the

court below. (1 Parsons on Bills, 32, 560, 591, 592, and notes;

2 Parsons on Bills, 40, 50; Story on Bills, §§56, 200; 4 E. D.

Smith, 83). Ought the defendant, who made the bills in ignor-

ance of the fact that the persons named as payees are fictitious,

and thus parted with them to a correspondent, be permitted to

aver and prove this as against the innocent holders for value?

Either plaintiffs or defendant must lose in this transaction. Wat-

kins transmitted these drafts to his correspondent McLain, and

AlcLain was thereby enabled to fraudulently put them in circu-

lation. If the payees had been known to defendant as fictitious,
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they could have been treated by McLain as well as the plaintiffs,

as bills payable to bearer. Now when a drawer issues a bill to a

fictitious payee, although ignorant of that fact at the time, and

parts with the possession thereof, ought he in fairness and justice

to be allowed to say that such bill is void? "Where one of two

innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful or tortious acts

of a third party, the law casts the burden or loss upon him by

whose act, omission or negligence such third party was enabled

to commit the wrong which occasions the loss." {Bank v. Rid.

Co., 20 Kas. 520). While the finding is, that the defendant was

not negligent in making and sending these drafts, and that Mc-

Lain was not the agent of the defendant in these transactions, it

fully appears from the other findings that the drafts were sent

to McLain, and that only for the act and conduct of the defendant,

induced by the wrongful acts of McLain, these bills would not

have been issued and sent forth as commercial paper. To some

extent, it must be conceded, defendant, by his conduct as to these

bills, placed himself in the hands of his correspondent. For

instance, if Greer and Cobb had been in existence, and McLain

had passed over to them these drafts without taking back any

note or mortgage, it will not be questioned that after Greer and

Cobb had indorsed and negotiated them to innocent holders, the

defendant could not set up the fraud of these parties as any
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nate in C.'s name, and it i negotiated to D., a bona fide holder for
value, without notice. D. can sue . Cooper v. Mayer (1830),
IO B. & C. 468; Beeman v. Duck ( 1843), II M. & W. 251;
Schitltz v. A stley (1836), 2 ing. (N. C.) 544."
Passing from these ca es, and the authorities therein cited,
to the reasons for these two drafts being held as payable to
fictitious payees, we add, that of course if Watkins had not
intended that such payees should b come parties to the transaction, or, in other words, had knowledge of their non-existence,
there could be no question as to error in the judgment of the
court below. ( l Par ons on Bills, 32, 560, 591, 592, and notes;
2 Parsons on Bills, 40, 50; Story on Bills, §§ 56, 200; 4 E. D.
Smith, 83). Ought the defendant, who made the bills in ign9rance of the fact that the persons named as payees are fictitious,
and thus parted with them to a correspondent, be permitted to
aver and prove this as against the innocent holders for value?
Either plaintiffs or defendant must lose in this transaction. Watkins transmitted these drafts to his correspondent McLain, and
McLain was thereby enabled to fraudulently put them in circulation. If the payees had been known to defendant as fictitious,
they could have been treated by McLain as well as the plaintiffs,
as bills payable to bearer. Now when a drawer issues a bill to a
fictitious payee, although ignorant of that fact at the time, and
part with the possession thereof, ought he in fairness and justice
to be allowed to say that such bill is void? "Where one of two
innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful or tortious acts
of a third party, the law casts the burden or loss upon him by
whose act, omission or negligence such third party was enabled
to commit the wrong which occasions the loss." (Bank v. Rld.
Co., 20 Kas. 520). While the finding is, that the defendant was
not negligent in making and sending these drafts, and that McLain was not the agent of the defendant in these transactions, it
fully appears from the other findings that the drafts were sent
to M cLain, and that only for the act and conduct of the defendant,
induced by the wrongful acts of McLain, t hese bills would not
have been issued and sent forth as commercial paper. To some
extent, it must be conceded, defendant, by his conduct as to these
bills, placed himself in the hands of hi corre pondent. For
instance, if Greer and Cobb had been in existence, and McLain
had passed over to them the d raft without taking back any
note or mortgage, it will not be que tioned that after Greer and
Cobb had indorsed and negotiated them to innocent holders the
defendant could not set up the fraud of the e parties as any
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defense. In this way, if such parties were insolvent, the defend-

ant would have been also absolutely defrauded of his money. So

we think that, having relied upon the application received from

McLain for the names of the payees in the drafts issued by him,

and two of the payees being fictitious, and then having trans-

mitted these drafts to McLain, and thus given him the oppor-

tunity to put them in circulation, the defendant is not now in a

condition to claim that the drafts are void, and to set up as a

defense that he did not know such payees to be fictitious. He

acted upon the information derived from McLain ; he is bound by

McLain's knowledge, and must be conclusively presumed, as

against the innocent holders for value, to have known that these

two drafts are payable to fictitious payees. He can no more set

up the fraud of McLain as to these two drafts, than he can the

fraud of Greer and Cobb, had there been such persons actually

existing in Kingman county, and they had obtained these drafts

from McLain without complying with the request of the drawer

as to the execution of the notes and mortgages, and then indorsed

and negotiated them to innocent holders.

Counsel for defendant refer to cases making the indorsement
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by McLain upon the bills at the time he delivered them to plain-

tiffs a forgery. Even if this be so, we do not think it prevents

the recovery by plaintiffs, because the principle of estoppel in pais

is to be applied to the defendant, and as between the plaintiffs and

the defendant these drafts are to be treated as if drawn payable to

bearer.

The case will be remanded, with directions for the court

below to render, judgment upon the findings of fact

for plaintiffs upon the drafts payable to Greer and

Cobb, and judgment for the defendant upon the draft

payable to Becker.

All the justices concurring.

Phillips v. Im Thurn (1865), 18 C. B. (N. S.) 694, 114 E. C. L.

6p2.

This was an action against the acceptor for honour of a bill

of exchange.

To the 6th plea, — that, when the bill of exchange in the first

count mentioned was made, there was no such person as Carlos

Raffo, the supposed payee named in the said bill, but the said name

of Carlos Raffo was and is merely fictitious, whereof the defendant

cl fen e. In this way, if such parties were insolvent, the defendant would have be n al o ab olut 1 defraud d of hi money.
o
"'' think that, having relied upon the application receiv d from
::\IcLain for the name of the pay es in the draft i u d by him,
and two of the pay e beino- fictitiou , and then having transmitted th se drafts to ~1cLain, and thus gi n him the opportunity to put them in circulation, the defendant is not now in a
condition to claim that the draft are void, and to et up as a
defen e that he did not know such payee to be fictitious. He
acted upon the infonnation derived from McLain; he is bound by
l\IcLain' knowled , and must b conclusively pre urned, as
again t the innocent holders for value, to have known that the e
two draft are payable to fictitious payees. He can no more set
up the fraud of IcLain as to the two draft , than he can the
fraud of Greer and Cobb, had there been uch persons actually
exi ting in Kingman county, and they had obtained these drafts
from McLain without complying with the request of the drawer
a to the ex cution of the note and mortgages, and then indorsed
and negotiated them to innocent holders.
Counsel for def ndant refer to case making the indorsement
by McLain upon the bills at the time he delivered them to plaintiffs a forgery. Even if this be so, we do not think it prevents
the recovery by plaintiffs, because the principle of e toppel fri pais
is to be applied to th defendant, and as between the plaintiff and
the defendant these drafts are to be treated as if drawn payable to
bearer.
The case will be re11ianded with directions for the collr '
below to render judgment upon the findings of fac t \
for plaintiffs upon the drafts payable to Greer and
Cobb and judgment for the defendant upon the dra.f t
payable to Becker.
All the justices concurring.
1

1

1

Phillips v. Im Thurn (1865) 1 18 C. B . (N. S.) 694) II4 E. C. L.
692.

Thi wa an action against the acceptor for honour of a bill
of exchang .
To th 6th plea,-that, when the bill of xchange in the fir t
count mentioned was made, there wa no uch p r on a Carlos
Raffo, the suppo ed payee named in th aid bill, but the aid name
of Carlos Raffo wa and i merely fictitiou , whereof the defendant
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at the time of his acceptance of the said bill had no notice or

knowledge, — the plaintiffs demurred ; the ground of demurrer

stated in the margin being, "that the defendant is by his said

acceptance estopped from saying that there was no such person as

Carlos Raffo, the person named in the said bill." Joinder.

Erle, C. J. — I am of opinion that our judgment in this case

v.

331

COOPER

at the time of his acceptance of the aid bill had no notice or
knowledge,-the plaintiffs d murr d; the ground of demurrer
stated in the margin b ing, " that the defendant is by his said
acceptanc estopped from aying that there was no such person as
Carlos Raffo, the person named in the aid bill.' Joinder.

should be for the plaintiff. The action is brought by the holder

of a bill accepted by the defendant supra protest for the honour of

the drawer, acceptance having been refused by the drawee. At

the maturity of the bill all things were done which were necessary

to fix the defendant with liability as an acceptor for honour: and

the defence relied on, is, that the bill was drawn payable to a fic-

titious payee, of which fact the defendant had no notice at the

time of his acceptance of the bill. I take it to be clear, that, ]f_

the defendant had not intervened, and the action had been brought

by the holder of the bill against the drawer, the drawer would

have been by law compelled to admit that the bill was a valid bill

payable to bearer, or, in other words, that he would have been

estoppe d_f rom denying the endorsement nf the payee . It seems to

me that there is good reason for saying that that which the drawer
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would be estopped from denying the acceptor for honour should

also be es topped from denying . I think he is equally bound to

admit that the bill is a valid bill. The acceptor supra protest pay-

ing the bill has all the rights against the drawer that an ordinary

holder would have. I find no authority which contravenes this

view ; and it seems to me that it receives confirmation from the

passages cited from Story on Bills.

Judgment for thejplqintiff.

Grey v. Cooper (1782), j Doug. (K. B.) 65.

This was an action on a bill of exchange, by the indorsee

against the drawer. The declaration stated, that the defendant

drew the bill payable to one Walker, who indorsed it to Holbrook,

who indorsed it to Shipden, who indorsed it to the plaintiff. Pleas :

1. Non assumpsit ; 2. That Walker, at the time of the indorsement

by him, was an infant. Demurrer to the second plea.

Lord Mansfield. The ground on which the drawer is

charged is, that he drew a bill by which he engaged to pay accord-

ing to the order of the payee, whoever that payee might be. He

ERLE, .C. J.-I am of opinion that our judgment in this case
hould be for the plaintiff. The action is broug ht by the holder
of a bill accepted by the defendant upra protest for the honour of
the drawer, acceptance having b n refu ed by the drawee. At
the maturity of the bill all things were done which were neces ary
to fix the defendant with liability as an acceptor for honour: and
the defence relied on, is, that the bill was drawn payable to a fictitious payee, of which fact the defendant had no notice at the
time of his acceptance of the bill. I take it to be clear, that, ii
the defendant had not intervened, and the action had been brought
by the holder of the bill against the dravver, the drawer would
have been by law compelled to admit that the bill was a valid bill
payable to bearer, or, in other words, that he would have been
e topped from denying the endorsement of the payee. It seems to
me that there is good reason for saying that that which the drawer
would be estopped from denying the acceptor for honour should
also be estopped from denying. I think he is equally bound to
admit that the bill i a valid bill. The acceptor upra protest paying the bill has all the rirrhts against the drawer that an ordinary
holder would have. I find no authority which contravenes this
view; and it seems to me that it receives confirmation from the
passages cited from Story on Bills.
Judgment f!!__the plaintiff.

-

Grey v. Cooper (1782) , 3 Doug. (K. B.) 65.

This was an action on a bill of exchange, by the indor ee
against the drawer. The declaration tated, that the defendant
drew the bill payable to one Walker, who indor ed it to Holbrook,
who indor edit to Shipden, who indor ed it to the plaintiff. Plea :
I. Non assumpsit; 2. That Walker, at the time of the indor ement
by him, was an infant. Demurrer to the econd plea.
LORD M A SFIELD.
The ground on which the drawer is
charged is, that he drew a bill by which he engaged to pay according to the order of the payee, whoever that pay e miO'ht be. He
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might give the infant an authority which the law itself does not

give him. In the same manner he may give a bill to his own wife.

The drawer says, "let anybody trust the payee on my credit." The

acts of an infant are void, or not, accordingly as they are for his

benefit. The privilege of an infant is personal, and thereJ s_no_

question here aslutween the infant and another person. The

infant sets up no claim, and the drawer is liable to pay.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

CONTRACT OF THE GENERAL INDORSER. § 68 — 2.

)C True v. Ballard {1895), 45 Neb. 409.

Error from the district court of Hitchcock county. Tried

mi rrht g ive the infant an authority ' hich the lav it elf does not
iY him. In th ame mann r h may give a bill to hi own wif .
on my er <lit. ' 1 he
T he draw r say , "let anybody tru t th pa
a b of an infant ar void, or not, accordingly as th y ar for hi
benefit. Th privilege of an infant i p r anal, and th r i no
gu tion her a b tween the infant and another p r on. The
infant ets up no claim, and the drawer is liable to pay.
Judgment for the plaintiff.

below before Welty, J.

/. W. Cole and Wm. 0. Wool-man, for plaintiff in error.

L. H. Blacklcdge, contra.

Ragan, C. The material facts in this case are : On the 9th

of December, 1889, one R. W. Boston made his certain promissory

note of that date for $265, due September 9, 1890. This note was

CONTRACT OF THE GENERAL INOORSER.

§ 68-2.

payable to the order of and delivered to one S. L. True. Before

the maturity of this note True sold and delivered it to W. C. Bul-

lard & Co., and indorsed it in blank. Before the note matured

" True v. BullMd (I895), 45 Neb. 409.
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Bullard & Co. sold it to a bank, and it not being paid at maturity,

the bank sued the maker of the note and True as an indorser

and obtained a judgment against them. True then brought this

suit in the district court of Hitchcock county against Bullard &

Error from the district court of Hitchcock county.
below before WELTY, J.

Tried

Co., reciting the foregoing facts, and alleging that at the time

he sold the note to Bullard & Co. and indorsed it, it was orally

agreed between him and Bullard & Co. that the sale and indorse-

J. fV. Cole and Wm. 0. Woolman, for plaintiff in error.
L. H. Blacllledge, contra.

ment of the note to them should be and was without recourse on

him, True ; or, in other words, notwithstanding that he indorsed

the note in blank, he was not to be or become liable thereon as an

indorser. True in his petition did not aver that he had paid the

judgment rendered on the note or any part thereof. The district

court sustained objections to the evidence offered by True to sup-

port the allegations of his petition on the ground that the petition

did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause for action, and

directed a verdict for Bullard & Co., on which judgment of dis-

RAGAN, C. The material facts in this case are: On the 9th
of December, 1889, one R. W. Boston made hi certain promissory
note of that date for $265, due eptember 9, 1890. Thi note was
payable to the order of and delivered to on S. L. True. Before
the maturity of this note True sold and delivered it to W. C. Bullard & o., and indorsed it in blank. Before the note matured
Bullard & Co. sold it to a bank, and it not being paid at maturity,
the bank sued the maker of the note and True as an indorser
and obtained a judgment against them. True then brought thi
suit in the district court of itchcock county again t Bullard &
Co., reciting the foregoing facts, and all ging that at the time
he old the note to ullard & o. and indor ed it, it wa orally
ag r ed between him and Bullard & Co. that the ale and indorsement of the note to them should be and wa without r cour e on
him, True· or, in other words, notwith tanding that h indor ed
th e note in blank, he was not to be or become liabl th r on a an
indor er. Tru in hi p tition did not av r that he had paid the
judgment rend red on th note r any part th r of. Th di trict
court u tained obj ction to th vid nc off red by Tru to upport th all gations f hi petition on the ground that th petition
did not tat fact sufficient to con titut a cau for action, and
dir cted a v rdict for Bullard & Co., on which judgment of dis-
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missal of True's action was rendered, and he prosecutes to this

court a petition in error.

The record presents two questions : May the payee of a

promissory note, who has indorsed his name on the back thereof

and delivered said note to a purchaser, show by parol, in a suit

between himself and said purchaser, that by so indorsing- and

delivering said note, that the liability created thereby was a

different liability from that which the law implies against a

party by reason of such an indorsement of commercial paper?

Or, applied to the facts in the case at bar, is it competent for True

to prove by parol that at the time he indorsed and delivered the

note in question to Bullard & Co. that the agreement between them

was that he, True, should not be liable on said note as an indorser

by reason of such indorsement and delivery? When the payee_

of anote indorses his name thereon in blank and delivers said

no te to a purchaser thereof, the law in effect writes over the sig-

nature, of said indorser an agreement on his part that if the holder

of said note shall present it to the payor thereof at its maturity

fo r payment and it be dishonored, and that if such holder shall

then give such indorser notice in a reasonable time of the djshonor
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of said note, that he, the indorser, will pay it : and on the part of

the indors ee of said note, the contract created by the law is that

he will present said note at its maturity to the payor thereof for

payment, a nd i f it be dishonored, that he will within a reasonable

Jime notify the indorser of said note of such dishonor . It must

be admitted that many eminent authorities hold that parol evidence

is not admissible to contradict or vary the contract which the law

raises by reason of the indorsement in blank and delivery of com-

mercial paper, either on the part of the holder or the indorser ; but

in Holmes v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 38 Neb., 326, this court

held that between the original parties a blank indorsement might

be modified bv parol : that the entire transaction might be shown

by reason of which the indorsement was made, and that parol

evidence was admissible for the purpose of proving the actual

contract made between the indorser and indorsee at the time of

the blank indorsement. On tne authority ot that case we hold

that it was competent foi&True to show by parol that at the time

he indorsed and delivered the note to Bullard & Co. that, not-

withstanding such indorsement and delivery, he, True, was not

to be held liable as an indorser of the note ; and that Bullard &

Co. in effect purchased the note without recourse on True. But

we must not be understood as deciding that the payee of a prom-

issory note, who indorses it in blank and delivers it before

v.

BULLARD
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missal of True's action wa rend red, and he prosecutes to this
court a petition in rror.
The record pr ent two que tions: May th payee of a
promissory note, who ha indorsed his name on the back thereof
and delivered said note to a purchaser, show by parol, in a uit
between himself and said purcha r, that by o indorsing and
delivering said note, that the liability created thereby was a
different liability from that which the law implie again t a
party by rea on of uch an indor ement of commercial paper?
Or, applied to the facts in the case at bar, is it competent for True
to prove by parol that at the time he indorsed and delivered the
note in que tion to Bullard & Co. that the agreement between them
was that h , True, hould not be liable on aid note as an indorser
by rea on of uch indorsement and delivery? When the payee
of a note indor es his name thereon in blank and delivers said
note to a purchaser thereof, the law in effect writes over the si nature. o aid indor er an a reement on his art that if the holder
of sa1 note shall present it to the ayor thereof at its maturity
for payment and it e is onored, and that if such holder shall
then give such indorser notice in a reasonable time of the dishonor
of said note, that he, the indorser will a it· and on the art of
the indorsee o said note, the contract created by the law is that
he will present said note at its maturity to the payor thereof for
payment, and if it be di honored, that he will within a reasonable
,time notify the mdorser of said note of such dishonor. It must
be admitted that many eminent authorities hold that parol evidence
is not admissible to contradict or vary the contract which the law
raises by reason of the indorsement in blank and delivery of commercial paper, either on the part of the holder or the indorser; but
in Holnies v. First Nat. Bank of Lincoln, 38 Neb., 326, this court
held that between the original parties a blank indorsement might
be modified by parol: that the entire transaction might be shown
by reason of which the indorsement was made, and that parol
evidence was admissible for the purpo e of proving the actual
contract made between the indor er and indorsee at the time of
the blank indorsement. On the autnonty of that case we hold
that it was competent fo~ True to show by parol that at the time
he indorsed and delivered the note to Bullard & o. that, notwithstandin o- such indorsement and delivery, he, True, was not
to be held liable as an indorser of the note; and that Bullard &
Co. in effect purchased the note without recour e on True. But
we must not be understood as deci lin that the payee of a promissory note, who indorses it in blank and delivers it before
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maturity, could set up the defense that he in fact sold and indorsed

without recourse, as against a subsequent indorsee of said note

who purchased it before maturity, in the usual course of business,

and without knowledge of the contract between the indorser and

first indorsee.

As already stated, T rue in his petition di d not aver that he

had paid any part of the j udgment which had been rendered

against him on said note in favor of the bank to whom it had been

sold and assigned by Bullard & Co. So far, then, as the petition

shows, True has not been damaged. Under no view of the case

can he have any cause of action against Bullard & Co. until he

shall Ha ve paid the judgment rendered on said note or some part

thereof (Churchill v. Moore, 15 Kan., 255; Lott v. Mitchell, 32

Cal., 24; Jeffers v. Johnson, 21 N. J. Law, 73).

But what was the contract between True and Bullard & Co. ?

The petition avers that Bullard & Co. "expressly agreed, and it

was understood and made a part of the consideration of the sale

and transfer of said note, that said defendants Bullard & Co. were

to accept and take said note without any liability or recourse

whatever on the part of this plaintiff on account of the non-
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payment of said note at maturity." The most that can be said for

this language is that by it Bullard & Co. agreed that so far as

they were concerned as holders of the note they would not look

to True for payment thereof ; that he was not to be liable to them

as an indorser. But Bullard & Co. did not agree, so far as the

pleadings show, not to sell and indorse this note, nor did they

agree that if they did sell and indorse the note they would advise

the purchaser of the contract existing between them and True.

The mere fact that Bullard & Co. transferred this note before

maturity to the bank, and that as against the bank True could

not set up as a defense the contract under which he indorsed it

to Bullard & Co., does not invest True with a right of action

against Bullard & Co. In other words, Bullard & Co. have not

violated their contract with True. The petition does not state

a cause of action. The judgment of the district court is right and

is Affirmed.

^Lcr^ &~Z\

maturity, could et up th defen e that he in fact sold and indorsed
' ithout r cour c a abainst a sub equent indor ee of said note
who purcha d it b fore maturity, in the u ual cour e of bu ine s,
and without knm l dge of the contract betw en the indor er and
fir t indorsee.
already tated, True in hi petition did not a er that he
had paid any part of thejudg ment which had been rendered
again t him on said n te m favo r of the bank to whom it had been
o far, then, a th p tition
old and as i ned by Bullard & o.
ho,
True ha not b en damaged.
nder no view of the ca e
can he have any cau c of action against ullard & Co. until he
l1all avepaldti1l1dgment rend ered on aid note or some part
ther~.
Churchill v. Moore, 15 Kan ., 255; Lott v. Mitchell, 32
Cal. 24; Jeffers v . Johnson, 21 N. J. Law, 73 ) .
B ut what was th contract bebveen True and Bullard & Co.?
The petition av r that ullard & Co. "expressly agreed, and it
' as under tood and made a part of the con ideration of the ale
and tran fe r of aid note, that said defendants Bullard & Co. were
to accept and take aid note without any liability or recourse
whatever on the part of this plaintiff on account of the nonpayment of said note at maturity." The most that can be aid for
this language is that by it Bullard & Co. agreed that o far as
they we re concern ed as holders of the note they would not look
to True for payment thereof; that he was not to be liable to them
a an indorser. But Bullard & Co. did not agree, so far as the
pleading show, not to ell and indorse this note, n or did they
agree that if they did sell and indorse the note they would advise
the purchaser of the contract existing between them and True.
The mere fact that B ullard & Co. tran £erred this note before
maturity to the bank, and that as ag ain t the bank True could
not et up a a d fense the contract under which he indorsed it
to ullard & Co., does not inve t True with a right of action
again. t ullard & Co. In other wor I , Bullard & Co. have not
violated their contract with True. The petition do s not tate
a cau e of action. The judgment of the district court is rio-ht and
is

Affirmed.

MT. MANSFIELD HOTEL

Co. v.

BAILEY
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Mt. Mansfield Hotel Co. v. Bailey {1891), 64 Vt. 151, 16 L. R. A.

?95-

Special assumpsit for the annual interest clue on five prom-

issory notes endorsed by the defendant. Plea, the general issue.

Mt. JV!ansfield Hotel Co. v. Bailey (1891), 64 Vt. 151, I6 L. R. A.
295.

Trial by court at the April term, 1890, Lamoille county, Munson,

J., presiding. Judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff excepts.

The case appears in the opinion.

P. K. deed, for the plaintiff.

Geo. JVilkins, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Tyler, J. It appears by the statement of facts that Geo. Doo-

little and Mrs. E. J. Doolittle promised to pay the defendant, Wil-

Special assump it for the annual interest du on five promissory notes endorsed by th d f ndant.
lea, the general i ue.
Trial by court at th
pril term, l 90, Lamoille county, Mun on,
J., pre iding. Judgment for th def ndant. The plaintiff except .
Th case appears in the opinion.

liam P. Bailey, or order, five thousand dollars, as their five promis-

sory notes should respectively become due, and the interest thereon

annually. The notes are dated April 1, 1886, are for $1,000 each,

P. K. Gleed, for the plaintiff.
Geo. Wilkins, for th defendant.

and payable 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 years from their date.

The plaintiff, as the indorsee of the notes, seeks to recover

of the defendant, as indorser, the first three years' interest upon

them without demand of the makers and notice to the defend-

ant of the makers' default of payment. The defendant's counsel
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contends, 1st, that the indorser cannot in any event be compelled

to pay the interest as it annually falls due, that his conditional

liability does not become absolute until the notes respectively

mature, and then only after demand and notice ; 2d, that if the

interest is collectable of the indorser as it annually accrues it is

after the usual measures have been taken to make him chargeable.

The general rule of law relative to the respective liabilities of

the maker and indorser of a promissory note is well defined. The

promise of the maker is absolute to pay the note upon presentment

at its maturity. The promise of the indorser is conditional that if,

when duly presented, it is not paid by the maker, he. the indorser,

will, upon due notice given him of the dishonor, pay the same

jo the indorsee or other holder.

It seems clear that the indorser is not_liable for the annrual_

payment of the interest without performance ofjhe_con3itions bx

tHFholden IT he were thus liable his relation to the note would

be like that of a surety or a joint maker, and his promise, instead

of being conditional, would be absolute as to the payment of the

interest. This is contrary to the general statement of the law that

The opinion of the court was delivered by
TYLER, J. It appear by the statement of facts that Geo. Doolittle and Mrs. E. J. Doolittle promi ed to pay the defendant, William P. Bail y, or order, five thousand dollars, a their five promissory note hould r p ctively become due, and the interest thereon
annually. The notes are dated April l, 1886, are for $1,000 each,
and payable 16, 17, 18 1 19 and 20 year from their date.
Th plaintiff, a the indorsee of the notes, seeks to recover
of the d f ndant, a indor er, the fir t three years' interest upon
them without demand of the makers and notice to the defendant of th makers' default of payment. The defendant counsel
contend , lst, that the indorser cannot in any event be compelled
to pay th intere t a it annually falls due, that hi conditional
liability does not become absolute until the note re pectively
mature, and then only after demand and notice; 2d, that if the
intere t i collectable of the indor er a it annually accrues it is
after the u ual mea ure have been taken to make him chargeable.
The general rul e of law relative to the respectiv liabilities of
the mak r and indor r of a promi ory note i well defined. The
promise of the maker is absolute to pay the note upon presentment
at its maturity. The promi e of th indor er is conditional that if,
when duly pre ented, it is not paid by the maker. he, the indor er 1
will, upon due notice giv n him of the di honor, pay the am
to the indorsee or other bold er.
It seem clear that th indor er i not liable for the annual
payment of the inter t -v ithout performance of the cond1tions by
the hold r. If he were thu liable hi relation to th note would
be like that of a urety or a joint mak r, and hi promi , in tead
f beino- conditional, would be absolute a to the payment of the
interest. This is contrary to the o-en ral tatement of the law that
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his liability is conditional. The relation of principal does not

exist between him and the maker. They are not co-principals.

Their contracts are separate and they must be sued separately, at

common law. (Randolph Com. Paper, s. 739). The maker has

received the money of the indorser and in consideration thereof

promises to repay it according to the terms of the note, and if he

fails to pay, his contract is broken and he is liable for the breach.

The contract of the indorser is a new one, made upon a new con-

sideration moving from the indorsee to himself. His undertak-

ing is in the nature of a guaranty that the maker will pay the

principal and interest according to the terms of the note. His

liability is fixed upon the maker's default upon demand, and

notice to him of such default. This new contract cannot be con-

strued as an absolute one to pay the interest without default of

or demand upon the maker. The promise cannot be absolute as

to the payment of interest when it is clearly conditional as to the

payment of the principal.

It is held that though the annual interest upon a promissory

note may be collected of the maker as it falls due, it is not separ -

ated from the principal so that the recovery of it is barred by the
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statute of limitati ons until the recovery of the principal is thus

barred. (Grafton Bank v. Doe ct at., 19 Vt. 463). The holder

of a note with interest payable annually loses no rights against

the parties to it, whether makers or indorsers, by neglecting to

demand interest, and he has the election to do so, or wait and

collect it with the prin cipal, for it is regarded as an incident of the

principal. (National Bank of North America v. Kirby, 108 Mass.

497). But it is so far an independent debt that he may maintain

an action a gainst the makers for it as it annually accrues, or

allow it to accumul ate and remain as a part of the debt until the

* not e matures. JJJatUn v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 44). In the latter course

I the makers would be chargeable with interest upon each year's

' YV *>* J interest from the time it was due until final payment. ( 1 Aik.

410; Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286). It was said by the court in

Talliaferro's Ex'rs. v. King's Admr., 9 Dana 331, (35 Am. Dec.

140) : "The interest, by the terms of the covenant, is made pay-

able at the end of each year, and is as much then demandable as if

a specific sum equal to the amount of interest had been promised ;

and. in default of payment, as much entitles the plaintiff to

demand interest upon the amount so due and unpaid. The fact

that the amount so promised to be paid is described as interest

accruing upon a larger sum, which is made payable at a future

day, cannot the less entitle the plaintiff to demand interest upon

hi liability i conditional. The relation of principal does not
exi t bet\\'cen him and the maker. They are not co-principal .
Their contract ar
parat and they mu t be ued separately at
common law. (Randolph om. aper, . 739). The mak r ha
received the mon y of th indor er and in con ideration th reof
promi es to r pay it according to the terms of the note, and if he
fail to pay, hi contract i broken and be i liable for the breach.
The contract of th indor r i a new one, made upon a new conideration moving from the indor ee to him elf. His undertaking i in th natur of a guaranty that the maker will pay the
principal and intere t according to th terms of the note. His
liability i fixed upon the maker' default upon demand, and
notice to him of such default. Thi new contract cannot be contrued a an ab olute on to pay the intere t without default of
or demand upon the maker. The promise cannot be ab olute as
to the paym nt of intere t when it i clearly conditional a to the
payment of the principal.
It is held that though the annual interest upon a promissory
note may be co11 cted of the maker a it falls due, it is not separated from the principal so that the recovery of it i barred by the
tatute of limitations until the recover of the rinci al i thu
barre .
ra ton Bank v. Doe et al., 19 Vt. 463). The holder
of a note with interest payable annually loses no right against
the parties to it, whether makers or indor ers, by neglectino- to
demand intere t, and he has the election to do so, or wait and
collect it with the principal for it is regarded as an incident of the
principal. (National Banll of North America v. Kirby, 108 Mas .
497). But it is so far an independent d 1 t that he may maintain
iln action against the makers for it a it annually accrues, or
allow it to accumulate and remain as a part of the debt until the
~ ~ ~note matures. (Catlin v. Lyman, 16 t. 44). In the latt r cour e
~~
the makers would be chargeable with intere t upon each year's
~ \......... ~- intcre t from th time it was due until final payment.
( l Aik.
410; Austin v. Imus, 23 Vt. 286). It was said by the court in
Talliaferro's Ex'rs. v. King's Adnir., 9 Dana 331, (35 Am. Dec.
140) : "The interest, by the t rm of the cov nant, is made payal le at the end of each year, and is a much then demandabl e a if
a pecific um equal to the amount of int rest had be n promi ed;
and in default of payment, as much ntitl
the plaintiff to
demand intere t upon th amount so du and unpaid. The fact
that the amount so promised to be paid is de cribed a intere t
accruing upon a larger um, whi h is mad payable at a future
day, cannot the less entitle the plaintiff to demand interest upon
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the amount, in default of payment, as a just remuneration in dam-

ages for the detention or non-payment."

It is true that at the maturity of the notes the defendant would

be liable, a s indorser, for bo th principal and interest, upon due

demand and notice, although these measures had not - been taken

to make him chargeable as the interest fell due each year. Notice

o f the maker's default of payment of interest need not be given

annually to the indorser in order to charge him with liability for

interest when the note matures. This is so stated by the court in

National Bank of North America v. Kirby, supra. In Howe v.

Bradley, 19 Me. 31, it is held that when a note is made payable

at some future period, with interest annually till its maturity and

no demand is made for the annual interest as it becomes due, or

if made, no notice thereof is given, the indorser, if duly notified

of the demand and non-payment when the note falls due, is liable

for the whole amount due, both principal and interest; that the

obligation imposed by the law upon the holder is only to demand

payment and gives the required notice when the bill or note

becomes payable. It is not held in this country that interest is,

subject to protest and notice, according to the law merchant, in
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order to charge indorsers with it when the note matures. The

usual consequence of omission to notify the indorser of the maker's

default, namely, the release of the indorser, would not follow the

omission to give him annual notice of such default? A note is not

dishonored by a failure of the maker to pay interest. First Na-

tional Bank v. County Commissioners, 14 Minn. JJ, (100 Am.

Dec. 196, note).

The defendant's counsel argues that it would be inconsistent

to hold the indorser liable for interest, which is a mere increment

of the principal, until his liability is established to pay the sum

out of which the interest springs ; that there may be defences to the

note at its maturity which will release the maker and consequently

the indorser, or that the indorser may then be released by neglect

of demand and notice. On first impression it might seem incon-

sistent that the maker should be compelled to pay interest before

his liability has been fixed to pay the principal, but that is his

contract. It is also argued that the fact that the interest, when

uncollected, is an incident of the debt so that as it annually falls

due, demand and notice are not necessary in order to charge either

the maker or the indorser with liability to pay it when the note

matures, is ground for holding that the indorser is not liable for

interest until he is made liable for the principal.

The question is whether the indorser, by the act of indorse-
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the amount, in default of paym nt, as a just remuneration in damag s for the d t ntion or n n- aym nt. '
It is true that at th maturity of the notes the defendant would
be liable, as indor er, for b th principal and inter t, upon due
demand and notice, although the c mea ures had not been taken
to make him charg abl a th int re t fell due each y ar. Notice
of the maker' default of paym nt of inter st need not be given
annually to th in<lor er in rder to charge him with liability for
intere t when th note mature . This is o tated by the court in
Tational Banli of i\ orth A merica v. Kirby, supra. In Howe v.
Bradley, 19 Me. 31, it i h ld that when a note i made payable
at some future period, with interest annually till its maturity and
no demand i mad for the annual inter t as it becomes due, or
if made no notice thereof is given, the indorser, if duly notified
of th d mand and non-payment when the note falls due, is liable
for the whole amount du , both principal and interest; that the
obligation impo ed by the law upon the holder is only to demand
payment and gives the required notice when the bill or note
becom payable. It i not held in this country that interest is.
subject to protest and notice, according to the law merchant, in
order to charge indor ers with it when the note mature . The
usual consequence of omi sion to notify the indor er of the makers
default, namely, the relea e of the indor er would not follO\ the
omission to give him annual notice of uch default A note i not
dishonored by a failure of the maker to pay intere t. First National Bank v. County Conunissioners, 14 Minn. 77, ( 100 Am .
Dec. 196, note).
The def ndant' coun el argu s that it would be incon i tent
to hold the indor er liable for intere t, which is a mere increment
of the principal, until hi liability i e tablished to pay the um
out of which the interest springs; that there may be defences to the
note at it maturity which will release th mak r and con equently
the indor er, or that the indor er may then be relea d by neglect
of demand and notice. On fir t impres ion it might seem inconi tent that the maker should be comp lled to pay intere t before
his liabil ity has been fixed to pay the principal, but that i his
contract. It is al o arg ued that the fact that the int re t when
uncollected is an incident of the debt s that a it annuall fa lls
due, demand and notice are not nece ary in order to charo-e either
the maker or th in dorser with liability to pay it " hen the note
matures is ground for holdin o- that the indor er i not liable for
intere t un til he i made liable for the principal.
T he question is whether the indor r by the act of indorse-
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ment, promises to pay anything on the note till its maturity, at

which time he clearly may he liable for both principal and interest.

The note bears upon its face an absolute promise by the maker

to pay the principal when it becomes clue and the interest thereon

annually. His promise is two-fold. It is as absolute to pay the

interest at the end of each year as to pay the principal at the end

of the time specified. Now what is the nature of the contract

which the indorser makes with the indorsee? His contract is not

in writing, like that of the maker, but his name upon the note is

evidence that he has received value for it, and also of an under-

taking on his part that it shall be paid according to its tenor.

When he indorses it and delivers it to the indorsee he directs the

payment to be made to the latter, and in effect represents that

the maker has promised to pay certain sums of money according

to the terms of the note, that is, the principal at maturity and the

interest annually ; that if the maker fails to pay on demand, he,

the indorser, will pay on due notice. His conditional promise is

concurrent with the absolute promise of the maker. His liability

to pay interest and principal, as each respectively falls due, arises

from his contract. It is his contract that he will make payment
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whenever the maker is in default and he, the indorser, is duly noti-

fied thereof.

It is true that interest is an incident, an increment of the

principal, and r/hat the holder may wait for it until his note matures

and then collect it with the principal. He may, however, by the

contract, collect it as it falls due, of the maker, and upon the tat-

ter's default, of the indorser .

The courts of England have never recognized the American

doctrine that interest is a mere incident, an outgrowth of the prin-

cipal, and in many cases follows and is recoverable as such without

an express contract. Until 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, it was unlawful to

demand interest even upon a contract to pay it. Since the case of

DcHavilland v. Bowcrbank, 1 Campb. 50. interest has been allowed

in England upon express contracts therefor, and not otherwise.

Where there is such a contract interest stands like the principal

in respect to the rights and liabilities of an indorser. (Sedg. on

Dam., 383 ; Scllcck v. French, 1 Conn. 32, [6 Am. Dec. 189,

note]). In Jennings v. Napanee Brush Co., reported in Ca. Law

Jour., Vol. 20, No. 19, in a learned opinion by McDougall, J., it

was held that where there was an express contract to pay interest

annually or semi-annually, it was not different from a contract

to pay an installment of the principal itself, and that notice to the

indorser of the maker's default was necessary to charge . the

ment, promi e t pa anything on the note till it maturity, at
which time he clearly may b liable for both principal and interest.
The note bear upon it fac an ab olute promi by the maker
t pay the principal when it becom due and th intere t thereon
annually. Hi promi i tv o-fold. It is a ab olute to pay the
inter t at the end of ach year a to pay the principal at the end
of the time pecified. Now what is the natur of th can tract
which the iudorser make with the indor ee? His contract i not
in writing, lik that f the maker, but hi name upon the note is
evid nee that h ha received value for it, and al o of an undertaking on his part that it hall be paid according to its tenor.
Wh n h indor e it and deliver it to the indor ee he direct the
payment to be made to the latter, and in effect represents that
the maker ha promi ed to pay certain sums of money according
to the ~rms of the note, that is, the principal at maturity and the
int r t annually; that if the maker fails to pay on demand, he,
the indor er, will pay on due notice. Hi conditional promise is
concurrent with the ab ol ute promi e of the maker.
i liability
to pay intere t and principal, a each resp.ectively falls due, ari es
from hi contract. It is hi contract that he will make payment
whenever the maker is in default and he, the indorser, i duly notified thereof.
It is true that interest is an incident, an increment of the
principal, and rllat the hold r may wait for it until his note matures
and then collect it with the principal. He may, however, by the
contract, collect it as it fall due of the maker and u on the latter's de ault, of the indorser.
The court of England have never recognized the American
doctrine that intere t i a mere incident, an outgrowth of the principal, and in many case follows and is recoverable as such without
an exp res contract.
ntil 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, it wa unlawful to
demand int rest even upon a contract to pay it.
ince the ca e of
DeHavilland v. BowerbQ.ltk, l ampb. 50, interest has been allowed
in England upon expre s contract ther for, and not oth rwise.
\i\There there i such a contract intere t tands like the principal
in re pect to the rights and liabilities of an indorser. ( edg. on
Dam., 383; Sellecl~ v. French, l Conn. 32, [6 m. Dec. 189,
note]). In Jennings v. Napa.nee Brush Co., reported in a. Law
Jour., Vol. 20, No. 19, in a learned opinion by McDouo-all, J., it
was held that where th r wa an expr
contract to pay interest
annually or semi-annually, it wa not diff r nt from a contract
to pay an installment of the principal it If, and that notice to the
indorser of the maker default was neces ary to charge . the
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indorser with it. In that case the indorser was released from pay-

ment of the first two half-yearly instalments of interest for want

of demand and notice.

While we adhere to the doctrine laid down in Grafton Bank

v. Doe, et al., supra, that interest is in general an incident of the

debt, it is consistent to hold that where the indorser is himself a

party to the original contract to pay interest annually, as in the

case at bar, by his indorsement he guarantees the performance of

that contract. Any other holding would make the indorser liable

for only a part of the maker's contract.

The case of Codman v. The Vt. and Ca. Railroad Co., 16

Blatch. 165, has been brought to our attention. The trustees and

managers of the Vermont Central Railroad Co. and the Vt. and

Ca. Railroad Co., issued notes to the amount of $1,000,000 in

sums of $1,000 each, payable to the defendant company, in twenty

years from their date, with interest semi-annually on presentation

of the interest coupons made payable to bearer and attached to the

notes. On each note was this indorsement, signed by the treasurer

of the defendant, under its seal: "For value received, the Ver-

mont and Canada Railroad Company hereby guarantee the pay-
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ment of the within note, principal and interest, according to its

tenor, and order the contents thereof to be paid to the bearer."

The coupons were not indorsed. The notes were put on the mar-

ket and the plaintiff purchased fifty of them, and subsequently,

after due demand, notice and protest, brought this suit to recover

the amount of two coupons on each of his notes, the notes them-

selves not having matured. Without passing upon the question

whether the guaranty was negotiable and available to the plaintiff,

as a remote holder, Wheeler, J., among other questions that arose

in the case, decided that the indorsement was a contract of indorse-

ment running to the bearer, and that demand, notice and protest

fixed the the liability of the indorser to pay the coupons, and gave

judgment for plaintiff for the amount of the coupons.

The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held

that the statute of limitations begins to run upon interest coupons

payable annually or semi-annually, from the time they respectively

mature, although they remain attached to the bonds, which rep-

resent the principal debt. (Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470).

Where the indorser is the payee of the note there would seem to

be no difference in his liability in respect to interest whether the

maker's promise to pay it is contained in the body of the note or in

interest coupons not indorsed, the notes to which they are attached

indorser with it. In that case the indorser was released from payment of the first two half-yearly instalment of interest for want
of demand and notice.
While we adhere to the doctrine laid down in Graf ton Bank
v. Doe, et al., supra, th~t interest is in general an incident of the
. debt, it is consistent to hold that where the indorser is himself a
party to the original contract to pay interest annually, as in the
.case at bar, by his indor ement he guarantees the performance of
that contract. Any other holding ·would make the indorser lialJ~e
for only a part of the maker's contract.
The case of Codman v. The Vt. and Ca. Railroad Co., 16
Blatch. 165, has been brought to our attention. The trustees and
managers of the Vermont Central Railroad Co. and the Vt. and
Ca. Railroad Co., issued notes to the amount of $1,000,000 in
sums of $1,000 each, payable to the defendant company, in twenty
years from their date, with intere t semi-annually on presentation
of the interest coupons made payable to bearer and attached to the
notes. On each note was this indorsement, signed by the treasurer
of the defendant, under its seal: "For value received, the Vermont and Canada Railroad Company hereby guarantee the payment of the within note, principal and interest, according to its
tenor, and order the contents thereof to be paid to the bearer."
The coupons were not indorsed. The notes were put on the market and the plaintiff purchased fifty of them, and subsequently,
after due demand, notice and protest, brought this suit to recover
the amount of two coupons on each of his notes, the notes themselves not having matured. \iVithout passing upon the question
whether the guaranty was negotiable and available to the plaintiff,
as a remote holder, \iVheeler, J., among other questions that arose
in the case, decided that the indorsement was a contract of indorsement running to the bearer, and that demand, notice and protest
fixed the the liability of the indorser to pay the coupons, and gave
judgment for plaintiff for the amount of the coupons.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held
that the statute of limitations begins to run upon interest coupons
payable annually or semi-annually, from the time they respectively
mature, although they remain attached to the bonds, which represent the principal debt. (A my v. Dubuq ne, 98 U. S. 470) .
Where the indorser is the payee of ~he note there would eem to
be no difference in his liability in respect to interest whether the
maker's promise to pay it is contained in the body of the note or in
interest coupons not indorsed, the notes to which they are attached
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being indorsed, and the coupons being mentioned in the notes ;

but it is unnecessary to decide that question here.

Upon the facts found by the County Court this action can-

not be maintainedf or the reason that the plaintiff never fixed the

defendant's liability to pay the three years' accrued interest. It

does not even appear that the maker s refused payme nt of it or

that they were requested to pay it before this suit was broughtj

therefore nothing is due from the defendant to the plaintiff.

Ross, Ch.J., dissents.

Judgment aMrmed.j^^^A

Ross, Ch.J. I concur in the disposal made of this case ;

being indor ed, and the coupons being mentioned in the notes ;
but it is unnecessary to decide that qu stion h r .
U pon th fact found by the ounty ourt thi action cannot be maintained for the rea on that the plaintiff n ver fixed the
de f ndant' liability to pay th thr e year ' ac ru d int r t. J!_
does not even app ar that the makers refu ed paym nt of it or
that th y w r reque ted to pay it before this uit v a brought_j_
ther fore nothing is due from the defendant to the plaintiff.

Judgment affirmed.~~ _

and in most of the grounds and reasoning of the opinion. But I

do not see my way clear to concur in holding, that an indorser

upon a promissory note, payable on time, with the interest

Ross, Ch.J., di sents.

annually, can be made chargeable for the payment of the inter-

est, before he can be, and is, charged with the payment of the

principal. By placing his name on the back of the note as an

indorser, without making any limitation upon his indorsement, he

guarantees its payment, upon condition that the indorsee, when

the time named in the note for its payment arrives, shall present
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it to the maker and demand its payment, and, if the maker fails

to make payment, shall seasonably notify him of such failure.

When this is done, the indorser promises to pay whatever of

principal and interest, is then due upon the note. This condi-

tion attaches primarily to the principal of the note. I think it

attaches to the interest only as it becomes a part of the principal.

It seems to me to be illogical, and pressing the indorsees condi-

tionaj_ undertaking beyond its proper scope and office, to hold

that he can have his liability fixed to nay for the use f or legal

rental of the principal, before his liability to pay the principal

is fixed . Interest is legal damage, fixed usually by statute, for

the detention and use of money. As soon as the money is due

and payable, the law implies damage for its detention and use.

It may also arise from the contract, for the detention and use of

the principal before it is payable by the terms of the contract.

When stipulated to be paid annually, it may be collected from

the maker of the note at the end of each year, because such is

his contract. It is an incident, and outgrowth from the prin-

cipal. The promise to pay it, whether implied or expressed, is a

dependent promise. It is attached to and arises from the prom-

ise to pay the principal. When the interest is stipulated to be

paid annually, and before the principle is payable, the maker

Ross, Ch.J. I concur in the disposal made of this case;
and in mo t of the grounds and reasoning of th opinion.
ut I
do not see my way clear to concur in holding, that an indorser
upon a promissory note, payable on time, with the intere t
annually, can be mad chargeable for the payment of the intere t, before he can be, and i , charged with the payment of the
principal. By placinD' his name on the back of the note a an
indor er, without making any limitation upon his indorsement, he
guarantees its payment, upon condition that the indorsee, when
the time nam d in the note for its payment arrives, shall present
it to the maker and demand its payment, and, if the maker fail
to make payment, hall seasonably notify him of such failure.
When this is done, the indor er promi es to pay whatever of
principal and interest, is then due upon the note. This condition attaches primarily to the principal of the note. I think it
attaches to the interest only as it becomes a part of the principal.
It seems to me to be illogical, and pre sing the indor er's conditional undertaking beyond its proper scope and office, to hold
that he can have his liability fixed to pay for the use or legal
rental of the principal, before hi liability to pay the principal
i fixed. Interest is I gal damage, fixed usually by statute, for
the detention and use of money. As soon as the money is due
and payable, the law implies damage for its detention and use.
It may also arise from the contract, for the d tention and u e of
th e principal before it is payabl by the terms of the contract.
When stipulated to be paid annually, it may b colle ted from
the maker of the note at th end of each year, b cause such is
his contract. It is an incid nt, and outgrowth from the principal. The promise to pay it, wh th r impli d or expres ed, is a
from the promdependent promise. It is attache 1 to and ari
i e to pay th principal. Vi'hen the inter t i tipulat d to be
paid annually, and before the principle is payable, the maker
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when sued for the annual interest, because his promise to pay it

is dependent upon his promise to pay the interest, may set up

any defence to the suit for recovering the annual interest, which

he could if the suit were for the recovery of the principal such

as fraud in the inception of the note ; or want, or failure of con-

sideration, or duress, or that his liability for the principal is con-

ditional, the terms of which have not been complied with. If

he defeats the action, it will estop the holder from recovering

the principal when due, and vice versa. In I Herman on Estop-

pel and Res Judicata 231, it is said, "So in an action for interest

due on a bond, a judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of

interest claimed will be conclusive evidence in an action on the

bond, and estop the defendant from alleging fraud, for the reason

that it was a defence which was available in the former suit, and

the presumption is that it was so used." Citing French v. How-

ard, 14 Ind. 455; Van Dolsen v. Abendroth, 43 N. Y. Super. Ct.

470; Preble v. Supervisors, 8 Bis. 358, and Edgell v. Sigerson,

26 Mo. 583 ; Cleveland v. Creviston, 93 Ind. 31, (47 Am. R. 367.)

The opinion recognizes this intimate, attached and depend-

ent relation of the promise to pay the interest annually to the
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promise to pay the principal, from which the interest springs. It

recognizes that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on

such promise to pay interest annually until the principal falls

due, in accordance with Grafton Bank v. Doe, et al., 19 Vt. 463.

This must be because, until severed by enforced collection or pay-

ment, interest is but an incident, and dependent of the principal.

It also recognizes this relation in holding that the indorsee may

allow the interest to accumulate, and may fix the indorsers liabil-

ity to pay it, by a proper demand, default and notice in regard to

the principal when that falls due. That is because liability for the

principal carries its dependencies. I concur in these holdings.

They are supported by the decisions cited in the opinion. But

they rest, and, in my judgment, can rest only on the basis that

the promise to pay the interest annually, both for its consideration

and enforcement is dependent upon the promise to pay the prin-

cipal. The opinion also holds that the liability incurred by the

indorsement is conditional, that that condition attaches to the

entire note, and that the liability of the indorser must be fixed

by demand, default and notice, in regard to the interest payable

from the maker yearly, as well as in regard to the principal. It

then seems to conclude, that, because the indorsee can lawfully

demand and collect of the maker, whose promise to pay the prin-

cipal is absolute, upon his dependent, but yet absolute promise to

when sued for the annual interest, because his promise to pay it
is dependent upon hi promi e to pay the interest, may set up
any def nee to the suit for recovering the annual interest, which
he could if the uit were for the r covery of the principal such
as fraud in the inception of the note; or want, or failure of consideration, or duress, or that hi liability for the principal is conditional, the terms of which have not been complied with. If
he defeats the action, it will e top the holder from recovering
the principal wh n due, and vice versa. In r Herman on Estoppel and Res Judicata 231, it is said, "So in an action for intere t
due on a bond, a jud ment for the plaintiff for the amount of
interest claimed will be conclusive evidence in an action on the
bond, and estop the defendant from alleging fraud, for the reason
that it was a defence which was available in the former suit, and
the pre umption is that it was so used." Citing French v. Haward, 14 Ind. 455; Van Dolsen v. Abendroth, 43 N. Y. Super. Ct.
470; Preble v. Supervisors, 8 Bis. 358, and Edgell v. Sigerson,
26 l\Io. 583; Cleveland v. Creviston, 93 Ind. 31, (47 Am. R. 367.)
The opinion recognizes this intimate, attached and dependent relation of the promise to pay the i'n terest annually to the
promi e to pay the principal, from which the interest springs. It
recognizes that the statute of limitations does not begin to run on
such promise to pay 'interest annually until the principal falls
due, in accordance with Graf ton Bank v. Doe, et al., 19 Vt. 463.
This must be because, until severed by enforced collection or payment, interest is but an incident, and dependent of the principal.
It also recognizes this relation in holding that the indorsee may
allow the interest to accumulate, and may fix the indorser's liability to pay it, by a proper demand, default and notice in re()"ard to
the principal when that falls due. That is because liability for the
principal carries its dependencies. I concur in these holdings.
They are supported by the decisions cited in the opinion. But
they rest, and, in my judgment, can rest only on the basis that
the promise to pay the interest annually, both for it consideration
and enforcement is dependent upon the promise to pay the principal. The opinion also holds that the liability incurred by the
indorsement is conditional, that that condition attache to the
entire note, and that the liability of the indorser must be fixed
by demand, default and notice, in regard to the interest payable
from the maker yearly, as well as in re<Yard to the principal. It
then seems to conclude, that, because the indor ee can lawfully
demand and collect of the maker, whose promise to pay the principal is absolute, upon his dependent, but yet ab olute promise to
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pay the interest annually, he can by proper demand, default and

notice, collect such annual interest of the indorser whose promise

and liability to pay the principal is conditional, and cannot as yet

be made absolute, and whose promise to pay the annual interest, it

has already held is dependent upon his promise to pay the prin-

cipal, and therefore, in my judgment, takes the condition attached

to his liability to pay the principal. It is at this point that 1 fail

to follow the reasoning of my associates. Here they assume, —

as I think — and proceed upon the basis, that, the indorser's implied

promise to pay the annual interest, is not dependent, but inde-

pendent, as it would be, if it were an instalment of the principal.

The holdings in the opinion, that the indorser's liability for the

accrued annual interest may be made absolute by a proper demand,

default and notice in regard to the principal when it falls due,

and that it may also be made absolute by a proper demand, default

and notice yearly, result in holding that the maker's promise to

pay the interest annually which he indorses, is both dependent

upon, and independent of, his promise to pay the principal. I

do not think that it has this double and inconsistent character,

but only the former. If it be independent, must not demand and
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default be made, and notice given yearly, or the indorser become

discharged? And if demand and default be made, and notice

given annually, must not the statute of limitation begin to run

from date of such demand? I think so. The result of giving

this double character to the promise to pay interest annually will

lead, I think, to some difficult legal problems. If the note is to

mature at the end of twenty years, and the payee holds it and

allows the interest to accumulate for ten years, and then having

indorsed it, sells it, the indorsee must wait for the accumulated

interest until the note falls due, because the maker's promise and

the indorser's liability in regard to that interest is dependent upon

the indorser's liability for the maker's promise to pay the prin-

cipal, which is still conditional, and for that reason the indorser's

liability to pay the accumulated interest is conditional, and will

remain so until it is made absolute for the principal ; but when

the eleventh year's annual interest falls due, the indorsee may at

once, by due demand, default and notice, fix the indorser's liabil-

ity to pay that year's interest, and may enforce its payment by

suit, while the indorser's liability for the payment of the principal

from which the year's interest springs, cannot for years be made

absolute and may never be. After the indorser's liability for the

payment of the year's interest has thus become fixed by suit, on

what legal principles governing res judicata, could the indorser

pay the inter st annuall , he can by proper d mand default and
notice, collect uch annual intere t of th indor r who e promise
and liability to pay the principal is conditional, and cannot as yet
be made absolute, and whose promise to pay the annual inter st, it
ha already held is dependent upon his promi e to pay the principal, and ther for , in my judgment, takes th condition attached
to hi liability to pay the principal. It is at this point that I fail
to follow the rea oning of my associat s. Here they assume,as I think-and proceed upon the basis, that, the indorser's implied
promise to pay the annual interest, is not dependent, but independent, as it would be, if it were an instalm nt of the principal.
The holdings in the opinion, that the indor er's liability for Lhe
accrued annual intere t may be made absolute by a proper demand,
default and notice in regard to the principal when it falls due,
and that it may al o be made absolute by a proper demand, default
and notice yearly, result in holding that the maker's promise to
pay the interest annually which he indorses, is both dependent
upon, and independent of, his promi e to pay the principal. I
do not think that it has this double and inconsi tent character,
but only the former. If it be independent, must not demand and
default be made, and notice given yearly, or the indorser become
discharged? And if demand and default be made, and notice
given annually, must not the statute of limitation begin to run
from date of such demand? I think so. The result of giving
this double character to the promise to pay interest annually will
lead, I think, to some difficult legal problem . If the note is to
mature at the end of twenty years, and the payee holds it and
allows the interest to accumulate for ten years, and then having
indor ed it, sells it, the indorsee must wait for the accumulated
inter t until the note falls due, because the maker's promi e and
the indor er's liability in regard to that interest is dependent upon
the indorser's liability for the maker's promise to pay the principal, which is still conditional, and for that reason the indorser's
liability to pay the accumulated intere t is conditional, and will
remain so until it is made absolute for the principal; but when
the eleventh year's annual interest falls due, the indorsee may at
one , by due demand, default and notice, fix the indorser liability to pay that year's intere t, and may enforce its payment by
suit while the indorser's liability for the payment of the principal
from which the year's interest prings, cannot for years be made
absolute and may never be. After the indorser's liability for the
payment of the year's inter t has thu become fixed by suit, on
what legal principles governing res judicata, could the indorser
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defend, in a suit brought, without further demand, default and

notice, at the maturity of the note, for the enforcement of the

payment of the principal and the ten years accumulated interest?

The only decision relied upon for the holding of my asso-

ciates is from 6 Blatchford. I do not regard that in point. The

guarantee was written instead of implied. The relation of the

indorser to the obligation was exceptional, it having been given

by its receivers and managers. The interest was expressed in

separate coupons, which, for some purposes, are treated as inde-

pendent obligations. The statute of limitations runs on them

generally from their maturity. (Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470,

[25 L. C. P. Co. 228] ). In this respect they are unlike the promise

in the note to pay the interest annually, as held in Grafton Bank

v. Doe ct al, 19 Vt. 463. I do not think that the indorsee has

the election to fix the indorser's liability for, and recover of him

annually such yearly interest, or to wait and fix it bv proper

demand, default a nd notice in regard to the principal. I think

his liability can only become absolute for the payment of the

incident or outgrowth of the debt, w hen it bernmps ahsolntp fnr

the _payment of the principal from which that incident or out-
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growth springs. The opinion on this branch of the case is made

to rest upon the ground that the indorser's undertaking, on due

demand and notice, is to make good to the indorsee any failure

of the maker to perform the contract, and, in that the maker has

promised to pay the interest at the end of each year, the indorser

has likewise so undertaken upon proper demand and notice. But

his implied contract being conditional in regard to the payment

of the principal, I think is conditional also to any incident or out-

growth of the principal, so long as it is conditional in regard to

the payment of the principal, and that he only becomes absolutely

bound to pay the interest at the end of each year, when he becomes

bound absolutely to pay the principal. When so bound for the

payment of the principal, then this obligation to pay the interest

at the end of each year attaches, in respect both to the interest

then accrued, and the interest which may thereafter accrue. I

would modify the opinion in the particular indicated.

V* *-*v

defend, in a suit brought, without further demand, default and
notice, at the maturity of the note, for the nforcement of the
payment of the principal and the ten years accumulated interest?
T he only decision relied upon for the holding of my associates is from 6 Blatchford. I do not regard that in point. The
guarante was writt n in t ad of implied. The relation of the
indorser to the obligation wa exceptional, it having been given
by its r ceivers and manager . The interest was expre ed in
eparate coupon , which, for some purposes, are treated a independent obligation . The tatut of limitations runs on them
generally from their maturity. (A11iy v. Dubitq.ue, 98 U. S. 470,
[25 L. C. P. Co. 228]). In this respect th ey are unlike the promise
in the note to pay th interest annually, as held in Grafton Bank
'. Doe et al., 19 t. 463. I do not think that the indorsee has
the election to fix the indorser's liability for. and recover of him
annually such yearly inter st or to wait and fix it
deman , e ault and notice in re ard to the rinci al
his liability can on y ecome ab olute for the payment of the
incident or outgrowth of the debt. when it becomes ahsah1te for
the payment of the principal from which that incident or outgrowth springs. The opinion on this branch of the case is made
to rest upon the ground that the indorser's undertaking, on due
demand and notice, is to make good to the indor ee any failure
of the maker to perform the contract, and, in that the maker has
promised to pay the inter t at the end of each year, the indorser
has likewi e o undertaken upon proper demand and notice. But
his implied contract beina conditional in regard to the payment
of the principal, I think is conditional al o to an) incident or outgrowth of the principal o long a it i conditional in regard to
the payment of the principal, and that he only become ab olutely
bound to pay the intere t at the end of each year, when he becomes
bound ab olutely to pay the principal. When so bound for the
payment of the principal, then thi obliaation to pay the intere t
at the end of each y ar attache in re pect both to the interest
then accrued, and the interest which may thereafter accrue. I
would modify the opinion in the particular indicated.
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WARRANTIES OF GENERAL INDORSER. § 68.

Ferguson v. Staples (1889), 82 Me. 159, ij Am. St. Rep. 4/0.

This was an action by the plaintiff, as surviving partner of

WARRANTIE

OF GENERAL INDORSER.

§ 68.

the firm, Samuel Otis & Co., to recover the consideration paid by

said firm to the defendant for three overdue town orders, which

Ferguson v . Staples (1889), 8- Me. r59, 17 Ani.

t. Rep. 470.

were afterwards adjudged by this court to be void. The orders

were indorsed by the defendant.

IV. H. Folgcr, for plaintiff.

N. H. Hubbard, for defendant.

Haskell, J. The defendant, upon payment of $3,000 to the

municipal officers of the town of Stockton, received from them

three town orders for $1,000 each, dated November 17, 1877,

payable to his own order, with interest annually, and already

Thi wa an action by the plaintiff, a urviving partner of
th e firm, amuel ti & o., to r ecover the con ideration paid by
aid firm t th d fendant for thr e overdu town orders, which
were afte rward ad judg d by this court to be void. The orders
were indorsed by the defendant.

accepted by the treasurer of the town.

On the 17th of January, 1879, the defendant indorsed one

year's interest upon each of the orders and indorsed and delivered

the orders to the plaintiff for value, and in good faith, both

parties believing them to be legal obligations of the town.

The orders have been held by this court as issued without

authority from the town, and, therefore, of no binding validity
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upon it. The plaintiff sues in assumpsit to recover the consid-

eration that he paid the defendant for the orders, as money had

and received, and interest.

Town orders , although not commercial paper to the extent

that transfer to an innocent holder shuts out equitable defenses,

may be negotiable in form, andjiecome transferable under the

same rules of law that would be applicableTo commercial paper.

(Parsons v. Monmouth, 70 Maine, 262).

The indorsement of a note is a new contract. The indorser

engages that the note shall be paid according to its tenor ; that is

upon proper presentment, demand and notice ; he engages that

it is genuine and the legal obligation that it purports to be, and

that he has title to it, and a right to indorse it. (Sto. Pr. Notes,

§135; Dan. Neg. Inst. §669; Bank v. Fearing, 16 Pick. 533;

Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray, 217).

All engagem en ts of the indorser. except payment, conditioned^

upon demand and notice, and possibly the validity of the note

when it is voidable only, are absolute warranties and not depend-

en t upon any condition whatever . If the note tran s ferred by

W. H. Folger, for plaintiff.
N. H. Hubbard, for defendant.
HASKELL, J. The defendant, upon payment of $3,000 to the
municipal officers of the t own of Stockton received from them
th ree town order for $1,000 each, dated November 17, 1877 1
payable to hi ow n order, with interest annually, and already
accepted by the trea urer of the town.
On the 17th of January, 1879, the defendant indorsed one
year's interest upon ach of the orders and indorsed and delivered
the order to the plaintiff for value, and in good faith, both
parties believing them to be legal obligations of the town.
The orders have been held by this court as issued without
authority from the town, and, therefore, of no binding validity
upon it. The plaintiff ues in assump it to recover the consideration that he paid the defendant for the orders, as money had
and r eceived, and interest.
Town orders, although not commercial paper to the extent
that tran fer to an innocent holder shut out equitable def nses,
may be negotiable in form, and become tran ferable under the
same rules of law that would be applicable to commercial paper.
(Parsons v . .Monmou th, 70 Maine, 262).
The indorsement of a note i a new contract. The indorser
engage that the note shall be paid according to its tenor; that is
upon proper pre ntment, demand and notice; he engages that
it is genu ine and the legal obligation that it purports to be, and
that he ha titl to it, and a right to indorse it. ( Sto. Pr. Notes,
§ 135; Dan. Neg. Inst. § 669; Bank v. Fearing, 16 Pick. 533;
Bank v. Caver!;• 7 Gray 217).
11 engagements of the indor er. except payment, conditioned
upon demand and notice, and po ibly the yalidity of the note
when it is voidabl only, are absolut warranti and not dependent
ndition
If th note transferred by

STATE BANK
State Bank v. Fearing o45

in dorsement be a forgery, or absolutely void for any other reason ,

the indorser may be sued for the orignal consideration p aid him,

or he may be held as a party without demand and notice] (Dan.

Neg. Ins. §§ 669, 675, 1 1 13; Par. N. & B. 444; Copp v. McDou-

gall, 9 Mass. 1 ; Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291).

The indorsement and transfer by the payee, of a dishonored

promissory note, for value, must create all the engagements on

the part of the indorser that an indorsement of the note before

maturity would create, except as to demand and notice. To

charge the indorser of a dishonored note, demand and notice are

required within a reasonable time after the indorsement. The

indorsement in such case is like the indorsement of the demand

note of the maker of that date, or the drawing of a bill upon the

maker of the note payable to the transferee. (Greely v. Hunt, 21

Maine, 455 ; Hunt v. Wadleigh, 26 Maine, 271 ; Sanborn v.

Southard, 25 Maine, 409; Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Maine, 112;

2 Par. N. & B. 13).

The plaintiff has elected to sue for the consideration that he

paid the defendant for the worthless orders. The plaintiff has

already recovered from the town by an action for money had and
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received, brought in the defendant's name, the part of the money

defendant loaned upon the order that went to the use of the

town. This sum the plaintiff must deduct from the amount that

he paid the defendant for the orders and have judgment for the

balance and interest.

Defendant defaulted. Damages to be assessed at nisi

prius.

Peters, C.J., Walton, Virgin, Emery and Foster, JJ.,

concurred. jj^ >^W—

State Bank v. Fearing (1835), 16 Pick. 5jj, 28 Am. Dec. 265.

Assumpsit on a promissory note for the sum of $2,000, dated

April 15, 1833, payable to the order of Thomas Jackson, junior,

in six months, made by Charles Brown, and indorsed with the

names of the payee, and of the defendant.

By an agreed statement of facts, it appeared that the signa-

tures of Brown and the defendant were genuine, but that the

defendant could prove, if such evidence was admissible, that the

indorsement of the name of the payee was a forgery; that the

note was presented by Brown to the plaintiffs for discount, in the

v.

FEARI

845

G

indorsement be a forgery, or absolutely yoid for any other reason,
the indor er may be sued for the orignal con ideration paid him,
or he may be held as a party without d mand and notice. (Dan.
Neg. Ins.§§ 669, 675, lII3; Par. N. & B. 444; Copp v. McDoitgall, 9 Ma s. l; Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291).
The indorsement and transfer by the payee, of a dishonored
promis ory note, for value, mu t create all the engagements on
the part of the indorser that an indorsement of the note before
maturity would creat , except as to demand and notice. To
charge the indorser of a di honored note. demand and notice
required within a rea onable time after the indorsement. The
indorsement in such ca e is like the indorsement of the demand
note of the maker of that date, or the drawing of a bill upon the
maker of the note payable to the transferee. (Greely v. Hunt, 21
Maine, 455; HHnt v. Wadleigh, 26 Maine, 271; Sanborn v.
Southard, 25 Maine, 409; Goodwin v. Davenport, 47 Maine, l 12;
2 Par. N. & B .. 13).
The plaintiff has elected to sue for the consideration that he
paid the defendant for the worthless orders. The plaintiff has
already recovered from the town by an action for money had and
received, brought in the defendant's name, the part of the money
defendant loaned upon the order that went to the use of the
town. This sum the plaintiff must deduct from the amount that
he paid the defendant for the orders and have judgment for the
balance and interest.
Defendant defaitlted. Damages to be assessed at nisi
priits.
PETER , C.J., WALTO } VIRGIN, EMERY and FosTER, JJ.,
concurred.

m
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usual course of business, and discounted by them for him ; that

State Bank v. Fearing ( 1835), 16 Pick. 533 28 Am. Dec. 265.
1

Assumpsit on a promissory note for the sum of $z,ooo, dated
April 15, 1833, payable to the order of Thoma Jack on, junior
in six months, made by Charle Brown, and indorsed with the
names of the payee, and of the defendant.
By an agreed tatement of fact , it appeared that the ignatures of Brown and the defendant were aenuine, but that the
defendant could prove, if uch eviden e wa admi ible, that the
indorsement of the name of the payee was a foraery · that the
note was presented by Brown to the plaintiff for di count in the
-u ual course of busines , and di counted b) them for him; that
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at the time of such discount, the plaintiffs and the defendant were

ignorant of the forgery; and that due notice of the non-payment

of the note was given to Brown, Jackson and the defendant.

If upon this statement of facts the court should be of opinion,

that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment, the defendant was

to be defaulted, otherwise, the plaintiffs were to be nonsuited.

Austin, for the plaintiffs.

Parsons and Stearns, for the defendant.

Shaw, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The peculiar features of this action are, that the plaintiffs

claim of the second indorser, from whom they immediately took

the note. The question is, whether the forgery of the indorse-

ment of the name of a prior party, is a good defence to the note ;

and the Court are of opinion that it is not.

In general it is not necessary for the holder to prove the

signature of any par ty prior to the party whom he sues. The

rea son seems to be obvious, that the party defendant, by his

Indorsement, has admitted the ability and the signature of all

prior parties. (Bayley on Bills, 313; Critchlow v. Parry, 2

Oimpb. 1S2. ) The effect of the engagement of the indorser is,
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that if the prior parties do not pay the note according to its tenor

upon due presentment, upon notice to him, he will. It is there-

fore a rule upon this subject, that a plaintiff is under no obligation

to prove the signature of those prior to the party intended to be

charged. It is very diffe rent_w here he claims against the acceptor

of a bill or maker of a note. They respectively promise to pay to

the payee or his order, and until he has made such order by his

indorsement, the plaintiff can establish no title, and to prove such

order, he must prove the genuineness of his signature. (Smith

v. Chester, 1 T. R. 654; Lambert v. Pack, 1 Salk. 127.) So an

acceptor is bound, though the bill be forged. (Jengs v. Fawler,

2 Strange, 946).

The circumstance that this bill was offered for discount, by

Brown, makes no difference ; the plaintiff's had a right to look to

their immediate indorser, and if satisfied to take the note on his

credit, he is liable to them ; and it was for him to see that he has

a good remedy over against those who purport to be prior parties. '

Defendant defaulted.

CONTRACT OF THE IRREGULAR OR ANOMALOUS INDORSER. § 66.

Gums v. Giegling. (See page 209.)

Hills v. Place 347

Section VIII. — Presentment and Demand.

PRESENTMENT TO PRINCIPAL DEBTOR NOT NECESSARY. § J2.

Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Shufeldt {1897), 78 Fed. 292.

Strudwick & Peters, for plaintiff.

Hastings & Stead man, for defendant.

Hanford, District Judge. This is an action to recover a bal-

ance due after deducting partial payments upon a negotiable prom-

issory note, made payable on demand. The defendant has

demurred to the complaint, his contention being that the same is

insufficient, for failure to allege a demand prior to the commence-

ment of the action. There is a rule of long standing, and sup-

ported by the weight of authority in this country, that the com-

mencement of an action is itself a demand, and that failure to

request payment, prior to the commencement of the action, affords

no ground of defense. (Bank v. Fox, Fed. Cas. No. 2,683; 5

Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 528Z 46 . It is insisted, however, that the

courts and the text-books in this country have fallen into error by

following early decisions, which were controlled by peculiar facts,

and which are insufficient of themselves to establish a general

rule upon the subject. It is unwise to depart from business cus-
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toms and practices which have been sanctioned by repeated deci-

sions of courts, and acquiesced in for a considerable time, and

which may fairly be supposed to have been contemplated by the

parties at the time of making their contract. This contract must

be construed as one having been made the subject to the rule

above stated, and the maker of the note is. by the terms of his

contract, liable without any demand, prior to the commencement

of an action. Demurrer overruled.

Hills v. Place (1872), 48 N. Y. 320.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Superior

Court of the city of New York, affirming a judgment entered in

favor of the plaintiff on a verdict.

The action was brought to recover the amount of a promis-

sory note, made by the defendant, payable one month after date,

at the Hanover National Bank of the city of New York, to the

order of D. Russel, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff.

34

PRE ENTME T TO PRIN CIPAL DEBTOR

3-48 Presentment to Principal Deijtor

The judge, on the trial, after the testimony was closed,

directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount

of the note and interest, to which direction an exception was taken

by the defendant.

The facts material to the decision of the case in this court

are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

H. C. Place, for the appellant.

/. R. Hills, for the respondent, in person.

The judge, on the trial, after th t timony wa closed,
dir ct d th jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for th amount
of the note and inter st, to which direction an xception ' as taken
by the d f ndant.
The fact mat rial to the decision of the case in this court
are suffici ntly stat d in the opinion.

Lott, Ch.C. The evidence given on the trial, most favor-

ably construed to the defendant, does not prove payment, or

establish facts sufficient to bar a recovery for damages and costs,

H. C. Place, for th app llant.
J. R. Hills, for the respondent, in person.

as well as the principal of the note.

It shows that the note was presented for payment on behalf

of the plaintiff at the Hanover National Bank, where it was made

payable, about n o'clock of the day it fell due, and that it was

not then paid ; that the defendant, on being notified of the fact by

the cashier, immediately thereafter, between eleven and twelve

o'clock, "put funds in the bank and gave instructions to have it

paid on presentation."

It was not presented for payment to or at the bank or to the
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plaintiff, at any time or place after the funds were so left, before

the commencement of this action.

The cashier of the said bank, on being asked, "what is the

custom of banks in the city of New York in reference to present-

ing notes?" answered, "that the custom is to present a note for

payment between ten and three o'clock, but a man has until three

o'clock to pay his note, and it cannot be protested until after

three o'clock." He also stated that ordinarily notes are presented

between ten and three o'clock, and if a note is not paid on the first

presentation thereof, that it is necessary to present it again or

the second time, according to custom, and that "the notary never

goes until three o'clock."

It is clearly established, by the preceding statement, that the

note in question was never in fact paid to the plaintiff, but it is

shown, on the contrary, that the funds which were left at the

bank, to be applied to its payment on presentation, were shortly

thereafter actually withdrawn by the defendant himself.

There is no ground for the theory or claim of the defend-

ant's counsel, that "the parties agreed in the note to make the

Hanover Bank the mutual receiving agent, and a payment to that

agent on the third day of grace of the $230 to pay the note, and

an acceptance of that by the agent, was a payment of the note,

LOTT, Ch.C. The evidence given on the trial, most favorably construed to the def ndant, does not prove payment, or
establish facts suffici nt to bar a recovery for damages and costs,
· as well as the principal of the note.
It shows that the not wa presented for payment on behalf
of the plaintiff at the Hanover National Bank, where it was made
payable, about r I o'clock of the day it fell due, and that it was
not th n paid; that the defendant, on being notified of the fact by
the ca hi r, immediately thereafter, between eleven and twelve
o'clock, "put funds in the bank and gave instructions to have it
paid on presentation."
It was not presented for payment to or at the bank or to the
plaintiff, at any time or place after the funds were so left, before
the commencement of this action.
The cashier of the said bank, on beino- asked, "what is the
custom of banks in the city of New York in r eference to presenting notes?" answered, "that the custom is to present a note for
payment between ten and three o'clock, but a man has until three
o'clock to pay his note, and it cannot be protested until after
three o'clock." He also stated that ordinarily notes are presented
between ten and three o'clock, and if a note is not paid on the first
pre en ta ti on thereof, that it is nee ssary to present it again or
the second time, accordino- to custom, and that "the notary never
goes until three o'clock."
It is clearly establi hed, by the preceding statement, that the
note in question was never in fact paid to the plaintiff, but it is
shown, on the contrary, that the funds which were left at the
bank, to be applied to it paym nt on pre ntation, were shortly
thereafter actually withdrawn by the defendant himself.
There is no ground for the theory or claim of the defendant's counsel that "the parti s agreed in the note to make the
Hanover Bank the mutual r ceiving agent, and a payment to that
agent on the third day of g race of the $230 to pay the note, and
an acceptance of that by the agent, was a payment of the note,
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and the maker had then discharged his obligation, and the holder

had only to go to the common agent, the bank, and receive the

money."

The bank was in no sense the plaintiff's agent for the col-

lection of the note, or the receipt of the amount due thereon, or

otherwise.

v.
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and the maker had then di charg d hi obligation, and the holder
had only to go to th common agent, the bank, and receive the
money. '
The bank was in
nse the plaintiff's ag nt for the colr ceipt f the amount du thereon, or

It was named, in the connection in which it was used, merely

as the place where its business was transacted, for the purpose

of making payment of the note there, without conferring or

intending to confer any power, authority or duty on the associa-

tion itself in reference thereto.

Such designation did not make it incumbent, as a precedent

condition, to create a liability or obligation by the maker of the

note to pay it or to give a right of a recovery thereon, that it

should be presented at that particular place for payment. The'i

effect or consequence of an omission or failure to make such pre- ' r

sentment was not to exonerate the maker from his promise to

pay what he had agreed, but only to relieve him from damages

in case he was ready at the time and place appointed to pay it,^

and there was no one there to receive the money. Such readiness
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is considered equivalent to a tender of the sum payable, and an

answer pleading that fact, and a payment of the money due into

court, would be a bar to a recovery of interest and costs, but not

to the cause of action.

This principle is settled by the decisions in Wolcott v. Van

Santvoord (17 John., 248) and Caldwell v. Cassidy (8 Cow.,

271).

The custom referred to by the cashier does not interfere with

that principle. It evidently does not affect the maker's liability.

It only shows that the usual banking hours are allowed him to

make his payment, and that his note cannot be protested till they

have passed.

Assuming that the leaving of the money in the bank, after

the demand ma de by the plaintiff, was sufficient proof of his read-

iness to pay the note, and is to be considered as a tender of pay-

ment in due time, y et he has entirely failed to show that he ever

brought the money into court; and asaprotest is never necessary

to charge or hold the maker, it follows, from the views above

expressed, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount

of the note, with interest ; and, there being no disputed questions

oFfact, the court was authorized to give a direction to the jury

to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for both principal and

interest.

It wa named, in th conn ction in which it was used, merely
as th place where its business wa tran acted, for the purpo e
of making payment of the note there, without conferring or
intending to confer any power, authority or duty on the association it If in reference ther to.
uch designation did not make it incumbent, as a precedent
condition, to create a liability or obligation by the maker of the
note to pay it or to give a right of a recovery thereon, that it
hould be presented at that particular place for payment. The
effect or con equ nee of an omission or failure to make such presentm nt was not to exonerate the maker from his promi e to
pay what he had agreed, but only to relieve him from damages
in ca e he was ready at the time and place appointed to pay it
and there wa no one there to receive the money. Such readiness
is consid red equivalent to a tender of the sum payable, and an
answer pleadino- that fact, and a payment of the money due into
court, would be a bar to a recovery of interest and costs, but not
to the cau e of action.
Thi principle i ettled by the decisions in Wolcott v. Van
Santvoord (17 John., 248) and Caldwell v. Cassidy (8 Cow.,
271).
The cu tom referred to by the cashier does not interfere with
that principle. It evidently does not affect the maker's liability.
It only hows that the u ual banking hours are allowed him to
make hi payment, and that his note cannot be prote ted till they
have pa sed.
A urning that the l aving of the money in the bank, after
the demand made by the plaintiff, wa ufficient proof of his readin ess to pay the note, and i to be con id red a a t nder of a ment in due time, yet h a entir 1 fai d to ow that he e er
_2roug t t e money into court; and a a protest is neyer n ce ar)
to charge or hold the maker, it f llow , from the i w aboye
expre ed, that the plaintiff was entitl d to r coyer the amount
of the not , with interest· and, there beino- no di puted que tion
of fact, the court was authorized to ive a dire tion to the jury
to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, for both principal and
interest.
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350 Time of Presentment

Tt is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of the

exception to that direction, so far as it related to the right to

recover interest, or what was the effect of the presentment of the

note and the refusal to pay it before the deposit of the funds to

meet it. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed with

costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

^

TIME OF PRESENTMENT. § 74.

TIME OF PRESENTMENT

It i , therefore, unnecessary to consider th e sufficiency of the
exception to that direction, so far a it r lat d to th rig ht to
r cover int rest, or what was the eff ct of the presentm nt of the
note and the refu al to pay it b for th depo it of th funds to
m et it. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed with
costs.
11 concur.
Judgment affirmed.

Farnsworth v. Allen (1855), 4 Gray (Mass.), 453.

Action of contract against the indorser of the following prom-

issory note :

"Boston, May 23, 1853.

TIME OF PRESENTMENT.
"Three months after date I promise to pay to the order of

Walter M. Allen one hundred and fifty dollars, value received.

"Francis Freeman."

Farnsworth v. Allen (r855), 4 Gray (Mass.), 453.

At the trial in the court of common pleas, a witness testified

that he received the note, at the close of bank hours on the last

day of grace, from the Grocers' Bank in Boston, who had received
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the note for collection from the Cambridge Market Bank, but did

not know the residence of the maker or indorser ; that he inquired

of a director of the Cambridge Market Bank, and learned that

the maker lived at Winchester and the indorser at North Cam-

bridge ; and the same afternoon carried the note to a notary public

in Charlestown, and told him where the parties resided.

Action of contract against the indorser of the following promory note:
"BosToN, May 23, I853.
"Three months after date I promi e to pay to the order of
Walter M. Allen one hundred and fift y dollars, value received.
" FRANCIS FREEMAN."

The notary public testified that, as soon as he could after

receiving the note for protest, he went to the house of the maker,

(about ten miles from Boston,) and arrived there about nine

o'clock in the evening; that there was no light in the house, and

the inmates appeared to have retired for the night ; that he rung

the bell, and after some time the maker came to the door with a

light ; and he presented the note, stated its contents, and demanded

payment, which the maker refused, saying that he could not, or

should not, or would not pay it ; that he returned with the note

to Charlestown, and on the same evening put in the post office a

proper notice of dishonor, addressed to the defendant at North

Cambridge.

The defendant contended that the demand proved was not

sufficient to charge the indorser. But Hoar, J., ruled otherwise,

At the trial in the court of common pleas, a witness testified
that he received the note, at the clo e of bank hours on the la t
day of grace, from the Grocers' Bank in Bo ton, who had receiv d
the note for collection from the Cambridge Market Bank, but did
not know the re idence of the maker or indorser; that he inquired
of a director of the Cambridge Market Bank, and learned that
the maker lived at Winchester and the indorser at North Cambridge; and the ame afternoon carried the note to a notary public
in Charlestown, and told him where the parties resided .
The notary public te tified that, as soon a he could after
receiving the note f r protest, he went to the house of the maker,
(about ten miles from Boston,) and arrived there about nine
o'clock in the eyening; that there -v as no lig ht in the hou e, and
the inmate appeared to have r etired for the night; that he rung
the bell, and after som time th e mak r came to the door with a
light; and he presented the note, stated its contents, and demanded
payment, which th mak r refused, saying that h ould not, or
should not, or would not pay it; that he returned with the note
to Charlestown, and on the same evening put in the post office a
proper notice of dishonor, addressed to the defendant at North
Cambridge.
The defendant contended that the demand proved was not
sufficient to charge the indorser. But Hoar, J., ruled otherwise,

Nelson y. Grondahl 351

the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant

alleged exceptions.

/. G. Abbott, for the defendant.

C. R. Train, for the plaintiff.

Bigelow, J. The note declared on, not being payable at a

bank, or at any place where business was transacted during cer-

tain stated hours in each day, was properly presented to the maker

at his place of residence. It was also the duty of the holder to

present it within reasonable hours on the day of its maturity.

No fixed rule can be established, by which to determine the hour

beyond which a presentment, in such case, will be unreasonable

and insufficient to charge an indorser. Generally, however, it

should be made at such hour^that, having regard to the habits

and usages of the community -where the maker resides, he may

be reasonably expected to be in a condition to attend to ordinary

business. In the present case, taking into consideration the dis-

tance of the place of residence of the maker from Boston, where

the note was dated, and where it was held when it became due;

the means that were taken to ascertain the residence of the maker,

and the season of the year at which the note fell due, we are of
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opinion that a presentment at nine o'clock in the evening was

seasonable and sufficient. It is quite immaterial that the maker

and his family had retired for the night. The question whether

a presentment is within reasonable time cannot be made to depend

on the private and peculiar habits of the maker of a note, not

known to the holder ; but it must be determined by a consideration

of the circumstances which, in ordinary cases, would render it

seasonable or otherwise. (Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Campb. 527 ; Triggs

v. Newnham, 10 Moore, 249, and 1 Car. & P. 631 ; Wilkins v.

Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill,

N. Y. 635).

Exceptions overruled.

WHERE AND TO WHOM PRESENTMENT SHOULD BE MADE. §§ 74, 75.

Nelson v. Grondahl (1904), (N. D.) 100 N. W. 1093.

Appeal from District Court, Cass county ; Charles A. Pollock,

Judge.

Action by Peter Nelson against Olaf Grondahl. Judgment

for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

H. R. Turner, for appellant.

Benton, Lovell & Holt, for respondent.
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352 Where Presentment Should he Made

Morgan, J. This action is brought against the defendant as

indorser of a promissory note of which he was the payee. The

plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges that one Steffes made and deliv-

ered such promissory note to the defendant, and that the defend-

ant duly indorsed and transferred it to the plaintiff for value, and

that the note was duly presented for payment when due, and pay-

ment refused. The defense attempted to be proven at the trial

was that the note was not presented for payment in the manner

provided by law. At the close of the taking of the testimony the

district court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of

$339.84, the amount claimed to be due in the complaint, and

denied defendant's motion to direct a verdict. The defendant

thereafter made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-

dict, on grounds stated, or for a new trial on account of errors

occurring at the trial and the insufficiency of the evidence to sus-

tain the verdict. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict was granted by the court, and the appeal is from the judg-

ment entered on such verdict. A statement of the case was settled,

specifying the errors relied on.

The only specification of error made on this appeal is that the
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court erred in granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding

the verdict. The question raised by such specification is that there

is no evidence showing that the note was presented for payment

when it became due, as is required by the statute, before an

indorser can be held liable under his indorsement. Section 70,

c. 100, Rev. Codes 1899. The certificate of the notary who pro-

tested the note for non-payment is in evidence, and recites that

"I, * * * did present the note hereto attached, * * *

and demanded payment thereof, which was refused." The cer-

tificate is silent as to the place of presentment and as to the

person to whom presentment was made. The note was, by its

express terms, made payable to Grondahl, the defendant, "at his

store in Fargo, North Dakota." The respondent contends that

the certificate of the notary is of itself insufficient to show a

proper presentment of the note for payment to the maker, and

that the evidence, outside of the certificate, is not competent to

prove that the note was presented for payment as required by the

terms of the statute. Section J$ of the Negotiable Instruments

Law of 1899 (Civ. Code, p. 1048) provides that "presentment for

payment is made at the proper place where a place of payment is

specified in the note and it is there presented." Section 72 of the

same law provides that presentment for payment is sufficient when

made at the proper place to the person primarily liable on the

~IoR r. \ 1 ' , J. Thi action i brought against th defendant as
indorser of a promi ory note of ' hich h wa the pay . The
plaintiff, in hi omplaint, allc e that on
teffes made and delivered uch promi ory note to the d f ndant, and that the defendant duly indor d and transferred it to the plaintiff for value, and
that the note wa duly pre ented for payment when due, and payment refused. Th defense attempted to be proven at the trial
wa that th note wa not pre ented for payment in the manner
provided by law. \t the clo e of the taking of the te timony the
di trict court direct d a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of
$339.84, the amount claimed to be due in the complaint, and
denied defendant's motion to direct a verdict. The defendant
thereafter made a motion for judgment notwith tanding the verdict, on grounds stated, or for a new trial on account of errors
occurring at the trial and the in ufficiency of the vidence to su tain the verdict. The motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was granted by th court, and the appeal is from the j udgment entered on uch verdict. A statement of the case was settled,
specifying the rror relied on.
The only specification of error made on this appeal is that the
court erred in granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The que tion raised by such specification is that there
is no evidence showing that the note was presented for payment
when it became due, as is required by the statute, before an
indorser can be held liable und er hi indorsernent. Section 70,
c. mo, Rev. Codes I899. The certificate of the notary who protested the note for non-payment is in evidence, and recites that
"I, * * * did present the note hereto attached, * * *
and demanded payment thereof, which was refused." The certificate is silent as to the place of presentment and as to the
person to whom pre entment v11as made. The note was, by its
express term , mad payable to Grondahl, the defendant, "at his
tore in Fargo, orth Dakota." The respondent contend that
Lhe certificate of the notary is of itself insufficient to show a
proper pre entment of the note for payment to the maker and
that the evidence, outside of the certificate, is not competent to
prove that the note was pre ented for payment a requir d by the
terms of the tatute. Section 73 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law of 1899 ( Civ. Code, p. 1048) provides that "pr entm nt for
payment is made at the proper plac wh re a place of paym nt is
ction 72 of the
specified in the note and it is there pre ented."
. ame law provides that pr sentment for paym nt i ufficient when
made at the proper place to th person primarily liable on the

NELSON
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instrument, or, if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person found

at the place where presentment is made. The trial court granted

the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the

ground that the notary's certificate did not show presentment of

the note for payment at the place where the note was, by its

terms, made payable, and that the notary's evidence of that fact

was not competent to prove such presentment, he having stated

that he had no independent recollection of the fact of such pre-

sentment. If the fact of presentment for payment, as required

by the statute, is supported by any competent evidence that reason-

ably tends to show due presentment, the granting of the motion

for judgment was erroneous. The notary was called as a witness,

and testified that he recollected that the note was by him presented

for payment ; that he had no independent recollection of the fact,

but that he so testified from an inspection of his certificate stating

the fact. He further testified that in cases where notes specified

the place where payment was to be made he presented them at

that place, and that he did so in every instance. Whether this

evidence, in addition to the certificate, is competent, and sufficient

to show presentment for payment at the proper place in accord-
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ance with the statute, is the only question arising on the appeal.

It is first claimed that there is no evidence that the note was

presented to the person primarily liable on the note ; that is, the

maker. The certificate does not state the name of the person to

whom it was presented, and the notary does not give the name of

the person in his testimony. A presentment at the bank ._whei£-a..

note is payable is a sufficient presen tm ent to the maker, althoug h

the name of the person to whom presented is not given . It is

held to have been made to some person connected with the bank.

This is expressly held in Ashe v. Beasley, 6 N. D. 191, 69 N. W.

188. If the notary's evidence is receivable, it brings the evidence

in this record within the rule stated in Ashe v. Beasley, supra, and

is sufficient to show presentment at the store where the note was

made payable, and to a person connected with such store. See

Douglas v. Bank of Commerce (Tenn.), 36 S. W. 874; 1 Daniel,

Neg. Inst. (5th Ed.), §635. In such cases no personal demand

on the maker is necessary. He is primarily liable on his promise

to pay. Section 70, Neg. Inst. Law 1899 (Civ. Code, p. 1048).

A presentment is necessary in order to fix the liability of the

indorser, which is a conditional obligation to pay the note if not

paid at maturity by the maker. If a maker stipulates to pay at

maturity at a specified place, and the note is there presented for

payment at its maturity, and payment refused or not made, the

v.
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instrument, or, if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person found
at the place where pres ntment i made. The trial court granted
the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that the notary's certificate did not show presentment of
the note for payment at the place where the note was, by its
terms, made payable, and that the notary s evidence of that fact
was not competent to prove uch presentment, he having stated
that he had no independent recollection of the fact of such presentment. If the fact of pre entment for payment, as required
by the statute, is supported by any competent evidence that rea onably tends to how due presentment, the granting of the motion
for judgment was erroneou . The notary was called as a witness,
and testified that he recollected that the note was by him presented
for payment; that he had no independent recollection of the fact,
but that he so testified from an inspection of his certificate stating
the fact. He further testified that in cases where notes specified
the place where payment was to be made he presented them at
that place, and that he did so in every instance. Whether this
evidence, in addition to the certificate, i competent, and sufficient
to sho,, pre entment for payment at the proper place in accordance with the tatute, is the only question arising on the appeal.
It is first claimed that there is no evidence that the note was
pre ented to the per on primarily liable on the note; that is, the
maker. The certificate does not state the name of the person to
whom it wa pre ented, and the notary doe not give the name of
the person in hi testimony. A presentment at the bank where a
note is payable i a ufficient resentment to the maker It
the name of the per on to whom presented is not iven.
hel to ave been ma to ome per on connected with the bank.
This is expre 1) held in Ashe v. Beasley, 6 . D. r91, 6g N. W.
r88. If the notary's evidence i receivable, it brinas the evidence
in this record within the rule stated in Ashe v. Beasley, supra, and
i sufficient to how pre entment at the store v here the note wa
made payable, and to a person connected with such tore. See
Douglas v. Bank of Co11imerce (Tenn.), 36 S. W. 874; I Daniel,
Neg. Inst. ( 5th Ed.), 635. In uch cases no per anal demand
on the maker is nece ary. He i primarily liable on his promi e
to pay. Section 70, Neg. In t. La, I 99 ( Civ. Code, p. 104 ) .
A presentment i nece ary in order to fix the liabilit of the
indorser which i a conditional obligation to pay the note if not
paid at maturity b the maker. If a maker tipulate to pa) at
maturity at a specified place and the note is there pre ented for
payment at its maturity, and payment refu sed or not made the
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liability of the indorser is fixed after notice to him, although

there was no personal demand made on the maker. (Pearson v.

Bank of the Metropolis, i Pet. 89, 7 L. Ed. 65; State Bank v.

Hurd, 12 Mass. 172; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449, 9 Am.

Dec. 165 ; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265.) A presentment at

the store was therefore sufficient to bind the indorser after notice

to him of the fact. It remains to be determined whether the

evidence of the notary was admissible to supply facts that occurred

in reference to the presentment that were omitted from the recitals

of this certificate. It is well settled that the facts stated in the

certificat e of pro test of promissory n otes may be supplemen ted

by other facts th at transpired, and th at such other facts may be

shown by the o ral testimony of the notary or by other testimony.

(Ash e v. Be astcy~supra; Seneca County Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio,

334; Daniel, Neg. Inst. [5th Ed.], §969, and cases cited.) On

this question the respondent does not contend that the defects of

notary's certificate may not be supplied, but he earnestly contends

that there is no evidence of presentment at the proper place,

because the notary testifies that he has no independent recollection

of such fact aside from the certificate. Respondent contends that
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the notary's evidence that he presented notes for payment in

every instance at the place where payable is inadmissible merely

as a statement of his custom unaccompanied by some recollection

of the fact. We agree that on authority and principle the evidence

should be held admissible in cases like the one under consideration.

The evidence objected to in this case is not merely the statement

of the notary's custom only. He had his certificate of protest

before him, from which he was able to say that a presentment

was made by him of the note described. The fact of a present-

ment was established by the certificate in a general way, but not

definitely. Whether the presentment was made at a right place

was not stated nor established thereby. The certificate showed

some kind of a presentment, but one not necessarily legal or

proper under the statute. The bare aHegation that the note was

presented for payment is not equivalent to certifying that the note

wj ^^esentecTat the place where it shoul d have been done L The

certificate of the notary is e vidence onTyof facts stated therein^

and it will not be enlarge d by indulging in presumptions^ The

facts must be stated, and, if stated, the certificate is prima facie

evidence that the facts properly a part of such certificate are

true. (People's Bank v. Brooke, 31 Md. 7, 1 Am. Rep. 11 ; Duck-

ert v. Von Lilcinthhl, 11 Wis. 56; Magoun v. Walker, 49 Me. 419;

Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 528, 2 S. E. 888.) The wit-

liabi'lity of the indorser is fixed after notice to him, although
there wa no per ana l demand made on the maker. (Pearson v.
Bank of the Metropolis, r Pet. 89, 7 L. E d. 65; State Bank v.
Hurd) r2 Ma . 172; f!Vhitwell v. Johnson, r7 Mass. 449, 9 Am.
Dec. r65; Meyer v. Hibsher) 47 N . Y. 265.) A pr sentm nt at
the store was therefore uipcient to bind the indor er after notice
to him of the fact. It remains to be determined whether the
evidence of the notary ·was admi ible to upply fac t that occurred
in reference to the pre entment that were om itted from the recitals
of this certificate. It is well settled that the fact stat d in the
certificate of protest of rom issory notes may be su lemented
by other acts t at transpired, an t 1at such other facts may be
shown by the oral te timony of the notary or by other testimony.
(Ashe v. Beasfey) supra; Seneca County Bank v. Neass) 5 Denio,
334; Daniel, eg. Inst. [5th Ed.], § 969, and ca es cited.) On
this que tion the respondent does not contend that the defects of
notary's certificate may not be supplied, but he earne tly contends
that there is no evidence of pre ntment at th e proper place,
becau e the notary testifies that he has no independent recollection
of uch fact aside from the certificate. R spondent contends that
th e notary's evidence that he presented notes for payment in
every instance at th place where payable is inadmissible merely
as a statement of his custom unaccompanied by some recollection
of the fact. We agree that on authority and principle the evidence
should be held admissible in cases li ke the one under consideration.
The evidence objected to in this case i not merely the statement
of the notary's custom only. H e had his certificate of protest
before him, from which he was able to say that a presentment
was made by him of the note described. The fact of a presentment was establi hed by the certificate in a general way, but not
definitely. Whether the presentment was made at a riaht place
was not stated nor established thereby. The certificate showed
some kind of a presentment, but one not necessarily legal or
proper under the tatute. Th e bare allegation that the note was
presented for payment is not equivalent to certif_yin tha!__th~note
wciSpresente atiliepfacewlie1:elt.should have been done. ~
certificate of the notary is ·ev1 ence on1 of facts stat
therein
and it will not b nlarge
y indulging in presumptions. The
facts must be stat d, and, if stated, the certificate is prima facie
evidence that the facts properly a part of such certificate are
true. (People's Bank v. Brooke) 3 I Md. 7 I m. R ep. r I ; D u ckert v. Von Lileinth~l) I I Wis. 56; Magoun v. Walker, 49 M . 419;
Insurance Co. v. Wilson) 29 W. Va. 528, 2 S. E. 888.) The wit-
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ness' invariable practice was proper evidence to sustain and to

supplement the statements of the certificate that presentment had

been made. In Eureka Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 56 Pa. 256, 94 Am.

Dec. 65, it is said : "We think it not uncommon in practice to cor-

roborate the defective memory of a vvitnesss by proof of what

was his habit in similar circumstances. Thus a subscribing wit-

ness to a will or bond, if unable to recollect whether he saw the

testator or obligor sign the instrument, or heard it acknowledged,

is often permitted to testify to his own habit never to sign as a

witness without seeing the party sign whose signature he attests,

or hearing that signature acknowledged. And it seems to be

persuasive and legitimate 'supporting' evidence." See, also,

Flack v. Green, 3 Gill & J. 474 ; Miller v. Hackley, 5 Johns. 375,

4 Am. Dec. 372; Gillette on Indirect & Collateral Ev. § 68; Mar-

tin v. Smith [Mich.], 66 N. W. 61 ; Seneca County Bank v. Neass,

supra; Lindcnbcrger v. Bcall, 6 Wheat. 104, 5 L. Ed. 216; State

v. Rau'ls, 2 Nott. & McC. 331. The testimony was therefore

competernVto suppo rt or corroborate th e notary's evidence th at he

recollect ed presenting the note for payment, and, tog ether with

the certificate, was sufficient to take the case to the iurv~6rr~tKe~
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question of due pre sentment of the note to the maker for pay ment

The defendant included in his motionTofyudgmeht notwith-

standing the verdict an alternative motion for a new trial, and

gave notice of intention to move for a new trial, and therein

specified the grounds thereof. Having prevailed in the court

below on his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,

the motion for a new trial was not perfected. Leave to do so

after filing the remittitur in the clerk of the district court's office

is granted. (Kreatz v. St. Cloud School District [Minn.], 81

N. W. 533.) If such motion is not made, judgment is directed

to be entered on the directed verdict for the plaintiff.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for

further proceedings. *

All concur. ^- ^U>— ■

Wallace v. Crilley, imp. (1879), 46 Wis. 577.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.

The case is stated in the opinion. The defendant, Crilley,

appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Brief for the appellant by Johnson, Rietbrock & Halsey, and

oral argument by Mr. Johnson.

Brief for the respondent by G. C. Markham and E. P. Smith,

and oral argument by Mr. Smith.

ness' invariable practice was proper e idence to su ta.in and to
uppl ment the tatements of the certificate that pr entment had
b n made. In Eitrelw Ins. o. v. Robinson, 5
a. 256, 94 Am.
Dec. 65, it is said: "\ think it not uncommon in practice to corroborate the defecti
m mory of a witne s by proof of what
was hi habit in similar circum tances. Thus a subscribing witn s to a will or bond, if unable to r collect whether he saw the
te tator or obligor ign th in trument, or heard it acknowledge ,
i often permitted t t tif) to hi own habit nev r to sign a a
" itne s without seeing th party ign who e signature he attests,
or h aring that ignatur acknowledged. And it seem to be
persua ive and legitimate 'supporting' evidence." See, also,
Flack v. Green, 3 ill & J. 474; Miller v. Hackley, S Johns. 375,
4 m. Dec. 372 ; illette on Indirect & Collateral Ev. § 68 ; M atrtin v. Smith [Mich.], 66 N. W. 6r; Seneca County Bank v. eass,
supra· Lindenber crer v. Beall, 6 \i\' heat. ro4, 5 L. Ed. 216; State
v. Rai ls 2 Nott. & McC. 33r. The testimony was therefore
compet nt to upport or corroborate the notary' evidence that he
recollected pre enting the note for payment, and, together with
the certificate, was sufficient to take the case to the u on t e
que bon of due pre entm nt of the note to the maker for payment.
- The defendant included in his mot10n or JU gment notwithtanding the verdict an alternative motion for a new trial, and
gave notice of intention to move for a new trial, and therein
specified the grounds th reof. {laving prevailed in the court
below on his motion for judgment notwith tanding the verdict,
the motion for a new trial was not perf cted. Leave to do so
after filing the remittitur in the clerk of the district court's office
is granted. (Kreat= v. St. Cloud School D,i strict [Minn.], 8r
N. vV. 533.) If uch motion is not made, jud2'ment i directed
to be entered on the directed verdict for the plaintiff.
The judg11ient is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings.
10~~ .
All concur.
1
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Wallace v. Crilley £mp. ( 1879 , 46 W£s. 577.
Appeal from th County Court of Milwaukee County.
The case is tated in the opinion. Th def en ant, Crille),
appealed from a judgment in fa or of the plaintiff.
Brief fo r the appellant by Johnson _ Ri tbrock & Halsey and
oral aro-ument by Mr. Johnson.
ri f for the re pond nt by G. C. 1ark ham and E . P. S111,£th,
.and oral argument by Ifr. Smith.
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Taylor, J. This action is brought upon a promissory note,

given by the defendant Sears, and indorsed by the defendant and

appellant Crillcy. Neither of the defendants appeared or put in

any answer or demurrer in the court below, and judgment for

the amount of the note and costs of suit was rendered against both

defendants. Crilley appealed from the judgment, and assigns as

error, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to consti-

tute a cause of action against him.

The point made is, that the complaint does not show that the

note was presented to the maker thereof for payment, and pay-

ment thereof demanded, at the maturity of said note. The fol-

lowing are the allegations of the complaint upon that subject :

"And the plaintiff further says that, when said note became due

and payable, the samo was presented at the office of the maker

of said note, the defendant William G. Sears, in the Chamber of

Commerce building in the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for pay-

ment, and that payment was then and there duly demanded upon

said note, and payment thereof was then and there refused." The

complaint contains a proper allegation of protest for non-payment,

and notice of such non-payment given to the said defendant Cril-
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ley.

The appellant insists that a presentation and demand of pay-

ment at the place of business of the maker is not sufficient; that

the demand must be made personally of the maker, and, if not so

made, the excuse for not making such presentment must be set

out in the complaint.

We think the learned counsel for the appellant misapprehends

the rule. Story, in his work on Bills of Exchange, says : "When

it is said that the 'bill must be presented for acceptance, at the

place of the domicil of the drawee,' we are to understand by this

expression, the town, city, village, or other municipality, within

which he has his residence. But in many cases the holder will

have an election as to the place of presentment. Thus, for exam-

ple, if the drawee has his home or domestic establishment in one

town, and his place of business is in another town, a presentment

made at either place will be good. So, if the drawee has his

dwelling house or home in one part of the same town, and his

place of business in another part, a presentment may be made at

either, at the option of the holder." (Sec. 236, and notes).

The same rule applies to the presentation of promissory notes,

when such presentation and demand of payment are necessary to

charge an indorser. See Shed v. Brett and Trustees, 1 Pick., 413 ;

TAYLOR, J. This action is brought upon a promissory note,
giv n by the defendant ears, and indor ed by the defendant and
app llant rillcy. N ither of the defendant appear d or put in
any an wer or d murr r in the court below, and judgment for
the amount of the note and costs of suit was rendered again t both
defendant .
rilley appealed from the j udgm nt, and a signs as
error, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to con titute a cause of action again t him.
The point made is, that the complaint does not show that the
note was presented to the mak r thereof for payment, and payment th reof demanded, at the maturity of said note. The following are the allegations of the complaint upon that subject:
"And the plaintiff further says that, when said note became due
and payable, the sam6 was presented at the office of the maker
of aid n te, the defendant William G. Sears, in the Chamber of
Commerce building in the city of Milwaukee, \i\Tisconsin, for payment, and that payment wa then and there duly demanded upon
said note, and payment thereof was then and there refused." The
complaint contains a proper allegation of protest for non-payment,
and notice of such non-payment given to the said defendant Crilley.
The appellant insists that a presentation and demand of payment at the place of business of the maker is not sufficient; that
the demand must be made personally of the maker, and, if not so
made, the excuse for not making such presentment must be set
out in the complaint.
We think the learned counsel for the appellant misapprehends
the rule.
tory, in his work on Bills of Exchange, says: "When
it is said that the 'bill must be presented for acceptance, at the
place of the domicil of the drawee,' we are to understand by this
expre ion, the town, city, village, or other municipality, within
which he has hi re idence. But in many cases the holder will
have an election as to the place of presentment. Thus, for example, if the drawee has his home or dom stic e tablishment in one
town, and his place of business is in another town, a presentment
made at either place will be good. So if ·t h draw
has his
dwelling hou e or home in one part of the same town and his
place of business in another part, a presentment may be made at
either, at the option of the holder." (Sec. 236, and notes).
The same rule applies to the pres ntation of promissory notes,.
when such presentation and demand of payment are necessary to
charge an indorser. See Shed v. Brett and Trustees, r Pick., 413;
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Williams v. Bank of the United States, 2 Peters, 96; Ogden v.

Cowley, 2 Johns. R., 274.

In the case at bar, the complaint alleges that the note in ques- 1

tion was presented at the office of the maker, Sears, in the city

of Milwaukee ; and, there being- no answer, it must be taken as

true that the maker had an office or place of business in the city of

Milwaukee, and that the presentation of the note for payment at

such office was a proper presentation.

The learned counsel also insists that the complaint is defec-

tive in not stating that the note was presented to the maker, and a

demand of payment made of him, or of some other person who

was authorized by such maker to receive and answer such present-

ment and demand. We think this objection is answered by the

allegation in the complaint, "that payment was then and there

duly demanded upon said note, and that payment was then and

there refused." It having been shown that the office was the

proper place to present and demand payment of the note, the

above allegation that payment was then and there duly demanded

and refused, is equivalent to an allegation that the same was pre-

sented within the usual business hours, and, if it be necessary to
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show that it was presented to the maker, or to some one author-

ized to answer for him (which we very much doubt), that it was

so presented.

This court held in the case of Batik v. Countryman, 11 Wis.

399, that, in an ac tion agains t an indorser of a promissory note,

it was sufficient if the complaint alleged in general words, "that

payment of the note was duly demanded at maturity. 77 without"

any turther statement as to the time or place of demand, or of the,

p erson ot whom such p ay ment was demanded. In that case the

court say : "This manner of stating the demand of payment, and

notice of the demand and non-payment to the indorser, has been

held to be sufficient in New York since the adoption of the code,

and we have no doubt that those decisions are in conformity to the

spirit of that enactment. We are disposed to follow these decis-

ions upon this point, and to hold that such a general statement of

the performance of the conditions precedent to a party's right to

recover against the indorser is sufficient." The rule laid down in

this case has been followed and approved in Smith v. Railway Co..

19 Wis., 326-331; Cutler v. Ainsworth, 21 Wis.. 381; Town of

Pine Valley v. Town of Unity, 40 Wis.. 682. In the last case,

which was an action brought to recover for the support of a

pauper, in which it was necessary, in order to entitle the plaintiff

to recover, to prove that a written notice had been given bv the

supervisors of the complaining town, to one or more of the super-

RILLEY

Williams v. Bank of the United States,
Cowley, 2 Johns. R., 274.
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In the case at bar, the complaint all ges that the note in question wa presented at the office of the maker, ear , in the city
of Milwaukee; and ther bein no an wer, it mu t be taken as
tru that the maker had an offic or place of busines in the city of
Milwaukee, and that the pr ntation of the note for pa ·ment at
uch office was a proper pr entation.
The learned coun 1 al o insi ts that the complaint is defective in not stating that the note wa presented to the maker, and a
demand of payment made of him, or of some other person who
was authorized by such mak r to receive and answer such presentment and demand. We think this obj ction is an wered by the
allegation in the complaint 'that payment was then and there
duly demanded upon said note, and that payment was then and
there refu ed . ' It having been shown that the office was the
proper place to pre ent and demand payment of the note, the
above alleo-ation that payment was then and there duly demanded
and refu ed, is equivalent to an allegation that the ame was presented within the usual business hours, and, if it be necessary to
show that it was pre ent d to the maker, or to some one authorized to an wer for him (which we very much doubt), that it was
so pre ented.
Thi court held in the case of Bank v. Countryman, I I Wis.
399, that, in an action again t an indor er of a romi ory note,
it '..V-3.S ufficient i t e comp amt alleg d in general words t at
payment of the note was duly demanded at maturity," ' ithout
any further tatement as to the bme or place of demand, or of the
person of whom uch payment ' as mantled. In that case the
court say: "Thi manner of tating the demand of payment and
notice of the demand and non-paym nt to the indor er, has been
held to be ufficient in New York ince the adoption of the code,
and we have no doubt that tho e d ci ion are in conformity to the
pirit of that enactment. \\ e are di po ed to follow the e deci ions upon this point, and to hold that uch a o-eneral tatement of
the performance of the condition precedent to a party' right to
The rul laid do' n in
recover a ainst th indor r i uffici nt.
thi ca has b en followed and approv din 111ith '. Raili ray Co.,
19 Wi . 326-331; Cutler v. Ainsworth, 2r \Vi .,
l; To" 111 of
Pine Valley v. Town of Unity, 40 \\ i ., 2. In the la t ca e
v. hich was an action brouo-ht to r cov r for th
upport of a
pauper in which it wa neces ar), in ord r to ntitle th plaintiff
to recover, to prove that a written n tice had b en o-iven by the
upervi or of the complaining town to one or more of the super-
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visors of the defendant town, before suit brought, stating therein

certain matters as prescribed by law, it was held that an averment

in the complaint that the plaintiff duly notified the defendant, was

a sufficient averment of legal notice in all respects. These cases

clearly show that the objections taken by the learned counsel for

the appellant in this case cannot be supported, and that the com-

plaint states a good cause of action against the appellant.

The cases above cited are not in conflict with the decision in

Duckcrt v. Von Lilcinthal, n Wis., 57, cited by the learned coun-

sel for the appellant, and relied upon by him to sustain his objec-

tions to the complaint in the case at bar. In that case there was

no evidence given on the trial of any demand of payment of the

maker of the note, except what was contained in the certificate

of the notary. The court held that such certificate was not evi-

dence of the contents of the* notice served, and the judgment was

reversed on that ground. What was said further in the case by

the late learned Justice Paine, was not necessary to the determina-

tion of the case. The statement made by Justice Paine, that "the

certificate should show presentment to the maker, or its legal

equivalent, and should not be left to intendment or presumption,"
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was clearly not intended by him to apply to the allegations neces-

sary in a complaint. He was speaking of the proof necessary to

be given on the trial, to prove the truth of the allegation that

presentment had been duly made and payment duly demanded..

That he intended to limit this statement to the proof to be made,

and not to the allegations necessary to be embodied in the com-

plaint, is clear from the fact that he assented to the decision made

in Frankfort Bank v. Countryman, supra, decided at the same

term.

By the Court — The judgment of the county court is affirmed.

\jcr- tqX*^^

King v. Crowell (1873), 61 Me. 244.

On facts agreed.

Assumpsit against the defendant as indorser of the following

promissory note, his signature admitted to be genuine.

"$150.00. "April 8, 1871.

"Four months after date I promise to pay to the order of A.

J. Crowell one hundred and fifty dollars. Value received.

"H. E. Morton."

Endorsed, "A. J. Crowell, Jeremiah Glidden, C. H. Glidden."

Writ dated Feb. 17, 1872. Plea, general issue.

visors of the defendant town, before suit brought, stating therein
certain matter as prescrib d by law, it wa held that an averment
in the complaint that th plaintiff duly notified the defendant, was
a sufficient av rment of legal notice in all respects. These ca es
clearly show that the objections taken by the learned coun el for
the appellant in this case cannot be supported, and that the complaint state a good cause of action again t the app llant.
The ca es above cited are not in conflict with the deci ion in
Duckert v. Von Lileinthal, I I Wis., 57, cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, and relied upon by him to su tain hi objections to the complaint in the case at bar. In that case there was
no evidence given on the trial of any demand of payment of the
maker of the note, except what was contained in the certificate
of the notary. The court held that such certificate was not evidence of the contents of the· notice served, and the judgment was
rever ed on that ground. What was said further in the case by
the late learned Ju tice Paine, was not necessary to the determination of the case. The statement made by Justice Paine, that "the
certificate should show presentment to the maker, or its legal
equivalent, and should not be left to intendment or presumption,"
was clearly not intended by him to apply to the allegations necessary in a complaint. He was speaking of the proof necessary to
be given on the trial, to prove the truth of the allegation that
presentment had been duly made and payment duly demanded ..
That he intended to limit this statement to the proof to be made,
and not to the allegations necessary to be embodied in the complaint, is clear from the fact that he assented to the decision made
in Frankfort Bank v. Countryman, supra, decided at the same
term.
By the Court-The judgnient of the county court is affirmed.

~~ King v. Crowell (1873), 61 Me. 244.
On facts agreed.
As umpsit against the defendant as indorser of the following
promis ory note, hi ignature admitted to be g nuine.
"$150.00.
"April 8, 187r.
"Four months after date I promi e to pay to the order of
J. Crowell one hundred and fifty dollars. Value r ceiv d.
"H. E. MORTO ."
Endorsed, "A. J. Crowell, Jeremiah Glidden, C. H. Glidden."
Writ dated Feb. r7, r872. Plea, general issue.
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This note was negotiated to the plaintiff for a full considera-

tion a short time after its date.

The maker and the indorsers resided in Winthrop village, and

the plaintiff in Monmouth. H. E. Morton, at the time of the

making of the note in question, was a manufacturer of boots and

shoes, and a dealer in boots, shoes, hats, and caps, and had a

store and place of business in said Winthrop village. On the

third day of July, 1871, the maker failed in business. His real

estate and goods were attached on that day, and his place of busi-

ness closed, the attaching officer taking possession of the keys

and the goods. On Friday, the morning of August n, 1871, the

plaintiff went to Winthrop for the purpose of collecting this note,

or of taking the necessary steps to hold the indorsers. He went

to the store recently occupied by the maker of the note, and find-

ing it closed he went directly to Morton's house, with the note in

his possession, for the purpose of making a demand of payment.

Morton was not at the house, but the plaintiff was informed he

was on the street, where the plaintiff found him about ten o'clock,

a. m., and then and there requested payment of the note of said

Morton, which was refused. About two hours afterwards, on the
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same day, the plaintiff sought the defendant, told him he had

demanded payment of the note of Morton, that he refused to pay

it, and informed him (defendant) that he should look to him, as

indorser, for the payment of the note. The defendant replied that

he would look into the matter, and, if he found that he was holden,

would see the note paid in two or three weeks. In two or three

weeks the plaintiff called on the defendant again for payment,

when the defendant refused to pay, saying that he had inquired

carefully into his liability as indorser of this note, and was

advised that he was not liable, and should not pay the same.

It was agreed that upon the above facts the full court should

enter such judgment as the law required.

If the action could be maintained, defendant to be defaulted;

otherwise, plaintiff to become nonsuit.

E. Kempton, for the plaintiff.

/. H. Potter, for the defendant.

Virgin, J. When the defendant indorsed and put into circu-

lation the note in suit, he thereby ordered the maker to pay the

amount therein specified to the plaintiff ; and he also thereby

promised that if the note were duly demanded of the maker and

not paid, then he himself would, upon receiving due notice of the

demand and non-payment, pay it to the plaintiff.

v.

CROWELL

3~9

This note was negotiated to the plaintiff for a full consideration a short time after its date.
The maker and the indorsers resided in Winthrop village and
the plaintiff in Monmouth. H. E. Iorton, at the time of the
making of the note in qu stion, was a manufacturer of boots and
shoes, and a dealer in boot , sho s, hats, and caps, and had a
store and place of business in aid \Ninthrop village. On the
third day of July, 1871, the maker fail d in business. His real
estate and goods were attached on that day, and his place of business closed, the attaching officer taking possession of the keys
and the good . On Friday, the morning of August II, 1871, the
plaintiff went to Winthrop for the purpose of collecting this note,
or of taking the necessary steps to hold the indorsers. He went
to the store recently occupied by the maker of the note, and finding it clo d he went directly to Morton's house, with the note in
his possession, for the purpose of making a demand of payment.
Morton was not at the house, but the plaintiff was informed he
was on the street, where the plaintiff found him about ten o'clock,
A. M., and then and there requested payment of the note of said
Morton, which was refused. About two hours afterwards, on the
same day, the plaintiff sought the defendant, told him he had
demanded payment of the note of Morton, that he refused to pay
it, and informed him (defendant) that he should look to him as
indorser, for the payment of the note. The defendant replied that
he would look into the matter, and, if he found that he was holden,
would e the note paid in two or three weeks. In two or three
weeks the plaintiff called on the defendant again for payment, ·
when the defendant refused to pay, aying that he had inquired
carefully into his liability as indorser of this note and was
advis d that he was not liable and should not pay the same.
It was agreed that upon the above facts the full court should
enter such judgment as the law required.
If the action could be maintained, defendant to be defaulted;
otherwise, plaintiff to become nonsuit.

E . Kempton, for the plaintiff.
J. H. Potter, for the defendant.

J.

When the defendant indor ed and put into circulation the note in suit he thereb ordered the maker to pay the
amount therein specified to the plaintiff; and he al o thereby
promised that if the note were duly demanded of the maker and
not paid, then he himself would, upon receiving due notice of the
demand and non-payment, pay it to the plaintiff.
VIRGI N,
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And now, in this suit upon his promise, the defendant declines

to pay the note on the following alleged grounds :

I. That the demand was not lawful inasmuch as it was made

on the street.

The general rule of law is that the holder must use diligence

to find the maker and demand payment of him ; and the inquiry

will be, whether, under the circumstances of the case, due dili-

gence has been used. (3 Kent's Com. 129).

It is familiar law that when a promissory not e p ayable gener-

ally, and not at a specifi ed place, is seasonably dem anded at the

maker's known and se ttled place ot business for the trans action

of his moneyed concerns, it is sufficient to hold the indorser. And

the same may be said of a like demand made at his place of resi-

dence. Neither does it make any difference whether the maker be

personally present or temporarily absent at th e time of the

demand. In either case, the law has for many years been constant

in declaring that the evidence afforded by such a demand consti-

tutes full proof of due diligence on the part of the holder.

But in the case at bar the plaintiff went still further than the

technical exactions of the law required. He was a resident of
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Monmouth. On the day the note became due he went to Win-

throp village, where both the maker and the defendant resided,

"for the purpose of collecting this note, or of taking the neces-

sary steps to hold the indorser." On going to the store which had

been occupied by the maker as his place of business, he found

it had been closed and in the possession of an officer more than

thirty days; that the maker had failed in his business, and that

all his property was under attachment. Thereupon the plaintiff

went to the maker's place of residence, where he was informed

that the maker was not at the house, but had gone out on the

street. Had he gone through the ceremony of demanding pay-

ment of the note at the house, while the maker was out on the

street, the law would pronounce the plaintiff's diligence ample.

But not finding the maker at home the plaintiff trebled his dili-

gence, sought and found him on the street in that country village,

and then and there requested payment of the note of the maker

personally, which was refused.

It does not appear (as it would be likely to, if true) that any

objection to the place of demand was made by maker. If he had

had funds with which to pay, not with him, but at his house, he

would at once have said so. If he had objected to the place and

requested the plaintiff to accompany him to his house and receive

the money due on the note, and the plaintiff had declined so reas-

And now, in this suit upon his promise, the defendant declines
to pay the not on the followino- alleged ground :
r. That the demand was not lawful inasmuch as it was made
on the street.
The general rule of law is that the holder must use diligence
to find the maker and demand payment of him; and the inquiry
will be, whether, under the circumstances of the case, due diligence ha be n used. (3 Kent's Com. 129).
It i familiar law that when a promissory note payable generall ', and not at a specified place, is seasonably demanded at the
maker's known and sett e p ace o usmess or t e transaction
of his moneyed concerns, 1t 1s sufficient to hold the mdorser. And
the ame may be said of a like demand made at his place of residence. Neither doe it make any difference whether the maker be
er onall
resent or temporarily absent at the time of the
demand. In either case, the law as for many years een constant
in declaring that the evidence afforded by such a demand constitutes full proof of due diligence on the part of the holder.
But in the case at bar the plaintiff went still further than the
technical exactions of the law required. He was a resident of
Monmouth. On the day the note became due he went to Winthrop village, where both the maker and the defendant resided,
"for the purpose of collecting this note, or of taking the necessary steps to hold the indorser." On going to the store which had
been occupied by the maker as his place of business, he found
it had been closed and in the possession of an officer more than
thirty days; that the maker had failed in his business, and that
all his property was under attachment. Thereupon the plaintiff
went to the maker's place of residence, where he was informed
that the maker was not at the house, but h_a d gone out on the
street. Had he gone through the ceremony of demanding payment of the note at the house, while the maker was out on the
street, the law would pronounce the plaintiff's diligence ample.
But not finding the maker at home the plaintiff trebled his diligence, sought and found him on the street in that country village,
and then and there requested payment of the note of the maker
personally, which was refu ed.
It does not appear (as it would be likely to, if true) that any
objection to the place of demand was made by maker. If he had
had funds with which to pay, not with him, but at his house, he
would at once have said o. If he had objected to the place and
requested the plaintiff to accompany him to hi house and receive
the money due on the note, and the plaintiff had declined so reas-
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onable a request, the legal aspect of this branch of the case might

thereby have been materially changed. But no such facts exist.

He simply refused payment, and, in all human probability, for

the real, though to him, perhaps, unpleasant, reason that all his

property was in the custody of the law, and he had in fact nothing

wherewith he could pay.

It would seem that such a demand would be more satisfactory

to all concerned than a mere formal ceremony of a demand gone

through at his place of residence during the maker's absence.

And we have no hesitation in declaring the demand sufficient

un der the circumstances, so far as the place is concerned, to charge

the defendant.

We are aware that Byles on Bills, 196, declares that a demand

made on the street is not sufficient. Such is the doctrine

expressed, too, in the author's notes in Leading Cases on Bills,

327, 328. And there are several cases containing the dictum in

general terms that a demand must be made either at the maker's

place of business or place of residence. But our attention has

been called to no case, neither have we, after considerable research,

been able to find any wherein the court having the question before
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it decided adversely to a demand made on the street, under cir-

cumstances similar to those in this case.

On the other hand, Judge Story, in discussing the law appli-

cable to notes like this, uses the following language : "The general

rule is, that the presentment for payment may be made to the

maker personally, or at his dwelling house or other place of abode,

or at his counting house or place of business. It seems a present-

m ent may always be made personally to the maker, wherever he

may be Jound, although he may n ot be either at hi s domicil, or at

his place of business. " And he cites quite a large number of

cases, in a note, as authority. (Story on Prom. Notes, § 235).

In Edwards on Bills (2 ed.), 150, is found the following:

"Being made payable at large, it is due at any and every place ;

but for the purpose of charging the indorser, it must be presented

for payment to the maker personally, or at his residence or place

of business. If it be made payable at a particular place in the city,

it is necessary to present the note there for payment, for the pur-

pose of charging the indorser. But even in this case, if a personal

demand is made upon the maker, and no objection is made by him

as to the place, it is sufficient."

So in 3 Kent's Com. 128. "Demand of payment must be

made by the holder or his agent upon the acceptor at the place

appointed for payment, or at his house or residence, or regular

361

onable a request, the legal aspect of thi branch of the case might
th r by have b en materially chang d.
ut no such facts exist.
H
imply refus d paym nt, and, in all human probability, for
the r al, though to him, I rhaps, unplea ant, r a on that all hi
property was in th custody of the law, and he had in fact nothing
wh rewith he could pay.
It would
m that uch a demand \: ould be more sati factory
to all concerned than a m r formal ceremony of a demand gone
through at hi place of re idence during the maker's absence.
nd we have no h itation in declaring the demand sufficient
under the circum tance , o far as the place is concerned, to charge
the defendant
We are aware that Byl son Bills, 196, declares that a demand
made on the treet is not sufficient.
uch i the doctrine
expre d, too in the author' notes in Leading Cases on Bills,
nd there are several ca es containing the dictum in
327 32 .
general terms that a demand mu t be made either at the maker's
place of bu iness or place of residence. But our attention has
been called to no case, neither have we, after considerable research,
been able to find any wherein the court having the question before
it decided adver ely to a demand made on the street, under circum tance similar to those in this case.
n the other hand Judge tory, in discussing the law applicable to notes like thi , u e the following language: "The general
rul i , that the pre entm nt for payment may be made to the
maker per anally, or at hi dwelling house or other place of abode,
or at his counting house or place of busine s. It seems a presentment may alway be made personally to th maker wherever he
ma be found, althou h he may not be eith r at his domicil, or at
hi place of bu ine s. '
nd he cite qmte a arO'e number of
case , in a note, as authority. ( tory on Prom. ates, § 235) .
In Ed wards on ill ( 2 ed.) 150, i found the following:
"BeinO' made payable at large, it i due at any and very place;
but for the purpo e of chawinO' the indor er, it mu t be pre ented
fo r payment to the maker per anally, or at hi r idence or place
of bu iness. If it be made payable at a particular place in the city,
it i nece ary to pre nt the note th re for payment, for the purpo e of charginO' the indor er.
ut e en in thi ca e, if a per anal
demand i made upon the maker, and no obj ction i mad by him
a to the place it i ufficient."
o in 3 Kent' Com. 12 . " emand of ayment mu t be
m ade by the holder or hi agent upon th acceptor at the place
appointed for payment, or at hi hou e or re i enc , or reO'ular
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known place of his moneyed business, or upon him personally, if

no particular place be appointed." And again, on page 96, "If

demand be made upon the maker elsewhere than the place

appointed, and no objection be made at the time, it will be deemed

a waiver of any future demand."

/ And Prof. Parsons says: "In general a personal demand

( would be sufficient, if made at any place where the maker may

) reasonably be expected to be in condition to pay ; and if made in

any other place — such, for instance, as in the street — it would

usually be good, unless objection were made to payment because

the place was an improper one, or some similar reason were given

for the refusal. (1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 421). And he

uses somewhat similar language on p. 372.

The doctrine as stated above by Judge Story is approved in

Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145, Sup. Ct. N. Y., published as a

leading case in Leading Cases on Bills, 313, 316.

Finally, our own court held, that where a note signed by two,

made payable at their dwelling houses, was demanded of them,

together, at the barnyard of one of them, and no objection was

made as to the place of the demand, the demand was sufficient.
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(Baldwin v. Farnsworth, 10 Maine, 414).

2. But the defendant further objecting to the sufficiency of

the demand says : "As the payer has a right to require its delivery

up to him before he pays, and may insist that the holder produce

it, the note should have been exhibited."

It is true that the rule re quiring the person making the

demand to exhibit the evidence of debt~is well settled, and welf

grounded in reason ; and, although applicable to all written con-

tracts on which a demand is necessary, it is, as has been well said,

especially applicable to negotiable securities, which may be legally

transferred to another at the very time the original payee makes

the demand. But the reasons applicable to cases i n_ which the

ma ker offers to pay cannot apply to c ases in which he not only

does_nqt offer, but absolutely fefuse sTto pay, and does not even

express any desire to see the notE

The idle ceremony of producing the note when the maker

unqualifiedly refuses to pay is well illustrated by C. J. Shaw, in

Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 497, where he says : "Even under the

law of tender, which is extremely strict, it is held that where a

party to whom a tender is to be made declares that he will not

accept it, an actual production and offer of the money is not nec-

essary."

The case finds expressly that the maker had the note in his

known place of hi moneyed business, or upon him personally, if
no particular place be appointed."
nd again, on page 96, "If
demand be made upon the maker el ewhere than the place
appointed, and no objection be made at the time, it will be deemed
a waiver of any future demand."
A nd Prof. Parsons says: "In general a personal ::iemand
would be sufficient, if made at any place where the maker may
reasonably be expected to be in condition to pay; and if made in
any other place-such, for instance, as in the street-it would
usually be good, unless objection were made to payment because
\ the place was an improper one, or some similar reason were given
·for the refusal. ( r Parsons on Notes and Bills, 421). And he
uses somewhat similar language on p. 372.
The doctrine as stated above by Judge Story is approved in
Taylor v. Snyder, 3 Denio, 145, Sup. Ct. N. Y., published as a
leading ca e in Leading Cases on Bills, 313, 316.
Finally, our own court held, that where a note signed by two,
made payable at their dwelling houses, was demanded of them,
together, at the barnyard of one of them, and no objection was
made as to the place of the demand, the demand was sufficient.
(Baldwin v. Farnsworth, IO Maine, 414).
2.
But the defendant further objecting to the sufficiency of
the demand says: "As the payer has a right to require its delivery
up to him before he pays, and may insist that the holder produce
it, the note should have been exhibited."
It is true that the rule requiring the person making the
demand to exhibit the evidence of debt 1s well settled. and well
grounded in reason; and, although applicable to all written contracts on which a demand is necessary, it is, as has been well said,
especially applicable to negotiable securities, which may be legally
transferred to another at the very time the original payee makes
the demand. But the reasons applicable to cases in which the
maker offers to pay cannot apply to cases in which he not onl
doe-snot offer, ut a sou e y re uses, to pay, and does not even
e ress any desire to see t e no e.
The idle ceremony of producing the note when the maker
unqualifiedly refuses to pay is well illu strated by C. ]. Shaw, in
Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Met. 497, where he says: "Ev n under the
law of tender, which is extremely strict, it i held that where a
party to whom a tender is to be made declar s that he will not
accept it, an actual production and offer of the money is not necessary."
The case finds expressly that the maker had the note in his
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possession when he made the demand. We think the objection

cannot prevail. (Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435 ; Freeman v.

Boynton, 7 Mass. 485; Etheridge v. Laid, 44 Barb. 69).

3. The defendant finally contends that the notice having

been given to the defendant on the last day of grace was prema-

ture, for the reason that the maker had the whole day in which to

pay.

We presume, however, that the defendant predicated this

objection upon the alleged insufficiency of the demand. For long

before, and certainly ever since, the review of the cases by C. J.

Shaw in Staples v. Franklin Bank, 1 Met. 43, the rule applicable

to notes like the one in question has been that the note is due on

actual demand at any su ch h our on the last day of grace that,

h aving regard to the habits and usages of the community where

the maker resides, he may be reasonably expected to be in condi-

tion t o attend to ordinary business ; and if upon such demand pay-

ment is not made, the maker is in default, and notice of dishonor

may forthwith be given to the indorser. But if no such demand

be made, and the maker does nothing amounting to a waiver, he

has the whole of the day in which to make payment, and is not in
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default until the expiration of the business day within which such

demand might have been made. (Greeley v. Thurston, 4 Greenl.

479; Flint v. Rogers, 15 Maine, 67; Lunt v. Adams, ij Maine,

230; Farnsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453 ; Estcs v. Tower, 102 Mass.

65; Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 413; Manchester Bank v. Fel-

lows, 28 N. H. 303; Crosby v. Grant, 36 N. H. 418).

Defendant defaulted.

Appleton, C. J. ; Cutting, Dickerson, Danforth, and

Peters, JJ., concurred. ^ vW—

PRESENTMENT WHERE PERSON PRIMARILY LIABLE IS DEAD. § 78.

if- Gower v. Moore (1845), 25 Me. 16.

The suit was against Moore, as indorser of a note given by

Robert Witherspoon to him, and indorsed by the defendant,

dated August 12, 1841, and payable on August 15, 1843.

Witherspoon, the maker of the note, died in February, 1842 ;

administration was taken out on his estate, and it was rendered

insolvent; one Freeman, then the holder of the note, proved it

before the commissioners as a claim against the estate, and noti-

fied the defendant, after the death of Witherspoon and before

364 Presentment Where Person is Dead

364

PRESENTMENT WHERE PERSON IS DEAD

the note became payable, that the maker of the note being dead,

he should look to the defendant for payment ; and that the defend-

ant, about a month after the day of payment, was notified by the

then holder of the note, that it was unpaid, and that he should

look to the defendant for payment.

This was the plaintiff's case; and thereupon Goodenow, the

district judge presiding, directed a nonsuit. To this the plaintiff

filed exceptions.

/. C. Woodman, for the plaintiff.

Dunn, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was by

Shepley, J. This is a suit by the indorsee against an indor-

ser of a promissory note, made on August 12, 1841, and payable

in two years. Before it became payable the maker had deceased,

an administrator had been appointed, the estate had been repre-

the note became payable, that the maker of the note being dead,
he should look to the defendant for payment; and that the defendant, about a month aft r the day of paym nt, was notified by the
then holder of the note, that it was unpaid, and that he should
look to the defendant for paym nt.
This was the plaintiff's case; and thereupon Goodenow, the
district judge presiding, directed a nonsuit. To this the plaintiff
fil ed exceptions.
J. C. Woodman, for the plaintiff.
Dunn, for the defendant.

sented to be insolvent, commissioners of insolvency had been

appointed and the holder of the note had proved it before them.

When the maker of a note die s, before it becomes payable, the

holde r should mak e inquiry tor his personal representative, if

there be one, and pre sent the noteTon its maturity to him for
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payment - " The case oCHale v. Burr, 12 Mass. R. 86, may be con-

"sidered as presenting an exception to this rule ; but doubts have

been expressed, whether it could be considered as either correct

in principle, or founded upon sufficient authority.

In this case the indorser may be considered as knowing, that

the note would not be paid on presentment ; and that the estate

was insolvent. But such knowledge does not relieve the holder

from his obligation to make presentment and give due notice of

its dishonor. The pro mise of the indorser is a conditional one

to pay, if the note be duly presentecTto the maker and seasonable

jiotice be given to him of its dishonor.

The holder connot assume the right to decide, that his per-

formance of the condition will be of no service to the indorser,

and thus put that matter in issue to relieve himself from the

performance of the condition imposed upon him by law. (Nichol-

son v. Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 609; Clegg v. Cotton, 2 B. & P. 239;

Prideaux v. Collier, 2 Starkie's R. 57) .

The various relations, which the parties, whose names are

upon negotiable paper, sustain towards other persons, whose

names are not upon it, cannot be anticipated.

The real debtors, who may feel obliged to pay, may not wish

to exhibit themselves as such. A deceased party may possibly

The opinion of the court was by
SHEPLEY, J. This is a suit by the indorsee against an indorser of a promissory note, made on August 12, 1841, and payable
in two years. Before it became payable the maker had deceased,
an administrator had been appointed, the estate had been represented to be insolvent, commissioners of insolvency had been
appointed and the holder of the note had proved it before them.
When the maker of a note dies, before it becomes payable, the
holder should make mqmry for his personal representative, if
there be one, and present the note on its maturity to him for
payment.
e case of Hale v. Burr, 12 Mass. R. 86, may be cons1 erecras presenting an exception to this rule; but doubts have
been expressed, whether it could be considered as either correct
in principle, or founded upon sufficient authority.
In this case the indorser may be considered as knowing, that
the note would not be paid on presentment; and that the estate
was insolvent. But such knowledge does not relieve the holder
from his obligation to make presentment and give due notice of
its dishonor. The romise of the indorser is a conditional one
to pay, if the note be duly presente to the maker and seasonable
notice be giyen to him of its dishonor.
The
der onnot assume the ri ht to decide, that his erformance of the condition will be of no ervice to t e indorser,
and thus put that matter in issue to relieve himself from the
performance of the condition imposed upon him by law. (Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 H. Bl. 6o9; Clegg v. Cotton, 2 B. & P. 239;
Prideaux v. Collier, 2 Starkie's R. 57).
The various relations, which the parties, whose names are
upon negotiable paper, sustain towards other persons, whose
names are not upon it, cannot be anticipated.
The real debtors, who may feel obliged to pay, may not wish
to exhibit themselves as such. A deceased party may possibly
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have held a contract of some responsible person to pay in case

the note should be duly presented for payment. So may an

indorser. To hold an indorser liable and yet deprive him of the

benefit of such a contract could not be justified. It is best for a

commercial community that the rules be simple, subject to few

exceptions, and not liable to be varied to. meet the apparent

injustice of particular cases. T he notices given to the defendant

in this case were either too early or too late to be of any avail .

Exceptions overruled.

V

presentment to partners. § 79.

Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen ct al. (76*75), 5 2 M°- 20 7-

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Hitchcock, Litbke and Player, for appellants.

Finkelnburg and Rassieur, for respondent.

have h Id a contract of ome re ponsible person to pay m case
o may an
th note should be duly present d for payment.
indor r. To hold an indors r liabl and y t deprive him of the
ben fit of such a con tract could not b ju tified. It is be t for a
commercial community that the rule b impl , subject to few
exceptions, and not liabl to be vari d to. meet the apparent
inju tice of particular ca e . The notic s giv n to the defendant
in this case were either too early or too late to be of any avail.
Exceptions overruled. . /
~ ·
v

--

y

Adams, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action on a negotiable promissory note, by the

plaintiffs, as holders for value before maturity, against the makers

PRE E

TME T TO PART

ERS.

§ 79.

and indorsers.

The note was made by a partnership composed of the defend-

Fourth Nat. Bank v . Heuschen et al. (1873), 52 Mo. 207.
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ants, Frederick W. Heuschen, Frederick Krite and Frederick

Perschbacker, whose firm name was ''Heuschen, Krite & Co."

It was executed to the defendant, John H. Schaales, who indorsed

the same to Wilhelm Ricke, and Ricke to the defendant, Frederick

W. Heuschen, and he to the plaintiff.

At the close of the evidence the plaintiff asked the following

ppeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
Hitchcock) Lnbke and Player) for appellants.
Finkelnburg and Rassieur, for respondent.

instructions, which were refused by the court and exceptions duly

saved :

"i. The court declares the law to be that service of notice

of protest by a notary, through the hands of a clerk, is sufficient

to charge the indorsers, and the notarial certificate verified by

affidavit is evidence of such service."

'(&) If the court, sitting as a jury, believe from the evidence

that at the maturity of the note it was placed in the hands of a

notary public who during business hours of that day presented

the same for payment at a place of business bearing the sign

of Heuschen, Krite & Co., a place where said firm had been doing

business for several years and which a person in charge thereof

then and there represented as the place of business of Heuschen,

An MSJ Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action on a negotiable promi sory note, by the
·-plaintiff , a holders for value before maturity, against the makers
and indor rs.
The note was made by a partner hip compo ed of the defendants, Frederick W. Heuschen, Frederick Krite and Frederick
Perschbacker, whose firm name was "Reusch n, Krite & Co."
It was executed to the defendant, John H. Schaales, who indorsed
the same to Wilhelm Ricke, and Rick to the def ndant, Frederick
W. Heu chen, and h to the plaintiff.
t th clo e of th evidence the plaintiff a ked the following
instructions, which wer refused by the court and xceptions duly
saved:
"r. The court d dares the law to be that ervice of notice
of protest by a notary, through the hand of a 1 rk, i ufficient
to charge the indor r , and the notarial c rtificate verified by
affidavit is evidenc f uch ervice."
© If th court, itting as a jury believ from the evid nee
that at the maturity of the note it wa la d in the hand of a
notary public who durino- bu ine hour of that day pre ented
the sam for payment at a plac of bu ine bearino- the iQil
of Heuschen, Krite & Co., a plac where aid firm had been doinobusines for several y ars and which a per on in charo-e thereof
then and there represented as the plac of busin s of Heuschen,
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Krite & Co., to which place plaintiff had been directed by one of

the partners as their place of business about ten days previously,

and which the same partner designated to the notary as their

place of business on the day of maturity, and that furthermore

said notary presented said note for payment to F. W. Heuschen,

a member of said firm, in person on the same day, then there was

sufficient demand to charge the indorsers although the court

may believe that a dissolution of said firm had in fact taken place

previous to the maturity of said note."

The court then at the instance of the defendants and against

the objections of the plaintiff gave the following declaration:

"If the makers of the note sued on in this cause had a place

of business in the city of St. Louis, but the individuals, or either

of them, composing the firm of Heuschen, Krite & Co., resided

in the said city of St. Louis, it was the duty of the notary to

demand payment of said note of the makers thereof or either of

said makers or at their place of residence or the place of business

of any one of them."

The case had been submitted for trial to the court sitting as

a jury, and when the court refused the plaintiff's instructions
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and allowed those of defendants, the plaintiff took a nonsuit and

by leave moved to set it aside, which motion being overruled he

appealed to general terms when the judgment at special term

was reversed and the cause remanded, and the defendants have

appealed to this court.

On the trial at special term the plaintiff gave evidence tend-

ing to prove the facts as set forth in the second instruction, but

failed to give any evidence in regard to the notice by the notary's

clerk, and it will be unnecessary to pass upon the plaintiff's first

instruction. The bill of exceptions shows that there were two

similar cases tried by the court at the same time and the first

instruction may have had reference to the other case.

The indorsers of a negotiable note are only liable in case due

diligence has been used to make a demand of payment from the

makers and due notice given to them in case the note is dis-

honored.

Where the facts are agreed on, due diligence in making a

demand is a question of law ; but when the facts are not agreed

on, the question of due diligence becomes a mixed question of

law and fact. That is, the jury are to find the facts and the

court is to pronounce the law upon the facts as they may be

found by the jury. The usual way is to state in the instruction

hypothetically the facts to be found from the evidence by the

Krite & Co., to which place plaintiff had been directed by one of
th partner as thei r place of business about ten day previously,
and which the same partner designated to the notary as their
place f bu ine on the day of maturity, and that furthermore
aid notary pres nted said note for payment to F. W. Heu chen,
a member of said firm, in person on the same day, then there was
suffici nt tl mand to charge the indor ers although the court
may believe that a di solution of aid firm had in fact taken place
previous to the maturity of aid not ."
The court then at the instance of the def ndant and against
the objecti on of the plaintiff gave the following declaration:
"If the makers of the note sued on in this cause had a place
of bu ines in the city of St. L ouis, but the individual , or either
of th m, composing th firm of Reusch n, Krite & Co., resided
in the aid city of St. Louis, it was the duty of the notary to
demand payment of said note of the makers thereof or either of
sa,id makers or at their place of re idence or the place of business
of any one of them."
The case had been submitted for tri al to the court sitting as
a jury, and when the court refused th e plaintiff's in structions
and allowed those of defendants, the plaintiff took a nonsuit and
by leave moved to set it aside, wh ich motion being overruled he
appealed to general terms when the judgment at special term
was reversed and the cause remanded, and the defendants have
appealed to this court.
O n the trial at special term the plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove the facts as set forth in the second instruction, but
failed to g ive any evidence in regard to the notice by the notary's
clerk, and it will be unnece sary to pass upon the plaintiff's first
in truction. The bill of exceptions shows that there were two
similar cases tried by the court at the same time and the first
instruction may have had reference to the other case.
The indor ers of a negotiable note are only liable in case due
diligence has been used to make a demand of payment from the
makers and due notice given to them · in case the note is dishonored.
\Nhere the facts are agreed on, due diligence in making a
demand i a question of law; but when the facts are not agreed
on, the qu stion of du e diligenc becomes a mixed question of
law and fact. That is, the jury are to find the facts and the
court is to pronounc th e law upon the facts as they may be
found by the jury. The usual way is to state in th e instruction
hypothetically the facts to be found from the evidence by the
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jury, and to pronounce upon those facts so to be found, the con-

clusion of law resulting therefrom. This mode was pursued in

the second instruction asked by the plaintiff. The evidence

strongly tended to prove the facts as hypothetically put in that

instruction. Those facts, if found to be true, in my judgment, as

a matter of law, constituted due diligence in making a demand

of payment on the makers of the note so as to fix their responsi-

bility so far as such demand was necessary. A perso nal demand

of payment on one of the parties w assufficient, although such

demand niay have been made after the dissolution of the firm"7

or a demand made in good faith at the late place of busines s of

su^h_firm, made on information, whether true or false, received

from a member of the firm that such place was the proper place

to make the demand, would constitute due diligence. A partner-

ship, although dissolved, must be tr eated as still in existence so

far_as the question of demand, protest and notice is concerned^

and_ th~e^cts of one partner in such case must be considered as

binding on air the others. Therefore the facts indicated in plain-

tiff's second instruction constituted not simply due, but extra-

ordinary diligence in making demand of payment of the makers
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of the note.

The instructions given at the instance of the defendants did

not cover the whole case as made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff

had the right to have his case as made by the evidence presented

by a proper instruction.

The judgment at General Term will therefore be affirmed.

The other iudges concur. t> q ,

PRESENTMENT TO JOINT DEBTORS. § 80.

Arnold v. Dresser (1864), 8 Allen (Mass.) 435.

Contract against the indorser of a joint promissory note.

At the trial in the superior court, before Morton, J., it

appeared that on the day when the note became due, Theodore

S. Stratton, in behalf of the plaintiff, demanded payment thereof

of the two promisors, but did not have the note in his possession

at the time; and the note was not paid. The plaintiff testified

that on the same day he called upon the defendant, and gave

notice to him that demand had been made on the makers ; that

jury, and to pronounc upon those facts o to be found, the condu ion of law resulting ther from. Thi mod wa pursued in
the second instruction a kcd by the plaintiff. The vidence
trongly tend d to prove th fact as hypoth tically put in that
in truction. Thos facts, if found to b true, in my judgm nt, as
a matt r of law, con tituted du dilig nc in making a d mand
of paym nt on the mak r of th note so a to fix their responsiper onal deman
bility o far as such d mand wa nee ary.
of a ment on on of the parti s was ufficient, although such
demand may have b n mad aft r the d1ssolut10n of the firm;
or a d mand mad m good faith at the late lace of business of
uch firm, ma e on mformat1on, wh ther true or false, receive
from a m mb r of the firm that uch place was the prop r place
t mak th demand, would con titut due dilio-ence. A partnerhi , although di olved mu t be treated as still in exi tence so
far a th qu t10n o d mand protest and notice is concerned,
and the act of one partner m such ca mu t be con idered as
binding on all the others. Th refore the facts indicated in plaintiff'
econd instruction constituted not simply du , but extraordinar diligence in making demand of payment of the makers
of th e note.
The in tructions given at the instance of the defendant did
not cover the whole case as made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
had th rio-ht to have his case as made by the evidence pre ented
by a proper in truction.
The judgment at General Term will therefore be aRi,rmed.
The other j,udges concur.

PRE ENTMENT T

JOINT DEBTORS.

§ 8o.

Arnold v. Dresser (1864), 8 Allen (klass.) 435.
Contract ao-ain t th indor er of a j int promi ory note.
At the trial in the uperior court, b fore Morton J. it
appeared that on th da \ hen th not b ame due Th odore
S. tratton, in behalf of th plaintiff, d man
paym nt th reof
of th two promi or , but did not hav th not in hi po
ion
at the time· and th note wa n t paid. Th plaintiff t tified
that on the same day he call d upon the def ndant an gave
notice to him that demand had b n made on the mak rs · that
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one of the makers called during the interview, and both he and

the defendant said that the note should be paid soon.

Upon this evidence, the judge ruled that the plaintiff was not

entitled to recover, and directed a verdict for the defendant,

which was accordingly rendered, and the plaintiff alleged excep-

tions.

H. IV. Bishop, for the plaintiff.

/. E. Field, for the defendant.

Bigelow, C. J. The defendant is not liable as i ndorser of

one of th e maker called during the intervi w, and both he and
t he defendant aid that the note hould be paid oon.
Upon this vid nee, th e judge rul d that th plaintiff wa not
entitl d to recover, and direct d a verdict f r the def ndant,
which wa accordin g ly rend red, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

the note declared on. ~ In orde r to char^tTrlim it was necessary

Tor the plaintiff to show_d ue presentment and demand of the note

orTboth t he promisors ^Uiiiion Bank of Weymouth, &c. v. Willis,

H . TV. Bishop) for th e plaintiff.
J. E . Field) fo r the defendant.

8 Met. 504; or a waiver thereof by the defendant. There were

no such presentment and demand. If a note is made payable at

a particular place, the holder must have it at that place on the day

of its maturity, in order to make due presentment ; if it is not

payable at a designated place, the note must be presented to the

promisor at his usual place of business or at his dwelling house.

BIGELOW, C. J. The defendant is not liable as indorser of
the note declared on . In order to char e him it was necessary
for t 1e p amt1 to how ue presentment and deman o t 1e note
on both the prom1 or ~ Union BaJZk of TVe3 11wuth) &c. v. Willis)
8 1et. 504; or a waive r thereof by the defendant. There were
no uch presentment and demand. If a note is made payable at
a pa rti cu lar place, the hold er must have it at that place on the day
of its maturity, in order to make due presentment; if it is not
payable at a designated place, the note mu t be presented to the
promiso r at his usual place of bu siness or at his dwelling hou se .
But no valid presentment and demand can be made b any per on
without having the note in his possession at the time, so that t 1e
maker may receive it in case he pays the amount du e:. unless
~Eecial circumstances, such as the loss of the note or its destruction, are shown to excuse its absence. (Shaw v. Reed) 12 Pick.
132; Freeman v. Boynton) 7 1\Iass. 483).
Nor was there any waiver of due demand by the defendant.
No such waiver is made, where an indorse r promises to pay the
:-1ote in i norance of the fact that he has been discharrred
lac es of the hold er. in not making due demand of the promisor,
or where such promise is made under a misapprehension or mistake of facts concerning the due presentment and demand of
the note. (Low v. Haward) I I Cush. 268; Keliey v. Brown) 5
Gray, 108). In the case at bar, the defendant made the statement
on which th plaintiff relies to show a waiver not only in ignorance of the fact that the note had not been duly demanded of one
of the promi ors, but under a mistaken belief that it had be n so
demand ed, induced by the false statement to that effect made to
him by the plaintiff.
Exceptions overruled,
1

But no valid presentment and demand can be made by any perso n

without having the note in his po ssession at the time, so that the_
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maker ma y_ receive it in case he~pays the amount due L unless

special circumstances, such as the loss of the note or its destruc-

tion, are shown to excuse its absence. (Shaw v. Reed, 12 Pick.

132; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483).

Nor was there any waiver of due demand by the defendant.

No such waiver is niade. where an indorser promises to pay the

note in ignorance of t he fact that he has been dischar ged by the

lache s of the holder, in not making due demand of the promisor,

or where such promise is made under a misapprehension or mis-

take of facts concerning the due presentment and demand of

the note. (Low v. Howard, 11 Cush. 268; Kelley v. Brown, 5

Gray, 108). In the case at bar, the defendant made the statement

on which the plaintiff relies to show a waiver, not only in igno-

rance of the fact that the note had not been duly demanded of one

of the promisors, but under a mistaken belief that it had been so

demanded, induced by the false statement to that effect made to

him by the plaintiff. Exceptions overruled.
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PRESENTMEN1 BY WHOM. §74-

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin et al. (1840), 17 N. J. L.

See §§96, 104-107.

PRE ENT iENT BY WHOM.

Armstrong and Williamson, for rule.

§74·

J. IV. Miller and P. D. Vroom, contra.

Dayton, J. This case was tried at the Sussex Circuit of

May, A. D. 1838, and verdict had for the plaintiff. Sundry rea-

sons are now relied upon to set the same aside, and I will consider

Sussex Bank

'V.

Baldwin et al. (1840), 17 N. J. L.
e §§ 96, 104-107.

them in their order.

The defendants are the indorsers of a promissory note made

by Conrad Teese, October 24, 1836, for five hundred and five

dollars and sixty-one cents, payable six months after date to the

order of Wm. A. Baldwin & Co., (the defendants) and by them

indorsed to the plaintiff. The first reason assigned is, that the

note was not duly presented to the maker, for payment. That it

was presented at an improper place, to wit, the office of Teese,

the maker, and by an improper person, to wit, one Dennis, who

swears that he acted as the clerk and under the directions of

Wm. Tuttle, who was himself merely the agent of James Hedden,

the notary public.
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As to the place of presentment, the objection may be disposed

of very briefly. It is a point not properly arising under the evi-

dence in the case. Dennis, the witness, swears that Teese, the

maker of the note told him, Dennis, to present his notes for pay-

ment at that place, and that he had been in the habit of doing so.

This estops Teese from objecting to the place of presentment;

and that which is good against the drawer, is good against the

indorser. {State Bank v. Hurd, 12 Mass. 172; Whitwell v. John-

son, 17 Mass. R. 449). But it is thought advisable that this point

be put at rest in this state, by an expression of opinion by this

court.

It appears by the evidence, that the office in question was the

regular place of business of the maker ; and I have no doubt

where a person has an office or known and settled place of busi-

ness f or the tra nsaction of his mo ne yed concerns — whether he be

a banker, broker, merchant, manufacturer, mechanic, or dealer in

any other way, a presentment and demand at that place, (as well

as a presentment and demand at his residence) is good in la wT

It must not, however, be a place selected and used temporarily for

the transaction of some particular business, as settling up some

Arnistrong and H' illiamson, for rul .
J. vV. Miller and P. D. Vroom, contra.

DAYTO , J. This ca
was tried at the Sussex Circuit of
May, A. D. 183 , and verdict had for the plaintiff. Sundry reasons ar now r li d upon to et the same aside, and I will consider
th m in th ir order.
The defendants are the indorsers of a promissory note made
by onrad T s , ctober 24, 1836, for five hundred and five
dollar and ixty-on cents, payable six months after date to the
ord r of 'Nm. \. Baldwin & o., (the defendant ) and by them
indorsed to the plaintiff. The first reason a igned is, that the
note was not duly pr nted to the maker, for payment. That it
was presented at an improper place, to wit, the office of Tee e,
the mak r and by an i11iproper person, to wit, one Dennis, who
wears that he acted as the clerk and under the directions of
Wm. Tuttle, who wa him elf merely the agent of James Hedden,
the notary public.
to the place of pre entment, the objection may be di posed
of very briefly. It i a point not properly ari ing under the evidence in the case. Dennis, the witne
swears that Teese, the
mak r of the note told him, Dennis, to pre ent his notes for paym nt at that plac , and that he had been in the habit of doing o.
This stops Tee e from objectincr to the place of presentment;
and that which i good acrain t the drawer, i good against the
indor er. (Stcrte Bauk v. Hurd, 12 Ma . 172 ·Whitwell v. Joh11so11 17 Ma . R. 449) . ut it i thought ad vi able that thi point
be put at rest in this tat , by an expr s ion of opinion by this

370 Presentment by Whom

old books or accounts merely, but bis regular and known place

370

PRESENTMENT BY WHOM

of business for tlie transaction of his moneyed concerns. The

counting room of a banker or merchant, may be a proper place

for a demand, though the manufactory or work shop would not.

Yet if the manufacturer or mechanic have an office, or known

place of business for the purpose aforesaid, a good demand may

be made there. (Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, i Peters, 582;

Williams v. The Bank of U. States, 2 Peters, 100; Byles on B.

118; State Bank v. I hud. 12 Mass. 173).

Nor is there any thing in the objection that the presentment

was made by an improper person. It appears by the evidence

that Tuttle did the business of Hedden, the notary public, and it

must have been with the consent and knowledge of the Bank, that

he employed and directed Dennis, who was his clerk, to present

the note in question to the drawers, and put him in possession

of the note for that purpose. If the note had been paid on pre-

sentment, he could and would have delivered it up to the drawers,

and that would have exonerated them from further liability. An

authority to make a dema nd, may be created by parol, and the mer e

posse ssion oT the pa per, is evidence enough of such authority . ("3*
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Kent L., 108 ; Bank ofUtica v. Smith, 18 J. R. 230; Shed v. Brett,

1 Pick. 401 ; Morris v. Foreman, 1 Dal. 193 ; Freeman and others

v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 487).

There is an impression current in some degree, even with the

bar. that a presentment of a note, must be by a notary, or at

least on his behalf, and that he must protest it upon non-payment,

before the indorser is liable. But this is not so. The record of

a demand and notice &c. by a notary, entered in his book, accord-

ing to our statute, of 21st February, 1829, Harr. C. 249, may

serve to refresh his memory, or in case of his absence or death,

it may be used as evidence of the facts contained in it; but such

dem and a nd protest by a notary, are n ot essential to a recovery

against the indorser . It was not so by the common or commer-

cial law, nor is it required by our statute. If a notary act in

the premises, and make the protest, although sanctioned by gen-

eral custom, it is not strictly an official act. (Nichols v. Webb,

8 Wheat. 326; 3 Kent C. 93-4; 1 Saund. on PI. & Ev. 295).

Any person may present at its maturity, a promissory note of

whic h he is put in possession, an d if paid in the ordinary course

of bus iness, and taken up. the payment is good ; and if no t paid,

the d emand is good as a groundwork for notice to the indorsers,'

and th at without any protest . The rule is otherwise as to fjojejgn"

bills of exchange, which must be protested by a notary, and their

old books or accounts mer ly, but hi regular and known place
of bu ines for th tran action of his moneyed concerns. The
counting room of a banker or merchant, may be a proper place
for a cl mand though the manufactory or work shop would not.
Yet if the manufacturer or mechanic hav an offic or known
place of busin
for the purpo e afar aid, a good demand may
be made there. (Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, r
ter , 582;
fVilliams v. Tlie Bank of U. States, 2 Peter , roo; Byl s on B.
r r8; State Ba1zk v. Hurd, 12 Mas . 173).
Nor is th re any thing in the obj ction that the presentment
wa made by an iniproper person. It appears by the evidence
that Tuttle did th bu in ss of Hedden, the notary public, and it
mu t have been \Yith the consent and knowledge of the ank, that
he employed and directed Denni , who was his clerk, to present
th note in que tion to the drawers, and put him in possession
of the note f r that purpose. If the note had been paid on presentment, he could and wou ld have delivered it up to th drawers,
and that would hav exonerated them from further liability. An
authority to make ad mand, may be created by arol, and the mere
o ess1on of t e paper, i evidence enoug h of uch authorit .
3
ent ., ro ; an" o
tica v. mith, I
. R. 230; Shed v . B rett,
r Pick. 401; 1VI orris v. Foreman, r Dal. 193; Freeman and others
v. Boynton, 7 l\Ia s. 487) .
There is an impre sion current in ome deo-ree, even with the
bar, that a presentment of a note, must be by a notary, or at
least on his behalf, and that he must protest it upon non-payment,
before the indorser is liable. But this is not so. The record of
a demand and notice &c. by a notary, entered in his book, accord. ing t our tatu te, of 21st February, 1829, Harr. C. 249, may
serve to refresh his memory, or in ca e of his absence or death ,
it may b u ed a evidence of the facts contained in it; but such
demand and rote t b a notary, are not e sential to a reco~
again t the indorser. It was not o by t 1e common or commercial law, n or is it required by our statute. If a notary act in
the prem i es, and make the prate t, although sanctioned by o-eneral cu tom, it is not strictly an official act. ( ichols v. Webb,
8 vVh eat. 326; 3 Kent . 93-4; l aund . on Pl. & Ev. 295).
ny per on may pr nt at its maturity, a promi ory note of
which he is ut in posse sion, and if paid in the ordinary co1trse
Qf b11siness, and taken up, the paym nt i goo ; and i not pa1 ,
the demand is good as a groundw ork for n otice to the indorsers,
and that without any prate t. Th rule i otherwi e as to !ore1gn
bill s of exchange, which must be protested by a notary, and their
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official seal is plenary evidence in all foreign courts and countries,

of the dishonor of the bill, (vide cases above cited).

2. The next objection, is to the notice to the indorsers.

The name of James Hedden, the notary public, was printed at the

foot of the notice, not written; and this is assigned for error.

There is nothing in this objection. The law prescribes no form

of notice, its object is merely to apprise the party of the non-

pa yment— to put him upon inquiry, that he may protect his rights.

This is as well done by a notice with a printed, as with a written

name.

The signature of the notary, would carry with it in a large

majority of cases, no higher degree of certainty than the printed

name, for it must in most cases be unknown to those to whom

notices are sent. The notice in this case, came from a proper

source, and stated the proper facts ; that is enough. It is needless

to cite authorities upon this point.

3. The next objection is, that the notice was not sent in

proper time.

The Sussex Bank was the owner of the note, and had sent it

indorsed to the Newark Bank for collection. The demand of
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payment was made on Teese, the maker, at Newark, where he

resided on the 27th April. 1837, and on the same day, notice of

non-payment was directed to S. D. Morford. the cashier of the

Sussex Bank, at Newton. In this notice to Morford. was

inclosed another directed to the defendants in this suit, with the

name "James Hedden, notary public," printed thereto, and none

other. It appeared that Tuttle, who forwarded the notices for

the notary, did not know that the defendants resided in Newark,

but supposed them to reside in Sussex. Morford swears that on

the notice thus directed to the defendants, he wrote "Newark,

New Jersey," and "thinks he sent it by the next mail." But

upon cross examination, he said "he distinctly recollected putting

the notice of protest directed to the defendants into the postoffice

at Newton, but could not recollect at what time he did so. Could

not tell precisely what was at that time the course of mail between

Newton and Newark, but thought that it was carried each way,

three times a week." And upon a re-examination, he said "he

seldom received such notices, but when he did, was in the habit

of sending them by the next mail : that he had no doubt he put

the notice for the defendants, into the postoffice at Newton, the

day after he received it, but could not say whether it zcas in time

for the next mail." And upon tin's branch of the case, the judge

charged the jury, that if Mr. Morford. the cashier, placed the

official seal i pl nary e id nee in all for ign court and countries,
of the di honor of the bill, ( vide ca
above cit d).
2.
Th next objection is to the notic to the indor ers.
The nam f Jame Iledd n, th notary public, was printed at the
foot of the notic , not writt n; and thi i a ign d for error.
There i nothing in thi objection. The law prescribes no form
of notice, its obj ct is m rely to apprise th party of the nonpaym nt-to put him upon inquiry, that he may protect his rights.
'I his is as well done by a notice with a printed, as with a written
name.
The signature of the notary, would carry with it in a large
majority of ca es, no high r d o-ree of certainty than the printed
name, for it must in mo t cas s be unknown to those to whom
notice are sent. The notice in thi ca e, came from a proper
ource, and tated the proper facts; that is enough. It is needless
to cite authoriti upon thi point.
3. Th next objection is, that the notice was not sent in
proper time.
The ussex Bank was the owner of the note, and had sent it
ind or ed to the Newark Bank for collection. The demand of
payment was made on Teese, the maker, at Newark, where he
re ided on the 27th pril, 1837, and on the same da), notice of
non-payment was directed to S. D. Morford, the cashier of the
us ex Bank, at Newton. In thi notice to Morford, was
inclosed another directed to the defendants in this suit, with the
name "Jame IIedden, notar) public," printed thereto, and none
other. It appeared that Tuttle, who forwarded the notices for
the notary, did not know that the defendant re ided in Newark,
but supposed them to re ide in uss x. Morford swears that on
th notice thu directed to the defendant , he wrote "Newark,
New Jers y," and "thinks he sent it by the next mail." But
upon cro
xamination, he aid "h di tinctly recollected putting
the notice of prote t directed to the defendants into the po toffice
at NeV\ ton but could not r ollect at what time he did so. Could
not tell pr ci ely what wa at that time th cour e of mail betV\ een
wton and Newark, but thought that it was carried each "ay
thre time a week."
nd upon a re- ·amination, he aid he
eldom r ceived uch noti , but when h did, ' a in the habit
of sendino- them by th n xt mail: that h had no doubt he put
th notice f r the defendant , into the po toffic at e\ ton, the
day after he received it, but could not sa'.\ i 1hether i'.t as fo tfrne
nd upon thi branch of th ca e, the j ud e
for the next mail.}}
charged the jury, that if Mr. 1orford, the ca hier, placed the

372 Presentment by Whom

372

PR E E

TME

T BY WHOM

notice in the postoffice, directed to the defendants, on the day

after he received it, it was sufficient and legal evidence of notice to

the defendants.

It is admitted that every bona fide indorser who may receive

a notice of non-payment, has a day to notify his immediate

indbrser; but it is contended that this rule extends only to real

holders and indorsers, not to such as are mere agents. That the

Sussex Bank had no right by appointing the Newark Bank its

agent, to extend the time allowed it by law for notifying the

indorsers, of the non-payment of the note really held and owned

by it. It would appear reasonable that the holder of a note should

not for his own accommodation, thus vary the rights of an

indorser: but the authorities grounded I presume upon commer-

cial convenience, are the other way.

It has long been settled that a banker who holds a bill for a

cust omer, is entitled to a day to give him notice, and the cus-

tomer orjp rincipal is enti tled to another day to give his in dorser

notice ; Firth v. Thursh, 1 5 Eng. C. L. 244-5 ; Robson v. Bennett,

2 Taunt. 388; Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & P. 599; Longdate v.

Trimmer, 15 East, 291 ; Bray v. Hadiven, 5 M. & S. 68; Scott v.
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Lifford, 9 East, 347 ; Daly v. Slatter, 4 Carr. and P. 200 ; but in

this last case, certain points were reserved, for which, see case;

and the same principle is laid down in Mead v. Engs, 5 Cowen,

303, where it is held that one to whom a bill or note has been

indorsed merely as agent to collect, (e. g. a bank) is considered

as a holder for the purpose of giving and receiving notice of non-

payment. See also, Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. 167; Tunno v. Lague,

2 J. C. 1. It was said on the argument that no case could be

found where this rule had been applied unless the notice was from

one indorser notifying another; and that in the case now under

consideration, the notice was not from the Sussex Bank, which

was the indorser, but from the notary public of the Newark Bank,

whose name was attached to it. Admitting this for the sake of

argument to be so, yet the case of Tunno v. Lague, lays down

the rule (which is founded in reason too) that if the agent under-

takes to give notice to the other indorsers, as well as his principal,

the notice will be good if given as early as it could have been

received from the principal. If therefo re this is to be considered^

a notice from the not ary, and not from the Sussex Bank, it is

good if given as ea rly as the Sussex Bank was bou nd to give it

But admitting this to be so, an important question yet remains.

Was the notice in time, supposing it to have come from the

Sussex Bank? There is nothing wherein greater strictness is

notic in the postoffice, directed to the d fendants, on the day
after he receiv ed it it wa suffici nt and 1 gal evidence of notice to
the defendants.
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a notice of non-payment, has a day to notify his immediate
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required, than upon this point. It is laid down that notice of

non-paymen t , cannot be left to inference; wit h out pnsiti-np proo f,

(Chitty on B. 314; Assignees of Schiffner v. Sherwood, 2 Eng.

C. L. R. 405).

There is certainly no positive proof that the letter containing

the notice of non-payment was put in the postoffice for the

defendants, in time for the mail of the day next after it was

received by the Sussex Bank. Morford says in substance, that he

thinks he sent the letter by the next mail; but upon a further

examination, he says he does not recollect the course of the mails

at that time, and although he has no doubt he mailed it next day,

he cannot say whether it was in time for the mail. There is

therefore no positive proof of that fact, and we cannot infer it.

Nor was it even submitted as a question of fact to the jury ; on

the contrary the charge of the court was, that the indorser had

the entire day to put the notice in the postoffice, without reference

to departure of the mail.

Does the law require that the notice be put in the postoffice

in time for the mail of the day next after the indorser receives

it, or has he the whole of that day to prepare it ?
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Kent in his commentaries, 3 Vol., p. 105, says, the modern

doctrine is, that the notice must be given by the first direct and

regular conveyance; meaning thereby ''the first convenient and

practicable mail that goes on the day next to the third day of

grace ; so that if the third day of grace be on Thursday, and the

drawer or indorser reside out of town, the notice may indeed be

sent on Thursday, but must be sent by the mail that goes on Fri-

day." Kent says in a note, that the case of Haivkes v. Salter, 4

Bing. 715, is a relaxation of the strictness of that rule; and yet

that case does not appear on examination, to militate against the

general rule that the notice must go by the first convenient and

practicable mail, on the day next after the third day of grace.

In the case of Hawkes v. Salter, the notice should have been sent

on Monday, but the only mail on Monday went out at half past

nine in the morning, and one of the grounds taken was that the

party was not bound to get up at an unseasonable hour, to send

his notice. The court held that notice sent on Tuesday morning

was in time. The general principle undoubtedly is, that a party

is bound to exercise reasonable diligence only, not excessive. If

therefore the only mail of the day, leave at an early hour in the

morning — before a party in the exercise of reasonable diligence

could mail his notice, he may properly send it by the next oppor-

tunity. The case of Firth v. Thursh, 8 B. and Cress. 387, was

r quired, than upon this point. It is laid down that notice of
non-payment, cannot be left to inference; without positive proof.
( hitty on B. 314; Assignees of Schiffner v. Sherwood, 2 Eng.
C. L. R. 405).
There i certainly no po itive proof that the letter containing
the notice of non-payment wa put in the postoffice for the
defendants, in tim for th mail of the day next after it was
r ceived by the u ex Bank.
forford says in sub tance, that he
thinks he sent the letter by the next mail; but upon a further
examination, he say he does not recollect the course of the mails
at that time, and although h has no doubt he mailed it next day,
he cannot say wheth r it was in time for the mail. There is
therefor no po itiv proof of that fact, and we cannot infer it.
or wa it ev n submitted as a question of fact to the jury; on
the contrary the charge of the court was, that the indorser had
the entire day to put the notice in the postoffice, without reference
to departure of the mail.
Does the law require that the notice be put in the postoffice
in time for the mail of the day next after the indorser receives
it, or has he the whol of that day to prepare it?
Kent in hi commentari s, 3 Vol., p. 105, says, the modern
doctrine is, that the notice must be given by the first direct and
regular conveyance; meaning thereby "the first convenient and
practicable mail that goes on the day next to the third day of
grace· so that if the third day of grace be on Thursday, and the
drawer or indorser reside out of town, the notice may indeed be
ent on Thur day, but mitst be sent by the mail that goe on Friday." Kent says in a note, that the case of Hawkes v. Salter, 4
Bing. 715, is a relaxation of the trictnes of that rule; and yet
that ca e does not appear on examination, to militate again t the
o-eneral rule that the notice must go by the first convenient and
practicable mail, on the day next after the third day of o-race.
In the ca e of Hawkes v. Salter, the notice hould have been sent
on Monday, but the only mail on Monday went out at half past
nine in the morning, and one of the ground taken v a that the
party was not bound to aet up at an unsea enable hour to end
his notice. The court held that notic ent on Tu day mornin
wa in time. The g neral principle undoubtedly i , that a party
i bound to exercise rea onabl dilio-enc only, not exce ive. If
therefore the only mail of the day, I ave at an arly hour in the
morning-before a party in the exerci e of rea onable dilio-ence
could mail his notice he may prop rly end it b the ne rt opportunity. The case of Firth v. Tlwrsh
B. and Cre .
7 was

374 Presentment by Whom

374

PRESENTMENT BY WHOM

decided on entirely different grounds : an attorney after receiving

information of the indorser's place of residence, was allowed in

that case one day to consult his principal, upon the ground that

he stood in the light of a banker who holds paper for his prin-

cipal. These cases of relaxing, cannot be considered as conflicting

with the general rule laid down by Kent. In Lenox v. Roberts,

2 Wheat. 373 ; Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion

of the court, says ''a demand of payment should be made on the

last day of grace, and notice of the default of the maker, be put

in the postoffice early enough to be sent by the mail of the

succeeding day." The same point substantially was ruled in The

U. States v. Adm'x. of Barker, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 464; Mead v.

Engs, 5 Cowen, 303 ; Bank of Alexandria v. Swann, 9 Peters, 45 ;

and in Whitwcll v. Johnson, ly Mass., 454, it was ruled that if

there be two mails on the day after the note falls due, it is good

if the notice go by either of them.

The English cases, more particularly those of a late date, are

to the same point. In Smith v. Mullet, 2 Camp. 208, the same

rule was applied between indorsers. The fourth indorser having

received notice of non-payment, on the 20th of the month, he
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mailed a notice to his immediate indorser, on the evening of the

21st, but so late that it was not delivered until the morning of the

22d. This was held by Lord Ellenborough to discharge not only

the defendant, but the other indorsers, although they actually

received notice of the dishonor during the day of the 22d ; and it

was said that although a party has an entire day, yet he must send

his letter within post-time of that day. That if he retain it

until atter the mail is gone, he might just as well retain it until

the next day : the consequence is, that an entire day is lost.

The opinion of Chief Justice Abbott, in Geill v. Jeremy and

Blagg, 1 Moody and M. 225 ; as cited and reported in Chitty on

B. 7 Am. Ed. 316; is but a reiteration of the same rule. He says

it is well settled, that a party who receives notice of the dishonor

of a bill, is not bound to forward notice to the prior party, till the

next day, and it then suffices if he puts a letter in the post on

any following day, so that it be forwarded by the next practicable

post. See this case 22 Eng. C. L. R. 249; or M. and M., 61,

not. ( ?) 225. See, also, Hilton v. Fairclough, 2 Camp. 633 ; Wil-

liams v. Smith, 2 B. and A. 500; Byles on B. 160.

It would certainly simplify this matter to lay down the rule,

that a party has the next day entire to prepare and mail his notice,

without reference to the time of the departure of the mail. But

this would be in violation of the authorities and against the gen-

decided on entirely differ nt grounds: an attorn y aft r rece1vmg
information of the indor er's place of r sidenc wa allowed in
that case one day to con ult hi principal, upon th ground that
he toad in the light of a bank r who holds paper for hi principal. The e cases of relaxing, cannot be con idered a conflicting
with the general rule laid down by Kent. In Lenox v. Roberts,
2 Wheat. 373; Chief Ju tice Marshall, in delivering th opinion
of the court, ays "a demand of payment hould be made on the
last day of grace, and notice of the default of the maker, be put
in th postoffice early enough to be sent by th mail of the
succeeding day." The same point ubstantially was ruled in The
U. States v. Ad11i'x. of Barker, 4 Wash . C. C.R. 464; Tvlead v.
Engs, 5 Cowen, 303; Banli of Alexandria v. Swann, 9 Peters, 45;
and in Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Ma s., 454, it was ruled that if
there be two mails on the day after the note falls due, it is good
if the notice go by either of them.
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received notice of non-payment, on the 20th of the month, he
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po t. See this case 22 Eng. C. L. R. 249; or M . and M., 61,
ee, also, Hilton v. Fairclo110"/i, 2 Camp. 633; Wilnot. ( ?) 225.
liams v. Smith, 2 B. and A. 500; Byl s on B . 160.
It would c rtainly simplify thj matt r to lay down the rule,
that a party ha the next day entir to prepare and mail hi notice,
without reference to the time of the departure of the mail. But
this \\'Ould be in violation of the authoriti s and aaainst the gen-

SUSSEX BANK

v.

BALDWIN ET AL.

375

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin et al. 375

eral principle which requires the exercise of at least reasonable

diligence. Many of the authorities say, the party has an entire

day to give the notice ; and so he has, but not an entire day to pre-

pare it. He must give or send his notice on the next day if he

can; if he neglect it, until after the departure of the mail, he

does not give or send his notice the next day, but in point of

fact, the day after the next, or at some other and perhaps more

distant day. It is safe therefore to adhere to the rule, that the

notice must be sent on the day next after the third day of grace,

unle ss the mail of that day go out at so early an hour as to render

it impracticable by the exercise of a reasonable diligence,. (4

Bing. 715; 1 Mood P. 750; 5 M. and S. 68; 2 B. and A. 501).

No precise hour can be named, particularly in the country, where

the term "business hours," has a somewhat vague and indefinite

meaning. Cases will occassionally arise, where it will become

necessary for the court to direct the jury whether due diligence

has been exercised, supposing certain facts to be proved. (Aymcr

v. Beers, 7 Cowen, 705 ; Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters,

578).

Applying the above rule to the evidence in this case, the
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plaintiff ought not to recover ; it certainly is not shown that the

notice was sent the next day after it was received. It was mailed,

but whether in time for the post, the witness does not pretend to

say, and that is a fact which he must make out. The importance

of sustaining this rule, is evident from the facts of this case. The

mail between Newton and Newark, being only tri-weekly, if the

letter were mailed after the post left, it was not one day only

lost, but two or perhaps three. The charge of the court upon

this point was clearly erroneous ; and for this reason, if there

were no other, the verdict must be set aside, unless there has been

a waiver of notice, on the part of the defendants, as is contended.

Mr. Morford swears "that a week or two before the note of

Teese came due, he received a private letter from Baldwin, one

of the defendants, in which he (Baldwin) stated that Teese could

not pay it, and requested to have it renewed." John Young,

another witness, swears that Baldwin "handed him a note of

Conrad Teese, indorsed by the defendants, and wished him to

try and get the plaintiff to take it in renewal of a note they then

held: he (Baldwin) stated that the note of Teese which they

wished to take up, had been protested, and that he had received a

notice of protest through the bank."

I was at first doubtful whether this evidence might not be

considered as showing an implied waiver of demand and notice.

eral principle which r quir s th x rci c of at 1 ast reasonable
Iany of th authoriti
ay, th party has an entire
diligence.
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But upon looking 1 into the authorities, I am satisfied that it cannot

be so considered. We are to bear in mind, that the defendants

are not drawers of a bill of exchange, but indorsers of a promis-

sory note, and as against them, a clear case of waiver must be

made out. Nothing short of an unconditional promise to pay,

made with a full knowledge of the laches of the holder of the

note, is sufficient. A knowledge that the maker could not pa y,

does not d ispense with strict proof of d emand and notice. In

Esdaile v. Sowcrby, n East, 117, Lord Ellenborough said, that

a knowledge of the insolvency of the drawer, and acceptor of a

bill, and that it must be dishonored when it became due, does

not dispense with proof of actual notice of the dishonor. And

this principle may likewise be found in many other cases, as well

as in the elementary books. (2 H. Blac. C09; Doug. 496; 8 East,

245 ; 2 Bos. and P. 277 ; 6 B. and C. 373 ; Chitty on B., 7 Am. Ed.

246; 1 Saund. on PI. and Ev. 292; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat.

183)-

The admission therefore that Teese could not pay the note,

does not affect the defendants' right to strict proof of notice.

Nor does the offer to substitute a new note, drawn by Teese, and
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indorsed by the defendants, affect this right. It was not an

unconditional promise to pay, made by the defendants. Nor if it

were, has it been shown to have been made with a full knowledge

of the laches of the holder, by which they were legally discharged

from all liability. All this it is necessary to prove, before we

can imply a waiver of notice. 1 Harr. 402; 1 D. and E. 712; 12

Wheat. R. 183; 5 Burrow 2670; U. S. Bank v. Southard, decided

at the present term of the court, ante, 473.

An admission that notice of protest, had been received

through the bank, is nothing. It does not appear when it was

received. It has never been disputed that a notice was received ;

but the allegation is that it was not received in time, and it was

the plaintiff's duty to sj iow that it was received or rather that iL

was mailed in time, which it has failed to do .

There was another point made on the argument, upon which

I shall do little more than express an opinion, referring to the

opinions of my brethren, for the authorities. It was alleged that

there was usury in discounting this note, by the Sussex Bank.

It appears by the evidence of Morford, the cashier, that in making

his calculation, he considered thirty days, a month, and 12

months, a year ; and that pursuant to a proposition of the defend-

ants, he deducted from the net proceeds of the note, one per cent

But upon looking into the authoritie , I am satisfied that it cannot
be so con idcred. \ e are to bear in mind, that the defendants
are Jiot drawers of a bill of exchang , but indorsers of a promissory note, and as against th m, a clear case of waiv r must be
made out.
I othing short of an unconditional promise to pay,
made with a full knowledge of the laches of the holder of the
note, is sufficient. A knowledge that the maker could not pay,
not dispense with strict proof of demand and notice. In
do
Esdaile v. owerby, l l East, l 17, Lord Ellen orough said, that
a knowledge of the insolvency of the drawer, and acceptor of a
bill, and that it must be dishonored when it became due, does
not dispense with proof of actual notice of the rlishonor. And
thi principle may likewise be found in many other cases, as well
as in the el mentary books. ( 2 H. Blac. 609; Doug. 496; 8 East,
245; 2 Bos. and . 277; 6 B. and C. 373; Chitty on B., 7 Am. Ed.
246; l Saund. on Pl. and Ev. 292; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat.
183).
The admi sion therefore that Teese could not pay the note,
does not affect the defendants' right to strict proof of notice.
Nor does the offer to substitute a new note, drnwn by Teese, and
indor ed by the defendants, affect this right. It was not an
uncoJZditional pro11iise to pay, made by the defendants. Nor if it
were, has it been shown to have been made with a full knowledge
of the laches of the holder, by which they were legally discharged
from all liability. All this it is necessary to prove, before we
can imply a waiver of notice. l Harr. 402; I D. and E. 712; 12
Wheat. R. 183; 5 Burrow 2670; U. S. Bank v. Southard, decided
at the present term of the court, ante, 473.
An admission that notice of protest, had been received
through the bank, is nothing. It does not appear when it was
received. It has never been di puted that a notice was received;
but the allegation is that it was not received in time and it was
the plaintiff's duty to show that it was received or rathe r that it
~a ffiaITed in time, which it has failed to do.
There was another point made on the argument, upon which
I hall do littl more than express an opinion, referring to the
opinions of my brethren, for the authorities. It was alleg d that
there was usury in di counting this note, by the ussex Bank.
It appears by the evidence of Morford, the ca hier, that in making
hi calculation, he considered thirty day , a month, and 12
months, a year; and that pur uant to a propo ition of the defendant , he deducted from the net proceeds of the note, one per cent
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for a draft upon Newark, where at the defendants' request, the

proceeds of the note were to be paid.

The mode of calculation adopted, might certainly have pre-

sented a serious question for the court, had it stood alone, but

M or ford swears that he was not aware that the bank received by

that mode of calculation, more than six per cent, that he intended

to take no more. If this be so, the taking of more than legal

interest was a mistake ; as much so as if it had been a mistake in

adding or substracting figures. This is the view taken by Savage,

C. J., in the case cited from 3 Wend. 369. Had Morford known

that he was taking more than six per cent (even though he had

supposed that he was legally entitled to make his calculation in

that way) would present a very different question. The law will

infer a corrupt intent, where the fact of taking more than six

per cent, knowingly is proved, but it cannot infer such intent

where it is done in ignorance and mistake of facts.

As to the charge of one per cent for a draft, it was fairly put

to the jury by the judge who tried the cause, and their finding is

conclusive upon that question. They were told that if the charge

of one per cent were unreasonable, and a part of the original
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agreement to discount the note, and if it were made corruptly, as

a contrivance and with a design to evade the statute, it was

usurious. This was doubtless the law, and the jury have, it is to

be presumed, rightly applied the law thus given them, to the facts

of the case. For reasons before stated, this rule must be made

absolute.

Hornblower, C. J., Ford and Nevins, JJ., concurred.

White, J., did not hear the argument, and gave no opinion.

Rule made absolute.

INSTRUMENT must be exhibited.

XlVaring v. Betts (1893), 9° ^ a - 4&> 44 ^m. St. Rep. 890.

Action on a negotiable note against J. L. Waring, W. L.

Waring, Jr., and J. D. Blair, maker and indorsers of the said note,

by E. Betts, the owner of the same. The note was negotiable and

payable at the Business Men's Bank, but at its maturity the bank

had gone out of existence and had distributed its assets. Demand

for payment was made on W. L. Waring, Jr., one of the indorsers

and manager of the said bank, at his place of business at 2 -.30

p. m. of August 29, 1892. He refused to pay on the ground that

for a d raft upon N cw ark \ h re at th defendants' request, the
proceed
f th not w r t b paid.
The mode of calculation adopted, might certainly have pres nt d a
rious iu tion for th court, had it sto d alone, but
lorford wear that h wa not aware that th bank received by
that mode of calculation, mor than ix per c nt, that he intended
to tak no more. If thi b
o, th taking of more than legal
int r t wa a mi tak ; a much o as if it had b en a mi take in
addino- or sub tractino- fio-ur s. Thi i the vi w tak n by avao-e,
. J., in the ca cit d from 3 \ end. 3 9. IIad Morford known
that he was taking mor than ix per c nt (even though he had
uppo d that he wa 1 o-ally entitled to make hi calculation in
that way) would pr ent a very different question. The law will
infer a corrupt int nt, \ her the fact of taking more than six
p r c nt, knowingly i proved, but it cannot infer such intent
wher it i don in i norance and mistake of facts.
to the charge of one per cent for a draft, it was fairly put
to the jury by the jud e who tried the cause, and their finding is
conclu iv upon that que tion. They were told that if the charge
of on per cent were unreasonable, and a part of the original
agreement to di count th note, and if it were made corruptly, as
a contrivance and with a de ign to evade the tatute, it was
u uriou . Thi wa doubtle the law, and the jury have, it is to
b pre urned, rio-htly applied th law thus given them to the facts
of th ca e. For rea ons before stated, this rule must be made
ab olut .
IIoR BLOWER, C. J., FORD and NEVIN , JJ. concurred.
WHITE, J., did not hear the argument, and gave no opinion.

Rule made absolitte.
~ ~
~~ .--~ ... ~
IN TRUMENT MU T BE EXHIBITED.

Waring v. Betts (1893), 90 Va. 46 44 Ani. St. Rep. 890.

v.

ction on a n o-otiable not ao-ain t J. L. \ arinoL.
i\Tarino- Jr. , and J. D. lair maker and indor er of the aid note,
by E. B tt , the own r f th am . Th not \ a n o-otiabl and
payable at the Bu ine s 1en
ank, but at it maturity th bank
had on out of exi tenc and had di tribut d it a
t .
mand
for payment wa made n \ . L. \\ aring-, Jr., n of the in or er
and manao-er of th
aid bank :it hi pla
of bu in
at 2 :30
P. :M. of Atwu t 29, 1892.
e refu
t pa · on the ground that
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he was not authorized to represent said Business Men's Bank;

that the funds of the band had all been distributed ; that he had

no assets in his hands belonging to the bank.

Later in the day, at 5 130 p. m., the note was taken by a notary

to the office of W. L. Waring, Jr., but that being closed it was

taken to the residence of Waring and presentment sought to be

made there. Failing to find Waring at either place, the note was

duly protested and notice was given to the indorsers. Judgment

was rendered for the plaintiff and defendant applied for and

obtained a writ of error.

Berkeley & Harrison, for plaintiffs in error.

E. E. Bouldin, for defendant in error.

Lacy, J., (after stating the case) delivered the opinion of the

court.

he wa not authoriz d to rcprc nt said Busin ss Men's Bank;
that the funds of the band had all been distributed; that h had
no as ets in his hands belonging t th bank.
Later in the day, at 5 :30 P. M ., the not was taken by a notary
to the office of \V. L. \Varina-, Jr., but that being clos d it was
taken to the residence of \ aring and presentment sought to be
made there. Failing to find \Varing at eithe r place, the note was
duly prote ted and notice was given to the indorsers. Judgment
wa rendered for the plaintiff and defendant applied for and
obtained a writ of error.

The first question arising here is that raised by the demurrer.

The declaration states a good case, and sets forth that on its due

dav it was duly presented for payment of the sum of money

therein specified, required, payment refused, and that it was duly

protested, &c.

And the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration
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was properly overruled.

The claim of the defendants is that there was no presentment

of the note, because when payment was demanded of the indorser,

W. L. Waring, Jr., manager of the late Business Men's Bank,

Mr. Glenn did not have the note in his possession, and could not

have presented it, but as has been seen from the facts found by

the jury, payment was refused by Waring, and the note not asked

for, but payment refused, and the statement made that he was

not authorized to represent the bank wriich had ceased to do bus-

iness and had distributed its assets.

Presentment of the bill or note and deman d of payment

should be made by an ac tua l exhibition of the instrument itself ;

or at least the demand of payment should be accompanied by some

clear indication that the instrument is at hand ready to be d eliv-

ered, and such must really be the ca se. This is requisite in order

that the drawer or acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genu-

ineness of the instrument ; (2) of the right of the holder to

receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately reclaim pos-

session of, upon paying the amount. T f, on demand of payment

the ex hibition of the instrument is not as ked for, and the party

of whonT^d^mand is made decline "oh other grounds, a formaT

presentment by_ actual exhibition of the paper is considered as

Berkeley & Harrison, for plaintiff in erro r.
E . E. Boitldin, for defendant in error.
LACY, J., (after stating the case) delivered the opinion of the
court.
The first question arising here is that raised by the demurrer.
The declaration states a good case, and sets forth that on its due
clay it was duly presented for payment of the sum of money
therein specified, required, payment refused, and that it was duly
protested, &c.
And the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration
\\·as properly overru led .
The claim of the defendants is that there was no pre entment
of the note, because when payment was demanded of the indorser,
vV. L. Waring, Jr., manager of the late Business Men's Bank,
Mr. Glenn did not have the note in his possession, and could not
have presented it, but as has been seen from the facts found by
the jury, payment was refused by Waring, and the note not a ked
for, but payment refused, and the statement made that he was
not authorized to r present the bank w11ich had cea ed to do business and had distributed its assets.
Presentment of the bill or note and demand of payment
hould be ma le by an actual exhib1t1on of the instrument it elf;
or at lea t the demand of payment shoul l be accompanied by some
clear indication that th instrument is at hand r ady to be delivered, and such must r ally be the cas . This is requi 1te 111 order
that the drawer or acceptor may be able to judge (I) of the genuineness of the in trument; ( 2) of t'he right of the holder to
receive payment; and (3) that he may imm ediately reclaim posession of, upon paying the amount. lf, on demand of payment
the exhibition of the in trument is not a ked for, and the party
of whom demand 1s made declme on other grounds, a fom1al
~esentment by actual exhibition of th paper is considered as
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waived. (Dan. on Neg. Inst, p. 485, §654; citing Lockivood v.

Ctawford, 18 Conn., 361, and Fall River Union Bank v. Willard,

5 Metcalf, 216).

All the parties subsequent to the principal paver are bound

only as his guarantors, and promise to pay only on condition

that a proper demand of payment be made, and due notice be

given to them in case the note or bill is dishonored. And we

repeat this as one of the fundamental principles of the law of

negotiable paper; and the infrequency and the character of the

circumstances which will excuse the holder from making this

demand, and still preserve to him all his rights as effectually

as if it were made, will illustrate the stringency of the rule

itself. Parsons on Notes and Bills, Vol. I., 442. The question

of excuse, then, will depend upon whether due diligence has

been used, and presents the ordinary inquiry as to negligence.

The principal excuses resolve themselves into two classes —

First. The impossibility of demand.

Second. The acts, words, or position of a party, proving that

he had no right, or waived all right to the demand of the waiver

of which he would avail himself.
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That impossibility should excuse non-demand is obvious, for

the law compels no one to do what he cannot perform. But it

must be actual and not merely hypothetical ; and though it need

not be absolute, no slight difficulty will have this effect. Id.

The circumstances which will excuse a demand are such

generally as apply to a faliure to present and demand payment

within the required time, not absolutely. Parsons, 444, 445.

In this case the presentment of the note was not made at

bank withi n the usual bank hours, with the note in possession,

but as we have seen, this was excused in this case (1) bv the

fact that there was no bank to present it at, and (2) _because

payment ^ was refused upon the ground that the bank had ceased

to jo business, and its assets distributed, and the note was not

asked for, nor required, payment being refused on other grounds,

the right to have it produced must be considered as waived.

The note, however, was carried, during the day, to the place

of business of the late manager of the bank, and the indorser

sought to be charged, and this being closed, it was carried to his

residence, and that being also closed, it could not be presented to

him, and although it was not in banking hours, it was during the

day time and before the hours of rest.

When the note is payable at a bank, it is to be presented

during banking hours; and the payer is allowed until the expira-

waived. (Dan. on Neg. In t., p. 485,
54; citing Lockwood v.
Crar. ford, l
onn., 361, and Fall River Union Bank v. ~Villard,,
5 Metcalf, 216).
All the parti s subsequent to the principal payer are bound
only as his guarantors, and promise t pay only on condition
that a proper demand of payment be mad , and due notice be
given to them in ca e the note or bill is dishonored. And we
repeat thi a on of the fundamental principle of the law of
negotiable paper; and the infrequency and the character of the
circum stanc
which will excuse the holder from making this
demand, and still pre erve to him all his rights as effectually
a if it were mad , will illu trate the tringency of the rule
itself. Par ons on Note and Bills, Vol. I., 442. The question
of excuse, then, will depend upon whether due diligence has
been used, and pre ents the ordinary inquiry as to negligence.
The principal excu es resolve themselves into two classesFir t. The impo ibility of demand.
Second. The act , word , or po ition of a party, proving that
he had no right, or waived all right to the demand of the waive r
of which he would avail him elf.
That impo sibility hould excuse non-demand is obvious, for
the law compels no one to do what he cannot perform. But it
must be actual and not merely hypothetical; and though it need
not be ab olute, no light difficulty will have thi effect. Id.
The circumstances which will excu e a demand are uch
generally a apply to a faliure to pre ent and demand payment
within the required time, not absolutely. Parson , 444, 445 .
In thi ca e the pre entment of the note \ as not made at
bank '' ithin the u ual bank hours, with the note in po e ion,
but as \•Ve have een, thi wa excu ed in this ca e ( r) by the
fact that there was no bank to pre ent it at, and (2) becau e
ayment was refu ed u on the round that the bank had cea ed
to o u iness, and it a ets distributed and th note wa not
a ked for, nor required, payment being refu ed on other grounds,
the rio-ht to have it produced mu t b con idered as waived.
The note, however, was carried, durino- the day, to the place
of busine s of the late manager of th bank, and the indor er
ought to be charged, and thi being clo ed . it \\·a carried to hi
re idence, and that being al o do ed, it could not be pre ented to
him, and although it ,. a not in banking hour it wa durino- the
day time and before the hour of r t.
W hen the note i payable at a bank, it i to be pre ented
during banking hours· and the payer i allow l until the expira-
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tion of banking hours for payment. But when not to be made at

bank, but to an individual, presentment may be made at any

reasonable time during the day during what are termed business,

hours, which, it is held, range through the whole day to the

hours of rest in the evening. (Parsons, 447, citing Cayuga County

Bank v. Hunc, 2 Hill, 635 ; Nelson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh, 194).

And in the case of Fainsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453, a pre-

sentment made at 9 p. m. at the maker's residence, ten miles from

Boston, when he and his family had retired, was held sufficient.

And in Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527, Lord Ellenborough

sustained a presentment made as late as 8 p. m. at the house of a

trader.

It is only when presentment is at the residence that the time

is extended into the hours of rest. If it is at the place of business,

it must be during such hours when such places are customarily

open, or, at least, while some one is there competent to give an

answer. (Parsons, 448).

In this case there was no presentment to the maker, who

could not be found, which, however, was unnecessary under sec-

tion 2842 of the Code of Virginia. The protest was in due form,
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and duly protested, which was authorized by section 2849 °* tne

Code, although the said note was payable at a bank in this

State. And under section 2850 is prima facie proof of the facts

stated therein, and are substantially in accordance with the find-

ing of the jury. It therefore appears that suc h_ presentment as

was requisite was made to the indorser and late manager of the

ba nk, and that it was impossible to present the same at the bank

named therein, as it had ceased to exist . We must, therefore,

conclude that there has been sufficient diligence on the part of

the plaintiff, and that the judgment of the court below in his

favor was right, and should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

V presentment where instrument payable at bank. § 77.

Chicopec Bank v. Philadelphia Bank (1869), 8 Wall. 641.

This was a suit by the Seventh National Bank of Phila-

delphia against the Chicopee Bank of Springfield, Massachusetts,

founded upon the allegation, that by reason of the neglect of the

latter bank, the former lost its remedy against the prior parties on

a bill of exchange, to wit, the drawer and payee.

The bill was drawn by one Coglin, of Philadelphia, on Mon-

-

tion of banking hour for payment.
ut when not to be made at
bank, but to an indi idual, pre entment may be made at any
rea onabl time during the day during what are termed busines~
hour , ' hich, it i h Id, range through the whole day to the
hour ' of r tin the ven ing . (Pa r on , 447, citino- Cayu a County
Bani~ v. H1t11e, 2 H ill, 35; ~' elson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh, 194).
~ \nd in the case of Fain sworth v. Allen, 4
ray 453 a preentment made at 9 P . l\I. at the maker's re idence, ten mil from
o ton when he and his family had retir d, was h ld ufficient.
A nd in Barcla3 v . Baile31, 2 Camp. 527, Lord Ellenborough
su tained a presentment made as late as 8 P. M. at th e hou e of a
trad r.
It i only when pre entment is at the re idence that the time
is xtended into the hour of rest. If it is at the place of bu iness,
it mu t be during such hours when such places are customarily
open, or, at lea t, while some one is there competent to give an
an we r. (Par on , 448).
In thi ca e there wa no presentment to th e maker, who
could not be fo und , which, however, was unneces ary und er secti on 2 42 of the ode of Virginia. The prote t wa in due form,
and duly protested, wh ich was aut'horized by section 2849 of the
Code, although the aid note was payable at a bank in this
Stafe. And under section 2850 is prima facie proof of the fact
stated therein, and are sub tantially in accordance with the finding of the jury. It th erefo re appears that such presentment as
wa requi it was made to the indor er and late manager of the
bank , and that it wa impos ibl to present the same at the bank
named therein, as it had ceased to exist. We must, therefore,
conclude that there ha been suffici nt diligence on the part of
the plaintiff, and that the judgment of the court below in his
favor was right, and hould be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
(

~

">1--0'VV'o"-

)(.PRE E TTMENT WHERE INSTRUMENT PAYABLE AT BANK.

§ 77·

Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank (1869), 8 Wall. 641.
This was a suit by the S eventh National Bank of Philadelphia agai n t the hicopee ank of pringfield, 1a sachusetts,
found d upon th e allegation, that by reason of the neglect of the
latter bank, the former lo t its remedy ao-ain t the prior partie on
a bill of exchange, to wit, the draw er and payee.
The bill was drawn by one Coglin of Philadelphia, on Mon-
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tague, of Springfield, payable to one Rhodes, of Philadelphia,

for $10,000, and accepted by Montague specially payable at the

Chicopee Bank. The day of payment was Saturday, February

18th, 1865. On the 13th, Rhodes, the holder, indorsed the bill

for value to the Philadelphia Bank, which sent it at once by mail,

inclosed in a letter, to the Chicopee Bank, to receive payment.

The course of the mail between Philadelphia and Springfield, is

two days. On the 15th, this letter with other letters and papers,

was duly delivered by the postman, and placed on the cashier's

table; but (as was afterwards ascertained), this letter slipped

from the pile, through a crack in the table, into a drawer of loose

papers, and its presence in the bank was not known to the cashier,

and as the two banks had no previous dealings, he was not expect-

ing anything from the other bank. On the 18th, Montague, the

acceptor, made no attempt to pay the bill, either by calling for it,

or depositing funds, and subsequently, at the trial, made oath

that he intended not to pay the bill, and had a defence against it.

The cashier of the Philadelphia bank, not receiving, on the 17th,

an acknowledgment of the letter which he had sent on the 13th,

felt somewhat anxious; and on the 18th consulted the president.
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On Monday, the 20th, he telegraphed to the cashier of the Chico-

pee Bank as follows :

"Did not you receive ours of 13th instant, with Montague's

acceptance, $10,000?"

The dispatch did not indicate either the time or place of

payment of the draft ; and the reply was sent,

"Not yet received."

This dispatch was received by the cashier of the Philadelphia

bank, at noon of the 20th. He testified at the trial, that he wrote

to Mr. Rhodes the same day, informing him of what he had

learned, that he had no recollection of writing to Coglin, but, as

tague, of Springfield, payable to one Rhod s, of Philadelphia,
for $10,000, and ace pted by Montague specially payable at the
aturday, February
Chic pee ank. Th day of payment wa
18th, 1865. On th 13th, Rhodes, the holder, indorsed the bill
hiladelphia ank, which sent it at once by mail,
for value to th
inclosed in a letter, to the hicop e Bank to receive payment.
The course of the mail betw en Philadelphia and Springfield, is
two day . On the 15th, this 1 tter with other letters and papers,
was duly delivered by the p tman, and placed on the cashier's
tabl ; but (as was afterwards a certained), this letter slipped
from the pile, through a crack in the table, into a drawer of loose
papers, and its pre ence in the bank was not known to the cashier,
and a the two 1 anks had no previous dealings, he was not expecting anything from the oth r bank. On the 18th, Montague, the
acceptor, made no attempt to pay the bill, either by calling for it,
or depositing funds, and sub equently, at the trial, made oath
that he intended not to pay the bill, and had a defence against it.
The cashier of the Philadelphia bank, not receiving, on the 17th,
an acknowledgment of the letter which he had sent on the 13th,
felt somewhat anxious; and on the 18th consulted the president.
On ilonday the 20th, he telegraphed to t'he cashier of the Chicopee Bank as follows :

he knew they were jointly concerned in dealings in petroleum

lands, he presumed Rhodes would inform him. This was the

only step the cashier took toward charging the prior parties.

They both did business at that bank ; Coglin was a director ; both

were frequently there, and well known to the cashier. As the

mail required two days, and the 19th was Sunday, there was no

question but the cashier had until and including the 24th, to give

notice to Rhodes and Coglin. After the receipt of the reply of

the 20th, at noon, he took no steps, by post or telegraph, to

ascertain from the Chicopee Bank whether the acceptor had or

had not been ready to pay on the 18th. The Philadelphia bank

"Did not you receive ours of 13th instant, with Montague's
acceptance, $10,000 ?"
The dispatch did not indicate either the time or place of
payment of the draft; and th reply was sent,
"Not yet received."
This di patch wa received by the ca hier of the Philadelphia
bank, at noon of the 20th. He testified at the trial, that he wrote
to M r. Rhodes the same day informing him of what he had
learn d, that he had no recollection of writing to Coo-lin, but, as
he knew they were jointly concern d in dealing in petrol um
lands, he presumed Rhodes would inform him. This wa the
only tep the cashier took toward charging the prior parties.
The both did bu ine s at that bank; oglin ' a a director· both
were frequently there, and well known to th ca bier.
the
mail required two days, and the 19th wa
unda ' there \ a no
question but the cashier had until and includin the 24th, to o-ive
notice to Rhodes and Co lin.
fter the receipt of the repl_ of
the 20th, at noon he took no tep , by po t or teleo-raph. to
ascertain from the Chicopee Bank whether th acceptor had or
had not been ready to pa on the 1 th. The Philad lphia bank
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brought no suit against Rhodes or Coglin, but sued the Chicopee

Bank for the amount of the note, on the ground that by its negli-

gence, they had lost the power to charge the prior parties.

The court below instructed the jury, that the prior parties

were absolutely discharged by what took place at the Chicopee

Bank, on the 18th; that where a bill is accepted payable at a

particular bank, the bank need not seek the acceptor, but that

there must still be a presentment, in order to charge prior parties ;

that the presence of the bill at the bank, ready to be delivered to

the acceptor upon his tendering payment, was equivalent to a

presentment; but that if the bill is not at the bank on the day of

payment, ready to be delivered as aforesaid, there is a failure of

presentment, and the prior parties are discharged, although the

acceptor made no attempt to pay ; that in this case, therefore,

the prior parties could not be held by any notice of whatever

description, whenever or by whomsoever given ; and that if the

loss or mislaying of the bill during the whole of the 18th, was

owing to the negligence of its cashier, the Chicopee Bank was

liable for the amount of the note.

After the charge was fully delivered, the court was asked
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by the counsel of the Chicopee Bank, to instruct the jury as to

the burden of proof. This the court refused to do, considering

that it had already sufficiently instructed the jury.

The verdict and judgment were accordingly for the plaintiffs.

R. H. Dana, Jr., for the Chicopee Bank, plaintiffs in error.

Mr. George Putnam, contra.

Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court.

The case was put to the jury, whether or not the loss of

the bill, and consequent inability of the collection bank to take

the proper steps against the acceptors to charge the prior parties,

was attributable to negligence, and want of care on the part of

the Chicopee Bank, and that, if it was, the bank was responsible.

The jury found for the plaintiffs.

Tn cases where the drawee accepts the bill, generally, in

brought no suit against Rhodes or Coo-lin , but sued the Chicopee
Bank for the amount of the note, on the ground that by its negligence, they had lo t the pow r to charge the prior parties.
The court below instructed the jury, that the prior partie
were ab olutely discharged by what took place at the Chicopee
Dank, on the 18th; that where a bill i accepted payable at a
particular bank, the bank need not seek the acceptor, but that
there must still be a pre entment, in ord r to charge prior partie ;
that the pre ence of the bill at the bank, ready to be d livered to
the acceptor upon hi tendering payment, was equivalent to a
pre entment; but that if the bill is not at the bank on the day of
payment, ready to be delivered as afore aid, there is a failure of
pre entment, and the prior parties a re di charged, although the
acceptor made no attempt to pay; that in this case, therefore,
the prior partie could not be held by any notice of whatever
description, whenever or by whomsoever given; and that if the
lo or mislayino- of the bill during the whole of the 18th, wa
owino- to the negligence of its cashier, the Chicopee Bank was
liable fo r the amount of the note.
After the charge was full y delivered, the court was asked
by the counsel of the Chicopee Bank, to instruct the jury a to
th e burden of proof. This the court refu sed to do, considering
that it had already ufficiently instructed the jury.
The verdict and judgment were accordingly for the plaintiffs.

order to charge the drawer or indorser, the holder must present

the paper, when due, at his place of business, if he has one, if

not, at his dwelling or residence, and demand payment ; and, if

R. H. Da.lla, Jr. , for the Chicopee Bank, plaintiff in error.
]}fr. George Putnam, contra.

the money is not paid, give due notice to the prior parties. If

he accepts the bill, payable at a particular place, it must be pre^.

sented at that place, and payment demanded. In these instances,

as_a ge neral rule, the bill must be present when th e demand is

made , as in case of payment the acceptor is entitled to it as his

M r. Ju stice TELSON delivered the opinion of the court.
The ca e was put to th e jury, whether or not the loss of
the bill, and con equent inability of the collection bank to take
the proper tep ao-ain t the acceptors to charge the prior partie ,
was attributable to negligence, and want of care on the part of
the Chicopee Bank, and that, if it wa , the bank was respon ible.
The jury fo und for the plaintiffs.
In ca es wh re the drawee accepts the bill, generally, in
order to charge th drawer or indor er, the holder must present
the paper, when due, at hi place of bu ines , if he has one, if
not, at his dwelling or re idence and demand payment; and, if
the mon y i not paid, g ive due notice to the prior parties. li_
he accepts the bill , pavable at a particular place, it mu t be presented at that place, and payment demanded. In the e instances,
a a general rule, the bill mu t be pre ent when the demand is
mad , as in ca e of payment the acceptor ts entitled to it as his

Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank

CHICOPEE BANK

v.

PHILADELPHIA BANK
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voucher. When th e hill is made payable at a hank, it has been

held that the p re sence of the bill in the bank at maturity, with

the fact that the acceptor had no funds there, or, if he had, were

not to be applied to payment of the paper, constitute a sufficient

presentment an d demand ; and, if the bill is the property of the

bank, the presence of the paper there need not be proved, as the

presumption of law is, that the paper was in the bank, and the

burden rests upon the defendant to show that the acceptor called

to pay it. (Chitty on Bills, p. 365 a, 353, Springfield ed. 1842; 1

Parsons on Notes and Bills, pp. 363, 421, 437; Byles on Bills, p.

251 and note; Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 1 Peters, 604;

Bank of United States v. Carneal, 2 Id. 543; Seneca Co. Bank v.

Neas, 5 Denio, 329; Bank v. Napier, 6 Humphry, 270; Folgar v.

Chase, 18 Pickering, 63.

In the present case, it is argued that the hill was in the

Chicopee Bank at the time of its maturity, and, as the acceptors

had no funds there, a sufficient presentment and demand were

made, according to the law merchant. It is true the bill was there"

physically, but, within the sense of this law, it was no more pres-
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ent at the bank than if it had been lost in the street by the mes-

senger on his way from the post-office to the bank, and had

remained there at maturity ; and this loss, which occasioned the

failure to take the proper steps, or, rather, in the present case, to

furnish the holder with the proper evidence of the dishonor of

the paper, so as to charge the prior parties, and enable him to

have recourse against them, is wholly attributable, according to

the verdict of the jury, to the collecting bank. In the eye of the_

law me rc hant there was no pres entment or de mand against the

acceptors ; and, as a consequence of this default, the holder has

lost his remedy against the drawer and indorser, which entitles

him to one against the defendant. The radical vice in the defence

being the failure to prove a presentment and demand upon the

acceptors at the maturity of the bill, the question of notice is

unimportant.

But, if it had been otherwise, the notice itself was utterly

defective. That relied on is the answer of the defendant to

the telegram of the plaintiff of the 20th February, which was,

that the bill had not yet been received. This was after its matu-

rity, and it simply advised the holder and payee indorser, to

whom the information was communicated the same dav, that the

drawer and indorser were discharged from any liability on the

paper. It showed that the proper steps had not been taken against

the acceptors to charge them.

voucher. vVhen th 1 ill i made payabl at a bank, it has been
held that the pre nc of the bIIT in th e bank at maturity, with
the fact thatthe ace ptor had no fund ..!b__£ , r, if h had, were
not to be appli d t paym nt of the paper. con titute a ufficient
pre entm nt and d mand; and, if th bill i the property of the
bank, the pre enc of th paper th r n d not be proved, a the
pre umption of law i , that th pap r wa in the bank, and the
burd n r ts upon the d f ndant to how that th acceptor called
to pay it. ( hitty n ill p. 365 a, 353, pringfield ed. 1842; l
ar on on Notes and ill , pp. 363, 421, 437; yles on Bill , p.
25 l and note· Fullerton v. Bank of United States, l Peter , 6o4;
Ba11k of U11ited fates v. Carneal, 2 Id . 543; Seneca Co. Bank Y.
~T eas, 5
nio 329 · Bank v. 1 apier, 6 Humphry, 270; Folgwr v.
Chase, l Pick rin , 63.
In the pre ent ca e, it i argued that the bill was in the
Chicopee ank at the time of its maturity, and, a the acceptor
had n fund there, a ufficient pre entment and demand were
mad , according to the law merchant. It i true the bill was there}~ ~
phy ically, but, within the n e of thi law, it wa no more pre - ~
ent at the bank than if it had been lo t in the tre t by the me - ~ ~
eno-er on hi way from the po t-office to the bank, and had ~.
remained th re at maturity; and this lo s, which occa ioned the
failure to take the proper t p , or, rather, in the pre ent ca e, to
furni h the holder with the proper evidence of the di honor of
the paper, o a to charge the prior partie , and enable him to
hav recour e ao-ain t them, i vvholly attributable, accordino- to
the verdict of the jury, to the collectino- bank. In the eye of the
law merchant ther wa no pre entm nt or d mand again t the
acceptor ; and, a a con equence of thi default the holder has
lo t hi remedy again t th drawer and indor er, ' hich entitle
him to on again t th d fendant. The radical ic in the defence
beino- the failure to prove a pre entment and demand upon the
acceptor at the maturity of the bill the que tion of notice i
unimportant.
ut, if it had been otherwi e th notice it elf wa utterly
defective. That relied on i the an w r of the def ndant to
the tele ram of th plaintiff of th -Oth F bruary, which wa ,
that the bill had not yet been received. This ' a after it maturity, and it imply advi d th hold r and payee indor er to
'Whom th information wa communicat d th am day, that the
drawer and indor r were di chaw cl fr m any liability on the
paper. It bowed that th proper tep had not b n taken ao-ain t
the acceptor to cliaro-e th m.

^

384 Failure to Make Presentment

Some criticism is made upon the refusal of the court below

to charge, as to which side the burden of proof belonged, in

respect to the question of negligence and want of care, after the

paper came into the hands of the defendant. No objection is

taken to the charge itself, upon this question, and, indeed, could

not have been, as the point was submitted to the jury as favorably

to the defendants as could have been asked. We think the

court, after having submitted fairly the evidence on both sides

bearing upon the question, had a right, in the exercise of its dis-

cretion, to refuse the request.

If, however, the court had inclined to go further, and charge

as to the burden of proof , it should have been that it belonged

to the defendant. The loss of the bill by the bank carried with

it the presu mption of negligenc e and want of care ; and, if it was

capable of explanation, so as to rebut this presumption, the facts

and circumstances were peculiarly in the possession of its officers,

and the defendant was bound to furnish it. Where a peculiar

obligation is cast upon a person to take care of goods intrusted

to his charge, if they are lost or damaged while in his custody,
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the presumption is that the loss or damage was occasioned by his

negligence, or want of care of himself or of his servants. This

presumption arises with respect to goods lost or injured, which

have been deposited in a public inn, or which had been intrusted

to a common carrier. But the presumption may be rebutted.

(Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord

Raymond, 918; Day v. Riddle, 16 Vermont, 48; 1 Phillips on

Evidence, Cowen's & Hill's Notes, p. 633).

Judgment affirmed.

WHEN PRESENTMENT NOT REQUIRED TO CHARGE INDORSER. § 82.

Am. Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros. (See page 420.)

EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO MAKE PRESENTMENT IN DUE TIME. § 83.

Windham Bank v. Norton ct ah (1852), 22 Conn. 211, 56 Am.

Dec. 597. See § 107.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the Windham

Bank, as holders of a bill of exchange, against the defendants,

as indorsers.

The bill of exchange referred to was drawn by George

Hobart, of Norwich, in this state, upon Mansfield, Hall & Stone,

Windham Bank v. Norton et al. 385
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of Philadelphia, and by them accepted, for $417.26; dated Jan-

uary 31, 1849, an(1 payable four months after date, to the order

of the defendants.

The declaration was in the common form, and contained the

usual averments of a due presentment of the bill in question, and

notice of its non-payment. The defendants pleaded the general

issue, and the cause came on for trial, at Brooklyn, October term,

185 1. The facts were found by the court, by agreement of the

parties, as follows : Said bill of exchange was, on the day of its

date, accepted by said Mansfield, Hall & Stone "payable at the

Farmers and Mechanics' Bank," in the city of Philadelphia. On

the day of February, 1849, the defendants procured said

draft to be discounted by the plaintiffs, and then indorsed and

delivered it to them. During the same month of February, the

plaintiffs forwarded said draft, by the United States' mail, to the

Ohio Life and Trust Co., a banking corporation in the city of

New York, for collection, and indorsed the same to their cashier,

as follows : "Pay G. S. Coe, Esq., cashier, or order ;" signed,

"Samuel Bingham, cashier." The bill, so indorsed, was, in a day

or two thereafter, and in due course of mail, received by said
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Ohio Life and Trust Co. The third day of grace, June 3d,

being Sunday, — the draft was actually due and payable on Sat-

urday, June 2. During the year 1849, there were two mails per

day, each way, between New York and Philadelphia, — those for

the latter place, leaving New York, one at nine A. m., the other

at four and a half p. m., and both due at Philadelphia, in five

hours from their departure. The Farmers and Mechanics' Bank

were the Philadelphia correspondents of the Ohio Life and Trust

Co., and communications, by mail, passed between them daily.

On the morning of June 1st, the cashier of the Ohio Life and

Trust Co., inclosed this draft with others, addressed, in the

proper and usual mode, to the Farmers and Mechanics' Bank,

and deposited said letter in the United States' post-office, at the

city of New York, in season for the afternoon mail of that day, ^v

for Philadelphia. That letter was duly deposited in said mail, J ' : ^ N *'

and said mail left New York, and arrived at Philadelphia, in due( *"*". ^ ^

and usual time ; but the mail-bags, containing the letters forL*^ ^x^

Philadelphia, were, by the post-office clerks in the office at New\^ Kj e r v U/N L ^ ~v

York, marked to be forwarded to Washington, and were, there- \ s^^ -^>ZJU

fore, not delivered at Philadelphia, but carried to Washington. l^~**Aa^ "^

At Washington the mistake was discovered, and said mail-bags I

forwarded to Philadelphia, which place they reached in the

course of Sunday, June 3d. On the morning of the next day,

-W/^*^}

of Philadelphia, and by th m ace pted, for 417.26; dated January 31 , l 49, and payabl f ur months aft r date, to the order
of the defendants.
The declaration was in th common form and contained the
usual averment of a du presentment of the bill in question, and
notice of its non-paym nt.
h defendants pl aded the g neral
i ue, and the cau e came on for trial, at rooklyn, October term,
l Sr. Th facts wer found by the court, by agr ement of the
parties, as follow : aid bill of exchange was, on the day of its
date, ace pted by aid Man fi ld, Hall & tone "payable at the
Farmers and M chanics ank," in the city of Philadelphia.
n
the - - day of February, 1849, the defendants procured said
draft to b di count d by the plaintiffs, and th n indorsed and
deliv red it to th m. During the same month of February, the
plaintiff forwarded said draft, by t'he United States' mail, to the
hio Life and Tru t Co., a banking corporation in the city of
New York, for collection, and indorsed the same to their cashier,
as follow : "Pay G. S. oe, Esq., cashier, or order;" signed,
" amuel ingham, cashier." The bill, so indorsed, was, in a day
or two ther after, and in due cour e of mail, received by said
hio Life and Tru t Co. Th third day of grace, June 3d,
being unday,-the draft was actually due and payable on Saturday, Jun 2 . During the year 1849, there were two mails per
day, each way, b tween N w York and Philadelphia,-those fo r
the latter place, 1 aving New York; one at nine A . :M . , the other
at four and a half P. M ., and both due at Philadelphia, in five
hours from their departure. The Farmers and M chanic ' Bank
were th
hiladelphia corre pondents of the Ohio Life and Trust
o., and communication , by mail, pas ed between them dail).
O n the morning of June l t, the cashier of th
hio Life and
Tru t o., inclo ed this draft with other , addressed, in the
proper and usual mode, to the Farmer and Mechanic ' Bank,
and depo ite l said 1 tter in the nited tate p t-offic , at the
- _
city of ew York, in sea on fo r the afternoon mail of that day, ~
for Philad lphia. That Jett r was duly d po ited in aid mail, ~ ~
and said mail left N w York, and arriv l at Philadelphia, in due ~ ~
and usual time; but the mail-bag , containino- the 1 tt r for ~ ~
hiladelphi a, wer , by the po t-offic cl rk in th office at ev ~, ._
York, marked to be forwarded to \ a hington and were, there- ~ ~
fore, not d liver d at Philad lphia , but carri d to \\ a hin ton. ~ ~
t Washin ton tJi mi tak ' a di cover d, and aid mail-bao-s -~
forwarded to Philadelphia, which plac th
r ached in the
°"""' -~ w~,
course of unday, June 3d.
n the mornino- of the n xt day,
••
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said letter, with the draft inclosed, was delivered from the post-

office at Philadelphia, to said Farmers and Mechanics' Bank,

who, by their cashier, refused payment of the same, and between

the hours of nine and ten a. m., of the day, placed said draft in

the hands of a notary public, for protest. Said notary, between

the hours of nine a. m. and three p. m., of said day, presented said

draft at the counter of said bank for payment, and received for

answer from said cashier, that he was ordered by the acceptors

not to pay it, and that had he presented it on Saturday, June 2nd,

he should have given him the same answer. Said notary there-

upon, on said 4th day of June, in due and proper form, protested

said draft, and made out written notices to the drawer, and the

several indorsers, of the non-payment of said draft, and inclosed

said notices, with the notice of protest, in a letter, and on the

same day, deposited the same in the post-office in said Philadel-

phia, duly addressed to George S. Coe, cashier of Ohio Life and

Trust Co., New York, who had indorsed said draft to the Farm-

ers and Mechanics' Bank, and by whom said letter was, in due

course of mail, received. Said Coe, on the same day in which he

received them, inclosed said letter of protest and said notices,
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except the one to himself, in a letter duly addressed to the plain-

tiffs, and deposited the same in the city of New York, in season

for the next mail. The same was, in due course of mail; received

by the plaintiff's, who, on the day of the receipt thereof, inclosed

said notices to the defendants, as indorsers, and said notice to

said drawer (his residence being unknown), in a letter duly

addressed to the defendants, and deposited it in the post-office at

Windham, in season for the next mail, and the same was, in due

course of mail, received by the defendants. Mansfield, Hall &

Stone became insolvent, and suspended payment on the 12th day

of April, 1849, and on the next day, sent to the Farmers and

Mechanics' Bank, the following notice in writing:

"E. N. Lewis, Esq., Cash.

"You will please pay no more notes or drafts drawn by us,

and payable at your bank, until further notice, as they will not

be provided for. Very respectfully yours,

"Mansfield, Hall & Stone."

No further notice was sent, and said bank, from that time

forward, acted upon this order, and refused payment of all notes

or drafts payable at the bank, by said firm. The business hours

of the Philadelphia banks were, in 1849, from nine A. m. to three

p. m. Owing to the miscarriage ofthe United States' ma il, as

said letter, with the draft inclosed, was delivered from the postoffice at hiladelphia, to aid Farmers and Mechanics' Bank,
who, by their cashier, refu ed paym nt of the same, and between
the hour of nine and ten A. M., of the day, placed said draft in
the hands of a notary public, for protest.
aid notary, between
the hours of nine A . M . and three P . M ., of said day, pre ented said
draft at the counter of said bank for payment, and received for
an wer from aid cashier, that he was ord ered by the acceptors
not to pay it, and that had he presented it on Saturday, June 2nd,
he should have given him the same answer. Said notary thereupon, on said 4th day of June, in due and proper form, protested
aid draft, and made ou t written notices to the drawer, and the
several indorsers, of the non-payment of said draft, and inclo ed
said notice , with the notice of protest, in a letter, and on the
same day, deposited the same in the post-office in said Philadelphia, duly addre sed to G orge S. Coe, cashier of Ohio Life and
Tru t Co., ew York, who had indorsed said draft to the Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, and by whom said lette r was, in due
course of mail, received. Said Coe, on the ame day in which he
received them, inclosed said letter of protest and said notices,
except the one to himself, in a letter duly addressed to the plaintiffs, and deposited the same in the city of ew York, in season
for the next mail. The same was, in due course of mail; received
by the plaintiffs, who, on the day of the receipt th ereof, inclosed
said notices to the defendants, as indorsers, and said notice to
said drawer (his residence being unknown), in a letter duly
addre ed to the defendants, and deposite l it in the post-office at
Windham, in season for the next mail, and the same was, in due
course of mail, received by the defendants. Mansfield, Hall &
tone became insolvent, and su. pended payment on thP 12th day
of April, 1849, and on the next day, sent to the Farn1ers and
Mechanics' Dank, the following notice in writing:

"E. N.

LEWIS, EsQ., Cash.
"You will please pay no more notes or drafts drawn by us~
and payable at your bank, until forth r notice, as they will not
be provid d for. Very respectfully yours,
"MAN FIELD, HALL & STONE."

No further notice was sent, and said bank, from that time
fon.vard, acted wpon thi orde r, and refused payment of all notes
or drafts payable at the bank, by said firm. The business hours
of the Philadelphia banks were, in 1849, from nine A. M . to three
P. ~r.
Owing to the miscarriage of the United States' mail, as
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above stated, said draft was not presented for payment, on Sat-

urday, June 2d, wh en it horann- rim*, nnd _was n e ver presen ted for

payment at any other time than on said 4th da^ 7 of June.

It has been the usage of the banks and merchants of the

country, for the last forty years, to make use of the United States'

mail, in forwarding negotiable notes and bills of exchange, for

collection or acceptance. It is the custom of the Windham Bank,

and the four Norwich banks, to forward all paper in their hands,

payable abroad, within five or eight days after it comes into their

hands, without reference to the length of time it has to run.

The questions of law arising upon these facts, and on such

further facts as the jury might rightfully infer, were reserved for

the advice of this court.

Edmund Perkins, for the plaintiffs.

Strong & Foster, for the defendants.

Storrs, J. The defendants first insist, that the averments in

this declaration, of a due presentment of the draft in question

and notice of its non-payment, must be strictly proved, and that

they are not sustained, by proof of the facts set up by the plain-

tiffs, by way of excuse. Whatever may be the course of author-
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ities elsewhere, it is well settled here, that those allegations are

supported by evidence of matter of excuse, or a waiver of demand

above stated, said draft ' a not pr ented for payment, on aturda , Jun 2d, wh n i
d wa never pre ented for
pa ment at any ther time than n aid th da ' o une.
It has b n t 1e u ag of the bank and merchant of the
country, for th la t forty y ar , to mak u e of the Unit d tates'
mail, in forwarding ncgotiabl not and bills of xchang , for
llection or ace ptanc . It i the cu tom of the \Vindham ank,
and the four orwich bank , to forward all paper in th ir hand ,
payable abroad, ' ithin fi
or ight day after it comes int their
hand , without refer nc to th length of time it has to run.
Th que tion of law ari ing upon the fact , and on such
further fa t a th jury might rightfully infer, were reserved for
the ad ic of this court.

Ed111und PerkiJZs) for the plaintiffs.
tro11g & Faster) for the defendants.

and notice. Norton v. Lewis, 2 Conn. R., 479, and Camp v.

Bates, 11 id., 478, are decisive on this point.

The other and more important question in this case is,

whether the plaintiffs are excused for the non-presentment of this

draft for payment, on the day when it became due. The last day

of grace being Sunday, it was payable on the preceding Satur-

day, which was the second day of June, 1849. This question

depends on whether the plaintiffs are chargeable with negligence,

in not presenting it on that day.

If the agent of the plaintiffs, to whom they sent it, to be

forwarded for presentment and collection, and who transacted

this business for them, was guilty of such negligence, it is, of

course, imputable to the plaintiffs. And it is not important to

this question, either that the defendants in fact sustained no dam-

age, by the draft not having been presented for payment, when

it fell due, or that it would not have been paid by the acceptor,

if it had then been presented. The indorser, on a question of

due presentment for payment, is not affected by either of these

circumstances. Nor indeed do the plaintiffs claim to recover,

on either of these grounds.

TORR , J. The defendants fir t insi t, that the averments in
this declaration, of a due pr sentment of the draft in question
and notic of it non-payment, mu t be trictly proved, and that
th y ar not u tain d, by proof of the facts set up by the plaintiff , by ' ay of excu e. Whatever may be the course of author1t1 el ewhere, it is well ettled here, that thos alle ations are
upported by evid nee of matt r of xcu e, or a waiver of demand
and notice. 1' ortoll v. Lewis) 2 onn. R., 479, and Camp v.
Bates, I I id. 47 , are deci ive on this point.
The other and more important question in this case is,
wh th r th plaintiff ar ~ cu ed for the non-pres ntment of this
draft for paym nt, on th day when it became du . The iast day
of o-race beino- unday, it wa payable on the preceding Saturday, ' hi ch wa the econd day of June 1849. Thi question
dep nd on wh ther the plaintiff are charo-eable with neo-ligence,
in not pre ntino- it on that day.
If th ao-ent of th plaintiff , t whom th y ent it to be
f r pr entm nt and coll ction, an who tran act d
thi bu in
for th m, wa o-uilty of uch n gli nc it i , of
cour e, imputabl to th plaintiff .
nd it i not important to
thi que tion either that th d f ndant in fact u tain d no <lama e, by the d raft not ha ino- b en pre nte for pa_ m nt, \ hen
it f 11 du or that it would not ha
b n ai by th ac
tor
if it had then b en pr nt d. The ind r r, on a qu tion of
due p re entm nt for payrn nt, i not aff t cl by ith r f th e
ci rcum tanc . No r indeed do the plaintiff claim to reco r,
on ither of these g round .
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The question of negligence here presented depends on the

inquiry, whether, under the circumstances of this ca se, the delay

of the plaintiffs' agent, in not forwarding this draft to Philadel-

phia, until the last mail left N ew York for that place, on the day

next precedin g that on wh ich the draft fell due, constituted a

want of reasonable or due diligence, in regard to its presentment.

We say, under the circumstances, because there is no positive or"

absolute rule of law, which determines within what precise time

the holder of a bill of exchange must, in all cases whatever, or

at all events, avail himself of the authorized mode of transmis-

sion adopted in this instance, to forward such paper for present-

ment. The general principle, established by all the adjudged

cases, as well as the approved elementary writers, is, that reason-

able diligence in the presentment of a bill for payment, is required

of the holder, and that, therefore, if there has been no want of

such diligence, he is excused. Story on Bills, ch. 10; Chitty on

Bills, ch. 9, 10; Story on Prom. Notes, ch. 7, § 368; Patience v.

Townlcy, 2 Smith's R., 223, 224.

In applying this principle, the general rule is, that it must be

presented for payment, on the very day in which, by law, it
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becomes due, and that, unless the presentment be so made, it is

a fatal objection to any right of recovery against the indorser.

But, although this is the general rule, it is not an universal one,

and prevails only under the qualification, which is really a part

of the rule itself, that there is no negligence or want of reasonable

diligence, in not making such presentment. The whole rule,

therefore, more properly stated, is, that the presentment must be_

on the day on which the bill becomes due, unless-it. is not in the

po wer of then^lder_._bv__the iise IS~reasonable diligence, so to

presentT t By the very statement of this rule, as thus fully

expressed? it is plain that, on the question, whether the holder

is excused on this ground, for not thus presenting it, or, in other

words, whether there was negligence on his part, or a want of

reasonable diligence, no absolute or positive rule can, from the

nature of the case, be laid down, which shall apply under all

circumstances. We have no evidence of any general custom of

merchants, in regard to the precise time, within which mercantile

paper is usually forwarded, in order to be presented for payment,

so that the law merchant furnishes us no guide on this point.

The question of n g lig nee here I resented depends on the
inquiry, whether, under the circurn tances of thi ca e, the delay
of the plaintiffs' agent, m not forwa rding thi draft to Philadelphia, until the last mail left New York for that lace, on the day
n xt pr ceding that on which the draft fell due, cofi'Stitute a
want of rea onable or di~9iE e~e in re ard to it presentme1:;t°
We say, under the circum tances, because there 1s no positive or
absolute rule of law, which determines within what precise time
the holder of a bill of exchange must, in all cases whatever, or
at all events, avail himself of the authorized mode of transmision adopted in this instance, to forward such paper for presentment. The general principle, established by all the adjudged
cases, as well as the approved elementary writers, is, that reasonable dili ence in the resentment of a bill for a ment, is re uired
of the holder, and that, therefore if there has been no want o
such diligence, he is excused. Story on Bills, ch. IO; Chitty on
Bills, c'h . 9, IO; Story on Prom. Notes, ch. 7, § 368; Patience v.
Townley) 2 Smith's R., 223, 224.
In applying this principle, the general rule is, that it must be
presented for payment, on the very day in which, by law, it
becomes due, and that, unless the presentment be so made, it is
a fatal ob jection to any right of recovery against the indorser.
But, although this is the general rule, it is not an universal one,
and prevails only under the qualification, which is really a part
of the rule itself, that there is no negligence or want of reasonable
diligence, in not making such presentment. The whole rule,
therefore, more properly stated, is, that the presentment must be
on the da on which the bill becomes due unles · '
·

And it is clear, that the strict rule of the common law, bv which

an inability to perform t he terms or condition of a contract, b y

reason of inevitable accident or ca sualty, constitutes generally no

excuse for their non-performance, is not applicable to mercantile

present 1t. "By the very statement o this rule, as t us u y
expressed, it i plain that, on t'he question, whether the holder
is excused on this ground, for not thus presenting it, or, in other
wo rds, whether there was negligence on his part, or a want of
reasonable diligence, no absolute or positive rule can, from the
nature of the case, be laid down , which shall apply under all
circumstances. We have no evidence of any general custom of
me rchants, in regard to th e precise time, within which mercantile
paper is usually forward d, in order to be present d for payment,.
so that the law merchant furnish es us no guide on this point.
nd it is clear, that the strict rule of the common law, by which
an inability to perform the terms or condition of a contract. by
reason of inevitable accident or casualt constitutes enerall no
excuse fo r their non-performance, is not applicable to mercantile
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instruments of this description. Therefore, the excuse for non-

presentment in this case, presents the ordinary question of negli-

gence. That question may, and often does, depend on such a

variety of circumstances, or those of such a peculiar character,

that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reduce them to any

fixed or invariable rule. But, in regard to such a question, as

applicable to the non-presentment of a bill or note, when it is

due, it is considered a well settled rule, that such want of pre-

sentment is excused, by any inevitable or unavoidable accident

not attributable to the fault of the holde~r,providecl there is a

presentment by him, as soon afterward alTI ne is able j by which is

intended that class of accidents, casualties or circumstances which

render it morally or physically impossible to make such present-

ment. Judge Story, in speaking of this ground of excuse, says :

"It has been truly observed, by a learned author," referring to

Mr. Chitty, "that there is no positive authority in our law, which

establishes any such inevitable accident to be a sufficient excuse

for the want of a due presentment. But it seems justly and nat-

urally to flow from the general principle, which regulates all

matters of presentment and notice, in cases of negotiable paper.
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The object, in all such cases is, to require reasonable diligence

on the part of the holder; and that diligence must be measured

by the general convenience of the commercial world, and the

practicability of accomplishing the end required, by ordinary skill,

caution and effort." And he cites the remark of Lord Ellen-

borough in Patience v. Townley (2 Smith's R., 223, 224,) that

due presentment must be interpreted to mean, presented accord-

ing to the custom of merchants, which necessarily implies an

exception, in favor of those unavoidable accidents, which must

prevent the party from doing it within regular time. (Story on

Bills, § 258.)

Applying these principles to this case, we are of opinion that

the plaintiffs a re not chargeable with a want of reasonable dili-

gence.

No fault or impropriety is imputable to them, by rea son of

their having selected the pu blic mail T as t he mode of forwarding

the draft in question , to the bank in Philadelphia, where it was

payable. It is properly conceded by the defendants, that such

m ode of t ransmission was in accordance with the general com-

mercial usage and law^ in the case of paper of this description.

Indeed, it is recommended in the books, as the most p ro per mode

of transmissi on, as being the least hazardous, and therefore prefer-

able to a special or private conveyance. But, although the public

instruments of thi d cription. Th
for nonp~esentment in thi ca , pr ent th ordinary qu tion of negligence. That qu tion may, and oft n doe d p nd on such a
variety of circum tance , or tho e of uch a p culiar character,
that it is v ry difficult, if not impo ibl , to r duce them to any
ut, in r ard to uch a question, as
fix d or invariabl rule.
applicabl to th non-pr ntment f a bill or note, when it is
due, it i consider d a well ettled rule, that such want of presentm nt is xcu d, b) an · inevitable or unav i
a i ent
pot a tn U a
0 t1
au t 0 ~ho er, prov1 e
ere lS a
presen m n y Im, a - OOn a ter~r a~ -- e lS a~ by which lS
mten e 1at c a o accident , ca ualties O!" circumstances which
rend r it morally or phy ically impo ibL to make such presentment. Judo-e tory, in peaking of this ground of excuse, says:
"It has be n truly observed, by a learned author," referring to
Mr. hitty, "that th r i no positive authority in our law, which
tabli he any such inevitable accident to be a sufficient excuse
for the want of a du pre entment. But it seems justly and naturally to flow from the general principle, which regulates all
matter of presentment and notice, in cases of negotiable paper.
The obj ct, in all such cases is, to require reasonable diligence
on the part of the holder; and that diligence must be measured
by the general convenience of the commercial \ orld, and the
practicability of accompli hing the end required, by ordinary kill,
nd he cites the remark of Lord Ellencaution and effort."
borough in Patience v. Townley (2 mith's R., 223, 224,) that
due pre entment mu t be interpreted to mean, pre ented according to th cu tom of merchant which nece arily implies an
exception, in favor of tho e unavoidable accident , which mu t
prevent the party from doino- it within reo-ular time. (Story on
Bills § 25 .)
pplying these principle to thi ca , we are of opinion that
the plaintiffs are not chargeable ' ith a want of rea onable dili-

able to a pecial or private conve ·anc .
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mail was a legal and proper mode by which to forward this

paper, it was their duty to use it in such a manner, that they

should not be chargeable with negligence, or unreasonable delay.

If, therefore, they put the draft into the post-office, at so late a

period that, by the ordinary course of the mail, it could not, or

there was reasonable ground to believe that it would not, reach

the place of its destination, in season for its presentment, when

due, we have no doubt that there would be, on their part, a want

of reasonable diligence, which would exonerate the indorser. On

the other hand, to throw the risk of every possible accident, in

that mode of forwarding the draft, upon the holder, where there_

has been no such delay, would clearly be most inconvenient^

unreasonable and unjust, as well as contrary to the expectation^

and understanding of the indorser, who is presumed to be aware

of the general usage and law, in regard to the transmission, by

mail, of this kind of paper, and must therefore be supposed to

require only reasonable diligence in this respect, on the part of

the holder ; and would, indeed, be inconsistent with the rule itself,

which sanctions its transmission in that manner. It has been
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suggested, that the principle should be adopted, that when the

holder resorts to the public mail, he should be required to forward

the presentment, at so early a period, that if by any accident it

should not reach the place of its presentment, in the regular

course of the mail, there should be time to recall it, and have it

presented when and where it falls due ; or that, at least, it should

be forwarded in season to ascertain whether it reached there by

that time, and to make such a demand or presentment for pay-

ment, as is required in the case of lost bills. We find no author-

ity whatever for any such rule, nor would it, in our opinion, com-

port with the principle now well established, requiring only

reasonable dilig ence, on the part of the holder, or with the policy

which prevails in regard to such commercial instruments. It

would, in the first place, be the means of restraining the transfer

of such paper within such a limited time as to impair, if not to

destroy, its usefulness and value, arising out of its negotiable

quality ; and, in the next place, it would, in many cases, be wholly

impracticable. The casualties, incident to this mode of transmis-

sion, are most variou s in their character, a nd can not, of course,

be foreseen ; and they might, in the case of forwarding mercantile

paper, be such as to render it impossible to ascertain its miscar-

riage, or to recall it, in season to remedy the difficulty. In the

case of the draft now before us, for example, if it had been

placed, by the plaintiff's, in the post-office at Windham, where

mail was a legal and proper mode by which to forward this
paper, it was their duty to use it in such a manner, that they
should not be chargeable with negligence, or unreasonable delay.
If, th refore, they put the draft into the post-office, at so late a
period that, by the ordinary course of the mail, it could not, or
there was rea onable ground to b lieve that it would not, reach
the place of it destination, in season for its presentm nt, when
due, we have no doubt that there would b , on their part, a want
of reasonable dilig nee, which would xonerate the indorser. On
the other hand, to throw the risk of every possible accident in
that mode of fo(wardin the draft, u on the holde!:_, where ther_L
has been no such delay, would clearly be most inconvenien_h
unr~aso!!_a_ble ~d unju~as welJ as contrary to the expectatio..£_
~nd_ understanding of the indorser, who is presumed to be aware
of the general u age and law, in regard to ~he transmission, by
mail, of this kind of paper, and mu t therefore be supposed to
require only reasonable diligence in this respect, on the part of
the holder; and would, indeed, be inconsistent with the rule itself,
which sanctions its transmission in that manner. It has been
suggested, that the principle should be adopted, that when the
holder resorts to the public mail, he should be required to forward
the pr sentment, at so early a period, that if by any accident it
should not reach the place of its presentment, in the regular
course of the mail, there should be time to recall it, and have it
presented when and where it falls due; or that, at least, it should
..
be forwarded in season to ascertain whether it reached there by
~ ~ that time, and to make such a demand or pre entment for pay~ ~ ment, as is required in the case of lost bills. \"1 e find no author,_ ~ ity whatever for any such rule, nor would it, in our opinion, com~
port with the principle now well established, requiring only
~
rea onable diliaence, on the part of the holder, or with the policy
~ ~
which prevail 111 regard to such commercial instruments. It
~t..A~
~ ~would, in the first place, be the means of restraining the tran fer
~l... ~
of such paper within such a limited time as to impair, if not to
~ destroy, its usefulne s and value, arising out of its negotiable
~,._u_ quality; and, in the next place, it would, in many cases, be wholly
impracticabl . The casualties, incid nt to this mode of transmision, are most various in their character, an I can not, of course,
be forese n; and they might, m the ca of forwardino- mercantile
paper, be such as to render it impossible to ascertain its miscarriage, or to recall it, in eason to remedy the difficulty. In the
case of the draft now before us, for example, if it had been
placed, by th plaintiff , in the po t-office at Windham, where
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they were located, and transacted their business, for transmission,

direct from thence to Philadelphia, on the very day when they

became the holders of it, which was between three and four

months before it became due, and, by an accident or mistake of

the postmaster in the former place, similar to that which occurred

in this case, at New York, it had been mailed to one of the most

distant parts of our country, or to a foreign country, (which

would not have been more singular, than that it should have been

mistakenly mailed, as in the present case, for Washington,) it

might not have been practicable for the plaintiffs to learn the

accident, or obviate its effect, before the paper fell due. In short,

such a rule as that suggested, would be merely artificial in its

character, productive of great inconvenience and injustice in par-

ticular cases, without any corresponding general benefits, and

change the whole course of business, in regard to a most exten-

sive and important class of mercantile transactions. Nor has any

other arbitrary or positive rule been suggested, which is not

equally obnoxious to the same or similar objections.

The only remaining enquiry is, whether the plaintiffs are

chargeable with negligence, for not forwarding the draft in ques-
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tion, by an earlier mail from New York to Philadelphia. It was

sent by the usual, legal, and proper mode. It was deposited in

the post-office, in season to reach the place where it was payable,

before it fell due, by the regular course of the next mail ; and

there was no reason to believe, that it would not be there duly

delivered. It was actually sent by that mail, and, but for the,

mistak eo f the postmaster where it was mailed, in misdirecting

the package containing it, would have reached its proper destina-

tion, and been received there in season for its presentment, when

due. It in fact reached that place, when it should have done;

but was carried beyond it, in consequence of that mistake. As

that mistake could not be foreseen or apprehended by the plain-

tiffs, it is not reasonable to require them to take any steps to

guard against it . Indeed, they could not have do ne so, as they

had no control or s upervision over the postmaster ! They had a

right to presume, that the latter had done his duty. They could

not know, that he had misdirected the package, until it was too

late to remedy the consequences. The occurrence of the draft

being sent beyond its place of destination, was, therefore, so far

as the plaintiffs were concerned, an unavoidable accident. It

happened, not in consequence of any delay of the plaintiffs, in

putting the draft into the post-office, at so late a period that it

could not, or probably would not, reach its destination in due

they wer located, and transact d their busin ss, for transmission,
dir ct from th nc t l hiladelphia, on th v ry day when they
becam th hold rs of it, which wa between three and four
months befor it b came du , and, by an accid nt or mistake of
the postmaster in th form r place, imilar to that which occurred
in this ca , at N w York, it had b n mailed to one of the most
distant part of our c untry, or to a for ign country, (which
would not have been mor ingular, than that it hould have been
mi takenly mailed, as in the present case, for \N ashington,) it
might not hav b n practicable for the plaintiffs to learn the
accident, or obviate its ffect, before th paper fell due . In short,
uch a rule as that sugg sted, would be merel artificial in its
character, productive of great inconvenience and injustice in particular case , without any corresponding general benefits, and
change the whole cour of business, in regard to a most extensive and important class of mercantile transactions. _No r has any
other arbitrary or po itive rule b en sugge ted, which is not
equally obnoxious to the same or similar objections.
The only remaining enquiry is, whether the plaintiffs are
chargeable with n glig nee, fo r not forwarding the d raft in ques- ,.
ti on, by an a rlier mail from New York to Philadelphia. It was
sent by the usual, legal, and proper mode. It wa depo ited in
the po t-office, in ea on to reach the place where it was payable,
before it fell due, by the regular course of the n xt mail; and
there wa no reasqn t believe, that it would not be there duly
deliv red. It ·was actually sent by that mail, and, but for the
mistake of the po tma t r where it was mailed, in mi directin[
the package containing it, would hav reached it proper de tination, and be n received there in ea on for it pre entment when
due. It in fact reached that plac , wh n it hould have done;
but was carried b yond it, in con equence of that mi take.
s
that mistak could not be foreseen or appr h nd d by the pla~
tiffs, it i not rea onabl to r guire th m to take any tep to
guard again t it. Ind ed, they could not ba
don o, a they
had no control or up rvi ion over the o tma t r. They had a
right to pr sum , t at th latter had don hi duty. Th ) could
not know, that he h ad mi dir cted the packa , until it wa t
late to remedy th e on qu nee . Th o urr n of th drait
being ent b yond it place of de tinati n, wa th refore, o far
a th plaintiff w r cone rned, an unavoidabl a ident. It
happened, not in con qu nee of any d lay f th plaintiff m
putting th draft int the po t-offic , at o lat a p ri od that it
could not, or probably would not, r ach it d . tination in due

392

392 Failure to Make Presentment

F Al LURE

TO MAKE PRE E TME T

e>~N^.- k><j^ season, but merely in consequence of the act of the official to

■»- dJJb^j^^ia, whom it was properly confided, done after it was properly in his

^-a-tX-*^*-©^: charge, by the plaintiffs, for transmission. The accident, more-

over, was of a very peculiar and extraordinary character, and

quite different from those which are ordinarily incident to that

mode of transmission, and against which it would be extremely

difficult, if not impossible, to guard. It would have been equally

liable to occur, at any time, when the draft should have been

^placed in the post-office. It was not ow jn g T in any seri ne, tn de-

fault of the plaintiffs, but solely to that of the postmaster.. Under

these circumstances, we do not feel authorized to impute any

blame or negligence to the plaintiffs. We are, therefore, of

opinion, that judgment should be rendered for the plaintiffs.

In this opinion, the other judges concurred.

Judgment for th e plaintiffs .

Pier et al. v. Heinrichshoffcn (1877), 67 Mo. 163, 29 Am. Rep.

501.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Fisher & Rowejl and Botsford & Williams, for appellants.

Slayback & Haenssler, for respondents.
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Hough, J. This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, as

~· ~

s ason, but merely in cons quence of the act of the official to
l. ~~ w hom it wa
prop rly confided, done after it was properly in his
~~ charge, by th e plaintiff , for tran mi sion. The accid nt, more~~ ove r, wa of a very peculiar and extraordinary character, and
~ .. quite different from those which a re ordi narily incident to that
-..>) ~ mode of tran mis ion, and again t which it would b
extremely
~Q~
difficult, if not impo ible, to guard. It would have been equally
.Q..
YV\. · ....,
liable to occur, at any time, when the draft should have been
~ • ~placed in the po t-office. It was not owing, in any sense, ta the..
~ ~
fault of the plaintiff , but solely to that of the postmaster. Under
~-> ' ~ these circum tances, we do not fee l authorized to impute an y
~ ~ ~ - blame or negliaence to the plaintiffs.
We are, therefore, of
~ ~ opinion, that judgment should be rendered for the plaintiffs.
~~ ~
In this opinion, the other judges concurred.
Judgment [or the plaintiffs.

holders of a negotiable promissory note, against the defendants,

as indorsers thereof. The questions presented for determination

are, whether the plaintiffs used due diligence in making demand

of payment, and gave the requisite notice of non-payment to the

defendants. The facts are as follows: The note in question

matured on the 4th day of July, 1861, and was payable at the

banking house of F. & G. Willins, in the city of St. Paul, Min-

Pier et al. v . H einrichshoffen ( r877), 67 Jlf o. r63, 29 Am. Rep.
501.

nesota. Some time in April, 1861, the plaintiffs delivered the

same to the bank of Cooperstown, at Cooperstown, New York,

for collection. At that time a letter, in due course of mail, would

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

reach St. Paul from Cooperstown, in about six days. The

cashier of the bank of Cooperstown sent the note by mail to its

regular correspondent, the Rank of St. Paul, in the city of St.

Fisher & RoweJ,l and Botsford & Williams, for appellants.
Slay back & Haeussler, for respondents.

Paul, for collection, in ample time, as the cashier stated, for it to

reach its destination by ordinary course of mail, before the matur-

ity of the note. When the letter reached St. Paul, the Bank of St.

Paul had made an assignment, and the envelope having printe d on

HouGH, J. This was an action brought by the plaintiffs, as
holders of a negotiable promissory note, against the defendants,
as indorsers thereof. The questions presented for determination
are, whether th e plaintiffs used due diligence in making demand
of payment, and gave the requisite notice of non-payment to the
defendants. The facts are as follows : The note in que ti on
matured on the 4th day of July, 1861, and was payable at the
banking house of F. & G. Willin , in the city of St. Paul, Minnesota.
ome time in April, 186 1, the plaintiffs delivered the
ame to the bank of Cooperstown, at Cooperstown, New York,
for collection.
t that time a letter, in due cour e of mail, would
reach t. Pau l from Cooper town, in about six days . The
ca hier of th bank of Cooperstown ent the note by mail to its
reaular corre pond nt, the ank of St. Paul, in th e city of St.
Paul, fo r coll ction, in ample time, a the cashier stat d, for it to
reach its de tination by ordinary course of mail, before the maturity of the note. When the letter r ached t. Paul, the Bank of St.
Paul had made an assignment, and the envelope having printed on
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it th e words "From the Dank of Cooperstown," the postmaster at

once returned it to the Bank of Cooperstown, with the indorse-

ment "hank failed." The letter was received by the Cooperstown

Bank in the original envelope, unopened, on the 9th day of July,

1861, and on the same day the note was returned by mail to St.

Paul in a letter directed to F. & G. Willins, who caused it to be

presented and protested on the 15th day of July, 1861, the day on

which it was received.

The defendants contend that there was a want of diligence

in not sending the note in time to guard against such contin-

gencies as the evidence discloses, and that the action of the post-

master in the premises, is no sufficient excuse for the failure to

present for payment on the day of the maturity of the note.

Professor Parsons, in his treatise on Notes and Bills, says :

"Ordinarily any failure to present a note at the proper time, by

reason of the negligence of an agent, would discharge an indorser,

but where the holder makes use of the public mail for the pur-

pose of transmitting the note to the proper p lacein season to~

Lave a legal demand made, and without any negligence on his

part, we should say that he would not lose his remedy on an
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indorser, if through any accident or disorder, or the negligence

or mistake of the postoffice clerks, the note does not reach the

destined place in season to make demand on the very day of

maturity ." Vol. 1, p. 461. In support of his text he cites the

case of Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213, the leading

features of which bear such a striking resemblance to the case

at bar, that we think it proper to present them. The draft in that

case was drawn upon and accepted by xMansfield, Hall & Stone, G-ro^Or, >j»a

of Philadelphia, payable at the Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, in

said city, on the 2d day of June, 1849, anc ^ was indorsed by the

defendants to the plaintiffs in the month of February, 1849.

During the same month the bill was indorsed and delivered to

the Ohio Life and Trust Co., a banking corporation, in the city

of New York, for collection. At that time there were two mails

per day from New York to Philadelphia ; one leaving at 9 a. m.

and one at 4 p. m., both of which were due at Philadelphia five

hours after their departure. The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank

was the Philadelphia correspondent of the Ohio Life and Trust

Co. On the morning of June 1st, the cashier of the Ohio Life

and Trust Co. inclosed this draft with others, properly addressed

to the Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, and deposited said letter

in the postoffice at the city of New York, in time for the afternoon

mail, of that day for Philadelphia. This mail arrived at Phila-

it the words 'From the Dank of Cooper lO\ n, ' the postmaster at
once returned it to th Dank of Cooper town, with the indorsement "bank fail ed." Th letter was received by th Cooperstown
ank in the original envelop , unop ned, on the 9th day of July,
I 61, and on the am day th note wa returned by mail to
t.
aul in a letter dir ct d t F. & G. Willin , who caused it to be
pre ented and prot ted on the 15th day of July, 1861, the day on
which it was received.
The defendants cont nd that there was a want of diligence
in not sending the note in time to guard against such canting ncies a the evidence di clo e , and that the action of the postma ter in the premi es, is no sufficient excuse for the failure to
pre ent for paym nt on the day of the ma~urity of the note.
Prof or ar on , in hi treatise on Notes and Bill , says:
Ordinarily any failure to pre ent a note at the proper time, by
rea on of the neglig nee of an agent, would di charge an indorser,
but where the holder makes use of the public mail for the purpo e of tran mitting the note to the proper place in season to
Eave a legal demand made, and without any negligence on his
part, we hould say that he would not lose his remedy on an
indor er, if through any accident or di order, or the negligence
or mi take of the po toffice clerks, the note does not reach the
destined place in eason to make demand on the very day of
maturity." \ ol. l, p. 46r. In support of his text he cites the
Orton, 22 Conn. 213, the leading
.case of vVindha111. Bank v.
features of which bear uch a striking resemblance to the ca e
at bar, that we think it proper to present them. The draft in that
ca e was drawn upon an l accepted by Mansfield, Hall & Stone,
of Philadelphia, payable at the Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, in
aid city, on the 2d day of June, 1849, and was indorsed by the
defendants to the plaintiff in the month of February 1849.
During the same month the bill was indor ed and delivered to
the Ohio Life and Tru t o., a banking corporation, in the city
t that time there were two mail
of New York, for collection.
per day from New York to Philadelphia· one leaving at 9 A. M.
and one at 4 P. M., both of which were du at Philadelphia five
hour after their departur . Th Farmers' and 'lechanic Bank
wa the Philadelphia corre pondent of th
hi Life and Tru t
Co. On the morning of June l t, the ca hier of the hio Life
and Trust Co. inclo ed this draft with other , properly addre ed
to the Farmers' and M chanic ' ank, and depo ited aid letter
i11 th postoffice at the city of New York, in tim f r the afternoon
mail, of that da for Philadelphia. Thi mail arrived at Phila-
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delphia in due time, but the mail bags containing the letters for

Philadelphia were, by the postoffice clerks in New York, marked

to be forwarded to Washington, and were therefore carried to

the latter place. The mistake was discovered at Washington,

and the mail returned to Philadelphia, reaching there on the 3d

of June, and on the next day, June 4th, payment was demanded

and refused, protest made and notice given. In discussing the

question of negligence, or reasonable diligence, the court said :

"The only remaining inquiry is, whether the plaintiffs are charge-

able with negligence for not forwarding the draft in question,

by an earlier mail from New York to Philadelphia. It was sent

by the usual, legal and proper mode. It was deposited in the

postoffice in season to reach the place where it was payable, before

it fell clue, by the regular course of the next mail, and there was

no reason to believe that it would not be there duly delivered.

It was actually sent by that mail, and, but for the mistake of the

postmaster where it was mailed, in misdirecting the package con-

taining it, would have reached its proper destination, and been

received there in season for its presentment when due. It in

fact reached that place, when it should have done, but was car-
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ried beyond it, in consequence of that mistake. As that mistake

could not have been foreseen or apprehended by the plaintiffs, it

is not reasonable to require them to take any steps to guard

against it. Indeed they could not have done so, as they had no

control or supervision over the postmaster. They had a right to

presume that the latter had done his duty. They could not know

that he had misdirected the package, until it was too late to

remedy the consequences. The occurrence of the draft being sent

beyond its place of destination, was, therefore, so far as the plain-

tiffs were concerned, an unavoidable accident."

We have been referred by defendants' counsel to the case of

^A~-" SchoUeld v. Bayard, 3 Wend. 488 , as being in direct conflict with

w^^e, tr.V*^ the case just cited from Connecticut; but a careful examination

■v^vSjC^jl ^**°-o of the facts in Schofield v. Bayard will show that there is no con-

x*aj^v^*^ flict whatever between the two cases. The latter case contains

j, ^A^a v^u»s( an e i emen t f negligence on the part of the holder, which was

_s_©-u> <x tXyvs aDS e n t from the case of Bank v. Norton, and which is wanting in

,~ jl&>a- v * a ~°^> the case at bar. The facts were, that a bill drawn by a firm in

o' w ~ 2 *" ,/ k ^X New York on a house in Liverpool was accepted supra protest,

Ysjt*Aj-Aft^--c* by a house in London. The bill was sent by the holder, who

resided at Birmingham, to Liverpool for payment, instead of

London, where it was payable. The holder's correspondent at

Liverpool returned the bill in a letter to the holder, with advice

v-

delphia in due time, but the mail bags containing the letters for
Philadelphia were, by the po toffice clerks in ew York, marked
to be forwarded to \Vashin ton, and were therefore carried to
the latter place. The mi take was discovered at \Va hington,
and the mail returned to Philadelphia, reaching th ere on the 3d
of June, and on the next day, June 4th, payment wa demanded
and refu ed, prate t made and notice given . In di cussing the
que ti on of neo-ligence, or reasonable diligence, the court aid:
"The only remaining inquiry i , whethe r the plaintiffs are chargeable with negligence for not forwarding the draft in que tion,
by an earlier mail from ew York to Philadelphia. It was sent
by the u ual, legal and proper mode. It was depo ited in the
postoffice in season to reach the place where it was payable, before
it fell due, by the regular course of the next mail, and there was
no rea on to believe that it would not be there duly delivered.
It was actually sent by that mail, and, but for the mistake of the
po tmaster where it was mailed, in misdirecting the package containing it, would have reached its proper destination, and been
received there in season for its presentment when due. It in
fact reached that place, when it should have done, but was carried beyond it, in consequence of that mistake. As that mi take
could not have been foreseen or apprehended by the plaintiffs, it
is not reasonable to require them to take any steps to guard
against it. Indeed they could not have done so, as they had no
control or supervision ove r the postmaster. They had a right to
presume that the latter had done his duty. They could not know
that he had misdirected the package, until it was too late to
remedy the consequences. The occurrence of the draft being sent
beyond its place of destination, was, therefore, so far as the plaintiffs were concerned, an unavoidable accident."
We have been referred by defendants' counsel to the ca e of
,..._ ~
~chofield v. Bayard, 3 Wend. 488, as being in direct conflict with
~ ~ ~ the ca e ju t cited from Connecticut; but a careful examin:ition
~ ~o f the facts in Schofield v. Ba,y ard wi ll how that there is no con~ flict whatever between the two cases. The latter case contains
c:r ~ \)J'\..11\ an element of negligence on the part of the holder, which was
~ °< v..,_,. ab ent from the ca of Bamk v. Norton, and which is wanting in
~ ~ the case at bar. The facts "'ere, that a bill drawn by a firm in
~0 6\ New York on a house in Liverpool was accepted supra protest,
~ by a house in London. The bill was sent by the holder, who
re ided at Birmingham, to Liverpool for payment, instead of
London, where it was payable. The holder's correspondent at
Liverpool returned the bill in a letter to the holder, with advice
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that the presentation should be made in London, and the letter

was put in the postoffice, but by some oversight of the clerks in

the postoffice, it did not get to Birmingham in time for the holder

to forward it to London and have a regular demand made. It

was held that the drawers were discharged. The court said :

"This case presents no impossibility, if due diligence had been

used. The plaintiff should not have sent the bill to Liverpool at

all. It is true that after the leter containing it had been left at

Liverpool, on the ioth of November, it could not have reached

London in season ; but it was the fault of the plaintiffs to have

parted with the bill in the manner they did. Instead of sending

it to Liverpool, they should have sent it to London, and then it

would have been in season, and probably would have been paid.

I am of the opinion that, by the law merchant payment should

have been demanded in London on the 12th of November, and

that not having been done, and there being no impossibility to

prevent it but what is attributable to the want of due diligence

on the part of the holders, the defendants are legally discharged,

and are entitled to judgment." It will be seen that the court

places its judgment expressly upon the ground that the holder
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was guilty of negligence in sending the bill to Liverpool, and

this fault of his produced the impossibility by virtue of which he

claimed to be discharged. In the present case the letter contain-

ing the note was not misdirected; it was properly directed ; it

actually reached St. Paul in time, and but for its unau thorized"

return~py" the postmaster, the probabilities are that some agent

or representative of the suspended bank would have received it

in time to make due presentment, as the testimony tends to show

that the representatives of the bank continued to receive letters

address ed_ to it, after its suspension. The holders therefore e xer-

cised due diligence in sending the note when they did ; its arrival

in time demonstrates that fact; and they were not require d to

makeprovision in advance fo r a possible, but unanticipated sus- L

pWiorrol the bank " of St. Taul before arrival of their letter*

O Ttoran^nwarrantable interference with the sam e bv the public

^cerjin^Harg e~of~The : 7n^ils l after its arrival "vVe are of the"

opimonr therefore, that under the circumstances of this case, the

demand was seasonably made.

Objections are also made to the notice which was given by

the notary. The certificates of protest are as follows: "Due

notices of the foregoing presentment, demand, refusal and pro-

test were put into the postoffice at St. Paul, as aferosaid, and

directed a9 follows: Notice for Katharina Ambs, directed St.

that the pr sentation sh uld b made in London, and the lett r
was put in th po toffic , but by om ov rsight of the clerks in
the postoffic , it <lid not g t to Birmingham in tim for th holder
to forward it to London and hav a r gular demand made. It
was held that th e draw rs w re di charged. The court aid:
''This cas pr ents no impo ibility, if due diligence had been
used. The plaintiff should not have ent the bill to Liverpool at
all. It is tru that aft r the 1 ter containing it had been left at
Liverpool, on the rnth of ov mber, it could not have reached
London in sea on; but it was the fault of th plaintiffs to have
parted with the bill in the manner they did. Instead of sending
it to Liverpool, they should have sent it to London, and then it
would have b en in season, and probably would have been paid.
I am of the opinion that, by the law merchant payment should
have been demanded in London on the 12th of ovember, and
that not having been done, and there being no impossibility to
prevent it but what is attributable to the want of due diligence
on the part of the holders, the d fendants a re legally discharged,
and are entitled to judgment." It will be seen that the court
place its judQ'!Tlent expressly upon the ground that the holder
was guilty of negligence in sending the bill to Liverpool, and
this fault of hi produced the impo sibility by virtue of which he
claimed to be discharged. In the present case the letter containing the note was not mi directed; it was properly directed; it
actually reached St. Paul in time, and but for its unauthorized
return by the o tma t r, the robabilities are that some ao-ent
or repr ntativ of the suspended bank would ·1ave received it
in time to make due pre entm nt, as the te timony tend to show
that the repre entative of the bank continued to recei
er;
ad ress to 1t, after it u p n ion . Th hold r therefore exercised due dilig nee in sending the note when they did; it arrival
in tim demon trate that fact; and they ' ere not required to
mak
rovision in advanc for a o ible but unanbc1 ated ust.
ul b for arrival of th 1r

opinion, ere ore, that under the circum tanc
demand was ea onably made.
Objections are also made to the notic ' hich a given by
the notary. The certificat s f prote t are a follO\
Due
notices of the foregoing pre ntm nt, d mand refu al and protest were put into the po toffice at t. au l, a afero aid and
directed as f !lows: Notice for Katharina Amb dir cted St.
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Louis, Mo. : Notice for W. and R. Heinrichshoffen, directed St.

Louis, Mo." And the notary testified, "1 personally mailed such

notices in the postoffice on the 15th day of July, A. D. 1861."

The objection is that he did not say that he had prepaid the

postage; and the court instructed the jury that this was neces-

sary. This objection is rather hypercritical. The word mailed,

as applied t o a letter, means that the letter was properly prepared

fo F transmission by the servants of the postal department, and

tha t it was put in t he_custod y of the of ficer charged with the duty

of~~forwarding the~maiT Indeed the words "put into the post-

offic e," as used by the notary, have a technical significance which

is well defined; an d jth ey are commonly employed to designate

the dut y of the holder in giv ing notice. Since the enactment of

the laws requiring all mail matter to be prepaid, these words have

been used by this court in the sense of mailed. Renshaw v.

Triplett, 23 Mo. 220; Sanderson v. Reinstadlcr, 31 Mo. 485. In

Story on Promissory Notes, § 328, (Ed. 1859,) it is said, "all

that the law requires of the holder is due diligence to send the

notice within the proper time ; and he has done his whole duty,

when he puts it into the proper postoffice in due season, and it
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is properly directed. The holder has no control over the acts,

or operations, or conduct of the officers of the postoffice, and is

not responsible for the accident or neglect which may prevent a

due delivery of the notice to the party entitled to notice." It

sufficiently appears in the present case that the notice was prop-

erly directed. The evident and only meaning of the notary's

certificate is that the notice was mailed to the defendants at St.

Louis, Mo.

The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.

All concur. Reversed.

WAIVER OF PRESENTMENT AND DEMAND. § 84 — 3.

Ross v. Hurd, imp. {1877), 71 N. Y. 14.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court, in the third judicial department, entered upon an order

denying a motion for a new trial, and directing judgment on a

verdict.

This was an action upon a promissory note made by defend-

ant Kingsbury, and indorsed by defendant Hurd for the accom-

modation of the maker. Hurd alone defended.

Louis, l\lo. : Notice for vV. and R. Ileinrichshoff n, directed St.
L oui , Mo."
nd th notary te tifi d, "I per onally mailed uch
n tice in the po toffice on the 15th day of July, A. D. I Gr."
Th objection i that he did not ay that he had prepaid the
po tage; and the court in tructed the jury that this was necesary. Thi objection i rather hypercritical. The word mailed,
a applied to a letter, means that the letter was properly prepared
f r tran 1111 ion b the ervants of the postal department, and
that it wa ut in the cu tod of the officer c 1ar e wit t e u y
o forwarding the mail. Indeed the words "put into the postoffice," as used by the notary, have a technical significance which
i well defined; and they are commonly employed to designate
the duty of th holder in g ivi£a notice. Since the enactment of
the law requirin all mail matter to be prepaid, these words have
been u ed by this court in the sense of mailed. Renshaw v.
Triplett, 23 l\Io. 220; Sanderson v. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 485. In
tory on Promissory otes, § 328, (Ed. 1859,) it is said, "all
that the law require of the holder is due diligence to send the
notice within the proper time; and he has done his whole duty,
when he puts it into the proper postoffice in due season, and it
is properly directed. The holder has no control over the acts,
or operations, or conduct of the officers of the postoffice, and is
not responsible for the accident or neglect which may prevent a
due delivery of the notice to the party entitled to notice." It
sufficiently appears in the present case that the notice was properly directed. The evident and only meaning of the notary's
certificate is that the notice was mailed to the defendants at St.
Louis, Mo.
The judg11ient will be reversed and the cause remanded.
All concur.
Reversed.

~~,

WAIVER OF PRESE TTMENT AND DEMAND.

Ross v . Hurd, inip. (1877), 71 N. Y. 14.
Appeal from judgment of the Gen ral T rm of the Supreme
Court, in the third judicial department, nt red upon an order
denying a motion for a new trial, and directing judgment on a
verdict.
This wa an action upon a promissory note made by defendant King bury, and indorsed by defendant Hurd for the accommodation of the maker. Hurd alone d fended.
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The evidence is sufficiently set forth in the opinion. The

court at the close of the evidence nonsuited the plaintiff, to which

plaintiff's counsel duly excepted.

/. McGuire, for appellant.

E. Countryman, for respondent.

Th
videnc i uffi i ntly
t forth m the opinion. The
cou rt at the clo of th vid nc non uit d th plaintiff, to which
plaintiff' coun el duly xc pt d.

Andrews, J. There was no demand or notice of non-pay-

ment of the note when it became due, and the plaintiff was nol

relieved from the necessity of making a demand and giving notice,

J. McGuire, for appellant.
E. Countryma11, for re pond nt.

by what occurred between the plaintiff and the defendant, at the

Tnterview on the first or second day of November. 1872 . before

the maturity of the note.

The evidence is that Kingsbury, the maker of the note, a few

days before that time, had applied to the plaintiff to extend the

time of payment ninety days, and the plaintiff consented to do so,

if the note was kept good and secure. The plaintiff afterwards

went to the bank and had the interview spoken of with the defend-

ant. He informed the defendant of what had occurred between

him and Kingsbury, and stated that he had come to make some

arrangement with regard to the note. The plaintiff testifies : "I

stated to him (Hurd) that I could let him (Kingsbury) have the
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money longer, if he kept it well secured or kept the note good (I

don't recollect the exact words I used to him) ; and he said he

guessed that could be fixed, and he would get Kingsbury in, or

I was to, and I went out to look for him." The plaintiff then left

the bank to find Kingsbury, but did not find him, and later in the

afternoon returned to the bank to see the defendant ; but, not find-

ing him there, went away and did not see him again until after

the note fell due. It is inferable, from this evidence, that the

defendant was willing to continue his liability as indorser, but it

was left to be arranged at an interview to be had between all the

parties. There was no request by Hurd that the plintiff would

extend the time of payment of the note, nor was anything said by

him which would justify the plaintiff in believing that he would

dispense with demand and notice, or which was calculated to mis-

lead the plaintiff. The conversation clearly contemplated a new

and substituted arrangement to be made before the note matured

for continuing the loan. The plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled

to recover, on the theory that this transaction dispensed with the

necessity of protest. It is quite evident, however, that the plaintiff

either did not understand that demand, and notice was necessary

to charge an indorser, or supposed that what occurred between

him and the indorser, on this occasion, made a protest unneces-

ANDREWS, J. Th re wa n demand or notice of non-paym nt of the note when it becam due, and the plaintiff wa noL
relieved from the n ce it f makin a d 1 and and ivin notice
by vvhat occurr d between the plaintiff and the defendant, at the
Tutervi w on tl1fir t or cond da of ovember
, before
the maturity of th note.
Th evid nc i that King bury, the maker of the note, a few
day b fore that time, had appli d to the plaintiff to extend the
time of paym nt nin t day , and the plaintiff consented to do so,
if the note was kept good and ecure. The plaintiff afterwards
w nt to the bank and had the inter iew poken of with the defendant. H inform d the defendant of what had occurred between
him and King bury, and tated that he had come to make some
arrangement with reaard to the note. The plaintiff testifie : 'I
tat d to him ( urd) that I could let him (King bury) hav the
money longer, if he kept it well secured o.r kept the note good (I
don't recollect the exact words I u ed to him) ; and he aid he
gue ed that could be fixed, and he would get King bury in, or
I wa to, and I went out to look for him. ' The plaintiff then left
the bank to find King bury, but did not find him, and later in the
afternoon returned to the bank to ee the d fendant; but, not find ina him there, went away and did not ee him again u ntil afte r
th not fell du . It i inf rabl , from this e idence that the
defendant \Vas willin to continue his liability as indor er, but it
wa left to be arranged at an int rview to b had between all the
parties. There was no r qu t by Hurd that the plintiff would
extend th time of payment f th note, nor wa anything aid by
him which wo uld ju tify the plaintiff in beli vina that he would
di pen with d mand and notic , or ' hich ' a calculated to mi lead the plaintiff . T he conv r ation clear!) contemplated a ne'
and sub tituted arrang m nt t b mad b for th not matured
for continuing th e loan. T h plaintiff, ther fo r , wa not ntitl d
to recov r, on the th ory that thi tran a tion di pen d ' ith the
n cessity of prot t. I t i quit vid nt, hO\ ev r, that the plaintiff
either did not und er tand th at d mand, and notice wa nee ary
to charae an indor er or uppo d that what occurred beb een
him and th indors r, on thi s occa ion, mad a prot t unneces-
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sary. He waited until the expiration of the second ninety days,

and then went to the bank, with Kingsbury, and had a second

interview with Hurd ; and the liability of Hurd, in this action,

depends upon what took place on that occasion. Kingsbury

desired a still further extension of ninety days, and he procured

from the bank (the defendant, Hurd, counting out the money for

him) the sum necessary to pay the interest on the note to that

time, and paid it to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff then spoke to

Hurd about the extension of time, and Hurd replied : "You and

Kingsbury can fix that about as you are a mind to." The testi-

mony proceeds as follows: "He (Kingsbury) asked how I (plain-

tiff) would fix it ; whether I would have a new note, or what ;

and I told him if both parties agreed I would let the note stand

/ just as it was; and Hurd turned around from us, and said, (then I

^-jp^ J I will waive protest.)' This closed the conversation, and the plain-

tiff left the bank, and waited until the expiration of ninety days

from that time, when he called upon the defendant, and informed

him that the note was due, and that he would have to collect it ;

and soon after, the defendant claimed that the note had not been

protested, and declined to pay it.
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Upon these facts the question is presented, whether the non-

suit was properly granted. When the parties met at the bank, on

the second occasion referred to, Hurd had been discharged from

his liability as indorser, by the neglect of the plaintiff to take the

steps necessary to fix his liability. But it was competent for the

defendant to waive the objection arising from the plaintiff's laches,

and to renew and continue his liability as indorser, and debar him-

self from setting up, when sued on the note, the want of protest

as a defense. If an indorser, with full knowledge of the laches of

the holder in neglecting to protest a note or bill, unequivocally

assent s to continue his liability, or to be responsible, as though

due protest had been made, he is held to have waived the right to

o fjject, ario Twill sta nd in the same position as Ifhe had been regu-

larly charged by" presentment, demand and notice. This assent

must be clearly established, and will not be inferred from doubtful

or equivocal acts or language. It has been frequently held that a

promise bv__the indorser to pay the note or bill, after he has been

discharged by the failure to protest it, will bind the indorser, pro-

vided he had full knowledgeTof the laches when the promise was

rnade^ (Trimble v. Thome, 16 J. R., 152; Sto. on Prom. Notes,

§§ 359> 362, and cases cited). A promise, made under these cir-

cumstances, affords the clearest evidence that the indorser does

not intend to take advantage of the laches of the holder; and the

sary. He waited until the expiration of the second ninety days,
and th en went to the bank, with Kingsbury, and had a second
interview with Hurd; and the liability of Hurd, in this action,
depends upon what took place on that occasion. Kingsbury
de ired a till forth r extension of ninety day , and he procured
from the bank (the defendant, Hurd, counting out the money for
him) the sum nece sary to pay the interest on the note to that
time, and paid it to the plaintiff; and the plaintiff then spoke to
Hurd about the extension of time, and Hurd replied: "You and
Kingsbury can fix that about as you are a mind to." The testimony proceeds as follows: "He (Kingsbury) asked how I (plaintiff) would fix it; whether I would have a new _note, or what;
.
and I told him if both parties agreed I would let the note stand
...,_~just as it was; and Hurd turned around from us, and said,(then I
~~b
f will waive protest)' This clo ed the conversation, and the plaintiff left the bank, and waited until the expiration of ninety days
from that time, when he called upon the defendant, and informed
him that the note was due, and that he would have to collect it;
and soon after, the defendant claimed that the note had not been
protested, and declined to pay it.
Upon these facts the question is presented, whether the nonsuit was properly granted. When the parties met at the bank, on
the second occasion referred to, Hurd had been discharged from
his liability as indorser, by the neglect of the plaintiff to take the
steps necessary to fix his liability. But it was competent for the
defendant to waive the objection arising from the plaintiff's laches,
and to renew and continue his liability as indorser, and debar himself from setting up, when sued on the note, the ~want of protest
as a defense. If an indorser, with full knowledge of the laches of
the holder in neglecting to protest a note or bill. unequivocally
assents to continue his liability, or to be respon ible, as though
due protest had been made, he is held to have waived the ri ht to
o Ject, an w1 stan m the same position as if he had been regularly charged by presentment, demand and notice. This assent
must be clearly established, and will not be inferred from doubtful
or equivocal acts or language. It has been frequently held that a
promise by th indor er to pay the note or bill, after he has been
discharged by the failure to protest it, will bind the indorser, rovided 1e 1a u
now edge of the !aches when the promise was
!!)_ad ~ (Trimble v. Thorne, 16 J. R., 152; Sto. on Prom. Notes,
§§ 359, 362, and case cited).
promi e, made under these circum tances, affords the clearest evidence that the indorser does
n ot intend to take advantage of the laches of the holder; and the
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law, without any new consideration moving 1 between the parties,

gives effect to the promise. The assent of the indorser to be

bound, notwithstanding he has not been duly charged, may be

established by any transaction between him and the holder, which

clearly indicates this purpose and intention. In Duryee v. Denni-

son (5 J. R., 248), the action was against an indorser who had

not been regularly charged by demand and notice. No demand

of payment was made until the day after the note became due. To

avoid the defense based on this ground, it was shown that, after

the note became due, the attorney for the plaintiff called on the

defendant and informed him of the non-payment by the maker,

and that the plaintiff looked to him for payment. The defendant

was told at the same time that the demand and notice was irregu-

lar, but the defendant "agreed to consider the demand and notice

as made in due time, and himself liable as indorser." The court

held, that this was equivalent to a promise of payment, and author-

ized a verdict for the plaintiff. Kent, Ch. J., said : "We are of

opinion that the testimony of Aiken, as given at the trial, was

sufficient to support the verdict. The law is now settled that if

an indorser has not had regular notice of non-payment by the
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drawer, yet if, with knowledge of that fact, he makes a subse-

quent promise to pay, it is a waiver of the want of due notice, and

assumpsit will lie."

In the case at bar, we think the jury would have been author-

ized to find that the defendant, with knowledge of the fact that

the note had not been protested, consented to be liable as indorser

upon the note, and that his indorsement should stand as security

to the plaintiff; and also the further fact that the plaintiff, in

consideration of this consent, agreed to extend the time of pay-

ment of the note, and that such consent was given to induce such

extension, without exacting a new security. In construing the

transaction, the jury were entitled to consider the surrounding

circumstances. The defendant was a banker, and familiar, as may

be presumed, with the rules regarding the protest of commercial

paper. His words, "I will waive the protest, then," had no sig-

nificance, unless they were intended to remove the objection aris-

ing from the prior laches of the holder, in neglecting to protest

the note at maturity. He intended, as is manifest, to continue

his liability as indorser for the security of the plaintiff. He

seemed to be willing to become obligated on a new instrument, or

to renew his liability on the old one, as the plaintiff and Kings-

bury should arrange. And the plain inference jrom_the_ f on vpr-

sation is, that the plaintiff consented to let the old note stand, on

law, without any new consid ration moving between the parties,
gives effect to the promise. The as ent of th indor er to be
bound, notwith tanding he ha not been duly charged, may b
e tablished by any tran action b tw en him and the holder, which
clearly indicates this purpo e and intention. In Duryee v. Dennison ( 5 J. R., 248), the action was again t an indorser who had
not been regularly charg d by d mand and notice. No demand
of payment was mad until th day after the note became due. To
avoid the defen e based on this ground, it was shown that, after
the note became due, the attorney for the plaintiff called on the
defendant and informed him of the non-payment by the maker,
and that the plaintiff looked to him for payment. The defendant
wa told at the same time that the demand and notice was irregular, but the defendant ' agreed to con ider the demand and notice
as made in due time, and himself liable as indorser." The court
held that this was equivalent to a promis of payment, and authorized a verdict for the plaintiff. Kent, Ch. J., said: "We are of
opinion that the testimony of Aiken, a given at the trial, was
sufficient to support the verdict. The law is now settled that if
an indor er has not had regular notice of non-payment by the
drawer, yet if, with knowledge of that fact, he makes a subsequent promi e to pay, it is a waiver of the want of due notice, and
a sumpsit will lie."
In the case at bar, we think the jury would have been authorized to find that the defendant, with knowledge of the fact that
the not had not b en prot ted, consented to be liable as indorser
upon the note, and that his indorsement should stand as security
to the plaintiff; and also the further fact that the plaintiff, in
con ideration of this consent, agr ed to extend the time of payment of the note, and that such con ent was given to induce such
exten ion, without exacting a new ecurity. In construino- the
tran action, the jury were entitled to con ider the urrounding
ci rcumstances. The defendant wa a banker, and familia r as may
be presumed, with the rule reo-arding the prote t of commercial
paper. H is wo rds, " I will waiv the prot t then" had no io-nificance unle s th y were intende to remove the objection ari ino- from the prior laches of the holder in ne lecting t protest
the note at maturity. He intended, as i manife t, to continue
curity of th plaintiff. He
his liabilit) as indorser for the
eemed to be willing to become oblio-ated on a new instrument, or
to renew his liability on the old one, a the plaintiff and K in sbur hould arrange. And the lain inf r nee from t
sation is, that the plaintiff consented to 1 t the old note tand, on
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consideration that the defendant continued liable thereon : and the

defen dant's declaration could mean nothing less than that he

woul d make no quest ion as to the protest of the note , or as to his

liability as an indorse?] This case is stronger in reason, for hold-

ing the indorser, than where there is a simple promise to pay after

maturity. The transaction here, not only indicates an intention

on the part of the indorser to remain bound, notwithstanding his

discharge, but the waiver of the laches of the plaintiff was the

consideration for the extension, given by the plaintiff to the

maker.

The nonsuit was improperly granted, and the judgment

should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.

All concur, except Folger and Miller, JJ., absent.

Judgment reversed.

y. In re Swift (iqoi), 106 Fed. 65.

In Bankruptcy.

Bancroft G. Darns, for Foreman, an objecting creditor.

Elder, Wait & Whitman, for Burleigh.

Lowell, District Judge. Under St. Mass. 1898, c. 533,

§§ 63, 64, Hodges was an indorser of the note in question. By

con ideration that the defendant continued liable thereon; an the
mean nothing less t an that he
defendant's dec~on cou
\Nould make no u stion as to the prot st of the n t , or as to his
his ca is stronger m reason for holdliability as an indorser.
ing the indorscr, than where there is a imple promi to pay after
maturity. The tran action here, not only indicat s an intention
on the part of the indorser to remain bound, notwithstanding hi
discharge, but the waiver of the !aches of the plaintiff was the
consideration for the extension, given by the plaintiff t6 the
maker.
The nonsuit was improperly granted, and the judgment
should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
All concur, except FOLGER and 1ILLER, JJ., absent.
Judgment reversed.
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sections 70 and 82 of the same act, presentment for payment was

necessary to charge him as indorser, "except as herein otherwise

provided." The first exception relied on by the creditor is found

in section 79 : "Presentment for payment is not required in order

to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require

)<

In re Swift (1901), I06 Fed. 65.

that the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument." The appeal-

ing creditor of the joint estate contends that section 79 applies

In Bankruptcy.

only to the drawer of a bill of exchange, and not to the indorser

of a promissory note. In some cases it is said or assumed that

the rights of a drawer of a bill of exchange regarding demand

Bancroft G. Davis, for Foreman, an objecting creditor.
Elder, Wait & Whitman, for Burleigh.

and notice are the same as those of an indorser of a promissory

note (see Bank v. Fulmcr, 3 Pa. St. 399), but it is at least doubt-

ful if the assumed identity governs the construction of a statute

like that before the court, where the words drawer, maker,

indorser, etc., appear to be used in their discriminated sense. It

is not necessary to decide this point, in view of the construction

put upon other sections of the act.

The second exception insisted upon is that found in section

82: "(3) By waiver of presentment, express or implied." No

LOWELL, District Judge. Under St. Mass. 1898, c. 533,
§§ 63, 64, Hodges was an indorser of the note in question. By
secti'Ons 70 and 82 of the same act, presentment for payment was
necessary to charge him as indorser, "except as herein otherwise
provided." The first exception relied on by the creditor is found
in section 79: "Presentment for payment is not required in order
to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require
hat the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument." The appealing creditor of the joint estate contends that section 79 applies
only to the drawer of a bill of exchange, and not to the indorser
of a promissory note. In some cases it is said or a surned that
the rights of a draw r of a bill of exchange regarding demand
and notice are the same a those of an indorser of a promissory
note (see Banli v. F1t.l111er, 3 Pa. St. 399), but it i at least doubtful if the assumed identity governs the construction of a statute
like that before the court. where th words drawer, maker,
indorser. etc., appear to be used in their di criminated sense. It
is not n cessary to de ide this point, in view of the construction
put upon other sections of the act.
The second exception in isted upon is that found in section
82: " ( 3) By waiver of presentment, express or implied." No
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express waiver is here shown, and the case turns upon the exist-

ence or absence of waiver implied from the facts agreed by the

parties and stated by the referee. St. Mass. 1898 is intended to

supersede all other statutes relating to promissory notes, and, as

it does not purport merely to rearrange statutes previously exist-

ing, there is no strong presumption that any one of its provisions

is merely a codification of the law previously existing. When it

attaches certain results to an implied waiver of demand, however,

a court called upon to define such waiver may appropriately look

at definitions of the term previously established. When the

legislature of Massachusetts used the words, "waiver of present-

ment, express or implied," it may be supposed to have used these

words in the meaning consistently attributed to them by the

courts of Massachusetts. In Kent v. Warner, 12 Allen, 561, 563,

Mr. Justice Foster said, in delivering the opinion of the supreme

court :

"Strictly speaking, a waiver is an intentional relinquishment

of a known right ; but where the indorser of a note by words or

acts has in fact misled and put the holder off his guard and

reasonably induced him to omit due presentment for payment and
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jiotice of nonpayment, he is deemed in law to have waived the

performance of these ceremonies, because it would be inconsistent

with good faith on his part to insist upon a condition compliance

with which had been prevented by his own conduct."

That which puts the hokkr off his guard is said to be waiver,

in other cases, among them Gordon v. Par melee, 15 Gray, 413,

422; Armstrong v. Chadwick, 127 Mass. 156.

Do the facts stated in the referee's certificate establish that

the holder of th e note was reasonably put off his guard by the

acts of Hodges ? I think they do. Hodges was liable on the note

both as maker and indorser. About a week before maturity he

consulted with the holder regarding a general assignment of the

firm and its partners, which assignment was made as a result

of the consultation. The note was discussed, and Hodges told)

the holder that neither the firm which made the note, nor he[

himself, the partner who had indorsed it, could pay it at maturity./

It is not necessary to decide that, where the maker and indorser

of a note are quite separate persons, the bare statement by the

indorser that the maker will not pay operates to. excuse demand.

Here the maker an d i ndorser were, in an important sense, the

same person . Hodges said, in effect, "I cannot pay you this note

either as maker or as indorser." Doubtless he might have added,

"In spite of the fact just stated, I require you to go through the

express waiver is here shown, and th case turns upon the existnce or absence of waiver implied from the fact agreed by the
partie and tated by th r fer .
t. Ma . 1898 i intended to
supersede all other statut relating to promi sory notes, and, as
it doe not purport m rely t r arrange tatut s previou ly existino-, ther is no stron pre umption that any on of its provisions
is merely a codification of th law pr viou ly xi ting. \Vhen it
attache certain re ults to an implied waiver of demand, however,
a court called upon to d fine such waiv r may appropriately look
at definition of the t rm previously establi hed. \:Vhen the
legi lature of fas achusetts used the words, "waiver of presentment, expre s or implied," it may be supposed to have u ~ ed these
words in the meaning consistently attributed to them by the
courts of Ma achus tts. In Kent v. Warner, 12 Allen, 561 563,
Mr. Justice Fo ter said, in delivering the opinion of the supreme
court:
" trictly speaking, a waiver is an intentional relinqui shment
of a known right; but where the indorser of a note by words or
acts has in fact misled and put the holder off his guard and
reasonably induced him to omit due resentment for a ment and
..QQ.tice o nonpayment, he is deemed in law to have waived the
performance of these ceremonies, because it would be inconsistent
with good faith on his part to insist upon a condition compliance
with which had been prevented by his own conduct."
That which puts the holder off his guard is said to be waiver,
in other ca es, among them Gordon v. Parmelee, 15 Gray, 413,
422; Armstrong v. Chadwick, 127 Mass. 156.
Do the facts tated in the referee's certificate establish that
the holder of the note was reasonably put off his o-uard v
act of Hodge ? I think the; do. Ho ge wa liable on the note
both a maker and indor er.
bout a week before maturity he
con ulted with the holder regarding a g neral a signment of the
firm and its partners which a si nment was made as a result
of the con ultation. The note was di cu ed, and Hodge told/
the holder that neither th firm which made the note nor he
himself, the partner who had indorsed it could pay it at maturit .
It is not necessary to decide that, vvher the maker and indorser
of a note are quite separate per on th bar tatement b; the
indorser that the mak r will not pay operates to xcu e demand.
Here the maker and indor er were, in an important en e. the
ame p r on. Hod e aid in effect, I cannot pa) you thi note
either as maker or as indorser." Doubt]
h mi ht have added,
"In spite f the fact ju t tated I requ ir you to go thr-0uah the
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useless ceremony of demanding payment." Had he said this,

there would have been no waiver; but, in the absence of such a

reservation, I think that the holder reasonably understood him

to waive the useless ceremony. Upon this understanding the

holder acted. It should be noticed that Hodge s and his creditor

were not dealing at arm's length, or as opposing parties, but

were conferring about the general condition of Hodges' affairs.

In construing a term found in a statute of Massachusetts,

and previously defined in Massachusetts decisions, it may be suf-

ficient to refer to those decisions. As the statute in question is

intended to introduce uniformity into the laws of the several

states, it would be unfortunate, however, if the Massachusetts

decisions concerning waiver of demand were opposed to a great

weight of authority elsewhere, and to the law merchant as gen-

erally laid down. I do not find that opposition exists. The defi-

nitions in 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. (4th Ed.) § 1103, and in 2 Pars.

Notes & B. (2d Ed.) p. 582, are similar to those declared by the

supreme court of Massachusetts. In Bank v. Dill, 5 Hill, 403, no

waiver of demand was understood by the creditor at the time

the alleged waiver took place. It was set up as an afterthought
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to excuse a mistake concerning the date of the note. When the

holder was asked by the indorser why the note had not been pre-

sented for payment, he answered that presentment would be made

that same afternoon, and claimed a waiver only after he had

found out, to his surprise, that this presentment would be too

late. In re Grant, Fed. Cas. No. 5,691, the court found that the

waiver, so far as there was one, was not made with any regard

to the indorsement, and that all parties were considering only

the rights of the maker. In the case at bar the indorsement was

expressly referred to. I hold, therefore, that there was no implied

waiver of presentment, within the purview of the statute.

That waiver of presentment for payment, and knowledge of

nonpayment arising from the identity of the maker and indorser.

take n together, will excuse notice of nonpayment, is a conclusion

so sensible that it must stand unless plainly opposed to the words

of the statute. That this is the law merchant is not denied. To

present for payment in order to charge an indorser, where the

indorser has already told the holder that he cannot pay the note

either as maker ®r as indorser, seems a useless ceremony, but it is

a matter of substantial importance, by comparison with giving

notice to the indorser who has waived presentment, that he, the

indorser, has not paid the note as maker. The notice, if given,

would run substantially thus : "Please take notice that you have

useless ceremony of demanding payment." Had he said this,
there would have been no waiver; but, in the absence of such a
re ervation, I think that th holder reasonably understood him
to waive the useless ceremony. U pon this understanding the
holder acted. It should b noticed that £lodges and hi er ditor
were not dealing at arm's length, or as opposing parti s, but
were conferrin o- about the general condition of Hodges' affairs.
In construing a term found in a statute of Massachusetts,
and previou ly defined in Massachu setts deci ions, it may be sufficient to refer to those decisions. As the statute in question is
intended to introduce uniformity into the laws of the several
states, it would be unfortunate, however, if the Massachusetts
d ci ion concerning waiver of demand were opposed to a great
weight of authority el ewhere, and to the law merchant as generally laid clown. I do not find that opposition exi ts . The definition in 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. (4th Ed.) § I 103, and in 2 Pars.
Not s & B. (2d Ed.) p. 582, are similar to those declared by the
supreme court of Massachusetts. In Bani? v. Dill, 5 Hill, 403, no
waiver of demand was understood by the creditor at the time
the alleged waiver took place. It was set up as an afterthought
to excuse a mistake concerning the date of the note. When the
holder was asked by the indorser why the note had not been presented fo r payment, he answered that presentment wo uld be made
that same afternoon, and claimed a waiver only after he had
found out, to his su rprise, that this presentment would be too
late. In re Grant, Fed. Cas. No. 5,691, the court found that the
waiver, so far as there was one, was not made with any regard
to the indorsement, and that all parties were considering only
the rights of the maker. In the case at bar the indorsement was
expressly referred to. I hold, therefore, th at there was no implied
waiver of pre entment, within th purview of the statute.
That waiver of presentm ent for payment, and knowledge of
nonpayment arisi ng from the identity of the maker and indorser,
taken togeth r, will excuse notice of nonpayment, is a conclusion
so sensibl e that it must stand unl ss plainly opposed to the words
of the statute. That this is th law merchant is not denied. To
present for payment in order to charge an indorser, where the
indorser has alr acly told the hold er that he cannot pay the note
either as make r @r as indorser, s ems a useless ceremony, but it is
a matt r of ubstan ti al importanc , by comparison with aiving
notice to the indor er who has waived pres ntment, that he, the
indorser, has not paid the note as maker. The notice, if given,
would run substantially thus: "Please take notice that you have
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not paid the note which, in accordance with our agreement, I

have not presented to you for payment." The facts which were

held to constitute a waiver of demand were held also to consti-

tute a waiver of notice in most or all the cases above cited.

Waive r of notice seems to have been implied from waiver of

pres entment. w-Vvw ^a^^tN -v w^v^v^aa •— o-~-^ y-o-^V^-

That notice would be excused by waiver, even in the absence

of an express provision of statute, I am inclined to think ; but

this case seems fairly covered by the statute itself. By section

115, notice of dishonor is not required "where the indorser is the

person to whom the instrument is presented for payment." The

instrument here was not presented to Hodges for payment,

because he had given the creditor to understand that presentment

would be useless. The exception was inserted to avoid the neces-

sity of giving notice of a fact which, by the terms of the excep-

tion, must be within the personal knowledge of the man notified.

It is no straining of language to hold that the term, "person to

whom the instrument is presented for payment," includes a per-

son to whom the instrument would have been presented if he had

not, both as maker and as indorser, waived such presentment.
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The creditor is therefore entitled to prove against Hodges' sep-

arate estate.

The proving creditor seeks to review the decision of the <q, o^e^—

referee in deducting from the amount proved against the separate jj^.,^ <i_*>jvj-<»-*SL

estate the amount of the dividend declared on the joint estate. ^^J^*^ tV*.

That a creditor may prove for the full amount of a note against ^ x>_*^<-»/^-*

both its m aker and indorser. and may collect from both estates aL^_£_ u _ > ^A>. ^*>

dividen ds on such proof until his whole debt is satisfied, is settled r ^^^^aJk. <vv*

la\\\ Where, however, proof against the estate of the indorser n^^S-^jJ^^-*^

is made after part payment by the maker, the proof must be lim- 5L ^5G s j LjL . ( ^a

ited to the balance due on the note after deducting the part pay- ^a^o-Sm^ ^-»^*

ment. And it appears to be settled that a dividend from the V^^ Kx* ^*-

estate of the maker, declared in favor of the creditor, and payable 4~>~->~^ ^^^

before proof is made against the estate of the indorser, is the a^^^*^-

equivalent of actual part payment. In this case, proof against Vr^ 3 ^^ aA ' /,

the estate of the maker was made after the declaration of the first ^ (>T ^ **

dividend. By section 65c, the creditor making proof after the ^^ ^* *

declaration of the first dividend is entitled to be paid "dividends y ^~^x*^**s^'

equal in amount to those already received by the other creditors, v-^^^-**-^

if the estate equal so much before such other creditors are paid y^**^ ,

any further dividends." This right of the creditor to a preference ^suao ^a *^*-

in future dividends does not seem to me equivalent to a declara- >-v>^. r>^-<-A.

tion of a dividend in his favor, or to actual part payment of the*Xv_x. \ <a *]<>■

not paid the note which, in accordanc with our agreement, I
hav not pr nt d l y u for pa)m nl." Th . fa t which were
h Id t con titute a waiv r of d mand w re held al o to constitute a wai r f notice in mo t or all lhe cas s abov cited .
\ ai r of notice seems t have been impli d from waiver ~
p re entm nt. ~ ~
~
That notice would be excused by waiver, even in the absence
of an expr
prov1 1011 f tatut , I am inclined to think· but
this ca
e ms fairly co r d by the statute itself.
y section
n5, notice of di honor i not requir d ' wh re the indor er i the
p rson to v horn the in trum nt is pr nted for payment." The
in trument h r wa not re ented to I odg s for payment,
becau e he had given the creditor to und rstand that presentment
' ould be u le . Th xception wa in erted to avoid the necesity of ivin notic of a fact which, by the t rms of the exception, mu t b within the p r onal knowledae of the man notified.
It i no strainin of lan uage to hold that the term, "person to
whom the in trum nt is presented fo r payment," includes a pe ron to whom th in trument wou ld have been pre nted if he had
not, both as maker and as indorser, waived such pre entment.
The creditor i ther fore entitled to prov again t Hodge ' separate e tate.
The proving creditor seeks to review the decision of the ~ ~ 
referee in deductino- from the amount proYed a ain t the eparate ~ ~
tate th amount of th dividend declared on the joint e tate. ~ ~
That a reditor may prove fo r the full amount of a note again t ~ ~~
both it maker and indor r . and may collect from both e tates &->·......r-·.-OJ~-.-..
divid nd on uch proof until hi whole debt i ati fied , i ettled c....~
'Oi
~ \Yh re, howe er, proof again t th e tate of the indor er ~
i made after part payment b the maker the proof must be lim- ~ 1 \..,...~
ited to the balance due on the note aft r I ductin the part pay- ~ ~
ment.
\nd it app ar t be
ttle I that a <livid nd from the
~ ~
tate of th maker, d clar d in favor of th er ditor, and payable ~
•
tate f the indor er, i the ~ •
b fore pro f is mad arrain t th
quivalent of actual part paym nt. In thi a
proof a ain t ~ ~
th
tat of the mal er ' a mad after th d claration of the fi r t
~ .JU2. •
dividend.
y ction 5c, th er ditor makin proof aft r the ~
""""lecla ration of th fir t di id nd i ntitl d to be paid dividen ~
qual in amoun t t tho alr ady rec iv d by th oth r er dit r , ~
if th e tat qual o m uch b for uch other er ditor ar paid ' ~ 'i),. '
any forth r dividend . ' Thi right of th r dit r to a p r fer n e
~ ~
in future <livid nd do not em to me qui ' al nt to a
clara~
t ion f a dividend in hi favor or to actua l pa rt pa_ ment of the
~<>-
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note. In re Hicks, Fed. Cas. No. 6,456; In re Hamilton (D. C.)

1 Fed. 800; In re Meyer, 78 Wis. 615, 626, 48 N. W. 55, 11 L.

R. A. 841 ; Ex parte Todd, 2 Rose, 202, note. The estate might

not be large enough to pay to this creditor the rate declared in

favor of the other creditors. Considering the situation as shown

in the finding of the referee and in the subsequent stipulation,

I think the creditor was entitled to prove for the whole amount,

of the note against the estate of the indorser.

The judgment of the referee is reversed, in so far as it

provides for a diminution of the proof presented

against the separate estate of E. C. Hodges; in other

not . In re H ic!?s, Fed.
o. 6,456; In re Hamilton (D. C.)
1 Fed. oo; I n re Meye r, 7
i. I5 , 62 4
. W. 55 , II L.
R. ~ \ . 84I; Ex parte T odd, 2 R o , 2 02, note. The estate might
not be larg
n ug h to pay to this creditor the rate d clar d in
favo r of th oth r credit r .
on id ring th ituation a shown
in the findin of th e referee and in the subsequent stipulation,
I think the creditor was ntitl d to prov for the whole amount
of the note again t the estate of the indor er.

respects it is affirmed.

V

Section IX. — Protest.

GENERAL REQUISITES OF THE PROTEST. § 1 55- 1 58.

Dennistoun et al. v. Stewart (1854), if How. (58 U. S.) 606.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the circuit

The judg 11ient of the referee is reversed, in so far as it
prov ides for a dimunition of the proof presented
against the separate estate of E. C. Hodges; in other
respects it is affirmed.

court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. Phillips, for the plaintiffs in error, no
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counsel appearing for the defendant.

Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs declared against the defendant, as drawer of a

SECTION IX.-PROTEST •

bill of exchange, by the name and style of James Reid and Co., of

which the following is a copy :

.

"No. — . £4,417 14s. 1 id. st'g. Mobile, Sept. 9, 1850.

"Sixty days after sight of this first of exchange, (second and

GE

ERAL REQUISITES OF THE PROTEST.

§ 155-158.

third unpaid,) pay to the order of ourselves, in London, forty-

four hundred and seventeen pounds, 14s. 1 id. st'g, value received,

and charge the same to account of 1,058 bales cotton per 'Wind-

Dennistoitn et al. v. Stewart (1854), 17 How. (58 U.S.) 606.

sor Castle.'

"Your obedient servants,

"Pr. pro James Reid & Co.,

"Wm. Moult, Jr.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the circuit
court of the United tates for the south rn district of Alabama.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
It was argued by Mr. Phillips, for the plaintiffs in error, no
counsel appearing for the defendant.

Mr. J ustic

GRIER

delivered the opinion of the court.

Th plaintiff declared against the defendant, as drawer of a
bill of xchange, by the name and style of Jam es Reid and Co., of
which the following is a copy:

"No. -. £4,4I7 qs. I Id. st'g.

s

MOBILE,
pt. 9, I850.
" ixty days after sight of this first of exchange, (second and
third unpaid,) pay to th order of ours Ives in London, fortyfour hundred and seventeen pounds, I4S. I Id. st g, value received,
and charge the same to account of 1,058 bales cotton per 'Windsor Castle.'
"Your obedient servants,
"Pr. pro JAMES REID & Co.,
"WM. MOULT, JR.
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"To Hy. Gore Booth, Esq., Liverpool.

"Acceptance across the face of the bill.

"Seventh October, 1850. Accepted for two thousand five

hundred and seventy-one pounds eighteen shillings and seven

pence, being balance unaccepted for acpt. 1,058 bf. cotton, pr.

Windsor Castle, payable at Glyn and Co.

"Pr. pro Henry Gore Booth,

"And. E. Byrne.

"Due 9 Decern.

"Indorsed :

"Pay Messrs. A. Dennistoun and Co., or order,

"Pr. pro James Reid and Co.,

"Wm. Moult, Jr."

After reading this bill, with its indorsements, the plaintiff

offered in evidence a regular protest, indorsed on a copy of a

bill agreeing in every particular with the above, except that for

"And. E. Byrne" was written "Chas. Byrne."

The defendant objected to the reading of the protest in evi-

dence, because it did not describe the bill of exchange produced

by the plaintiffs, but a different bill. The court sustained this
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objection, and excluded the protest from the jury, which is the

subject of the first bill of exceptions.

A protest is necessary by the custom of merchants in case of

a foreign bill, in order to charge the drawer. It is defined to be

in form "a solemn declaration written by the notary under a

fair c opy of. the bilL-Slaljrig L that the payment or acceptance has

been d emanded and refused, the reason, if any, assigned, and

that the bill is, therefore, "protested."

A copy of the bilt, it is said, should be prefixed to all protests,

with the indorsements transcribed verbatim. 1 Pardess. 444;

Chitty on Bills, 458.

However stringen t the law concerning mercantile paper, with

regard to protest, demand, and notice, may appear, it is never-

th eless founded on reason and the necessities of trade. It exacts

nothing harsh, unjust, or unreasonable. A protest, though neces-

sary, need only be noted on the day on which payment was

refused. It may be drawn and completed at any time before

the commencement of the suit, or even before the trial, and con-

sequently may be amended according to the truth, if any mistake

has been made.

The copy of the bill is connected with the instrument certify-

ing the formal demand by the public officer, as the easiest and

best mode of identifying it with the original. Mercantile paper

"To HY. GoRE OOTH, EsQ., Liv rpool.
'Acceptance across the face of the bill.
"Seventh October, 1850.
ccept d for two thousand five
hundred and seventy-one pounds ighteen shillings and seven
pence, b ing balanc unaccepted for acpt. 1,058 bf. cotton, pr.
Windsor astle, payable at Glyn and o.
"Pr. pro HENRY GoRE BooTH,
' AND. E. BYRNE.
"Due 9 Decem.
"Indorsed :
"Pay Mes r . . Dennistoun and Co., or order,
"Pr. pro J MES RErn A D Co.,
"WM. MOULT, JR."
After reading this bill, with its indorsements, the plaintiff
offered in evidence a regular protest, indorsed on a copy of a
bill agreeing in every particular with the above, except that for
" nd. E. Byrne" wa written "Chas. Byrne."
The defendant obj cted to the reading of the protest in evidence, becau e it did not describe the bill of exchange produced
by the plaintiffs, but a different bill. The court sustained this
objection, and excluded the protest from the jury, which is the
subject of the first bill of exceptions.
A protest.is nece sary by the custom of merchants in case of
a foreign bill, in order to charge the drawer. It is defined to be
in form "a olemn declaration written by the notary under a
of the bil1 1 stating that the payment or acceptance ha
fair co
been demanded and refu d, the reason, if any assigned, and
that the bill i , t ere ore, protested."
A copy of the bil1, it is said hould be prefixed to all protests,
with the indorsements tran cribed verbatim.. I Pardess. 444;
Chitty on Bills, 458.
However stringent the law concernino- mercantile a er, with
regard to prote t, emand, and notice, may appear, it is nevertheless found d on reason and the nece ities of trade. It exacts
nothing har h, unjust, or unrea onable. A prote t though necessary, need only be noted on the day on which payment was
refused. It may be drawn and comp! t d ?-t any time before
the commencement of the uit or ev n before the trial and consequently may be amended according to th truth if any mistake
has been made.
The copy of the bill i connected with the instrument certifying the formal demand b) th public officer, as the a ie t and
1ercantile paper
best mode of identif ing it with the orio-inal.
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is generally brief, and without the verbiage which extends and

enlarges more formal legal instruments. Hence, it is much

easier to give a literal copy of such bills, than to attempt to

identify them by any abbreviation or description. The amount,

the date, the parties, and the conditions of the bill, form the

substance of every such instrument. Slight mistakes, or vari-

ances of le tters, or even words, when the substance is retained7

cannot an d ought not to vitiate the protest . A lost bill may be

protested, when the notary has been furnished with a sufficient

description, as to date, amount, parties, &c, to identify it.

In indictments for forgery, it is not sufficient to state the

- ( "substance and effect" of the instrument ; it must be laid accord-

N ing to the "tenor," or exact letter ; but the law merchant demands

J no such stringency of construction. The sharp criticism indulged

I when the life of a prisoner is in jeopardy cannot be allowed for

^X_^, * the purpose of eluding the payment of just debts.

It is unnecessary that a copy of the protest should be included

in the notice to the drawer and indorsers. The object of notice

is to inform the party to whom it is sent that payment has been

refused by the maker, and that he is held liable. Hence such a.
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dj^rip_tion_of _ the note as will give sufficient information to

identify it, is all that is necessary. What was said by Mr. Justice

Story, in delivering the opinion of this court, in Mills v. The

Bank of the United States, with regard to variances and mis-

takes in notices, will equally apply to protests : "It cannot be

for a moment maintained that every variance, however imma-

terial, is fatal. It must be such a variance as conveys no sufficient

knowledge to the party of the particular note which has been

dishonored. If it does not mislead him, if it conveys to him the

real fact, without any doubt, the variance cannot be material,

either to guard his rights or avoid his responsibility."

In the case before us. _the protest had an accurate copy of

every material fact which could identify the bill — the date, the

place where drawn, the amount, the merchandise on which it

was drawn, the ship by which it was sent, the balance on the cot-

ton for which it was accepted, the names of drawers, acceptor,

indorsers ; in fine, every thing necessary to identify the bill. The

only variance is a mistake in copying or deciphering the abbre-

viations and flourishes with which the Christian name of the

acceptor's agent is enveloped. The abbreviation of "And." has

been mistaken for Chas., and the middle letter E. omitted. The

omission of the middle letter would not vitiate a declaration or

i generally brief, and without the verbiage which extends and
enlarges more formal 1 gal instruments. Hence, it is much
ea ier to give a literal copy of such bills, than to attempt to
identify them by any abbreviation or description. The amount,
th date, th parties, and the conditions of the bill, form the
sub tance of every such instrument. Sli ht mi takes, or variances of letters, or even words, when the substance is retaine ,
cannot and ought not to vitiate the protest. A lost bill may be
protested, when the notary has been furnished with a sufficient
description, as to date, amount, parties, &c., to identify it.
........,..> ~
In indictments for forgery, it is not sufficient to state the
~ v~ "substance and effect" of the instrument; it must be laid accord~
ing to the "tenor," or exact letter; but the law merchant demands
~\' ~ no such stringency of construction. The sharp criticism indulged
~
when the life of a prisoner is in j eopar:dy cannot be allowed for
~\ the purpose of eluding the payment of just debts.
It is unnecessary that a copy of the protest should be included
in the notice to the drawer and indorsers. The object of notice
is to inform the party to whom it is sent that payment has been
refused by the maker, and that he is held liable. Hence such a
description of the note as will give sufficient information to
identify it, is all that is necessary. What was said by Mr. Justice
Story, in delivering the opinion of this court, in Mills v. The
Bank of the United States, with regard to variances and mistakes in notices, will equally apply to protests: "It cannot be
for a moment maintained that every variance, however immaterial, is fatal. It must be such a variance as conveys no sufficient
knowledge to the party of the particular note which has been
dishonored. If it does not mislead him, if-it conveys to him the
real fact, without any doubt, the variance cannot be material,
either to guard his rights or avoid liis responsibility."
In the case before us. the protest had an accurate copy of
every material fact which could identify the bill-the date, the
place where drawn, the amount, the merchandise on which it
was drawn, the ship by which it was sent, the balance on the cotton for which it was accepted, the names of drawer , acceptor,
indorsers; in fine, every thing necessary to identify the bill. The
only variance is a mistake in copying or d ciphering the abbreviations and flourishes with which the Chri tian name of the
acceptor's agent is enveloped. The abbreviation of " nd." has
been mistaken for Chas., and the middle letter E. omitted. The
omission of the middle letter would not vitiate a declaration--;;-
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indi ctment. Nor could the mistake mislead any person as to the

identity of the instrument described.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the objection ma d e to this

pr otest, "that it does not describe the bill of exchange produced,

but a different bill," is not true in fact, and should have been

overruled by the court.

This renders it unnecessary for us to notice the offer of testi-

mony to prove the identity, which was also overruled by the

court. X^x. ^V-o-

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and

venire de novo awarded.

Section X — Notice of Dishonor.

FORM OF THE NOTICE. § 98.

Mills v. Bank of the United States {1826), 11 Wheat. (24 U. S.)

43i,

This cause was argued by Mr. Wright, for the plaintiff in

indictment. Nor could th mi stak misl ad any person as to the
'identity of th e in trum nt cl crib d.
W ar of pini n, th refor , that ...:;t=
h=--=~==:.::-::.==..::.....::..::.-=~
protest, "that it do not cl esc rih e the bill f xchange produced,
but a different bill," is not tru e in fact, and should have been
overrul d by th e court.
This r nd ers it unn ec ssary for us to notice the offer of testimony to prove the identity, which was also overruled by the
court.
~ ~·
The judgmen t of the Circuit Court is re ersed, and
venire de nova awarded.

error, and by Mr. Webster, for the defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit originally brought in the Circuit Court of Ohio,

by the Bank of the United States, against. A. G. Wood and George
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Ebert, doing business under the firm of Wood & Ebert, Alexan-

der Adair, Horace Reed, and the plaintiff in error, Peter Mills.

SECTION X-NOTICE OF DISHONOR.

The declaration was for $3,600, money lent and advanced. Dur-

ing the pendency of the suit, Reed and Adair died. Mills filed a

separate plea of non assumpsit, upon which issue was joined, and

§ 98.

FORM OF THE NOTICE.

upon the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Bank of the

United States for $4,641 ; upon which judgment was rendered in

their favor. At the trial a bill of exceptions was taken by Mills,

for the consideration of the matter of which the present writ of

Mills v. Bank of the United States ( I826),

II

Wheat. ( 24 U. S.)

4JI,

error has been brought to this court.

By the bill of exceptions it appears that the evidence offered

by the plaintiff's in support of the action "was, by consent of coun-

sel, permitted to go to the jury, saving all exceptions to its com-

Thi cause was argued by Mr. °'f'Vright, for the plaintiff m
error, and by Jo.fr. Webster, for the defendants in error.

petence and admissibility, which the counsel for the defendant

reserved the right to insist in claiming the instructions of the

court to the jury on the whole case."

Mr. Ju tice STORY delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a uit originally brought in the Circuit Court of Ohio,
by the Bank of the nited States, against.A. G. Wood and George
Ebert, doing bu ine s under the firm of Wood & Ebert, Alexander Adair, orace Reed , and the plaintiff in error, eter Mill .
The declaration was for $3,000, money lent and advanced. During the pendency of the suit, Reed and Adai r died.
fills filed a
separate plea of non assu111psit, upon which i ue wa joined, and
upon the trial, the jury r turned a verdict for the Bank of the
United States for $4,641 ; upon whi h judo-m nt wa rend red in
their favor.
t the trial a bill of exceptions wa taken by Mill ,
for the consideration of the matter of ' hich the pre ent writ of
error has been brought to this court.
By the bill of exception it app ar that th
by the plaintiffs in support of th e action "wa , b) on nt of counsel, permitted to go to th jury, avino- all exc ption t it competence and admissibility, which the counsel for the defendant
reserved the right to in ist in !aiming th in tructions of the
court to the jury on the whole case. '
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FOR 1 OF THE NOTICE

The plaintiffs offered in evidence a promissory note signed

Wood & Ebert, and purporting to be indorsed in blank by Peter

Mills, Alexander Adair and Horace Reed, as successive indors-

ers, which note, with the indorsements thereon, is as follows, to

wit: "Chillicothe, 20th of Julv, 1819. $3,600. Sixty days after

date I promise to pay to Peter Mills, or order, at the office of

discount and deposit of the Bank of the United States, at Chilli-

cothe, three thousand six hundred dollars, for value received.

Wood & Ebert." Indorsed/ "Pay to A. Adair or order, Peter

Mills." "Pay to Horace Re4d or order. A. Adair." "Pay to the

President, Directors and /Company of the Bank of the United

States, or order. Horace' Reed." On the upper right hand cor-

ner of the note is also ir/dorsed: "3185. Wood & Ebert, $3,600,

Sep. 18, '21." It was proven that this note had been sent to the

office at Chillicothe to/ renew a note which had been five or six

times previously renewed by the same parties. It was proven by

the deposition of Le,vin Belt, Esq., mayor of the town of Chilli-

cothe, that on the 2^d day of September, 18 19, immediately after

The plaintiffs offered in evidence a promissory note signed
Wood & Ebert, and purporting to be indor ed in blank by eter
Iills, Alexand r Adair and Horace R ed, as succe ive indorsrs, which not , with the indorsem nt ther on, i as follows, to
wit: ''Chillicothe, 20th of ul l 19. $3,000.
ixty days after
date I promise to pay to P t r fills, or ord r, at the office of
di count and d posit of the
nk of th
nited tatcs, at hillicoth three thou and ix l undr d dollars, for value received .
\Vood & Ebert. " Indor ed . " ay to A . <lair or order, eter
Iills.'' "Pay to Horac R ed or ord r. A . <lair." "Pay to the
President, Directors and ompany of the Bank of the United
State , or ord r. Horac R eed ."
n the upper ri g ht hand corner of the note is also i dorsed: "3185. Wood & Ebert, $3 6oo,
ep. 18, '2r." It wa
raven that thi note had been sent to the
office at hillicothe to renew a note which had been five or six
time previou 1y rene ed by the same parties. It was proven b)
the deposition of L in Belt, Esq., mayo r of the town of Chillicothe, that on th e 2 d day of September, 1819, immediately after
the commencemtn of th e hour of busincs , he dul y presented
the said note at t e said office of di count and deposit, and there
demanded paym nt of the said note, but th ere was no person ther e
ready or willino- to pay th e same, and the said note was not paid,
in consequencl'of which the said deponent immediately protested
the said note for th e non-payment and dishonor thereof, and
immediately' th ereafter prepared a notice for each of the indorsers
respectively, and immediately on th e same day deposited one of
aid notices in the postoffice, directed to Peter Mill , at Zanesville
(his place of r sidence), of which notice the foll owing is a copy:
"Chillicothe, 22d of September, 1819.
ir, you will hereby take
noti ce that a note drawn by Wood & Ebert, dated 20th day of
eifember, 1819, for $3,600, payable to you, or order, in sixty
days, at the office of di count and deposit of the Bank of the
U nited Stat at Chillicoth , and on which you are indorser, has
been protested for non-payment, and the hold rs thereof look to
you . Your , respectfully, Levin
elt, mayor of Chillicoth ."
( eter M ills, "' q.) It was further proven by the plaintiffs
~· ~~that it had been the cu tom of the banks in Chillicothe, for
~ 'b
a long tim pr viously to the e tablishm nt of a branch in that
~ _place, to make d mand of promis ory notes and bills of xchange
~ on th e day aft r th la t day of grac (that i , n the 64th
~7~ day); that the branch bank, on it stablishment at Chillicothe,
AA....
adopted that custom, and that such had been the uniform usage
- - \ ~~· in th e several banks in that place ever since. No evidence
1

the commencement of the hours of business, he duly presented

the said note at the said office of discount and deposit, and there
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demanded payment of the said note, but there was no person there

ready or willing to pay the same, and the said note was not paid,

in consequence of which the said deponent immediately protested

the said note for the non-payment and dishonor thereof, and

immediately thereafter prepared a notice for each of the indorsers

respectively, and immediately on the same day deposited one of

said notices in the postoffice, directed to Peter Mills, at Zanesville

(his place of residence), of which notice the following is a copy:

"Chillicothe, 22d of September, 1819. Sir, you will hereby take

notice that a note drawn by Wood & Ebert, dated 20th day of

September, 1819, for $3,600, payable to you, or order, in sixty

days, at the office of discount and deposit of the Bank of the

United States at Chillicothe, and on which you are indorser, has

been protested for non-payment, and the holders thereof look to

you. Yours, respectfully, Levin Belt, mayor of Chillicothe."

(Peter Mills, Esq.) It was further proven by the plaintiffs

,t<U*~- i^**^ t h at i t had b een the custom of the banks in Chillicothe, for

°^ JC * w '. r ^ a long time previously to the establishment of a branch in that

~*\ place, to make demand of promissory notes and bills of exchange

^on the day after the last day of grace (that is, on the 64th

]^5 *^^*\day) ; that the branch bank, on its establishment at Chillicothe,

adopted that custom, and that such had been the uniform usage

^^^T^^'in the several banks in that place ever since. No evidence
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was given of the handwriting- of either of the indorsers. The

court charged the jury, (i) that the notice being sufficient to put

the defendant upon inquiry, was good, in point of form, to charge

him, although it did not name the person who was holder of the

said note, nor state that a demand had been made at the bank

when the note was due. (2) That if the jury find that there was

no other note payable in the office at Chillicothe, drawn by Wood

& Ebert, and indorsed by defendant, except the note in contro-

versy, the mistake in the date of the note made by the notary in

the notice given to that defendant does not impair the liability

of the said defendant, and the plaintiffs have a right to recover.

(3) That should the jury find that the usage of hanks, and of the

office of discount and deposit in Chillicothe, was to make demand

of payment, and to protest and give notice on the 64th day, such

demand and notice are sufficient.

The counsel on the part of the defendant prayed the court

to instruct the jury "that before the common principles of the

law relating to the demand and notice necessary to charge the

indorser can be varied by a usage and custom of the plaintiffs, the

jury must be satisfied that the defendant had personal knowledge

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of the usage or custom at the time he indorsed the note ; and also,

that before the plaintiffs can recover as the holder or indorser of

a promissory note, they must prove their title to the proceeds by

evidence of the indorsement on the note," which instructions were

refused by the court.

Upon this posture of the case, no questions arise for deter-

mination here, except such as grow out of the charge of the court,

or the instructions refused on the prayer of the defendant's

( Mills') counsel. Whether the evidence was, in other respects,

sufficient to establish the joint promise stated in the declaration,

or the joint consideration of money lent, are matters not submitted

to us upon the record, and were proper for argument to the jury.

The first point is, whether the notice sent to the defendant at

Chillicothe was sufficient to charge him as indorser. The court

was of opinion that it was sufficient, if there was no other note

payable in the office at Chillicothe, drawn by Wood & Ebert, and

indorsed by the defendant. ^

It is contended that this opinion is erroneous, because "the

notice was_fatally defective by reason of its not stating who was

the lipid errby reason of its misdescription of the date of the note,

and^rjy reason of its not stating that a demand had been made at

the bank when the note was due. The first objection proceeds

upon a doctrine which is not admitted to be correct; and no

\

was given of th handwriting of either of the indorsers. The
c urt char d th jury, ( r that th n ti e b ing ufficient to put
th d f ndant upon inquiry, was good, in point of form, to charge
him, although it did n t nam th p r on who wa holder of the
said not , n r stat that a d mand had been mad at the bank
wh nth not wa du . (2) That if th jury fin l that there was
n other note payabl in the offic at Chillicothe, drawn by Wood
& Ebert, and ind r d by d f ndant, xcept the note in controv rsy, th mistake in th date of the note made by the notary in
the notic given t that d f ndant do s not impair the liability
of the said defendant, and th plaintiffs have a right to recover.
(3) That should th jury find that the usage of banks, and of the
office of di count and d posit in Chillicothe, was to make demand
of payment, and to prot t and give notice on the 64th day, such
demand and notice ar suffici nt.
The coun 1 on th part of the defendant prayed the court
to in truct the jury that before the common principles of the
law relating to the demand and notice necessary to charge the
indor er can be varied by a usao-e and cus1om of the plaintiffs, the
jury mu t b satisfi d that the defendant had p r onal knowledge
of the u a e or cu tom at th time he indor ed the note; and also,
that before th plaintiff can r cover a the holder or indorser of
a promi ory note, they mu t prove their title to the proceeds by
e\ idence of the indor ement on the note," which instructions were
refu ed by the court.
Upon this po tu re of the ca e, no qu stions ari e for deterrnina tion her , xc pt uch a o-row out of th charge of th court,
or the instructions r fu ed on the prayer of the defendant's
(Mill ) coun 1. \ h th r the videnc wa , in oth r re pects,
sufficient to establi h the joint promi e tat d in the declaration,
or the joint con id rati n f mone 1 nt ar matt r not ubmitted
to u upon the record and w r proper for ar ument to the jury.
The fir t point i , \\ h th r th notic ent t the defendant at
Chillicoth was uffici nt to charg him a indor r. The court
was of opinion that it wa uffici nt, if th r wa no oth r note
payable in the offic at hillicothe, drawn by \ ood & Ebert, and
-indor ed by th d f ndant.
,
It i cont nd 1 that this opinion i rron ou , because he
notice \\ ak-fatally d fe tiv b rea on of it n t ta tin "'ho \ a
the..Jlolde~y rea on of it mi de cription of th' dat of the note,
an~) rea on of it not tating that a d mand had een made at
the bank when th not wa due. The fir t obj ction proceed
upon a doctrine which i not admitted to be correct; and no
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authority is produced to support it. No form of notice to an

indorser has bee n prescribed by l a w. The whole object of it is to

i rIionriTh~e~ party to whom it is sent that payment has been refused

by the maker; t hat he is considered liable ; and that payment is_

o^v^» iMx JUaMja. Expected of him ! It is of no consequence to the i ndorser who

^n~c*. v~*>tv* is the holder , as he is equally bound by the notice, whomsoever

,_aS& ° v ^*- v ~ ,>- lie may be, and it is time enough for him to ascertain the true

title of the holder when he is called upon for payment.

The objection of misdescription may be disposed of in a few

_a qI^ab^Xa-w. words. It cannot be for a moment maintained that every vari-

^^Xs ance, however immaterial, is fatal to the notice. It must be such

a variance as conveys no sufficient knowledge to the party of the

particular note which has been dishonored. If it does not mislead

him, if it conveys to him the real fact without any doubt, the

variance cannot be material, either to guard his rights, or avoid

authori ty is produced to support it. No form of notice to an
indorser ha be n pr cribed by law. The whole ob· ect of it is to
c:t: ~ ··
m orm t e party to whom it is sent that payment has been refused
~ ~
by the maker; that he i considered liabl ; and that a ment is
~ ~ expecte o
1m. It is of no consequence to the indorser who
.A... ~~ - is the holder, as he 1 equally bound by the notice, whomsoever
~ ~ ~ he may be, and it is time enough for him to ascertain the true
~
title of the holder when he is called upon for payment.
The objection of misdescription may be disposed of in a few
~ ~ ~·. words. It cannot be for a moment maintained that every vari~ . ~. _\-:: ance, however immaterial, is fatal to the notice. It must be such
~ ~
a variance as conveys no sufficient knowledge to the party of the
:..X ~ o... particular note which has been dishonored If it does not mislead
~~ - him, if it conveys to him the real fact without any doubt, the
'°""" ~ t-t>
variance cannot be material, either to guard his rights, or avoid
~ ~ his responsibility. In the present ca e, the misdescription was
~•
merely in the date. The sum, the parties, the time and place of
~\.!. \ ~
.
_ payment, and the mdorsement, were truly and accurately
. .~ ~
1
~ .,......._
described. The error, too, was apparent on the face of the notice.
~ ~ \J\
The party was informed that on the 22d of September, a note
-u.. ~(;2...) indorsed by him, payable in sixty days, was protested for non~ ~
payment; and yet the note itself was stated to be dated on the
~ ~
20th of the same month, and, of course, only two days before.
~ Under these circumstances the court laid down a rule most favor. - ~ able to the defendant. It directed th e jury to find the notice good
~
if there was no other note payable in the office at Chillicothe,
drawn by Wood & Ebert, and indor ed by the defendant. If there
was no other note, how could the mistake of date possibly mislead the d fendant? If he had indorsed but one note for Wood
& Ebert, how could the notice fail to be full a:nd unexceptionable
in fact?
i . ~:
The last objection to the notice is, that it does not state that
ll5X ~ payment was d manded at the bank wh en th note became due.
It is certainly not necessary that the notice should contain such
-~~
~ ~ a formal allegation. It i suffici nt that it tates the fact of non~~ payment of the note, and that the holder looks to the indorser for
~
indemnity. Whether the demand wa duly and r ularlv made
~
is matter of evidence to e establi hed at the trial. If it be not
l <:>-JVJ , ~
legally made, no av rm ent, how v r a curat , will help the ca e;
~ ~ ~ and a statement of non-payment and notice is, by necessary impli. OVO ~
cati on, an a ertion of right by the hold r, founded upon his hav"' ~ ~j,>.
ing compli ed with the requi itions of law against the indorser.
In point of fact, in commercial cities, the general if not universal,
)Jvv.J

~....__~

his responsibility. In the present case, the misdescription was

merely in the date. The sum, the parties, the time and place of

payment, and the indorsement, were truly and accurately

described. The error, too, was apparent on the face of the notice.
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The party was informed that on the 226. of September, a note

^ v^s'o-oi- .£*,) } n( j orsec i by n i m) payable in sixty days, was protested for non-

V 9 -*-* payment ; and yet the note itself was stated to be dated on the

20th of the same month, and, of course, only two days before.

Under these circumstances the court laid down a rule most favor-

able to the defendant. It directed the jury to find the notice good

if there was no other note payable in the office at Chillicothe,

drawn by Wood & Ebert, and indorsed by the defendant. If there

was no other note, how could the mistake of date possibly mis-

lead the defendant? If he had indorsed but one note for Wood

& Ebert, how could the notice fail to be full and unexceptionable

in fact?

The la stobjection to the notice is, that it does not state that

paymej nt was demanded at_the bank when the note became due.

It is certainly not necessary that the notice should contain s uch

a formal allegation.. It is sufficient that it states the fact of non-

payment of the note, and that the holder looks to the indorser for

indemnity. Whether th e de mand was duly and regularly made^

is matter of evidence to be established at the trial. If it be not

oJC

legally made, no averment, however accurate, will help the case ;

and a statement of non-payment and notice is, by necessary impli-

cation, an assertion of right by the holder, founded upon his hav-

ing complied with the requisitions of law against the indorser.

In point of fact, in commercial cities, the general, if not universal,
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practice is, not to state in the notice the mode or place of demand,

but the*mere naked non-payment.

Upon the point, then, of notice, we think there is no error in v

the opinion of the Circuit Court.

Another question is, whether the usage and custom of the

bank not to make demand of payment until the fourth day of

grace, bound the defendant, unless he had personal knowledge of

that usage and custom. There is no doubt that, according to the

general j yles of law, demand of payment ought to be made on_ ( >>-~ s - v ^^^

the third day, and that it is too late if made on the fourth day r "

oj gra ce. Butit has been decided by this court, upon full consid- ^^^ »w.

eration and argument, in the case of Rentier v. The Bank of Col- ^^ 6-e->\>/\

umbia (9 Wheat. Rep., 582), that where a note is made for the o^umji, x~jc

purp ose of being negotiated at a bank, whose custom, know n_to_ v^V*^. <*j*>

the parties, it is to demand payment and give notice on the fourth_ **"*" ^V-^Oi

day of grace, that custom forms a part of the law of such contract, "* / ^*"\V r ' A ^ 1 ]

at least so far as to bind their rights . In the present case, the Y <^ &\<>j.

court is called upon to take one step farther; and upon the prin- v^^^jc o^A-*^

ciples and reasoning of the former case, it has come to the conclu- <l*$a/-v. &^j^Ju

sion that w hen a note is made payable or negotiable at a bank, S^j^j^r^A "C*>
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who se invariable usage it is to^Iemarid payrnent'and give notice i 3 ^!^ k - h * JOy ~~

on tjgrfourth day of grac"e, the parties are bound by that usag e , . .

whether th ey have a personal knowledge of it or rloF ! In the case j^v ^^

of sucrTaTnote, the parties are presumed by implication to agree Vj^xvn <a aJu

to be governed by the usage of the bank at which they have

chosen to make the security itself negotiable.

Another question propounded by the defendant is, whether

the plaintiffs were entitled to recover without establishing their vA wSla/^j

title to the note, as holders by proof of the indorsements. There y^*^*. <-****■-

is no doubt that, by the general rule of law, such proof is indispen- ^»* cy~*^*_

sable on the part of the plaintiffs, unless it is waived by the other * VN

side. But in all such cases the defendant may waive a rule intro- ^~ V *V

duced for his benefit ; and such waiver may be implied for cir-

cumstances as well as expressly given. It is in this view that the

rule of the Circuit Court of Ohio of 1819, which has been referred

to at the bar, deserves consideration. That rule declares, "that

hereafter, in any actions brought upon bond, bill, or note, it shall

not be necessary for the plaintiffs on trial to prove the execution

of the bond, bill or note, unless the defendant shall have filed with

his plea an affidavit, that such bond, bill or note, was not executed

by him." We think the present case falls completely within the

purview of this rule. Its object was to prevent unnecessary

expense and useless delays upon objections at trials, which were

practice is, not to stat in th notice th mode or place of demand,
but th m re nak d non-payment.
pon th point, th n, of notice, we think th re is no error in
the opinion of th Circuit ourt.
Another que tion i , wheth r the usag and custom of the
bank not to make d mand of paym nt until the fourth day of
grace, bound the defendant, unl ss h had p rsonal knowledge of
that usage and cu tom. Th re is no doubt that, according to the
general rules of law, demand of paym nt ought to be made on
the third day, and that it i too late if made on the fourth dav
of race. ~it has be n decided by this court, upon full consideration and argument, in the case of Renner v. The Bank of Colitmbia (9 Wheat. Rep., 582), that where a note is made for the
purpo e of b inO" negotiated at a bank, whose custom, known to
!he parties, it i to d mand payment and give notic on the fourth
day of grace, that cu tom forms a part of the law of such contract,
at least so far a to bind their rights. In the present case, the
court is called upon to take one step farther; and upon the principles and reasoning of the former ca e, it has come to the concluion that _w hen a note i made payable or negotiable at a bank,
whose invana e u a e it is to eman
a ment and O"lVe notice
ar ies are oun
t at usa e
er ona now e O"e o it or no. n t e case
o sue a note, the parties are presume
y imp ication to agree
to be governed by the usage of the bank at which they have
chosen to make the security it elf negotiable.
Anoth r que tion propounded by the defendant is, whether
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover without e tabli hinO" their
title to the note, as holders by proof of the indor ement . There
is no doubt that, by the general rule of law, uch proof i indispensable on the part of the plaintiffs, unless it is ' aived by the other
side. But in all such cases the def ndant ma waive a rule introduced for his benefit; and uch waiv r ma be implied for circumstances a well as xpr ly g iven. It i in thi view that the
rule of the Circuit ourt of hio of I 19, which ha b en referred
to at the bar, d s rv con id rati n. That rul e declares, that
hereafter, in any action brou ht upon bond, bill or note it hall
not be nece ary for the plaintiff n trial to prove th execution
of the bond bill or note, unl e s th d f nd ant hall ha filed ' ith
his plea an affidavit , that uch bond, bill r not , wa not xecuted
b_ him." We think the pre ent ca e fall completely v ithin the
purview of this rule. It obj ct wa to prev nt unnece ary
expen e and usele d la ·· upon obj tions at trial , which were
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frivolous and unconnected with the merits. If the rule attempted

to interfere with or control the rules of evidence, it certainly could

not be supported. But it attempts no such thing. It does not

deny to the party the right to demand proof of the execution or

indorsement of the note at the trial ; but it requires him, in effect,

to give notice by affidavit, accompanying the plea, that he means

to contest that fact under the issue. If the party gives no such

notice, and files no such affidavit, it is on his own part a waiver

of the right to contest the fact, or rather an admission that he does

not mean to contest it. We see no hardships in such a rule. It

subserves the purposes of justice, and prevents the accumulation

of costs. It follows out, in an exemplary manner, that injunction

of the judiciary act of the 2d of March, 1793, ch. 22, which

requires the court of the United States "to regulate the practice

thereof, as shall be fit and necessary for the advancement of jus-

tice, and especially to that end to prevent delays in proceedings."

As no affidavit accomp anied the plea of the defendant in the pres-

ent case, he__ha d_no right to insist upon the proof of the indorse-

men ts.

Another objection now urged against the judgment is, that
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the count demands $3,600 only, and the jury gave damages

amounting to $4,641. But there is no error in this proceeding,

since the ad damnum is for a larger sum. In all cases where

interest, not stipulated for by the terms of the contract, is given

by way of damages, the sum demanded in the declaration is less

than the sum for which judgment is rendered. The plaintiffs may

not recover more, as principal, than the sum demanded as such

^x^^VaA-V- in the declaration; but the jury have a right to add interest, by

way of damages for the delay .

Some other objections have been suggested at the bar, such

as, that the jury had no right, without evidence, to presume that

there was no other note of Wood & Ebert, in order to help the

misdescription ; and that the case proved was of several liabilities

of the defendants which would not support a declaration on a

joint contract. These questions have been fully argued by coun-

sel, but are not presented by the record in such a shape as to

enable the court to take cognizance of them.

Upon the whole, it is the opinion of the court that the judg-

ment ought to be affirmed with costs.

frivolous and unconnected with the merit . If the rule attempted
to interfere with or control the rules of evidence, it certainly could
not be supported.
ut it attempt no uch thing. It doe not
deny to the party the right to demand proof of the execution or
indorsem nt of th note at th trial; but it r quir him, in effect,
to o-ive notice by affidavit, accompanying the plea, that he means
to conte t that fact under the i ue. If th party giv no uch
n otice, and files no such affidavit, it is on his own part a waiver
of the right to contest the fact, or rather an admi ion that he does
not mean to contest it. We s e no hardships in such a rul e. It
sub erves the purpo e of ju tice, and prevents the accumulation
of cost . It follows out, in an exemplary manner, that injunction
of the judiciary act of the 2d of March, 1793, ch. 22, which
requires the court of the United tates "to regulate the practice
th r of, a shall be fit and n cessary for the advancement of justice and especially to that end to prevent delays in proceedings."
_ no affidavit accompanied the plea of the defendant in the present case, he had no right to insist upon the proof of the indorsements.
Another objection now urged against the judgment is, that
the count demands $3,600 only, and the jury gave damages
amounting to $4,64!. But there is no error in thi proceeding,
since the ad damnmn is for a larger sum. In all cases where
int rest, not stipulated for by the terms of the contract, is given
by way of damages, the sum demanded in the declaration is less
~ ~ than the sum for which judgment is render d. The plaintiffs may
"~ not recover more, as principal, than the sum demanded as such
.'k.d-=r~-;:}n the declaration; but the jury have a right to add interest, by
way of damages for the delay.
Some other objections have been suggested at the bar, such
as, that the jury had no right, without evidence, to presume that
there wa no other note of Wood & Ebert, in oroer to help the
mi de cription; and that the case proved was of several liabilities
of the defendants which would not upport a declaration on a
joint contract. These questions have been fully argu d by couns 1, but are not pre nted by the record in such a shape as to
enable the court to take cognizanc of th m.
Upon the whole, it is the opin£on of the court that the judg~

'11ent ought to be affirmed with costs.
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by whom notice given. § 0,2.

Lysaght v. Bryant (1830), 9 Common Bench 46, (6/ E. C. L.)

Assumpsit. Defendant drew a bill of exchange to his own

order, endorsed it to James Lysaght and William Smithett, who

BY WHO 1 N TI E

!VEN.

§ 92.

endorsed it to the plaintiff, Admiral Lysaght, father of James.

James, however, retained the bill as his father's agent and pre-

sented it for payment at maturity. Upon payment being refused

Lysaght v . Bryant (1850), 9 Common Bench 46, (67 E. C. L.)

Lysaght & Smithett gave defendant notice in their firm name.

Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant moved for a rule nisi to

enter the verdict for the defendant.

Maule, J. — I am of opinion that the notice of dishonour that

was g iven i n this case, was sufficient. Lysaght the younger

appears to have acted as the agent of his father, the plaintiff. In

that character, he received the bill from Lysaght & Smithett, by

whom it was sworn to have been endorsed before it became due ;

and Lysaght the younger proved that it had ever since been kept

by him amongst the documents which were held by him for his

father. It was undoubtedly his duty to see that his father should

have all proper remedies upon the bill." The bill, it seems, was

sump it. Defendant drew a bill of xchang to hi own
ord r, nd r d it to Jam Ly a ht and William mithett, who
endor d it to th plaintiff, dmiral y ao-ht, fa th r of Jame .
James, how v r, r tain d th bill as hi father' agent and prented it for paym nt at maturity.
pon paym nt being refu ed
Ly ao-ht & mith tt av def ndant notice in their firm name.
erdict for th plaintiff, and defendant moved for a rule nisi to
enter the v rdict for the defendant.

presented on the day it became due, and was dishonoured ; and
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due notice of dishonor was given by Lysaght & Smithett to the

defendant, as drawer. Lysaght the younger having due notice of ^^* V»_*^s>~»

the dishonour, which operated as a notice to Lysaght & Smithett, a^^ S^^^-v^

it was clearly competent to the latter, according to the decided \ KJL<L jl^> **o^

cases, to give notice to all prior parties to the bill ; and a notice so j\ \^yk>^- , "^

given would enure a s a notice by the party who had given notice ^r^ >v«W ,

to them. I therefore think the defendant has had a sufficient v»*^> **» ******

notice of dishonour. Then, as to the other point, — there was evi- < V* S * j^^" 1

dence on both sides. It was for the jury to say whether the plain- V^*^ t*

tiff's witness was perjured or the defendant's mistaken. The for- ^^r ^j^^.

mer stated positively that the endorsement was made before the (I

bill became due ; the latter, not professing to have any special rec-

ollection on the subject, merely stated that it was the usual course

of his office to copy all endorsements into the book which he

produced, and that no such endorsement was entered therein. I

think it is impossible for us to say that the jury, in giving credit

to the positive statement, rather than to the inference arising from

the statement, on the other side, came to a wrong conclusion.

any pecial r cthe u ual cour e
book ' hich he
d th rein. I
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Cresswell, J. — I am of the same opinion. Two questions

J.-I am of the ame opinion. Two questions
aro e in this case-first, whether the defendant had received a
sufficient notice of dishonour,-secondly, whether Lysaght &
Smithett endorsed the bill before it became due. The decision of
the first question depends in some degree upon the econd;
because, wh ther the notice was sufficient or not, may d pend
upon whether ther was a proper endorsement. Mere writing on
the back of the bill i not enough to constitute an endorsement;
there must be a d livery, or something equivalent to a delivery
of the bill to the endor ee. Here, the fact has been di posed of
by the jury ; and I think there was evidence enough to justify the
conclu ion the) came to. James Lysaght swore positively that
the bill was endorsed in the name, and with the concurrence of
the firm, in July or August; and he further stated, that ever since
the endorsement, it had been kept by him, as his father's agent,
apart from the securities of the firm. That being so, it seems,
from the cases, that the holder of a bill wax avail himself of a
notice of di honour iven in due time b a rior endorsee, provide
he him elf is in a condition to sue the art, b whom t e notice
wa given. Here, Lysaght the younger, holding the bill as 1s
father's agent, duly presented it, and had it returned to him dishonoured.
otice of that fact to him, therefore, operating as
notice to the firm, the present plaintiff was entitled to sue them,
and, con equently, is in a condition to avail himself of the notice
of dishonour given by them to the defendant.
RESSWELL,

arose in this case — first, whether the defendant had received a

sufficient notice of dishonour, — secondly, whether Lysaght &

Smithett endorsed the bill before it became due. The decision of

the first question depends in some degree upon the second;

because, whether the notice was sufficient or not, may depend

upon whether there was a proper endorsement. Mere writing on

the back of the bill is not enough to constitute an endorsement ;

there must be a delivery, or something equivalent to a delivery,

of the bill to the endorsee. Here, the fact has been disposed of

by the jury; and I think there was evidence enough to justify the

conclusion they came to. James Lysaght swore positively that

the bill was endorsed in the name, and with the concurrence of

the firm, in July or August; and he further stated, that ever since

the endorsement, it had been kept by him, as his father's agent,

apart from the securities of the firm. That being so, it seems,

from the cases, that the holder of a bilLm ax avail himself of a

notice of dishonour given in due time by a prior endorsee, provide^

he him self is in a condition to sue the party by whom the notice

was given. Here, Lysaght the younger, holding the bill as his
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Father's agent, duly presented it, and had it returned to him dis-

honoured. Notice of that fact to him, therefore, operating as

notice to the firm, the present plaintiff was entitled to sue them,

and, consequently, is in a condition to avail himself of the notice

of dishonour given by them to the defendant.

Williams, J. — I am of the same opinion. The evidence estab-

lished the whole case, if the jury were right in the conclusion to

which they came : and I am not prepared to say that they were

wrong.

Wilde, C. J. — I certainly was not dissatisfied with the ver-

dict. Lysaght the younger swore positively that the security in

question was appropriated by him, with Smithett's assent, in part

discharge of the debt due to the plaintiff. He was very strictly

cross-examined as to the period at which the endorsement took

place : he distinctly swore that it was before the bill became due :

he believed it was in July or August. If Lysaght & Smithett

intended to act honestly, they were bound to make the endorse-

ment ; and there is no reason for supposing that they did not, or

that James Lysaght stated that which was untrue. On the other

hand, there can be as little doubt that the notary's clerk meant cor-

J.-I am of the same opinion. The evidence established the whole case, if the jury were right in the conclusion to
which they came: and I am not prepared to say that they were
wrong.
WILLIAMS,

rectly to copy the endorsements into the book. It was for the jury

to decide between the conflicting statements. As to the notice of

WILDE, C. J.-I certainly was not dissatisfied with the verdict. Lysaght the younger swore positively that the security in
qu e tion was appropriated by him, with Smithett's assent, in part
di charge of the debt due to the plaintiff.
e was very strictly
cros -examined a to the period at which the endor ement took
place : he distinctly swore that it was before the bill became due:
he believed it was in July or ugu t. If Ly aght & Smithett
intended to act honestly, they were bound to make the endorsement· and there i no rea on for supposing that they did not, or
that James Lysaght stated that which was untrue. On the other
hand , there can be a little doubt that the notary's clerk meant correctl y to copy the endorsement into the book. It was for the jury
to decide between the conAicting statements. As to the notice of
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dishonour, the case seems to fall within the authorities. The facts

show that Lysaght & Smithett had due notice of the dishonour of

the bill, — one of them having caused it to be presented, and hav-

ing had it returned to him. A notice, therefore, by Lysaght &

S mithett, then being under a liability to the present plaintiff,

according to the authorities , enures as a notice to the defendant.

Rule refused.

NOTICE BY AGENT. §§ 92, 93.

Traders' Nat. Bank v. Jones (1905), 104 App. Div. 433, 93 N. Y.

Supp. 768.

Appeal from Trial Term, New York county.

dishonour, the case seems to fall within the authorities. The facts
show that Lysaght & Smithett had du notice of the dishonour of
the bill,-one of them having caused it to be presented, and having had it return d to him. A notice, therefor , b_y Lysa ht &
Smithett, then being under a liability to the present plaintiff 1
according to the authorities. enures as a notice to the defendant.
Rule refused.
~-

Action by the Traders' National Bank against Frank Cazen-

ove Jones. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an

order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, he appeals.

NOTICE

BY

AGENT.

§§ 92, 93.

Affirmed.

Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, Pat-

terson, Ingraham, and Laughlin, JJ.

Traders' Nat. Bank v. Jones (r905), ro4 App. Div. 433, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 768.

James H. Warner, for appellant.

Grant C. Fox, for respondent.

Laughlin, J. The action is brought to recover of the
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defendant, as indorser, the amount of two promissory notes and

protest fees. The question presented for determination is whether

the evidence shows as matter of law the giving of due notice of

protest to the defendant. Both notes were made at Scranton, Pa.,

by the copartnership firm ©f C. F. Beckwith & Co., of that city.

They were payable to the order of the defendant, indorsed by

him, and then indorsed by the makers and delivered to the plain-

tiff before maturity, at whose bank they were payable. The

Appeal from Trial Term, New York county.
Action by the Traders' National Bank against F rank Cazenove Jones. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an
order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, he appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P.
TERSON, I GRAHAM, and LAUGHLIN,

J., and
JJ.

McLAUGHLIN, PAT-

notary who protested the notes was called by the plaintiff. His

testimony is sufficient to show due presentation, demand, dis-

honor, and protest, but concerning the mailing of the notice of

James H. Warner, for appellant.
Grant C. Fox, for respondent.

protest to the defendant it was indefinite and uncertain both as to

time and address, and conflicted with other evidence presented

by the plaintiff. He testified that he addressed the notice to the

defendant at some place, the number he could not remember,

between 60 and 70 Central Park West, city of New York, and

that he obtained the defendant's address from C. F. Beckwith.

one of the makers ; but he does not expressly state that he

addressed the envelope according to the address he received from

LAUGHLI , J. The action is brought to recover of the
defendant, as indorser, the amount of two promissory notes and
prote t fee . The question presented for determination is whether
the evidence shows as matter of law the giving of due notice of
protest to the defendant. Both notes were made at Scranton, Pa.,
by the copartner hip firm ef C. F. Beckwith & Co., of that city.
They were payable to th order of the defendant indorsed by
him, and then indor ed by the makers and delivered to the plaintiff befor m~turity, at who e bank they were pa able. The
notary who protest d the notes was call d by the plaintiff. His
testimony is sufficient to how due pre entation, demand di honor, and protest, but concernino- the mailino- of the notice of
-protest to the defendant it wa indefinit and uncertain both as to
t ime and address, and conflict d with ther evidence pre ented
b_ the plaintiff. He te tified that he addre sed the notice to the
defendant at some place,. the numb r h could not remember,
between 60 and 70 Central Park W t, city of New York and
that he obtained the defendant' addre s from C. F. Beckwith
one of the makers; but he doe not expre sl
tate that he
add ressed th e envelope according to the addre s h received from
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Beckwith. Beckwith was also called by the plaintiff, and gave

the defendant's residence, place of business, and other addresses

for receiving mail at that time, none of which, however, was

; Central Park West; and further testified that the defendant had

had an apartment in Central Park West, but does not specify

the time or place. He was not asked concerning the address that

he gave the notary. Beckwith testified that the defendant was

j^v^v -wU^fvSL ^ a member of his firm._ It may be that the jury would have been

^jo-cV-e,^-^ \ justified in finding that the notary addressed the notice to an

,&. ^**>-«-a- «< address given by Beckwith, the defendant's partner, and that

e-^> aJlAaj^***^, this would be a full compliance with the duty of exercising proper

^^^^wa^y^iiiigence to ascertain the postoffice address and notify the indor-

, \xm. sj-*X>-^ j ser £ t j le di s i lon or of the paper, which is a condition precedent

l^to his liability. (Spencer v. Bank of Salina, 3 Hill, 520; Univer-

sity Press v. Williams, 48 App. Div. 188, 62 N. Y. Supp. 986;

Requa v. Collins, 51 N. Y. 144; Gaivtry v. Doane, id. 84, 92).

^jX^st^j^ The court, however, was no t warranted in attempting- t o recon-

^s^ ^- <5U- cile this conflict of testimony and in deciding the question as one

-^- N **\ of law^ The verdict, therefore, cannot be sustained upon the

^^S T «v direct notice to the defendant . The notary gave due and timely
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■^ x *~ c ^ r " . notice of protest to the defendant's firm, who were both makers,

and in form, at least, subsequent indorsers. If the plaintiff had

» alleged that the defend ant was a member of the firm, I am of

-— opinion that he would be chargeable with knowledge of the dis

v^<vvo^-3l hono r and with the notice given to his firm as indorsers (Gozvan

Tjt -!L>si<-*- v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176; Hall id ay v. McDougall, 22 Wend.

q^jb^jj^ 264, 272. See, also, Negotiable Instruments Law, Laws 1897, p.

Beck\Yith. Deckwith wa also called by the plaintiff, and gave
the clef nclant' re id nc , place of bu ine , and other addre es
for receivin mail at that time, none of which, howev r, w· s
Central Park \Vest; and forth r te tifiecl that the def ndant held
had an apartment in entral ark \ tV est, but does not spcci fy
th time or place. He wa not a k cl cone rning the adclre that
he gave the notary. Beckwith te tified that th defendant was
~~
a member of hi firm. It may be that the jury ' ould have been
~ ~i ju tified in finding that the notary adclr ssed the notice to an
d.. .... _,-.. a
add r s given by
ckwith, th e defendant's partner and. that
:M> ~ this would be a full compliance with the duty of exercising proper
~ ~lilige nce to a certain the po toffice addr
and notify th e indor6 ~
er of the di hon or of the paper which is a condition precedent
1
\ t his liability. (Spencer v. Bank of Salilla, 3 Hill, 520 · University Press v. Williams, 48 App. Div. 188, 62 . Y. Supp. 986;
Requa v. Collins, 51 N. Y. 144 · Gawtry v. Doane, id. 84, 92).
~~
The court, however. was not warranted in attempting to recon~ ~ &.i.- cile this conflict of testimony and in deciding- the que tion as one
~ ~ of law. The verdict, therefore, cannot be sustained upon the
~ -r~ ~ ~ direct notice to the defendant. The notary gave due and timely
t ~ notice of protest to the defendant's firm, who were both makers,
. . a ~'\ and in form, at least, ub equent indor ers . If th plaintiff had
-, -alle ed that the defendant was a member of the firm, I am of
I..~
~, ~ opinion that he would e chargeable with nowledge of the dis~ honor and with the notice g iven to his firm as indor ers (Gowan
::.;-- ~ v. 1ackson, 20 Johns. 176; Halliday v. McDougall, 22 \Vend.
~ ~ 264, 272. See, also, Negotiable In truments Law, Laws 1897, p.
>-0-0 ~
739, c. 612, §§ 170, 185, 186) ; but this was not pleaded and, since
1>-- w..., ~ ~ it was not an issue, there is no justice or propriety in seizing upon
~, ~,~ this item of evidence, although admitted without objection that
~ ~ it was not pleaded, for the purpose of holding the defendant.
....._ ~ ~ The verdict should stand or fall upon the issues as tried. The
~ ~ ~·notic to the firm, how ever, was received ei.th r n the day the
note fell due or on the morning of the day following. \i\ ith it
came, under separate cover, addressed to the defendant, care of
the firm , a formal notice of prate t by the notary in behalf of the
plaintiff directed to the defendant, and the firm were requested to
forward the same to him. Mr. Beckwith testified that immediately upon rec ivino- this notice he inclo ed it in an envelope and
addressed it to the defendant at his regular place for receiving
mail in the city of New York, which was in care of his counsel
on this appeal. Th n tary, who was a member of the bar of
Pennsylvania, testified that the statutory law of that state required

■j-o-o ^w*^*- 8 - 739' c - 6 I2 > §§ 170, 185, 186) ; but this was not pleaded, and, since

ty \^jL* 90L/&." it was not an issue, there is no justice or propriety in seizing upon

vju, a>A-,jvO~** this item °f evidence, although admitted without objection that

juC *y>tN~~*- it was not pleaded, for the purpose of holding the defendant.

j-*^, v~>*L rx>»^& The verdict should stand or fall upon the issues as tried. The

^ £^ ^**^--notice to the firm, however, was received either on the day the

note fell due or on the morning of the day following. With it

came, under separate cover, addressed to the defendant, care of

the firm, a formal notice of protest by the notary in behalf of the

plaintiff directed to the defendant, and the firm were requested to

forward the same to him. Mr. Beckwith testified that immedi-

ately upon receiving this notice he inclosed it in an envelope and

addressed it to the defendant at his regular place for receiving

mail in the city of New York, which was in care of his counsel

on this appeal. The notary, who was a member of the bar of

Pennsylvania, testified that the statutory law of that state required
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that the notice of protest to an indorser, when served by mail,

be addressed either to his residence or place of business, or last

place of residence. If this testimony is to be construed liter-

ally, it indicates that the rule in Pennsylvania is more restricted

than the requirements of the law merchant or of the negotiable

instruments law as adopted in this and many other states, includ-

ing Pennsylvania (Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania No. 162,

1901 [P. L. 194]), in that under them, if the indorser has not

designated an addres on the instrument, notice to any address

where he is accustomed to receive mail would be sufficient. (Ran-

som v. Mack, 2 Hill, 587, 38 Am. Dec. 602; Van Vechtcn v.

Pruyn, 13 N. Y. 549, 555). This question would not have arisen

had the plaintiff's counsel introduced the statute, instead of tak-

ing the opinion of the notary, which was manifestly not only

erroneous on the law, but, as he construed the law, it is doubtful

whether the notice would be sufficient. We think that the verdict

may be saved, however, upon the theory that this evidence was

incompetent to prove statutory law (Code Civ. Proc, §942;

Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 41, 54, 37 Am. Rep. 538; Lincoln

v. Battcllc, f> Wend. 475 ; Chanoine v. Fozvlcr, 3 Wend. 173) ;
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and, even if the plaintiff, having introduced it, is bound by it, it is

insufficient to establish that the law of Pennsylvania on this point

is different from the law merchant, and should be so construed as

to be ..consistent therewith.

Although it presumptively appears from the face o f the notes

and the indorsements that the defendant was an accommodation

indorser for the makers (Smith v. IVcston, 159 N. Y. 194, 54

N. E. 38; Nat. Bank v. German American M. IV. Co., 116 N. Y.

281, 22 N. E. 567, 5 L. R. A. 673), and therefore would not be

Hable to them, and consequently they could not, in their own behalf, < ^Juot^^ <r™

give him a valid notice of protest ( Negotiable Instrument Law, V«J^^JL ( W#

Laws 1897, p. 739, c. 612, § 161 ; Cabot Bank v. Warner, 92 Mass. M>jl*^ o<w^su£ J

522; Harrison v. Roscoe, 15 M. & W. 231 ; Stanton v. Blossom, *-* *~^ °^ ¥****

14 Mass. 116, 120, 7 Am. Dec. 198; Story on Promissory Notes,

§ 3°3 r7th Ed. 1). yet thev could on behalf of the bank, and as its

agents, give the notice by forwarding it immediately, as was done

(Negotiable Instruments Law. Laws 1897. p. 739, c. 612. §§ 162,

163; Sewall v. Miller,' 16 N. Y. 235; Smith v. Poillon, 87 N. Y.

590, 41 Am. Rep. 402; Eagle Bank v. Hathazvay, 46 Mass. 212;

Rowe v. Tipler, 13 C. B. 249; Chapman v. Kcane, 3 Adol. & L.

193; Lysaght v. Bryant, 19 L. J. C. P. 160).

It follows, therefore, that the judgment and order should be

affirmed, with costs. All concur, except Wan Brunt, P. I., who

dissents.
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notice to whom. § 91.

Linn ct al. v. Morton, imp. (1863), 17 Wis. 157.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rock county.

NOTICE TO WHOM.

§ 9r.

Yates and Gray, for value, gave their note, indorsed for

them by Horton before delivery, and payable to the plaintiffs or

order at the Rock County Bank, at Janesville, in this state. Before

Linn et al. v. Horton, imp. (1863), 17 Wis. I57·

the note became due, the plaintiffs, who were merchants in the

city of New York, indorsed it for collection to Kissam & Taylor,

bankers in the same city, who indorsed it and sent it for collection

to the Central Bank of Wisconsin, at Janesville. Default having

been made in its payment when due, to wit, November 22, 1861,

it was duly protested, and on the same day the note and notice

of protest for Horton, and like notices for Kissam & Taylor and

the plaintiffs respectively, were enclosed in an envelope and

deposited in the postoffice at Janesville, postpaid, directed to

Kissam & Taylor, who received the same November 27. On the

same day Kissam & Taylor delivered to the plaintiffs the notices

addressed to them and to Horton respectively ; and the plaintiffs,

on the same day, enclosed the notice to Horton in an envelope

directed to him at Janesville, and deposited the same postpaid,
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in the postoffice at New York ; but the notice was never, in fact,

received by Horton. This action was brought against Horton

together with the makers ; but the Circuit Court found that "the

notary who protested the note did not use due diligence to ascer-

tain the residence of Horton," and thereupon held that proper

steps had been not taken to charge him, and rendered judgment

in his favor ; from which the plaintiffs appealed.

Conger & Hawcs, for appellants.

Charles G. Williams, for respondent.

By the court, Dixon, C. J. It is an established principle of

mercantile law, that if the holder of a bill or note chooses to rely

upon the responsibility of his immediate indorser, there is no

necessi t y for his giving notice to any previous party; and it

such not i ce be properly given, in due time, by the other parties, it

w ill enure to the benefit of the holder, an d he may reco ver thereon

against any ot them. Thus, it the holder notifies the sixth indor-

ser, and he the fifth, and so on to the first, the latter will be liable

to all the parties. (1 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 503, 504; and

Edwards on Bills and Notes, 473, 474, and the cases cited). And

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rock county.
Yates and Gray, for value, gave their note, indorsed for
them by Horton before delivery, and payable to the plaintiffs or
order at the Rock County Bank, at Janesville, in this state. Before
the note became due, the plaintiffs, who were merchants in the
city of New York, indorsed it for collection to Kissam & Taylor,
bankers in the same city, who indorsed it and sent it for collection
to the Central Bank of Wisconsin, at Janesville. Default having
been made in its payment when due, to wit, ovember 22, 1861,
it was duly protested, and on the same day the note and notice
of protest for Horton, and like notices for Kissam & Taylor and
the plaintiffs respectively, were enclosed in an envelope and
deposited in the postoffice at Janesville, postpaid, directed to
Kissam & Taylor, who received the same November 27. On the
same day Kissam & Taylor delivered to the plaintiffs the notices
addressed to them and to Horton re pectively; and the plaintiffs,
on the same day, enclosed the notice to Horton in an envelope
directed to him at Janesville, and deposited the same postpaid,
in the postoffi.ce at New York; but the notice was never, in fact,
received by Horton. This action was brought against Horton
together with the makers; but the Circuit Court found that "the
notary who protested the note did not use due diligence to ascertain the residence of Horton," and 'thereupon held that proper
steps had been not taken to charge him, and rendered judgment
in his favor; from which the plaintiffs appealed.
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it is no objection to such notice that it is not in fact received so

soon by the first or any prior indorser, as if it had been trans-

mitted directly by the holder or notary, provided it has been

seasonably sent by each indorser as he receives it. (Colt v. Noble,

5 Mass., 167; Mead v. Engs. } 5 Cow., 303; Howard v. Ives, 1

Hill, 263). And jJTe_ same degree of diligence must be exercised

on the part of the indorser in forwarding notice as is required

of the holder. Ordinary diligence must be used in both cases.

He is not bound to forward notice on the very day upon which

he receives it, but may wait until the next. (Howard v. Ives,

and the authorities cited).

For the purpose of receiving and transmitting notices, those. )

whojiol d at the time of pro test, and thosej vho indorse as mere, /'

agents to collec t, are regarded as real parties to the bill or note ; '

The former as holders in fact, and the latter as actual indorsers J

for value. (Mead v. Engs; Howard v. Ives).

It follows from these principles, that the proper steps were

taken to charge the defendant Horton as indorser. Notice for

him was forwarded by mail, postpaid, on the day of the protest, to

the agents and last indorsers in New York, and delivered by them,
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on the day it was received, to the plaintiffs, their immediate

indorsers, who, on the same day, deposited it, inclosed in an

envelope postpaid, in the postoffice at New York, directed to the

defendant at Janesville, Wisconsin, his proper postoffice.

Under these circumstances, the only question which can pos-

sibly arise is, whether the defendant ought to be discharged by

reason of the notice not having been in fact received by him. He

testified that it was not. Professor Parsons observes, that in all

the cases of constructive notices, where notice given by a subse-

quent to a prior indorser has been held to enure to the benefit

of the immediate indorser, it has appeared that the notice was

actually received ; and he raises a question whether this would ^

be so if the notice was sent to the wrong place. ( 1 Pars, on- ^V

Notes and Bills, 504, note, and 627). But here the notice

w as sent to the right place . Besides, t he plaintiffs, who seek to

avail them selves of the notice, are the indorsers who sent it to

the defendant as the indorser next immediately preceding them.

We have already seen that the rule of diligence as to them is the

same as in the case of the holder . J> ^Lc^Xa/v.

Let the judgment be reversed, and the cause remanded

with directions to enter judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs according to the demand of the complaint.

it is no objection to such n tice that it is not in fact received so
soon by the fir t or any pri r indor r, a if it had been tran mitted directly by the hold r or notary, provid d it has been
ea onably s nt by each indor r a h receiv s it. (Colt v. able)
5 Mas ., 167; Mead v. Engs.) 5 ow., 303 · Howard v. Ives) I
Hill, 2 3) . And the same d gree of diligence must be exercised
on th part of th ind r r in f n arding notic a i r quired
of the holder.
rdinary dilig nee mu t be used in both cases.
He i not bound to forward notice on the very day upon which
he r ceive it, but may wait until the next. (Haward v. Ives)
and the authoritie cited).
For the purpo e of receiving and transmitting notices, thosel
who hold at the tim of protest, and tho who indorse as mer
ag nt to collect, ar r gar e a rea parties to the bill or note;
the former a hold rs in fact, and the latter as actual indorsers
for alu . (il1ead v. Engs)· Howard v. Ives).
It follows from these principle , that the proper steps were
taken to charg th defendant Horton as indorser. Notice for
him was forwarded by mail, postpaid, on the day of the protest, to
the ao-ent and last indorser in New York, and delivered by them,
on the day it was received, to the plaintiff , their immediate
indor ers who. on the same day, deposited it, inclosed in an
envelope po tpaid, in the postoffice at ew York, directed to the
def ndant at Jan ville, Wiscon in, his proper postoffice.
nd r the e circum tance , the only que tion which can possibly ari e i whether the defendant ought to be discharged by ~ ~
rea on of the notice not having been in fact r ceived by him . He ~~
testified that it was not. Profe or Parsons observe , that in all ~~·ti
th ca e of con tructive notic , where notic giv n by a ubse- ~ ~ ~
quent to a prior indors r has b en h Id to enur to the benefit
~ v...>4-of the imm diate indor er it has appear d that the notice was
~ ~
actually receiv l; and he rai e a que ti n wh ther thi would
~ .
be o if the notice was nt to the wron place. (I ar . on.
Notes and
ill , 504, note, and 627). But her the notice~ ·
was sent to the rig-ht place.
e ide th plaintiff , ' ho eek to
avail themselves of the notic , ar th indor r who ent it to
t he defendant as the indor r ne ·t imm diat ly prec ding them.
W have alr ady se n that Jhe rul of diligenc a to them is the
as in th e case of the hold r.

L et the judg11ient be rev rs d, and the caus remand d
with direction s to enter jud m nt in fa'"' or of the
plainti ffs according to th d 111a11d of th complaint.
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notice by inurement. § 94"95-

Lysaght v. Bryant. (See page 413.)

NOTICE TO PARTNERS. § IOI.

NOTICE BY INUREMENT.

Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen. (See page 365.)

Lysaght v. Bryant.

NOTICE TO BANKRUPT. § IO3.

Am. Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros (1895), 94 Tenn. 624.

§ 94-95.

(See page 4r3.)

Appeal from Chancery Court of Davidson county. Andrew

Allison, Ch.

/. M. Gaut and J. S. Pilcher, for Bank.

A. N. Grisham, for Junk Bros.

NOTICE TO PARTNERS.

§IOI.

Beard, J. This suit was instituted against the Junk Bros.

Lumber & Manufacturing Co., a corporation with its situs in

Nashville, as the indorser for value of certain domestic negotiable

Fourth Nat. Bank v. Heuschen.

(See page 365.)

notes. The defendant resisted recovery on the ground that

notice of dishonor of the paper was not given as the law requires.

A decree having been pronounced against the corporation, it has

filed the record in this court, and the action of the court below

NOTICE TO BANKRUPT.

in overruling this defense is assigned as error.

§ 103.

Before coming to the general question raised by the assign-

ments, it is proper to dispose of five of these notes, which are

Am. Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros (r895), 94 Tenn. 624.
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shown by the proof to have been made for the accommod ation of

this corporation and after w ards indorsed by it to the complainant.

As to these notes, their makers stood in the situation of sure ties

to the indorser, and it was the lat ter s duty to p rovide funds to

Appeal from Chancery Court of Davidson county. ANDREW
Ch.

ALLISON'

meet them at maturity, and it was, therefore, bound to the holder

without presentm ent, protest, or notice. (2 Am. & Eng. Ency.

of Law, 399; 2 Daniel on Nego. Ins., Sec. 1085; 3 Randolph on

!. M. Gaut and J. S. Pilcher, for Bank.
A. N. Grisham, for Junk Bros.

Com. Paper, Sec. 1205; Black v. Fizer, 10 Heis., 48). Thus dis-

posing of those five notes, the question recurs as to the liability

of the defendant as indorser of the remaining thirty-five.

The facts disclosed in the record are, that, for a consider-

able period of time, the Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Co.

were engaged in manufacturing in Nashville, with its business

BEARD, J. This suit was instituted against the J upk Bros.
Lumber & Manufacturing Co., a corporation with its situs in
Nashville, as the indorser for value of certain domestic negotiable
notes. The defendant resisted recovery on the ground that
notice of dishonor of the paper was not given as the law requires.
A decree having been pronounced against the corporation, it has
filed the record in this court, and the action of the court below
in overruling this defense is assigned as error.
Before coming to the general question raised by the assignments, it is proper to dispose of five of these notes, which are
shown by the proof to have been made for the accommodation of
this corporation and afterwards indor ed by it to the complainant.
As to th se notes, their makers stood in the s1tuat10n of sureties
to the indorser, and it was the latter's duty to provide funds to
meet them at maturit , and it was, therefore, bound to the holder
without resentment prote t, or notice. (2 Am. & Eng. -<ncy.
of Law, 399; 2 Daniel on Nego. Ins., ec. 1085; 3 Randolph on
Com. Paper, Sec. I205; Black v. Fizer, IO Heis., 48). Thus disposing of tho e five note , the question recurs as to the liability
of the defendant as indorser of the remaining thirty-five.
The facts disclo ed in the record are, that, for a considerable period of time, the Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Co.
were engaged in manufacturing in Nashville, with its business
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office located at the corner of First and Woodland streets, in that

city. Its books were kept there and there its mail, with that of

its principal officers and its various employes, was delivered. On

May 28, 1892, the corporation being insolvent, made a general

assignment of all its property, both real and personal, to one

Stainback, as assignee, for the benefit of all its creditors. This

assignment was a full surrender to the assignee, and, by its

terms, "vested him with all power and authority to do all acts

and things which may be necessary in the premises to the full

extent of the trust" created, and it authorized him "to ask,

demand, recover and receive of and from all and every person or

persons, all property, debts, and demands due, owing, and belong-

ing to" said assignee, and "to give acquittances and discharges

for the same, to execute and deliver deeds," and to use the name

of the assignor whenever the purpose of the trust required.

Immediately on the execution of the assignment, the assignee

took charge of the property covered by it, and went into posses-

sion of the office of the corporation; with its books, iron safe, etc.,

and employed at this office a young man to do such clerical work

as was required in the administration of the trust. For a limited
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time after the day of the appointment, with the old employes of

the corporation, he continued to run its machinery for the pur-

pose of converting its raw material into manufactured goods. In

winding up the affairs of this trust, he took into his service, as

such assignee, one Spain, who was a stockholder as well as the

director and general manager of this corporation at the date of

the assignment, and who continued, according to the testimony

in the case, to sustain these relations to it after that date. It is

true the duties imposed by the assignee upon Spain made it neces-

sary for him to be principally in the yard and about the plant, but

the proof is, that he was in this office every day, and sometimes

more than once during the day. The mail of the corporation was

delivered there as before, and, assuming to be entitled to the con-

trol of it, the assignee opened it personally or by his clerk, and

gave it such attention as it required, and no officer of the corpora-

tion ever called in question his right to control it, although, in

the nature of things, all the officers must have known that he was

receiving it and so dealing with it.

After the assignment the corporation abandoned business,

and all of its executive officers (with the single exception of the

general manager) were scattered, and each one pursued his own

private affairs at other points in the city of Nashville. After that

time it had no other office, and there were but two meetings of

office located at the corner of First and Woodland treets, in that
city. It books w re k pt th r and th r it mail, with that of
it principal offic rs and it variou mploy s, was deliv red.
n
fay 2 , 1892 th corp rati n b ing in lvent, mad a g n ral
a ignm nt of all its property, b th r al and p rsonal, t one
tainback, a a i ne , for th b nefit f all its creditor . This
a ignm nt was a full urr nd r to the assign , and, by its
terms, ' ested him v ith all pow r and authority to do all acts
and thing which may be n c ssary in th premises to the full
ext nt of th tru t" er at d, and it authorized him "to ask,
d mand, rec ver and r ceive of and from all and every person or
p r on , all prop rty, d bt , and demand due, owing, and belonging t " aid a si nee, and "to giv acquittances and discharges
for th ame, to xecute and deliv r de d ," and to use the name
of the a ignor wh never th purpo e of the trust required.
Immediately on the execution of the assignment, the assignee
took charge of the property covered by it, and went into possession of the office of the corporationi with it books, iron safe, etc.,
and employed at thi office a young man to do such clerical work
as was required in the administration of the trust. For a limited
time aft r the day of th appointment, with the old employes of
the corporation, he continued to run its machinery for the purpo e of conv rting its raw material into manufactured goods. In
winding up the affairs of this trust, he took into his service as
such a ignee, on
pain, who was a tockholder as well as the
director and o- neral manao-er of this corporation at the date of
the a iQTiment, and who continued, accordino- to th testimony
in the ca e, to su tain th e r lation to it after that date. It is
frue the duties impo ed by t'he as i nee upon pain made it necessary for him to b principally in th yard and about the plant but
the pr of is, that h wa in this office
ery da and sometimes
more than once durino- the day. The mail of the corporation was
deliver d th r a b fore, and, as umino- to b ntitl d to the control of it, th assio-nee open d it p r nall or by his clerk and
ga e it uch att ntion a it r quir d, and no ffic r of th c rporation ever call d in que tion hi right to control it althouo-h in
the natur of thin , all th officer mu t ha e kno-v n that he was
r c ivino- it and o dealino- with it.
Aft r the a ignment th
orporati n aban ned busine
and all of it ex cutive offic rs (with th ino-1 exc ption of the
gen ral mana er) w r catt r d, an
ach n pursu d hi Ov n
privateaffair atotherpoint inth cit of_Tah ille.
fterthat
time it had no other office an th re w r but tw m tin s of
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the board of directors, and these were held in private offices, and

with regard to past and unimportant transactions. Beginning

with the date of the assignment, and for several months there-

after, the paper sued on matured, and payment on proper demand

having been refused, it was protested by a notary public, and

notice of the protest in each instance, save two, was directed by

him to the corporation by name, and was left by him at the office

heretofore mentioned. In the two excepted cases, or instances,

the notices were addressed to "George W. Stainback, Assignee

of the Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Company." In all

these cases, as notices were received, the clerk of the assignee

entered a memorandum of the protest in the books of the corpora-

tion kept by him, and generally deposited these notices in the

safe. The officers of the corporation insist that they did not

receive these notices. Conceding this to be true, is the defend-

ant bound as indorser under the foregoing facts, notwithstanding

the lack of actual receipt of these notices?

Where the indorser has failed to receive notice, he is dis-

charged unless the holder can show that he has used due dili-

g ence in his effort to communicate notice. Where this can^_ be
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shown, Jio wever, it is immaterial that the notice does not reach

the indorser . (Harris v. Robinson, 4 Howard [U. S.], 336). So

it is, that kgal notice is no t neces sarily actual notice. (SciCO

National Bank v. Sanborn, 63 Maine, 340). Thus, an indorser

who changes his res i dence without the knowledge of the holder of

th e prot ested paper, is bound by notice sent to his former place of

rjsidence ^if the holder is not guilty of negligence in his failure

to have kn ow ledge of the change . I n such a case the holder,

jn the absence of any fact to put him on inquiry, can well

assum e that the indorser's r esidence continues where it for-

merly was. He is not bound to go upon the street to ascertain a

fact which he has the right to assume he already knows. (Saco

National Bank v. Sanborn, supra; Bank of Utica v. Phillips, 3

Wend.. 408; Rcqua v. Collins, 51 N. Y., 148; 2 Daniel on Neg.

Inst., Sec. 1083 ; 3 Randolph on Com. Paper, Sec. 1281 ; Harris

v. Memphis Bank, 4 Hum.. 518).

The well-established rule is that, where personal notice is

not given, the notice must be sent to the place where the indorser

will be most likely to receive it, and, if there is reasonable dili-

gence exercised by the holder in ascertaining this place, this is

all the law demands.

The Bank of America v. Shaw, 142 Mass., 290 (S. C, 7 N.

E. R., 779), is, in many respects, similar to this case, and will

the board of directors, and these were held in private offices, and
with regard to pa t and unimportant tran actions.
ginning
with the date of the assignment, and for several months therea fte r, the pap r u d on matured, and paym nt on proper demand
having been refused, it was prote ted by a notary public, and
notice of th prote t in each in tance, av two, wa directed by
him to the corporation by name, and was left by him at the office
heretofore mentioned. In the two excepted ca es, or in tances,
the notices were addressed to "George W. Stainback, ssignee
of the Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Company." In all
these cases, as notices were received, the clerk of the assignee
entered a memorandum of the prote t in the books of the corporation kept by him, and generally deposit d these notices in the
afe. The officers of the corporation insist that they did not
r~ceive these notices.
Concedinrr this to be true, is the defendant bound as indorser under the foregoing facts, notwithstanding
the lack of actual receipt of these notices?
Where the indorser has failed to receive notice. he is discharged unless the holder can show that he has used due diligence in his effort to communicate notice. Where this can be
shown, however, it is immaterial that the notice does not reach
the indorser. (Harris v. Robinson, 4 Howard [U. S.J, 336). So
it is, that le al notice is not n
n tice. (Sa.co
National Bank v. anborn, 63 Maine, 340). Thus, an indorser
who change hi residence without the knowledge of the holder of
the protested paper, is bound by notice sent to his former lace of
resi ence, 1
e o er 1s not guilty of negligence in his failure
.!_o have knowledge of the change. In such a case the holder,
in the ab ence of any fact to put him on inguiry, can well
assume that the indorser's residence continue where it formerly wa . He is not bound to go upon the street to ascertain a
fact w'hich he has the right to assume he already knows. (Saco
National Bmtll v. Sanborn, supra· Bank of Utica v. Phillips, 3
Wend., 408; Requa v. Collins, 51 N. Y., 148; 2 Daniel on Neg.
Inst., ec. IO 3; 3 Randolph on Com. Paper, Sec. 1281; Harris
v. Memphis Bank, 4 Hum., 518).
The well-e tabli hed rule i that, where personal notice is
not given, the notice mu t be ent to the place where the indorser
will be mo t likely to receive it, and, if there is reasonable dilig ence exerci ed b th holder in ascertaining this place, this is
all the law d mands.
The Bank of America v. Shaw, 142 Mass., 290 (S. C., 7 N.
E. R. , 779), is. in many r spects, similar to this case, and will
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serve to illustrate this rule. The facts in that case were that F.

Shaw & Co. had done business at 268 Purchase street, in Boston,

and, while so engaged, indorsed the paper in question. Before

its maturity, the firm became insolvent, and made a general

assignment to one Wyman for the benefit of their creditors. The

assignee took possession of the office of the firm, and used it in

the administration of his trust, but he permitted the sign of the

firm to remain tacked to the door. At the maturity of the paper,

F. Shaw was a fugitive from Massachusetts, and in hiding in

Canada. The notice of protest addressed by the notary to the

firm, by its proper name, was left by him at this office. F. Shaw,

when subsequently sued on this paper, defended upon the ground

that this notice was not sufficient to bind him, but the court held

that it was good, "because it was sent to what had been the place

of business of the firm, where its affairs were actually in process

of settlement under the trust." It is true that, in the opinion

announced, the fact of Shaw being a fugitive at the time of the

notice is given its due weight by the court, but this was not, by

any means, controlling in the conclusion reached.

So, in ex parte Baker, L. R., 4 Ch. Div., 795, the facts were,

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

that Bellman & Co., who had done business at "Oak Brewery,"

but were no longer doing so, drew drafts on one Hay, which

were dishonored. Before their maturity, Bellman had become

bankrupt, and a trustee had been appointed for his estate. Notice

of dishonor was directed to the drawers at "Oak Brewery," and,

yet, in the absence of proof that the trustee was in possession of

the old place of business of the firm, the notice was held to be

sufficient.

Again, in Casco National Bank v. Shaw, 79 Maine, 376 (S,

C, 10 At. Rep., 67), upon facts like those considered in Bank v.

Shazv, supra, and in an action against the indorsers, the court

say : "Notices were addressed to them at their former place of

business, where their affairs were being settled by a trustee to

whom they had made an assignment for the benefit of their

creditors, and we have no doubt that the notices were received

by the latter. Notices so sent and mailed are sufficient."

It is unnecessary to extend the discussion of this question.

It is sufficient to say that, in view of all these authorities, we have

no hesitation in holding that the corporation is liable as indorser

on al l this paper, where n otices of protest were addressed to it

in its corporate name.

But it is insisted, however, that at least the corporation is not

liable on the two notes the notices of the protest of which were

erve to illu trat thi rul . Th fact in that case were that F.
Shaw & o. had done bu in
at 2
Purcha
tr t, in o ton,
and, whil o ngag d, ind r d the pap r in que ti n. Before
its maturity, the firm b cam in Iv nt, and mad a gene ral
a signm nt to on Wyman for th b nefit of their r ditors. The
a igne took po
ion of th offi of th firm, and u ed it in
th admini tration f his tru t but he perrnitt d the ign of the
firm to r main tack d to the door.
t the maturity of the paper,
F. haw wa a fu iti
from Ia sachusett , and in hiding in
anada. The notic of prot t addre d by th notary to the
firm, by its prop r name was 1 ft by him at thi office. F. haw,
when sub equ ntly u d n thi pap r, d feml d upon th ground
that thi notic was not sufficient to bind him, but the court held
that it ' as ood, 'becau e it was sent to what had been the place
of bu ine of the firm, v. here its affairs were actually in proces
of ettlement und r th tru t." It i true that, in the opinion
announced, the fact of haw b ing a fugiti e at the time of the
notice i giv n it due weight by the court, but this was not, by
any mean , controllino- in the conclusion reach d.
o in ex parte Baker L. R., 4 h. iv., 795, the facts were,
that ellman & o., who had done bu ine at "Oak Brewery,"
but were n longer doino- o, drew draft on one Hay, which
were dishonored. Before their maturity, Bellman had become
bankrupt and a tru tee had been appointed for hi estate.
otice
of dishonor was directed to the drawers at " ak Br wery," and,
y t, in the ab enc of proof that th trustee was in pos e sion of
the old plac of bu ine of the firm, the notice was held to be
ufficient.
Ao-ain in Casco (\ ational Bank v. Shaw 79 Maine 376 ( .·
C., IO At. R p. 67) upon facts like tho e con idered in Ballk v.
Shaw, supra and in an action against the indor r , th court
a : " J otic s were addre ed to them at th ir form r place of
bu ines , v h re th ir affair were b ing
ttled by a tru tee to
w·hom they had mad an as i nment for the b n fit of their
creditor and v e have no doubt that th notic
were recei ed
by the latter. Notices so sent and mailed ar uffici nt.
It i unnece ary t e ·t nd th di cu ion of thi que tion .
It i uffici nt to ay that in view fall th
authoriti , w ha'
n he itation in holdin o- that th corporati n i liable a indor er
on all this paper, wh r notic of prot t w r ad r
d to it
in its corporate nam .
But it 1s ms1 t d, however, that at I a t the corporati n i not
liable on the two notes the notic of th prote t of which were
1
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addressed by the notary to "G. W. Stainback, assignee of the

Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Company." Whether

notice of protest to the trustee of a bankrupt's estate, or to the

assignee of an insolvent assignor making a general assignment, is

sufficient, has been the subject of uncertainty of opinion with

some of the text writers, and of conflict among others.

Air. Byles, in his work on Bills (Wood's Ed.), p. 294, says:

"If the drawer of a bill become bankrupt, notice must, neverthe-

less, be given to him, whether a trustee be appointed or not." A

number of English cases are cited by the author in his note to

this text, some of which support it, and others do not.

Parsons says: "If a person entitled to notice be bankrupt,

notice should be given to him, if the assignees are not yet

appointed ; if they are, notice, perhaps, should be given to them,"

etc. (1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 500).

Judge Story says : "If the party entitled to notice be a bank-

rupt, and assignees have been appointed, and the holder knows it,

notice should be given to them." (Story on Prom. Notes, Sec.

307)-

Mr. Daniel says: "If the party be a bankrupt, it is best to
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give notice to him and to his assignee also." If, however, "given

to the assignee alone, it would probably be sufficient." (2 Daniel,

§ 1002).

On the other hand, Mr. Chitty says : "If the party entitled

to notice be a bankrupt, notice should be given to him before the

choice of assignees, and after such choice, to them." (Chitty on

Bills, p. 228).

The author of the article on Bills and Notes (Mr. Charles

Merrill Hough, of the New York bar) in 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. of

Law, p. 412, says: "Upon the bankruptcy of an indorser, and

before the appointment of an assignee, the bankrupt himself is

the proper person to notify, but the assignee, when appointed,

should receive all notices of dishonor."

Mr. Tiedcman says: "If the drawer or indorser be bank-

rupt, notice should be given to the assignee, if there be one, par-

ticularly if the party has absconded."

In one of the latest, and, perhaps the most elaborate, of the

treatises on the subject of commercial paper — that of Mr. Ran-

dolph — the author says : "After the drawer or indorser of a bill

has become bankrupt, notice of its dishonor must be given to him

or to his assignee ; * * * if an assignee has been appointed,

and his appointment is known, the notice should be given to him."

(3 Randolph. Sec. 1243).

adclre ed by the notary to "G. W. tainback, assignee of the
Junk Bros. Lumber & Manufacturing Company.'
Whether
n tice of protest to the tru tee of a bankrupt's state, or to the
assia nee of an in olvent as ignor making a g n ral as ignment, is
sufficient, ha be n th subject of uncertainty of opinion with
some of the text writer , and of conflict among other .
lvlr. Byl , in his work on Bills (\Vood's Ed.), p. 294, says:
"If the drawer of a bill become bankrupt, notice must, nevertheless, be giv n to him, whether a trustee be appointed or not." A
number of Eno-Ii h cases are cited by the author in his note to
this text, some of which support it, and others do not.
Parsons says: "If a per on entitled to notice be bankrupt,
notice should be given to him, if the assignees are not yet
appointed; if they are, notice, perhaps, should be given to them,"
etc. ( l Parsons on Notes and Bills, 500).
Judge tory Sa) s: "If the party entitled to notice be a bank:-upt, and a signees have been appointed, and the holder knows it,
notice should be given to them." (Story on Prom. Notes, Sec.
307).
Mr. Daniel says: "If the party be a bankrupt, it is best to
give notice to him and to his assignee also." If, however, "given
to the assignee alone, it would probably be sufficient." ( 2 Daniel,
§ 1002).
On the other hand, Mr. Chitty says: "If the party entitled
to notice be a bankrupt, notice should be given to him before the
choice of assignees, and after such choice, to them." (Chitty on
Bills, p. 228).
The author of the article on Bills and Notes (Mr. Charles
Merrill Hough, of the New York bar) in 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. of
Law, p. 412, says: "Upon the bankruptcy of an indorser, and
before the appointment of an assignee, the bankrupt himself is
the proper person to notify, but the assignee, when appointed,
should receive all notices of dishonor."
Mr. Tiedeman says: "If the drawer or indorser be bankrupt, nnrice should be given to the assignee, if there be one, particularly if the party has absconded."
In one of the latest and, perhaps the most elaborate, of the
treatises on the subject of commercial paper-that of Mr. Randolph-the author ay : "After the drawer or indorser of a bill
has become bankrupt, notice of its dishonor must b given to him
or to his as ignee; * * * if an as ignee has be n appointed,
and his appointment is known, the notice should be given to him.''
(3 Randolph, Sec. 1243).
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Mr. Wade, in his work on "Notice," says: "When the indor-

ser or drawer becomes bankrupt subsequent to drawing or indors-

ing the bill or note, the notice should be given to the assignee,

when one has been selected prior to the dishonor of the instru-

ment."

This question seems to have been considered and determined

in only three of the American courts. The Supreme Court of

Kentucky, in Callahan v. Bank, supra, in the case of a voluntary

general assignment for the benefit of creditors, after a full and

careful consideration of the authorities, announced as the law of

that state, that notice to the assignee, in such an assignment,

would bind the indorser and his estate, and this upon the ground

that, by this act of the assignor, he was, under the assignor, in

a qualified sense at least, the general representative of his indebt-

edness.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in House v.

Vinton, 43 Ohio St. R., 346, by a majority opinion, declined to

recognize the authority of this case, making a distinction between

an assignee under a voluntary general assignment and an

assignee in bankruptcy. In this latter case, however, there is a
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strong dissenting opinion dv two of the judges of that court, in

which the soundness of the rule, as announced by the Kentucky

court, is earnestly insisted upon.

The case of Casco National Bank v. Shaw, 79 Maine, 376,

is in harmony with the rule in Callahan v. Bank, supra, although

the latter case is not mentioned in the opinion of the court.

This question has been heretofore undetermined in this

state, and we are at liberty, therefore, to establish that rule which

is most in accord with what we conceive to be the weight of

authority and reason. We are satisfied, therefore, to hold the law

to be that, whenever a general assignment is made, as contem-

plated by our law, that the assignee in such assig nment so far

stan ds in the shoes of his assig nor that notice to such assignee of

the noivpayment of indorsed paper will bind such indorser.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

-V

&--

Mr. \i ad , in hi work on "N otic ," ay : ' When the indorer or draw r becom bankrupt sub equent to drawing r indor ing the bill or not , th n tic hould b giv n to the a signee,
wh n on has been sel cted prior to the dishonor of the in trument."
Thi question e m to have be n considered and determined
in only thre of the Ame rican court . The upreme ourt of
Kentucky, in allahan v. Bank, supra, in th case of a voluntary
eneral a ignment for the ben fit of creditor , after a full and
.careful con id ration of the authorities, announced as the law of
that state, that notice to the a iO'nee, in uch an assignment,
would bind the indor er and his estate, and this upon the ground
that by thi act of the a ignor, he wa , under the a ignor, in
a qualified s n e at 1 a t, the g neral representative of his indebtedness.
n the other hand the Supreme Court of hio, in H O'U Se v.
I inton, 43 Ohio t. R. 346, by a majority opinion, declined to
recognize the authority of this case, making a distinction between
an a ignee under a voluntary general a signment and an
a ignee in bankruptC) . In thi latter ca e, however, there is a
stronO' di enting opinion oy two of the judges of that court, in
which the oundne of the rule, as announced by the Kentucky
court, is arne tly in isted upon.
The case of Casco ational Bank v. Shaw, 79 Maine, 376,
is in harmony with the rule in Callahan v. Bank, supra, although
the latter ca e i not mentioned in the opinion of the court.
Thi question has been heretofore undetermined in this
state, and we are at liberty, therefore, to e tabli h that rule which
i mo t in accord with what \Ve conceive to be the weiO'ht of
authority and rea on. \ V are ati fied th refore, to hold the law
to be that, whenev r a general as ignment is made a contemplated b our law, that the a i n e in uch a signment o far
tand in the hoe of hi a iO'n r that notice t uc a wnee o
ment of indor ed pap r will bind uch rndor er.
t he nonThe judgment of the court below is a r11ied.
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notice by telegraph. §§ 98, iio-3.

Fielding v. Corry ct al. (1897), 1 Q. B. D. (1898), 268.

Appeal from the judgment of Ridley, J. at the trial of the

cause with a jury.

NOTI E BY TELEGRAPH.

§§ 98, I I0-3.

The action was by the plaintiffs as holders of a bill of

exchange against several defendants, and, among others, against

Fielding v. Corr3 et al. (1897),
1

Mrs. Edwards, who was an indorser of the bill. The bill was put

I

Q. B. D. (1898), 268.

into the hands of the Cardiff branch of the County of Glouchester

Bank for collection, and forwarded by that branch to the London

and Westminister Bank in London, who presented it on Saturday,

November 10, 1894. The bill was dishonoured ; and on Monday,

November 12, the London and Westminster Bank sent by post

a notice of dishonour directed to the Cirencester branch of the

County of Gloucester Bank. On the following day they discov-

ered the mistake, and telegraphed notice of dishonour to the Car-

diff branch. There was no evidence as to the written notice of

dishonour having reached the Cardiff Bank, but on the Wednes-

day, which was the day on which notice of dishonour should, in

due course, have been given by that branch, this was done. The

subsequent notices were given in time. Ultimately the defendant,
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Mrs. Edwards, received notice at the time at which she would

have received it had all the notices been given in order and in due

time. The defence to the action was that notice was not sent to

the Cardiff branch in time, and that the defendant was therefore

discharged. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.

The defendant, Mrs. Edwards, appealed.

Woodtin, for the defendant.

Ashton Cross and Edmondson, for the plaintiffs.

A. L. Smith, L.J. The question of law raised in this case

is whether notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange was given in

time. It appears that the plaintiffs had a bill of exchange, which

they handed to the Cardiff branch of the County of Glouchester

Bank, which is a banking company having branches at different

places. The Cardiff branch sent the bill to their London agents,

the London and Westminster Bank, by whom it was presented

for payment in London on Saturday, November 10. 1894, and it

came back into their hands in the afternoon, so that they had until

Monday, November 12, to give notice of dishonour, and on that

day they sent notice. By mistake this notice was sent to the Ciren-

App al from the judgment of Ridley, J. at the trial of the
cause with a jury.
The action was by the plaintiff as holder of a bill of
exchange again t everal defendant , and, among other against
Mrs. ""' dwarcl , who wa an indor er of the bill. The bill was put
into the han l of the ardiff branch of the ounty of Glouchester
Bank for collection, and forwarded by that branch to the London
and \V cstmini ter ank in London who pre n t d it on aturda y,
ovember ro, 1894. The bill was dishonoured; and on Monday,
November 12, the Lon Ion and Westmin ter ank ent by post
a notice of dishonour directed to the Cirencester branch of the
aunty of louce ter Bank. On the following day they discovr d the mistake, and telegraphed notice of dishonour to the Cardiff branch. There wa no evidence as to the written notice of
cli honour having reach d the Cardiff Bank but on t'he Wednesday, which wa the day on which notice of dishonour should, in
due course, have been given by that branch, this was done. The
ubsequent notice were given in time. Ultimately the defendant,
:Mrs. Edwards, received notice at the time at which he would
have received it had all the notices been given in order and in due
time. The defence to the action was that notice wa not sent to
the Cardi ff branch in time, and that the defendant was therefore
discharged. Judgm nt wa ent red for the plaintiffs.
The defendant, Mrs. Edwards, appealed.

Woodfin, for the defendant.
Ashton Cross and Ednwndson, for the plaintiffs.
A. L. MITH, L.J. The que tion of law raised in this case
i wh ther notice of di honour of a bill of xchange wa given in
tim . It appears that the plaintiffs had a bill of exchange, which
they handed to the ardiff branch of the ounty of Glouche t r
ank, which is a bankincr company having branch at different
place . The ardiff 1 ranch ent the bill to th ir London agents,
the London and \V stminster ank, by whom it was pre ented
for payment in London n aturday, ov mber IO, I 94, and it
came back into their hands in the afternoon, o that they had until
iv notic f di honour, and on that
Monday, November 12 t
day they sent notice. By mi take thi notice was s nt to t11
iren-
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cester branch of the County of Gloucester Bank, and not to the

Cardiff branch. On the morning of Tuesday, November 13, the

London bankers had discovered the mistake, and they telegraphed

to the Cardiff branch, giving them notice that the bill was dishon-

oured. What happened after this was that due notice was given

in succession by the Cardiff branch, and then all the way down

the line of indorsers till the defendant, who now appeals, was

reached, though she got notice of dishonour in due time. The

question raised is whether there was a blot in the proceedings by

reason of notice not having been given on Monday the 12th to

the Cardiff branch ; the notice having, as I have said, been mis-

directed to the Cirencester branch. To ascertain this we must

refer to the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 49. By sub-s. 5 the

notice may be given in writing or by personal communication,

and in any terms which sufficiently identify the bill and intimate

that it has been dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment,

and I refer to this for the purpose of shewing that there is no

magic about a notice of dishonour, but that it may be sent by

post or in any other way. Then, by sub-s. 12, the notice may be

given as soon as the bill is dishonoured, and must be given within
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a reasonable time thereafter. It is further provided that in the

absence of special circumstances — and I think there were no

special circumstances proved in this case — notice is not to have

been deemed to have been given within a reasonable time unless,

"where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside

in different places, the notice is sent off on the day after the dis-

honour of the bill, if there be a post at a convenient hour on that

day; and if there be no such post on that day, then by the next

post thereafter." Speaking for myself, I think that the notice

would be good if on the day after the dishonour of a bill the

person giving the notice were to telegraph to the person to

receive the notice in terms which sufficiently identified the bill and

intimated that it had been dishonoured. It appears that the Lon-

don and Westminster Bank gave what would be a proper notice

of dishonour to the County of Gloucester Bank, though by mis-

take the notice was addressed to the wrong branch of that bank.

It seems to me that we would be frittering away the provisions

of th estatute if we were to ho ld that a mistake in an address cou1d_

not :be~rectihed, it the effect of the rectification is that the person

to whom notice is sent in point of fact gets notice in due cours e

ancl in due time, it is said that the sending of the notice and the -

sending of the telegram were disjunctive acts, and that, the

notice of Monday being sent to the wrong place and the telegram

cester branch of the ounty of Glouc ter ank, and not to the
Cardiff branch.
n the morning of Tuesday, November 13, the
London bankers had di covered th mi take, and th y telegraphed
to the Cardiff branch, giving them notice that the bill was dishonoured. What happened after this was that du notice was given
in succes ion by the ardiff branch, and then all the way down
the line of indor ers till the defendant, who now appeal , was
reached, though h got notice of dishonour in due time. The
question raised is v hether there wa a blot in the proceedings by
reason of notice not having been given on fonday the 12th to
the Cardiff branch; the notice having, as I have said, been misdirected to the Cirencester branch. To ascertain this we must
refer to the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 49.
y sub-s. 5 the
notice may be given in writing or by personal communication,
and in any terms which sufficiently identify the bill and intimate
that it ha been di honoured by non-acceptance or non-payment,
and I refer to this for the purpose of shewing that there is no
magic about a notice of dishonour, but that it may be sent by
post or in any other way. Then, by sub-s. 12, the notice may be
given as soon as the bill is dishonoured, and must be given within
a reasonable time thereafter. It is further provided that in the
absence of special circum tances-and I think there were no
special circum tances proved in this case-notice is not to have
been deemed to have been given within a reasonable time unless,
"wher the person giving and the per on to receive notice reside
in different places, the notice is sent off on the day after the dishonour of the bill, if there be a post at a convenient hour on that
day; and if there be no such po t on that day, then by the next
post thereafter." Speaking for myself, I think that the notice
would be good if on the day after the dishonour of a bill the
person giving the notice were to telegraph to the person to
receive the notice in terms which sufficiently identified the bill and
intimated that it had been dishonoured. It appears that the London and Westminster Bank gave what would be a proper notice
of dishonour to the County of Glouc t r Bank, though by mistake the notice was addressed to the wrong branch of that bank.
It seems to me that we would be frittering away the pro
of the statute if we were to hold that a mi
not be recti e , 1 e
er on
to w om notice 1s sent in point of fact g: t notic in due cour e
and m due bme. It 1 aid that the nding of the notice and the
sending of the telegram were disjunctive acts and that, the
notice of Monday beinrr sent to the wrong place and the telerrram
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of Tuesday being too late, no proper notice has been proved. I

cannot bring myself to disconnect these two acts, and, although

the written notice of Monday is not shewn to have been properly

directed, I think the mistake was rectified in due time by the tel-

egram of the next day . I think, therefore, that the appeal should

be dismissed.

i Rigby, LJ. I am of the same opinion. A notice of dishonour

is not required to be in any particular form — it may be by writ-"

ing or by personal communication, and maybe in any te rms pro-

vided it gives the necessary information^ it was plainly intended

to give the widest discretion as to the form of the notice. If there

were anything in the act which declared that the address of the

person who is to receive the notice is material, different considera-

tions would arise. For my part, I think it is not material that the

notice has been wrongly addressed, pro vided that this has not pre T

vented it getting to the proper person within t hlTproper time .

With regard to the facts of this case, i agree that there are

no special circumstances to be considered. The notice has been

sent to the County of Gloucester Bank at one of their many

addresses, and received there and acted upon without objection,
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and the question is whether it was sent to them in time. With

regard to the giving of notice, agents are treated successively as

if they were holders. Can it be said that if the County of Glou-

cester had themselves been indorsers they would not have been

liable had the notice come in an irregular maner into their hands

but in proper time? If this cannot be said, I do not think the

notice should be held to be ineffectual in a case in which the bank

are not parties to the bill. In fact, the Cardiff branch knew of

the dishonour of the bill on Tuesday, November 13, in time to

give notice on the proper date — the 14th. To hold that notice

directed to the right person but sent to a wrong address must nec-

essarily be invalid would be to go to an extreme length, and make

it appear that a right address is an essential part of the notice.

There may be no address, or the address would not be material

if a person carrying the notice with a wrong address met the

person to whom it was directed and delivered it to him.

vAxo»vaA>-A I think the notice was sufficient whether the Cardiff" branch

ct^sc^- is treated as separate from and independent of the Cirencester

branch or not. The latter bank received due notice on the 13th,

and the Cardiff branch knew of the dishonour of the bill and of

the notice on the same day, and by reason of the action of the

Cirencester branch were enabled to do exactly what was neces-

sary. Notice of dishonor reached the defendant at the proper

~-

of Tu day being too late, no proper notice has been proved. I
cannot bring my elf to di connect the two act , and, although
th e written noti of Monday is not hew n to have b n properly
directed, I think the mi tak was rectified in du time by the telegram of the next day. I think, therefore, that the appeal should
be di missed .
RIGBY, L.J. I am of the same opinion. A notice of dishonour
i not r quir d to be in any particular form-it may be by writing or b
r onal commumcat10n, and may be m any terms provided it give the nece sary information. t was p am y mt nde
to give the widest discr tion as to the form of the notice. If there
were anything in the act which declared that the addres of the
person who is to receive the notice is material, different consideration would arise. Fo r my part, I think it is not material that the
notice has been wron 1 addre sed rovid ed that this has not revent d it gettinb to the proper person wit in the pro er time.
!\T 1th reaard to the acts of t 11s case, agree that there are
no special circum tances to be considered. The notice has been
sent to the County of Gloucester Bank at one of their many
addre ses, and received there and acted upon without objection,
and the question is whether it was sent to them in time. With
regard to the giving of notice, agents are treated successively as
if they were holders. Can it be said that if the County of Gloucester had them elves been indorsers th ey would not have been
liable had the notice come in an irregular maner into their hands
but in proper time? If this cannot be said, I do not think the
notice should be held to be ineffectual in a case in which the bank
are not parties to the bill. In fact, the Cardiff branch knew of
the dishonour of the bill on Tuesday, November 13, in time to
g ive notice on the proper date-the 14th. To hold that notice
directed to the right person ·b ut sent to a wrong address must necessarily be invalid would be to go to an extreme length , and make
it appear that a right a ld ress is an e sent·ial part of the notice.
\ There may be no address, or th e address would not be material
if a person carrying the notice with a wrong address met the
per on to whom it was directed and delivered it to him.
T think the notice was suffioi nt wh th r the Cardiff branch
i ~ treated a separat from and independent of the Cirencester
branch or not. The latter bank received due notice on the 13th,
and th Cardiff branch knew of the di honour of the bill and of
t he notice on the same day, and by reason of the action of the
Cirence ter 1 ranch were enabled to do exactly what was necessarY. ~ otice of dishonor reached the defendant at the proper
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time, and what was done was precisely what is required by the

statute. Under these circumstances it seems to me impossible to

say that there was a failure in one of the links of the chain of

notices ; and if so it follows that the plaintiffs are entitled to retain

the judgment in their favour. \ < ^V srv ~$ LJ *~ yr ~

Collins, LJ. I have the misfortune to differ from the other

members of the court on a point in this case which is of import- ^^

time, and what was done was precisely what is required by the
statute. Und r th e circurn tanc it
ms to me impossible to
say that th r wa a failur in on of th links f the chain of
notices; and if so it follow that th plaintiff ar ntitl d to retain
the judgment in their favour.
\_

0

~~

ance, and the conclusion I have come to is that the appeal should

be allowed.

In the case of a bill of exchange any one who is entitled to

notice of dishonor may rely on a prior breach by any one of the

persons required to give notice. This is established by the cases,

and was not disputed in the argument. Another general observa-

tion is that the requirements as to notice of dishonour are arbi-

trary and highly technical, b ut they have long been settled by

aut hority, and are now crystallized Into statutory rules. It was

long ago held that knowledge is not equivalent to rec eipt of

notice: see Caunt v. Thompson, 1849, 7 C. B. 400. It would

unsettle the practice of merchants if these rules were not strictly

observed.
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The point on which I differ is the question whether different

branches of a bank are to be treated as one and the same person

for the purpose of giving and receiving notice of dishonour. I

think the judgments that have been given involve the proposition

that they may be treated as one. I am clearly of opinion that they

cannot. The point was decided in Clode v. Bayley, 12 M. & W.

51 ; 13 L. J. (Ex.) 17, more than fifty years ago, in which case

it was treated as resting on long-established practice. In Prince

v. Oriental Bank Corporation, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 325. Sir

Montague Smith in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council

refers with approval to Clode v. Bayley. He says, speaking of

that case: "It was held that for the purpose of estimating the

time at which notice of dishonour should be given, the different

branches were for that purpose to be regarded as distinct. In

considering whether notice of dishonour was given in time, it was

thought reasonable that the bill should be sent successively to the

branch banks through which it had come to the principal bank,

before giving the notice. It was pointed out by Lord Abinger

that it was not possible for the bank in London to know from

whom the bill came ; therefore it was necessary, in the ordinary

course of the transaction of business, that it should be sent to the

branches before notice of dishonour could properly be given."

In Clode v. Bayley, there was an indorsement of the bill to

COLLINS, L.J. I hav the mi fortune to cliff r from the other
·
members of the court on a point in thi ca e whrch is of import- ~
ance, and the conclusion I have com to is that the appeal should
be allowed.
In the case of a bill of exchange any one who is entitled to
notice of dishonor may r ly on a prior breach by any one of the
per ons required to give notice. This i e tabli hed by the cases,
and wa not di puted in the argument. Another general observation i that the requirements as to notice of dishonour are arbitrary and highly technical, but they have Ion been settled b
authority, an are now crystallized into statutory rules. It was
long ago held that knowledge is not equivalent to receipt of
notice: see Caunt v. Thompson, 1849, 7 C. B. 400. It would
unsettl the practice of merchants if th se rules were not strictly
observ d.
The point on which I differ is the question whether different
branches of a bank are to be treated as one and the same person
for the purpose of giving and receiving notice of di honour. I
' think the judgment that have been o-iven involve the proposition
that they may be tr ated as one. I am clearly of opinion that they
cannot. The point was d cided in Clode v. Bayley, 12 M. & W.
51; 13 L. J. (E.x .) 17, more than fifty years ao-o, in which case
it was treated as restino- on long-e tabli hed practice. In Prince ·
v. Oriental Bank Corporation, (I 7 ) 3 \pp. a . 325, Sir
Montao-u
mith in deliv rino- the judo-ment of th Privy Council
refers with approval to Clode v. Bayley. He ays, speaking of
that case: "It was h Id that for the purpose of stimatino- the
time at which notice of di honour hould be given the different
branches were for that purpose to b r ard d a di tinct. In
con id ring whether noti of di honour wa giv n in time it was
thought r asonable that the bill hould b sent succe ively to the
branch banks through which it had com to th principal bank,
before givino- the notice. It wa point cl out b Lord bino-er
that it wa not po ibl for th bani' in Lon on to know from
whom th bill came; th refore it "a n c ary in the ordinary
course of the transaction of bu in , that it hould b ent to the
branches before notice of di honour could prop rl be given."
In Clode v. Bayley, there was an indorsement of the bill to
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one of the branch banks; but that fact does not affect the

principle upon which the decision is based, and, indeed, as between

two of the branches, there was no indorsement. In the course

of the argument in that case it was said: "The only question

is, whether, this bank having two subordinate branches, each

of the three establishments is to be considered as a separate

holder, and entitled to notice of dishonour, or whether it is not

to be considered as one and the same establishment." That seems

to me to be the point before us, and the submission that the bank

and its branches were to be considered as one establishment was

unsuccessful. In Bray v. Hadwen, (1816) 5 M. & S. 68, the

banker was held to be entitled to one whole day for the purpose

of giving notice, as in the case of an ordinary person into whose

hands a dishonoured bill comes.

Under s. 49, sub-s. 8, of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882,

"where notice of dishonour is required to be given to any person,

it may be given either to the party himself, or to his agent in that

behalf." In this case the London and Westminster Bank was

agent to present the bill, and had no other principal for the pur-

pose of giving notice of dishonour but the Cardiff branch from
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which the bill was received ; but they sent notice to a branch to

which they were not responsible. Such a notice, in my opinion,

is ineffective, and must be put out of consideration. If it were

not so. it would follow that notice to one branch of a bank would

be notice to all branches, and this even though a branch might

be in a remote part of the kingdom, or, for anything I know,

out of the kingdom.

It has been contended that the London and Westminster

Bank sent notice on the 12th, because on that day they posted

one to the County of Gloucester Bank at their Cirencester branch ;

but on the authorities I have cited this was not notice to the Car-

diff branch. It is said to have been a notice sent to the right

person at a wrong address. That, in my judgment, would not

make it a better notice than if it had been sent to the wrong

person. In fact, it was not sent to the right person ; it was sent

to the Cirencester branch, which, for this purpose, was the wrong

person, and there is no evidence that it ever reached the Cardiff

branch. This notice, therefore, may be wiped out of the discus-

sion. It has been sought to eke out this defective notice by means

of the telegram which was sent to the Cardiff branch on the fol-

lowing day; but, within the terms of the section, that telegram

was clearly not in itself a good notice ; and to this my learned

brothers agree. How does it become any better from the fact

one of the branch banks; but that fact does not affect the
principle upon which the decision is ba ed, and, ind ed, as between
t\: o of the branches, there was no indorsem nt. In the course
of the ar0 ument in that case it was aid: "The only question
is, whether, this bank having two subordinate branches, each
of the three
tablishments is to be considered as a separate
holder, and entitled to notice of dishonour, or whether it is not
to be consider d a one and the same establishment." That seems
~ f"\- to me to b the point before us, and the submi sion that the bank
:J'~ and its branches were to be considered as one establishment was
un ucce sful. In Bray v. H adwen, ( r8r6) 5 M. & S. 68, the
t r " ' ~anker was held to be entitled to one whole day for the purpose
~
of giving notice, as in th case of an ordinary person into whose
~ ~ hand a di honoured bill comes.
~ \::b- c.N\J'
Under s. 49, sub-s. 8, of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882,
~·
"where notice of di honour is requi red to be given to any person,
it may be given either to the party himself, or to his arrent in that
behalf." In this case the London and VI/ e tminster Bank was
agent to present the bill, and had no other principal for the purpose of giving notice of dishonour but the Cardiff branch from
which the bill was received; but they sent notice to a branch to
which they were not responsible. Such a notice, in my opinion,
is ineffective, and must be put out of consideration. If it were
not so, it would follow that notice to one branch of a bank would
be notice to all branches, and this even though a branch might
be in a r mote part of the kingdom, or, ·for anything I know,
out of the kingdom.
It ha been contended that the London and Westminster
Bank sent notice on the 12th, because on that day they posted
one to the County of Gloucester Bank at their Cirencester branch;
but on the authorities I have cited this was not notice to the Cardiff branch. It is said to have been a notice sent to the right
person at a wrong address. That, in my judrrment, would not
make it a bett r notice than if it had been sent to the wrong
person. In fact, it was not sent to the right person; it was sent
to the Cirence ter branch, which, for this purpose, was the wrong
person, and there is no evidenc that it ever reached th Cardiff
branch. This notic , th refor , may be wiped out of the discussion. It has been sought to eke out thi def ctive notice by means
of the telegram which was sent to the Cardiff branch on the following day; but, within the terms of the section, that telegram
was clearly not in itself a good notice; and to this my learned
brothers agree. How does it become any better from the fact
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that an abortive attempt to send a good notice had been made the

day before? The defendant Mrs. Edwards did, in point of fact,

receive notice as soon as she would have done if there had been

no break in the chain ; but the cases have decided that she is

nevertheless entitled to take advantage of the break. I think,

therefore, that the appeal should be allowed. ^^ oV^

Appeal dismissed.

WHERE NOTICE MUST BE SENT. § IIC

Bartlett et al. v. Robinson (1868), 39 N. Y. 187.

This action is brought against the defendant herein as

that an abortive attempt to send a good notice had been made the
day before? The · d f ndant irs. Edwards did, in point of fact,
receive notice as soon as she would hav don if there had been
no break in the chain; but th ca s have decided that she is
neverthel ss entitl d to take advantao- of the break. I think,
therefore, that the appeal hould be allowed.
~
Appeal dismisse .

indorser of a promissory note, dated New York, July 18, i860,

made by J. Bryant Smith, which the defendant indorsed in the

following form, viz.: "Chas. Robinson, 214 E. 18th street." At

the time he so indorsed the note he resided at the place so desig-

WHERE NOTICE MUST BE SE T.

§!IC

nated, and continued to reside there to the time of the trial of

the action.

Bartlett et al. v. Robinson ( I868), 39 N . Y. I87.

The note was duly presented for payment, in the city of New

York where it was payable, and was protested, and on the next

day the notary deposited in the postoffice in the city of New

York a notice of such protest, addressed "Chas. Robinson, Esq.,
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City of New York," and paid the postage thereon.

The notice did not reach the defendant, and he did not

receive any notice of such protest.

There were at least two other persons of the name of Charles

Robinson residing in the city of New York at the time of the

making and at the time of the protest of the said note.

By a statute of the State of New York, passed in 1857,

(Laws of 1857. ch. 416) it is provided that "whenever the resi-

dence or place of business of the indorser of a promissory note

* * * shall be in the city or town, or wherever the city or

town indicated under the indorsement or signature of such

indorser as his or her place of residence * * * shall be the

same city or town where such promissory note * * * is pay-

able, or is legally presented for payment * * * all notices of

non-payment * * * of such promissory note * * * may

be served by depositing them, with the postage thereon prepaid

in the postoffice of the city or town where such promissory note

* * * was payable, or legally presented for payment * * *

directed to the indorser * * * at such city or town.

On a trial of the action before a referee the service of notice

This action is brought again t the defendant herein as
ind or er of a promi ory note, <lat d New York, July 18, r86o,
made by J. Bryant mith, which the defendant indorsed in the
following form, viz.: "Chas. Robin on, 214 E. 18th street." At
the tim he o indor ed the note he r ided at the place so designated, and continued to reside there to the time of the trial of
the action.
The note was duly presented for payment, in the city of New
York wh re it was payable, and was protested, and on the next
da) the notary deposited in the postoffice in the city of ew
York a notice of uch protest, addre ed "Chas. Robinson, Esq.,
City of New York,' and paid the po tage thereon.
The notice did not reach the defendant, and he did not
receive any notice of uch protest.
Ther were at 1 a t two other per ons of the name of Charles
Robinson residing in the city of ew York at the time of the
making and at the tim of the prate t of the aid note.
By a tatute of the tate of ew York pa ed in 1857,
(Laws of 1857, ch. 416) it i provided that wh never the re iof the indor er of a promi sory note
dence or place of bu in
* * * shall be in th city or town or wher ver the city or
town indicated under the indor em nt or sio-nature of uch
indorser a his or her place of re idence * * * shall be the
same city or town where such promi ory note * * * 1s pa :able, or is legally pr ented for paym nt * * * all notice of
non-payment * * * of such promi ory note * * * may
be served by depositin them, with th po ta
thereon prepaid
in the postoffice of the city or tO\ n wher such promi ory note
* * * was payable, or 1 gall pr nt d for payment * * *
directed to the indorser * * * at uch cit or town .
On a trial of the action before a ref ree the rvice of notice
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upon the indorser was held insufficient, and judgment was ren-

dered for the defendant. The judgment was affirmed in the

Supreme Court in General Term in the first district. The plain-

tiff appealed to this court.

Thomas Stevenson, for the appellant.

Wm. W. Niles, for the respondent.

Woodruff, J. — The condition of the liability of the indorser

of a promissory note is, that if, upon due demand, the note is not

paid by the maker, the holder shall give him notice thereof, in

order that he may take measures for his own security or protec-

tion.

The use of due diligence, by the holder , t o bring such notice

home to the indorser, stands by law, in the place of actual notice,

even though it be ineffectual, and fails to bring home- knowledge

to the indorser.

In all cases, then, in which the indorser fails to receive notice

(he having done nothing to waive or dispense with it), the ques-

tion of liability becomes one of diligence. Has the holder used

reasonable diligence to give the indorser notice?

That is a question partly of fact and partly of law, and must
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be determined according to the circumstances of each case.

What w ill constitute reasonabl e diligence, in ever y suppos-

able set of circumstances, cannot be decided by any unvarying

rule. Certain efforts, when proved to have been made, have been

passed upon by the courts, and, prior even to adjudication, been

so accepted by mercantile usage and acquiescence, that they may

be stated as rules for the guidance of all holders of bills, and the

instruction of all indorsers, and, it will be seen, that they adapt

themselves to the changes in the condition of things, and to the

conveniences and necessities of business.

Thus, in the early history of the subject, it was necessary to

carry the notice, or send it by some messenger, so as to be able

to prove its delivery. When communication was established by

regular post, under such governmental or official responsibility,

that a presumption of safe carriage was warranted, and the usages

of business men to take their correspondence from such officials,

in due course, were recognized, then, reasonable diligence was

held satisfied by the immediate dispatch of notice by the post,

properly addressed, to the indorser.

So, delivery of notice, at the residence or_us ual place of busi-

ness, is held reasonable di ligence, because the habits of business,

and of life, make it unreasonable to require the holder to pursue

the person to whatever place he may, at the time, happen to be,

upon the indor er wa held insuffici nt, and judgment was rend red for the def nclant. The j ud ment wa affirmed in the
upr me Court in en ral Term in the first district. The plaintiff appealed to this court.
Thomas Stc~·c Hson, for th appellant.
vVm. W . Niles, fo r the r pondent.
WOODRUFF, J.-The condition of the liability of the indor er
of a promi ory note i , that if, upon due demand, the note i not
paid by the maker, th e holder hall g iv him notice thereof, in
order that he may take mea ures for hi own security or protection.
The use of due dilig nee, by th e holder, to bring such notice
home to the indorser, tands by law, in the place of actual notice,
even though it be in effectual, and fails to bring home knowledge
to the indorser.
In all cases, then, in which the indor er fails to receive notice
(he having done noth ing to waive or di pense with it) , the question of liability becomes one of diligence. Has the holder used
reasonable diligence to g ive the indor er notice?
That is a question partly of fact and partly of law, and must
be determined 'according to th e circumstances of each case.
What will constitute reasonable diligence, in every supposable set of c1rcum tances, cannot be decided by any unvarymg
rule. Certam efforts, when proved to have been made, have been
passed upon by the court , and, prior even to adjudication, been
so accepted by mercantile usao-e and acquiescence, that th ey may
be stated as rules for the g uidance of all holders of bills, and the
instruction of all indorsers, and, it will be seen, that they adapt
themselves to th e changes in the condition of things, and to the
conveniences and necessiti es of bu in ess.
Thu s, in the early hi tory of th e ubj ct, it was neces ary to
carry the notice, or send it by some me senger, so as to be able
to prove its delivery. When communication was establi hed by
regular post, under uch governmental or official responsibility,
that a presumption of safe carriage was warranted, and the usages
of business men to take their correspondence from uch officials,
in due cours , were recognized, th n, rea onable diligence was
held satisfi d by the imm ed iate dispatch of notice by the post,
properly addre ed, to th e indor r.
So, deliver of notic , at the residence or usual place of busines , is held reasonable diligence, because the habits o usm ,
and of life, make 1t unreasonable to require the holder to pursue
the person to whatever place he may, at the time, happen to be,

Bartlett et al. v. Robinson 433

BARTLETT ET AL. V. 1<.0BINSO . .

433

and, also, because, presumptively, and according to the ordinary

experience of men, a notice so left will come to his hands.

And so, also, when the residence is unknown, then diligence,

in the endeavor to find the person, or to learn his residence, or

place of business, is deemed all that it is reasonable to require,

and that will stand in the place of notice.

Every relaxation of the rule, that actual notice shall be given,

is founded on the idea, that reasonable convenience in respect

to the mode of giving the notice, and reasonable diligence in the

endeavor to bring it home to the indorser, should stand instead

thereof, or be deemed equivalent to actual notice ; and, therefore,

it shall avail to the holder whether it is effective in bringing notice

home to the indorser or not.

But, immediately out of this relaxation grows another cor-

relative right of the indorser to prescribe the place to which such

notic e may be sent, when he makes his indorsement. He enters

into the contract, presumptively, with knowledge that he may

receive personal notice, or that the notice may be sent to his

residence or place of business. He knows what contingencies

may happen under which notices, so left, may fail to reach him
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in due season. He may know of arrangements of his own, which

make it important that, in order to reach him in due season, the

notice should be forwarded or delivered at a particular place.

Now, it is settled that, if he designate such place, the holder

may give notice at that place! This is so settled, because it is

reasonable diligence on the part of the holder to deliver the

notice at the place where the indorser has appointed to receive

it, and because, to hold that such notice is not sufficient, is to

permit the indorser to mislead the holder, and practically to

defraud him.

The designation of the place b y underwriting, at th e time of

his indorsement, is, theretore, an invitation to the holder to deliver

a notice addressed to him as indorser at that place, and concludes

him so that he may not deny that, for all the p urposes and condi-

tions of the indorsement, that shall be de emed his residence or

place of business. ~~

If he has actually removed, and that fact is known to the

holder, another question would arise, but in the first instance it is

clear that a notice at that place should be deemed sufficient to

bind him.

Why then should not the obligation of the holder, who

accepts an indorsement with such a designation, and the obliga-

tion of the indorser, who makes the designation, be reciprocal?

and, also, because, pre umptively, and according to the ordinary
xperi nee of men a notic
1 ft will come t hi hand .
And so, also, when the r idence is unknown, then diligence,
in th ndeavor to find the p r n r to learn hi re idence, or
place of bu in , i de med all that it is r asonable to require,
and that will stand in the place of notice.
Every relaxation of the rul , that actual notice hall be given,
is founded on the idea, that rea onable convenience in re pect
to the mode of gi ing the notic and rea onabl diligence in the
endeavor to brin it home to th indorser hould stand in tead
ther of, or be deemed equivalent to actual notice; and, therefore,
it shall avail to the holder whether it is effective in bringing notice
home to the indorser or not.
ut, immediately out of this relaxation grows another correlative right of the indorser to prescribe the place to which such
notice may be ent, when he makes his indorsement. He enters
mto the contract, pre umptively, with know ledge that he may
receive personal notice or that the notice may be sent to his
residence or place of business. He knows what contingencies
may happen under which notice , o left. may fail to reach him
in due ea on. He may know of arrangem nts of his own, which
make it important that, in order to reach him in due eason . the
notice should be forwarded or delivered at a particular place.
I ow, it i settled that, if he designate uch place, the holder
may give notice at that place. Tht 1s so ettled, becau e it is
reasonable diligence on the part of the holder to deliver the
notice at the place where the indor r ha appointed to receive
it, and becau e, to hold that uch notice is not ufficient, is to
permit the indorser to mislead th holder. and practically to
defraud him.
The designation of the place b) underwritin , at the time of
his indor ement, i , 1ere ore an mv1tat10n to the holder to deliver
a notice addre sed to him a indorser at that place, and conclude
him so that he may not deny that, for all the purp se and condition of the indorsement that shall be deemed hi res1d nee or
place of bu ines .
If he has actuall removed, and that fact i known to the
holder, another question would ari . but in the fir t instance it i
clear that a notice at that place hould be deen d ufficient to
bind him.
Why then hould not th obli<Yation of the holder, who
accepts an indorsem nt with uch a de ignation., and the bligation of the indorser, who make th e de ignation be reciprocal?
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1 think they are, and that such designation should be deemed

a qualification of the indorsement, and import that notice shall be

per sonal or by delivery at the place designated.

If this be so, then the decision of this case does not depend

upon the particular construction of our statute of 1855, but upon

a broader inquiry. Thus, before our statute, if the indorser

resided in the same town or city with the party seeking to charge

him, the notice must be given by actual delivery to him or at his

residence or place of business; and a delivery, if not personal,

would be sufficient at the place designated, and in my opinion

must, in order to charge him, be delivered there.

If they did not reside in the same town or city, then a notice

sent by mail — and, in order to that, deposited in the postoffice —

addressed to him at the city or town in which he resides was suffi-

cient; and, if there be more than one postoffice in the same town-

ship, then addressed to the postoffice at which the indorser usually

receives his letters.

Now our statute has substituted a deposit of the notice in

the postoffice, in the same city or town in which presentment
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for payment is made, "directed to the indorser at such city or

town" for the actual carriage or sending the notice by a mes-

senger to the residence, in certain cases and among them, "when-

ever the residence or place of business of such indorser shall be in

such city or town."

I apprehend that all that was intended by this statute (in its

bearing upon this case) is, that, in view of the perfection of our

postal system and the general certainty that men of business will

receive letters directed to them coming into our postoffices, such

deposit of notice shall be accounted reasonable and sufficient dili-

gence to notify an indorser as well when he resides in the same

town as when he resides in another ; and that the statute has no

b earing whatever upon the right of the indorsertq designate the

place to which the notice shall be addressed, the right of the

holder to act in pursuance of that designation, the binding effect

of such a designation on the indorser, or the obligation of the

holder who accepts an indorsement so qualified.

And, therefore, as well when the parties do not reside in the

same city or town as when (according to our statute) they do,

or in short whenever notice is sent by mail or deposited in the

post office. tile "notice must be directed tothe indorser, not only

at thecity or towrt, btftTo'lhe specific place designated by the

mid er writing .

Tn our cities and large towns, where there are often many

persona or
f this be so, then the decision of this case does not depend
upon the particular construction of our statute of 1855, but upon
a broader inquiry. Thus, before our statute, if the indorser
resided in the same town or city with the party seeking to charge
him, the notice must be given by actual delivery to him or at his
resid nee or place of bu ine s; and a delivery, if not personal,
would be sufficient at the place de ignated, and in my opinion
must, in order to charge him, be delivered there.
If they did not reside in the same town or city, then a notice
sent by mail-and, in or<ler to that, depo ited in the postoffi.ceaddressed to him at the city or town in which he resides was sufficient; and, if there be more than one postoffice in the same township, then addressed to the postoffice at which the indorser usually
receives his letters.
Now our statute has substituted a deposit of the notice in
the postoffice, in the same city or town in which presentment
for payment is made, "directed to the indorser at such city or
town" for the actual carriage or sending the notice by a messenger to the residence, in certain cases and among them, "whenever the residence or place of business of such indorser shall be in
such city or town."
r-~~(
I apprehend that all that was intended by this tatute (in it
·---,\ - ---.
bearing upon this case) is, that, in view of the perfection of our
- ~·
postal system and the general certainty that men of business will
~
receive letters directed to them coming into our postoffices, such
deposit of notice shall be accounted reasonable and sufficient dili~
I gence to notify an indorser as well when he resides in the same
town as when he resides in another; and that the statute has no
bearing whatever upon the right of the indorser to designate the
lace to which the notice shall be addressed, the right of the
holder to act 111 pursuance o t 1at es1gna 10n, the binding effect
of such a designation on the indorser, or the obligation of the
holder who accepts an indorsement so qualified.
And, therefore, as well when the parties do not r side in the
same city or town as when (according to our statute) they do,
or in short whenever notic is sent by mail or deposited in the
postoffice the nohce must be directed t the rndor r not on!
a
e c1 y or own,
y
underwntmo-.
In our cities and large town , wher there are often many
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persons of the same name, such underwriting is very important

as a descriptive designation of the indorser, and not only appoints

the place where the indorser desires to have the notice come, but

tends to identify the person who is entitled to the benefit of the

notice.

I think, therefore, that a compliance with what is said to be

the letter of the statute, by writing the name of the indorser and

the name of the city, is not satisfying the requirement that rea-

sonable diligence should be used, and that a just interpretation of

the statute requires that the words "directed to the indorser at

such city or town" includes as a part of such "direction" con-

formity to the prescription which the special indorsement imports.

To the suggestion that the holder ought not to be compelled

to take the risk of the handwriting of the indorser, and that if

he directs the notice to the designated place, it may turn out that

the indorser has no residence or place of business there and did

not write nor authorize such designation, it will suffice to say that

no party is bound to accept such an indorsement ; he acts voluntar-

ily in accepting the note or bill and in giving faith to the indorse-

ment. If he takes it he necessarily assures himself (so far as he
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deems it necessary or prudent) of the genuineness of all the

signatures on which he relies, and yet the signature of a supposed

indorser may not be genuine ; the holder is at that risk. So in

reference to the authenticity of any qualification of the indorse-

ment. He acts voluntarily and may rely upon it or not at his

election, and ought to be bound by it.

think the judgment should be affirmed.

Mason, J., dissenting. JPc^, &£xJL

NOTICES TO ONE INDORSER FOR DISTRIBUTION AND DELIVERY TO

CO-INDORSERS. § 0,2.

Van Brunt & Sons v. Vaughn {1877), 47 Ioiva, 145, 29 Am.

Rep. 468.

Appeal from Pottawattamie District Court.

Action against the indorser of commercial paper. There was

a judgment in the District Court for plaintiffs; defendant appeals.

The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

John H. Keatley, for appellant.

Smith & Carson, for appellees.
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NOTICES TO bDORSE-R A o

Co-INDORSE RS

Beck, J. The plaintiffs, defendant, and two others, all resi-

dents of Council Bluffs, were indorsers of a draft which was

protested for non-payment in Little Rock, Arkansas, where the

acceptor resided, or was, at the time, doing business. Notices

of non-payment to all the indorsers were sent, by the notary

making the protest, through the mail, under one cover addressed

to one of the indorsers at Council Bluffs. This indorser gave the

notices addressed to the other indorsers to plaintiff, who depos-

ited the notice directed to defendant in the postoffice at Council

Bluffs, properly directed to him. Notice to another indorser, who

is sued with defendant, was sent in the same way and was received

by him. It is not shown that defendant, who alone appeals,

received the notice sent him. It is now insisted by defendant that

the sending of the notice to one indorser by mail and the deposit

thereof, properly directed, in the postoffice by such indorser, as

above stated, is not sufficient to charge the defendant as an indor-

ser of the paper. This position presents the only question in the

case.

The notary was authorized to transmit the notices to the

indorsers by mail, and if they were so directed and sent that,
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in the usual course of the mail, defendant would have received

them, it is sufficient. The notary may employ proper means and

instrumentalities to secure the deposit of the notices in the post-

office. So he can use proper instrumentality, if any be necessary,

to secure their transmission by the mail. If it be necessary in

thus transmitting them to re-deposit them in the postoffice with

new directions, so that they may reach the indorser in due time

and by due course of the mail, this may be done. The mail is

used in this manner as the medium of the transmission of the

notices, and the instrumentalities used for the re-deposit and

re-direction of the notices are but means necessary to secure the

transportation of the notices by mail from the notary to the

indorser.

The transmission of notices of the protest of commercial

paper through a party thereto, who re-deposited them in the

postoffice of the persons to who m theywe re directed, has been

held sufficient in more than one well considered case. See

Hartford Bank v. Stcdman, 3 Conn. 489; Eagle Bank v. Hath-

away, 5 Met. 212; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8 Foster, 302;

Warren v. Oilman, 17 Me. 360. But a different rule was recog-

nized in Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129. The weight of author-

ity, as well as reason, seems to support the rule we adopt. The

judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.

^

BECKJ J. The plaintiffs, defenclanl, and tw o others, all residents of ouncil Bluffs, were indorsers of a draft which wa
prot sted fo r non-payment in Littl Rock, Arkan as, where the
acceptor resid d, or was, at th time, doing bu iness. Notices
of non-payment to all the indo r r were ent, by the notary
making the prate t, through th e mail, under one cover addressed
to one of th indorsers at Co uncil Bluff . This indorser gave the
notices addressed to the other indorsers to plaintiff, who depo ited the notice directed to d fenclant in the postoffice at ouncil
Bluffs, properly directed to him. Notice to another ind ors r, who
is sued vvith defendant, was sent in the same way and was r eceived
by him. It is not shown that defendant, who alone appeals,
received th e notice sent him. It is now insisted by defendant that
the sendin g of the notice to one ind or er by mail and the deposit
thereof, properly directed, in the postoffice by such indorser, as
above stated, is not sufficient to charge the defendant as an indorser of the paper. This position presents the only question in the
case.
T he notary was authorized to transmit the notices to the
indorsers by mail, and if they were so directed and ent that,
in the usual course of the mail, defendant would have received
them, it is sufficient. The notary may employ proper means and
instrumentalities to secure the deposit of the notices in the postoffice. So he can use proper instrumentality, if any be necessary,
tO'Secure th eir transmission by th e mail. If it be necessary in
thus transmitting them to r e-deposit th em in the postoffice with
new directions, so that they may reach the indorser in due time
and by due course of the mail, this may be done. The mail is
used in this mann er a s the medium of th e transmission of the
notices, and the instrumentalities u sed for th e re-deposit and
re-direction of th e notices are but means necessary to secure the
transportation of the notices by mail from the notary to the
indorser.
The transmission of notices of the protest of commercial
paper through a party thereto, who re-deposited them in th
postoffice of the per ons to whom they w re directed, has been
held sufficient in more than one well considered case.
ee
Hartford Bank v. Stedman} 3 Conn. 489; Ea ale Bank v. Hathaway} 5 Met. 212; Manchester Banli v. Fellows} 8 Foster, 302 ·
Warren v. Gilman} 17 Me. 36o.
ut a different rule was recognized in Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129. The weight of authority, as well as reason, seems to support the rule we adopt. The
judgm nt of the District Court is
Afiirmed.
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time within which notice must he sent. §§ io4-i06.

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin. (See page 560.)

Simpson v. Turney (1844), 24 Tcnn. (5 Humph.) 419, 42 Am.

TIME WITHIN \VIII H

TI E .MU T BE

ENT.

§§

rn4-Io6.

Dec. 443.

Gibbs, for Simpson.

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin.

( cc page 369.)

H. M. Burton, for Turney.

Reese, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The Branch Bank of the State of Tennessee was the holder

of a promissory note, payable at said bank, made by James H.

Jenkins, to Anthony Dibrell, and endorsed in the following order :

A. Dibrell, S. Turney, and Jno. W. Simpson. Turney's residence

is within one mile of the bank, at Sparta, so known to be to the

bank, and to all the other parties to the note. The note was

legally due on the 1st day of February, 1843, that being the third

Simpson v. Turney (1844), 24 Tenn. (5 Humph.) 419, 42 Am.
Dec. 443·
G1'bbs, for impson.
H. 1Vf. Burton, for Turney.

day of grace. It was on that day protested. On the 2d day of

February no notice of the protest for the non-payment of the

note was either served upon Turney personally or left at his

residence. He had notice from the bank, the holder, on the 3d

day of February. John W. Simpson, the plaintiff, the immediate

endorser of Turney, gave him no notice whatever.
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These facts being specially found by the jury in the case, the

circuit court gave judgment for Turney, and the plaintiff has

appealed in error to this court.

It is not insisted for the plaintiff here that the notice of the

bank to Turney, the only notice he received, was in time. But

it is urged that, if Simpson had given him notice on the day he

received notice from the bank, such notice would have been good ;

and that is certainly so ; and the plaintiff further insists that the

notice given by the bank shall inure to his benefit. If the notice.

had been in time and valid, it would by law have inured to Ins

Benefit, he being an intermediate party. But a notice of no ben-

efit to the bank, because n ot fixing the liability of the partv noti-

fied, cannot inure to the benefit ot another . So to hold would be

to introduce a new principle into the law merchant. Suppose

there were ten endorsers upon a note ; if the holder, ten days

after the protest, gave notice to the first endorser, this, according

to the argument, would fix all the endorsers, for it would be just

the time necessary to them to have given notice to each other

successively.

J., deliv red the opinion of the court.
The Branch ank of the State of Tenne ee was the holder
of a promissory note, payable at said bank, made by James H.
Jenkin , to Anthony Dibrell, and endor d in the following order :
A. Dibrell, S. Turney, and Jno. W. impson. Turney's residence
is wi hin one mil of the bank, at Sparta, so known to be to the
bank, and to all the other parties to the note. The note was
legally due on the Ist day of February, I843, that being the third
day of a-race. It was on that day protested.
n the 2d day of
February no notice of the protest for the non-payment of the
note was either served upon Turney personally or left at his
residence. He had notice from the bank, the holder, on the 3d
day of February. J ohn W. impson, the plaintiff the immediate
endorser of Turney, gave him no notice whatever.
These facts beino- specially found by the jury in the case, the
circuit court a-ave judgment for Turney, and the plaintiff has
appeal d in error to this court.
It is not insi t d for the plaintiff here that the notice of the
bank to Turney, the only notice he received, was in time. But
it is urged that, if imp on had given him notice on the day he
received notice from the bank, such notice would have been good;
and that is certainly o; and the plaintiff further in i ts that the
notice o-iven by th bank shall inure to his benefit. If the notice
had been in time and valid, it would by law hav inured to hi
benefit, he bein an intermediat art '· But a notic of no b ne _t to t e ank, b cau e not fixing th li ability of th party notifi ed, cannot inure to the benefit of anoth r. So to hold would be
to introduce a new principle into th law merchant.
uppo e
there were ten ndorsers upon a not ; if the hol er, t n days
after the protest, gave notice to th fir t ndor r thi ac ordin
to the argument, would fix all the ndor r , for it would be ju t
the time neces6ary to them to have o-iv n notic to each other
successively.
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It is, perhaps, a universal principle, where substitution exists

at all, that the matter or thing to be substituted to must be valid

and effective in behalf of the principal ; if it be ineffectual in his

behalf, it is difficult to see how it can inure to the benefit of

others.

Upon the direct question raised in this case, Bailey on Bills

expressly says: "Nor is it any excuse that there are several

intervening parties between him who gives the notice and the

defendant to whom it is given ; and, if the notice had been com-

municated through those intervening parties, and each had taken

the time the law allows, the defendant would not have had the

notice the sooner."

The same principle is also decided in the case of Turner v.

Leech, 4 Barn, and Aid. 454.

We have been referred by the plaintiff to what has been said

by this court in the case of McNeil v. Wyatt, 3 Humph. 128. The

bank, at Lagrange, in that case gave notice to one Glover, on the

14th, to be served on Wyatt & McNeil. Wyatt was served on

the 14th, and McNeil on the 15th. But Glover proved in the cir-

cuit court that he was the general agent of Wyatt to serve notices
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for him when his name was on paper. And the circuit court left

it to the jury to say whether Glover, who served the notice, was

not Wyatt's agent as well as the agent of the bank; and, if he

was, then the notice to McNeil on the 15th, one day after Wyatt

received notice, was sufficient.

This court held that there was not any error in this part of

the charge; and placing the validity of the notice, as this court

did, upon that special ground, is a distinct recognition of the

general principle maintained by us in this case.

Upon the whole, we affirm the judgment.

SEASONABLE NOTICE. § IO4.

Smith v. Poillon ct al. (1882), 87 N. Y. 590, 41 Am. Rep. 402.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court, in the first judicial department, entered upon an order made

January 28, 1881, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff,

entered upon a verdict, and affirmed an order denying a motion

for a new trial. (Reported below, 23 Hun, 528.)

It is, perhap a univer al principle, where substitution exists
at all that the matter or thing t be ubstituted to mu t h valid
and ffective in b half of th principal ; if it be ineffectual in hi
behalf, it i difficult to see how it can inure to the benefit of
other .
pon the direct que tion rai ed in thi ca e, ailey n Bill
expre ly says: "Nor i it any excu e that th ere are several
intervening partie betwe n him who give the noti e and the
defendant to whom it i giv n; and, if the notice had been communicated throuo-h tho e interv ning parti , and ach had tak n
the time the law allow , the defendant would not have had the
notice the ooner."
The ame principle is also decided in the ca e of Turner v.
Leech, 4 Barn. and Id. 454.
We have been referred by the plaintiff to what ha been said
by thi court in the ca e of McNeil v. Wyatt, 3 Humph. 128. The
bank, at La ranrre, in that ca e gave notice to one Glover on the
14th, to be serv d on Wyatt & McN il. \ i\Tyatt wa erved on
the qth, and kN eil on the I 5th. But Glover proved in the circuit court that he was the general agent of Wyatt to erve notice
for him when his name was on paper. And the circuit court left
it to the jury to ay whether Glover, who rved the notice, wa
not Wyatt' agent a well as the agent of the bank ; and, if he
wa , then the notice to 1\1c ei l on the 15th, one day after Wyatt
received notice, wa ufficient.
This court held that the re wa not any error in this part of
the charge; and placing the validity of the notice, as this court
did, upon that pecial ground, i a di tinct recognition of the
general principle maintained by us in thi case.
Upon the whole, we affirni the judgment.
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Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court, in the fir t judicial departm nt enter d upon an order made
January 28, 1881, which affirmed a jud2'"!T1ent in favor of plaintiff,
ent red upon a verdict, and affirmed an order denving a motion
for a new trial. (Repo rted below, 23 Hun, 528.)
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The nature of the action and the material facts are stated in

the opinion.

Albert A. Abbott, for appellants.

Th natur of th action and th mat rial fact are tated in
the opinion.

James McKcen, for respondent.

Earl, J. This action was brought to recover of the defend-

ants as indorsers upon a promissory note, made in the city of New

York by the McNeal Coal and Iron Company, February 28, 1870,

A lb ert A . Abbott, for app llants.
I ames .M cK een, f r r pond nt.

payable to their order three years after date, at the office of the

com pan}'.

It was alleged in the complaint that the company, a Pennsyl-

vania corporation, had an office in the city of New York at the

date of the note, and that the note was payable at such office, and

these allegations were expressly admitted in the answer.

The defendants defended the action upon two grounds :

(1) That the note was not properly presented for payment and

payment demanded ; and (2) that notice of protest was not in due

time served upon the defendants. The trial judge held, that upon

the undisputed evidence it appeared that notice of protest was

duly served in proper time upon the defendants, and refused to

submit the evidence in relation thereto to the jury, but he sub-
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mitted the evidence as to the demand of payment to the jury, and

they found in reference thereto in favor of plaintiff. The judg-

ment entered upon the verdict of the jury having been affirmed

at the General Term, the defendants appealed to this court.

We are of opinion that there was no material question of fact

to be submitted to the jury, and that upon the undisputed evi-

dence the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was entitled to a verdict.

It is undisputed that the note on the last day of grace was placed

in the hands of Mr. Baker, a notary, for demand and protest ;

that he took the note and went to an office, 11 1 Broadway, New

York, in the Trinity building, where the company either then had

or shortly before had had its office, and that he there presented

the note and demanded payment thereof of the person in charge

of the office, and that there was then a sign at the door of the

office, indicating that it was the office of the company.

The only dispute at the trial was whether the place at which

the demand was thus made was at the time the office of the com-

pany, and there was evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending

to show that it was. The evidence on the part of the defendant

tended to show, and. if undisputed, did show, that that place had

been the office of the company, its last office in this state, but

that it had then ceased to be such office. If it was then the office

EARL J. Thi action was brought to recover of the defendants as indor er upon a promi ory note made in the city of New
York by the Mc al oal and Iron ompany, F bruary 28, 1870,
payable to their ord r thr e year after date, at the office of the
company.
It wa alleged in th complaint that the company, a Pennsylvania corporation, had an office in the city of ew York at the
date of the note, and that the note was payable at such office, and
the e alleo-ation
r xpre sly admitted in the an wer.
The defendant def nd d the action upon two grounds :
(I) That the not wa not properly presented for payment and
payment demanded · and ( 2) that notice of protest was not in du e
time erved upon the defendants. The trial judge held, that upon
the undisputed evidence it appeared that notice of prote t "'a
<luly er ed in proper time upon the d fendants, and refused to
ubmit th vidence in relation thereto to the jury, but he submitted the evidence a to the demand of payment to the jury, and
they found in reference thereto in favor of plaintiff. The judgment entered upon th v rdict of the jury having been affirmed
at the General Term, the defendant appealed to this court.
vVe are of opinion that th ere wa no material question of fact
to be submitted to the jury, and that upon th e undi put d evidence the plaintiff, a a matter of law, wa entitled to a verdict.
It is undisputed that th note on the la t day f grace was placed
in the hand of M r. Bak r, a notary, for demand and prote t ·
that he took the note and went to an office, r I I Broadway, New
York, in the Trinitv building, where th compan ith r then had
or short!) b fo re had had it office, and that he there pre ented
th note and d mand cl payment ther of of th p r on in charge
of the office, and that th re was th n a i n at th door of the
office , indicating that it wa the offic of th company.
The on ly dispute at th trial wa wheth r th place at which
the demand was thus mad wa at th time the ffi e of the ompany, and there was vidence on th part of th plaintiff ten inh
to show that it wa . Th vidence on th part f the defend ant
t nded to how and, if undisputed, di
how, that that place had
been th e office of the ornpany, it 1~ t offic in th i tat but
that it had then cea eel to b uch office. If it wa th n the offi e
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of the company, it is undisputed that presentment and demand

there was properly made ; if it was not then the office of the com-

pany, it was the last office of the company within this state, and

the company being a foreign corporation had removed its office

and left the state. In such case it is well settled that no pre-

sentment and demand at any place are necessary, in order to

charge the indorser. (Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28). It matters

not that the plaintiff alleged due presentment and demand in Ins

complaint; that did not preclude him from proof upon the trial

that presentment and demand had been waived or rendered useless^,

and unnecessary. So it lias been held that under an allegation in

a complaint of a tender the plaintiff could, upon the trial prove

that a tender had been waived, and thus rendered unnecessary.

(Holmes v. Holmes, 9 N. Y. 525). Therefore, even if the defend-

ants were right in their contention that the place where the

demand was made was not then the office of the company, the

result, upon their own evidence, so far as that branch of the case

was concerned, should have been the same.

We have now only to consider whether upon the undisputed

evidence the defendants were in due time notified of the non-
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payment of the note. This suit was commenced nearly six years

after the note fell due, and the evidence therein was given more

than seven years thereafter. After such a lapse of time the mem-

ory of witnesses cannot be expected to be full and minutely

accurrate, and some force should be given to the presumption that

official duty was discharged. The last day of grace upon this

note was the 3d of March, 1873 ; on that day the notary presented

the note for payment as above-mentioned and protested the same

for non-payment. On the following morning he caused notices

of protest to be drawn up, one to the defendants, the first indor-

sers, one to Smith, the second indorser, and another to O. Robin-

son, cashier, the last indorser, the cashier of a bank at Thomaston,

Maine. He signed them all and inclosed them in an envelope and

addressed the envelope to Robinson, at Thomaston. and gave the

notices so addressed and inclosed to his clerk before two o'clock

p. m., on that day, March 4, to mail in the New York postoffice.

It was the duty of the clerk to whom the letter was thus delivered

to mail it, and he had been in the habit for years of attending to

that branch of the notary's business. The clerk was then called.

who testified that he had no particular memory of that letter, but

that he knew that he mailed notices of protest that day, and that

he mailed all the letters that were given him to mail that day

between the hours of one and two.

of the company, 1t is undi puted that presentment and demand
there was properly made; if it was not th en the office of the company, it was the last office of the company within this state, and
the company being a foreign corporation had removed its office
and left the state. In such case it is well settled that no presentment and demand at any place ar necessary, in order to
charcre the indorser. (Foster v. Julien, 24 . Y. 28). It matter
not that the plaintiff alleged due presentment and demand in his
complaint ; that dlcfi1ot preclude him from proof u on the trial
that presentment a...!:d _9.er!l.filJ._d had been waived_gr rendered useless
and unnecessary. So it has been held that under an allegation in
a complaint of a tender the plaintiff could, upon the trial prove
that a tende r had been waived, and thus r endered unnece ary.
(Holmes v. Holmes, 9 J. Y . 525 ) . Therefore, even if the defendants ·were right in their contention that the place where the
demand wa made was not then the office of the company, the
result, upon their own evidence, so fa r as that branch of the ca e
wa concerned, should have been the ame.
VJ e have now only to consider whether upon the undisputed
evidence the defendants were in due time notified of the nonpayment of the note. This suit was commenced nearly six year
after the note fell due, and the evidence therein was given more
than seven years thereafter. Afte r such a lapse of time the memory of witnesses cannot be expected to be full and minutely
accurrate, and some fo rce should be given to the presumption tha t
official duty was discharged. The last day of grace upon thi
note was the 3d of March, 1873; on that day the notary presented
the note for payment as above-mentioned and protested the same
for non-payment. On the following morning he caused notice
of protest to be drawn up, one to the defendants, the first indorsers, one to Smith, the second indorser, and another to 0 . Robinson, cashier, the last indorser, the cashier of a bank at Thomaston ,
Maine. He signed th em all and inclo ed them in an envelope and
addressed the envelope to Robin on, at Thomaston, an d g ave the
notices so addressed and in closed to his clerk before two o'clock
P. M., on that day, March 4, to mail in the New York postoffice.
It was the duty of the clerk to whom the letter wa thus delivered
to mail it, and be had been in th e habit for years of attending to
that branch of the notary's busines . The cl rk was then called,
\i\1 ho testified that he had no particular memory of that letter, but
that he knew that he mailed notices of protest that day, and that ·
he mailed all the letters that were given him to mail that day
between the hours of one and two.
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This was all the evidence it was practicable for the plaintiff

to give that the notices were mailed at New York. If mailed as

testified to by the clerk between one and two on the 4th of March,

I do not understand it is disputed that they were mailed in time.

It was further shown that a notice mailed in New York at the

time named would reach Thomaston in the state of Maine, the

residence of Robinson, to whom the letter was addressed, if the

train from New York made its connection with the early train

north from Boston, in the evening- of March 5, but that if the

New York train failed to make the connection at Boston, then the

letter would reach Thomaston at noon on the 6th of March. It

was also shown that this letter reached its address at Thomaston

on the 5th or 6th of March, and that the notices for Smith, the

next prior indorser, and for the defendants were mailed to Smith

at his place of residence, Warren, in the state of Maine, by the

next mail after they were received at Thomaston, and that they

were received by Smith in the evening of March 6. As there were

two mails daily from Thomaston to Warren, a distance of only

about four miles, one leaving at 10:10 a. m., and the other at 1 40

p. m., the claim is made that the letter did not reach Thomaston
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until the 6th of March, after the first mail for Warren had been

sent, and thus the appellants claim there was some evidence which

would authorize the inference that the letter was not mailed in

New York, as claimed by the plaintiff, on the 4th of March. But

we think, under all the circumstances, such an inference was

unwarranted and could not properly have been drawn by the jury

if the case had been submitted to them. The presumption is very

strong that Baker, an experienced notary, caused the notices to be

mailed to Robinson, as his duty required, on the 4th, and that

presumption is fortified by the evidence of himself and his clerk,

and that presumption and evidence are not overcome by the fact

that the letter did not reach Thomaston until the 6th of March.

It may have been delayed in the mails or by failure of the con-

nection at Boston. The fact that the letter did not reach its des-

tination until the 6th of March does not, under the circumstances

of this case, furnish any evidence that it was not mailed between

one and two o'clock on the 4th of March.

Smith was an aged man, upward of eighty years old. On the

morning of March 7 he took the notices for the defendants and

drove to Thomaston for the purpose of consulting his counsel,

and there, under the advice of his counsel, he wrote a letter

addressed to the defendants, and inclosed it with the notice for

the defendants in an envelope addressed to them, and caused it to

This wa all the cvi<l nc it wa praclicabl for the plaintiff
t give that the notices w r mailed at r ew York. If mailed a
testified to by the clerk b tw n one and tw on the 4th of /[arch,
I do not under tand it is disputed that they were mailed in time.
It was further hown that a notice mailed in J: ew York at the
time named would reach Thomaston in the state of Maine, the
re idenc of Robin n to whom th letter was addressed, if the
train from N w York made it connection with the early train
north from o ton, in the evening of March 5, but that if the
New York train failed to make the conn ction at o ton, then the
letter would reach Thomaston at noon on the 6th of March. It
was also hown that thi letter reached its addre s at Thomaston
on the 5th or th of l\Iarch, and that the notices for mith, the
next prior indorser, and for th defendants were mailed to mith
at his place of re idence, \Varren, in the state of Maine, by the
next mail aft r they were received at Thoma ton, and that they
were recei ed by mith in the eveninrr of 'larch 6. As there were
two mails daily from Thomaston to \~Farren, a distance of only
about four mile , one leaving at IO :IO A. M., and the other at I :40
P. ~r.. the claim i made that the ietter did not reach Thoma ton
until the 6th of l\Iarch, after the first mail for Warren had been
ent, and thu the appellants claim there wa ome evidence which
v\ ould authorize the inference that the letter vYas not mailed in
New York, as claimed by the plaintiff, on the 4th of March. But
we think, under all the circumstances, such an inf rence was
unwarranted and could not properly have been drawn by the jury
if the case had been submitted to them. The pre umption is very
trong that Baker, an experienced notary, cau d the notice to be
mailed to Robin on, a hi duty required . on the 4th, and that
presumption is fortified by the evidence of him elf and his cl rk,
and that presumption and evidence are not overcome by the fact
that the letter did not reach Thomaston until the 6th of March.
It may have been delayed in the mails or by failure of the connection at oston. Th facl that the lett r did not reach it de tination until the 6th of March does not, und r the circum tance
of this ca e, furni h any evidence that it ' a not mailed bet\\ een
one and two o'clock on the 4th of -;\larch.
Smith was an ag d man, upward of ighty year old.
n the
morning of fa rch 7 he took the noti e for th def ndant and
drove to Thoma ton fo r tl purpo of con ultinrr hi coun el,
and there, und er th e advice of hi coun 1 h ' rot a 1 tter
addre s d to the d f ndant . and inclo~ e l it ' ith the notic for
t he defendant in an envelope addre eel to them, and ca u ed it to
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be mailed at Thomaston, in time for the mail which left there for

New York, the residence of the defendant, at i 40 r. m. That

mail passed through Warren, on its way to New York, at 2 p. m.

There were two mails each day from Warren, one closing - at about

9:30 a. m., and the other at about 1 130 p. m., and that letter went

in the same mail that closed at Warren at 1 ".30. The contention

on the part of defendants is, that the law required that that notice

should have been mailed by the first convenient, practical mail on

the 7th, and hence that it should have been mailed by the first

mail on that day; and, to sustain their contention, our attention

is called to various authorities. (Smedes v. Utica Bank, 20 Johns.

2,J2;Mcad v. Bngs, 5 Cow. 303; Scwall v. Russell, 3 Wend. 276;

Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Haskell v. Boardman, 8 Allen, 38;

Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison [X. J.J, 487; Burgess v.

/ 'reeland, 24 N. J. L. 71 ; Lazvson v. Farmers' Bk., 1 Ohio St.

[N. S.] 206; Freeman's Bk. v. Perkins, 18 Me. 292.) These

authorities, while not entirely harmonious, undoubtedly tend to

sustain the rule that the notice must be sent on the next day by

the first practical and convenient post.

The counsel for the plaintiff, however, contends that the rule
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is, that notice of dishonor in such cases may be sent to the prior

party by any post of the next day, and he calls our attention to

several authorities which tend to sustain his contention. (Chick

v. Pillsbiiry, 24 Me. 458; Whitwell v. Johnson, \J Mass. 44^;

2 Daniels on Neg. Instr. 87 ; Story on Bills, § 288 ; Story on

Prom. Notes, §324; 3 Kent's Com. 106.)

From a careful examination of all these authorities and

many others it is clear that the law is not precisely settled. It

appears that at first it was supposed to be necessary that notice

of dishonor should be given by the next post after dishonor, on

the same day, if there was one. That rule was found inconveni-

ently stringent, and then it was held that when the parties lived

in different places, between which there was a mail, the notice

could be posted the next day after the dishonor or notice of dis-

honor. Some of the authorities hold that the party required to

give the notice may have the whole of the next day. Some of

them hold that when there are several mails on the next day,

it is sufficient to send the notice by any post of that day. Other

autho rities lay down the rule, in g ^eral_ter ms, that the notice

must be posted b y the first practical and convenient mail of the

next da y; and that rule seems to be supported by the most

authorit y in this state. _What is a practical and convenient mail.

depends upon circumstances. Tt may be controlled by the us ag es

b mailed at Thomaston, in time for th mail which left there for
\: York, the residence o·f the d fendant, at 1 AO P. M . That
mail pa sed through Warren, on it way to New York, at 2 P. M.
There were two mai l ach day from Warren, one clo ing at about
9 :30 A. M., and the other at about I :30 P . l\I. and that lett r went
in th ame mai l that clo ed at Warren at l :30. The contention
on the part of defendants i , that the law required that that notice
hould have be n mailed by the first convenient, practical mail on
the 7th, and hence that it should have been mailed by the fir t
mail on that day; and, to su tain their contention, our attenti on
is called to various autb'oritie . (Sme des v. Utica Bank, 20 John .
372 ;Mead v. Engs, S Cow. 303 ; Sewall v. Russell, 3 end. 276 ·
Haward v. I ves, l Iill , 263; Has lull v . Boardman, 8 llen, 3 ;
Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison [ N . J.J, 487· Burgess'·
Vreelan d, 24 . J. L. 71; Lawson v. Fa1r111.ers' Bk., l
hio t.
[1I . S.] 206; Freeman's Bk. v. Perkins. 18 l\1e. 292.) These
a uthorities, while not entirely harmoniou , undoubtedly tend to
ustain the rule that the notice must be se nt on the next day by
the first practical and convenient post.
The cou n el for the plaintiff, however, contends that th e ru le
i , that notice of dish onor in such cases may be sent to the priorparty by any po t of the next clay, and he call our attention to
several authorities which tend to su tain hi s contention. (Chic!?
v. Pillsbury, 24 Me. 458; vVhitwell v. Johnson. 17 Mas . 449;
2 Daniels on Neg. In str. 87; Story on Bi ll s, § 288; Story on
Prom . Notes, § 324; 3 K nt's Com . 106.)
From a careful examination of all these authoritie and
many oth ers it is clear that th e law is not precisely settled. It
appea rs that at fir st it was supposed to be necessary that notice
of dishonor hould be giv n by the next po t after dishonor. on
th same day, if the re was one. That rul e wa found inconveniently tringent, and then it was h eld that when the partie lived
in different place , between which there was a mail, th e notice
co uld be posted the next day after th di honor or notice of di honor. S om of th e authoritie hold that the party required to
give the notice may have the whole of the n ext day. S ome of
them hold that wh en there are seve ral mails on the next day,
it is sufficient to end the notice by any po t f that day . . Other
~uthorities lay down the rule, in general term , that the notice
mu t be po ted by the first practical and conv ni ent mail of th
next cla ; and that rule eerns to be u orted by th e mo t
~uthority in this tate. WhatiSapractical and conveni nt mail
d end u on circum_stances. It ma be_ controlled b the usa es
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of business and the customs of the people at the place of mailing,

and the condition, situation and business engagements of the

person required to give the notice^ The rule should have a

reasonable application in every case, and whether sufficient dili-

gence has been used to mail the notice, the facts being undis-

puted, is a question of law.

In Mead v. Engs (5 Cow. 303), notices of dishonor of a bill

reached the postoffice at the residence of the last indorser at

5 p. m., and actually came to his hands the next morning. The

first mail thereafter for the residence of the prior party left at

1 P. m., but the notices for that party were not mailed until after

that hour. Sutherland, J., said: "The cashier was not bound in

the exercise of due diligence to have prepared and forwarded

notices by the one o'clock mail ; it is not reasonable to demand

from him the neglect of his other official duties to prepare his

letters and notices during the usual banking hours ;" and further,

that "the law docs not require the holder of a bill or note to give,

the earliest possible notice of its dishonor; itrequires of him onlv

an ordinary and reasonable diligence.: nor is he bound, the_

moment he receives notice of the dishonor of a bill, to lay aside
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all other business and dispatch notice to the prior parties to th£

bill ; if reasonable diligence is used, it is sufficient." In Darbishirc

v. Parker (6 East, 3), Lord Ellenborough observes: "There must

be some reasonable time allowed for giving notice, and that, too,

accommodating itself to other business and affairs of life ; other-

wise it is saying that a man who has bill transactions passing

through his hands must be nailed to the postoffice, and can attend

to no other business, however urgent, till this is dispatched."

It does not appear here how far Mr. Smith lived from the

postoffice at Warren ; he was an aged man and wanted some

advice about the matter. Early on the day after he received the

notices, he went to Thomaston to see his counsel, and thus he

missed the mail, which closed at Warren at 9 :3c We think it

cannot be said that the delay was unreasonable, or that there was

the absence of that proper diligence which the law requires.

There was, therefore, no error in holding as matter of law that

due diligence was used by Smith in posting the notice to the

defendants.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

of business and the custo112 52f_!!le co le at the place of f!lailin~
and the condi ion situation_ and business ngagements of th!_
ersGn re~ired.J.9 o-ive the notic~ The rule should have a
reasonable application in every case, and wh th r sufficient_ dilig nc has been used to mail the notice, the facts being undispute , 1s a question of law.
- In Mead v. Engs (5 Cow. 303) , notices of Ii honor of a bill
reached th postoffice at the residence of the la t indorser at
S P. M., and actually came to his hands the next morning. The
first mail thereafter for the residence of the prior party left at
I P. 1\L, but the notices for that party w re not mailed until after.
that hour.. Sutherland, J., said: "The cashier wa not bound in
the exercise of due diligence to have prepared and forwarded
notice by the one o'clock mail; it is not reasonable to demand
from him the neglect of his ·other official duties to prepare his
Jett rs and notices during the usual banking hours;" and further,
that "the law does not require the holder ol a bil or ..11£-1e_ o giv~
the earliest osiilile notice of itsdl; i ec uires_Qf him onl
~n-~:>rcJinary and rea-sonabli · c · nor . is M bouri'd th~
moment Tie receives notice of e chs11QI!9r Qf a 'OJll to Jay asideall ot 1f _r ~usiness and g is ate otice to the pnor ar .es 0 thi
pil ; if reasonable ~dili eri~e is used_, 1t i sufficierlb" In Darbishiri'
v. Park er 6 East, 3), Lor EITen orough observes: "There must
be some reasonable time allowed for giving notice, and that, too,
accommodating itself to other business and affairs of life; otherwise it is saying that a man who has bill transactions passing
through his hands must be nailed to the postoffice, and can attend
to no other bu iness, however urgent, till thi is dispatched."
It does not appear here how far Mr. Smith lived from the
postoffice at Warren; he was an ao-ed man and wanted some
advice about the matter. Early on th e day after he received the
notices, he went to Thomaston to se hi counsel, and thu he
missed the mail, which closed at Warren at 9 :30. We think it
cannot be said that the delay ~as unreasonable, or that there was
the absence of that proper diligence which th law require .
There was, therefore, no error in holdino- a matter of law that
due dilio-ence was used by Smith in po tino- th notice to the
J";fendants. - - The judgment should be affirm d with co t .
All concur.
Judgmrnt affirmed.

444 Where Notice Must be Sent

444

\ HERE NOTICE

Mu

T BE

ENT

WHERE NOTICE MUST BE SENT. § 1 10.

Chouteau v. Webster (1843), 6 Mete. (Mass.) 1, jo Am. Dec.

705-

WHERE NOTICE

iU T BE

ENT.

§ IIO.

Assumpsit by the indorsee against the indorser of two prom-

issory notes, dated at the city of New York, March 24th, 1837,

and payable at the Merchants Bank in that city, on the 1st of

October, 1837. The case came before the court on the following

agreed statement : On the last day of grace, viz., on the 4th of

ho11teau v. rr ·cbstcr (18,;J), 6 Mete. (11lass.) I, 39 Am. Dec.
705.

October, 1837, about three o'clock p. m., the notes were delivered

by the holders thereof to T. W. Christie, a notary public residing

in the city of New York, who straightway presented each of them

to the paying teller of said bank, while the bank was open for

the transaction of business, and demanded payment of the same

of the said teller, who refused to pay them, or either of them, for

want of funds of the makers. The notes were duly protested,

by said notary, for non-payment, and written notices, signed by

him, of the protest of each of said notes, and that the holders

looked to the indorsers for payment thereof, were by said notary,

by direction of the holders, put into the postoffice in said city,

on the morning of the 5th of said October. The notices to the
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defendant, as first indorser of each of said notes, were directed to

him at Washington, in the District of Columbia. The defendant's

general domicil and place of business was in Boston, where he

at all times had an agent, who had the charge and management

of his business affairs, in his absence ; but from the 7th of Sep-

tember, 1837, to the 16th of October following, the defendant was

at said Washington, attending to his duties as a senator in con-

gress from this Commonwealth, during the extra session held

that year.

Letters from New York usually reach Washington in about

48 hours, in the regular course of the mail. Such letters, as are

addressed by mail to members of the senate, during the session

of congress, are taken from the Washington postoffice, by officers

of the senate, appointed for that purpose or charged with the

duty, and delivered to the members in their places, when the

senate is actually in session, and on other days are delivered, by

those officers, to members at their lodgings ; and such was the

usual course with regard to letters addressed by mail to the

defendant, during the extra session of September and October,

I837-

~

s umpsit by the in lor ee again t th inclorser of two promi ory note dated at the city of ew York, March 24th, 1837,
and payable at the 1\1 rchants Bank in that city, on the lst of
ctober, l 37. The ca e came before the court on the following
agreed statement:
n the la t day of grace, viz., on the 4th of
October, i837, abou t three o'clock P . u ., th e not were deliv red
by the holder ther of to T. vV. Christie, a notary public residing
in the city of I\ ew York, who straightway pre ented each of them
to the payin telle r of aid bank, while the bank was open for
th tran action of business, and demanded payment of th e same
of the said teller. Y ho refused to pay them, or ither of them, for
want of funds of the makers. The notes were duly protested,
by aid notary, fo r non-payment, and written notices, signed by
him, of the protest of each of said notes, and that the holders
looked to the indorsers for payment thereof, were by said notary,
by direction of the hold ers, put into the postoffice in said city,
on the morning of th 5th of said October. The notice to the
defendant, a fir t indorser of each of said notes, were directed to
him at Washington, in the District of Columbia. The defendant's
general domicil and place of business was in Boston, wh re he
at all times had an agent, who had the charge and manao-ement
of his busine affairs, in his absence; but from the 7th of September, 1837, to the 16th of ctober following the defendant was
at aid Wa hington, attendino- to his duties as a senator in congr s from thi Commonwealth, during the extra session held
that year.
Letter from 1 w Yo rk u ually r ach °V'l a hington in about
48 hours, in th e r g ular course of the mail. Such 1 tter , as are
acldre sed by mail to 111 mbers of th enate, during the session
of congr s are taken from the Washington postoffice, by offic rs
of the enate, appointed for that purpo e r charo-ed with the
luty, and delivered to the members in their plac , when the
enate is actually in
ion an 1 on other day are deliv red, by
th
officers, t memb r at their lodging ; and such was the
u ual cour e \Yith r gard to letter addr
d by mail to the
def ndant, during the extra e ion of eptemb r and ctober,
18~7 .
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The making and indorsement of the said notes, and the con-

sideration thereof, are admitted. All matters of fact, as well as

of law, involved in the case, are submitted to the decision of the

court, who may make such inferences from the facts stated, as a

jury would be authorized to make. If any facts are contained

in this statement, which it would not be competent for either

party, on a trial before a jury, to prove or put into the case,

upon the other party's objecting thereto, such facts shall be

stricken out by the court, and neither party shall be in any way

prejudiced by their having been inserted herein. .And if, in the

opinion of the court, it shall be necessary to the rights of either

party, the case may be opened for the introduction of evidence

touching facts that may be deemed material ; whether the} are

embraced in this statement, or not. But if no further evidence

or facts shall be introduced, and the court are of opinion that the

facts stated would justify a jury in finding a verdict for the plain-

tiff, a default is to be entered, and judgment rendered thereon

for the plaintiff ; otherwise, the plaintiff is to become nonsuit.

W. J. Hubbard & Watts, for the plaintiff.

/. P. Rogers & Hcaly, for the defendant.
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Shaw, C. J. It is admitted that these notes were duly made

and indorsed ; that they were seasonably presented for payment

at the bank in Xew York, where by their terms they were pay-

able, and payment refused ; that notice thereof, in due form, was

seasonably prepared by the proper officer, and put into the post-

The making and indor ement of th aid note and th e conideration thereof, are admitted.
11 matter of fact, a well as
of law, involved in th ca e, are ubmitted to the decision of the
co urt, who may make uch inference from the fact tat d, a a
jury w uld be au th riz d to make. If any fact are contained
in this statement, which it would not b comp tent for either
party, on a trial b for a jury, to prove or put into the ca e,
upon the other party's objecting ther to, uch facts shall be
trick n out by th court, and neither party hall be in any way
prejudiced by their havin · been in rted herein. . . nd if, in the
opinion of the court, it shall be nece sary to the right of eith r
party, th ca e may b opened for the introduction of evidence
touchin a facts that may be deemed material; whether they are
embraced in thi tatement, or not. But if no further evidence
or facts hall be introduced, and th e court are of opinion that the
facts tated would ju tify a jury in finding a verdict for the plaintiff, a default i to be entered, and judgment rendered thereon
for the plaintiff; othenvi e, the plaintiff is to become nonsuit.

office ; and the only question is. whether, under the circumstances

stated, it was rightly addressed to the defendant, at Washington.

The mercantile law, regulating the liabilities of parties to

not es~"lfnd bills, does no t_ r_eqjure~proof of a , ctiin] nnt jcp~ot dis-

honor to an indorser, in oTder to charge him ; but reasonable care_

and diligence in giving such notice.

The inference is very strong from the facts stated, as strong,

perhaps, as mere circumstantial evidence could make it, Jhat th£.

notice actually reached the defendant at Washington. He was a

senator of the United States ; the senate was then in session ; and

such precautions were taken, in regard to letters addressed to

senators, as to ensure their delivery with promptness and cer-

tainty.

The ground relied upon, to show that such notice was not

sufficient, is, that the defendant's general domicil and place of

business was in the city of Boston, where he had, at all times,

an agent, who had the charge and management of his affairs.

TV. J. Hubbard & Watts, for th e plaintiff.
J. P. Rogers & H eal3 1, for the defendqnt.

SH w, C. J. It i admitted that th e e notes were duly made
and indorsed; that they were sea onably pre ented for payment
at the bank in ::\ ew York, where by th eir terms they were payable, and payment refu d; that notice th ereof, in due form, was
a onably prepared by th e proper officer, and put into the po toffice; and the only que tion i , whether, under the circum tances
stated, it wa ri a htly addre sed to the defendant, at \A/a hing ton.
The mercantile law, re latina the liabilitie of artie to
roof

enator , as to ensure
certainty.
The g round relied upon, to show that such notice ' a not
uffici ent, is, that the defendant' general domi il and place of
business was in th e city of Boston. wh re h had, at a11 time
an agent who had th e charge and management of hi affai rs.
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But it docs not appear that he hail made any request to have

notices sent to him at Boston, or that any actual or constructive

notice was had by the holder of these notes, that he had an agent

at Boston. This fact, therefore, must he considered immaterial.

The defendant, though his domicil was at Boston, was actually

resident at Washington, in discharge of his public duties as a

senator, at a session of congress, called by public proclamation,

and continued until after the time at which this notice was sent ;

so that the place, where he might be presumed to be actually

residing, was fixed and well known by the nature of these duties.

Under these circumstances, the court are of opinion, that notice

to the de fendant, by mail, addressed to him at Washington, was

good andsu jficient notice of the dishonor of these notes .

This decision is founded on the circumstances of the particu-

lar case, and may be varied by other facts. It is not like the case

of a merchant stopping, for a day or two, at a hotel or watering

place, or on a journey of business or pleasure; though we are

not prepared to say that actual personal notice to an indorser, at

such place, would not be sufficient ; but of this we give no opinion.

Nor is it like the case of a banker or merchant, having exten-
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sive dealings in negotiable securities, having an open, fixed, and

well-known establishment and place of business, with agents

having the custody of his funds, the keeping of his accounts, and

generally charged with the transaction of his business in his

absence. Such circumstances might, perhaps, amount to con-

structive notice, to the holders of such securities, that such was

the indorser's place of business, and of his request and direction

that notice should be addressed to him there. It might, in this

view, be sufficient to show, that notice so given would be good

and sufficient, though it would still be open to the question,

whether other notice would not be equally good.

The fact of domicil is one circumstance only, in determining

where notice shall be given. A man may retain his domicil at

a place, though in fact personally absent therefrom, and absent

with his family for years. Such is the condition of a president

of the United States, or cabinet minister, residing at Washing-

ton, or of an ambassador in a foreign country. His domicil is

not thereby changed ; but yet we cannot doubt, that notice to

such public officer, at the place of his actual residence, to which,

for the time being, he is fixed by his public duty, would be good

notice. Yet the only distinction between a president of the

United States and a senator is, that the residence of the former

at Washington is somewhat more protracted, and uninterrupted

ut it doc not appear that he had mad any request to have
n tic
cnt t him at o ton, or that any actual or con tructive
n t
that h had an a ent
notice wa had by th h lder of th
at o ton. Thi fac t, th ref r , mu t b" con id r d immat rial.
Th def ndant, th ug h hi d micil wa at oston was actually
r id nt at \ ashington, in discharo- of hi public dutie as a
nator at a
ion of congr , call d by public proclamation,
and continu d until after the time at which thi notice was sent;
s that the plac , wh re he might b pre urn ed to b actually
r icli ng wa fix d and w 11 kn ow n by th e natur of these dutie .
Unde r th ese circumstance , the court ar of opinion, that notice
19 the def ndant by mail, addressed to him at \ a hington, wa
good and sufficient notice of the di hon or of th se not .
Thi deci ion i founded on the circum tances of the particular case, and may be varied by other fact . It is not like the ca
of a merchant topping, for a day or two, at a hotel or waterinoplace, or on a journ ey of bu iness or pl asure; though we are
not prepar d to ay that actual per onal notice to an indorser, at
such place, would not be sufficient; but of thi we give no opinion.
Nor i it like the ca e of a banker or merchant, having extenive dealings in negotiable s curities, havino- an open, fixed and
well-known
tabli hment and place of bu ine s, with agent
having the cu tody of his funds, the keepino- of hi accounts, and
g nerally charged with the transaction of his business in his
ab ence. Such circumstances might, perhaps, amount to constructive notic to the holders of such securities, that such was
the indor cr's place of business, and of hi request and direction
that notice should be addr ssed to him there. It might, in this
view, be sufficient to show, that notice so gi~en would be good
and sufficient, though it would still be op n to the question
whether other notice would not be equally good.
The fact of domicil i one circumstance only, in d t rmining
whe re notice hall b given.
man may retain his domicil at
a plac , though in fact p r onally abs nt therefrom , and ab ent
with his family for y ar .
uch i th condition of a pr ident
tates, or cabinet minister, residino- at V\Ta hingf the Unit
t n, or of an ambassador in a foreio-n country. His domicil is
not ther by changed; but y t we cannot doubt. that notice to
such public fficer , at the place of his actual re idenc , to which,
fo r the time being, he is fix d by hi public duty would be good
n tice. Y t the only distinction between a presid nt of th
Unite"l tat s and a senator i , that th r id nee of th f rmer
at Wa hington i om what more protracted, and uninterrupted
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by the intervals between sessions of congress, than that of the

latter.

We place no great reliance, in this decision, upon another

rule, which seems to be well established, and to embrace the

present case; namely, that notice at a postoffice, where- the part)

usually receives his letters, though not the place of his domicil,

is good notice. Rcid v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218. It is conformable

by th interval belw
latter.
plac n
ml , which
pr ent ca

n

ion

of cong ress than that of the

to the more .general rule, sustained by many authorities, t hat

notice shall be so given, and at such place, that it will be most

likely to reach the indorser pr o mptly. Bank of Columbia v.

Lawrence, 1 Pet. 578 ; U. S. Bank v. Corneal, 2 Pet. 553.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

WAIVER OF NOTICE CONTAINED IN INSTRUMENT. § 112.

v.

Phillips r. Dippo {1894), 93 Iou ' a 35> 57 Am. St. Rep. 254.

Appeal from Tama District Court. Hon. J. R. Caldwell,

Judge.

Action at law upon a negotiable promissory note. A demur-

rer to the petition was overruled, and, the defendant electing to

stand upon his demurrer, judgment was rendered in favor of the

plaintiff for the amount which appeared to be due on the note.
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The defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. H. Stivers, for appellant.

\V IVER OF N TI E

0

T I

ED 11

I

, TR ME1 T.

§ II2.

I'incel Drahos, for appellee.

Robinson, J. — The note in suit was made payable to defend-

ant or bearer, and contains the following : "The makers, indors-

Phillips v. Dippo (1894), 93 I01. a 35 57 Anz. St. Rep. 254 .
1

ers, and guarantors of this note * * * hereby waive pre-

sentment for payment, notice of non-payment, protest, and notice

of protest, and diligence in bringing suit against any party

thereto." Before the maturity of the note, the defendant wrote

his name thereon, and transferred it, and it is now owned by the

plaintiff. The grounds of the demurrer are that the defendant

is an indorser of the note, and the petition fails to show that the

note was duly presented for payment, that payment was refused,

and that the defendant was notified of the non-payment. The ques-

tion we are required to determine is whether the waiver of present-

ment for payment, protest, and notice of non-payment, contained in

. . \ppeal from Tama District Court. Ho . J. R. C LDWELL,
Judge .
. . ction at la\ upon a neo-otiabl promi sory note.
demurrer to the petition ' a o erruled, and, th d f ndant electino- to
tand upon hi demurr r, jud ment wa rendered in favor of the
plaintiff for th amount which appeared to be du on the note.
The def ndant appeal .
ffirmed.

the body of the note, is effectual as against an indorser in blank.

Wm. H. frvers, for appellant.
Vincel Drahos, for appell e.
RoBI
ON, J.-The note in uit wa made payable to defendant or b arer, and c ntain th followin : 'The maker , indor * * * her b waive pr r , and o-uarantor of thi not
entment for paym nt notice of non-paym nt, pr t t, and notic
in brino-ino- uit ao-ain t any part ·
f prot t, and dilig n
thereto. '
for the maturity of th not the d fendant wrot
his nam th r on, and tran ferr d it, and it i n w wn d by th
plaintiff. Th o-round
f th demurr r ar that th d fendant
i an indor r of th e not , and the p titi n fail to how that th
note wa duly pre ent l for paym nt. that paym nt wa r fu d.
and that the defendant was notifi d of th n n- aym nt. The que ti n \ ar required t d termin i "h th r th ' ai r f pre ntment for payment prot t, and noti e of non-pa ·m nt ontain d in
the body f th not , i ffe tnal a again t an indor r in blank.
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44b Notice Contained in Instrument

ko^-fr-*-^ ^ w ho was also the payee. It is contended by appellant that such an

^^Zts^^-r indorsement is a new, independent written contract between the

,.vi l- indorser and indorsee, with conditions implied by law. and that it

'^~- has no reference to a provision in the note of the character of that

"Vjj. in question. It was said in Davis v. Miller, 88 Iowa, 1 14, 55 N. \Y.

Rep. 90, that "an indorsement constitutes a new agreement with

.the indorsee, by which the indorser agrees that the instrument will

be paid at maturity, and, if it is not so paid upon proper demand,

that he will pay it if duly notified of the default;" and it was

held that the blank indorsement of a negotiable promissory note

payable by its terms at a designated place did not require the

indorser, when his liability became fixed, to pay the note at that

place. The reason for that conclusion was that such indorse-

ments are governed by the law of the place where they are made,

and create obligations which are to be performed there, or gen-

erally, and not at a place specified. In other words, it was held

that implied obligations created by the blank indorsement relate

to the time and amount, but not to the place, of payment. There

was nothing in the body of the note under consideration in that

case which referred in terms to the indorser. None of the author-
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ities relied upon by the appellant are applicable to this case, for

the reason that in none of them did the instrument in question

contain a provision in any respect like the one we have set out.

The part of that which referred to indorsers and guarantors was

without force as between the maker and payee, and was designed

to take effect onlv if the note should be indorsed. When the

defendant wrote his name on the back of the note, and trans-

ferred i t without in any manner qualifying the effect of the

indorsement, he necessarily became a party to the agreement of

waiver, and was not ent itled to the demand andjiotice which an

ordinary indorsem ent in blank requires. And this result does

not in any manner depend upon the fact that he was the payee

of the note. It is said in Tied. Com. Paper, section 363, that, "if,

the waiver is put in the body of the instrument, it enters into.

and forms a part of the "confracT ot everyone who^signs hi T ^

name to the paper, whether a^s^drawei- or indor ser. In 2 Dan-

iel, Neg. Inst., section 1092, the law is stated as follows: "Some-

times the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself, and in such

cases the waiver enters into the contract of every party who

signs it, whether as drawer, maker, acceptor, or indorser. Thus,

when the words 'presentation and protest waived,' or 'notice and

protest of non-acceptance and non-payment waived,' are written

in the bill, they are binding, not only upon the drawer, but also

~\.)r ~ x... who wa al o the pa ye . It i contend d by appellant that such an
~ incl r ement i a ne\v, ind pendent written contract bet\ een th e
~ ~

...... in<lor er and indor ee, with con lition i1111 Ii d by law and that it
·__,. ._ ha~ n ref renc to a provi ion in the note of the character of that
~~in iue tion. It wa aid in Davis v. }.;filler) 88 Iowa, I 14, 55 I . V\ 1 .
Rep. 90, that ''an indor ement con ti tut a new agr ement with
l.J ~"""-the in lor ee, by which th indor er agree that the instrument "ill
~
be paid at maturity, and, if it i not o paid upon proper d mand ,
~ '\ ~~ that he will pay it if duly notified of th default;" and it was
JI_
held that the blank indor rnent of a negotiable promi sory note
payable by it terms at a designated place did not require the
indorser, wh en hi liability became fixed, to pay the note at that
place. The rea on for that conclusion was that such inclor ement are govern ed by the law of th plac wh re they are made,
and create obligations which are to be performed there or aenrally, and not at a place specified. In other word , it wa held
that implied oblio-ations created by the blank indorsement relate
to the time and amount, but not to the place, of payment. There
wa nothing in the body of the note und r consideration in that
case which referred in terms to the indorser.
one of the authoritie relied upon by the appellant are applicable to this ca e, for
the r ason that in none of them did the in trument in que tion
contain a provision in any respect like the one we have et out.
The part of that ·w hich referred to indor er and guarantor was
without force as between the maker and payee, and wa de igned
to take effect only if the note should be indor ed . When the
defendant wrote his name on the back of the note, and transferred it without m any manner quahfymg the ffect of the
indorsement, he necessarily became a party to the agreement of
" ·aiver, and wa not entitled to the demand and notice which an
ordinar indor ement in blank require . And thi result doe
n t in any rnann r depen upon the fact that he "'as the payee
of the note. It is said in Tied. Com. Pap r, ection 363, that, 'Jk
the waiver i put in the body of the instrument, it enters into
an
arms a part of th contract of ev ryone who 1~ns hi
nam to the pap r, whether as drawer or indorser." In 2 Daniel, N eg. Inst., s ction 1092, the law is stated a follow : " ometimes the waiver i embodi d in the in trurnent it If. and in uch
cases the waiver enters into the contract of every party who
ign it, wheth r a draw r, maker, ace ptor or indor er. Thu .
when the "'ord 'presentation and prate t waived or 'notice and
protest of non-acceptance and non-paym nt waived,' are writt n
iv the bill, they are binding not only upon th e drawer, but al o
,..~
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upon the indorsers, who are in effect new drawers, and who

become parties to the waiver in becoming parties to the bill.

Clearly, this is the case where such waiver expressly includes the

drawer and indorsers." The rule of these authorities has sup-

port in the following cases: Lowry v. Steele, 27 Ind. 170; Bryant

v. Lord, 19 Minn. 405; Bank v. Ewing, 78 K\. 266; Bryant v.

Bank, 8 Bush, 43 ; Smith v. Lockridge, Id. 431. See, also, Wood-

ward v. Lowry, 74 Ga. 148; Studcbakcr v. Ryan, 46 Kan. 273,

26 Pac. Rep. 700. We conclude that the demurrer was properly

overruled, and the judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

V-

^Si-»^N

ORAL WAIVER. §111.

Annville Nat. Bank v. Kettering {1884), 106 Pa. St. 331. 51

and who
npon the indor er , who ar m ff ct n w draw
th
ill.
h com parti
parti
U arly, thi i
xpre 1
rlraw r and indor r ."
authoriti
upport in th follov in ca
: Lowry . te le, 27 Incl. 170; Bryant
v. Lord 19 1inn. 405; Bank v. Ewin u , 7 K). _66: Bryant v.
Bank,
u h, 43; mith . Lockridge Id. 43r.
e, al o f!Voodward v. Lowr3•, 74 a. 14 : tudebaker . Rya11, 4 Kan. 273,
?- Pac. Rep. 700. \Ve conclud that the demurr r wa properly
ov rru led, and the jud m nt of th Di trict ourt i
Affirmed.

~~-

Am. Rep. 53d.

Assumpsit on promissory note. Defendant had judgment

below. Opinion states the point in dispute.

Josiah Fitnek & Son, for plaintiff in error.

OR L \ V \IVER.

III.

W. M. Derr, for defendant in error.

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Mr. Justice Sterrett delivered the opinion of the court.

No principle of the law merchant is better settled than that

demand and notice of the non-payment of a negotiable note may

Annville ..\at. Bank v. KetteriHg (1884), Jo6 Pa. St. 53 I. 51
Am. Rep. 536.

be waived by the indorser, either orally or in writing, or by acts

clearly calcul ated to mislead the holder and prevent him from

treating the note as he otherwise would, but there is some diver-

A ump it on promi or) not . Defendant had judgm nt
helow.
pinion tate the point in dispute.

si ty of opinion as to what constitutes a waiver of tUese necessary

pre requisites to charge the indorser ! When a written waiver of

""demand and notice" accompanies the indorsement, or is given

by the indorser before maturity of the note, there can be no ques-

tion as to its legal effect ; nor can there be any doubt when the

language employed clearly imports or implies the same thing.

It has been doubted, however, whether the words "protest

waived," written on a note by the indorser. or his separate request

in writing not to protest it, is a waiver of both demand and notice,

and in some cases these words have been considered insufficient

to dispense with either ; but the weight of both reason and

authority is that they do constitute a waiver of both. Strictly

speaking, the term "protest" applies only to foreign bills, but

the custom to treat inland bills and notes in the same manner as

foreign bills has become so well-nigh universal that, in common

Josiah Funck & Son, for plaintiff in error.
vV. 1ll. Derr for defendant in rror.

Mr. Ju tice TERRETT d livered the opinion of the court.
No principl of th law merchant i better ettled than that
demand and notice of the non-payment of a negotiable note may
be waived by th indor er, eith r orally or in writino-, r by act
d arly calculat d t mi lead th holder and prev nt him from
treating the note as he otherwi would, but there i ome diversity of opinion a to what con titute a waiver of t
e nee sar
prerequi ites to charge the indor er. W h n a written waiver of
T•d mand and notic " accompanie th indor m nt. or i i en
by the indor er b for maturity of the note, there can b no qu tion a to it lea-al ff ct; nor can th re be any doubt ' hen th
languag
mployed cl arly import or impli s th
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'prote t
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the cu tom to treat inland bill and n t in th am manner a
forei n bill ha becom o 'Nell-nigh um r al that in common
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parlance, the term means the taking of such steps as are required

to charge the indorser. For the same reason, the word "pro-

tested," sometimes employed in giving notice of dishonor to

indorsers of inland bills and notes, clearly implies demand, non-

payment, and consequent dishonor of the bill or note in all cases

where protest is necessary: 1 Pars. Liills and Notes, 471, 575,

579, 582, and authorities there cited.

It is not essential that the waiver should be in writing.

When the fact is established by competent evidence, a parol

waiver is as valid and binding as a written one. The only dif-

ference is in the character of the proof: Barclay v. Weaver, 7

Harris, 396. It was there held that a verbal agreement between

the holder and indorser to renew a note at maturity, might be

shown by oral testimony, and that demand and notice were there-

by dispensed with. The general principle underlying nearly all

cases of waiver is that the indorser has by word or deed done

something calculated to mislead the holder and induce him to

forego the usual steps to fix the liability of the former.

It is unnecessary to refer specially to several well-considered

cases in other states, holding that a waiver of protest, without
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more, dispenses with demand and notice of non-payment. They

are in full accord with our own cases on the subject, the last of

which is Huckcnstein v. Herman, 34 Leg. Int. 232. That was

a suit by the holder against the indorser of a note which was not

presented for payment at maturity. To sustain the averment of

demand and notice of non-payment, the plaintiff relied on the

words "protest waived" written on the note and signed by the

indorser the day before, or early in the morning of the day the

note matured.* The court charged in substance that the words

were equivalent to an express waiver of demand and notice, and

on that point there was a verdict for the plaintiff. In the per

curiam opinion of this court, affirming the judgment of the Com-

mon Pleas, it is said : "A waiver of protest before maturity of a

note is a waiver of all the steps leading to it, and includes demand

and notice of non-payment. This, we think, is the general under-

standing of a waiver of protest among business men. The very

purpose of a waiver is to supersede the ordinary steps and avoid

trouble and expense. To waive the mere act of the notary, and

yet suffer the duty of making demand and giving notice of its

result to remain, would scarcely be thought of by business men."

It is argued by the learned counsel of defendant that this con-

flicts with the former ruling of this court in Scott v. Greer, 10

Barr.. 103, but we do not so understand it. In that case it was

parlance, the term mean th taking f such teps as are required
ame rea on, th word "proto harg th indor r. For th
test d, " ometim
employed in g ivin n tic of dishonor t
indo r::,e r of inland bill and note , clearly implie demand, nonpayment, and con equ nt di honor of th bill or not in all ca e
wh re prate t i nee ·ary : r Par . Dill and ot
471, 575,
579, S 2, and authoritie there cited.
It i not e ntial that the waiver hould be in wntmg.
\Vh n the fact i e tabli bed by competent evid nee, a parol
waiver i a valid and binding as a written one. The only difference i in the character of th e proof: Barclay v. Weaver, 7
Harri , 396. It wa there held that a verbal agreement between
the hold' r and indor er to r new a note at maturity, might be
shown by oral testimony, and that demand and notice were thereby di pensed with. The general principle und erlying nearly all
ca e of waiver is that th e indorscr ha by word or deed done
som thing calculated to mi lead the holder and induce him to
fore o the usual t ps to fix the liability of the former.
It i unnece ary to ref er specially to several well-con idered
ca es in other tates, holding that a waiver of protest, without
more di penses with demand and notice of non-payment. Th y
ar in full accord with our own cases on the subject, the last of
which is H uckenstein v. H erman, 34 Leo-. Int. 232. That was
a suit by the hold r against th e indor er of a note which was not
pre ented for payment at maturity. To sustain the averment of
demand and notice of non-payment, the plaintiff relied on the
words "protest '"''aiv d" writt n on the note and signed by the
indorser the day before, or early in the morning of the day the
note matured.• The court charged in ub tance that the word
were equivalent to an xpress waiver of demand and notice, and
on that point th ere was a verdict for the plaintiff. In th per
curiani opini on of this court, affirming the judo-ment of the Common P lea , it is said: "A waiver of prot st before maturity of a
note i a waive r of all the st p leading to it, and includes demand
and notice of non-payment. Thi we think, is th e general undertanding of a waiver of prate t among business men. The very
purpose of a \\ aiver is to sup r ed the ordinary steps and avoid
trouble and exp nse. T o waiv the mere act of the notary, and
yet uffer the duty of making demand and giving notice of it
r ult to r main, would carcely 1 thought of by bu iness men."
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held that the waiver of a protest by an indorser on the day the

note matured puts him in the same situation as if the protest had

been made and proved; and, there being no contradictory evi-

dence, it is proof under the Act of Assembly of demand, refusal

and notice. It is true the learned judge who delivered the opinion

in that case intimates that the prima facie case thus presented by

the plaintiff might have been rebutted by showing that no demand

was, in fact, made; but what was said on that subject was aside

from the question before the court, and, in so far as his remarks

may be considered in conflict with the ruling in Huckcnstcin v.

Herman, supra, they cannot be regarded as authority for the posi-

tion that a waiver of protest does not necessarily imply a waiver

of demand and notice. The principle decided in Huckenstein v.

Herman is akin to that involved in Ridgzvay & Budd v. Day, I

Harris, 208, and Brittain v The Doylestozvn Bank, 5 W. & S.,

87. In the latter case the indorser, by memorandum on the note,

waived "notice of non-payment by the maker," and it was held

that proof of demand was thereby rendered unnecessary. "The

interpretation," said Gibson, C. J., "is that he agreed to become
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immediately liable, without more, in case the note should not be

taken up at maturity."

In the case at bar it is conceded there was neither demand

nor notice of non-payment, nor was there any written waiver of

protest. For the purpose of sustaining the material averment of

demand and notice, testimony was introduced by plaintiff tending

to prove, in substance, that during a course of dealing with the

bank, defendant had several notes discounted, and the proceeds

placed to his credit ; that when he first requested a discount, he

informed the officers of the bank that, desiring to deal with them,

he would be obliged to apply for discounts, and wished it to be

understood that none of his notes should be protested ; that, pur-

suant to this request, none of them were protested, nor was pav-

ment of them demanded of the maker; and, in consequence of

that understanding, payment of the note in suit was not legally

demanded, nor was notice of non-payment given to defendant.

In view of this testimony the court was requested to charge :

"1st. If an indorser gives directions to the indorsee, at th e

time or before he brings the note for discount, that the same shall

not be protested, and this is assented to by the indorsee, it relieves

the latter from the duty of m aking demand for payment of the

maker, and of giving notice of the non-pavment to the indorser

of such note. "

"2d. If the defendant waived protest of the note before

held that the waiver of a protest by an indor er on the day the
note matured put him in the ame situation a if the prot t had
beep made and proved; and, there being no contradictory cvide.nce, it i proof under the ct of ssembly of demand, refusal
and notic . It i true the learn d judge who delivered the opinion
in that ca
intimat s that the prima facie case thus presented by
the plaintiff mio-ht have been r butted by showing that no demand
wa , in fact made; but what was aid on that subject wa aside
from the que tion before the court, and, in so far as his remarks
may be con id red in conflict with the ruling in Huckenstein v.
Herman, upra, they cannot b regarded as authority for the position that a waiver of prot t does not nece sarily imply a waiver
of demand and notice. The principle decided in Huckenstein v.
Herman i akin to that involved in Rid away & Budd v. Da3, r
Harris, 20 , and Brittain v The Doylestown Bank, 5 W. & S.,
7. In the latter ca e the indor er, by memorandum on the note,
waived "notice of non-payment by the maker," and it was held
that proof of d mand wa thereby rende red unnecessary. 'The
interpretation," aid ibson, C. J., "is that he agreed to become
immecliat ly liable, without more, in ca e the note should not be
taken up at maturity."
In the ca e at bar it i conceded there wa neither demand
nor notice of non-payment, nor was there any written waiver of
prote t. For the purpos of sustaining the material averment of
demand and notice, testimony was introduced by plaintiff tending
to prove, in substance, that durino- a course of dealing with th
bank, defendant had several notes di counted, and the proceed
placed to his credit; that when he first requested a discount. he
informed the officers of the bank that, de iring to deal with them,
he would be oblio-ed to apply for discounts, and wi hed it to be
understood that none of his notes should be prote ted · that puruant to this reque t none of them were protest d nor was payment of them d mantled of the maker· and, in con equence of
that understanding, payment of the note in uit ' as not legally
demanded, nor wa notic of non-payment given to d fendant.
In view of this te timony th court was r quest d to charo-e :
"r t. If an indorser give direction to th indor ee, at the
~ime or before he brings th note for di count, that the ame hall
not be protested, and this is assent d to b) th indor ee. it reliev .
the latter from the duty of making demand for payment of th e
;naker, and of g iving notice of the non-payment to the in or er
of such note."
"2d. If the defendant ' aived prot t of the not before
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maturity, no demand oi the maker was necessary to charge him

with its payment."

The learned judge refused these points, saying: "Such

waiver of protest is prima facie evidence of presentment to and

demand upon the maker, but it does not relieve the indorsee from

the necessity of such presentment and demand ;" and he further

instructed the jury, in substance, that if, in point of fact, no

demand was made or no notice given to defendant, the plaintiff

could not recover. It being conceded that there was no legal

demand or notice, the verdict, as matter of course, was for defend-

ant. The plaintiff's testimony, if believed by the jury, was clearly

sufficient to have warranted them in finding the facts as stated

in the foregoing points, and, for reasons already suggested, they

should have been affirmed.

When the alleged waive r is in writing, its construction is

for the court, but when it consists of verbal communications, it

is the special province of the jury to consider the testimony and

ascertain the facts. When ascertained, it is their duty to apply

the law under the direction of the court. Assuming the facts to

be as recited in the points, the law as therein stated is correct, and
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hence there was error in refusing to affirm plaintiff's first and

second points, and in charging the jury as complained of in the

third specification.

Judgment reversed, and a ■venire facias de novo awarded.

WAIVER BY IMPLICATION. §111.

Gove et at v. Fining (1843), 7 Mete. (Mass.) 212, 39 Am. Dec.

7/0.

Assumpsit by the indorsees against the indorser of the fol-

lowing note: "Scituate, December 27th, 1841. Four months after

date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of Polly

Vining one hundred and three dollars and eighteen cents at either

bank at Boston. Alexander Vining." This note was indorsed

in blank by the defendant.

The plaintiffs, to prove their declaration, offered the deposi-

maturity, no u man I f th mak r wa
ary to charg him
"ith iL paym nt. "
Th learn d j ud
r fu d th
point
aymg: " uch
\\ ai\'er of prot t i pri111a facie evid nee of pre entment to and
demand upon th e mak r, but it do not r Ii v the indor e from
th nee ity of uch pre cntm nt and demand;" and he forth r
in · tructed th jury, in ub tance, that if, in point of fact, no
demand wa made or no notic rriv n t d f ndant, the plaintiff
could not r cover. It being c needed that there \ a no l o-al
demand or notic , th v rdict a matt r of our e, wa for def nclant. The plaintiff' te timony, if b lieved by the jur~, wa clearly
ufficient t have warranted them in finding the fact a
tated
in th for g ing points and, for r a on already uo-ge ted, they
hould have b n affirm d.
\\hen the all ged waiver i in wnt111
for the court, ut w 1en 1t con i t of verbal communication it
i the pecial province of the jury to con ider the te timon y and
a c rtain the fact . V\ h n a certain d , it i their duty to apply
th law under the direction of the court.
suming the facts to
he a recited in the p int , the law a th rein tat d i corr ct, and
hcnc there wa
rror in refu ing to affirm plaintiff first and
econd point , and in charo-ino- the jury a' complained of in th
third pecification.
Judgment reversed, and a ven ire facias de nova awarded.

tion of C. E. Fogg, who deposed, that he, on or about the 27th

of April, 1842, at the request of his father, Eben. T. Fogg, took

the said note, and also a written notice requesting payment of

said note, and went to the dwelling-house of Polly Vining

WAIVER BY IMPLI ./\TIO

§ III.

and Alexander Vining: that he saw said Polly, but did not see

Gove et al.

7.'.

i·illing (1843), 7 ~Mete. (Mass.) 212 39 Am. Dec.
770.

, \ ump it by the indor ee again t the indor er of the followi ng note: " cituate, ec mb r 27th I 4I. Four months after
elate, f r value r ceived, I promise to pay to the order of Polly
Yinino- ne hundred and three dollar and ighteen cents at either
bank at o ton.
I xand r Vining." This note wa indor ed
in blank by th d fendant.
The plaintiff to prove their declaration, offer l th deposition of C. E. Fogg, who d po ed that h , on or about th 27th
of April, I 42, at the r que , t of hi father, Eb n. T. Fo g, took
th
aid not , and al
a written notice requesting pa ment of
aid note, and w nt t the dwelling-hou e of Polly Vining
and lexand r ining; that he aw said ally. but did not see

Gove et al. v. Vining 453

G

VE ET AL.

v.

VINING

453

said Alexander, he not being at home ; that he handed to said

Polly the note and written notice, and she read them, and said

that Alexander was going- down to see the deponent's father in a

short time, and wished he would not sue the note until Alexander

saw him: That said notice was in the following words: "A

note dated December 27th, 1841, signed by Alexander Vining,

and indorsed by you, for $103.18, and payable in four months

from date, is now due, and you are requested to pay the same.

Ebenr. T. Fogg, Atty. April 28th, 1842."

The defendant admitted that the statements in the deposition

were true, and the parties took the case from the jury, and agreed

that the court, on those statements, should render judgment for

the plaintiffs or for the defendant, according to their opinion

thereon.

Eddy, for the plaintiffs.

Kingsbury, for the defendants.

Shaw, C. J. The plaintiffs seek to recover of the defendant,

as indorser, the amount of a promissory note, made by Alexander

Vining to the defendant or her order, and by her indorsed. The

note was dated December 27th, 1841, payable at four months

said Alexander, h not being at home; that he handed to aid
Polly the note and written notice, and sh r ad them, and aid
that A lexander was going down to se the d ponent's father in a
hort time, and wished he would not u the note until Alexander
aw him: That aid noti~e wa in the following word : "
note dated D c mber 27th, 1841, igned by I xander mmg,
and indorsed by you, for $103.18, and payable in four month
from date, i now due, and you are requested to pay the ame.
Ebenr. T. Fogg, tty. April 28th, 1842."
The def ndant ·admitted that the statements in the deposition
were true, and th parties took the cas from the jury, and agreed
that the court, on those statements, should render judgment for
the plaintiff or for the defendant, according to their opm1on
thereon.
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from date at either bank in Boston. The defence relied on was,

that there was no demand on the maker, and no notice of dishonor

to the defendant as indorser. The plaintiffs relied on a waiver

Edd'y, for the plaintiff .

KingsbHry, for the defendants.

of demand and notice by the defendant

The facts were testified to, in a deposition of C. E. Fogg, son

of the agent with whom the note was deposited by the plaintiffs

for collection, and were subsequently agreed to,, as a statement of

facts. It appears, by this statement, that on the day the note

nominally fell due, but before the days of grace, the deponent, by

direction of his father, took the note, and went to the house

where both the promisor and indorser lived. He carried with

him a written demand on the indorser, for payment. This, how:

ever, though payment was not then made, would not amount to

a dishonor of the note, botlfobecause the days of grace had not

expired, and it was not yet due ; anEPbecanse it was payable at a

bank in Boston. But there was still ample time to send it to

Boston, and place it in a bank there for collection, if nothing had

been done by way of waiver by the indorser. It appears that the

messenger did not see the promisor, but he saw the indorser, the

defendant, and handed to her the written demand and the note,

and she read them. She said that Alexander, the promisor, was

going down to see the messenger's father (who had charge of

SHA w, C. J. The plaintiffs seek to recover of the defendant,
as indorser, the amount of a promissory note, made by Alexander
ining t.o the defendant or her order, and by her indorsed. The
note was dated December 27th, 1841, payable at four months
from date at either bank in Boston. The defence relied on was,
that there was no demand on the maker, and no notice of dishonor
to the defendant as indorser. The plaintiffs relied on a waiver
of demand and notice by the defendant
The fact were testified to, in a deposition of C. E. Fogg, son
of the agent with whom the note was deposited by the plaintiff
for collection, and were subsequently agreed to,. as a statement of
facts. It appears, by this statement, that on the day the note
nominally fell due, but before the days of grace, the deponent, by
direction of his father, took the note, and went to the house
where both the promisor and indorser lived. He carried with
him a written demand on the indorser, for payment. This, however, thou h ayment wa not then made, would not amount to
a dishonor of the note, bot ' ecause the days of grace had not
expired, and it was not yet due; an~ecau e it ' a payable at a
bank in Boston. But there was till ample time to send it to
. Bo ton, and place it in a bank there for collection, if nothino- had
been done by way of waiver by the indorser. It app ars that the
messenger did not see the promi or, but he aw th indor er the
defendant, and handed to h r the writt n demand and the note,
and he read them. She said that I xander, the promisor, was
gomg down to see the messeno-er's father (who had charge of
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the note for the holders) in a short time, and wished he would

not sue it until Alexander saw him. Although, literally, this

was stated as the request of the promisor, yet it was made by

the indorser, without any restriction or qualification on her part,

and therefore may be considered the same as if it were her own.

It was therefore a request, by the indorser, to the holders, through

their agent, with full notice that the note was then nominally due,

(though not legally payable till three days after) for forbearance

of payment. It was calculated to induce the holder to believe

that the parties who were liable were about making some arrange-

ment or some proposal, by which it would be paid, if he would

forbear resorting to coercive measures for a short time.

And the court are of opinion that when the indorser, at or

s hortly before the time when the note be comes due, says to the

holder, that an arrangement to r its payment is about being made,

and in direct terms, or by reaso nable implication, requests the

hol der to wait or giv e time, it amounts to an a ssurance that the

note will be paid — that the prom is or or indorser will pay it—

and is a waiver of demand and n o tice. It tends to put the holder

off his guard, and induces him to forego making a demand at the
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proper time and place; and it would be contrary to good faith.

to set up such want of demand and notice — caused perhaps by

such forbearance — as a ground of defence. (LeMngwell v. White,

i Johns. Cas. 99; Mechanics Bank v. Griszvold, 7 Wend. 165;

Leonard v. Gary, 10 Wend. 504; Taunton Batik v. Richardson,

5 Pick. 436; Thornton v. Wynn, T2 Wheat. 183 ; Wood v. Brown,

1 Stark. R. 217).

Judgment for the

WHEN NOTICE DISPENSED WITH. § II4.

Bacon v. Hanna, imp. {1893), 13/ N. Y. 379.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the fifth judicial department, entered upon an order

made January 22, 1892, which affirmed a judgment in favor of

defendant entered upon a verdict directed by the court.

This was an action upon a promissory note made by defend-

ant. J. Sawyer Hanna, payable in two months after date to the

order of A. E. Hanna. It was indorsed by the payee and the

defendants. Morris W. Hanna and W. Dwight Munger. Morris

the note for th h Id r ) in a hort time, and wished he would
not ue it until Alexand r aw him.
1th u h, lit rall y, this
\\'a tated a th reque t of the promiser, y t it wa made by
the ind r er, without any r triction r qualification on her part,
and therefor may be con id red the ame a if it were her ow1-:..
It wa therefor a r quest, by the indor er, to th holder , through
their agent with full notice that the note wa th n nominally due,
( thOLwh not legally payable till tbre days after) f r £orb arance
of payment. It was calculated to induce the holder to believe
that the parti s who wer liable were about making some arrangement or ome proposal, by which it would be paid, if h would
forbear re orting to coercive measur s for a hort time.
And the court are of opinion that when the indor er, at or
shortl before the time when the note becomes due, says to the
holder, that an arrangement or 1 s payment 1s a OtJt being made,
and in direct term , or by rea onable implicat10n, r guest thehold r to wait or give time, it amount to an assurance that thenote will be aid-that the prorrn or or mdorser will a itand is a waiver of demand and notice. t tends to put the holder
off his guard, and induces him to forego making a demand at the
proper time and place; and it would be contrary to good faith,
to et up such want of demand and notice-caused perhaps by
uch forbearance-as a ground of defence. (Leffingwell v. White,
l Johns. Cas. 99; Jl!f echanics Ban!? v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165;
Leonard v. Gary, IO Wend. 504; Taunton Bank ' v. Rfrhardson,
5 Pick. 436; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Wood v. Brown,
I Stark. R. 217).
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

WHEN NOTICE DI SP ENSED WITH.
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Bacon v . Hanna, imp. (1893), 137 N. Y. 379.
Appeal from juclo-ment of the General Term of the Supr me
Court in th fifth judicial department, ntered upon an ord r
made January 22, 1892, which affirmed a judgment in favor of
cl f nclant nt r cl upon a verdict dir cted by the court.
This was an action upon a promissory not made by def ndant, ]. awyer Hanna, payable in two months after date to the
ord r of . E. Hanna. It was indors d by th payee and the
def ndant , Morri \ . Hanna and W. Dwight Munger. Morri
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W. Hanna refused to submit any question to the jury and alone

defended. The court directed a verdict for defendant, to which

plaintiff's counsel excepted. A verdict was rendered in accord-

ance with the direction.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

John Gillette, for appellant.

Edwin Hicks, for respondent.

W. Hanna refused to ubmit any qu tion to th jury and alon
de fended. The court directed a v rdict for def ndant, to which
plaintiff's coun el xc pt d. A v r Ii t wa r nder d in accordance with the direction.
Th facts , o far a material, are tat d in th opinion.

Finch, J. The complaint involved in this appeal respects

the ruling of the court, which determined, as matter of law, that

due diligence had not been exercised in giving notice of protest

John Gillette, for app llant.
Edwin Hicks, for re pondent.

to the_indorser, and refusing to submit the question, as one of

fact, to the decision of the jury. The General Term sustained the

ruling, and we are inclined to approve it, as justified by the facts.

The indorser lived in the town of Hopewell, and his postoffice

address was at Chapinville in that town. He had resided in the

same place for nineteen years, and at the time of the maturity of

the note was supervisor of his town, which adjoined the village

of Canandaigua, and had held that office for two years. His

home was four miles east of the east line of the village, and the

notary who served the notice had been at his house and conse-
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quently knew of its location. He knew also that the indorser was

supervisor of the town of Hopewell, and had mailed a notice of

protest of a note preceding the one in suit, and of which the latter

was a renewal to the same indorser at Chapinville. Inquiry of

the maker of the note ; at the postoffice in Canandaigua ; or of bus-

iness men in that village ; would have disclosed the residence of

the indorser easily and correctly. What the notary did was to

mail a notice directed to the indorser at Canandaigua, under the

provisions of the act of 1857 (Chap. 416, § 3), which permits such

notice by mail where the indorser lives in the same city or town,

or has a place of business therein, or has indicated such residence

by a memorandum added to his signature, or where, "from the

best information obtained from diligent inquiry," he is "reputed"

there to reside or have a place of business. We may assume that

the notary may have forgotten for the moment his previous action

in mailing a notice to Giapinville, and was in doubt about the

residence of the indorser, although with the knowledge which he

had and some reasonable reflection upon the subject it would seem

that his memory might not have failed him, but his only effort to

solve the doubt was to look into a directory of Canandaigua to

ascertain the truth. He there found this entry : "Hanna, Morris

W., 158 Canandaigua." The record does not show whether or

Frn H, J. The complaint involved in this appeal re pects
the rulin o- of the c urt, which det rmined, as matter of law, that
due dilig nee had not been exercis d in giving notice of protest
to t~er, and r fu ing to submit the qu tion, a one of
fact, to the deci ion of th jury. The General Term sustained the
ruling, and we ar inclined to approve it, as justified by the fact .
The indorser liv d in the town of Hopewell, and his postoffice
addre s wa at Chapinville in that town. He had resided in the
ame place for ninet en years, and at the time of the maturity of
th note wa upervi or of his town, which adjoined the village
f Canandaigua, and had held that office for two years. Hi
horn wa four miles east of the east line of the village, and the
notary who erved th e notice had been at his house and con equently knew of it location. He knew al o that the indorser was
upervisor of the town of Hopewell, and had mailed a notice of
prote t of a note preceding the one in uit, and of which the latter
was a renewal to the ame indorser at Chapinville. Inquiry of
t he maker of the note; at the postoffice in Canandaigua ; or of business men in that villabe; would have disclosed the residence of
the inclor er ea ily and correctly. What the notary did was to
mail a notice directed to the indorser at Canandaigua, under the
provisions of the act of 1857 (Chap. 416, § 3), which permits such
notice by mail where the indorser lives in the same city or town,
·or ha a place of busine s therein, or ha indicated uch residence
by a memorandum added to his sio-nature, or wher , "from th
best information obtained from dilig nt inquiry' he i "reputed'
there to re ide or have a place of bu ine . We may assume that
the notary may have for otten for the moment hi previous action
in mailing a notice to 01apinville, and was in doubt about the
residence of the indors r, although with the knowl do-e which he
had and some reasonable reflection upon the subject it' ould s em
that his memory mio-ht not have failed him, but his only effort to
solve the doubt was to look into a dir ctory of anandaigua to
ascertain the truth. H there found thi entry: "Hanna Morris
W., 158 Canandaigua." The record doe not how whet er or
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not there is a street in the village bearing its name. If there is,

inquiry at that number would have disclosed the error. If there

is not, the entry was sufficiently odd and peculiar to make the

notary's alleged understanding that the figures meant number of

acres owned in Canandaigua inexcusable without some further

inquiry. Prior to the act of 1857 service upon the indorser resid-

ing in the same town at his place of business therein was required.

The change permitting instead a service by mail was carefully

guarded and limited. Where the notary relied upon a "reputed"

residence he was required to act from "the best information

obtained by diligent inquiry/' Merely looking int o^a_ directory.

is not enough. The sources of error in that process are too many-

arid too great. Such books are accurate enough in a general way

and convenient as an aid or assistance, but they are private ven

tures, created by irresponsible parties and depending upon infor

mation gathered as cheaply as possible and by unknown agents.

Their help may be invoked, but, as was said in Lawrence v. Miller

(16 N. Y. 231), their error may excuse the notary, but will not

charge the defendant. Merely consulting them should not be

deemed "the best information obtained by diligent inquiry."
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(Greenwich Bank v. De Groot, 7 Hun, 210; Baer v. Leppert, 12

id. 516). These cases differ somewhat in their facts, but clearly

indicate that bare reliance upon a directory is not sufficient dili-

gence, and that should certainly be the rule upon facts such as are

disclosed in' the present case.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Judgment affirmed.

agreements to waive strictly construed. § hi.

Freeman v. O'Brien {1874), 38 Iowa 406.

Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court.

This action is brought on a promissory note, against William

O'Brien as maker, and Michael Cash as indorser thereof. The

defendant Cash demurred to the petition. The court sustained

the demurrer and plaintiff appeals. The further facts are stated

in the opinion.

Williams & Ewing, for appellant.

Boal & Jackson, for appellee.

not there i a street in th village bearin its name. If there is,
inquiry at that number would have disclo ed the error. If there
i n t, th
ntry was sufficiently odd and peculiar to make the
notary' all ged under tanding that the figures meant number of
acre owned in anandaigua inexcusabl without ome further
inquiry. Prior to the act of 1857 service upon the indor er re iding in the am town at his place of business therein was required.
The chano-e permitting in tead a ervic by mail wa carefull
guarded and limited. Where the notary relied upon a ' reputed"
re idence he wa required to act from "the be t information
obtain d b diligent in uir ." M r 1 r lookin into
rector
i not enough . The ource of error in t 1at process are too many
arid too great. Such books are accurate enough in a general way
and convenient a an aid or a istance, but they are private v n
ture , created by irre ponsible parties and depending upon infor
mation gather d as cheaply as possible and by unknown agent .
Their help may be invoked, but, as was said in Lawrence v . .Miller·
( 16 . Y. 231), their error may excuse the notary, but will not
charge the def ndant. Merely consulting them should not b~
deemed "the be t information obtained by diligent inquiry.' ·
( Greenwich Ban!~ v. De Groot, 7 Hun, 2IO; Baer v. Leppert, 12
id. 516). These ca es differ somewhat in their fact , but clearly
indicate that bare reliance upon a directory is not sufficient diligence, and that hould certainly be the rule upon facts such as are
di clo ed in' the present case.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
11 concur.
Jitdgn·:r~_aflirmed.
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Frecnian v. O'Brien (I874), 38 Iowa 406.
Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court.
This actipn is brought on a promissory note, against William
O'Brien as maker, and Michael Cash a indorser thereof. The
defendant Cash demurred to the petition. The court su tained
the demurrer and plaintiff appeal . The further facts are stated
in the opinion.

Williams & Ewing, for appellant.
Boal & Jackson, for appellee.
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Miller, Ch.J. — The note upon which suit is brought is nego-

tiable. It is alleged that before the maturity thereof it was

indorsed in blank by Michael Cash, the payee thereof, to the plain-

tiff, and that the indorser had notice of the dishonor of the same ;

that demand for payment was made and refused after the note

matured, and that notice in writing of such demand was given

to Cash about four years after the maturity of the note. It is

further alleged in an amendment to the petition that plaintiff

bought the note from Cash, paying him the full amount thereof ;

that at the time of the indorsement and transfer of the note it

was orally agreed between the parties that "the plaintiff should

not sue on said note but wait until defendant O'Brien could pay

said note, or until Cash should give notice to commence action

on said note ;" that at numerous times between the transfer of the

note and the commencement of this action, "Cash has notified

plaintiff not to push or distress said O'Brien and at all times

assured plaintiff that he as indorser would stand good for the

payment of said note ;" that "on or about the time of the maturity

of said note plaintiff gave notice of the same to O'Brien who

nevertheless failed to pay the same ;" that at or about the day of
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the commencing of this suit, Cash came to plaintiff and notified

him that he would not stand good any longer for said note unless

plaintiff should at once commence an action to recover the

amount of said note, and on the same day plaintiff took steps to

commence this action."

The court sustained a demurrer to the petition as amended,

which ruling is assigned as error.

I. It is conceded that the plaintiff did not, upon the matur-

ity of the note, make due demand upon the maker of the note,

and give due notice to the indorser of the failure to pay bv the

maker. It is claimed, however, that the indorser waived the

necessity of demand and notice required by the commercial law

in order to fix an absolute liability upon him, and that he is there-

fore liable, notwithstanding the failure to make due demand and

give due notice.

Appellant urges that the verbal agreement, alleged to have

been made at the time of the transfer of the note to plaintiff, to

the effect that plaintiff should not sue the maker, O'Brien, until he

could pay or until the indorser should notify plaintiff to sue.

operated as a waiver of demand and notice. It seems clear to

us that this would be giving to this alleged agreement a meaning

and effect far beyond its scope, and not within the contemplation

of the parties. The agreement that suit was to be delayed, by no

MILLER, Ch.J.-Th note upon which uit is brought i negotiable. It is alleged that befor the maturity thereof it wa
indorsed in blank by Michael a h, the payee ther of, to the plaintiff, and that the indorser had notic of the di honor of the ame;
that demand for payment was made and refus d after the note
matured, and that notice in writing of such d mand wa given
to Cash about four y ar after th maturity of the not . It i
further alleged in an am ndment to the petition that plaintiff
bought the note from a h, pa) ing him the full amount thereof·
that at the time of the indor ement and transfer of the note it
·was orally agreed between th parti s that "th plaintiff h uld
not sue on said note but wait until defendant O'Brien could pay
aid note, or until a h hould give notice to commence action
on said note;" that at numerous times between the transfer of the
note and the commencement of thi action, "Ca h has notified
plaintiff not to push or distre s said O'Brien and · at all times
a ur d plaintiff that he as indorser would stand good for the
payment of aid not ;' that "on or about the time of the maturity
of aid note plaintiff gave notice of the same to O'Brien who
neverth le s failed to pay the same;" that at or about the day of
the commencing of thi uit, Cash came to plaintiff and notified
him that he would not stand good any longer for aid note unle
plaintiff hould at once commence an action to recover the
amount of aid note, and on the same day plaintiff took teps to
commence this action."
The c urt · u tained a demurrer to the petition as amended,
which rulino- is as io-ned as error.
I. It i conceded that the plaintiff did not, upon the maturity of the note, make due demand upon tl e maker of the note,
and give due notice to the indor er of the failure to pay by the
maker. It is claimed, however, that the indor er waived the
necessity of demand and notice required by the commercial law
in order to fix an ab olut liability up n him, and that he is therefore liable, notwithstandino- the failure to make due demand and
give due notice.
Appellant uro-es that the verbal ao-reement, alleo-ed to have
been made at the time of the tran f r of th note to plaintiff, to
the effect that plaintiff should not ue the maker,
rien, until he
could pay or until th indor er hould notify plaintiff to sue,
operated as a waiver of demand and notice. It seems clear to
u that this would be givin to thi all a- d a re m nt a meaning
and effect far beyond its scope, and not within th contemplation
-0f the parties. The a~reement that uit "'a to b d laYed, by no
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means exonerated the plaintiff from the duty of mak ing d emand

upon the maker at the maturity of the note, and from giving the

indorser due notice of default in payment. These acts were neces-

sary to fix an absolulte liability upon th~e* indorser. and they could

be done without infringing upon the agreement to delay suit on

the note . There is no inconsistency between the agreement

alleged and the duty to make demand and give notice.

The substance of the alleged agreement is that if, at the

maturity of the note, the maker was not able to pay, the plaintiff

was not to sue until he was able, or until the indorser gave notice

that he should sue. From the terms of the agreement it is rea-

sonably clear that it was contemplated by the parties that demand

of payment should be made upon the maker of the note at matur-

ity, else how was it to be known whether he was able to pay or

not. It is equally clear that in case of the refusal of the maker to

pay on demand, the indorser was, under the agreement, entitled to

notice, so that he could determine whether or not to require the

plaintiff to sue.

2. It is further alleged that Cash constantly after the

indorsement assured plaintiff that he would stand good for the
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payment of the note. It is claimed that this agreement or assur-

ance operated as a waiver of demand and notice. Agreements of

this sort are always construed strictly and are never extended

beyond the fair import of the terms used. (Berkshire B'k v.

Jones, 6 Mass., 524; Central B'k v. Davis, 19 Pick., 373; Union

B'k v. Hyde, 6 Wheat., 572 ; May v. Coffin, 4 Mass., 341 ; Backus

v. Shiphcrd, 11 Wend., 629). If the all eged assurance or promise

to stand good was made prior to the maturity of the note, it would -

be an undue extension ~6f its terms to hold that the indorser

inte nded thereby to'stancTgno tf'Tdr the payment of the note abso-

InteTv^jio hvithsfantlino- plaintiff should tail to make demand and

give him notice of non-payment. An understanding as follows :

"I do request that hereafter any notes that may fall due at the

Union Bank, on which I am or may be indorser, may not be pro-

tested, as I will consider myself bound in the same manner as if

the same had been legally protested," was held in Union Bank v.

Hyde, supra, to be so ambiguous and doubtful whether it was

intended thereby to waive demand and notice, that further proof

of such intention was required. In that case there was doubt as

to the intention of the party, and under the rule of .strict construc-

'io.n further evidence was demanded. In the case before us the

language used does not approach near enough to a waiver to

become doubtful.

m an exon rated th plaintiff from the duty of making demand
u n th mak r al the maturity of th nol , and from g 1vmg the
ind r er du notice of cl fault in paymenl. Th e acts w re ncces·ar · t fix an ab olulte liability upon th indor er] and they could
be don without infringino- upon the agreement to d lay uit on
the note . Th r i no mcon i t ncy b tween th e agreement
alleo- d and th duty to mak demand and g ive notice.
~~
The ub tanc of the alleged agr em nt is that if, at the
...._ ~
maturity of th not , the maker wa not able to pay, the plainti ff
~ ,
wa not to ue until he was able, or until the indor er gave notice:
~~t hat he should sue. From th t rm s of th e agre ment it i r a~~ onabl y cl a r that it wa co ntemplated by the parties that demand
~~of payment should b made upon th mak r of the note at matur,
:. ~~ it_ 1 how wa it to be know n whether he wa able to pay or
.
not. It is qually clear that in ca e of the refu al of the mak r to
"")
pay on demand, the indor er was, under the agreement, entitled t()
notice, so that he could determine whether or not to require th tplaintiff to sue.
2.
It i further all o-ed that Cash constantly after the:
inclor ement a urecl plaintiff that he would tand good for the
payment of the note. It is claimed that this agreement or a ur·
ance operated a ci. waiver of demand and noti ce. Agreements of
this ort are always construed trictly and are never extended
beyond th e fair import of the term u ed. ( B erkshire B' l? v.
Jones, 6 Mass., 524; Central B' k v. Davis, 19 Pick., 373: Union
B' l? v. Hyde, 6 Wheat., 572 ; Ma.y v. Coffin, 4 Ma ., 341; Backus
v. hip herd, II Wencl., 629). If th e alleaed assurance or romi c
to stand ood was mad prior to t e matunt of th note it wou
e an undu e extension o its t rm to h ld that t 1e indorser
mt nctcd th ere15V to tftfcTi'6"5d"'1or the payme11t of tt"e note Tusou e y, notw·
·
b
give bim notice of non-paym ent.
n understanding a o ow :
"I do reque t that h reafter an y note that may fall du at th
nion ank, on which I am or may b indors r, may not be prot steel. a I will con id r my elf bound in the ame manner as if
the ame had be n legally protested" was h Id in Union Bank v.
Hyde supra., to be o ambiguous and doubtful wh ther it wa
int nded ther by to waiv d mand and notice, that further proof
nf such int nti n wa r quir d. In that a e th r was doubt as
to th intention of the party, and under the rule of"'"""°..;;.;;;,;...;.;;;.;.;.;;.__....,
. further vid nc wa cl mand d. In the ca
language u d does not approach near nough to a waiver to
b c 111 doubtful.

Freeman v. O'Brien 459

Under the allegation in the petition the assurances or prom-

ises to stand good were made after the maturity of the note as

well as prior thereto. It is well settled that an indorser of a

negotiable instrument may waive the objection of, a want of due

presentment and notice, by a promise to pay the same made after

default, but in order to make such a waiver binding "it must be

clearly established and deliberately made after a full knowledge

of the facts," and it will not be presumed or implied from doubt-

ful circumstances, or sudden acknowledgme nts, or hastyCxpres-

sions. (Balhu v. bctckc ct a/./ii Iowa, 204; Allen v. Harrak,

3oTowa, 363 ; Story on Prom. Notes, § 275, and notes ; 1 Parsons

on Notes and Bills, 601). The law will not infer that an indorser,

who promises to pay the note after maturity, had knowledge that

it was not duly presented. (Abbott v. Striblen, 6 Iowa, on p.

J 97)- The party alleging the promise m^ist_also_aJleg^jm^_prove

that it was made with a full knowledge, of the fact that the prom- ..

isor was released from legal obligations to pay the same. ( Ballin

v. BetcklTeTTiT^lMprwT. ' Tff the case before us there is no allega-

tion that the indorser, at the time of the alleged promises, made

after the maturity of the note, had knowledge that the note had
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not been duly presented to the maker for payment at maturity and

payment thereof refused. There is indeed no allegation that he

had any knowledge whatever in respect to the fact of present-

ment. The judgment of the Circuit Court will be

Affirmed.

EXCUSE OF NOTICE, TEMPORARILY OR PERMANENTLY. §§ II4-II5.

Windham Bank v. Norton. (See page 384.)

Pier v. Heinrichshoffen. (See page 392.)

WHERE NOTICE NEED NOT BE GIVEN TO INDORSER. § II7.

In re Sivift. (See page 400.)

Am. Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros. (See page 420.)
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LIABILITY OF DRAWEE RETAINING THE BILL. § 139-

Westberg v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. (Jpoj), 117 Wis. 389.

See § 3-4.

LI BILITY
Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Bayfield

F DRA'v\ ' EE RET

ri · r

G THE

BILL.

139·

county: John K. Parish, Circuit Judge. Reversed.

Action upon a negotiable bill of exchange drawn upon the

defendant in favor of the plaintiff by the Lien-Neally Lumber

Company for $585, alleged to have been accepted by the defend-

ant. The answer was a general denial. The evidence disclosed

that the Lien-Neally Company, sawmill owners, had purchased

from the plaintiff certain logs or stum page amounting to $585 ;

ircstbcr cr v . Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. (I903 , II? Wis. 589.
e § 3-4 .
. \pp al from a judgm nt of the Circuit ou rt for ayfield
county: JonK V . .\RI H, ircuit Jud . Reversed.

that they had sold product of their mill, including that of these

logs, to the defendant, and were in the habit of making orders

and drafts upon the latter for money to pay their various bills.

About April 21st, upon plaintiff's application for payment, they

made out an order upon the defendant substantially as follows:

"To Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. :

"Please pay to John Westberg five hundred eighty-five (585)

dollars for logs delivered at Bibon as per contract.

"[Signed] Lien-Neally Lumber Co."
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They had plaintiff write his name on the back of it, and then

Mr. Lien mailed that order, in connection with other orders and

time-checks aggregating some $2,000, to the defendant, accom-

panied by a letter the contents of which are not disclosed. The

defendant's representative denied any memory of the or^der or

draft in favor of the plaintiff. It was proved, however, that he

ction up n a neaotiable bill of exchange drawn upon the
d fen !ant in favor of the plaintiff by the Lien-Neally Lumber
' mpany fo r $5 5, alleged to have b en accepted by the defendant. The an w r was a general denial. The evid nee disclo ed
that the Lien- eally ompany, awmill ow ners, had purcha ed
from the plaintiff certain log or stum page amounting to $5 5;
that th y had old product of their mill, including that of the
lo
t the defendant, and were in the habit of making ord r
and draft upon the latter for money to pay th eir variou bill .
About ,\pril 21 t, upon plaintiff' application for payment, th y
made out an ord er upon th defendant sub tantially a follows:

sent to the Lien-Neally Company the money for the other orders

inclosed in the same letter. Plaintiff never heard from the defend-

ant, but made repeated applications to the Lien-Neally Company

for payment, and was put off from time to time by promises, until

finally they refused to pay, saying he must look to the defendant.

At that time the defendant had paid drafts of that company to

more than the amount of the indebtedness to it, and refused to

"To hicago Lumber & Coal Co.:
''Plea e pay to J ohn W tberg fiv e hundred eighty-five (585)
dollar for lo
delivered at Bibon as per contract.
"[Signed] LIEN-NEAL LY LUMBER Co."

pay this. The plaintiff's draft never was returned to him.

On the trial, a special verdict being requested, the court

submitted but one question, namely, whether the defendant

received this draft on or before April 23d, which was answered

in the affirmative, and thereupon the court found that the plain-

tiff delivered that order for acceptance on or before April 23d ;

They had plaintiff write his name on the back of it, and then
Ir. Lien mailed that order, in connection with oth r orders and
time-ch ck agg regating some $2,000, to the defendant, accompani cl by a letter the cont nt of which are not disclosed. The
d f ndant's representative denied any memory of the orµer or
draft in favor f th e plaintiff. It wa proved, however, that he
s nt to the Lien-Neally Company the money for the other orders
inclo ed in the ame letter.
laintiff never heard from the defendant, but made repeated applications to the Lien-Neally Company
for payment, and wa put off from time to time by promi es, until
finally they refu d to pay, saying he must look to the defendant.
t that tim th defendant ha i paid drafts of that company to
more than the amount of the indebtedn s to it, and refused to
pay thi . Th plaintiff' draft never was r turned to him.
n the trial, a special verdict being requested, the court
uhmitted but ne qu e tion , namely, whether the d fendant
r c iv d th i draft on or befor
pril 23d, which wa an wered
in th affi rmativ , and thereupon th court found that the plainiff d livered that ord r for acceptanc on or before pril 23d;
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that it was received by the defendant, and was by it destroyed,

and that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount

thereof, with interest ; the last conclusion being predicated upon

the theory that the retention and destruction of the order consti-

tuted an acceptance. From judgment in accordance with that

finding the defendant appeals.

For the appellant there was a brief by Lamorcux & Shea, an

oral argument by W. F. Shea.

that it wa rec iv d by th def ndant, and wa 1y it d troy d
and that the defendant i indebted t the plaintiff in th amount
th r of, ·with intere t; the la t conclu ion being predicat d upon
the theo ry that the r t ntion and d truction of the order con tituted an acceptanc . From judgm nt in accordance with that
finding the defendant app als.

E. F. Gleason, for the respondent.

Dodge, J. Rendition of judgment in favor of plaintiff in

this case can be justified only on one of two theories — either that

in law an implication of acceptance results from the mere physical

receipt of a bill of exchange by the drawee, followed by silence,

F r the appellant there wa a brief by Lamoreux & Shea, an
oral argum nt by f.1/ . F. Shea.
E. F. Gleason, for the re pondent.

or that all other facts essential to such implication were undis-

puted or were supported by inference from undisputed facts so

clear and unavoidable that no reasonable mind could draw any

other. Appellant had the right to have each controverted ques-

tion of fact decided by the jury.

Upon the question of law as to when implied or constructive

acceptance takes place, the authorities are reasonably clear and
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approximately unanimous. Upon delivery for acceptance, the

drawee is not bound to act at once. He has a right to a reasonable

tim e — usually twenty-four hours — to ascertain the state of

accou nts between himself and the drawer, and until expiration

pfTha-t time the holder has no right to demand an answer, nor,

without categorical answer, to deem the bill either accepted or

dishonored; not accepted, because of the right of drawee to con-

sider before he binds himself; not dishonored, because both

drawer and drawee have the right that their paper be not dis-

credited during such period of investigation. Aftpr the expira-

tion of that reasonable time the holder has a right to know

whether the drawee assumes liability to him by accepting. and:

if not, he has a right to return of the document, so that he may

protest or otherwise proceed to preserve his rights against the

drawer. The concensus of authority is. however, that jjiejhgy

rests on the holder to demand either acceptance or retufnof the

bill, and that mere inaction on t he nart nt the drawee has no errecE

Affpr the pypTraHon ot this time for investigation, the drawee

ma y, by retention of the bill, accompanied by other circumstances^

become bound as' an acceptor; not, howevefT bv mere retention!

TWp seem tr> he t W r> phases ot conduct recognized by the

authorities as charging the drawee: one purely contractual , as

J.

Rendition of judgment in favor of plaintiff in
thi case can be justified only on one of two theorie -either that
in law an implication of acceptance results from the mere physical
receipt of a bill of exchange by the drawee, followed by silence,
or that all other fact essential to such implication were undi puted or were supported by inference from undisputed facts so
clear and unavoidable that no reasonable mind could draw any
other. Appellant had th right to have each controverted que tion of fact decided by the jury.
Upon the question of law as to when implied or constructive
acceptance takes place, the authorities are reasonably clear and
approximately unanimous. Upon delivery for acceptance. the
drawee is not bound to act at once. He ha a right to a rea onable
time-usually twenty-four hours-to a certain th e state of
accounts between himself and the drawer, and until expiration
Ofthat time the holder has no right to demand a;-answer, nor,
without cateo-orical an wer, to deem the bill either accepted or
dishonored; not accepted, because of the right of drawee to con-:
icier before he bind himself ; not dishonored, because both
Irawer · and drawee have the right that their pap r be not di credited during such period of inve tigation. f> fter the expiration of that reasonable time the holder has a rio-ht to know
whet1er 1e rawee a umes 1a 1Tity to 1m y accep mg an ,
Trnot, he has a rlght to return- of the document, o that he may
rotest or otherwise roceed to pre erve hi ri o-ht a am st t e
drawer. The concen u of authority. is, however, that the duty
..rest on the holder to demand either acceptance or return of the
DODGE,

one

contractual. as
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v~- A-o ^ where the retention is accompanied by such custom, promise, or

tezz*XZ~-*- notification as to warrant the holder, to the knowledge of the

hirlrt n dri— --, in understanding that the retention declares acceptance;

L ."^ the other, where the conduct of the drawee is substantially tor-

tious and amounts to a conversion of the bill. This is the phase

of conduct which our negotiable instrument statute (sec. 1680k,

ch. 356, Laws of 1899) has undertaken to define and limit as

"refusal (not mere neglect) to return the bill, or destruction of it;

reiterating the common-law rule that mere retention of the bill is

not acceptance. (Overman v. Hoboken Bank, 31 N. J. Laws 5 6 3 !

McEowen & Co. v. Scott, 49 Vt. 376 ; Colo. Nat. Bank v. Boett-

chcr, 5 Colo. 185; Dickinson v. Marsh, 57 Mo. App. 566; Dun-

avan v. Flynn, 118 Mass. 537; Holbrook v. Payne, 151 Mass.

383, 24 N. E. 210; Gates v. Eno, 4 Hun. 96; Matteson v. Moul-

ton, 11 Hun. 268, affirmed 79 N. Y. 627; Hall v. Steel, 68 111.

231; First Nat. Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. St. 460; Koch v.

Howell, 6 Watts & S. 350; Short v. Blount, 99 N. C. 49> 5 S. E.

190; Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 11 1; Bank of the Republic v.

Millard,' 10 Wall. 152; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §§499. 5°°-) Xhe

doctrine of constructive acceptance is based on the general prin-
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ciples" of estoppel. H th e conduct o f the drawee will prejudice

the existing rights of the holder, unless it means acceptance, and

the drawee has knowledge of such fact, he is estopped to deny

the only purpose which could render his condu ct I nnocuous"

namely, acceptan c e of the bilk This underlying principle sug-

gests the reasons for many oFThe limitations upon the implication

of acceptance from conduct ; as, for example, that such implication

arises only when the bill is presented for acceptance, and that

no one but the holder (payee or indorsee) can make such tech-

nical presentment. 2 Randolph, Comm.* Paper, §§568, 572;

1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §455; sec. 1681— 2, Neg. Inst. Law Wis.

ch. 356, Laws of 1899. Only when the drawee knows that

acceptance is accepted would he suppose that his conduct can

lead to a belief that he does accept. Only when the presentment

is by the holder, whose conduct and rights must be affected by

acceptance or refusal, is the draw ? ee charged by the strict rules of

the law merchant with notice that his conduct may so injuriously

affect the person delivering the bill to him.

In the light of these rules of law it is at once apparent that

the verdict alone does not present sufficient facts to charge

defendant with constructive acceptance. Not only m ust he have_

receiv e d the bill, as the jury found, but h ejnnst knowingly havx

receiv ed it from the payee or his authorized agent, and for

~

"'\where the retenti n i accompani d by uch cu tom, promise, or
~r: .>--Q... notificati n a to warrant th
holder to the knowledge of the
..._..
d ra w e, in und r landing that th r tention declare acceptance;
~ . _ th other, where th conduct of the drawee i
ubstantially JQr.:": ~ tious and amount to a conver i n of th bill. Thi is the plu
~ of conduct which our ne<Yotiable in trument tatute ( ec. 168o/l,
~ l ch. 356, Law of l 9) ha undertak n to define and limit a.
~.,,.... refu al (not mere neglect) to return the bill, or destruction of it;
r iterating the common-law rule that mere retention of the bill i
not ace ptance. (Overman v. Hoboken Banll, 31 N. ]. Law, 563;
JI cEoi en & Co. v. Scott, 49 Vt. 376; Colo. at. Banll v. Boettcher, 5 olo. 185; Dichnson v. !JI arsh, 57 Mo. App. 566; Dunavan v. F/3 nn, u8 Mas . 537; Holbrook v. Payne, l 5 l Ma .
3 3, 24 N. E. 210; Gates v. Eno, 4 Hun. 96; Matteson v. Afo11lton, l l Hun. 26 , affirmed 79 N. Y. 627; Hall v. Steel, 68 Ill.
231; First "i'/at. Banh v. Mc!Vlichael, 106 Pa. t. 460; Koch v.
Howell, 6 Watts & . 350; Short v. Blount, 99 . C. 49, 5 S. E.
190; Boyce v. Edi 1ards, 4 Pet. r l r; Bank of the Republic v.
11lillard, IO \Vall. l 52; r Daniel,
e<Y. In t. §§ 499, 500.) ~
doctrin of con tructive acce tance is ba ed on the eneral rinciple o e toppe . If the conduct of the drawee will re' udice
the exi ting right of the hol er, unless it mean acceptance, and
the drawee ha knowledge of such fact, he i e topped to deny
the only purpose which could render his conduct innocuou ;
pamely, acceptance of the bill. This underlyin<Y principle ugge ts the reason for many of the limitations upon the implication
of acceptance from conduct; as, for example, that such implication
ari e only when the bill is pre ented for acceptance, and that
no one but the holder (payee or indor ee) can make such technical pre entment. 2 Randolph, Comm.' Paper, §§ 568, 572;
I Daniel, Neg. In st. § 455; sec. 1681-2, Neg. Inst. Law Wi .
ch. 356, La\v of 1899. Only when the drawee knows that
acceptance is accepted would he suppose that hi conduct can
lead to a belief that he does accept.
nly when the presentment
i by the holder, whose conduct and rights mu t be affected by
acceptance or refu al, is the drawee charged by the trict rul of
the law merchant with notice that hi conduct may so injuriou ly
affect the person leliv ring the bill to him.
In the li<Yht of th e rul s of law it is at once apparent that
the verdict alone does not present ufficient facts to charge
defendant with constructive acceptanc . Not only must he~
r ceiv d the bill, as the · ur found but he
·
ieCe'IVed it from the payee or hi
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acc eptance; and even then there must have been something more

tha n mere retention — either destruction or refusal to return to

the holder, if within the negotiable instrument statute, or some

circumstances, contractual or tortious, to arouse estoppel, if, by

reason of non-negotiability^ this instrument is governed only by

the common law. We must, therefore, turn to the evidence to

ascertain whether all these necessary additional facts were estab-

lished beyond controversy. True, the court filed so-called find-

ings of fact declaring some of them to exist, but, as appellant

claimed that the fact of acceptance should be submitted to the

jury, it did not consent that the court might assume to decide

either the facts or the inferences therefrom, unless free from

controversy.

The only evidence of the manner and purpose of the send-

ing of this draft is that the drawer sent it in the same inclosure

with numerous other documents similar in form, with which

plaintiff had no connection. The contents of the accompanying

letter are not disclosed, but it is reasonably clear that the other

orders were not sent for acceptance on behalf of the payees

therein, but merely as vouchers between the drawer and drawee ;
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for, evidently as expected, the latter sent money in response

thereto direct to the drawer. The plaintiff's order or draft,

having no time of payment expressed, was payable on demand,

and did not need to be presented for acceptance, and therefore

did not of itself suggest any demand for such action, i Ran-

dolph, Comm. Paper, §119; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. §454. The

witness Lien testified, "I mailed it in behalf of the Lien-Neally

Lumber Co." Plaintiff said : "I didn't mail it myself. Lien said

he would mail it. I left it to him." And again : "I was expect-

ing money on this draft. Mr. Lien said he would send the money

down to me." This is the substance of all the evidence as to the

circumstances under which this paper came to the hands of the

defendant. We need not say more than that, instead of con-

clusively establishing, as the court found, that "the plaintiff

delivered the said order for acceptance to the defendant," it quite

as much tends to show the contrary, namely, that the drawer,

with consent of plaintiff, sent it as a voucher for money expected

to be remitted to that corporation and by it paid over to plaintiff.

There is no pa rticle of evidence to establish existence of any

communication or circumstance which could suggest to defendant

that plaintiff sent it or authorized its sending, that any acceptance

was demanded or expected, or that plaintiff's relations with tHe

drawer would be affected by silence.

q,cceptance; and even then there mu t have been something more
than mere retention- ither destruction or refu al to return to
the holder, if within the negotiable in trument tatute, or some
ircum tances, contractual or tortiou , to arou
e toppel, if, by
reason of non-negotiability, thi in trument i gov med only by
the common law. We mu t, therefore, turn to the evidence to
nee ary additional facts were e taba certain \Vh ther all th
lished beyond controver y. True, the court filed o-called findings of fact d daring om of them to exi t, but, a appellant
daimed that the fact of acceptance should be ubmitted to the
jury, it did not con nt that the court might a ume to decid
either the facts or the inferences therefrom, unless free from
controver y.
The only evi lence of the manner and purpose of the sendlng of thi draft is that the drawer ent it in the same inclosure
with numerou other documents similar in form, with which
plaintiff had no connection. The contents of the accompanying
letter are not disclosed, but it is reasonably clear that the other
orders were not sent for acceptance on behalf of the payees
therein, but merely as vouchers between the drawer and drawee;
for, evidently as expected, the latter sent money in response
thereto direct to the drawer. The plaintiff's order or draft,
having no time of payment expressed, was payable on demand,
;i.nd did not need to be presented for acceptance, and therefore
rlid not of itself uggest any demand for such action. I Ranr:lolph, Comm. Paper, § I 19; r Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 454. The
witness Lien testified, "I mailed it in behalf of the Lien-Neally
Lumber Co." Plaintiff said: "I didn't mail it my elf. Lien said
he would mail it. I left it to him." And again: "I was expecting money on this draft. Mr. Lien said he would send the money
down to me." Thi i the substance of all the evidence as to the
.circumstances under which this paper came to the hands of th e
defendant. We need not say more than that, in tead of conclu .ively establishing, a the court found, that "the plaintiff
delivered the said order for acceptauce to the defendant," it quite
as much tends to show the contrary, namely, that the drawer
with consent of plaintiff, sent it as a voucher for money expected
to be remitted to that corporation and by it paid over to plaintiff.
There is no particle of evidence to establish exi tence of any
commu111cation or circum tance which could uggest to defendant
that laintiff sent it or authorized it endin that any acceptance
was demanded or expected, or that plaintiffs relations wit t e
<lravver would be affected by silence.
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If, however, both of these questions could be answered in

the affirmative, there would still remain the question of fact

whether defendant's conduct was such as to warrant inference

or implication of acceptance. There is no direct evidence of

anything except long-continued retention of the draft, and no

evidence that any demand was ever made, either for decision as

to acceptance or for return. The court sought to meet this ques

tion by its finding that defendant destroyed the draft. Of this

there is no direct proof, the sole evidence on the subject being

that of defendant's agent that he had no recollection about it,

and did not know whether or not it was among papers in defend-

ant's Chicago office. Whether this might have warranted the

jury in so doing, it certainly was not so wholly inconsistent with

any other as to require the court to raise the inference of destruc-

tion as matter of law.

Hence we must conclude that there were at least three ques-

tions of fact on which the jury were not permitted to decide, as

to which the evidence and inferences were not beyond contro-

versy, at least in favor of plaintiff. Whether there was any

evidence to support such a decision we need not decide, for there
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was no motion, after verdict, for judgment in defendant's favor.

A new trial must, therefore, be directed.

As a guide to the court and parties upon such new trial it

seems important that we declare whether the instrument in suit

is within the purview and control of our negotiable instrument

law, above cited. Whether such paper continues to be a bill of

exchange in pursuance of our earlier decisions (Mehlberg v

Tisher, 24 Wis. 607; Schicrl v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 69, 43 N. W.

724), it certainly is not a negotiable bill within the definition of

sec. 1680, Stats. 180,8, as amended by ch. 356, Law s of 1899,

which requires that such an inst rume nt shall be payable to order

or bearer . It seems clear from the title that the codifying law of

1899 is intended to regulate only negotiable instruments. Selover.

Neg. Inst. Laws, § 2. It therefore does not affect or control the

rights of the parties upon this paper.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a nezv trial

If, ho\\' v r, b th of th e qu tion could be an wered in
t h affirmati , th re \\" uld till remain th qu stion of fact
wh et her d fenda nt' con luct wa
uch a to warrant infer nee
or implication f acceptanc . There is no dir ct evidence of
anythino- exc pt Iona-continu ed r t ntion of th draft, and no
evid nee that any demand was ev r made, either for decision a
to acceptance or for return. The court sought to meet this que f thi ~
lion by it findin that defendant destroyed the draft.
ther i no direct proof, th sol evidence on the ubject being
that of defendant's agent that he had no recollection about it,
and did not know wheth r or not it wa:, among papers in defendant's Chica o office. Whether this mio-ht have warranted the
jury in o doing, it certainly was not so wholly inconsi tent with
any other as to require the court to raise the inference of destruction a matter of law.
H ence we. mu t conclude that there were at least three questions of fact on which the jury we.re not permitted to decide, a ~
to which the evidence and inferences were not beyond controversy, at least in favor of plaintiff. Whether there was any
evidenc to upport uch a d cision we need not decide, for there
wa no motion, after verdict, for judgment in defendant's favor.
A new trial must, therefore, be directed.
As a guide to the court and partie upon uch new trial it
seems important that we declare whether the ' instrument in suit
i within the purview and control of our neo-otiable instrumenr
law, above cit d. Whether such paper continues to be a bill of
exchano-e in pur uance of our earlier decisions ( M ehlberg v
Tisher, 24 Wis. 6o7; Schier[ v. Bamnel, 75 \fl/is. 69, 43 N. W .
724) , it certainly is not a negotiable bill within the definition of
ec. 16 o, Stat . 1898, as amended by ch. 356, Laws o
which r uire that such an in trument shall be pa able to order
or bearer. It seems clear from t e tit e that the codifying law of
1899 is intended to regulate only negotiable instruments. Seloyer.
Neg. Inst. Law , § 2. It therefore does not affect or control the
rights of the parties upon thi s paper.

Judg11ient reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
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Section XI — Contract of the Vendor — Warranties of
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Hannum v. Richardson (1875). / <v ,L 508, 21 Am. Rep. 152.

Assumpsit for false warranty of a promissory note. Plea,

the general issue, and trial by jury, December Term, 1874, Bar-
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rett, J., presiding.

Said note was for $58, dated Aug. 6, 1870, payable to the

order of one Mcintosh & Co. 30 days after date, signed by one

Hannum

'l!.

Richardson ( 1875 ) , 18 Vt. 508,

21

A m. Rep. 152.

Lincoln, indorsed by the payees to defendant, and by defendant

to plaintiff without recourse to the payees or the defendant.

/. F. Deane and, M. P. Sawyer, for defendant.

Walker & Goddard, for plaintiff.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Pierpoint, Ch. J. It may be observed in the outset, that this

action is not brought by the plaintiff as the indorsee of the note

referred to against the defendant as the indorser, and the action

is not based upon the indorsement, but is brought upon an alleged

warranty by the defendant that the note was a valid and binding

note, based upon a valid and lawful consideration, when in fact it

ssumpsit for false warranty of a promi sory note. Pl a,
the general i sue, and trial b jur , ecember Term, 1874, BARRETT, J., presiding.
aid note wa for $58,. dated Aug. 6, 1870, payable to the
ord r of one Mcintosh & o. 30 days after date, igned by one
Lincoln, indorsed by the payees to defendant, and by defendant
to plaintiff without recourse to the payees or the defendant.

was given for an illegal consideration, and was at its inception
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void. On trial the plaintiff introduced evidence in support of his

declaration. After the evidence was in, the defendant insisted

J. F. Deane and ,M. P. Sawyer, ford fendant.
liValker & Goddard, for plaintiff.

that as it appeared from the note that it was indorsed by the

defendant "without recourse," the legal effect of the indorsement

could not be varied or controlled by evidence outside of the

indorsement itself — that the same was conclusive in that respect;

but the court held that such indorsement was not of itself con-

clusive of its legal effect in such sense as to exclude the evidence

aliunde; and submitted the case to the jury in accordance with

such ruling, and it is upon this decision and the charge of the

court in respect to it, that the only question that has been raised

and discussed by the defendant's counsel arises.

What would have been the effect of this objection if the

action had been based upon the indorsement, it is not necessary

now to inquire. P>v indorsing the note "without recourse," the

defendant refused to assume the responsibility and liability xyj iieh

the law attaches to an unqualified indorsement , so that in respect

to such liability, it may perhaps be regarded as standing without

The opinion of the court was delivered by
PIERPOINT, Ch. J. It may be observed in the outset, that this
action is not brought by the plaintiff as the indorse of the note
referred to .against the defendant as the indor er, and the action
is not based upon the indor5ement, but is brought upon an alleged
warranty by the defendant that the note was a valid and binding
note, based upon a valid and lawful consideration, when in fact it
wa given for an illegal consideration, and was at its inception
void.
n trial the plaintiff introduced evidence in support of hi
d claration.
fter the vidence was in, the d , fendant insi ted
that as it appeared from the not that it wa indorsed by the
defendant "without r cour ," the legal effect of the indorsement
could not be varied or controlled by evidenc out ide· of the
indor ement it elf-that th sam was conclu ive in that respect;
but the court h Id that such indor ment wa not of it elf conclusiv of it 1 gal effect in uch ense a to exclud the evidence
al-iunde ; and ubmitted the ca e to the jury in accordance with
uch ruling, and it is upon thi d cision and the charae of the
court in respect to it, that th only question that has be n rais d
and discus ed by the defendant' coun el ari es.
What <Vould have be n the eff ct f thi objection if the
action had be n ba d upon the indor m nt, it i not n ce ar
now to inquire.
v indor ing th note "without recour . the
defendant refu ed to a ume the r pon ibility and liabilitv which
!he law attaches to an ungualifi d indor ment, o that in re p ct
to such liability, it may perhaps be r g-ard d a tanding \\ ithout
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an indorsement. If it is to be so regarded, then in what position

do these parties stand in respect to the transaction ? The principle

is well settled, that where personal property of a ny kind i s sold,

there is on the part of the seller an implied warranty that he has

tit le to the property, and that it is what it pu rports to be, and is

"that for which it was sold, as understood by the parties at the

time ; and in such case, knowledge on the part of the seller is not

necessary to his liability. The implied warranty is, in this respect,

like an express warranty, the scienter need not be alleged or

proved. Edwards, in his work" on Bills and Promissory Notes,

188, says: "One who transfers a negotiable instrument by deliv-

ery or by indorsement, impliedly guarantees that it is genuine,

and that he has title to it. The rule is the same in regard to per-

sonal property. The vendor of a chattel always gives an implied

warranty of the title. (15 Johns. 240; 6 Cow. 484; 4 Duer,

[N. Y.] 191; 6 Johns. 5). Though the indorser transfers the

note upon condition that it is to be collected at the risk of the

indorsee, he is, nevertheless, responsible if the note proves to be

a forgery." (Edwards, 289).

In this case t he note in question was given for intoxicating
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liquor sold in this state in violation of law, and therefore was

void at its incept ion ; in short, it was not a note, it was not what

it imported to be, or what it was sold and purchased for ; it is of

no more effect than if it had been a blank piece of paper for

which the plaintiff had paid his fifty dollars. In this view of the

case we think the defendant is liable upon a warranty that the

thing sold was a valid note of hand.

The plaintiff has declared as upon an express warranty. If

he could prove one, very well ; if he could not, the implied war-

ranty is just as available to him, the declaration being according

to its legal effect.

This view of the case relieves it from all embarrassment

^T* growing out of the question as to the admissibility of parol testi-

mony to vary the indorsement, as the effect of the indorsement

is really not involved in the case. And the ruling and charge of

the court were really more favorable to the defendant than he

had the right to ask.

The exceptions to the overruling of the motion in arrest were

waived. The exceptions to the refusal to set aside the verdict as

against the evidence, this court refuses to hear, the decision of

the County Court being conclusive in such cases.

Judgment affirmed.

"w-v ^^^

an indorsemcnt. If it i to be o rega rd 1 th n in \ hat position
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tit e to t 1e prope rty, and that it i what it purport to be, an is
that for which it wa old , a und er tood by th e parti s at th
time; and in such ca e, kn owledge on the part of the seller is not
nece · ary to hi liability. The impli d warranty i , in thi re pect,
like an exp re s warranty, the scienter need not be alle d or
prov d.
war , 111 11 work on ill and Promi ory Notes,
I
, ay : ''One who transfers a negotiable in trument by delivry or by ind or ement, impli ed ly o-uarantees that it i genuine,
a nd that he ha titl to it. The rule is the same in regard to peronal property. The vendor of a chatt 1 alway gives an implied
·warranty of the title. ( 15 J olins. 240; 6 Cow. 484; 4 Duer,
[ N . Y.] 191 ; 6 J ohn . 5). Though the indorser transfers the_
note upon condition that it is to be collected at the risk of the
inclorsee, he is n everthele s, re ponsible if the note proves to be
a forgery ." (Edward , 289) .
In thi case the note in question wa given for intoxicating
liquor old in this state in v1 lat1 on of law, and therefore wa
void at its 111cept1011; m short, it \Vas not a note, it was not what
it imported to be, or what it wa sold and purchased for; it is of
no more effect than if it had b en a blank piece of paper for
which the plaintiff bad paid his fifty dollars. In this view of the
case we think the def ndant is liable upon a warranty that the
th ing sold was a valid note of hand.
The plaintiff has declared a upon an express warranty. If
~ he cou ld prove one, very well; if he could not, the implied warranty is ju t as available to him, the declaration being according
to its legal effec t.
~
Thi view of the ca e relieves it from all embarras ment
~~grow ing out of the que tion as to th admissibility of parol te ti'""
mony to vary the indor ement, as the effect of the indorsement
i reall y not involved in the ca. e.
nd the ruling and charge of
the cou rt were really more favorable to the defendant t-han he
had the right to ask.
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Challiss z>. McCrum (1879), 22 Kan. if,y, 31 Am. Rep. 181.

Error from Atchison District Court.

McCrum sued Challiss to recover the sum of $229.60, with

interest thereon at seven per cent, per annum, from December

halliss v . N!cCrnm ( I879),

I 57,

3 I Am. Rep.

181.

10th, 1875, alleged to be due plaintiff on a certain promissory

note by defendant, indorsed without recourse, and transferred to

plaintiff. At the March Term, 1878, of the district court, the

defendant Challiss interposed a general demurrer to the petition,

which was overruled, and to review this ruling the case is brought

here. All necessary facts appear in the opinion.

IV. IV. Guthrie, for plaintiff in error.

W . D. Webb, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Brewer, J. On December 4, 1871, plaintiff in error loaned

one Edward A. Ege $250, and took his note therefor in the sum

of $265, payable to Richard Probasco or bearer, and secured by

mortgage. Long after its maturity, and in 1876, several pay-

Error from tchison District Court.
Mc rum su d halli to r cover th e um of $229. , with
int r t th r on at sev n per cent. per annum, from ecember
roth, 1875, all ged to b due plaintiff on a certain promi ory
note by def ndant, indor d without recour e, and tran £erred to
plaintiff.
t th March T rm, 1878, of th district court, th
d f ndant halli s interpo ed a general d murrer to the petition,
which was overruled, and to review thi ruling the case is brought
here.
11 neces ary fact appear in the opinion.

ments having been made thereon in the meantime, plaintiff in

error sold the note for its then face value to defendant in error.

At the time of such sale he indorsed it, "Without recourse. — W.

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

L. Challiss." McCrum sued on the note. Ege plead usury. The

W. W. Guthrie, for plaintiff in error.
U' . D. rVebb, for def ndant in error.

plea was sustained, and McCrum recovered $229.90, less than the

face value of the note, for which sum he brought this action. A

demurrer to the petition was overruled, and this ruling is now

presented for review. Can the action be sustained? Of course

no a ction will lie on the indorsement , for by his written contract

Challiss expressly declines to assume the liabilities of an indorser.

If sustainable at all, it must be as against him as a vendor ^and

not as an indorser, and upon the doctrine of an implied warranty .

The theory of the defendant in error is, that every vendor of a bill,

bond or note impliedly warrants that it is what it purports on

its face to be — the legal obligation of the parties whose names

appear on the instrument ; and that the character of the indorse-

ment or the lack of an indorsement in no manner affects this

implied warranty. On the other hand, the counsel for plaintiff

in error lays down the broad proposition that "there is no

such thing as implied warranty in the sale of chattels ;" and that,

in the absence of express warranty, the maxim caveat emptor is

of universal application. Tt is clear that the character of the

indorsement cuts no figure in the question ; as stated, no action

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRE\VER J. On Decemb r 4 1871, plaintiff in error loaned
one Edward . Ege $250, and took hi note therefor in the sum
of $265, payable to Richard Probasco or bearer, and secured by
mortgarre. Long after its maturity, and in 1876, several payment having been made thereon in the meantime, plaintiff in
error sold the note for its then face value to defendant in error.
t the time of such sale he indorsed it, " \iVithout recourse.-W.
L. Challi s." McCrum sued on the note. Ege plead u ury. The
plea wa su tained, and McCrum recovered $229.90, le s than th
face value of the note, for which sum he brought this action. A
demurrer to the petition was overruled, and this ruling is now
presented for re iew. Can the action be su tained? Of cours
no action will lie on the indor ement, for by hi written contract
halliss xpressly declines to a ume the liabilities of an indorser.
Tf sustainable at all, it mu t be as again t him as a yendor.J.. and
not a an indor r, and upon the doctrine of an impli d warranty.
The theory of the defendant in error i , that ev ry vendor of a bill.
bond or note impliedly warrants that it is what it purport on
its face to be-th 1 gal obligation of the parti -v ho e nam
appear on the in trument ; and that the character of th indor ement or the lack of an indor ement in no manner aff ct thi.
implied warranty. On the other hand, th coun I for plaintiff
in error lays down the broad propo ition that 'there i no
uch thinrr as implied warranty in the sale of chattel ; and that.
in the absence of expr ss warranty, the maxim cavea.t emptor i
f universal application. It is clear that the charact r of the
indorsem nt cut no :firrure in the question· a tated no action
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will lie on it. But further, the restriction is only as to his liability

as indorser, and in no manner affects his r elation to the paper as

vendor . An unqualTF«rnTd~brsement is the assumption of a con-

ditional liability. The indorser becomes a new drawer, and is

liable on the default of the drawee. " Without recourse. " does

away with this conditional liability. It l eaves the indorsement

simply as a transfer of title, an d the indorser liable only as vejv

d£r; yet it leaves him a vendor, and divests him of none of the

liabilities of a vendor. It makes the transaction the equivalent

of a delivery of paper payable to bearer, and transferable bv

delivery . (H annum v. Richardson, 48 VT.~5o8)T" Independent,

therefore, of any matter of indorsement, what implied warranty

is there in the transfer of a promissory note? Two things are

clear under the authorities : First , that there is an implied war-

ranty of the genuineness of the signatures; and second, that there

is no warranty ot the so lvency o f the parties. It is unnecessary

to more than refer tcTa few of the authorities upon these proposi-

tions: Byles on Bills, pp. 123, 125, and cases in notes; Jones v.

Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488 ; Gurney v. Womersley, 4 El. & Bl. 132 ; Gom-

pertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 156; Terry v. Bissell, 26
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Conn. 2T,; Mcrriam v. Wplcott, 3 Allen, 259; Aldrich v. Jackson,

5 R. I. 218; Lobdcll v. Baker, 3 Mete. 469; 1 Addison on Cont.,

p. 152 ; Ellis v. Wild, 6 Mass. 321 ; Eagle Bank v. Smith, 5 Conn.

71 ; Shaver v. Ehlc, 16 Johns. 201 ; Dumont v. Williamson, 18

Ohio St. 515; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, ch. 2, §2. But in

the case at bar, the signature of the maker was genuine. The

objection is, that it was never his legal obligation to the full

amount for which it purported to be. How far is there any

implied warranty in this respect? A reference to some of the

leading cases will throw light upon this question.

In Thrall v. Newell, 19 Vt. 203, it appeared that one of the

makers of a note was insane. The vendor made a written assign-

ment, in which was a description of the note, and the court con-

strued this as an express warranty that the instrument was the

legal obligation of the apparent makers, and one being incapable

of contracting, gave judgment against the vendor on account of

this breach for the amount received by him. While the judgment

of the court is rested upon the fact of an express warranty, the

judge who writes the opinion expresses his individual conviction

that the same result would follow on a mere transfer without any

express warranty, and quotes approvingly an extract from Rand's

edition of Long on Sales, that "there is an implied warranty in,

every sale that the thing sold is that for which it was sold."
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In Lobdell v. Baker, 3 Mete. 469, it appeared that the owner

of a note procured the indorsement of a minor, and then put the

paper in circulation. He was held liable to a subsequent holder.

Chief Justice Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, says:

''Whoever takes a negotiable security is understood to ascer-

tain for himself the ability of the contracting parties, but he

has a legal right to believe, without inquiring, that he has the

legal obligation of the contracting parties appearing on the bill

or note. Unexplained, the purchaser of such a note has a right

to believe, upon the faith of the security itself, that it is indorsed

by one capable of binding himself by the contract which an

indorsement by law imports."

In H annum v. Richardson, 48 Vt. 508, a note was given\<~ s> _ >v ^njv^.

for liquor sold in violation of law, and was by statute void. I ft /0 L-<iu € iy W ^

Defendant knew its invalidity, transferred it by an indorsement J c _ 4y _^_ SL .

without recourse, and he was held liable to his vendee. •

In Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. 226, a usurious note

was sold, and the vendor was adjudged liable, not merely for the

money received by him, but also the costs paid by his vendee in
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a suit against the makers of the note. In the opinion, Mr. Justice

Comstock uses this language :

'"The authorities state the doctrine, in general terms that the

vendor of a chose in action, in the absence of express stipulation,

impliedly warrants its legal soundness and validity. In peculiar

cirumstances and relations, the law may not impute to him an

engagement of this sort. But if there are exceptions, they cer-

tainly do not exist where the invalidity of the debt or security sold

arises out of the vendor's own dealing with or relation to it. In

this case, the defendant held a promissory note which was void,

because he had himself taken it in violation of the statutes of

usury. When he sold the note to the plaintiffs and received the

cash 'therefor, by that very act he affirmed in judgment of law

that the instrument was unattainted so far at least as he had been

connected with its origin."

In Young v. Cole, 3 Bingham (N. C), 724, certain bonds

were sold as Guatemala bonds, which turned out afterward to be

lacking the requisite seal, and the vendor, though ignorant of

the defect and innocent of wrong, was compelled to refund the

money. The thing in fact sold was .not the thing supposed and

intended to be sold.

In Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng. Law and Eq. 156, the

plaintiff discounted for the defendant an unstamped bill, purport-

In Lobdell v. Balwr, 3 M tc.

469,
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ing on its face to have been a foreign bill, drawn at Sierra Leone

and accepted in London, but which was in fact drawn in London.

I i actually a foreign bill, it required no stamp, and was valid ; but

being an inland bill, it required a stamp to make it a valid bill

in a court of law. The acceptance was genuine, and the acceptor

had previously paid similar bills. But the acceptor becoming

bankrupt, the commissioner refused to allow it against his estate

because not stamped. Thereupon plaintiff, who had sold the bill,

and been compelled to take it up, brought his action to recover

the price he had paid for it, and the action was sustained. Lord

Campbell, before whom the case had been tried, and who then

held adversely to the plaintiff, said :

"I then thought that the rule caveat emptor applied ; but after

hearing the argument and the authorities cited, I think the action

is maintainable, and upon this ground : that the article sold did

not answer the description under which it was sold. If it had

been a foreign bill, and there had been any secret defect, the

risk would have been that of the purchaser ; but here it must be

taken that the bill was sold as and for that which it purported to

be. On the face of the bill it purported to be drawn at Sierra
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Leone, and it was sold as answering the description of that which

on its face it purported to be. That amounted to a warranty that

it really was of that description."

In Ticonic Bank v. Smiley, 27 Me. 225, an overdue note was

transferred with this indorsement, "Indorser not holden ;" yet

it was decided that the indorser was liable to his vendee for

any payment made on the note before the transfer, or any set-off

existing against it of which the note gave no indication and the

vendor no information.

In Snyder v. Reno, 38 Iowa. 329, it was held that there is

an implied warranty that there has been no material alteration in

the paper since its execution. The court says: "We have no

doubt that there is an implied warranty of the transferrer that

there is no defect in the instrument, as well as that the signature

of the maker is genuine." See, also, Blethcn v. hovering, 58 Me.

437 ; Ogden v. Blydenburgh, 1 Hilton, 182 ; Fake v. Smith, 2 Abb.

(N. Y.) App. 76; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, ch. 2, §2, and

cases in notes ; Terry v. BisscII, 26 Conn. 23 ; 1 Daniel on Neg.

Instruments. §670. In this, the author thus states the law:

" When the indorsement is without recourse, the indorser specially

declines to assum e any responsibility as a party to the bill or note ;

but by the very act of transferring it, he engages that it is what it

ing on its face to have been a for ign bill, drawn at ierra Leone
and ace pt d in London, but which wa in fact drawn in London.
1f actually a f reirrn bill, it required no tamp, and was valid; but
being an inland bill, it required a stamp to make it a valid bill
in a court of law . The acceptance wa genuine, and the acceptor
had previou ly paid similar bills.
ut the acceptor becoming
bankrupt, the cornmis ion r refu ed to allow it again t hi e tate
becau e not stamped . Thereupon plaintiff, who had old the bill,
and been comp lled to take it up, brought his action to recover
the price he had paid for it, and the action was sustained. Lord
Campbell, before whom the case had 1 een tried, and who then
held adversely to the plaintiff, said:
"I then thourrht that the rule caveat emptor applied; but after
hearing the argument and the authorities cited, I think the action
is maintainable, and upon this ground : that the article sold did
not answer the description under which it was sold. If it had
be n a foreign bill, and there had been any secret defect, the
risk wou ld have been that of the purchaser; but here it must be
taken that the bill was sold as and for that which it purported to
be. On the face of the bill it purported to be drawn at Sierra
Leone, and it was sold as answering the description of that which
on its face it purported to be. That amounted to a warranty that
it really wa of that description."
In Ticonic Bank v. Sniiley, 27 Me. 225, an overdue note wa
transfe rred with this indorsement, " Indorser not holden ;" yet
it was decided that the indorser was liable to hi vendee for
any payment made on the note before the transfer, or any set-off
existing against it of which the note gave no indication and the
vendor no information.

In Snyder v. Reno, 38 Iowa, 329, it was held that there is
an implied warranty that there has b en no material alteration in
the paper ince its execution. The court says: "We have no
doubt that there is an implied warranty of the transferrer that
there is no def ct in the instrum ent, a well as that the signature
of the maker i g nuine." See, also, Blethen v. Lovering, 58 Me.
437; 0 gden v. Bl31denburgh, I Hilton, I 2 · Fake v. Smith, 2 Abb.
(N . Y.) App. 76; 2 Par on on Note and Bills, ch. 2, § 2, and
case in notes; Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23; I Dani el on Neg.
rnstruments, § 670. In this, the author thus tate th e law:
"When the indorsement i w£thout recourse. th e indorser specially
declines to assume any responsibility as a part to the bill or note ·
but b ' the ver act o tran errin it he en a es t at it is what it
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purports to be — the valid obligation of those whose names are

u pon it. He is like a drawer who draws without recourse; but

who is nevertheless liable if he draws upon a fictitious party, or

one without funds. And, therefore, the holder may recover ,,

against the indorser without recourse, ( I ) if any of the prior s ig-

natures were not genuine ; or. (2) if the note was invalid between

the origin al parti es, because of the _want, or illegality, of th e coth

sideration; or, (3"] if any prior party was incompetent; or (4)

the indorser was without title. "

These authorities fully sustain the ruling of the district court.

The note was not the legal obligation of the maker to the full

amount. As to the usurious portion, it was as it were no note.

This was a defect in the very inception of the note. It was

known to the vendor and arose out of his own dealings in _the

matter. By all these authorities there is an implied warranty

against such a defect, and the vendor i s liable for a breach thereof.

The suggestion of counsel that the change in the usury law,

by the legislation of 1872, affected the right of recovery upon the

note, has been already decided adversely, in the case of Jcnncss

v. Cutler, 12 Kas. 500.
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The judgment will be affirmed.

All the justices concurring. %r^rv <^L&/\a/v

^ Littauer v. Goldman (1878), 72 N. Y. 506.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the first judicial department, entered upon an order

affirming an order of Special Term, which overruled a demurrer

to the complaint herein. (Reported below, 9 Hun, 231).

The complaint alleged, in substance, that defendant sold and

transferred by delivery to plaintiff, for valuable consideration, a

promissory note, which was void for usury in its inception ; that

sideration; or (3) if~
rior art wa incom etent; or _(±)
the indor er was with out tit! ."
These authorities full y ustain the ruling of the district court.
Th note wa not the 1 gal obligation of the maker to the full
amount.
to the u urious portion it was as it were no note.
This v as a defect in th very inception of the note. It was
known to th vendor and aro e out of his own dealings in the
matter.
y all the e authorities there is an implied warranty
again t uch a def ct, and the vendor is liable for a breach thereof.
The suggestion of counsel that the chang, in the usury law,
by th 1 gi lation of 1872, affected the right of recovery upon the
note, ha been already decided adversely, in the case of Jenness
v. Cutler, 12 Kas. 500.
The judgment will be afiirmed.
All the justices concurring.
~ ~-

plaintiff sued the makers, who interposed the defense of usury;

that plaintiff notified defendant of the bringing of the action and

of the defense set up, and requested him to take charge of the

prosecution of said action and that he would be held liable in

case the defense was sustained ; that plaintiff was beaten in said

action and a judgment for costs rendered against him. It was

not alleged that defendant had knowledge of the defect or that

_)< Littaue1' v. Goldnian (r878), 72 N. Y. 506.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the first judicial department entered upon an order
affirming an ord r of p cial Term, which ov rruled a demurr r
to the complaint h rein. (Report d below, 9 Hun 231).
The complaint alleo-ed, in ub tan , that defendant old and
transferred by delivery t plaintiff, for valuable con ideration, a
promi ory note which ' a void for u ur in it inception· that
plaintiff ued the maker who interpo ed the defen e of u ury ·
that plaintiff notified def ndant of the brino-ino- of th a tion and
of the d f n e t up, and request d him to tak char e of the
pro ecution of aid action and that h w uld b h Id liable in
ca e the defen e wa su tained; that plaintiff wa beaten in said
action and a judgment for co t rend r d again t h ·m. It was
not alleo-ed that d f ndant had knm 1 do-e of th d f ct or that

472

CONTRACT OF THE VENDOR

472

Contract of the Vendor

any express representation or guaranty was made. The defendant

demurred that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to con-

stitute a cause of action.

any express representation or uaranty was made. Th defendant
U. murred that the complaint di l not tate facts sufficient to contitute a cau e of action.

E. H. Bcnn, for appellant.

B. IV. Huntington, for respondent.

Miller, J. The right of the plaintiff to maintain this action

rests upon the ground that the note in question which was sold

E . H. Be1ln, for appel1ant.
B. TV. Huntington, for re pondent.

and transferred by the defendant to the plaintiff was invalid and

void, by reason of its original usurious consideration. It is

alleged that, being in violation of the statute against usury, it

was no note, and by implication of law the defendant did warrant

and undertake that the same was not usurious or illegal, but a

valid and legal note. The complaint does not allege that the

defendant had any knowledge of the usury or was a party to the

same, but states that the seller by the act of transfer for a valuable

consideration, impliedly warranted that the paper was genuine

and all that it purports to be upon its face, and incurred an obli-

gation by the sale to make the paper good, although he did not

indorse or guaranty the same. The question whether an action
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will lie for the loss sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the note

being usurious, and the recovery of the amount thereof thereby

defeated, has never arisen under the precise circumstances pre-

sented in this case, and demands an examination of the principle

applicable to the contract entered into upon the sale of paper of

this description, and of the authorities bearing upon the subject.

The ru le is well-settled that generally on e who transfers paper

by delivery only, i ncurs none of th e liabilities which attach to an

indorser, for the reason that the irresistible inference is, that if he

transfers it and it is received without his indorsement, that such

liabilities did not enter into the bargain or the intention of the

partes. This ru le, however, is not without exception, and the

transferrer of notes or bill s b y delivery w j rrant s_jhelgen^ine ness

TIF the signatures, and that the title is what it purports to be . If

the paper is forged the transferee is liable upon the original con-

sideration which has never been extinguished by the sale. (2

Parsons on Contracts, 37, 38). So, also, it is laid down by the

same author that the vendor without indorsement warrants that

the paper is of the ki nd and descri ption that it purpor ts to be, and

there is an implied warranty that the parties to the paper are

under no incapacity to contract, as from infancy or marriage or

other disability, and the assignment of a bill or note for a valuable

consideration raises an implied warranty that the assignor has

The right of the plaintiff to maintain thi action
re t upon the ground that the nole in question which was old
and transferred by the defendant Lo the plaintiff was invaiid and
void, by r a on of it oriainal usuriou con ideration. It i
alleged that, being in violation f the statute again t usury, it
wa no nole, and by implication of law the defendant did warrant
and undertake that the same wa not usurious or illegal, but a
valid and I gal note. The complaint does not all ge that the
defendant had any know! dge of the usury or was a party to the
ame, but states that the eller by the act of trans£ r for a valuable
consideration, impliedly warranted that the pap r was genuine
and all that it purport to be upon its face, and incurr d an obligation by the sale to make the paper good, although he did not
indor e or guaranty the ame. The question whether an action
will lie for the loss su tainecl by the plaintiff by reason of the note
Leing u urious, and the recovery of the amount th reof thereby
defeated, ha never arisen under the precise circumstances presented in this ca e, and demands an examination of the principle
applicable to the contract entered into upon the sale of paper of
this description, and of the authorities bearing upon the subject.
The rule is well- ettled that generally one who transfers a er
by de rvery on y, incurs none o 1 1a 1 1ties which attach to an
inclorser, for th rea on that the irre istibl e inference i , that if he
transfer it and it is received without hi indorsement, that such
liabilities did not ent r into the bargain or the intention of the
partes. J'his rule, however, is not without exception, and the
_
~ tran ferrer of notes or bills b cl liver warrants th enuineness
~
of t s1anature , and that the title is what it ur orts to be. !!
~
th paper is forged th tran feree is liable upon the original con~
sideration which has n v r be n xtingui hed by the sale. ( 2
"'~~ Par ons on Contract , 37. 38). o, also, it is laid down by th
·
ame author that the v ndor without indor ement warrants that
the paper i of the kind and.description that it purports to be, and
th r is an irrpliecl warranty that the parties to the paper are
under no incapacity to contract, as from infancy or marriage or
other di ability, and the as ignment of a bill or note for a valuable
con ideration raises an implied warranty that the assignor has
MILLER, ].

Littauer v. Goldman 473

•

ITT UER

.

G

LDMA

473

done nothing, and will do nothing to prevent the assignee from

collecting it. The reason given as to forged paper is that it is

nothing, and the one who has transferred it has transferred noth-

ing, and is therefore liable. (Id., 39, 40). The question whether

paper tainted with usury, which is transferred by the holder with-

out knowledge of this defect, can be regarded as within the prin-

ciple of the exceptions stated, is not free from difficulty, and at

first view there appears to be some ground for claiming that a

note made in violation of a statute which declares usury to be a

misdemeanor, and that all paper of this kind shall be void, should

stand on the same footing as forged or other paper, which is

excepted from the general rule.

Although the reported cases do not decide the exact point,

an examination of some of the leading authorities tends to throw

some light on the subject. In Marvin, Prest. of the Delaware Bank

v. Jarvis (20 N. Y., 226), a note was transferred to the plaintiff

which had been taken at a usurious premium by the defendant

and the avails received by him. Upon being sued, the defense of

usury was interposed, which was successful, and the bank sued

the defendant to recover the amount and costs of prosecuting the
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note. It was held that one who transfers a chose in action \

impliedly warrants that there is no legal defense to its collection

arising out of his own connection with its origin, and that the y

party accepting the transfer is at liberty to act upon the implied

assertion of the validity of the paper, and to bring an action for its

collection ; and when defeated to recover the costs incurred by him

from his assignor. The opinion lays down the rule that the author-

ities hold the doctrine in general terms that the vendee [vendor?]

of a chose in action, in the absence of express stipulations, impliedly

warrants its legal soundness and validity, and that exceptions do

not exist when the invalidity of the debt or security sold arises

out of the vendor's dealing in relation to it. It is also said that

the act of transferring the note was the strongest possible asser-

tion that no legal defense existed. The defendant in the case

cited had knowledge of the usury, which was not the fact here,

and hence it differs from the case at bar, and is not decisive

of the question ; but the opinion is very strong in upholding the

general doctrine referred to where there is a radical defect in the

note.

In Webb v. Odell (49 N. Y., 583), a recovery for the pur-

chase-price was upheld where notes were sold for less than their

face, upon a representation that they were business paper, when.

in fact, thev were accommodation notes, and thus usurious and void

don nothing, and will do nothing to prevent the assignee from
coll ctin it. T h rca n giv n a to f rg d paper i that it i
nothin , and th one who has transf r.r d it has transf rred nothing, and i th refore liabl . (Id. 3 , 40) . Th question wheth r
paper tainted with u ury, which is transf rred by the holder without knowledae f thi d feet, can b r gard d a within the principl of th xception stat d, i not fr e from difficulty, and at
fir t view ther app ar to be some round for claiming that a
note made in iolation of a statute which declares usury to be a
mi elem anor, and that all paper of this kind hall be void, should
tand on the sam footing· as forged or other paper, which i
xcept d from th g neral rule.
lthough th r ported case do not decide the exact point,
an xamination of om of the leading authorities tends to throw
ome lig ht on the ubject. In Marrvin~ Prest. of the Delaware Bank
v. Jarvis (20 N. Y., 226), a note was transferred to the plaintiff
which had been taken at a usurious premium by the defendant
and the avail received by him.
pon being sued, the defense of
u ury was interpos d, which wa succes ful, and the bank sued
the def ndant to recover the amount and costs of prosecuting the
note. It was held that one who transfers a chose in action
impliedly warrants that there is no legal defense to its collection
ari ing out of hi own connection with it origin, and that the
party accepting the transfer is at libert) to act upon the implied
assertion of the validity of the paper, and to bring an action for it
collection; and when defeated to recover the co ts incurred by him
from his assignor. The opinion la~ s down the rule that the authoritie hold the doctrine in aeneral t rm that the v ndee [vendor? ]
of a cho e in action, in the ab ence of x pres tipulations, impliedly
warrant it legal oundness and validity, and that exception do
not exi t when th invalidity of the debt or ecurity sold ari s
out of the vendor' d aling in r lation to it. It i al o aid that
the act of transf rrin the note wa th tronae t po sible a ertion that n I gal d fen e exi t d. Th d fendant in the ca
ited had knowledg of the u ury, which wa not the fact here,
and hence it differs from the ca
at bar, and i not decisive
of the question; but the opinion i very tr na in upholdin the
aeneral doctrine r f rr d to wher th r i a radical defect in th
note.
a r o ery for the purIn Webb . Odell (49 N. Y.,
ol f r le than th ir
ha -price wa uph l where not
fac , upon a r pre ntation that th y v r bu in
paper, ' hen.
1n fact , the wer accommodation not , an thu u uriou and oid
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in the hands of the vendee. The decision is placed upon the ground

that the thing sold differed in substance from what the purchaser

was led by the vendee [vendor?] to believe he was buying, and the

difference was so substantial and essential in its character as to

amount to a failure of consideration. The representation that

the notes were business paper was an important fact, and hence

the decision does not exactly cover a case where the party trans-

ferring had no knowledge of the true character of the paper. In

Ross v. Terry (63 N. Y., 613), the defendant sold a bond and

mortgage to the plaintiff, which was usurious and void. The

defendant was personally concerned in the making of them, and in

the unlawful acts which vitiated them, and it was held that there

was an implied warranty of the validity of the securities. It will

be observed that here, also, the defendant had knowledge of the

usury, and hence the case is not directly in point. In Take v.

Smith (7 Abb. [N. S.], 106), the defendants, who sold a usurious

note to the plaintiff, were held liable upon an implied warranty

by defendants, on the sale of the note, that there was no legal

defense to an action upon it, but it appeared that the defendants

were privy to the consideration of the note, and the facts and
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circumstances under which it was given and transferred.

The foregoing constitute the principal cases in this State

which have a direct bearing upon the question arising where the

notes transferred were tainted with usury. In the cases of Whit-

ney v. National Bank of Potsdam (45 N. Y., 305), and Bell v.

Pagg (60 N. Y., 530), the notes were forged, and the implied

warranty related to the genuineness of the signature, which, as we

have seen, is expressly provided for in the elementary works. In

the case of Gemport v. Bartlctt (75 Eng. C. L. R., 849), an

unstamped bill of exchange, indorsed in blank purporting to be

a foreign bill, was sold without recourse by the holder. It was

shown to have been drawn in the country where the parties

resided, and was for that reason unavailable for want of a stamp,

and it was held that the article did not answer the description of

that which was sold, viz. : a foreign bill, and hence the purchaser

could recover back the price from the vendor. This case sustains

the doctrine that the money might be recovered as paid under a

mistake of fact, which seems to have been a mutual mistake, and

the whole case appears to have been disposed of upon the ground

that the article did not answer the description. There is some

analogy between the case last cited and the one at bar, for here

the note on its face purported to be valid, and was only shown not

to be by proof of extrinsic facts, which affected the original con-

in the hands of the vendee. The decision i placed upon the ground
that the thing old differed in substance from what the purchaser
was led by the vendee [vendor?] to believe he was buying, and the
differ nee wa o ubstantial and es ential in its character a to
amount to a failure of consideration. The representation that
the note were bu iness paper was an important fact, and hence
the deci ion does not exactly cover a ca e where the party transferring had no knowledge of the true character of the paper. In
Ross v. Terry ( 63 N. Y., 613), the defendant sold a bond and
mortgage to the plaintiff, which wa u urious and void. The
defendant was per anally concerned in the making of them, and in
the unlawful act which vitiated them, and it was held that there
wa an implied warranty of the validity of the securities. It will
be ob erved that here, also, the defendant had knowledge of the
usury, and hence the case is not directly in point. In Take \'.
S11iith (7 Abb. [N. S.], rn6), the defendants, who sold a usurious
note to the plaintiff, were held liable upon an implied warranty
by defendants, on the sale of the note, that there was no legal
defense to an action upon it, but it appeared that the defendant
were privy to the consideration of the note, and the facts and
circumstances under which it was given and transferred.
The foregoing constitute the principal cases in this State
which have a direct bearing upon the question arising where the
notes transferred were tainted with usury. In the cases of Whitney v. National Bank of PotsdaVJn (45 N. Y., 305), and Bell v.
Dagg ( 60 N. Y., 530), the . notes were forged, and the implied
warranty related to the genuineness of the signature, which, as we
have seen, is expressly provided for in the elementary works. In
the case of Gernport v. Bartlett (75 Eng. C. L. R., 849), an
unstamped bill of exchange, indorsed in blank purporting to be
a foreign bill, was sold without recourse by the holder. It wa
shown to have been drawn in the country where the partie
resided, and was for that reason unavailable for want of a stamp,
and it was held that the article did not answer the description of
that which was sold, viz.: a foreign bill, and hence the purchaser
could recover back the price from the vendor. Thi case sustain .
the doctrine that the money might be recovered as paid under a
mistake of fact, which seems to have be n a mutual mistake, and
the whole case appears to have been disposed of upon the ground
that the article did not answer the description. There is some
analogy between the case last cited and the one at bar, for here
the note on its face purported to be valid, and was only shown not
to be l y proof of extrinsic facts, which affected the original con-
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sidcration. The difference however is, that in the case last cited

the purchaser contracted for a foreign bill which required no

stamp, and did not receive what he was entitled to, while here

there was a secret defect unknown to both parties, and not pro-

vided for ; and as was said by the Lord Chief Justice in Gemport

v. Bartlett: "If it really had been a foreign bill, any secret defect

would have been at the risk of the purchaser." From the author-

ities to which we have adverted, it appears that in every case

where usury was involved there was knowledge of its exist ence on

the part of the person who held and transferred the note ! It is

true that in Delaware Bank v. Jarvis (supra), it is remarked by

the judge that he does not consider it a material circumstance that

the defendant had knowledge that the note had not been nego-

tiated prior to the time when it was received, and as we have seen

lays down the broad rule that, in any case where there is not an

express agreement, the vendor of a chose in action warrants not

only the title, but the soundness and validity of the note. The

opinion of the learned judge is entitled to great respect; but, as

the facts show it was not necessary to go to this extent to sustain

the decision made, it is not entirely controlling.
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It is of grave importance whether a scienter is material for

the purpose of upholding an implied warranty in a case of this

kind. In Hoe v. Sanborn (21 N. Y., 552), Selden, J., lays down

the rule, "that whenever an article sold has some latent defect,

which is known to the seller, and not to the purchaser, the former

is liable for this defect if he fails to discover his knowledge on

the subject at the time of the sale." He proceeds to state that

where knowledge is proved by direct evidence, the responsibility

rests upon the ground of fraud ; but where the probability of

knowledge is so strong that courts will presume its existence with-

out proof, the vendor is held responsible upon an implied war-

ranty ; and the difference between the two cases is, that in the one,

the scienter is actually proved, in the other it is presumed. A

sciente r is, therefore, essential to establish an implied warranty ;

and as we have seen, the cases to which we have referred all show-

knowledge on the part of the vendor. The cases which are cited to

sustain the doctrine that the scienter is immaterial where there is

a warranty either express or implied do not go to that extent.

In Evcrston v. Miles (6 J. R., 138). the action was assumpsit

for a breach of warranty on the sale of a horse, and the judge upon

the trial rejected evidence to show that the representations proved

were false, and decided that the plaintiff must show an express

warranty, otherwise they could not recover upon the declaration.

ideration. The difference how v r i , that in the case last cited
th purchas r contract d for a for ign bill which required no
tamp, and did not receiv· what h wa ntilled to, while here
there was a ecret def ct unknown to both parties, and not provid d f r; and a was aid by the Lord hief Ju tice in Gemport
v. Bartlett: "If it r ally had be n a foreign bill, any secret defect
would have b en at the ri k of the purcha er." From the authoritie to which we have adverted, it appear that in every case
where u ury \\'a involv d th re was knowl d e of it exi tence on
t e part of th p r on who held and tran ferred the note. t is
true that in Delaware Bank v. Jarvis (supra), it i remarked by
the judO'e that he doe not con ider it a material circumstance that
the lefendant had knowledg that the note had not been negotiated prior to th time when it was received, and a we have seen
lay down the broad rule that, in any case where there is not an
expre agreement, the vendor of a chose in action warrant not
only th title, but the oundnes and validity of the note. The
opinion of the learned judge i entitled to great respect; but, as
the fact how it was not neces ary to go to this extent to u tain
the de ision made, it i not entirely controlling.
It is of grave importance whether a scienter i material for
the purpo e of upholding an implied warranty in a case of thi
kind. In Hoe v. Sanborn (21 N. Y., 552), elden, J., lays down
the rule, "that whenever an article sold has ome latent defect,
which i known to the seller, and not to the purcha er, the former
is liable for this defect if he fail to discover his knowledO'e on
the ubject at th time of the ale." He proceed to state that
where knowledge i proved by direct evidence, the respon ibility
re ts upon the ground of fraud; but where the probability of
knowled e i o tronO' that court will pre ume it exi tence without proof, the v ndor is held respon ible upon an implied warranty; and the difference between the t\ o ca
i , that in the one,
the scienter i actually pro ed, in th other it i pre urned. A
scienter i.s, therefor
ential to tabli h an implied ' arranty;
and a we have e n. the ca e to \\ hich we have r ferred all hov.
knowl dge on th part of the vendor. The ca
which are cited to
u tain the doctrin that th scie11 ter i immaterial where there is
a warranty either xpr
or impli d do not o to that extent.
In Everston v. JI.files (6 J. R., 13 . th action "a a ump it
for a breach of warranty on the al of a hor e, and the judO'e upon
the trial rejected evid nee to how that the repre entation proved
wer fal e, and d cided that th plaintiff mu t hO\ an expr
warrant otherwi e they could not recover upon the d claration.
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This ruling was sustained by the higher court, and it was said

that there is no case which permits a plaintiff to establish deceit

and fraud, when he declares only in assumpsit on a warranty

express or implied. The question presented related to the form of

the complaint, and has no application to the case now considered

where the point is, what constitutes an implied warranty upon the

sale of a chose in action. In Ross v. Mather (47 Barb., 582), the

action was for a false warranty in the sale of a horse, and it was

held it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to make proof of the

scienter, but proof of the warranty was sufficient, and whether the

defendant knew the warranty was false at the time of making it

was of no importance. The warranty in the case cited was express

and of course when proved made out a case. Here the question

is, where there is no express warranty and the evidence does not

show knowledge or deceit, whether any implied warranty is made

out and the cases cited furnish.no light on that subject. In

Williamson v. Allison (2 East, 446) , the warranty was proved and

the same rule was laid down. The reason of the rule was stated

by Lord Ellenborough to be that the plaintiff was equally entitled

to recover on the same proof, by striking out the whole averment

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of a scienter. This is apparent, and hence the rule last stated has

no application to a case where the warranty is necessarily depen-

dent upon proof of knowledge. Without proof of such knowledge

no warranty is made out, for there is only _the_ naked fac t that the

plaintiff purchased the notes, and as we have seen there is no

reported casew hich holds that where such purchase is made with-

out_ actual knowledge by the defendant that an implied warranty

is established.

It is true that some of the cases to which we have referred,

hold that express representations are not necessary to establish

a case and fix a liability, but in all of those where the notes were

affected bv usury the evidence showed that such fact was known

to the defendant. The case of a forged instrument, as we have

s een, rests upon a different principle, viz.: That the note is no

note, and hence none of the cases cited aid the plaintiff ! The doc-

TrTne that an action"can be maintained to recover back the pur-

chase-price paid under a contract of sale of personal property,

without proof of warranty or fraud, where, upon delivery of the

property, it proves utterly valueless, and where an offer to return

has been made and refused, which is held in Stone v. Frost (61

X. V r ., 614), is scarcely applicable to negotiable paper which must

be governed by entirely a different rule. In the latter case, where

the transfer is made without indorsement, it is not unreasonable

Thi ruling was sustained by the higher court, and it was said
that th re i no cas which permits a plaintiff to establi h deceit
and fraud, wh n he declar
only in a umpsit on a warranty
cxpre or impli d. The que tion pre nt d related to the form of
the complaint, and ha no application to the ca e now con ider d
where the point i , what con titute an implied warranty upon th
ale of a cho e in action. In Ross v. Mat her ( 47 Barb., 582 ), the
action ' as for a fal e warranty in the sale of a horse and it wa
held it wa unnecessary for the plaintiff to make proof of th
scie11ter) but proof of the warranty was ufficient, and whether the
defendant knew the warranty was false at the time of making it
wa of no importance. Th warranty in the case cited was expre
and of course when proved made out a case. Here the question
i , where there is no expre vvarranty and the evid ence does not
how knowledge or deceit, whether any implied warranty is mad
out and the ca es cited furnish . no light on that subj ect. In
Williainson v. Allison (2 East, 446), the warranty was proved and
the same rule wa laid down. The reason of the rul was tated
by Lord Ellen borough to be · that the plaintiff was equally entitled
to recover on the ame proof, by striking out the whole averment
of a scienter. Cfhis is apparent, and hence the rule last stated has
no application to a case where the warranty is neces arily dependent upon proof of knowledge. Without proof of such knowledge
no warranty is made out, for there is only the naked fact that the
plaintiff purcha ed th e notes, and as we have seen there is no
reported case which holds that where such purchase i made without actual knowledKe by the defendant that an implied warranty
is establi hed .
It is true. that some of the cases to which we have referred,
hold that expre s repre entations are not necessary to establish
a case and fix a liability, but in a ll of those where the notes were
affected by usury the evid ence hawe d that such fact wa known
to the defendant. The ca of a forged instrument, as we have
seen, rests upon a different prmc1ple, viz. : That th note is no
note, and hence none of the cases cited aid the plaintiff. The doctrine that an act10n can be maintained to recover back the purchase-price paid und er a contract of sale of personal property,
without proof of warranty or fraud , where, upon d livery of the
property, it proves utterly valuel ss, and where an offer to return
has been made and refused, which is held in Stone v. Frost (61
N. Y., 614), is carcely applicable to negotiable paper which mu t
be overned by ntirely a different rule. In the latter ca e wher
the tran fer i made without indorsement, it is not unreasonable
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to suppose that certain liabilities did not enter into the consider-

ation of the transfer, and had it been so intended some agreement

would have been made in regard to the same.

The authorities cited in Parsons on Contracts (supra), in

the note to uphold the rule stated that there is an implied war-

ranty that the parties are under no incapacity to contract, do not

sustain the doctrine laid down in the text. In Lobdcll v. Baker

(i Met., 193 ; id., 469), the note was indorsed by a minor, and the

action was for deceit in procuring the minor to indorse it, and

then putting it in circulation. Knowledge was a necessary ingre-

dient of the plaintiff's action, and hence the case cited is not in

point. In Thrall v. Newell (19 Vt., 202), where the note was

invalid, as one of the signers of the same was insane, and had

successfully defended on that ground, the case turned somewhat

upon the construction to be given to a written assignment to the

plaintiff, which it was held must be construed as an express war-

ranty on the part of the defendant that it was a valid note, and

that the signers were of sufficient capacity to contract, and

although, in the opinion, the judge was inclined to think that there

was a warranty implied by law from the sale of the note, that

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

question was not in the case; nor do the text-books sustain the

doctrine as stated in Parsons in reference to incapacity.

In Story on Promissory Notes (§118), it is said that the

holder warrants by implication, unless otherwise agreed that he is

the lawful holder and has title ; that the instrument is genuine, and

not forged or fictitious ; that he has no knowledge of facts which

prove the instrument, if originally valid, to be worthless, either by

a failure of the maker, or by its being paid, or otherwise to have

become void or defunct. ,

In Chitty on Bills (p. 245), it is laid down that where a per-

son obtains money on a note, and it turns out to be forged, he

is liable to refund the money to the party from whom he received

it, on the ground that there is, in general, an imp li ed warranty that

the instrument is genuine. Again, at page 2477Tt is said : "lTjT_

man assign a bill for any sufficient consideration, knowing it to

oe of no value, and the assignee be~not aware of the fact, the

former would. in all cases be compellable to repay the money he

h ad received. It is kno wl edge of the defect wjudi^enders the

party liable for a note \yJucjTjs~oTno va jue. and this rule appTjeT

folfm)te "which is tainTeTTwU h^surx In terns v. H arris on^T

ET8TE., 757), the same rule was laicTcTown. In the case last cited

the holder of a bill of exchange desired to get it discounted, but

refused to indorse it, and delivered it to another party, who

to suppos that certain liabiliti s did not nter into the con ideration f th tran f r, and had it b en o int nd d ome agr ement
would have be n mad in r ar I to th same.
Th authoritie it d in Par on
n on tract (supra), in
the n te to uphold th rul stated that ther i an impli d warranty that the parti ar und r no incapacity lo contract, <lo not
su tain th doctrine laid down in th t xt. In Lobdell v. Baker
(I M t., 193; id., 4 ) , th not wa indors d by a minor, and the
action wa for deceit in procuring the minor to indorse it, and
th n puttina it in circulation. Know! dge was a nee ary ingr di nt of the plaintiff' action, and henc the case cit d i ,not in
point. In Thrall v. Newell ( 19 t., 20-), where the note was
invalid, a one of the ign rs of the ame wa insane, and had
ucc fully def nded on that ground, the case turned somewhat
upon th construction to be aiven to a written a ignment to the
plaintiff, which it was held must be con trued as an express warranty on the part of the defendant that it was a valid note, and
that the igners were of ufficient capacity to contract, and
although, in the opinion, the judge was inclined to think that th re
was a warranty implied by law from the sale of the note, that
que tion was not in the ca e; nor do the text-books sustain the
doctrine as stated in Parson in reference to incapacity.
In Story on romissory otes ( § u8), it is said that the
holder warrants by implication, unless otherwise agr ed that he i
the lawful holder and has title; that the instrument i genuine, and
not forged or fictitiou · that he has no knowledge of fact which
prov the in trument, if ori inally valid to be worthle , either by
a failure f the maker or by its being paid or otherwi e to have
become void or defunct.
•
In bitty on Bill (p. 245), it is laid down that where a person obtains mon y on a note, and it turns out to b foraed, he
is liable tor fund th money to the party from whom he received
it, on the ground that there i in general an implied warraHh that
th instrument is ge11ume.
aam, at page 247, it i aid: ~
man a sign a bill for an ufficient con id ration, kno'l. i11 it to
e a i ne
not awar of the fact t e
former would, in all ca
b comp llabl to r pay th mon Y he
had r ceiv d." It i kn wl dg f th d f t which r nd r th
party liable for a not which i of no alue and thi rul a he
:-;:=;;;:=;;:;:=::~~:i'.t:~=i=~~F-Ow;::;1;:;;t;:;;;;:t:::;1:;u;rry?-.
rns v.
arr1s011 3
-P
In th ca e la t cited
ounte<l, but
another
part), \\hoit,
r fused to indor
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passed it oft" for that purpose to a third party, informing him to

whom it belonged, and such last-named party disposed of it by

indorsing it, being prevailed upon to do so by the person who

delivered it to him. Although the original owner afterward prom-

ised to pay the bill, it was held that such promise cannot support

an action brought against him by the indorser. Lord Kenyon

>;i\ s : "It is extremely clear that if the holder of a bill sends it

to market without indorsing his name, neither morality nor the

laws of this country will compel him to refund the money for

which he sold it, if he did not know at the time that it was not a

good bill. If he knew the bill to be bad, it would be like sending

out a counterfeit into circulation to impose upon the world instead

of current coin. In this case, if the defendant had known the bill

to be bad, there is no doubt that he would have been obliged

to refund the money." (See, also, Byles on Bills, 158, 159; Story

on Bills, § 111 ; Edwards on Bills, 191).

In Lambert v. Heath (15 M. & W., 485), the defendant, a

share broker, bought for the plaintiff script certificates, which

were sold in the share market, at a premium, as "Kentish Coast

Railway Script," and were signed by the secretary of the railway
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company. The genuineness of the script was denied afterwards

by the directors, who alleged that it was issued without authority.

In an action brought to recover back the price on the ground that

it was not genuine, it was held that it was a proper question for

the jury whether what the defendant intended to buy was that

which was sold in the market as such script. Alderson, B., said :

"It appears that it was signed by the secretary of the company ;

and if this was the only Kentish railway script in the market, as

appears to have been the case, and one person chooses to sell and

another to buy that, then the latter has got all he contracted to

buy." The script was of no value, because it was not genuine, as

the note here is worthless, by reason of the usury. The same

principle is applicable in both cases, and the plaintiff cannot

recover unless it is made to appear that the plaintiff intended to

purchase and the defendant to sell the note without the alleged

defect.

In Hall v. Condcr (26 L. J. [C. P.], 138), an action was

brought to recover money agreed to be paid upon the sale of an

interest in a patent right. One of the pleas interposed to the

declaration was, that the invention was not new in England, and

was worthless, and the plaintiff was not the first inventor. To

that there was a demurrer, and it was held that there was in the

agreement no warranty, express or implied, that the patent was

pa sed it off fo r that purpose to a third party, informing him to
whom it b lonCYed, and u h la t-nam d party di po ed of it by
indor ing it, being pr vail d upon to do so by th per on who
d livered it to him.
!though the original owner afterward pr mi d to pay the bill, it was h Id that uch promi e cannot upport
an action brought again t him by the indor r. Lord K nyon
·ay : "It i extremely clear that if the holder of a bill end it
to market ·without indorsing hi name, neither morality nor the
law of thi country w ill compel him to refund the money for
which he sold it, if h did not know at th tim that it was not a
good bill. If he kn w the bill to be bad, it would be like sending
out a count rfeit into circulation to impose upon the world instead
of current coin. In thi ca e, if the defendant had known the bill
t be bad, there is no doubt that he would have been obliged
to refund th e money." ( ee, al o, Byles on Bills, 158, 159; Story
on ill , § II l · Edwa rds on B ill , 191).
In Lambert v. H cath ( 15 I. & vV., 485), the defendant, a
hare brok r, bought for the plaintiff script certificate , which
were sold in the share market, at a premium, as "Kentish Coast
Railway Script," and were sig ned by the secretary of the railway
company. The ge nuin eness of th e script was denied afterwards
by the director , who alleged that it was is ued without authority.
In an action brought to recove r back the price on th e ground that
it was not genuine it was held that it wa a proper qu e tion fo r
the jury whether what the defendant intended to buy was that
which was sold in the market as such script. Alderson, B., said:
"It appears that it was signed by the secretary of the company;
and if this was the only Kentish railway cript in the mark t, as
appears to have been the case, and one person chooses to sell and
anoth r to buy that, then the latter has got all he contracted to
buy." The cript wa of no value, becau se it was not genuine, as
the note h re i worthless, by rea on of the usury. The sam
principle is applicabl in both ca e , and the plaintiff cannot
r cover unl s it is made to appear that the plaintiff intend d to
purchase and the defendant to sell the note without the all rred
defect.
In II all v. Conder ( 26 L. J. [C. P.], 138), an action wa
brought t r cov r money agre d to be paid upon the sale of an
intere t in a patent rig ht. One of the pleas interposed to the
d claration wa , that th invention was not new in England and
wa worthless, and the plaintiff was not the first inventor. To
that th re was a demurrer, and it was held that there wa in the
agr em nt no warranty, express or implied, that the patent was
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indefeasible, and no fraud being alleged, and the defendant having

the same means of knowledge as to the novelty and value of the

patent as the plaintiff, the plea was bad. The rule is laid down by

Caswell, J., that on the sale of a known ascertained article, there

is no implied warranty of its quality.

The examination we have made of the question shows that

the law in regard to the transfer of negotiable bills of exchange

and promissory notes, as laid down for a century or more, only

excepts tw o cases as coming w j.thin the doctrine of an implied

warnmty, viz. : a warranty of title, and that the ins trument is

genuine and not forged. There is no precedent and not a single

reported case in the books'in favor of the doctrine that whefe~a

promis sory note is infected~with usury, and that fact is unknown

tolhe party who trans ferred it. that is an implied w ar ranty oij hg'

valulit} of the not e. To uphold such a doctrine would be an

Innovation upon a "settled principle of law and the establishing

of a new and different rule from that which has governed the

sale and transfer of this species of property for a long period of

time. It is at least exceedingly doubtful whether it would be expe-

dient to inaugurate a new and" questionable rule of conduct for the
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government of transactions of this description, even if the law per-

mitted it to be done. The hardship which may fall upon the

plaintiff by the purchase of the paper in question may operate

quite as harshly on the defendant, as the assumption is that he had

no knowledge of the inherent vice which affected the note. It is

difficult to apply the rules of law in all cases with exact justice.

In fact, if the rule be as the authorities hold, and as should be

if it is not well understood, that the purchaser of paper of this

description takes it at his own hazard and risk without any war-

ranty, unless he chooses to require such an indemnity and makes

it a part of the contract, no serious inconvenience or injury can

follow. The doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and the fault is

with the person who fails to exact a warranty, if it turns out that

he has been mistaken or has unfortunately made an unprofitable

or a bad bargain. Neither party has any just ground of complaint

in such a case.

The result is that the judgment was wrong and must be

reversed, with leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint upon

the usual terms in such cases. SLcrx. Jul\-.

All concur, except Earl. J., dissenting.

Judgment accordingly.

/

indef a ible, and no fraud being alleged, and the defendant having
the am mean of knowl d
a to the novelty and value of the
patent a the plaintiff, th pl a wa bad. The rul is laid down by
asw 11, J., that on th sale of a known ascertained articie, there
is no implied warranty of it quality.
The examination w have made of the qu tion hows that
the law in r o-ard t the tran fer of negotiable bill of exchange
and promi ory not , a laid down for a c ntury or more, only
excepts two ca e a coming within the doctrine
an im lie£
~a_!!.!L viz.: a warranty of .ti1k, and that the instrument is
s;enuine and not foro-e .
here i no precedent an not a singfe
repoft d ca e in th books in favor of the doctrine that where a
promissory note i infected with usury, and that fact 1s unknown
tOilie party who tran ferred it, that 1 an implied warrant of the
validity o t e note.
o up o sue a octrme would be an
mnovation upon a settled principle of law and the establishing
of a new and different rule from that which has governed the
sale and transfer of this species of property for a long period of
time. It i at lea t exceedino-ly doubtful whether it would be expedient to inauo-urate a new ci.nd questionable rule of _conduct for the
governm nt of tran actions of thi description, even if the law permitted it to be done. The hardship "' hich may fall upon the
plaintiff by the purchase of the paper in question may operate
quite as har hly on the <lPfendant, as the a umption is that he had
no knowledge of the inherent vice which affected the note. It is
difficult to apply the rul of law in all ca e with exact justice.
In fact, if the rul be as the authorities hold, and as should be
if it is not well under tood, that the purchas r of paper of this
description takes it .at his own hazard and risk \ ithout any warranty, unl
he chooses to require uch an ind mnity and make
it a part of the contract, no serious inconvenience or injury can
follow. The doctrine of caveat eniptor applie , and the fault i
with the p r on who fails to exact a warranty if it turns out that
he has been mi taken or ha unfortunately made an unprofitabl
or a bad bargain. Neither party ha an; ju ta-round of complaint
in such a case.
The r sult i that th judo-m nt \ a wr no- and mu t be
reversed, with leave to the plaintiff to am nd hi complaint upon
the u ual term in uch ca e .
Q _...
All concur except EARL, J., di ntincr.
'V ._
Jud owent accordingly.
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Erwin v. Downs {1857), 15 N. Y. 575.

Appeal from the Supreme Court. The defendant was sued,

Erwin v . Doe;_•Jls (1857), 15

. Y. 575.

as the endorser of two promissory notes, signed Waller & Burr,

for the payment of $150 each, to the order of the defendant. The

action was tried before a referee, who found, as facts, that Waller

& Burr were two married women, viz., Rachel M. Waller and

Henrietta Burr, doing - business as a mercantile firm in the city

of New York. That the promissory notes were signed by said

Henrietta Burr, in the name of Waller & Burr, and were endorsed

by the defendant, for the benefit and accommodation of Waller

& Burr, and for the business carried on by them ; that said notes

were transferred to the plaintiff before maturity, for a full and

valuable consideration, but with the knowledge that the names of

Waller & Burr, signed to the notes, were those of two married

women. He further found that when the notes became payable,

the presentation was made at the place of business of the said firm

of Waller & Burr, to Mrs. Burr, and payment thereof refused,

but in the absence of Mrs. Waller; and notice of non-payment

was duly served on the defendant. The referee reported that the

plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and the Supreme Court, at
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general term in the first district, affirmed the judgment rendered

on his report. The defendant then appealed to this court.

S. F. Clark son, for the appellant.

Levi S. ChatHcld, for the respondent.

Siiankland, J. The note was void, as against the makers.

b ecause they were married women, and incapable of contracting

obligations in that form. But wh en the defendant endorsed the

note, he imp liedly co ntracted that the makers w ere__ competent

to'contr act^ and had legally contracted, the obligation of joint

makers of the note. He also assumed the legal obligation, in most

respects, of the drawers of the bill. The fact, known to the plain-

tiff at the time he took the note, that the makers were married

Appeal from the Supr me Court. Th defendant was sued,
as the endorser f two promi sory note , signed Waller & Burr,
for the payment of $150 each, to the order of th d fendant. The
action was tried before a ref ree, who found, as facts, that Wall er
& Burr were two marri d women, viz., Rachel M. vValler and
Henrietta Burr, doing business as a mercantile firm in the city
of New York. That the promissory notes were signed by said
Henrietta Burr, in the name of Waller & Burr, and were endorsed
by the defendant, for the benefit and accommodation of \Valler
& Burr, and for the business carried on by them; that said notes
were transferred to the plaintiff before maturity, for a full and
valuable consideration, but with the knowledge that the names of
Waller & Burr, signed to the notes, were those of two married
women. He further found that when the notes became payable,
the presentation was made at the place of business of the said firm
of Waller & Burr, to Mrs. Burr, and payment thereof refused,
but in the absence of Mrs. Waller; and notice of non-payment
was duly served on the defendant. The referee reported that the
plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and the Supreme Court, at
general term in the first district, affirmed the judgment rendered
on his report. The defendant then appealed to this court.

women, did not deprive him of the character of a bona fide pur-

chaser. Ngr_jlQ£s the_paypp's knnwjedge that the drawee is a.

married women Jt _djid hargp thr rlrnwer in case of non-pnyine . nt of

fneJji H by the drawee . Nor is the endorser discharged, though

the name of the maker is forged. (1 Comst, 113). The fact is

not found that the plaintiff was aware the note was accommoda-

tion paper. The plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser within the

law merchant. Neither the complaint, nor the finding of the ref-

S. F. Clarkson, for the appellant.
Levi S. Chatfield, for the respondent.
SHANKLAND, J. The note was void, as against the makers,
because they were married women, and incapabl of contracting
obligations in that form. But when the defendant endorsed the
note, h,e impliedly contracted that the makers were competent
to contract and had legally contracted, the obligation of joint
makers of the note. He also assumed .the legal obligation, in most
resp cts, of the drawers of the bill. The fact, known to the plain tiff at the time he took th note, that the makers were married
women, did not deprive him of the character of a bona fide purchaser. Nor does the payee's knowledge that the drawee is a
married women, discharge the drawer in case of non-payment of
the bill by the drawee. Nor is the ndorser discharged, though
the name of the maker is forged. ( 1 Comst., n3). The fact is
not found that the plaintiff was aware the note was accommodation paper. The plaintiff was a bona fide purcha r within the
law m rchant. Neither the complaint, nor the finding of the refI
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eree, tell us who transferred the notes to the plajntiff. The legal

presumption is, that he received them from some legal holder in

due course of business.

The judgment should be affirmed.

Brown, J., delivered an opinion to the same effect.

All the other judges concurring. -K^- te-*-*^^-'

Judgment affirmed.

Brown et al. v. Montgomery et al. (1859), 20 N. Y. 28/, 75 Am.

Dec. 404.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Buffalo. The plaintiffs

er e, tell us who tran f rred the n t to th lq.intiff. The legal
pr sumption is, that h rec iv d them fr m om 1 gal holder in
due course of bu in
The judgment should b affirm d.
BROWN, J., deliv r d an opinion to th ame effect.
All the oth r j.udg s concurring.
~
Judg ment affirVned.

sued to recover the amount of a note for $297, made April 11,

1856, by the defendants, payable presently. The defence was

fraud in the consideration of the note.

On the trial, before a jury, the following facts appeared in

evidence : At the date of the note, the plaintiffs were the holders

of a check drawn by Farnham, Smedley & Kendall, on the Bank

Brown et al. v. Montuomery et al. (1859),
Dec. 404.

20

N. Y. 287, 75 Am.

of Attica, payable to the order of and indorsed by L. R. Farnham,

one of that firm, for $300, post-dated as of April 16, 1856. On

that day (April 11), the plaintiffs employed one Cutting, a bill

broker, to sell the check, authorizing him to allow not exceeding
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$4 discount. Cutting, on the same day, sold it to defendants for

$297, for which he received the note sued on. The drawer and

indorser of the check failed on the same day, and when it matured

the defendants caused it to be presented at the Bank of Attica

for payment, which being refused, notice was given to the plain-

tiffs. The defendants offered to deliver up the check to the

plaintiffs, and required their note to be returned, but this the

plaintiffs refused ; and the defendants again offered the check to

the plaintiffs on the trial.

Cutting, who was examined by the defendants, swore that

the check was handed to him by the plaintiffs in the afternoon,

and that before selling it to the defendants, he offered it to Mr.

Chard, who declined to purchase it, and said that he had one

drawn and indorsed by the same parties, which had that day been

protested for non-payment, and he showed the protested check to

the witness. The witness and Chard talked about the different

members of the firm, and Chard said he considered them perfectly

good. The witness then went directly to the defendants, and sold

them the check as above mentioned, without saying anything

about the protested check or his conversation with Chard. Mont-

Appeal from th
uperior Court of Buffalo. The plaintiffs
sued to r cov r the amount of a note for $297, made April II,
1856, by the def ndant , payable presently. The defence was
fraud in the consideration of the note.
n the trial, before a jury, the following facts appeared in
evid nee: At th date of the note, the plain~iffs were the holders
of a ch ck drawn by Farnham, Smedley & Kendall, on the Bank
of ttica, payable to the order of and indorsed by L. R. Farnham,
one of that firm, for $300, post-dated as of April 16, 1856. On
that day ( pril Ir), the plaintiffs employed one Cutting, a bill
broker, to ell the ch ck, authorizing him to allow not exceeding
$4 discount. Cutting on the same day, sold it to defendants for
$297, for which he received the not sued on. The drawer and
indorser of the check failed on the sam day, and when it matured
the defendants caus d it to be pr sented at the Bank of ttica
for payment, "hich b ing refused, notice was given to the plaintiffs. The defendant offered to deliver up the check to the
plaintiff , and required their note to b returned, but thi the
plaintiffs refused ; and the defendants again offered the check to
the plaintiff on th trial.
Cutting, who was examined b) th defendants, wore that
the check was hand d to him by the plaintiff in the afternoon,
and that before s lling it to the d fendant , he offer d it to fr.
hard, who declin d to purcha it, and aid that he had n
drawn and indors l by th sam parti
which had that day been
protest ·d for non-payment, and h h w d th prot ted ch ck t
the witne . The witne s and hard talk d about the different
member of the firm, and Chard aid h on id red them perfect!
good. The witness th n w nt dir ctl ' to th
f ndant and old
them the check a above mention d, without a in<Y an thing
about th protest d h ck or hi conv r ation with hard. Mont-
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gomery, wlio transacted the business for the defendants, said he

considered the check good, and took it readily.

It appeared that the drawers of the check kept an account at

the Liank of Attica, and were wholesale merchants, in good credit

and standing, until that day, when they stopped payment ; and

their checks to a considerable amount, including the one men-

tioned by Chard, were refused payment on that and the succeed-

ing days, and remained unpaid at the time of the trial. Some

of them were post-dated like the check in question. The defend-

ants' business was buying and selling negotiable paper and deal-

ing in uncurrent money. The transaction took place in Buffalo,

where all the parties lived.

The court charged the jury, that the non-payment and protest

of the check, on the nth April, was evidence tending to show

insolvency in the drawers ; that it was the duty of Cutting to

communicate to the defendants what he had heard Chard say

about the protest of that check, without regard to what he may

have thought about the solvency of the drawers ; and if he did

not do so, and they were really insolvent, the plaintiffs could not

recover on the note. The plaintiffs' counsel excepted to both
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branches of the charge. There was a verdict and judgment for

the defendants, which was affirmed at a general term. The plain-

tiffs appealed.

Amasa J. Parker, for the appellants.

Lorenzo K. Haddock, for the respondents.

Denio, J. I think there is no error in the charge to the jury

in the Superior Court. The law unquestionably is, as it was

assumed on the argument, that notice to the plaintiffs' a gent, Cut-

ting, while he was actually engaged in attempting to sell the

ch eck, of the failure of th e drawers, was equiva lent, so far as the

present action is concerned, to notice to tile pla int iffs themselves.

What Chard informed him, was not precisely that Farnham

& Co. had failed, but that their check on the bank at which they

kept their account was that day protested for non-payment. This,

prima facie was notice that they had suspended payment ; for

when a business man in a commercial town fails to meet his paper,

payable at a bank, and especially his checks upon the bank at

which he keeps his account, the natural inference which every

one draws is, that he is no longer able to pay his debts. Such

a circumstance may occur from oversight or accident, but those

are exceptional cases. The failure to meet the paper is itself a

suspension of payment, and noticeo jTsuch a fact r ~unaccompanie6?

with any explanation which would give it a different character,

cromery, who tran acted th bu in
for the defendants, said he
con idered the ch ck good, and took it readily.
It appeared that the drawer of the check kept an account at
the Bank of ttica, and were whol sale merchants, in good credit
and standing until that day, wh n they topped payment; and
their check to a con iderable amount, including the one mentioned by Chard, were refu sed payment on that and the succeeding day , and remained unpaid at the time of the trial. Some
of them were po t-dated like the check in question. The defendants' busine s was buying and selling negotiable paper and dealing in uncurrent money. The transaction took place in Buffalo,
where all the parties li ved .
The court charged the jury, that the non-payment and protest
of the check, on the r rth April, was evidence tending to show
insolvency in the drawers; that it was the duty of Cutting to
communicate to the defendants what he had heard Chard say
about the protest of that check, without regard to what he may
have thought about the solvency of the drawers; and if he did
not do so, and they were really insolvent, the plaintiffs could not
recover on the note. The plaintiffs' counsel excepted to both
branches of the charge. There was a verdict and judgment for
the defendant , which was affirmed at a general term. The plaintiffs appealed.

Amasa J. Parker, for the appellants.
Loren:;o K. Haddock, for the respondent .

DE ro, J. I think there is no error in the chaf<Ye to the jury
in the Superior Court. The law unque tionably is, as it was
assumed on the argument, that notice to the plaintiffs' agent, Cutell he
ting, while he was actually engao-ed in attem tin t
ch ck, of the failure of t e draw rs, wa equivalent, so far as the
present action is concerned, to nohce to the plaintiffs themselyes.
What Chard informed him, was not precisely that Farnham
& Co. had failed, but that their check on the bank at which they
kept their account was that day protested for non-paym nt. This,
pri111a facie was notice that they had usp nded payment; for
when a business man in a commercial town fail to meet his paper,
payable at a bank, and e pecially his checks upon the bank at
which he keeps his account, the natural inferenc which every
one draws is, that he is no longer able to pay his debts. Such
a circumstance may occur from over ight or accident, but those
are exceptional cases. The failur e to meet the pap r is itself a
~pen ion of payment, and notice o sue a act un ccom ame
with any explanation w 1c would give it a different character,
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is notice of the commercial failure of the part y. That it was so

understood by Cutting and Chard is evident from the fact that

they speculated upon the question, whether the members of the

firm drawing the check would ultimately be able to pay. Upon

that question, Chard, as a creditor is apt to do, took the most

favorable view. It is apparent that neither of them expected the

check to be paid on presentation when it should mature, five days

afterwards. The Superior Court considered that the confidence

which Chard expressed in the ultimate solvency of the members

of the firm, did not relieve Cutting from the duty of communi-

cating to the defendants the fact that its check had not been met.

I am of the same opinion. Up to that time the drawers were in

good credit, and their paper of this kind, we are to presume, was

promptly met. Thereafter, the holders of such paper were to be

put upon their legal diligence in the courts, with a fair expecta-

tion, perhaps, that they might ultimately be able to obtain pay-

ment. The difference between a bank check having jive days\

to r un, and which is then to be paid, and a suspended debt /

against parties who have failed, is sufficiently obvious. TheJ

defendants purchased this check as one of the former class, while
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the plaintiffs' agent well knew that it belonged to the latter, and

withheld that knowledge from the defendants. The plaintiffs' con-

duct is less censurable, morally, than it would be had it been

proved that they personally knew of the failure of the drawers ;

but in point of law, the case is the same as though, after hearing

that Farnham & Co. had failed, they took the paper which they

held against them into the street, and sold it to parties who had

not heard of that event. Such an act could not be justified at

law any more than in the forum of conscience. The judge was

therefore perfectly correct in instructing the jury, that it was the

dutv of Cutting to communicate to the defe ndants what he had

Hear d Chard _sa y as to the protest ot the other check. Re was

also correct in advising them that the consequence of omitting

to do so was, that the plaintiffs could not recover on the note.

Where a party negotiates commercial paper, payable to bearer,

or"~under~Tn"e ~ blank Indo rsement of another person, he cannot

" Be sued on the paper because ne is not a pai ly-ter it ; but he

nevertheless warra nts that he has no knowledge of any facTs "

which pr"ove~"the~paper to be worthless, on acco unt o f the~tailure

of the makers, or bv its being already paid, ui ulhe r wise to

ha ve become void or defunct ; for, says Judge Story, any conceal-

ment of this nature would be a manifest fraud. (Story on Prom.

Notes, § 118).

is notice of the commercial failure of the art . That it was so
un r tood by utting and hard i vident from the fact that
they speculated upon the qu stion, wheth r the members of the
firm draw in the ch ck would ultimately be abl to pay. Upon
that que tion, har 1, a a creditor i apt lo do, tool· the most
favorable view. It is apparent that neithe r of them c ~ ·pected the
check to be pai<l on pr entation when it houl<l mature, five day
afterwards. The upenor ourt con ider <l that the confidence
which hard expr
d in the ultimate solv ncy of the members
of the firm, lid not relieve Cutting from the duty of communi~
eating to the defendants the fact that its ch ck had not been met.
I am of th ame opinion. "Up to that time the drawers were in
good credit, and their paper of this kind, we are to presume, was
promptly met. Thereafter, the holders of such paper were to be
put upon their legal diligence in the courts, with a fair expectation, perhap , that they might ultimately be able to obtain payment. The difference between a bank check having five day }
to run, and ' hich i then to be paid, and a suspended debt
against partie who have failed, i sufficiently obvious. The
defendant purcha ed this check as one of the former class, while
the plaintiffs' agent well knew that it belonged to the latter, and
withh ld that knowl dge from the d fendants. The plaintiffs' conduct i le censurable, morally, than it would be had it been
proved that they per onally knew of the failure of the drawers;
but in point of law, the case is the same as thotwh, after hearing
that Farnham & Co. had failed, th y took the paper which they
held again t them into the treet, and sold it to parties who had
not heard of that v nt. Such an act could not be justified at
la\\ any more than in the forum of con cienc . The judge wa
therefore perfectly correct in in tructing the jury, that it wa th
dutv of Cuttin to communicate to th defendant what he had
card hard say a to t 1e prot
o
al 0 correct in advi ing them that the on equ nee of omittina
to do o was, that the plaintiff could not recov r on the note.
a 'able to bear r,
\Vhere a arty nerrotiate comm rcial

tory on
ote
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The plaintiffs' counsel argued that, according to the case of

Nichols v. Pinner (18 N. Y., 295), the plaintiffs and their agent

were warranted in maintaining silence as to the failure of Farn-

ham & Co., though they knew it and the defendants did not. But

the cases are essentially different. There we decided, that where

a merchant, knowing himself to be insolvent, purchases goods

without disclosing the fact, there being no inquiry made, he is

not necessarily guilty of fraud, as he may honestly believe that

he can go on and retrieve his affairs. Where so much of the trade

of the country is conducted without invested capital, or on bor-

rowed capital, it must often happen that a merchant who is ulti-

mately successful has known periods of commercial disaster when

his property would not pay his debts. It would be too strict to

hold, that under such circumstances he must in all cases go into

liquidation, or expose himself to probable bankruptcy by disclos-

ing his condition. But the case does not countenance the position,

that a dealer who has been of known standing, but who has sud-

denly failed in business, can go to those who were acquainted with

his former character, but who have not heard of his failure, and

innocently purchase their property on credit. Judge Selden, in
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his opinion, puts that case as one not covered by the judgment.

The judge was also right in stating to the jury, that the non-

payment of the check, spoken of by Chard, was evidence upon the

question of the insolvency of the drawers. I have already stated

what T consider the necessary inference from such a circumstance

among business men. The judgment must be affirmed.

Johnson, Ch. J., Comstock, Gray and Grover, Js., concur-

ring. Judgment affirmed.

Section XII — Contract of Accommodation Parties. § 31.

National Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz (1903), 81 App. Div. 593, 81

N. Y. Supp. 422.

Appeal from Trial Term, New York county.

Action by the National Citizens' Bank of the city of New

York against Emma Ida Toplitz. From a judgment for plaintiff,

defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Hatch, Patterson,

O'Brien, and Ingraham, J J.

R. L. Sweeay, for appellant.

The plaintiff ' couns 1 argued that, according to the case of
\1 ich ols v. Pinner ( 18 N. Y., 295), the plaintiff and their agent
wer wa rranted in maintaining silence as to the failure of Farnham & Co., though th ey knew it and the daf ndants did not. But
the ca es are e ntially different. There ·we decided, that where
a merchant, knowing him elf to be insolvent, purcha es goods
wi th out disclo incr the fact, there being no inquiry made, he is
not n ce arily g uilty of fraud, a he may honestly believe that
he can go on and retrieve hi affairs. vVher
much of th trade
of the country i conducted without inve ted capital, or on borrowed capital, it must often happen that a merchant who is ultimately succe sful has known periods of commercial disaster when
his property would not pay his debts. It would be too trict to
hold, that under such circumstances he mu t in all cases go into
liquidation, or expose himself to probable bankruptcy by disclosing his condition. But the case does not countenance the position,
that a dealer who has been of known standing, but who has suddenly failed in bu iness, can go to those who were acquainted with
his former character, but who have not heard of his failure, and
innocently purchase their property on credit. Judge Selden, in
his opinion, puts that case as one not covered by the judgment.
The judge wa al o right in stating to the jury, that the nonpayment of the check, spoken of by Chard, was evidence upon the
question of the insolvency of the drawers. I have already stated
what I consider the necessary inference from uch a circumstance
among business men. The judgment must be affirmed.
JOHNSON, Ch. J., COMSTOCK, GRAY and GROVER, Js., concurring.
Judgment affi,rmed.

V L,

Charles Blandy, for respondent.
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N ational Citi::ens' Bank v. Toplitz (!903), 8r App. Div. 593, 8r
J\. Y. Supp. 422.
Appeal from Trial Term, N w York county.
Action by the National Citizens' Bank of the city of New
York against Emma Ida Toplitz. From a judgment for plaintiff,
defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VA
RUNT, P. J., and HATCH, PATTERSON,
O'BRIEN, and I GRAHAM, JJ.
R. L. Swe ezy, for appellant.

Charles Blandy, for re pondent.
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Patterson, J. On the 26th of December, 1899, the defend-

ant made her promissory note, by which she promised, five

months after date, to pay to the order of L. Toplitz, Son & Co.

$5,000 at the Chemical National Bank, N. Y., for value received.

The note was indorsed by L. Toplitz, Son & Co., and was dis-

counted by the Ninth National Bank, to the rights of which bank

the plaintiff has succeeded by consolidation of the two corpora-

tions.

This was an accommodation note, and when it was dis-

counted by the Ninth National Bank that bank had full notice

that it was an accommodation note. It was not paid at maturity,

and at the request of the indorsers, for whose benefit it was dis-

counted, the time of payment was extended without the knowledge

of the maker. The complaint is in the usual form of an action

upon a promissory note against the maker, with an admitted

credit of $1,000 paid on account. The answer sets up that the

note was delivered as an accommodation note for the express

purpose of having the same discounted by the Ninth National

Bank of the city of New York, and upon the distinct understand-

ing that at its maturity it should be taken up and paid by the
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indorsers, and that subsequent to the delivery of the note the

Ninth National Bank had knowledge that it was given for

accommodation, and that after its maturity the Ninth National

Bank, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, entered

into an agreement by which it extended the time of payment of

the note, and that for a certain fixed time it would not collect

or enforce payment thereof.

When the case came on for trial, the facts set up in defense

were admitted ; and the simple question arising was whether, as

to the plaintiff in the action, the defendant, the maker of the note,

stood in the attitude of a surety, and was released from her obli-

gation as maker of the note by reason of the extension of the

time of payment given to the person for whose benefit the note

was discounted, without her knowledge or consent. The trial

judge held that the facts thus set up did not constitute a defense,

and that the defendant was primarily liable as the maker of the

note, notwithstanding the extension of the time of payment. In

this ruling the trial court was right. Concededly, this was an

accommoda tion note^ It was given wi th the intention that the

indorser should raise money on it on the liability of the maker.

and the maker i s liable prim ari ly notwithstanding the knowledge

of t he ho lde r that she \vas an accommodation maker only.

Section 55, Negotiable Instrument Law (Laws 1897, p. J2&7~c.

PATTER Or , J.
n the 26th of December, 1899, the defendant made her promi ory not , by which he promised, five
month aft r date, to pay to the order of L. Toplitz, on & Co.
$5,000 at th Ch mical National ank, . Y., for value received.
The note was indorsed 1 y L. Toplitz, on & o., and was discounted by the Ninth National Bank, to th rights of which bank
the plaintiff has ucceed d by con olidation of the two corporations.
Thi was an accommodation note, and when it was di counted by the inth National Bank that bank had full notice
that it was an accommodation not . It was not paid at maturity,
and at the reque t of the indorsers, for whose benefit it was discounted, the time of payment was xtended without the knowledge
of the maker. The complaint is in the usual form of an action
upon a promissory note against the maker, with an admitted
credit of $1,000 paid on account. The answer sets up that the
note was delivered as an accommodation note for the expre
purpo e of having the same discounted by the Ninth National
Bank of the city of New York, and upon the distinct understanding that at its maturity it should be taken up and paid by the
indorsers, and that ubsequent to the delivery of the note the
Ninth National Bank had knowledge that it was given for
accommodrrtion, and that after its maturity the Ninth National
Bank, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, entered
into an a<Yreement by which it extended the time of payment of
the note, and that for a certain fixed time it would not collect
or enforce payment thereof.
When the case came on for trial, the facts et up in defense
were admitted; and the imple que tion ari ing wa whether a
to the plaintiff in the action, the defendant, the maker of the note,
stood in the attitude of a surety, and was relea ed from her obligation as maker of the note by reason of the extension of th
time of payment given to the per on for who e benefit the note
was discounted, without her knm led
or con ent. The trial
judge held that the fact thus set up did not con ti.tute a defens
and that the defendant was primarily liable a the maker of the
note, notwithstanding the extension of the time of payment. In
this rulino- the trial court was right. Concededly, this wa an
accommodation note. It was <Yiven with th int ntion that the
indorser should rai e money on it on the liability of the maker
and the maker is liable pnman y notw1th tanding t e now e o-e
of the holder that he was an accommodation maker only.
Section 55, Neo-otiable Instrument Law (La\\ I 97, p. 728 c.

486 Contract of Accommodation Parties

4 6

ONTRACT

F - CCOl\IMODATl

PART IE S

612). This note was discounted on the credit of the maker, whose

very purpose was to become absolutely liable. Thus she became

primarily liable. Therg_i g_no relation of surety. By section 3 of

the statute relating to negotiable instruments, the_person primarily

liable is the o ne who by the terms of the instrument is absolu tely,

requir ed to pay the same, and all other persons are secondarily

liable. No other question of liability can arise in this case than

such as appears upon the face of the instrument. The case is

entirely unlike that of Grow v. Garlock, 97 N. Y. 81, in which it

was held, as between two debtors standing to each other in the

relation of principal and surety, and the fact being known to a

creditor, that creditor was bound to respect such relationship,

no matter how or when it arose, or whether he consented to it or

not. But the present case, if not determinable by the ordinary

rules relating to negotiable paper, is controlled by the third sec-

tion of the negotiable instrument law. The note was made by the

defendant in order that the indorsers might receive money upon

her credit. That is the very essence of an accommodation note.

That credit was given, and the indorsers received the money.

Thej paker. was thus a principal debtor. She jos t nothing by the.
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extension of time to the indorser, for she had no right of action

on t he note itself as against the indorsers . She could not sue

them on the note, and she lost nothing of her claim against them,

for by paying the note at any time she could have maintained her

action to recover from the indorsers notwithstanding the exten-

sion of the time of payment of the note by the bank. On the

note itself the maker never could recover against the indorsers.

It may be evidence of an indebtedness of them to her, the circum-

stances under which it was made being shown ; but the liability

of the indorsers to the maker would arise, not on the note, but

out of the original credit given for their benefit, and her payment

of money on their behalf.

The verdict for the plaintiff was properly directed, and the

judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.

6 12). This note was di count d on the credit of the maker, whos
\·cry purpo e \: a to b come ab olut ly liable. Thu h b ame
primarily liable. There i no relation of surety. By ection 3 of
the tatute relating tone otiabl in strument , the per on primarilJ:
liable is the one who by th t rm of the in tru~ nt is absolutcl.J:_
required to a · the am , and all oth r per on are secondaril_,.
liable.
To oth r qu ti on of liability can ari e in this case than
such a appear upon the face of the in trument. The cas i
ntirely unlike that of Grow v. Garlock, 97 N . Y. 8r, in which it
wa h Id, as b tw en two d btor tandino· to each ther in th
relation of principal and surety, and the fact beino- known to a
creditor, that creditor wa boun 1 to re pect such r lationship ,
no matter how or when it aro e, or whether he consented to it or
not. But the present ca e, if not determinable by the ordinary
rul es relating to negotiable paper, i controlled by the third section of the negotiable in trument law. The note was made by the
defendant in order that the indorsers might receive money upon
h r credit. That i the very essence of an accommodation note.
That credit was given, and the indorsers received the money.
The maker wa thu a principal debtor. She lost nothing by the
extension of time to th e indorser, for she bad no right of action
on the note itself as again t the indor er . She could not sue
them on the note, and she lost nothing of her claim against them,
for by paying the note at any time he could have maintained her
action to recover from the indor ers notwithstanding the extenion of the time of payment of the note by the bank. On th e
note itself the maker never could recover against the indorser .
It may be evidence of an indebtedne s of them to her, the circumtances under which it wa made being hown; but the liability
of the indor ers to the maker would arise, not on the note, but
out of th e orig inal credit g iven for their b n fit, and her payment
of money on their behalf.
The v rdict for th plaintiff wa properly directed, and the
judgment should be affirmed , with costs. All concur.
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1vlaffat v. Greene ( I898) ,

Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. Hon Leroy B.

Valliant, Judge.

I

J9 NJ o. 48.

D. D. Fassett, for appellant.

Smith J'. Gait, for respondent.

Gantt, P. J. — This was an action on the following promis-

sory note :

"$3,218. St. Louis, Mo., Feb. 20, 1893.

"Four months after date I promise to pay to the order of

Domestic Sewing Machine Co., thirty-two hundred and eighteen

dollars at their office, 853 Broadway, New York. Value received.

"Due June 20th, 1893. "E. L. Green e."

Indorsed :

Appeal from St. Louis
Judge.

v ALLIANT,

ity

ircuit

ourt.

Hon LEROY B.

D. D. Fassett, for appellant.
Smitli P. Galt, for re pond nt.

G

TT, P. J.-Thi wa an acti on on th
ory note :

following promi -

"No. 28,942. 3457

"E. L. Greene. June 23.

"$3,218. Due June 20-23. Payable at 853 Broadway, New York.

Domestic Sewing Machine Co., David Blake, V. P. D. Hutch-

inson, S. M. Jones, Jannette P. Moffat.

"Pay Chemical National Bank, New York City, or order for col-

lection for account of Braddock National Bank, Braddock,
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Penn., John Kelly, Cashier."

Protested June 2^ 1893, at the request of the Chemical

National Bank, for failure to pay.

The plaintiff as indorser, having paid said note after its dis-

honor, sued the defendant as maker in the circuit court of St.

"$3,2I8.
ST. Lo IS, Mo., Feb. 20, I893.
"Four month aft r date I promise to pay to the order of
Domestic Sewing fachine Co., thirty-two hundred and eighteen
dollar at their office 853 Broadway, New York. Value received.
''Due June 20th, I893.
"E. L. GREENE. '
Indorsed:
"No. 28 942.
3457
·'E. L. Gr ene.
June 23.

Louis.

The answer admits the execution of the note and the various

indorsements, and then proceeds to aver that defendant was

merely an accommodation maker of said note for the Domestic

Sewing Machine Company without any consideration therefor,

of which plaintiff and the other indorsers and holders had notice,

and for further answer defendant says that the plaintiff is a part-

ner of said S. M. Jones in said petition named, and was such

partner at the time said note came into the possession of said

Jones and the plaintiff, and that plaintiff and said Jones have in

their possession, or said Jones has in his possession for plaintiff's

benefit, with her consent, a large amount of property of the

Domestic Sew r ing Machine Company, placed in their or his hands

by said company for security to them or her for the payment of

"$3,218. Due June 20-23. Payable at 853 Broadway, New York.
Dome tic Sewing fachine Co., David Blake, V. P. D. Hutchinson, . L Jones, Jannette P. Moffat.
"Pay Chemical National Bank, New York City, or order for collection for account of Braddock National Bank, Braddock,
enn., John Kelly, Cashier."
Protested June 23 1893, at the request of the Chemical
National Bank, for failure to pay.
The plaintiff as indorser, having paid aid note after its dishonor, sued the defen lant as maker in the circuit court of t.
Louis.
The answer admit the execution of the note and the various
indor ement , and th n proceed to a r that defendant was
merely an accommodation maker of aid not for th Dome tic
ewing Machine ompany without any on ideration therefor,
of which plaintiff and th other indor er and holder had noti e
and for further answer defendant ays that th plaintiff i a partner of aid . M. Jone in aid p tition narn d, and ' a uch
partner at the time aid note cam int th po
ion f aid
Jone and the plaintiff and that plaintiff and aid J ne ha e in
their po e ion, or aid Jone ha in hi ~ p
i n for plaintiff'
benefit, with her con nt, a laro- am unt of property of the
Domestic S wino- Machine Company, pl d in th ir r hi hand
by said c-0mpany for ecurity to them or her for th payment of
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the note in this case sued on ; that said property so held by them

or him is of the value of at least $100,000. That they have real-

ized, or he has realized for her benefit, in cash, from part of the

property so held by them, or him as aforesaid as security as afore-

said, and now hold in cash, as defendant is informed and believes,

and so charges the fact to be, more than sufficient to pay said

note, according to the terms of the agreement by which said

property was by said company left with them, or him as security

as aforesaid, and defendant says that the same ought to be

applied by the plaintiff and said Jones to the payment of said

note. Defendant says that the plaintiff, or said Jones for plain-

tiff, has realized as above said, if not sufficient to pay said note

"in full, at least a large amount that should be credited on said

note. And defendant further says that it was agreed and under-

stood between the Domestic Sewing Machine Company and said

Jones and the plaintiff at the time said security was deposited with

them as aforesaid, that said note would not be paid by the said

Greene, and that he was not to be called upon by the plaintiff or

said Jones to pay the same, but that the same should be paid out

of the property so held as aforesaid by them as said security as
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aforesaid. Defendant further says that said Domestic Sewing

Machine Company is not a resident of this state and is insolvent.

And defendant further says that the plaintiff and said Jones and

said Hutchinson are non-residents of the state of Missouri. That

defendant is a resident of the state of Missouri. Wherefore,

having fully answered, defendant says that the plaintiff ought not

to have judgment against defendant, and ought at least not have

judgment against him until the amount received by plaintiff, or

for her benefit as aforesaid, is credited on said note, and not until

said property held as aforesaid for plaintiff's benefit as security

as aforesaid has been realized upon by plaintiff, and applied to

the payment of said note. Wherefore, defendant prays that the

court do order and decree that judgment be not entered against

defendant until plaintiff has fully realized upon said security

held for her benefit as aforesaid, and the cash now realized there-

from, or that may be realized therefrom, be credited on said note,

and defendant prays such other and further order and decree as

to the court may seem right and just.

Plaintiff in her reply denied all the new matter in defendant's

answer, and proceeding, admits that said S. M. Jones had a con-

siderable amount of property in his hands as security for the pay-

ment of the note in suit and a number of other notes to a large

amount and said collaterals were placed in his hands by the

the note in this case ued on; that said property so held by them
or him i of th value of at lea t $100,000. That th ey hav realiz d or he ha realized for h r ben fit , in cash, from part of the
property so h Id by them, or him a af r aid a ecurity a afor said, and now h lcl in ca h, a defendant i informed and b licves,
and o charge the fact to be, more than sufficient to pay aid
note, according to the t rms of the ao-reem ent 1 y which ai l
property wa by aid company left with th em, or him as security
a afo re aid, and defendant ay that th e ame ought to be
applied by th plaintiff and aid J ones to the payment of said
note.
efendant says that the plaintiff, or said J on s for plaintiff, ha realiz cl a abov said, if not sufficient to pay said note
•in full, at least a large amount that should be credited on aid
note. And defendant forth r say that it was agreed and und crt od between the ome tic Se\Ying Machine Company and aid
Jon sand the plain tiff at the time said ecurity wa depo itecl \vith
them a afore aid, that said note would not be paid by the aid
Greene, and that he wa not to be called upon by th e plai ntiff or
aid Jones to pay th e ame, but that the arne hould be paid out
of the property so held a afore aid by th em as said security as
afore aid. Defendant furth er says that said Dome tic S wing
1achine Company is not a re ident of thi tate and is insolvent.
A nd d fe ndant furth er ay that the plaintiff and said Jone and
aid Hutchinson are non-re ident of th e tate of Mi ouri. That
defendan t i a re ident of th e tate of Missouri. Wherefore,
havino- fully an wcred, defendant says that the plaintiff ought not
to have judgment against defendant, and ouo-ht at 1 a t not have
judgment again t him until the amount received by plaintiff, or
for her benefit a afore aid, i credit d on said note, and not until
aid property h Id as aforesaid for plaintiff's benefit as security
as aforesaid has been realized upon by plaintiff, and applied to
the payment of aid note. \i\Th crefor , cl fendant pray that the
court do order and decree that judgment be not entered again t
defendant until plaintiff ha full y realized upon aid securit¥
held for her benefit a afore aid, and the cash now realized therefrom or that may be realized therefrom, be credited on said note,
and defendant pray uch other and forth r order and deer e a
to the cou rt may e m ri g ht and ju t.
P laintiff in h r reply d nied all th new matter in defendant's
an wer, and proceeding, admits that aid . 1. Jon had a considerable amount of property in his hand a ecurity for the payment of the note in suit and a number f other note to a large
am ou nt and said collaterals were placed in his hand by the
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Domestic Sewing Machine Company to secure and indemnify

plaintiff, Jones and Hutchinson as indorsers of said note, and

sundry other notes; that Jones has realized some money out of

said collaterals, but the amount is small compared to the amount

of his and their liability as indorsers for said Sewing Machine

Company ; that they have not applied any part of said collaterals

to the payment of his note ; that a large portion of said collaterals

is in litigation, and the right of said Jones to hold and apply

them is questioned and denied, and neither plaintiff nor said

Jones could safely apply the same pending said litigation. Plain-

tiff admits that said Jones, Hutchinson and herself 'are all resi-

dents of Pennsylvania and non-residents of Missouri and that the

said Jones holds said collaterals in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

The evidence tended to prove that Defendant Greene was

the agent of the Domestic Sewing Machine Company at St.

Louis ; that under an agreement with the company he made his

accommodation notes from time to time for the use of the com-

pany under an arrangement allowing him to reimburse himself

out of sales of the company's machines ; that the note sued on was

of this character ; that at the time of the insolvency of the com-
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pany his notes to and indorsements for it amounted to about

$140,000, and he held assets which amounted in his opinion to

thirty-three to forty per cent of his liabilities on that account.

It further appeared that after receiving the note in suit the sewing

machine company sent it by George Blake, secretary of said com-

pany, to Pittsburg ; that S. M. Jones was agent at Pittsburg for

said company and had contracted to furnish a responsible

indorser on "dealers' paper" to the amount of $50,000; that the

note in suit under this agreement was indorsed by Hutchinson,

Jones and plaintiff, Mrs. Maffat, and the money procured from

the Braddock National Bank of Braddock, Pennsylvania. The

company having failed to honor the note, plaintiff Mrs. Maffat,

paid it, and is now its holder.

At the time Mrs. Maffat indorsed the note she was not a

partner of Jones and had no knowledge of the relation defendant

bore to the note other than appeared from the face thereof, viz..

that he was the maker, and principal debtor; she indorsed it

before maturity.

On the fifth day of May. 1803. the Domestic Company

assigned what is known as its Cleveland. Ohio, assets to Jones,

to protect the indorsers of its paper. Jones testified he had col-

lected a portion of these collaterals but not enough to hold him-

self, Hutchinson and plaintiff harmless by reason of their indorse-

Domestic Sewing Machine Company to secure and indemnify
plaintiff, Jone and Hutchinson a indor er of aid note, and
sundry oth r not ; that Jone ha realized om money out of
aid collat ral , but the amount i small compared to the amount
of his and their liability as indor r for aid ewing Machine
Company; that th y hav not appli d any part of said collateral
to the payment of hi note; that a laro-e portion of said collateral
is in litio-ation, and th right of aid Jone to hold and apply
them i qu tion d and denied, and neither plaintiff nor aid
Jones could afely apply the ame pending said litigation. Plaintiff admit that aid Jones, utchin on and her 1f 'are all re ident of enn ylvania and non-r ident of Missouri and that the
aid Jone hold aid collaterals in ittsburg, Penn ylvania.
The evidence tended to prove that Defendant Greene wa
the agent of the Domestic Sewing Machine Company at St.
Loui ; that under an agr ement with the company he made hi
accommodation notes from time to time for the use of the company under an arrano-ement allowing him to reimburse himself
out of al of the company's machine ; that the note sued on wa
of this cha·racter · that at the time of the insolvency of the company hi notes to and indorsements for it amounted to about
$140,000, and he held a set which amounted in his opinion to
thirty-three to forty per cent of his liabilities on that account.
It further appeared that after receiving the note in suit the ewing
machine company sent it by George Blake, secretary of said company, to ittsburg; that S. M. J ones was agent at Pitt buro- for
said company and had contracted to furni h a re ponsible
indor er on "dealer ' paper" to the amount of $so,ooo; that the
note in uit under thi agreement wa indor ed by Hutchin on,
Jone and plaintiff, 1r . Maffat, and the money procured from
the Braddock National Bank of Braddock, Penn ylvania. The
company having failed to honor the note, plaintiff Mr . Maffat,
paid it, and is now it holder.
At the time 1r . Maffat indor ed the not he wa not a
partner of Jone and had no knowledo- of the r lation defendant
bore to the note oth r than appear d from th face thereof, viz.,
that he wa the mal er and principal debtor; he indor ed it
before maturity.
·
n the fifth day of :i\fa)', r ,., the Dom tic Company
a igned what i known a it Cle eland, hio a et to Jone ,
to protect the ind or er of it paper. Jone t tifi d he had collected a portion of the collateral but not en0twh to hold him~elf, Hutchinson and plaintiff harml
by rea n f their indor e-
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ments. At the time of the trial a suit in equity was pending

against Jones by another creditor for these collaterals. The

receiver also claimed them.

The circuit court rendered judgment for defendant, enjoin-

ing plaintiff from prosecuting her suit at law against defendant

on said notes until she account to him for collaterals she holds,

or that are held by S. M. Jones or any one else for the use of the

Domestic Sewing Machine Company, and apply such of the pro-

ceeds thereof as in law should apply toward the payment of said

note and that she pay the cost of this suit.

Plaintiff appeals.

I. An accommodation maker of a no tejs in like manner a

principal at common law, and Jiable of course to a bona Me

holder as principal and not as surety,

"Accommodation paper stands upon grounds somewhat dif-

ferent from other negotiable instruments. If an accommodation

bill or note is made and put into circulation, the holder whojias.

advanced the monev_upon it may recover upon jt L juramst_a ny of

the parl ies to it, notwithstanding there was no consideration, for

ltTas between the parties to it, and although no action could have
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been maintained upon it between the original parties. When

paper of this kind is put in circulation it is both a request to

advance the money upon it and a promise to repay the amount

so advanced, and this is sufficient consideration to bind any one

whose name is on the instrument as a party to it." ( I Waite's

Actions and Defenses, 617.)

The holder m ay recover of the maker notwith s tanding he

kne w it was" accommodation paper. (1 Daniel, Neg. Inst., sec.

786; Stillwell v. Aaron, 69 Mo. 546; Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73

Mo. 338 ; Miller v. Mellier, 59 Mo. 388.)

In Hillegas v. Stephenson, 75 Mo. 118, it was held that

where one of two accommodation signers execute a note as a

joint maker with the principal debtor, and the other, as payee

and indorser, and there was no special agreement between them,

the former could not after paving the note call upon the latter

for contribution.

No question was made that such was the law in the circuit

court, nor was it denied that a creditor might proceed to judg-

ment at law on his note before exhausting any securities he might

hold, but that in such cases if the debtor desired to avail himself

of such securities he must pay the note and become subrogated

to the securities, but an exceedingly important modification of

the general rule was announced, to wit, that if the nature of the

ments.
t the time of th trial a uit in equity was pending
against Jone by another creditor for these collaterals. The
receiver al o claimed them.
The circuit co urt rendered judgment for defendant, enjoining plaintiff from prosecuting her uit at law again t defendant
on aid notes until she account to him for collateral he hold ,
or that are held by S. 1. J one or any one el e for the use of the
Dom tic Sewing Machine Company, and apply such of th e proceeds thereof a in law hould apply toward the payment of said
note and that she pay the cost of this suit. ·
Plaintiff appeals.
I. A n accommodation maker of a note is in like manner a
principal at common law , and liable of course to a bona fide
holder as princi Al an n a sure aAccommodation paper stands upon grounds somewhat different from oth er negotiable instruments. If an accommodation
bill or n ote is made and put into circulation, the holder who has
advanced the money upon it may recover upon it against any of
the partlesto it, notwithstanding there was no consideration for
1t, as between the parties to it, and although no action could have
been maintained upon it between th e original parties. When
paper of this kind is put in circulation it is both a requ est to
advance the money upon it and a promise to repay the amount
o advanced, and this is sufficient consideration to bind any one
whose name is on the in strument as a party to it." ( l Waite's
Actions and Defenses, 617.)
The holder may reco\fer of the maker notwithstanding he
knew it was accommodation paper. ( l Daniel , Neg. Inst. , sec.
786; Stillwell v. Aaron, 69 Mo. 546; Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73
Mo . 338; Miller v. M ellier, 59 Mo. 388.)
In Hilleaas v. Steph enson, 75 Mo. l 18, it was held that
w here one of two accommodation signers execute a note as a
joint maker with the principal debtor , and the other, as payee
and indorser, and there was no special agreement between them.
the former could not after paying th e note call upon the latter
for contribution.
No que ti on was made that such was the law in the circuit
cou rt, nor was it denied that a creditor might proceed to judgment at law on his note before exbau ting any securities he might
hold, but that in such ca es if the debtor desired to avail him elf
of such securities he must pay the note and become subrogated
to the securities, but an exceedingly important modification of
the general rule wa announced, to wit, that if the nature of the
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case was such that the debtor could not be subrogated to the

securities held by or to the use of plaintiff, the plaintiff could not

sue until he had first exhausted the securities.

And it was considered that because plaintiff was living in

another state, and held certain collaterals in that state, her right

to recover on her note in this state should be denied until she

first exhausted her remedies against the collaterals.

We have been unable to find any authority for the modifica-

tion thus announced, and we can not agree to it. On the con-

trary we understand that under the facts of this case when this,

note was p rot ested and notice given to plaintiff, her__liabilitv

beca me fixed, and when she paid it she had an absolute right_

to sue~de fendant as the maker thereof, irrespective of any co llat-

erals she lmght~have afterwards obtained^ As to plaintiff he

was the real debtor.

We do not think the authorities or sound reason go further

than to hold that when a surety pays a d ebt fo r his principal He.

is en titled to be subrog atgdjojhe secur ities held by the creditor.

Until payment he is not entitled to be subrogated, and his right
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of subrogation is to the collaterals just as he finds them. The

creditor is not required to furnish his debtor with immunity from

losses. The surety can only have the collaterals or other secu-

rity as they actually exist with their burdens and advantages.

(Bank v. Wood, 71 N. Y. loc. cit. 412.)

In this State from an early date it has been uniformly held

that a mortgagee has three concurrent remedies. He may sue on

his note, foreclose his mortgage, and bring ejectment. (Thornton

v. Pigg, 24 Mo. 249; Allen v. Dennott, 80 Mo. 56.)

The_ circumsta_nces that the collaterals are in_ another Stat e_

can not affect the princ ipal under consideration Tlt so happens,

it is true, that in this~case the collaterals are in Pittsburg, Penn-

' sylvania, and that they are held not for plaintiff alone, but for

Jones and Hutchinson, and that suits in equity are pending in the

Federal courts denying the right of Jones and the plaintiff to hold

them at all. and the receiver is also denying their right to collect

them, but whatever the difficulties of the case, defend ant can not, y^\ e

s et th e m up as aJlefens^a4^ntifEs.^ctipn against hi m on hi s

und ertaking to pay this note absolutely at a certain _ti me.

The answer only constituted a defense because it alleged

an agreement between plaintiff and defendant and the sewing

machine company that defendant should only be liable for a bal-

ance after crediting the collaterals, but not a word of evidence

sustains this allegation. Stripped of that averment the answer

j o>>jeJL a »Jauu

case wa such that the d btor could not be subrogated to the
ecunt1 h Id by or to th u e of plaintiff, the plaintiff could not
sue until he had first exhaust d the ecuritie .
. nd it was con ider d that becau e plaintiff wa living in
another state, and h ld c rtain collateral in that tat , her right
to r cover on her not in thi tate should be denied until she
fir t exhau ted her rernedi against the collateral .
\Ve have been unal le to find any authority for the modification thu announc d, and w can not agree to it. On the contrary we understand that und r the fact of thi ca e when thi
!!Ote wa protested and notice given to plaintiff, her liabilit
became fixed, and wh n she paid it she had an ab olute right
fo u defendant as the maker thereof, irrespective of any collateral she might have afterwards obtamed. As to plaintiff he
wa the real debtor.
\i e do not think the authorities or sound reason go further
than to hold that when a surety pays a debt for his rinci al ~
is entitled to be subrogated to the securities held by the credito .
Until paym nt he is not entitled to be subrogated, and his right
of ubrogation is to the collaterals ju t as he finds them. The
er ditor is not required to furnish his debtor with immunity from
losse . The surety can only have the collaterals or other security a they actually exist with their burdens and advantages.
(Bank v. Wood, 71 N. Y. lac. cit. 412.)
In this State from an early date it has been uniformly held
that a mortgagee has three concurrent remedies. He may sue on
his note, foreclose hi mortgage, and bring ejectm nt. (Thornton
v. Pigg, 24 Mo. 249; Allen v. Dermott, 80 Mo. 56.)
The circumstance that the collat rals are in another Stat
can not affect the principal under consideration. It o happen ,
it is true, that m this ca e the collateral are in itt burg, Penn.. sylvania, and that they are held not for plaintiff alone, but for
Jone and Hutchin on, and that suit in equity are pendin in the
Federal courts denying the right of Jone and the plaintiff to hold
them at all, and the r ceiver i al o d nyino- their right to collect
defendant can not
them, but whatever the difficultie of the ca
~et them up as a defense to plaintiff's action again t him on hi
undertaking to pay thi note ab olutelv at a c rtain time.
The an wer only con titut d a defen e b cau e it alleged
an ao-reement between plaintiff and d fendant and th
e\\ in
m achine company that defendant hould only be liable for a balance after crediting the collateral , but not a word of ' idence
sustains th i alleo-ation.
tripped of that averment the an wer
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pleads no defense whatever. The testimony proved none against

plaintiff, who is an innocent purchaser for value and without

notice of any relation of surety and principal between defendant

and the company, or any want of consideration.

If jhe defense r elied on in this case be sustained ^ the d octrine

that a negotiable note is a "courier without luggage" must be

abandoned. It would require the plaintiff to stop and sue [ones

and abide the marshaling and adjusting of Hutchinson's, Jones's

and her respective equities to the collaterals in Jones's hands, if

any are left after the suit in the Federal court shall be determined

against Jones. It would make defendant's promise to pay not

an absolute, but a conditional one and the time of payment utterly

indefinite. Commercial paper can not be subjected to such a rule

without the most serious results.

The judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiff

upon the pleadings and conceded facts.

The judgment is reversed and the circuit court mill enter

judgment for the plaintiff. .

Sherwood and Burgess, JJ., concur. A-rCv ^J2s^n^"

The Merchants & Mfrs.' Nat. Bank v. Cumings, imp. (1896),
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149 N. Y. 360.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the second judicial department, entered upon an order

made June 18, 1894, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plain-

tiff rendered upon a decision of the court on trial without a jury.

The action was brought upon a promissory note, against the

pleads no defen e whatever. The t timon proved none against
plaintiff, who i an innoc nt purcha r for value and without
notice of any r lation of urety and principal between defendant
and the company, or any want of c n ideration.
If the d f n e relie_d on in his case....b._e l.1.tsJ:aine the doctrine
that a n gotiabl note i a "courier without luggage" mu t be
abandoned. It would require the plaintiff to top and sue Jones
and abide the mar haling and adju ting of Hutchin on s, Jon e '
and her re p ctive equiti s to the collateral in Jones s hand , if
any are left aft r the uit in the Federal court shall be determined
ao-ain t Jone . It would make defendant's promise to pay not
an ab olute, but a conditional one and the time of payment utt rly
indefinite. Commercial paper can not be ubjected to such a rule
without the mo t erious results.
The judrrment hould have been rendered for the plaintiff
upon the pleadino- and conceded fact .
The judgment is reversed and the circu1't court will enter
judg111ent for the plaintiff.
SHERWOOD and BURGESS, JJ., concur. _. ,~~

maker and indorser.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

George H. Decker, for appellant.

Daniel Finn, for respondent.

Andrews Ch. J. The facts briefly are that on the 18th day

of March, 1893, one John L. Cumings indorsed the note of one

The Merchants & Mfrs.' Nat. Bank v. Cumings, imp. (1896),

Joseph Cumings for his accommodation, dated on that day, for

the sum of $2,000 payable to the order of John L. Cumings three

I

49 N . Y. 360.

months after date, at the plaintiff's bank, where it was discounted.

Contemporaneously with the indorsement, and to induce John L.

Cumings to indorse the same, Joseph Cumings made his certain

other note of the same date and amount, and payable at the same

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the econd judicial department, entered upon an order
made June 18, 1894, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered upon a decision of the court on trial without a jury.
The action was brouo-ht upon a promis ory note, against the
maker and indorser.
The fact , o far as material, are stated in the opinion.

George H. Decker for appellant.
Daniel Finn, for re pondent.
NDREW Ch. J. The facts briefly are that on the 18th day
of March, 1893 one John L. Cumings indorsed the note of one
Jo eph Cumings for his accommodation, dated on that day, for
the um of $2,ooo payable to the order of John L. Cuming three
month after date, at the plaintiff's bank, where it was discounted.
ontemporaneously with the inclorsement. and to induce John L.
urning to indor e the sam , Jo eph Cumings made his certain
other note of the ame date and amount, and payable at the same
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time and place as the former note, to his own order, and there-

upon indorsed his own name thereon and procured it to be

indorsed also by the defendant. Over the indorsement on the

second note was this statement : "This note is given to and to be

held by John L. Cumings as collateral security for his indorse-

ment on my note, same tenor, date and amount, favor of said

John L. Cumings, which I have given to said John L. Cumings

to be by him indorsed and delivered to the Merchants and Man-

ufacturers' National Bank of Middletown, N. Y., for the purpose

of renewing my note due at said bank Mch. 18th, 1893. Pro-

test hereof and notice thereof hereby waived." This second note

was thereupon delivered to John L. Cumings, who then indorsed

the note first mentioned. The note discounted by the bank was

not paid at maturity and was duly protested, and is still held by

the bank, and is unpaid, and so far as appears no proceedings to

collect it have been taken. On May 20th, 1893, before the matu-

rity of either note, John L. Cumings, by formal written assign-

ment, transferred to the bank the second note with all his "right,

title and interest" therein. This note was also protested at matu-

rity, and not having been paid, this action was brought thereon
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against the indorsers. Ira T. Cumings alone defends.

The plaintiff, among other things, relies upon the established

rule in equity that a creditor is entitled to the benefit of all col-

lateral securities or counter bonds which a principal debtor, has

given to a surety or a person standing in the position of a surety

for his indemnity. (Moses v. Murgatroyd, 1 Jo. Ch. 119; Vail

v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312.) But in our view it is unnecessary to

determine whether the present case is within this principle. What-

ever rightjohn L. Cumings had to the note in suit and to main-^

tain anact ion thereon against the defendant, was acquired bv th g_

plarrnnffju uler his assignment . If on the non-payment of the first

note~and the charging of John L. Cumings as indorser, the latter

could have maintained an action on the second note, and have

recovered the amount thereof, without having paid the first note,

then we perceive no reason why he could not, by assignment of

the second note to the bank which held the original note and

debt, have substituted the bank in his place, and given it any

right of action which he himself had or might have in case of

the payment of the original note and its due protest. The char-

acter of the obligation which the defendant assumed . becomes in

this view a material inquiry. It turns upon the distinction between

a contract to indemnify against liability, and a contract to indem-

nify against damage resulting from a liability. . tD If in the present

time an I place a th form r n tc, to hi own ord r, and thereupon indor d hi own name thereon and procured it to be
indorsed al o by the def ndant.
ver th indor ement on the
econd note wa thi tatement: "Thi note is given to and to be
held by John L. umin
a collateral curity for his indors ment on my note, same tenor date and amount, favor of aid
John L. umin , which I have given to aid John L. urning
to be by him indor ed and leliver d to the Merchants and Manufacturer ' ati nal Bank of 1iddletown, . Y., for the purpose
of renewino· my note due at aid bank 1\/Ich. l th, 1893. Prote t her of and notice th r of h reby waived." This second note
was thereupon delivered to John L. umings, who then indorsed
th note fir t m ntioned. The note discounted by the bank was
not paid at maturity and was duly protested, and is still held by
the bank, and is unpaid, and so far as appears no proceedings to
collect it have been taken. On May 20th, 1893, before the maturity of ither note, John L. Cumings, by formal written assignment, tran ferred to the bank the second note with all hi "right,
title and interest" therein. This note wa also protested at maturity, and not having been paid, this action was brought thereon
against the indorsers. Ira T. Cumings alone defends.
The plaintiff, among other things, relies upon the establi hed
rule in equity that a creditor is entitled to the benefit of all collateral securities or counter bonds which a principal debtor . ha
o-iven to a surety or a person standing in the position of a surety
for his indemnity. (Moses v. Jl1urgatro)d, l Jo. Ch. 119; Vail
v. Foster 4 N. Y. 312.) But in our view it is unnece ar) to
determine whether the pre ent ca e is within ·this principle. Whatever right Iohn L. Cumings hq.d to the note in uit and to maintain an action th reon against the defendant, was acquired by the
plaintiff under hi assi~nrnent. If on the non-payment of the fir t
note and the charo-ino- of John L. Cumino- a indorser, the latter
could have maintained an action on the econd note, and have
recover d the amount thereof, without havino- paid the fir t note,
then we perceiv no r a on why he could not, by a ignment of
the second not to the bank which held the orio-inal note and
debt, hav sub tituted th bank in hi place, and o-iv n it any
right of action which h him If had or mio-ht hav in ca e of
the payment of the original not and it due protest. Th character of the obligation which the d fendant a urned become in
this view a material inquiry. It turn upon th di tinction between
a contract to indemnify again t liability and a contract to indemnify again t damage re ulting from a liability.© If in th pre ent
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casejth e undertaking of the defendant was of the former class,

the action can be maintained, because the liability of John L.

Cumings became fixed upon the non-payment a nd protest of the

first note, and has not been discharged^ If , on the other~"hand,

the contract into which the defendant entered was against damage

which should accrue to Tohn L. Cumings by reason of his liability

as indorser, there can be no recovery, b ec ause as yet he has suf-

fered no legal damage. He has as vet paid nothing, and mere

liability, without more, is not damage within the distinction men-

tioned. The distinction between the two classes is familiar, and

is stated with great distinctness in Belloni v. Freeborn (63 N. Y,

39o).

It is not always easy to determine the nature of the indem-

nity into which a surety enters. In the present case we have

the fact that John L. Cumings refused to assume liability as

indorser on the first note until the second note was given. There

is the further fact, which appears in the statement on the back of

the second note, that it was given as collateral security for his

indorsement of the first note. There is the further significant fact

that the second note was payable at a day certain, which was coin-
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cident with the day of the maturity of the first note. John L.

Cumings became indorser of the first note at the request of the

defendant, for such is the legal effect of the transaction. Under

the circumstances /f /£ not a reasonable construction that the

security was given to protect him against the liability which he

assumed, and that _as_ between the parties the intention was to

place upon the defendant and his co-indorser the burden of look^

ing afte r and providing for th e pay ment of ^the first note at its ,

m aturity, and, failing to do this, to crea te an immediate liability.

Jo Tohn L. Cumings, by enforcing which he could, in case the

bank wo uld defer proceedings agai nst him on his indorsement^

realize the mea ns for the pa yment of the orig inal note .

In Russell v. La Roque (11 Ala. 352), a case nearly identical

with this, it was held that the plaintiff, who, at the request of the

defendant, became surety for him on a note to a third person,

receiving as his indemnity the note of the defendant payable at a

day certain, may sue upon it, though he had not been compelled

to pay the debt for which he became surety if his liability to pay

continues. In Hap good v. Wellington (136 Mass. 217), the

plaintiff had, at the request of the defendant, indorsed his note

for his accommodation and contemporaneously therewith and as

collateral security against loss on account of said indorsement

the defendant gave to the plaintiff his note for the same amount.

ca e the undertaking of the d fendant wa of the former class,
the action can be maintained, becau e the liability of l ohn--1=.·
Cuming became fix d u on the non-payment and protest of the
fir t note, and ha not been di char ere~ If, on t e ot 1er hand,
the contract into which the def ndant ntered wa again t damage
which hould accrue to Tohn L. Cumings by rea on of his liability
a indorser, there can be _EQ_I!.£2_veryi becau e a yet he ha suffered no le al
He ha a yet paid nothing, and mere
liability, without more, is not damage within the distinction mentioned. The di tinction between the two cla se i familiar, and
tated with great di tinctness in B elloni v. Freeborn ( 63 N. Y.
390) .
It i not always easy to determine the nature of the indemnity into which a surety enter . In the present case we have
the fact that John L. Cumings refu ed to assume liability a indorser on the first note until the second note was given. There
is the forth r fact, which appears in the statement on the back of
the econd note, that it was given as collateral security for his
inclor ement of the first note. There is the further significant fact
that the second note was payable at a day certain, which was coincident with the day of the maturity of the first note. John L.
Cumings became indorser of the first note at the request of the
defendant, for such is the legal effect of the transaction. Under
the circumstances · /s not a reasonable construction that the
ecunty a gi ven fo protect him again t the liability which he
as urned, and that as between the parties the intention was to
£!ace upon the defendant and his co-ind~ er the burden of looking aft r and providing for the payment of the fir t note at its
maturity, and, ailin --fO(fO this, to create an immediate liabillix,
to Iohn-CC\.1ming , by enforcing which- he could, i~-ca~e the
bank ~y_Quld def er roceedin
a ain !_him on his indorsement_
realize the mealli_for the a ment of the ori in.al note.
In Russell v. La Roque (I I Ala. 352) , a ca e nearly identical
with this, it was held that the plaintiff, who, at the request of the
defendant, became surety for him on a note to a third per on,
receivincr as hi indemnity the note of the defendant payable at a
day certain , may ue upon it, though he ha l not be n compelled
to pay the debt for which h became surety if hi liabilit_ to pay
continue . In Hapgood v. Wellington ( 136 ifass. 217), the
plaintiff had, at the reque t of the defendant, indor d hi note
for his accommodation and contemporaneously therewith and as
n account of aid indor ement
oll atcral security again t lo
th e defendant gave to the plaintiff hi note for th e same amount.
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The note indorsed by the plaintiff was transferred for value and

was not paid at maturity. Thereupon the plaintiff brought suit

upon the note given as indemnity and the court held that the

plaintiff was entitled to recover, although payment of the other

note had not been enforced and it was still outstanding and

unpaid. In Loosemore v. Radford (9 M. & W. 657), the plaintiff

and defendant being joint makers of a promissory note, the

defendant as principal and the plaintiff as surety, the defendant

covenanted with the plaintiff to pay the amount to the payee of

the note on a given day. but made default; held, in an action on

the covenant, that the plaintiff was entitled, though he had not

paid the note, to recover the full amount of it by way of damages.

The question is not free from doubt, and the decisions are

not altogether harmonious. See Osgood v. Osgood, 39 N. H.

209 ; Child v. Powder Works, 44 id. 354. The contract is ambig-

uous, but we think that construction which treats it as one again st

liability is most consistent with the admitted facts . On payment

of the n ote the liability of Joh n L. Cumings on the original note

will be discharged and the defendant by subrogation will b e

entitled to enforce it against the maker .
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The judgment should be affirmed.

O'Brien, Haight and Vann, JJ., concur; Gray, Bartlett

and Martin, JJ., dissent. "V^ ^-^- —

Judgment affirmed.

Thatcher v. The West River Nat. Bank (1869), 19 Mich. 196.

Error to Saginaw Circuit.

This was an action of assumpsit upon a promissory note

brought by a corporation plaintiff, whose name was stated in the

commencement of the declaration to be — "The West River

National Bank of Jamaica, Vermont." The note declared on was

made by E. Thatcher, the defendant below, and was payable to

the order of "L. N. Sprague, Ag't." The defendant pleaded the

general issue and gave notice that Sprague, the payee named in

The note indorsed by the plaintiff was tran f rred for value and
was not paid at maturity. Th reupon the plaintiff brought uit
upon the note given as indemnity and th court held that the
plaintiff wa entitled to recover, although payment of the other
note had not been enforced and it wa still out tanding and
unpaid. In Loose,m ore v. Radford (9 M. & W. 657), the plaintiff
and defendant being joint makers of a promissory note the
defendant a principal and th plaintiff as urety, the defendant
covenanted with the plaintiff to pay the amount to the payee of
the note on a <Yiven day, but made default; held, in an action on
the covenant, that the plaintiff was entitled, though he had not
paid the note, to recover the full amount of it by way of damage .
The question is not free from doubt, and the deci ions are
not alto<Yether harmoniou . See Osgood v. Osgood, 39 N. H.
209; Chi"ld v. Powder Works, 44 id. 354. The contract i ambiguous, but we think that con truction which treats it a one against
liability i most consi tent with the admitted fact . On payment
of the note the liability of John L. Cumings on the original note
will be discharged and the defendant by subrogation will be
entitled to enforce it against the maker.
The judgment should be affirmed.
O'BRIEN, HAIGHT and VA N, JJ., concur; GR Y, B RTLETT
and MARTIN, JJ., dissent.
~ ~~ .
Judgment affirmed.

the note, was the agent of the Jamaica Leather Company, and that

the note was given without consideration to the defendant, and

for the accommodation of the Leather Company, of which the

Thatcher v. The West River t\ at. Bank ( 1869), 19 Mich. 196.

plaintiff had notice.

E. Thatcher, plaintiff in error in person.

W. L. Webber, for defendant in error.

Christiancy, J. — The defense relied upon by the defendant

Error to Saginaw Circuit.
This was an action of a umpsit upon a promissory note
brought by a corporation plaintiff, whose name was stated in. the
commencement of the declaration to be-"The We t River
ational Bank of Jamaica, ermont." The note declared on , a
made by E. Thatcher, the defendant below and wa payable to
the order of "L.
pn.1.<Yue, g't." Th defendant pleaded the
general is ue and gave notice that Spra<Yue, the paye named in
the note, was the agent of the Jamaica Leather ompany, and that
the note was given without con ideration to the d fendant, and
fo r the accommodation of the Leather ompany of which the
plaintiff had notice.

E. Thatcher, plaintiff in error in per on.
W . L. Webber, for d fendant in error.
CHRI

TI NCY,

J.-The defen e relie
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the defendant
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below, without going here into unnecessary particulars, was sub-

stantially, that the note was given to L. N. Sprague, agent of the

Jamaica Leather Company, (to whose order it was made payable),

without consideration, and merely for the accommodation of said

Leather Company, upon the assurance of Sprague that the note

would be taken care of and the defendant protected ; and that the

bank, the endorsee and plaintiff below, received it with full notice

of these facts.

The testimony of the defendant himself, and perhaps some

other testimony in the cause, tended to show, that the note was

given for the purpose above stated, and without consideration,

and with the assurance of Sprague above stated.

But the defendant's own testimony further tended to show

that the note was given for the express purpose, and with the full

understanding that it was to be negotiated to the bank to enable

the Leather Company to raise money upon it. It was also clearly

shown by other evidence that the bank did discount the note

endorsed in blank by Sprague, as agent, and paid the money for

it ; and there was no evidence of a contrary tendency.

We think it, therefore, wholly imm ateria l whether the bank
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J251JJig*iggi or nnt - of trip circumstances under which, and the pur-

j K isc for which it was given, and of the other facts relied upon in

t he defense. Had the directors of the bank, knowing the nature

of the previous transactions between defendant and the Leather

Company, been present and heard and known the whole arrange-

ment between Sprague and the defendant, when the note was

given, the bank would still be entitled to recover. See Charles v.

Marsden, i Taunt. 224; Smith v. Knox, 3 Esp. 46; Thompson v.

Shepherd, 12 Met. 311; Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. 361; Lord v.

Ocean Bank, 20 Penn. St. 384; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 Wend. 227;

Renwick v. Williams, 2 Md. 356; Molson v. Hawlcy, 1 Blatch.

409; Carnthcrs v. West, 11 Q. B. 143.

The want of consideration, and the assurance of Sprague that

the note would be taken care of, do not affect the right of the_

bank as endorsee, though taking it with notice. Mere accommo-

dation paper is generally, at least, without consideration, and

such assurances, express or implied, are always given or relied

upon, when such accommodation paper is given. Such facts

might constitute a good defense as against the party for whose

accommodation it is given ; but to allow them to defeat a recovery

by an endorsee who advances money upon it — when that is the

purpose for which it is given — would defeat the very purpose for

which such paper is made, and render the transaction absurd.

below, without goinrr here into unnece sary particulars was substantially, that th note wa aiven to L. J. pra -u ag nt of the
Jamaica L eather ompany, (to who e r I r it' a made payable) ,
wi thout con id ration, and merely for the accommodation of said
Leather ompany, upon th a urance f prague that the note
woul l b tak n care of and th def ndant protected; and that the
bank the en<lor ee and plaintiff below, r ceived it with full notice
of the e fact .
The te timony of the d fendant him elf, and perhap some
other te timony in the cau e, t nded to show, that the n te wa
g iven for th purpose above tated, and without con iderationr
and with the a surance of prague abov stated.
ut th d fendant' ovm testimony further tended to how
that the not wa given for the express purpose, and ~vith the full
understandino- that it wa to be negotiated to the bank to enable
the Leather Company to raise money upon it. It was also clearly
hown by other evidence that the bank did discount the note
ndor ed in blank by prague, as agent, and paid the money for
it; and there was no evidence of a contrary tendency.
We think it, therefore, wholl immaterial wheth r the bank
had notice, or not. of the circumstances under which. and the purpose for which it was giyen . and of the other fact relied upon in
the defense. Had the director of the bank, knowing the nature
of the previous transaction betw en defendant and the Leather
Company, been present and heard and known the whole arrangement between Sprague and the defendant, when the note was
given, the bank would still be entitled to recover. See Charles v.
1ll arsden, l Taunt. 224; Smith v. Kno,1~, 3 Esp. 46 : Thompson v.
Shepherd, 12 Met. 31 r; Brown v. Mott, 7 Johns. 36r; Lord v.
Ocean Bank, 20 Penn. t. 384; Grant v. Ellicott, 7 \i\T end . 227;
Renwick v. Williams, 2 Md . 356; 111 olson v. H awle'y, l Blatch.
409; Caruthers v. West, l r Q. D. 143·
The want of consideration and the a surance of Sprague that
the note would be taken care of, do not affect the right of the,
bank as endorsee. though taking it with notice. Mere accommodation paper i generally, at least, without consideration. and
such assuranc s, express or implied, are always given or relied
uch facts
upon, when uch accommodation paper is rriven.
might constitute a good cl f nse as aaain t the part) for whose
accommodation it i given; but to allow them to defeat a r covery
by an cnclorsee who advan e money upon it-wh n that i the
purpose for which it is given-would d f at the very purpo e for
which such paper is mad and r nd r th transaction absurd.
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As between the defendant and the endorsee, the defendant

took the risk of Sprague's assurances being made good, and his

remedy is upon him or the party he represented.

These conclusions render it unnecessary to notice the defend-

ant's request to charge with reference to the want of considera-

tion, and the question of notice, or the charges given upon these

points.

The Circuit Court was right in holding that there was no

evidence tending to show that the Leather Company had any

interest in the money sought to be recovered in this suit.

A copy of the note with the endorsement, accompanied the

declaration, and the note and endorsement were read in evidence

without objection, and no evidence was given tending to disprove

the endorsement. The Court was therefore right in refusing to

charge that it was necessary to prove the endorsement in any

other way.

We see no error in the record, and the judgment must

be affirmed, with costs. _

The other justices concurred. *d^^ ^SX<yy\™-^ ■

Whittier v. Eager (1861), 1 Allen (Mass.) 499.
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Contract by the indorsee against the maker of a promissory

note. Answer, that the note was an accommodation note, and

that there was no consideration for the making or indorsement

thereof.

At the trial in the superior court, the defendant testified that

he gave the note in exchange for a note of S. W. Bean & Co., the

As between the defendant and th endorsee the defendant
took the ri k of pragu
a uranc b in ma le good, and hi
remedy i upon him or th party h repr nt d.
These conclusion rend r it unn c ary to notice the defendant' request to char c with referenc t th want of con ideration, and the question of notice, or the charges given upon these
points.
The ircuit ourt wa right in holding that there ' as no
evidence tending to how that the Leather Company had any
intere t in the mane ought to be recov red in thi uit.
copy of th note with the endor em nt, accompanied the
declaration, and the note and endorsement were read in evidence
without objection, and no evidence wa o-iven tending to di prove
the endor em nt. Th Court wa therefore right in refu ing to
charge that it wa nece ary to prove the endorsement in any
other way.
~Ve see no error in the recordl and the jitdgment must
be affirmed, with costs.
0 ;:::....'- K"ICL...
The other justices concurred.
V
,~~ - ~
--- .

payees, and that it was for their accommodation ; that, at the time

the note was signed, he proposed that they should give him their

receipt, but they replied that it would be as well to give a note,

which was done, and that he still held it. Upon this evidence,

~Vhittier

v. Eager (1861)

l

Allen (Jlllass.) 499.

Brigham, J., ruled that the note declared on was not an accommo-

dation note. The defendant's counsel then offered evidence that

there was no consideration for the indorsement of the note in

suit to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had notice of the facts

above stated ; and that the note had been paid to the plaintiff by

some person; but by whom he was not instructed. The court

rejected the evidence, and directed the jury to find a verdict for

the plaintiff, which they did ; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

W. L. Brozvn, for the defendant.

H. C. Hutchins, for the plaintiff.

Contract by the indor ee against the maker of a promis ory
note.
n wer, that the note was an accommodation note, and
that there was no consideration for the making or indor ement
thereof.
At the trial in the superior court, the defendant te tified that
he gave the note in exchange for a note of . \ . Bean & Co., the
payee , and that it was for their accommodation; that at the time
the note wa signed, he proposed that they hould give him their
receipt, but they replied that it would be as w 11 to give a note,
which wa done, and that he still h Id it. Upon thi evidence
righam, J., ruled that the note declar d on wa not an accommodation note. The d fendant' coun el th n offered Yidence that
there was no con id ration for the indor ement of the note in
suit to th plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had n tic of the fa t
above stated; and that the note had b n paid to th plaintiff by
ome per on; but by whom he wa not in truct d. The ourt
rejected the evidenc , and directed th jur to find a erdict for
the plaintiff, which th y did; and the d fendant all o-ed exceptions.

W. L. Brown for the defendant.
H. C. Hutchins, for th plaintiff.
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Bigelovv, C. J. — The defendant by his own testimony proved

that the note in suit was given for a valid consideration. Nothing

is better settled than that a promissory no t e given by the maker in

exchange f or a note given to him by the payee is for a good con :

side ration, and is in no proper sense an accommodation note,

alth ough made for the mutual convenien ce of theparties, (Hig-

gin'son v. Gray, 6 Met. 212). Being a valid note on which the

defendant was liable, it was wholly immaterial whether the plain-

tiff, as indorsee, took it for value .

If the evidence of payment was admissible, for the reason

that it was not objected to at the trial on the ground that it had

not been duly pleaded in the defendant's answer, it is very clear

that the proof offered wholly failed to substantiate the fact. Evi-

dence that some one had paid the amount of the note to the plain-

tiff did not necessarily show that the note was paid, so as to

exonerate the defendant from his liability thereon. It was equally

consistent with the fact of the purchase of the note by the person

who paid the money, as with its payment, and the burden of proof

to establish payment being on the defendant, it failed to sustain

the allegations ; a fortiori is this true, where it appears, as in the
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case at bar, that the defendant has not instructed his counsel that

the money was paid either by himself or on his behalf. We there-

fore cannot see that the defendant was in any way aggrieved by

the rulings of the court at the trial.

Exceptions overruled.

Am. Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros. (See page 420.)

Section XIII — Contract of Surety or Guarantor. § 65.

Bickford v. Gibbs et al. (1851), 8 Cush. 154.

This was an action of assumpsit on the following note : —

"July 26th, 1845. $100. For value received, I promise to

pay on demand to Joseph Bickford, or order, one hundred dollars

with interest. George May."

On the back of the note was the following agreement, signed

by the defendants: "We guaranty the payment of the within,

waiving demand and notice."

The writ was dated the 23d of May, 1849 1 and contained the

money counts only. At the trial in the court of common pleas,

DrcELO\Y, C. J.-The defendant by hi own te timony proved
th at the note in uit wa o-iven for a valid con ideration.
othin
i better ettled than that a promis ory note given by the mak r in
~xch a n o-e for a not given to him by the payee i f r a g od .£2.!!:
ide ration, and i in no proper s n e an accommodation note,
a lthough mad e for the mutual convenience of the partie
(Higg inson v. Gra·y, 6 Met. 212).
eing a va i note on which the
def ndant was liable, it was wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff, a indorsee, took it for yalue.
If th e evidence of payment vv·a admi ible, for the reason
that it was not objected to at the trial on the ground that it had
not been duly pleaded in the def ndant's an wer, it is very clear
that th proof offer ed wholly failed to ub tantiate the fact. Evid nee that some one had paid the a'mount of the note to the plaintiff did not nece arily show that the note was paid, so a to
exonerate the defendant from his liability thereon. It was equally
con i tent with the fact of the purchase of the note by the person
who paid the money, as with it payment, and the burden of proof
to e tablish payment being on the defendant, it failed to sustain
the allegations; a fortiori is this true, where it appears, as in the
case at bar, that the defendant has not instructed his counsel that
the money wa paid either by himself or on his behalf. We therefore cannot ee that the defendant was in any way aggrieved by
the rulings of the court at the trial.
Exceptions overruled.
-~~ ·

Am. Nat. Banlc v. Junk Bros.

(See page 420.)

SECTION XIII-CONTRACT OF SURETY OR GUAR NTOR.

§ 65.

Bic!?ford v. Gibbs et al. (1851), 8 Cush. 154·
This was an action of assumpsit on the following note:"July 26th, 1845. $100. For value received, I promise to
pay on demand to Jo ph Bickford, or order, one hundred dollars
with interest.
GEORGE MAY."
O n the back of the note was the followino- agreement, signed
b y th defendant : "W guaranty the oaym nt of th within,
waiving demand and notice."
The writ was dated the 23d of May, l 49; and contained the
money counts only. At the trial in the court of common pleas,
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before Byington, J., the plaintiff put in evidence the foregoing

note and agreement, and there rested his case. And the presid-

ing judge submitted the case to the jury, with directions, if they

found for the plaintiff, to cast interest on the note. The jury

returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendants alleged

exceptions to the instructions of the judge.

This case was argued and decided at the last October term.

R. B. Caverly, for the defendants.

B. F. Butler, for the plaintiff.

before yington, J. th plaintiff put in vidcncc th fore omcr
not and agr m ·nt and th r r t d hi ca . A nd th e pre icling judo- ubmitt d th a t th jury, with dir ctions, if they
found for the plaintiff, to ca t int re t on th e n t . Th jury
r turn d a v rdict f r th plaintiff· and th defendant alleged
exc ption t th in tru cti on of th e ju<lg .
Thi ca e wa argued and d cided at th e la t ctober term.

Shaw, C. J. — Assumpsit to recover the amount of a note

given by one May, and guaranteed by the defendants.

An exception is now taken, that this guaranty should have

been specially declared on. No such exception was taken at the

R. B. Ca'uerly for th defendant .
B. F. B utler, for the plaintiff .

trial; had it been, an amendment might have been made; the

objection comes too late.

The exception is also taken, that as the guaranty was a

contract collateral to the note, a distinct consideration should be

proved. There would be force in this objection, had the guaranty

been made after the note had been made, delivered and received

as a complete contract. But when the guaranty is made on
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the note before its delivery by the maker to the promisee, it must

be deemed to be done for the benefit of the maker, to add to the

strengtrTof the note and to induce th e promisee to take it and

adva nce his money on it ; and no other consideration is necessar y

than the credit thus given to the maker . And the guaranty being

without date, and there being no direct proof of any time at

which it was made, we think the court were right in leaving it

to the jury, to find that the guaranty was simultaneous with the

note itself. ( Benthall v. Judkins, 13 Met. 265).

Supposing, then, that the defendants were regularly bound as

guarantors, and thereby assumed an obligation somewhat differ-

ing from that of either sureties or indorsers, what was that obli-

gation? This question has been much discussed, especially since

the leading case of Oxford Bank v. Hayncs, 8 Pick. 423. The

principle to be deduced from that case, and the Pennsylvania case

of Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 S. & R. 202, there cited with approbation

and relied on, is this: That in order to maintain an action

against a guarantor, a demand of payment must be made in a

reasonable time of the principal, and notice of non-payment given

to the guarantor ; and if in consequence of want of such notice,

the guarantor suffers loss, he is exonerated. (Dole v. Young, 24

Pick. 250) . The same prompt demand and notice, as are required

. J.- \ sumpsit to recover th e amount of a note
g1v n by n 1\Iay. and uaranteed by the defendant .
n ex epti n i now taken, that thi guaranty should have
b n sp ially cl Jar d on. No such xception wa taken at the
trial· had it b n an amendment mio-ht have b en made; the
obj ction comes too lat .
Th
xc ption i al o taken, that a the guaranty was a
contract collat ral to the not , a di tinct consideration should be
prov d. Th re ' ould be fore in thi bjection, had the guaranty
b en made after tbe not had been made deliv red and received
a a compl t contract.
ut when the guaranty is made on
the not b f r it d livery by the mak r to th promi ee, it mu t
be deemed t be done for the benefit of the maker, to add to the
trength of the note and to mduce th promi e to take it and
advance hi money on it; and no other consideration i nece ary
than the er dit thus given to the mak r. And the guaranty being
with ut dat and ther beino- no direct proof of any time at
which it wa ma I , we think the court were ri ht in leaving it
to the jury, t find that the guaranty wa imultaneou with the
note it lf. ( Be11tlzall v. J11dliins, r3 Iet. 265).
uppo in~. th n, that the def ndant were r o-ularly bound a
me\ hat differo-uarantor , and th r by a urned an blio-ation
ino- from that of ith r uretie or ind or r ' hat wa that oblio-ation? Thi qu tion ha be n much di cu ed. pecially ince
the 1 adin
a e f Oxford Bank v. Hay11c ,
ick, 423. The
principle to b d due d from that ca e, and th
nn ylvania ca e
of Gibbs v. Cannon,
. & R. 202 th r it l with appr bation
and reli d on, i thi : That in order t · maintain an action
again t a o-uarantor, a demand of paym nt mu t b mad in a
rea onable time of the principal, and n tic of non-payment ITT.ven
to th o-uarantor: and if in on equ n
f want f uch noti ,
the o-uarantor suff r lo he i ex n rat d. ( ole v. Y 01111 • 24
Pick. 250). The am prompt d man and noti , a ar required

500

ONTRACT OF

UR TY

R GUARANTOR

500 Contract of Surety or Guarantor

to charge an indorser, arc not necessary; and if the circumstances

of parties remain the same, and the guarantor suffers no loss by

delay, demand and notice at any time before action brought, will

be sufficient. (Babcock v. Bryant, 12 Pick. 133). Such being the

obligation of the defendants, as guaranto rs, they would not be

liable b y the general law, without proof of demand and notice.

But they jraye_e xpresslv agreed to waive demand and notice, and

conventio le?em vincit. The effect of that waiver is, to put the

plaintiff in the same situation as if he had proved that he season-

ably demanded the money of the promisor, who did not pay it,

and gave reasonable notice thereof to the defendants. In the

absence of all proof on the part of the defendants, that they have

suffered any loss by the laches of the plaintiff, the court are of

opinion that this proof would entitle the plaintiff to recover.

Exceptions overruled.

Roberts v. Hawkins ( 1888), 70 Mich. 566.

Error to superior court of Grand Rapids. (Burlingame, J.)

Assumpsit. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The facts

are stated in the opinion.

N orris & N orris, for appellant.
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/. C. Fitz Gerald {Charles Chandler, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Long, J .—January 12, 1884, one Lyman D. Follett made his

to charge an indor r, ar not nee ssary; and if the circumstances
of partie r main th am , and th e guara ntor uff r no lo by
cl lay, d mancl and notic at any time b fo re action brou ht, will
be uffici nt. (Babcoc lz v. Bryant, 12 P ick. 133).
uch b ing the
oblio-ati n of the clef ndant , a guarantors, they would not be
liab e by the gen ral law . without pro f of dema nd and notice.
But th y hav xpr ly ag-re d to waive demand and notice. and
co11ve11tio lege111 vi11cit. T he effect of that waiv r i , to put the
plaintiff in th ame ituation a if .h had proved that he ea onably demand l the money of the promi or, w ho did not pay it,
and gave r a onable notice thereof t o the defendant . In the
ab ence of all proof on the part of the defendant , that they have
uffered any lo s by the lache of th e plaintiff, the court are of
opinion that thi proof wou ld entitle the plaintiff to r ecover.
Exce~tions overru!ed.
-~ ·~~ '

promissory note as follows :

"$1,000. Grand Rapids, Mich., January 12, 1884.

"One year after date, I promise to pay to the order of Helen

M. Roberts one thousand dollars, with interest at eight per cent,

Roberts v . Haw kins ( 1888), 70 .NI ich. 566.

per annum. Value received.

''Lyman D. Follett."

And defendant signed an indorsement on the back thereof,

as follows :

"For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of the

E rror to superior cou rt of Grand Rapids. (BURLINGAME, J.)
Assumpsit. Defendant brings error. A ffirmed. Th e facts
a re tated in the opinion.

within note. L. E. Hawkins."

On the delivery of this note to plaintiff, she paid Follett

$1,000. January 8, 1885, seven days before this note became due,

Follett paid one. year's interest; and neither at that time, nor

at the maturity of the note, was the same presented to Follett or

defendant for payment. No notice of non-payment was given

Norris & Norris, for appellant.
]. C. Fit::; Gerald (Charles Chandler, of counsel), for plaintiff.
LONG, J.- January 12, 1884, one L yman D. Follett made his
promissory not a follow :
"$1,000.
GRAND R APIDS, MrcH., January 12, 1884.
"One year after date, I promise to pay to the ord r of Helen
M. Roberts one thousand dollar , with interest at eio-ht per cent.
per annum. Value r eceived.
" L YMAN D. FOLLETT."
And defendant
as follow :

i ned an indorsement on the back thereof,

"For value received, I hereby guarant e the payment of the
within note.
L. E. HA wr<I "
n the delivery of this note to plaintiff, she paid Follett
$1,000. January 8, 1885, even day b fore thi note b came due
Follett paid one year' interest ; and neither at that time, nor
at ·th maturity of th note, was the sam pr nted to ollett or
def ndant for payment. N o notice of non-payment was given
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defendant then or at any time prior to June 8, 1887. January 15,

1886, Follett paid the interest for the next year, and January 17,

1887, for the year following. About June 8, 1887, the note being

then two years and five months overdue, it was first presented to

defendant, and payment demanded and refused. August 13 this

suit was brought.

On the trial, plaintiff, having proved the note and guaranty,

and its non-payment, rested. Defendant then sought to make his

defense as pleaded, and offered to show —

1. That he was an accommodation guarantor, without con-

sideration or security.

2. That, at or about the maturity of the note, he inquired

of the maker of the note if it was paid, and was told it was.

3. That neither at the maturity of the note, nor at any subse-

quent time, prior to June 8, 1887, was any notice of the non-

payment of this note given to defendant, nor any demand made on

him for the payment thereof.

4. That at the maturity of this note, and for some consider-

able time thereafter, — at least a year, — Follett, the maker of the

note, was solvent, and had property out of which defendant could
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have procured him to pay the note or obtained security.

5. That when defendant, on June 8, 1887, learned of the

non-payment of this note, the maker was insolvent, out of the

jurisdiction, and that he could then obtain no security or payment.

The court directed a general verdict for plaintiff on all the

counts of the declaration. Judgment being entered on the verdict

in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest,

defendant brings the case into this court by writ of error.

The declaration contains three counts. The first alleges the

guaranty, demand of the maker at maturity, non-payment, and

notice of said demand and non-payment to defendant at maturity.

The second alleges the guaranty, the refusal by maker to pay

at maturity, and notice to defendant, at maturity, of maker's

refusal.

The third is the common counts in assumpsit, with copy of

note annexed, and an alleged indorsement on back of L. E. Haw-

kins, without any guaranty over it.

The plea is the general issue, with notice of the defense of

release by plaintiff's failure to give notice of non-payment to

defendant, and the consequent damage and loss to him thereby.

It is claimed that the court erred in receiving the note and

guaranty in evidence under the third count in plaintiff's declar-

ation, for the reason that the note and guaranty offered were not

defendant then or at any time prior to June 8, 1887. January I 5,
18 6, Follett paid the int re t for the next y ar, and January 17,
1887, for th y ar following.
bout Jun 8 1 7, th note 1 ing
then two y ar and fiv month o rdu , it wa fir t pre ented t
defendant, and paym nt d mand d an 1 r fu cl. .r\ugu t 13 thi
uit was brought.
On th trial, plaintiff, having Ir v d th not and guaranty,
and its non-paym nt, re ted. Defendant th n sought to make his
defen e as pl ad d, and offered to howl.
That he wa an accommodation guarantor, without conideration or security.
2.
That, at or about the maturity of the note, he inquired
of the maker of the note if it was paid, and was told it was.
3. That neither at th maturity of the note, nor at any sub equent time, prior to June 8, 1887, wa any notice of the nonpayment of thi not given to defendant, nor any demand made on
him for the payment thereof.
4. That at the maturity of this note, and for some considerable time thereafter,-at lea t a year,-Follett, the maker of the
note, was solvent, and had property out of which defendant could
have procured him to pay the note or obtained ecurity.
5. That when defendant, on June 8, 1887, learned of the
non-paym nt of this note, the maker was in olv nt, out of the
jurisdiction, and that he could then obtain no security or payment.
The court dir ct d a general verdict for plaintiff on all the
count of the declaration. J udgm nt being entered on the verdict
in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note and interest,
defendant brings the ca e into thi court by writ of error.
The declaration contain three count . The fir t alleges the
guaranty, demand of the maker at maturity non-pa ment and
notice of aid demand and non-payment to defendant at maturity.
The cond all O'es the guaranty, the refu al b maker to pa
at maturity and notic to defendant, at maturity of maker
refusal.
The third i th common count in a smnpsit ' ith cop of
note annexed, and an all ed indor ment on back of L. E. Hawkins, without any guaranty over it.
The plea i the general is ue with notice of the defen of
relea e by plaintiff' failur to O'iv n tic of non-payment to
defendant, and the con equent damaO' an lo to him thereby.
It i claimed that the court rr d in r
rn th n t and
guaranty in evidenc under th third c unt in plaintiff' declaration, for th e reason that the not and uaranty ff r d were not
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the note and guaranty set forth in that count; that the contract

set out in plaintiff's third count was that defendant had indorsed

his name in blank on the back of the note, not payable to his

order ; and that this would make him a maker of the note, and

liable as such, while the note offered had a guaranty of payment

indorsed thereon. Defendant claimed that this was a variance,

and that the court should have excluded the guaranty under this

third count, and confined the verdict to a recovery under the first

two counts.

As we view the case, however, this objection has no force.

The plaintiff being entitled to recover under the first and second

counts of the declaration, the defendant was not prejudiced in the

course taken by the court in not withdrawing all consideration

of the case under the third count. The declaration was sufficient

in the first two counts to allow a recovery thereunder.

The chief error complained of is the exclusion of the entire

defense, and the direction of a verdict for plaintiff. On the trial

the plaintiff proved by a witness the application for the loan, the

loaning of the money, the giving of the note and guaranty, and,

after reading the note and guaranty in evidence, rested. The
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defendant was then called and sworn as a witness in his own

behalf, and was asked by his counsel :

"Q. When that note became due, in January, 1885, — Janu-

ary i§ } — wa s any notice given you of the fact that it remained

unpaid ?"

To this question counsel for plaintiff objected, that the same

was irrelevant and immaterial ; that the defendant was not an

indorser nor guarantor of collection, but of payment of the note.

Counsel for the defendant then offered to show by the witness

that he had no notice of the non-payment of the note prior to June

8, 1887; that he was an accommodation guarantor without secur-

ity ; that, at or near the maturity of the note, he inquired of the

maker, and was informed that it was paid ; that, at the time, the

maker of the note was solvent, and for some considerable time

thereafter, — probably a year, — and that the defendant could, if he

had any knowledge of its non-payment, have secured himself, or

procured the maker to pay it ; that, when the defendant learned

of the non-payment of the note, the maker was insolvent, and out

of the State, and no security could have been obtained by the

defendant ; the counsel then saying —

"That this, of course, is the line of defense marked out by

the notice in the pleadings. It is all covered by my brother's argu-

ment; and, if we have no right to show that defense, then, of

th note and guaranty et forth in that count; that th contract
et out in plaintiff's third count wa that defendant had indor ed
his name in blank on the 1 ack of th note, not payable to hi
ord r; and that thi would make him a maker of the note, and
liable as such, while the note offered had a guaranty of payment
indo r ed th reon. Defendant claimed that this was a variance,
;,i.nd that the court should have excluded the guaranty under this
th ird count, and confin d the verd ict to a recovery und er the first
two count .
·
As we view the ca e, however, this ob jection has no force.
T he plaintiff being entitled to recover under the first and second
counts of the declaration, the defendant was not prejudiced in the
course taken by the court in not withdrawing all consideration
of the ca e under the third count. The declaration was sufficient
in the first two counts to allow a recovery thereunder.
The chief error complained of is the exclusion of the entire
defense, and the direction of a verdict for plaintiff. On the trial
the plaintiff proved by a witn ess the application for th e loan the
loaning of the money, the g iving of th e note and guaranty, and,
after reading the note and guaranty in evidence, rested. The
defendant was then called and sworn as a witness in his own
behalf, and was asked by his counsel:
"Q. When that note became due, in January, 1885,- J anuary 15,-was any notice given you of th e fact that it remained
unpaid?"
T o thi question counsel for plaintiff objected, that the same
was irrelevant and immaterial ; that th e defendant was 11ot an
indorser nor guarantor of collection, but of payment of the note.
Counsel for the defendant then offered to ·show by the witness
that he had no notice of the non-payment of the note prior to June
8, 1887; that he was an accommodation guarantor without security; that, at or near the maturity of the note, he inquired of the
maker, and was informed that it was paid; that, at the time, the
maker of the note was solvent, and for some con iderable time
the reaft er,-probably a yea r, -and that the defendant could, if he
had any knowled e of its non-payment, have secured himself, or
procured the maker to pay it; that, when the d fendant learned
of the non-payment of the note, the maker was in olvent, and out
of the State, and no s curity could have been obtained by the
defendant ; the counsel then saying" That ·this of course is the line of defen e marked out b)'
the notice in the' pleading .' It is all covered by my brother's argument; and, if we have no rig ht to show that def n e, then, of
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course, there remains nothing but for the court to direct a verdict

for the amount of the note, and interest."

The court sustained the objection, and directed a verdict for

plaintiff.

In considering the case, the defendant's offer to prove this

state of facts must be taken as true. (Clay, etc., Ins. Co. v. Man-

ufacturing Co., 31 Mich. 356). Under this offer by the defendant,

the issue is made : Is a person not being a party to a promissory

note, who at its date and before delivery, and for the purpose of

having a loan made upon the strength of his guaranty, guarantees

the payment of such note, liable thereon in case the note is not

paid at maturity, without notice of non-payment having been given

to him by the holder at the maturity of the note, or within a

reasonable time thereafter; or in case notice is not given, and no

proceedings taken to collect the note from the maker, and the

maker of the note, at the maturity thereof, was solvent, and sub-

sequently, and before suit is brought on the guaranty, becomes

insolvent, can such guarantor, when such action is brought against

him, set up such insolvency as a defense? The defense being
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based on plaintiff's laches in not giving notiqe to defendant of the

non-payment of this note at maturity, and the consequent damage

to defendant thereby, the correctness of the court's ruling depends

on whether or not there rested on the plaintiff the duty to give

such notice under any circumstances.

The defendant claims that his liability existed only on the

happening of a contingency and the performance of a condition ;

that whether or not that contingency happened, or condition was

performed, was matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the

plaintiff, and not within his own; and that if plaintiff intended to

assert the performance of the condition, or the happening of the

contingency, whereby alone defendant was to become liable, it was

her duty to do so within a reasonable time, and, in any event,

before the maker of the note became insolvent and a fugitive ; that

her neglect to do so, and the damage to him thereby, has released

him from the obligation of his conditional contract.

The position, however, of a guarantor of payment, as between

him and the maker of the note, is that of a surety. Jt is a

common-law contract, and not .a contract ktpwnto the law- mer-

chant. I t is ah~aFsorute~promise to pay if the maker does not_pay_,

5nd IheTight 6T~acHon accru es~~a gainst the guarantor at the

moment the maker fails to pay. The guarantor would not be dis-

charged by any neglect or even refusal on the par t of the holder

of_ _the note to prosecute the principal, even if the maker was

course there remain nothin but for th court to direct a verdict
for th am unt of th not and int r t."
Th court u tain d th obj ction, and direct <l a v rdict for
plaintiff.
In consid ring th ca , th <l f ndant'
ffer to prov thi
tat of fact mu t b tak n a tru .
lay, tc., Ins. Co. . i'vlanu,facturing o., 3 I Iich. 35 ) . Under thi offer by the d fendant,
the i ue i mad : I a p r n not being a party to a promi ory ) ~
note, who at it date and before d livery, and for the purpo e of { ~ ~
havin a loan mad upon th trength of hi guaranty, guarante
~
the payment of uch not liable thereon in ca e the note i not ~. .
paid at maturity, without notic of non-paym nt having been given
. ~
to him by the hold r at the maturity of the not or within a ~
r a onabl tim th r after· or in ca e notice i not given and no ~e-~• "f\..\... ~
proceeding taken to collect the note from the maker, and the ~~
maker of th note, at the maturity thereof, was olvent, and ub· .
~
quently, and b for uit i brought on the guaranty, becom
in olv nt, can uch uarantor, when uch action i brought again t ~ \.,~
him, et up such in olvency a a d fen e? The def nse being ~'.
ba ed on plaintiff' Jach in not giving notic.e to defendant of the
non-payment of thi not at maturity, and the con equent damage
to defendant thereby, th correctne of the court' ruling depend
on whether or not there re ted on the plaintiff the duty to gi\ e
uch notice und r any circurn tance .
The defendant claim that his liability exi ted only on the
happening of a canting ncy and the p rformanc of a condition·
that whether or not that contingency happened, or condition wa
performed, wa matt r peculiarly within the knowled e of the
plaintiff, and not within his own; and that if plaintiff intended to
a sert the performance of the condition, or the happ ning of the
contingency whereby alone defendant wa to b come liable, it wa
h r duty to do o within a rea nable time, and, in any event,
before the mak r of th not b earn in oh nt and a fu itive; that
her neglect to do so an l th dama e to him thereby, ha rel ea ed
him from the oblio-ation of hi conditional contract.
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s olvent at the maturity of the note, and subsequently became

--ins olvent ; and the fact that no notice of tpn-payment was given

v >_ ^ v oj vvv _\ Ib-^ guarantor at the ma. "f jhe jjut_e..,_or at any time, hefore

<\ l.:-ii:.'in| ^uit. would not atfect the riflhts of ihe n"blder ot thenote

,-;ain>t th e guarantor. Ihe guarantor's remedy was to have paid

the note, and taken it up, and himself proceeded against the

maker.

A guaranty is held to be a contract by which one person is

bound to another for due fulfillment of a promise or engagement

of a third party. (2 Pars. Cont. 3).

The contract or undertaking of a surety is a contract by one

person to be answerable for the payment of some debt, or the

performance of some act or duty, in case of the failure of another

person who is himself primarily responsible for the payment of

such debt or the performance of the act or duty. (3 Add. Cont.,

§ 1 11 1 ; 3 Kent, Comm. 121 ; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 734).

In the case of Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (decided in

1816), it was held that if the surety call upon the creditor to

collect the debt of the principal, and he disregard that request,

and thereby the surety is injured, as by the subsequent insolvency
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of the principal, the surety was thereby discharged. A directly

contrary decision was given by Chancellor Kent, upon argument

and full consideration, the following year. (King v. Baldwin, 2

Johns. Ch. 554). Two years later the last decision was reversed

by the court of errors by casting vote of the presiding officer, a

layman, and against the opinion of the majority of the judges.

(King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384).

In the case of Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 226 (decided in

1849), the action was brought against the guarantor of a prom-

issory note. On the trial it was admitted that there had been no

demand of the maker, nor any notice of non-payment, and the

note was dated April 2, 1838, and payable six months after the

date. The suit was brought against the guarantor in September,

1845. The defendant offered to prove that, from the time the

note fell due until the latter part of 1843, the maker was able to

pay the note; that he then failed, and was insolvent at the time

of the commencement of the suit, and still remained so. This

evidence was objected to, and excluded, and verdict directed for

plaintiff. The court (at p. 227) says:

"The undertaking of the defendant was not conditional, like

that of an indorser ; nor was it upon any condition whatever. It

was an absolute agreement that the note should be paid by the

maker at maturity. When the maker failed to pay, the defendant's

. ~- - -CY-a: Ul

"'- '-"" ~~~
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a gam t t e guaran or.
th e note, and taken it
maker.
A guaranty is held to be a contract by which one person i
bound to another for due fulfillment of a promise or engagement
of a third party. (2 Pars. Cont. 3).
The contract or undertaking of a surety is a contract by one
person to be answerable for the payment of some debt, or the
performance of some act or duty, in case of the failure of another
person who is him elf primarily responsible for the payment of
uch debt or the performance of the act or duty. ( 3 Add. Cont.,
§ l II l; 3 Kent, Comm. 121; Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 734) .
In the case of Pain v. Pa.ckard 13 Johns. 174 (decided in
1816) , it was held that if the surety call upon the creditor to
collect the debt of the principal, and he disregard that request,
and thereby the surety is injured, as by the subsequent insolvency
of the principal, the surety was thereby discharged. A directly
contrary decision was g iven by Chancellor Kent, upon arg ument
and full consideration, the fo llowing year. (King v. Baldwin 2
Johns. Ch. 554). Two years later the last decision was reversed
by the court of errors by casting vote of the presiding officer , a
layman, and against the opinion of th e majority of the judges.
(Kin g v. Baldwin 17 J ohns. 384).
In the case of Brown v. Curtiss 2 N. Y . 226 (decided in
1849) , the action was brought against the guarantor of a promi sory note. On the trial it was admitted that there had been no
demand of the maker, nor any notice of non-payment, and the
note was dated April 2, 1838, and payable six months after the
elate. The su it was brought against the guarantor in September,
1845. The defendant offered to prove that, from the time the
note fell due until the latter part of 1843, the maker was able to
pay the note; that he then failed, and was insolvent at the time
of the commencement of the suit, and still remained so. This
evidence was objected to, and excluded, and verdict directed for
plaintiff. The court (at p. 227) says :
1

1

1

1

"The undertaking of the defendant was not conditional , like
that of an indorser; nor was it upon any condition whatever. It
was an absolute agreement that the note should be paid by the
maker at maturity. When th maker failed to pay, the defendant's
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contract was broken, and the plaintiff had a complete right of

action against him. It was no part of the agreement that the

plaintiff should give notice of the non-payment; nor that he

should sue the maker, or use any diligence to get the money from

him. * * l'roof that when the note became due, and for

several years afterwards, the maker was abundantly able to pay,

and that he had since become insolvent, would be no answer to

this action. The defendant was under an absolute agreement to

see that the maker paid the note at maturity. * *

"If the defendant wished to have him sued, he should have

taken up the note, and brought the suit himself. The plaintiff was

under no obligation to institute legal proceedings."

The weight of authority, both in this country and in England,

sustains this doctrine, and we think with much good reason.

(Bellows v. Lord!, 5 Pick. 310; Davis v. Huggins, 3 N. H. 231 ;

Page v. Webster, 15 Me. 249; Dennis v. Rider, 2 McLean, 451).

contract was broken, and the plaintiff had a complete right of
action again t him. It wa no part of the agreement that the
plaintiff should give notice of the non-payment· nor that he
should ue th mak r, or u e any diligence to get the money from
him. * * * Proof that wh n the note became due, and for
several year aft rward , th maker ' a abundantly abl to pay,
and that he had ince become insolv nt, would be no ans er to
thi action. The clef ndant wa under an absolute agreement to
ee that the maker paid the note at maturity. * * * * * *
"If the d f ndant wi hed to have him ued he hould have
tak n up the not , and brought the uit himself. The plaintiff was
under no obli ation to in titute legal proceeding .'

In Train v. Jones, 11 Vt. 446, it is said:

"An absolute guaranty that the debt of a third person shall

be paid, or that he shall pay it, imposes the same obligation upon

the guarantor. In either case, it is an absolute guaranty of
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the sum stipulated, and the creditor is not bound to use diligence,

or to give reasonable notice of non-payment." (Noyes v. Nichols,

The weio-ht of authority, both in this country and in England,
u tain thi doctrine, and we think with much good rea on.
(Belloi is v. Lovell 5 ick. 310; Davis v. Huggins) 3 N. H. 231;
Pa cre v. TVeb ster, 15 Me. 249; Dennis v. Rider, 2 McLean, 451).

28 Vt. 174).

In Bloom v. Warder, 13 Neb. 478 (14 N. W. Rep. 396),

which was an action against the guarantors of payment of a

promissory note, the court says:

'This is an absolute contract, for a lawful consideration, that

the money expressed in the note shall be paid at maturity thereof

at all events, and depends in no degree upon a demand of payment

of the maker of the note, or any diligence on the part of the

holder."

Mere passiveness on the part of the holder will not release the^

gu a rantor, even if the m aker of the note was solvent at its matur-

ity, and tnereaher~~became insolvent. (Breed v. Hill house, 7

Conn. 528 ; Bank v. Hopson, 53 Conn. 454 [5 Atl. Rep. 601] ; Fos-

ter v. Tolleson, 13 Rich. Law, 33; Machine Co. v. Jones, 61 Mo.

In Train v. Jon es, r r Vt. 446, it is said:
n ab elute guaranty that the debt of a third person shall
be paid or that he hall pay it, imposes the same obligation upon
the guaranto r. In either ca e, it i an ab olute guaranty of
the um stipulated, and the creditor is not bound to u e dilio-ence,
or to o-iv rea enable notice of non-payment." ( oyes v. Nichols,
28 Vt. 174).
In Bloom v. TVarder, 13 Neb. 478 (14 N. v\. Rep. 396),
which was an action against the guarantors of payment of a
promi ory note, the court ay :

409; Barker v. Scudder, 56 id. 276: Norton v. Eastman, 4 Greenl.

521 ; Brown v.Citrtiss, 2 N. Y. 225 ; Allen v. Rightnierc. 20 Johns.

365; Bank v. Sinclair, 60 N. H. 100; Gage v. Bank, 79 111. 62:

Hungerford v. O'Brien, 37 Minn. 306 [34 X. W. Rep. 161I).

It follows that, this being an absolute undertaking on the part

of the defendant as guarantor to pay the amount of this note at

"This i an ab elute contract, for a lawful con ideration, that
the money expre ed in the note hall be paid at maturity thereof
at all event , and depend in no degr upon a demand of payment
of the maker of the note, or any diligence on the part of the
holder.'
~ere pa iven
on the part of the holder will not relea e the
guarantor even if the maker of the note wa ol ent at it maturlty, and thereafter became insolvent. (Breed v. Hillhouse, 7
Conn. 528; Bank . Hopson, 53 onn. 454 [S tl. Rep. 6or] ; Foster v. Tolleson 13 Rich. Law, 33 · 1achh1e Co. v. Jones, 6r 1o.
409; Barker v. cudder, 56 id. 276; orton v. EasfJllan 4 r enl.
521; Brown v.·Curtiss) ~ N. Y. 2~5 ·Allen . Ri crht111cre 20 John .
. Bank 79 Ill. 62 ·
365 · Bank v. SiHclair, 60 . H. 100; Gag
Hungerford . 0) Brien 37 Iinn. 06 [ 4 . \\ . Rep. 161 J .
It foll ows that thi b ino- an ab olut und rtakino- on the part
of the d fe ndant a o-uarantor to pay th amount of thi note at
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maturity in the event of the default of payment by the principal,

the guarantor could not demand any diligence on the part of the

holder of the note to collect the same from the principal. It was

his duty to perform his contract, — that is, to pay the note upon

default of the principal ; and it is no answer for him to say that the

principal was solvent at the maturity of the note, and that the same

could then have been collected of him by the holder, and that he

has since become insolvent. If h e wished to protect himself

against los s, he should have kept his engagement with the holder

of the note, p aid it upon default of the principal, taken up the note,

and Himself prosecuted theparty for whose faithful performance^

oflhe corTtr ac t he became liable.

The court properly directed the verdict for the plaintiff ;

and the judgment of the court below must be affirmed,

with costs. v -.
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The other justices concurred. "^J* (^-^^

maturity in the event of the default of payment by the principal,
the guarantor could not demand any diligence on th part of the
holder of the note to coll ct the same from the principal. It was
hi duty to perform hi contract,-that i , to pay the note upon
default of the principal; and it is no an wer for him to say that the
principal was olvent at the maturity of the note, and that the same
could then have been collected of him by the holder, and that he
ha
ince become insolvent. If he wished to protect himself
again t loss, he should have ke t h1 en a ement with the holder
o t e note, paid it upon default of the rinci al taken u the note
and h1mse prosecuted the arty for who e faithfu l erformance
o t 1e contract he became liable.
The court properly directed the verdict for the plaintiff;
and the judgment of the court below must be affirmed,
with costs.
~ __ ~.
The other justices concurred.
-~,_ \\

TITLE III.

Rights of the Holder.

right to sue and receive payment. § 53.

Haysv. Hathorn ct al. (1878), 74 N. Y. 486.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court, in the third judicial department, affirming a judgment in

favor of plaintiff, entered upon a decision of the court on trial

without a jury. (Reported below, 10 Hun, 511).

TITLE Ill.

This action was upon a promissory note, alleged in the com-

plaint to have been made by the firm of Hathorn & Southgate,

payable to the order of defendant, Frank H. Hathorn. and by him

indorsed and transferred to plaintiff.

RIGHT

OF THE HOLDER.

The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.

Chas. S. Lester, for appellants.

John R. Putnam, for respondent.

RIGHT TO SUE A D RECEIVE PAYMENT.

§ 53·

Hand, J. — In their answer, the defendants denied that the

note on which the action was brought was ever transferred to

the plaintiff or that he was the legal owner or holder thereof.

Hays v . Hathorn et al. (1878), 74

r..·.

Y . ..J.86.

They further denied that the plaintiff was the real party in inter-

est; alleged that the Saratoga County Bank was the real party

in interest and the owner and holder and should be the plaintiff
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and that the note was duly transferred to it instead of to the

plaintiff.

Upon the trial, the plaintiff having produced the note which

was payable to the order of F. H. Hathorn and indorsed in blank

by him, rested. The defendants then offered to prove that the

note "was not the property of the plaintiff, that the same was

never transferred to him. that he was not the real party in interest,

that the note was the property of the Savings Bank who is the real

party in interest." The evidence was objected to by the plaintiff

as immaterial and was excluded. This ruling I think was errone-

ppeal from ju lgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court, in the third judicial department, affirming a judgment in
favor of plaintiff, entered upon a deci ion of the court on trial
\\ithout a jury. (Reported below, IO Hun, 5Ir).
Thi action wa upon a promi ory note, alleged in the complaint to have been made by the firm of Hathorn & outhgate,
payabl to th'e order of defendant, Frank H. Hathorn and by him
indor ed and tran £erred to plaintiff.
The facts appear ufficiently in the opinion.

ous and renders necessary a reversal of the judgment.

Under the answer and this offer, the defendants unquestion-

Chas. S. Lester for appellants.
Jolin R. Putnam, for respondent.
HAND, J.-In th ir an wer, the defendants denied that the
note on which the action wa brought wa ever transferred to
the plaintiff or that h was the I gal own r or holder thereof.
They further denied that th plaintiff wa the real party in interest; alleaed that th
aratoga ount
ank wa the real party
in int r t and the owner and holder and hould be the plaintiff
and that the note wa duly tran £erred to it in tead of to the
plaintiff.
Upon th trial, the plaintiff havina produced the note \ hich
was payable to the ord r of F. I . Hathorn and indor ed in blank
by him, re ted. The def ndant then ff r d to prov that the
note "wa not th prop rty of th plaintiff. that th
ame wa
never tran £erred to him, that h ' a not tl real party in intere t,
that the note wa the prop rt of the a in
ank ' ho i the rea l
party in intere t." The evid nc ' a o j ct d to by the plaintiff
a immaterial and wa e "clud d. Thi rulin I think " a erron ou and render nece sarv a r
r al of th judgm nt.
Under th an w r and thi off r th d f ndant unque tion-
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ably proposed to show substantially that the plaintiff had no title

legal or equitable to the note and no right as owner to its posses-

sion. This might have been done by proving that he was the mere

finder or the unlawful possessor, or that the right to its posses-

sion and ownership was in the bank to whom they were liable

thereon, or in some other way. This they had a right to show.

It may be that, had their offer been admitted, they would have

produced in fact no evidence to sustain it or prevent a recovery,

but in considering the validity of their exception to the exclusion,

we must assume that the evidence would have fully covered the

propositions contained in the offer. And, as remarked in the

dissenting opinion in the court below, "unless the defendants are

to be precluded altogether from giving any evidence of a matter

confessedly issuable, I do not see how this offer could be rejected."

The cases relied upon as justifying the exclusion of the evi-

dence do not go that length. Tn Cummings v. Morris (25 N. Y.,

625) it was held that the maker of a note could not defeat the plain-

tiff, not a payee, by proof that the consideration of the transfer to

him was contingent upon his collecting the note. Such plaintiff was

declared to be the real party in interest on the express ground that
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the transfer was complete and irrevocably vested in him the title

to the note. In City Bank v. Perkins (29 N. Y., 554) there was

no question of exclusion of evidence, but all the circumstances

being proved, it was held that where the cashier of a bank holding

commercial paper, pledged it "duly indorsed" to the plaintiff as

security for a loan by the plaintiff to his bank, and it had been

actually transmitted under his direction to the plaintiff so indorsed,

it was no defense to one admitting his liability upon such paper

to show lack of authority in the cashier alone to contract a loan

for the bank ; or the fraudulent diversion by him of the funds

received from the plaintiff on such loan. Some remarks in the

opinion in that case, not necessary to the decision, are perhaps too

broad to be entirely approved, but it is fully conceded in it that

proof that the plaintiff had no right whatever to the possession

but was a mere finder or had obtained it by some "positive breach

of law" would be a defense.

Brown v. PenHcld (36 N. Y., 473) holds merely that proof

by the party liable on a bill, of gross inadequacy of the consider-

ation for the transfer of such bill to the plaintiff does not impeach

the validity of such transfer as to the party so liable.

In Allen v. Brown (44 N. Y., 228) it was decided that, as

against the plaintiff holding legal title to the claim by written

assignment valid upon its face, the debtor cannot raise the ques-

ably propo cd to how ub tantially that the plaintiff had no title
1 gal or equitable to the note and no right as owner to its possesion. Thi might hav been done by proving that he \ a the mere
or, or that the right to its possesfinder or the unlawful po
ion and O\ ner hip wa in the bank to whom they were liable
thereon, or in ome other way. This they had a right to show.
It may b that, had their offer b en admitted, they would have
produced in fact no evidence to u tain it or prevent a recovery,
but in con idering the valid ity of th ir xception to the exclu ion,
we mu t a ume that the evidence would have full y covered the
propositions contained in the off r.
nd, as remarked in the
di ntina opinion in th e court below, " unle the defendants are
to be precluded altogether from o-iving any evidence of a matter
confe sedly i uable, I do not ee how thi offer could be rejected."
The ca e relied upon a ju tifying the exclusion of the evidence do not go that length. In Cummings v. Morris ( 25 N. Y.,
625) it wa held that the maker of a note could not defeat the plaintiff, not a payee, by proof that the consideration of the tran fer to
him was contingent upon hi s collecting th e note. Such plaintiff was
declared to be the real party in interest on the express ground that
the tran fer wa complete and irrevocably vested in him the title
to the note. In City Bank v. Perkins (29 N. Y. , 554) there was
no que tion of exclu ion of evidence, but all the circumstances
beino- prond, it was held that where the cashier of a bank holding
commercial paper, pledged it "duly indorsed" to the plaintiff a
security for a loan by the plaintiff to his bank, and it had been
actually transmitted under his direction to the plaintiff so indorsed,
it wa no defense to one admitting his liability upon such paper
to show lack of authority in the ca hier alone to contract a loan
for the bank; or the fraudulent diver ion by him of the funds
rec ived from the plaintiff on such loan. Some remarks in the
opinion in that ca e not nece sary to the decision, are perhaps too
broad to be entirely approved, but it is full y conceded in it that
proof that the plaintiff had no right whatever to the possession
but wa a mere finder or had obtained it by some "positive breach
of law" would be a defense.
Brown v. P en field (36 N. Y., 473) holds merely that proof
by the party liable on a bill, of o-ro inadequacy of the consideration fo r the tran fer of such bill to the plaintiff does not impeach
the validity of such tran fer a to the party o liable.
In A llen v. Brown (44 N. Y., 228) it was decided that, as
against the plaintiff holding legal title to the claim by written
a i~rnment valid upon its face, the debtor cannot raise the ques-
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tion as to the consideration for such assignment or the equities

between the assignor and assignee.

In Eaton v. Alger (47 N. Y., 345) the note being payable to

bearer and produced by the plaintiff upon the trial, it was proved

that the payee had delivered it to the plaintiff upon his undertak-

ing to collect it at his own expense and pay to such payee upon its

collection a certain sum of money. This was held to show suffi-

ciently that the plaintiff and not the payee was the real party in

interest under the Code.

Sheridan v. The Mayor (68 X. Y., 30) reiterates the doctrine,

that, as against the debtor, the plaintiff holding a written assign .

ment of the claim to himself valid on its face, obtained the legal

title and was the real party in interest notwithstanding the fact

that the assignment was without consideration and merely color-

able as between him and the original claimant. Such assignment

is expressly declared to protect the debtor paying the assignee

against a subsequent suit by the assignor.

In Gage v. Kendall (15 Wend., 640) the fact that the prose-

cution of the note was by its owner and holder in the name of the

plaintiff a stranger to it, without his consent or knowledge, was
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sought to be set up as a defense, but it was ruled out on the

ground that the nominal plaintiff need have no title to or interest

in the paper sued upon. We apprehend the Code has changed this

and that such facts would now be fatal to an action. Such a

plaintiff could not in any view be the real party in interest. Indeed

he would not even have manual possession of the paper.

From this glance at the cases, it appears that it is ordinarily

no defense to the party sue d upon commercial paper, to show that

the transfer under whic h the plaintiff holds it is without consid-

eration or sub ject to equities between him and his assignor, or

colorable and merely for the purpose of collection, or to secure a

debt contracted by an agent without sufficient authority . It is

sufficient to make the plaintiff the real party in interest, if he have

the legal title either by written transfer or delivery, whatever may"

be the equities between him a nd his assignor. But to be enti tled

to sue, he must now have the right of possession and ordinarily be

the legal owne r. Such ownership may be as equitable trustee, it

may have been acquired without adequate consideration, but must

be sufficient to protect the defendant upon a recovery against him

from a subsequent action by the assignor.

As we understand the scope of the offer in the present case,

it went to entirely disprove any ownership or interest whatever or

even right to possession as owner in the plaintiff. It should there-

assignment or the equities
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fore have been admitted. It may be true that the plaintiff, if this

note had been delivered to him with the intent to transfer title,

might have lawfully overwritten the blank indorsement with a

transfer to himself ; it is also true that the production of the paper

b y him was prima facie evidence that it had been delivered to him

bv the payee and that he had title to it. but the defendants' offej:

was precisely to rebut this very presumption and for aught that

we can know the evidence under it would have done so.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered,

costs to abide the event.

All concur, except Miller and Earl, JJ., absent.

Judgment reversed.

~y^ *-*\;

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. § 54-

The Third Nat. Bank v. Lange ct al. (18/p), 51 Md. 138, 34 Am.

Rep. 304.

fo re have been admitted. It may be true that the plaintiff, if thi
note had been deliver d to him with th intent to tran fer title,
might have lawfully ov rwritten the blank indor ement with a
tran fe r to him elf; it i al o true that the production of the paper
bv him wa prinza faci e evid nee that it had been delivered to him
b\· the payee and that he had title to it. but the defendants' offg__
.;_va preci ely to rebut this v ry J re umption and for aught that
we can know th e evidence under it would have done so.
The judo-ment mu t b rever ed, and a new trial ordered
co t to abid the event.
All concur, except MILLER and EARL, JJ., absent.
Judgment reversed.

~~~,

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

This was a proceeding in equity by the appellee, Lange,

against the appellant and others, to enjoin the appellant from col-

HOLDER I

lecting or attempting to collect a promissory note, purchased by

DUE COURSE.
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it, but equitably belonging to the appellee Lange, or from protest-

ing it, or taking any further steps in regard thereto. The injunc-

tion ordered to be issued, was served upon the appellant three

days before the maturity of the note. The case is further stated

Th e Third Nat. Bank v . Lang e et al. ( I879), SI Md. 138, 34 Am.
Rep. 304.

in the opinion of the Court.

Henry Stockbridgc, for the appellant.

Thomas R. Clendinen, for the appellee, Lange.

Brent, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The note, about which this case has arisen, is as follows :

"$1100. Baltimore, Feby. 8th, 1876.

"Twelve months after date we promise to pay to the order N.

W. Watkins, trustee, eleven hundred dollars with interest, value

received. Flynn & Emerich."

The names of "N. W. Watkins, trustee," and "J. Regester &

Sons," are endorsed upon it.

This note was given for the purchase of property sold by N.

W. Watkins, as trustee under a decree of the Circuit Court of

~

ppeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.
This was a proceeding in equity by the appellee, Lange,
again t the appellant and others, to enjoin the appellant from collecting or attempting to collect a promissory note, purchased by
it, but equitably belonging to the appellee Lange, or from protesting it, or taking any further steps in regard thereto. The injunction ordered to be issued, was served upon the appellant three
days before the maturity of the note. The case is further stated
in the opinion of the Court.

Baltimore City, and is for one of the deferred payments, as

authorized by that decree. At the time of its delivery to the

H enry Stockbridae, for the appellant.
Thomas R. Clendinen, for the appellee, Lange.
BRENT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The note, about which this case has arisen, is as follows:
BALTIMORE, Feby. 8th, I876.
"Twelve months after date we promise to pay to the order N.
\\'. Watkins, trustee, eleven hundred dollar with interest, value
FLYNN & EMERICH."
r ceived.

" $1100.

The name of "N. W. Watkins, trustee," and "J. Regester &
on ," are endorsed upon it.
This note was given for the purchase of prop rty sold by N.
W. Watkins, as trustee under a decree of the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City, and i for one of the deferred payment , as
authorized by that decree. At the time of its delivery to the
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trustee, it was endorsed by J. Regester & Sons as securities for

the drawers, — the terms of sale requiring the deferred payments

to be secured in that form.

Subsequently N. W. Watkins wrote above the names of J.

Regester & Sons the endorsement "N. W. Watkins, Trustee," and

applied to the Union Hanking Company to buy the note, offering

tru te it wa
nclor cl by J. R g t r
on a securities for
th clra\ r ,-th t rm
f al r quiring th cl f rred payment
t b
cured in that form.
ub equ ntly N. w·. Watkin wr t abov th name of J.
t r
on the nd r m nt 'N. \
Watkin , Tru tee," and
d t th
ankin
mpany t 1 uy the note, ffering
ff. The anking Company not being
willin
buy it it ca hicr off r cl t
11 it for \\7 atkin , and
placed it in the ban 1 of a bill broker for that purpo e.
fter
tting into the hand of a econd bill brok r it wa tak n by him
t The Third National ank, th app llant, an 1 ffered t it for
al . The bank bought it from th broker at nin per cent. off,
and th pr c e 1
m t ha
been appropriat d by \Vatkin .
Th appellee claim that the bank acquired no right to the
note, while it i cont nd d for the bank that the note i embraced
in th cla
of commercial paper, and wa acquired by it in a
u ual and proper ' ay.
\ ithout intendin
a national
1

to sell it for 12 per cent. off. The Banking Company not being

willing to buy it. its cashier offered to sell it for Watkins, and

placed it in the hands of a bill broker for that purpose. After

getting into the hands of a second bill broker it was taken by him

to The Third National Bank, the appellant, and offered to it for

sale. The bank bought it from the broker at nine per cent, off,

and the proceeds seem to have been appropriated by Watkins.

The appellees claim that the bank acquired no right to the

note, while it is contended for the bank that the note is embraced

in the class of commercial paper, and was acquired by it in a

usual and proper way.

Without intending to decide upon the right of a national

bank to purchase paper, as the question does not necessarily arise

in this case, w e do not think the note in question is within the

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

class t.if paper kn own as commercial paper. Although like it in.

general form, the fact t hat it i sjp ayable to the order of W atkins,

trustee, restricts its free AHrcuralTon^ and excepts it from some of

the rules governing commercial paper.

•

No doctrine is better settled, than that a trustee has no power

to sel l and dispose of trust property for his own use and at his__

own mer e will. One who obtains it from him or through him with

actual or constructive notice of the trust, can acquire no tit le,

and it may be recovered by suitable proceedings for ihe benefit

of the cestui que trust. If there are circumstances connect edwith^

th e purchase which reasonably indicate that__truj;t property js_

being dealt with, they will hx upon the purchaser notice of_theT

trust, and it he tails to make inquiry about the title he is getting ,

ft is nis own fault jind he must suff e r the consequences of his own

neglect .

The general doctrine is stated in 1 Story's Eq. Juris., sec. 400,

where it is said : ''for whatever is sufficient to put a party upon

inquiry, (that is, whatever has a reasonable certainty as to time,

place, circumstances and persons,) is, in equity, held to be good

notice to bind him." A large number of authorities is referred to

in the note, and it is unnecessary to allude to them more particu-

larly.

In the case of the present note, it cannot be read understand-

neral loctrin i
q. Juri ., c. 400
aid: ' for whatev r i
put a party upon
inquiry, (that i , ' hateY r ha a r a onabl c rtainty a to time,
place, circum tanc and p r n , i , in quity, h Id t be o-ood
notice to bind him."
numb r f authoriti i r f rr d to
in th n te, and it i
ary t allu
to th m mor particularly.
In th ca e of th
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ingly w ithout seeing upon its face that it is connected with a trust

an d is part of a trust fund. It was the duty of the bank, before

purchasing it, to have made enquiry into the right of the trustee

to dispose of it. But this it wholly failed to do, and as it turns

out, he was disposing of the note in fraud of his trust, the bank

must suffer the consequences of the risk it assumed.

In the case of Shanv v. Spencer, and others, ioo Mass., 382,

the question is considered, whether the addition of the word

trustee to the name alone is sufficient to indicate a trust and put

a party upon inquiry. That was the case of stock certificates,

which were pledged by the holder as collaterals for certain accept-

ances. The certificates in question were in the name of E. Carter,

trustee. They were by him endorsed, and one of the questions

presented was whether the word trustee was sufficient to put the

holders upon inquiry, and thereby affect them with notice of the

trust. The Court says on page 393, "The rules of law are pre-

sumed to be known by all men ; and they must govern themselves

accordingly. The law holds that the insertion of the word 'trus-

tee' after the name of a stockholder does indicate and give notice

of a trust. No one is at liberty to disregard such notice and to
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abstain from inquiry, for the reason that a trust is frequently

simulated or pretended when it really does not exist. The whole

force of this offer of evidence is addressed to the question,

whether the word 'trustee' alone has any significance and does

amount to notice of the existence of a trust. But this has hereto-

fore been decided, and is no longer an open question in this com-

monwealth." And upon the ground that pledgees took the certi-

ficates with this notice of the trust, it was held that they could

not retain them against the equitable owner, inasmuch as Carter,

the trustee, had no authority to use or dispose of them for any

such purpose.

The argument, that the bank should not be deprived of its

action against J. Regester & Sons, whose endorsement it is

claimed guarantees the preceding endorser, would be entitled to

weight but for the facts of the case. While the rule is undoubted

that a subsequent endorser guarantees the preceding endorsement,

it cannot apply to a case where in fact there was no previous

endorsement at the time of the alleged second endorsement. The

obligations of J. Regester & Sons upon this note were those of

original makers, Ives v. Boslcy, 35 Md., 263; Good v. Martin,

(Sup. Court U. S.) Am. L. Reg., Feb'y, 1878, as is clearly shown

by the proof in the case. Their name was placed upon the note

as security, and they cannot be held to a contract of guaranty

in ly without seeing upon it face that it is connected with a trust
and is part o a tru t und. It was the duty of the bank, before
purchasing it, to have made enquiry into the right of the trustee
to di pose of it. But this it wholly failed to do, and as it turns
out, he was disposing of the note in fraud of his trust, the bank
must suffer the consequences of the risk it assumed.
In the ca e of Shaw v. Spencer, and others, 100 fass., 382,
the qu estion is considered, whether the addition of the word
trustee to the name alone is sufficient to indicate a trust and put
a party upon inquiry. That was the case of stock certificates,
which were pledged by the holder as collaterals for certain acceptances . The certificates in question were in the name of E. Carter,
trustee. They were by him endorsed, and one of the questions
presented was whether the word trustee was sufficient to put the
holders upon inquiry, and thereby affect them with notice of the
trust. The Court says on page 393, "The rules of law are presumed to be known by all men; and they must govern themselves
accordingly. Th e law holds that the in ertion of the word 'trustee' after the name of a stockholder does indicate and give notice
of a trust. No one is at liberty to disregard such notice and to
abstain from inquiry, for the reason that a trust is frequently
simulated or pretended when it really does not exist. The whole
force of this offer of evidence is addressed to the question,
whether the word 'trustee' alone has any significance and does
amount to notice of the existence of a trust. But this has heretofore been decided, and is no longer an open question in this commonwealth." And upon the ground that pledgees took the certificates with this notice of the trust, it was held that they could
not retain them against the equitable owner, inasmuch as Carter,
the trustee, had no authority to use or dispose of them for any
such purpose.
The argument, that the bank should not be deprived of its
action against J. Regester & Sons, whose endorsement it i
claimed guarantees the preceding endorser, would be entitled to
weight but for the facts of the case. vVhile the rule is undoubted
that a subsequent endorser guarantees the preceding endorsement,
it cannot apply to a case where in fact there was no previous
endorsement at the time of the alleged second endorsement. The
obligations of J. Regester & Sons upon this note were those of
original makers, Ives v. Bosley, 35 Md., 263; Good v. Martin,
(Sup. Court U. . ) Am. L. Reg., Feb'y, 1878, as is clearly shown
by the proof in the case. Their name was placed upon the note
as security, and they cannot be held to a contract of guaranty
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into which they never entered. That parol evidence is admissible

to show the character in which they stand relative to this note is

settled by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of

Good v. Martin, just referred to.

We are therefore very clearly of opinion, that the bank can-

not hold Rege ster & Sons liable as guarantors . When the note

is paid, their liability ceases.

We find no error in the decree of the court below, and it will

be affirmed.

Decree affirmed with costs, and case remanded

Fisher v. Leland et al. (1849), 4 Cush. 456.

This was an action of assumpsit on a negotiable promissory

note, made by the defendant Leland, as principal, and the other

defendants, Fogg and Harrington, as sureties, to one James Luke,

Jr., or order, and by him, before maturity, indorsed to the plain-

tiff.

The defendant pleaded the general issue, and filed a specifica-

into which they nev r ent r d. That parol evid nee is admissible
to show the character in which they tand r lative to thi note i
settled by the Supreme Court of the Unit d tate in the case of
Good v. M a.rtin, just r ferr d to.
We are therefore v ry cl arly of opinion, that the bank cannot hold Rege t r & on liable a guarantor . \Nhen the note
is paid, their liability cea e .
We find no error in the decree of the court below, and it will
be affirmed.
Decree affirmed with costs, a,nd case remanded.

~P'- ~~. i_~

-

0-

~>->--~~

tion of defence, in which they set forth that they should undertake

to prove that the note relied on by the plaintiff was obtained by

Fisher v. Leland et al. ( 1849), 4 Citsh. 456.

Luke, the payee, by fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, and
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without consideration ; of all which the plaintiff had notice when

he took the note. The defendants further alleged, in their speci-

fications, that Leland and Luke, who were formerly partners, dis-

solved their partnership in March, 1847, Luke assigning to Leland J^W ojib^

his interest in the concern, and Leland giving Luke the note iruj?^jv1t •**>-*-

question, with others, and a bond to pay the liabilities of the firm : v^-*_ n^*-*~^

that Luke kept the books of the partnership, and, at the time of X^^^v^^-^^

the dissolution, knowing that Leland relied on his statements, rep- v ^Sm>^aa-». ^

resented to him that the assets of the concern were greater and

the liabilities much less than they were in fact, that he also with—*

held from Leland knowledge of the fact that he. Luke, had

appropriated to himself certain funds of the concern and the pro-

ceeds of certain debts due the same ; that he thus induced Leland

to give the notes, of which the note in question was one, and the

bond above mentioned; and that herein consisted the fraud, mis-

representation, and want of consideration, of which the plaintiff

had notice.

At the trial, before Byington. J., in the court of common

pleas, the defendants offered evidence that the plaintiff took the

This was an action of a sumpsit on a negotiable promissory
note, made by the defendant Leland, as principal, and the other
defendant , Fogg and Harrington, as sureties, to one Jame Luke,
Jr., or order, and by him, before maturity, indorsed to the plaintiff.
The defendant pleaded the general i ue, and filed a specification of defence, in which they set forth that they should undertake
to prove that the note relied on by the plaintiff was obtained by
Luke, the payee, by fraud and fraudul nt misrepresentation, and
without consideration; of all which the plaintiff had notice when
he took the note. The defendants further alleged, in their specification , that Leland and Luke, who were formerly partner , di solved their partnership in March, 1847, Luke as igning to Leland
~
hi intere t in the concern and Leland aiving Luke the note i~1t. ~..)...
question, with others, and a bond to pay the liabilities of the firm; ~ ~
that Luke kept the book of the partner hip, and at the time of~
the dissolution, knowing that Leland relied on hi statement , rep- y ~· \J.
re ented to him that the a et of the concern were great r and ~ "'\,
the liabilities much less than the) were in fact, that he al o with-~ ~
held from Lelan 1 knowledg of th fact that he, Luke. had
appropriated to him If certain fund of the concern and the proceed of certain debt due the ame: that he thu induced Leland
to give the note , of which the note in que tion "a on and the
bond above mentioned; and that h r in con i t d th fraud. mi representation, an d want of consid ration, of which th plaintiff
had notice.
t the trial before Byin2"ton, J. in the court of common
plea , the defendant offered evidenc that the plaintiff took the

e<w·
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note with notice that it was obtained by fraud, and would not be

paid by any party to it. There was no evidence of the death of

Luke, but the defendants then offered to prove by his admissions

made while the note was held by him, and before its indorsement

to the plaintiff, that he made such representations. To this evi-

dence the plaintiff objected, but the judge admitted it.

In order to show knowledge on the part of Luke of the falsity

of these representations, and for other reasons, the defendants

offered to prove specific acts of fraud committed by Luke, against

Leland, such as misappropriating the assets of the firm, altering

the books of account, &c, before and at the time of the making of

the note, and as inducements thereto. To this evidence the plain-

tiff objected, but the court admitted it.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plain-

tiff thereupon alleged exceptions to the above rulings.

B. F. Jacobs, for the plaintiff.

G. M. Brown, for the defendants.

Shaw, C. J. The single question is, whether, after the

defendant had proved that the plaintiff took the note in question

by indorsement before it was due, but with notice that the prom-

not with notice that it \.vas obtained by fraud, and would not be
paid by any party to it. There wa no evidence of the death of
Luke, but the defendant then offe red to prove by hi admi ion
made wh ile the note was held by him, and before its indorsement
to the plaintiff, that he made such representation . To this eviadmitted it.
dence the plaintiff obj ected, but the jud
In order to how knowledge on the part of Luke of the falsity
of these rep re ntations, and for other reason , the d fendant
offered to prove pecific acts of fraud committed by Luke, a ainst
Leland, uch as misappropriatino- the a ets of the firm, altering
the books of account, &c., before and at th time of the making of
the note and as inducements th ereto. To this eYidence the plaintiff objected, but the court admitted it.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the plaintiff thereupon alleged exceptions to the above rulings.
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isors intended to defend on the ground, that the note was obtained

by the payee of the maker by fraud, they could give in evidence

the fraudulent acts of the payee ; and whether they could give in

evidence the admissions and confessions of the payee, whilst he

B. F. Ja cobs, for the plaintiff.
G. 11.1. Brown, for the defen lant .

was the holder of the note and before the indorsement, to prove

such fraud. The distinction appears to be this: that when an

indorsee takes a b ill or no te, by indorsement, before it is due, and

without notice of fraud or other maters of defence, he takes it on_

an independent title by the indorsement, and will not be affected

by any payment, set-off, fraudulent consideration, or other matter

of defence, which the acceptor or promisor might ha ve had ngainsr

any previous' holder or prior party . He is not in privity with such

prior party, does not claim under him, and is not bound by the

acts, frauds, or admissions of any such prior party. And in order

to give the highest credit and the freest circulation to negotiable

securities, transferred by indorsement, in favor of commerce, this

principle is held with great firmness and strictness ; and by a series

of recent decisions, the rule upon the subject, instead of being

relaxed, is held with greater strictness than formerly. (O'Keefe v.

Dunn, 6 Taunt. 305 ; Dunn v. O'Keefe, 5 M. & S. 282 ; GUI v.

Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466; Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870; Fos-

C. J.

The single question is, whether, after the
defendant had proved that the plaintiff took the note in question
by indorsement before it was due, but with notice that the promisors intended to defend on the ground, that the note was obtained
by the payee of the maker by fraud , they could give in evidence
the fraudulent acts of the payee; and whether they could give in
evidence the admissions and confessions of the payee, whilst he
was the holder of the note and before the indorsement, to prove
such fraud. The distinction appears to be this: that when an
indorsee takes a bill or note, by indorsement, before it is due, and
without notice of fraud or other maters of defence, he takes it on
an independent title by the indorsement, and will not be affected
by any payment, et-off, fraudulent consideration, or other matter
of defence, which the acce tor or romi or mi ht ha
·
any previous.holder or prior party. He is not in privity with such
p rior party, do s not claim under him, and is not bound by the
acts, frauds, or admi sion of any such prior party. And in order
to give the highest er <lit and the freest circulation to negotiable
ecurities, tran £erred by indorsement, in favor of commerce, this
p rinciple is held with great firmness and strictness· and by a series
of recent deci ions, the rule upon the subject, instead of being
relaxed, is held with greater strictness than formerly. ( O' Keefe v.
Dunn, 6 Taunt. 305; Dunn v. O' Keefe, S M. & S. 282; Gill v.
Cubitt, 3 B. & C. 466; Goodman v. Harvey , 4 d. & El. 870; FosSHA\V,
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ter v. Pearson, I ('. M. & R. 849; Arbouin v. Anderson, 1 Ad. &

El. N. S. 498).

But where a negotiable note is found in circulation after it

is due, it carries suspicion on the face of it. The question instantly

arises, Why is it in circulation, — why is it not paid? here is some-

thing wrong. Therefore, although it does not give the indorser

notice of any specific matter of defence, such as set-off, payment,

or fraudulent acquisition, yet it puts him on inquiry ; he takes

only such title as the indorser himself has , and subject to any

defence which would be made, if the suit were brought by the

indorser. The note does not cease to be negotiable; the indorsee

takes a title, and may sue, but he is so far in privity with his

indorser that he takes only his title ; and if the defendant could

make any defence against a suit brought by such indorser, he can

make it against the indorsee.

This rule is settled in the case of a suit by an indorsee taking

the note overdue, by a series of authorities, which show not only

that such defence may be made, but that it may be proved by

the same evidence, by which it might have been proved if the

indorser were plaintiff, to wit, the admissions of such indorser,
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made whilst he was the holder. (Sylvester v. Crapo, 15 Pick. 92 ;

Borough v. White, 4 B. & C. 325 ; Phillips v. Cole, 10 Ad. & El.

106; Beauehamp v. Parry, 1 B. & Ad. 89). These authorities

might be multiplied almost indefinitely.

But t he indorsement of a note overdue is only one mode of

givi ng the indorser notice, that there is some matter of defence

relied on ; if he has express notice, he may take it and may sue

the note, but he takes subject to such defence as the defendant

m ight make against the indorser .

The case in an early volume of the reports of this court,

Wilson v. Holmes, 5 Mass. 543, was one where the plaintiff had

notice in the form of the indorsement, which was: "Pay T. \Y..

or order, for our use, value received in account." See Humphries

v. Blight, 4 Dall. 370; White v. Xubling, 11 Johns. 128. In the

early leading case on this subject, Brozvn v. Dai'ies, 3 T. R. 80,

83, Lord Kenyon, who was not disposed to go quite the length

of the doctrine held by Mr. Justice Buller, says : "I agree. &c, if

it appears on the face of the note to have been dishonored, or if

knowledge can be brought home to the indorsee that it had been

so." In a note to the same case, in Taylor v. Mather, where the

defence was, that the note was obtained by fraud, and where it

was negotiated when overdue, Buller, J., says: "Such a note is

negotiable, but if there are any circumstances of fraud in the

ter v. Pearson, I . M. & R. 49; Arbouin . Anderson I Ad. &
El.N. . 49 ).
ut ~ a n gotiabl not i f und in circulation after it
i due, it carri
u picion n the fac of it. Th qu tion instantly
, \!Vhy i it in circulation,-why i it n t paid? her i omethin0 wrono-. Th r for , alth ugh it doe n t give the indorser
notice of any pecific matter of defenc , uch a
t-off, payment,
or fraudul nt acgui ition, y t it put him on in 1uiry; h take
9nly uch titl a the indor r him elf ha , and ubject to any
def nc which would b made, if the uit were brought by the
not cea e to 1 n otiable; the indorsee
take a title, and may ue, but he is so far in privity with hi
indor r that he tak only hi titl ; and if the defendant could
make any d fence ao-ain t a uit brought by such indorser, he can
make it ao-ain t th indor
Thi rul is ttl d in the case of a suit by an indorsee taking
the note ov rdu , by a s rie of authorities, which show not only
that such defenc may be made, but that it may be proved by
the ame evidence, by which it might have be n proved if the
indor r were plaintiff, to wit, the admi sions of such indor er,
made whil t he wa the holder. (Sylvester v . Crapo, I 5 Pick. 92;
Barou c;h v. Whfre, 4 B. & C. 325; Phillips v. Cole, IO d. & El.
ro6; Beauchamp v. Parry, I B. & d. 89). These authoritie
might b multiplied almost indefinitely.
ut the indorsement of a note overdue i only one mode of
giving th indorser notice, that ther i some matter of defence
relied on; if he has expre s notice, he may tak it and may u
the note, but he takes ubj ct to uch defence a the defendant
might mak again t the mdor er.
l'he ca e m an early volume of the reports of this court,
Wilson v. Holmes, 5 1a . 543 wa one wh r th plaintiff had
notice in the form of the indorsement which wa : "Pa T. V\T.,
or order, for ur u e, valu received in account. '
e Humphries
v. Blic;hf, 4 all. 370; T;flhite v. 11bli11u, II John. 128. In the
early leading ca e on thi ubject, Broi n v. Da~ ies, 3 T. R. o
83, Lord Kenyon, wh wa not di po d to o-o quite the leno-th
ull r, ay : I a err e, &c. if
o f th doctrin h Id by Mr. Ju tic
it appear on th face of the note to have b n di honored or if
know! dg can b brought horn t th indor
that it had b en
o." In a note to th~ ame ca e, in Ta:. !or . 111 ath r, "'here th
defence wa , that th not wa obtain d b) fraud. and \ here it
was negotiat d "h n overdue. Buller, J., a)
uch a note i
negotiabl , but if ti~ r are anv- ir urn tan
f fraud in the
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transaction, I have always left it to the jury, on the slightest

evidence, to presume that the indorsee was acquainted with the

on the

fraud."

Ii htest
with the

It seems, therefore, that it is not that the indorsement of a

note after it is due is, per se, such as to render the note void, or

to defeat the right of the plaintiff ; but if there are anterior circum-

stances, such as fraud in obtaining the note, the fact that the,

indorsee takes it when overdue, is a circumstance of suspicion,

which should put him on inquiry, and leads to a presumption that

he knew, or by inquiry might know, of such fraud, and is deemed

c onstructive notice of it. It identifies the title of the indorsee

with that of the indorser. This being so, actual notice of such,

fraud, brought home to the knowledge of the indorsee at the time

he took the" note b y indorsement's equally "a vailing to prove that

he is not a bona fide holder, and to give the detendant the same

ground ~bi detence as he would h ave had against the indorser.

Exceptions overruled.

^ M-

Kelley v. Whitney et al. (1878), 45 Wis. no.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Brown county.
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The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cole:

This was an action to foreclose a mortgage originally given

groun

upon lot number 30, and the south 34 feet of lot number 29, in

Fort Howard. The mortgage was executed by Bridget Whitney

and Edwin Whitney to Joel S. Fisk on the 25th of February,

1873, to secure the payment of a promissory note of that date

given by the mortgagors to Fisk or order, for $233.03 in six

Kelley v . Whitney et al. (1878), 45 Wis .

IIO.

years from date, with interest payable annually thereon at the

rate of ten per cent per annum. J. S. Curtis, for a valuable con-

sideration, purchased the note and mortgage of Fisk on the nth

of July, 1874. The plaintiff derives title from Curtis by an assign-

ment bearing date May 20, 1876. When the note and mortgage

came to plaintiff's hands, the principal was not due, but there

was interest overdue and unpaid. The defendants Bridget and

Edwin Whitney answered, alleging, among other things, payment

in full to plaintiff's assignor on or about the 25th of June, 1874.

under and in pursuance of an agreement set out in the answer.

The defendant Goodenough answered separately, alleging pay-

ment of the mortgage previous to the assignment to the plaintiff,

and further that he was the owner of a mortgage given by Bridget

and Edwin Whitney, June 26, 1874, on a portion of the mort-

ppeal from the Circuit Court for Brown county.
The case i thus tated by Mr. JusncE COLE:
This was an action to foreclose a mortgage originally given
upon lot number 30, and the south 34 feet of lot number 29, in
Fort Howard . The mortgage was executed by Bridget Whitney
and Edwin Whitney to Jo I S. Fi k on the 25th of February,
1873, to secure the payment of a promi sory note of that date
given by the mortgagor to Fi k or order, for $233.03 in six
years from date, with interest payable annually thereon at the
rate of ten per cent per annum. J. . Curti , for a valuabl conideration, purchased the note and morto·a e of Fi k on the I 1th
of July, 1874. The plaintiff derives title from Curti by an a ignment bearino- <lat May 20, 1876. Wh n the note and mortgage
came to plaintiff's hand , th principal wa not due, but there
wa interest overdue and unpaid. The d fendant Bridg t and
Eclwin Whitney answered, all ging, among other things payment
in full to plaintiff' a ignor on or about the 25th of June, 1874,
under an l in pur uanc of an agreement set out in th an wer.
Th cl f nclant ood nough answered
parat ly, alleging pay111 nt of the mortgage pr vious to the a signment to the plaintiff,
and further that he wa the owner of a mortgage giv n by Bridget
an l Edwin \ iVhitney, June 26, 1874, on a portion of the rnort-
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gaged premises, to wit, the north ten feet of lot number 30, and

the south 34 feet of lot 29, being a portion of the mortgaged

premises remaining and covered by plaintiff's mortgage, after

Curtis had released the south 45 feet of lot 30 therefrom while

he held the mortgage. The agreement set out in the answers,

under which it was claimed that the note and mortgage were paid,

was never recorded; the plaintiff had no knowledge of its exist-

ence when he purchased the securities ; nor had he any actual

notice of any other fact affecting their validity, except the fact

that interest was overdue and unpaid when they were transferred.

The circuit court found that the note and mortgage were paid

and extinguished while in the hands of Curtis, and rendered

judgment for the defendants.

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment.

Tracy & Bailey, for appellant.

L. J. Billings, for respondent.

Cole, J. — Can the plaintiff, under the circumstances, claim

the protection which the law affords a bona fide purchaser of

commercial paper for value, before maturity? The learned cir-

gaged premi es, t wit, th n rth ten f t of lot number 30, and
th
uth 34 fe t of lot 29, b ing a p rtion of the mortgaged
premises remaining and co ered by plaintiff's mortgage, after
Curti had r 1 a d th
outh 45 f t of lot 3 therefrom while
he held the mortgag . Th agr m nl
t out in th an w r ,
under which it was claimed that th note and mortgage were paid,
was n ver r cord d · th plaintiff had no knowledge of it xi tenc when he purcha ed the securitie ; nor had he any actual
notice of any oth r fact affecting th ir validity, xcept the fact
that intere t wa ov rdu and unpaid when they were transferred.
Th circuit court found that the not and mortgage were paid
and xtino-ui h d while in the hand of Curti , and rendered
j ud2"m ent for the d fendants.
Plaintiff app aled from the judgment.

cuit court, in obedience to the decision of this court in Hart v.
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Stickney, 41 Wis. 630, decided that the plaintiff took the note

and mortgage as dishonored and subject to equity, because install-

ments of interest were due and unpaid when they were trans-

Tracy & Bailey for appellant.
L. ]. Billings, for respondent.

ferred. If there is error in this ruling of the court below — as

we are well satisfied there is, — it is an error for which this court,

and not the circuit court, should be held responsible. When the

case of Hart v. Stickney was decided, our attention was not

called by counsel, and we entirely overlooked in our examination,

the previous case of Boss v. Hezcitt, in the 15 Wis., 260, where a

directly opposite ruling was made. The case of Boss v. Hczvitt

was decided in 1862, and the point was directly involved in the

judgment. The defendant had given four negotiable notes pay-

able respectively in one, two. three and four years, with interest

payable annually, for the price of sheep bought of the payees, and

secured all the notes by a mortgage. One of the notes, and an

installment of interest on all of them, being due and unpaid, the

payees transferred the notes and mortgage to the plaintiff, who

brought an action to foreclose the mortgage. The defendant

pleaded fraud on the part of the payees in the sale of the sheep.

The court held that the fact that the first note was due and unpaid

at the time of the transfer to the plaintiff, did not let in the defense

as against the notes not then due. On the other point, Mr. Jus-

COLE, J.-Can th plaintiff, under the circumstances, claim
the protection which the law affords a bona fide purchaser of
commercial paper fo r value, before maturity? The learned circuit court, in obedience to the deci ion of this court in Hart v.
Stickne3, 41 'Ni . 30, decided that the plaintiff took the note
and mortgage a di honored and subject to equity, because in tallment of intere t were cfue and unpaid when they were tran £erred. If there i
rror in thi rulino- of the court below-as
we ar well ati fied ther i ,-it i an error for which this court,
and not th circuit ourt, hould be held respon ible. vVhen the
case of Hart v. Stickney was decid d, our attention was not
called by coun 1 and w entirely overlooked in our examination,
the previou ca of Boss'· He" itt, in the 15 \\ i ., 26o where a
directly oppo ite ruling 'iva made. The ca of Boss v. H ei itt
was decided in I 62, and the point wa dir ctly involv d in th
judgm nt. Th d f ndant had o-i n four neo-otiable note payable re pectively in on , t\ o, thre and four y ar , with intere t
payable annually, for th price of h p bou ht of the payee and
secured all th note by a rnortga
n of the not , and an
in tallm nt of int r t on all of them b in due and unpaid the
pay
to th plaintiff who
brought an acti n t f r lo e th
The defendant
plead d fraud on the part of th pa
s in th al of the he p.
The court held that th fact that th fir t not ' a due and unpaid
at th tim of the tran f r to th plaintiff, did n t 1 t in th d f n e
as again t the not not then due.
n the other point, fr. Ju -
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tice Paine, in delivering the opinion of the court, says : "Neither

do we think that the fact that the interest had not been paid

makes the case equivalent to a purchase after maturity, so as to

let in defenses that might have been made against the original

parties. The interest is a mere incident to the debt, and although

it is frequently provided that it shall be paid at stated periods

before the principal falls due, we know of no authorities holding

that a failure to pay it dishonors the note, so as to let in all

defenses against subsequent purchasers for value without any

other notice of defects except the mere fact that such interest

has not been paid. And we do not think it should have that

effect. The maturity of the note, within the meaning of the

commercial rule upon this subject, is the time when the principal

becomes due." pp. 262-3. Boss v. Hewitt derives direct support

from the decisions in National Bank of North America v. Kirby,

108 Mass. 497, and Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 51. It

is true, in National Bank v. Kirby, while it was held that failure

to pay interest, standing alone, was not sufficient in law to throw

such discredit upon the principal security upon which it was due,

as to subject the holder, to the full extent of the security, to ante-
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cedent equities, yet it was also held that it was a fact proper to

be considered by the jury, in connection with other circumstances,

on the question whether the holder is entitled to the protection

of one who has taken it in good faith and without actual or con-

structive notice of existing defenses. What is said in the opinion

in Hart v. Stickney upon the point now in question, was not

necessarily involved in the decision, and must therefore be

regarded as a mere dictum. The judgment in that case was

reversed on the appeal of the plaintiff, the holder of the note, on

the ground that the trial court refused proper, and gave erro-

neous, instructions as to the legal consequences resulting where

a vendee abandons possession of premises held by him under an

executory contract of sale, and the vendor takes the possession.

That was the precise point upon which the judgment was

reversed. And as the earlier case of Boss v. Hezvitt was entirely

overlooked, which, by implication, is sustained by many decisions

of this court, made in the farm mortgage cases and in actions

arising upon town, county and city bonds, we deem it our duty

to adhere to the rule, that a purc haser for value of unmatured,

commercial paper, with interest overdue, is not, from that fact

alone, affected with notice of prior equities or i nfir mities in the

t itle .

The plaintiff being the purchaser of the note and mortgage

ti ce ain e in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "Neither
<l we think that the fact that the int r t had not been paid
mak s the case ~ quival nt t a purcha e after maturity o a to
let in defen e that might hav b n made again t the original
parti e . The intcre t i a mere incident to th debt, and although
it i frequently provided that it hall be paid at tated p riods
before the principal falls due, we know of no authoriti s holding
that a failure to pay it disl:. ~nors the note, o as to let in all
defen es again t ubsequent purcha er for value without any
other notice of defects except th mere fact that such interest
has not b en paid. And we do not think it should have that
effect. The maturity of the note, within the meaning of the
commercial rule upon this subject, is the time when the principal
becomes due." pp. 262-3. Boss v. Hewitt derive direct support
from th decision in National Bank of North Anzerica v. Kirb'.Y,
108 l\Ia . 497, and Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 . S. 5r. It
is true, in Natiollal Bank v. Kirb'y, while it was held that failure
to pay interest, standing alone, was not sufficient in law to throw
such discredit upon the principal ecurity upon which it was due,
as to subject .the holder, to the full extent of the security, to antecedent equities, yet it was also h Id that it was a fact proper to
be considered by the jury, in connection with other circumstances,
on the question whether the holder is entitled to the protection
of one who has taken it in good faith and without actual or constructive notice of existing defenses. \i\That is said in the opinion
in Hart v. Stidmey upon the point now in question, was not
necessarily involved in the decision , and must therefore be
regarded as a mere dictum. The judgment in that ca e was
reversed on the appeal of the plaintiff. the holder of the note, on
the ground that th trial court refused proper, and gave erroneous, instructions as to the legal consequences resulting where
a vendee abandons posse sion of premises held by him under an
executory contract of ale, and the vendor takes the possession.
That was the precise point upon which the judgment was
reversed.
nd as the arlier case of Boss v. Hewitt wa entirely
overlooked, which, by implication, i ustained by many deci ions
of this court, made in the farm mortgage cases and in actions
arising upon town, county and city bonds, we deem it our duty
to adhere to the rule, that a purchaser for value of unmatured
commercial paper with interest overdue, is not, from that fact
afone affected with notice of prior equities or infirmities in the
title.
The plaintiff b ing the purchaser of the note and n;10rtgage

-
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for value before maturity, the further question arises, whether

there were any circumstances or facts disclosed which can affect

his rights as a bona tide holder. In considering this question,

it is necessary to bear in mind that it is the settled law in this

state that _a _negotiable promissory note secured by mortgage

may be transferred before m aturity like other negotiable paper,

and the holder takes it discharged of existing equities. The

mortgag e in such a case passes a s an incident to the note, and

may be enforced by the holder in spite of equities which may

exist between the mortgagor and mortgagee. This is the doc-

trine laid down in Croft v. B mister, 9 Wis. 504, and the same

point has been repeatedly affirmed in subsequent cases. And,

"as with other negotiable paper, mere suspicion that there may

be a defect of title in its holder, or knowledge of circumstances

which would excite suspicion as to his title in the mind of a

prudent man, is not sufficient to impair the title of the purchaser.

That result will only follow where there has been bad faith on

his part." Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra. Was the plaintiff

guilty of gross negligence, or had he any ground of suspicion

of defect of title, or knowledge of circumstances which would
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excite suspicion on the part of a prudent man that there was

some infirmity in these securities ; and if so, what were those

circumstances? The note, it is said, was indorsed by the payee

and mortgagee " without recourse ." But that "j snot sufficient to.

ch arge the assignee with notice of a defense against the note, on

the part of the maker, nor is it sufficient to put him o n inquiry

in reference thereto. " Stevenson v. O'Neal, 71 111. 314. Then

it is said that the words "secured by real estate mortgage"

appeared on the face of the note. But "the object and intent of

the parties in putting these words on the note was not to limit

or impair its value, but to add to it; * * * and they were

neither sufficient to inform third parties of the contents or terms

of the mortgage, nor to put them upon inquiry." Howry v.

Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29-33. Again, it is claimed that there was

on the records in the register's office a satisfaction or release of

the note and mortgage in suit, executed by Curtis on the 16th

day of July, 1874, so far as the mortgage was a lien on the south

45 feet of lot 30, known as the hotel property. But the plaintiff

does not claim anything inconsistent with that release, even if

chargeable with actual knowledge of its existence.

But it is also said that while Curtis was the owner of plain-

tiff's note and mortgage, and when he executed this release, he

knew of the existence of the second mortgage now held by the

for value befer maturity, the furth r qu tion arises, whether
th r w r any circum tance or facts di clo <l which can affect
his rio-hts as a bona fide hold r. In con id ring this que ti n,
ary to b ar in mind that it is the s ttled law in this
it 1s n
stat that a ncgotiabl pr mi ory note
cured by mortgage
may b tran ferred b for maturity lik other ne otiable
and th hold r ta es 1t 1 c arged of exi ting equitie .
pa es as an incident to th note, and
may be nforced by th holder m pite of equities which may
exist b twe n th morto-agor and mortgagee. This is the doctrin laid down in Croft v. Bitnster, 9 vVis. 504, and the same
point has been repeatedly affirmed in subsequent cases. And,
'as with oth r negotiabl paper, mer uspicion that there may
be a defect of title in it holder, or knowledge of circumstances
which would excite uspicion as to his title in the mind of a
prud nt man, i not ufficient to impair the title of the purchaser.
That re ult will only follow where there has been bad faith on
his part." Cromwell v. County of Sac, supra.. Was the plaintiff
guilty of gross n glig nee, or had he any ground of su picion
of d feet of title, or knowledge of circumstances which would
excite suspicion on the part of a prud nt man that th re wa
om infirmity in these securities; and if so, what were tho e
circum tances? The note, it is said, wa indor d by the payee
and mortgagee "wi.thout recourse." But that "is not sufficient to
charg the a ignee with notice of a defense again t the note, on
the part of the maker. nor i it sufficient to put him on inquiry
in ref r nc thereto." Ste~ enson v. O' eal, 71 Ill. 314. Then
it i
aid that the words " ecured by real estate mortgage'
appeared on the face of th note. But "the object and intent of
the partie in putting these word on the note was not to limit
or impair its value, but to add to it; * * * and th y were
neith r sufficient to inform third parti of the content or term
of the mortgage, nor to put them upon inquiry." H owr31 v.
Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29-33.
gain, it is claimed that there wa
on th r cord in th r i t r's office a satisfaction or r lease of
th note and morto-ao- in uit, execut d by Curti on the 16th
day of Jul y, I 74, o far as the morto-ao-e was a lien on the outh
45 f t of lot 30, known a the hotel pr p rty.
ut th plaintiff
do not claim anythino- inconsi tent with that relea e e en if
char eable with actual kn wledg of it .. i t nc .
But it i al o aid that whil Curti \ a th own r of plainand \\hen h
cut d thi r 1 a e. he
tiff's note and morto-a
nm h ld by the
knew of the xi tence of the econd mortga
r
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defendant Goodenough on a portion of the premises covered

by the first. Suppose he did : it does not appear that when

plaintiff bought the note and mortgage, he had knowledge of

either the release or the second mortgage. The doctrine is well

settled, "that equity will not permit a pr io r mortgagee, knowing

that portions of the mortgaged premises have been subsequently

conveyed or incumbered by the mortgagor, to deal with hirn_

a rbitrarily, to the prejudice of the interests of such subsequent

Incumbrancers or purchasers, by releasing those parts of the

lan d on which he has the only lien, and attempting to enforce

h*Is~entire claim out of those portions in which such others had

become interested ." Deuster v. McCamus, 14 Wis. 308-311. But

we do not see that this equitable principle has any application

to this case, because the defendant Goodenough does not aver

in his answer that he was injured in any way by the discharge of

the prior mortgage as to a part of the premises contained in that

mortgage ; and the proof shows beyond a doubt that he was not

prejudiced thereby. The property may be ample security, and it

ap pears that it is, to discharge both mortgages. So, in any aspect

oTthe case, we think the plaintiff is entitle d to a judgmen t of
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foreclosure according to the prayer of his complaint.

By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is

reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to

enter such a judgment. , ^(^J^^.

Ryan. C. J., took no part.

WHAT CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF DEFECT. § 58.

Hamilton v. Vought (1870), 34 N. J. L. 187.

Case certified from the Sussex Circuit Court.

Hamilton and McCartcr, for plaintiff.

Coult and Pitney, for defendant.

Beasley, Chief Justice.— We have presented to our consider-

ation in this case but a single question, viz.. whether the title of

a holder of negotiable paper, acquired before it was due, for

valuable consideration, is affected by the fraud of a prior party,

d fendant
ood nouah on a portion of th prem1
c v red
by the fir t.
uppo
be did: it doe not appear that wh n
plaintiff bought the not and mortgag , he had knO\ 1 dge of
either the relea e or th second rnortgao- . The doctrine i well
ettled, "that equity \Nill not permit a prior mort a
knowin
that_QQrtion of the mortgaged premise have been ubsequently
conveyed or incumbere<l by the mortg-agor, t d al with TiTiTJ
arbitrarily, to the prejudice of the interest of such ubsequ nt
incumb rancer or purcha er b · r 1 asina tho
part of the
land on which he ha the only lien. and attempting to enforce
~ -entire claim out of th9 e portion in which uch othe rs had
become interested." Deuster v. AicCa11111s, 14 Wi . 30 -31r.
ut
we do not ee that this equitable principle ha s any application
to thi ca e, because the defendant oodenoug h doe not aver
in hi anS\Ye r that he was injured in any way by the di charg of
the prior mortgage as to a ?art of th e premis contained in that
mortgage; and the proof shows beyond a doubt that he wa not
prejudiced the reby. The property may be ample curity, and it
appears that it is, to discharge both mo rtgage .
o, in any a~Q~..t
of the case, we think the plaintiff i ntitled to a judgment of
foreclo ure according to the praye r of hi complaint.
B·y tlze C Ollrt.- T lze judgment of th e cirrnit court is
reversed, and the cause re111anded witlz directions to
enter such a jud arnent.
RYA , C. ] ., took no part.

without proof of bad faith on the part of such holder.

At the trial of this cause, the jury was instructed that if the

holder of the note sued on— the plaintiff in the action— acquired

his title under circumstances which should have put a person of

WHAT CO

TITUTES

OTICE OF DEFECT.

§ 58.

Hamilton v . Voug ht ( 1870) , 3 4 N . J. L. 187.

Case certified from the

u

x Circuit Court.

H anzilton and M cCarter, fo r plaintiff.
Coult and Pitney, for defendant.
BEASLEY Chief Ju tice.- \ Ve have pre ented to our con ideration in thi ca e but a inale qu estion, viz. , whether the title of
a holder of negotiable pap r, acquir d befor it wa due, for
valuable con ideration, is aff cted by the fraud of a prior party,
without proof of bad faith on the part of such hold r.
At the trial of this cau e, the jury was instructed that if th e
hold r of the note sued on-the plaintiff in the action-acquired
hi title under circumstances which should have put a person of

HAMILTON V. VOUGHT

521

Hamilton v. Vought 521

ordinary prudence upon his guard, the note was invalid, if its

inception had been fraudulent.

The verdict was in favor of the defence, and the plaintiff

now insists that the judicial instruction should have been, that

suspicious circumstances attending the acquisition of his title were

not sufficient to defeat his claim, unless of a character to raise a

conviction of actual fraud on his part.

Counsel who so ably argued this case in behalf of the

defendant, did not deny that the modern English authorities were

hostile to their position, but they went upon the ground that the

rule thus sanctioned was an innovation, and consequently would

not be followed by this court. The ancient rule, it was main-

tained, is that declared in Gill v. Cubitt, 3 Barn. & Cress. 466.

This decision was made in the year 1824, and, beyond all ques-

tion, it sustains the principle now claimed by the defence, for, in

the reported case referred to, the jury were explicitly told that

"there were two questions for their consideration : first, whether

the plaintiff had given value for the bill, of which there could be

no doubt ; and, secondly, whether he took it under circumstances

which ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent and care-
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ful man." The authority is directly in point, and the only ques-

tion which can arise is, whether it correctly states the ancient

rule of the common law upon the subject.

My first remark in this connection is, that from the opinion

of the judges in the case of Gill v. Cubitt, it appears that the

doctrine adopted was intended to be an innovation upon the ante-

cedent practice, and that it was avowedly opposed to a decision of

the greatest weight. Twenty-three years before, in the year 1801,

Lord Kenyon, in Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp. 56, had expressly

repudiated the idea that suspicious circumstances, in the absence

of actual fraud, would avoid a note in the hands of a holder for

value. But this doctrine did not harmonize with the views of the

judge in the case of Gill v. Cubitt, and it was accordingly over-

ruled. Thus. Chief Justice Abbott says, in his opinion : "I think

the sooner it is known that the case of Lawson v. Weston is

doubted, at least by this court, the better. I wish doubts had been

cast on that case at an earlier time." And he concludes: "For

these reasons, notwithstanding all the unfeigned reverence I feel

for everything that fell from Lord Kenyon. by whom Lawson v.

Weston was decided, I cannot think that the view taken by that

learned lord was a correct one." Nor is this rejection of this

antecedent decision attempted, in the slightest degree, to be put

upon the foundation of pre-existing authority : not a case is

ordinary prudence upon hi guard, the note wa invalid, if il
i1 ception had b en fraudulent.
The verdict wa in favor of the d fenc , and the plaintiff
n w in i t that the judicial in truction h uld have been, that
susp1c10us circum tanc att nding th acqui ition f hi title wer
not ufficien t to d feat hi claim, unlc s of a character to rai e a
com·iction of a tual frau 1 on hi part.
Counsel wh o o ably arrrued thi ca e in behalf of the
. defendant, di 1 not len that the mod rn English authorities were
ho tile to their po ition, but they went upon the ground that the
ru.le thu anction d was an innovation, and con cquently would
not be followed by thi court. The ancient rule, it was maintained, i that d clar d in Gill v. Cubitt, 3 Barn. & Cres . 466.
This deci ion wa made in the year 1824, and, b yond all question, it su tain the principle now claimed by the defence, for, in
the report d case r f rred to, the jury were explicitly told that
"there were two questions for their consideration: first, whether
the plaintiff had <Yiven value for the bill, of which there could be
no doubt; and, secondly, whether he took it und r circum tances
which ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent and careful man." The authority is directly in point, and the only question which can arise is, whether it correctly states the ancient
rule of the common law upon the ubject.
:i\Iy fir t remark in thi connection is, that from the opinion
of the judges in the case of Gill v. Cubitt, it appears that the
doctrine adopted wa intended to b an innovation upon the antecedent practice, and that it was avowedly opposed to a decision of
the areate t weight. Twenty-three years before, in the year 1801
Lord Kenyon, in Lai 1son v. TVeston, 4 Esp. 56, had expressly
repudiated the idea that suspicious circum tanc , in the ab ence
of actual fraud, would avoid a note in the hand of a holder for
value. But thi doctrin did not harmonize with th view of th
judge in th ca of Gill v. Cubitt, and it was accordingly overruled. Thus, Chi f Ju tice , \bbott ay , in hi opinion: 'I think
the soon r it i knm n that the ca e of Lawson v. TVeston i
doubted, at least by thi ourt, the bett r. I wi h doubt had been
ca t on that ca e at an earlier time.'
nd he conclude : For
these reasons, notwith tanding all th unf igned r v renc I fe 1
for everything that f 11 from Lord K nyon . by \\·horn Lai son v.
T17 eston wa d cid d I cannot think that th i w taken by that
lea rned lord wa a corr ct one."
r i thi r jection of thi
antecedent deci ion attempt d. in th lig-1 t t d gr e, to be put
·u pon th found ation of pre-exi ting- authority ; not a ca e 1
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referred to for its justification, and although in Lawson v. Wes-

ton, the authority of Lord Mansfield, in Miller v. Race, was

mooted, no remark is made on that circumstance. I think a peru-

sal of the opinions in Gill v. Cubitt will satisfy any one that it

was a well-understood intention to deviate from the legal rule

upon this subject which had previously existed ; or, if any doubt

should remain, such doubt will certainly be dispelled by a refer-

ence to the case of Slater v. West, 3 Carr. & Payne 325, decided

in the year 1828, in which Chief Justice Abbott, (then Lord Ten-

terden) in laying down the doctrine that a person is not entitled

to recover who takes a bill of exchange "under circumstances

which ought to excite suspicion in the mind of a reasonable man,"

says: "This doctrine is of modern origin. I believe I was the

first judge who decided this point at nisi prius. The court to

which I belong confirmed my decision, and the other courts have,

I believe, acted on the same principle." And Chief Justice Bayley,

in his opinion in Gill v. Cubitt, is equally explicit. "But, it is

said" — such is his language — "that the question usually submitted

for the consideration of the jury in cases of this description, up to

the period of time at which my Lord Chief Justice's direction was
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given, has been whether the bill was taken bona fide, and whether

a valuable consideration was given for it. I admit that has been

generally the case." From these citations, I think it is manifest

^jlJLnj. that the judges who participated in the decision of the case of

Gill v. Cubitt were aware that by the views expressed by them,

they introduced a novelty, and departed from the older practice of

the courts. That the principle adopted in that case was an inno-

vation, seems to me unquestionable. I have shown that it is irrec-

oncilable with Lawson v. Weston. So it plainly occupies the same

relation to the case of Peacock v. Rhodes, Doug. 632, decided by

Lord Mansfield in 1781. This rule which it endeavors to over-

throw will be found sustained in Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 ;

Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516;

Anonymous, 1 Lord Raymond 738; Morris v. Lee, 2 Lord Ray-

mond 1396. There was not a case cited upon the argument, nor

have my researches led me to one anterior to the decision of Gill

v. Cubitt, which sustains the doctrine there propounded. I con-

fidently conclude, therefore, that the case above- criticised cannot

stand on the ground of ancient authority. Tn my apprehension,

the original rule as it existed in the time of Lords Kenyon and

, ^^c)^vot\tf>Jt.Mansfie ld was, that nothing short of mala fides would vitiate the

jcyX c*~- <*^~ jrtTe"~of the holder of negotiable paper taking it for value, before

*— **"-*■**")( maturity . It is entirely out of the question, therefore, for this

referred to for it ju tification, and although in Lawson v. Weston , the authority of Lord Mansfield, in Miller v. Race, was
mooted, no remark is made on that circum tanc . I think a p rual of the opinions in Gill v. Cubitt will ati fy any one that it
was a well-under tood int ntion to deviate from th legal rule
upon thi ubject which had previously existed; or, if any doubt
hould remain, such doubt will certainly 1 di pelled by a reference to the ca e of Slater v. ~Vest, 3 Carr. & Payne 325 decided
in the year l 28, in which Chief Justice Abbott, (th n Lord Tenterden) in laying down the doctrine that a per on i not entitled
to recover who takes a bill of exchange "under circumstance
which ought to excite uspicion in the mind of a reasonable man,"
say : "Thi doctrine i of modern origin. I believe I was the
fir t judge who decided this point at nisi prius. The court to
which I belong confirmed my decision, and the other courts have,
I believe, acted on the same principle." And Chief Ju tice Bayley,
in his opinion in Gill v. Cubitt, is equally explicit. "But, it is
aid"-such i his language-"that the question usually submitted
for the con ideration of the jury in cases of this description, up to
the period of time at which my Lord Chief Justice's direction was
o-iven, has been whether the bill was taken bona fide, and whether
a valuable consideration was given for it. I admit that has been
generally the case." From the e citations, I think it is manife t
~'\..I that the judges who participated in the decision of the case of
~ ~ Gill v. Cubitt were aware that by the views expressed by them,
~ they introduced a novelty, and departed from the older practice of
the courts. That th principle adopt d in that ca wa an innovation, seems to me unque tionable. I hav shown that it is irreconcilable with Lawson v. Weston. So it plainly occupies the am
relation to the ca e of Peacocll v. Rhodes, Doug. 632, decided by
Lord Mansfield in l78I. Thi rule which it endeavors to overthrow will be found ustained in Miller v. Race, l Burr. 45~;
Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355; Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516;
Anon:ymous, r Lofd Raymon 1 738; l.J orris v. Lee, 2 Lord Raymond 1396. There was not a ca e cited upon the argument, nor
have my researches I d me to one anterior to the decision of Gill
v. Cnbitt, which ustains the doctrine there propounded. I confidently conclud , therefore, that the ca e above· criticised cannot
tancl on th ground of ancient authority. In my appr hen ion,
the original rule as it exi t d in the tim of Lords K nyon and
:.,., ~~VIan field wa , tha_!__!lOthino- sh<?rt of maja_fides would vitiate the
~ ~ o->->---tltt of the holder of ne otiable pap r takin it for value, before
~maturity. It is entir ly ouC 01 the que tion, therefore, for this
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court to regard Gill v. Cubitt as imperative authority. It is true

that that case was followed for a time to a considerable extent by

the English courts. But, as I have already said, in England the

original rule has been re-instated. In Backhouse v. Harrison, 5

B. & Ad. 1098, Air. Justice Patterson says: "I have no hesitation

in saying that the doctrine first laid down in Gill v. Cubitt, and

acted upon in other cases, has gone too far and ought to be

restricted." And in Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870, Lord

Denman thus forcibly expresses the rule at present prevailing in

the courts at Westminster : "The question I offered to submit to

the jury was, whether the plaintiff had been guilty of gross negli-

gence or not. I believe we are all of opinion that gross negligence

only would not be a sufficient answer where the party has given

consideration for the bill. Gross negligence may be evidence of

mala fides, but it is not the same thing. We have shaken off the

last remnant of the contrary doctrine. Where the bill has passed to

the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him, there is no

objection to his title." The following cases recognize and enforce

the same rule: Uther v. Rich, 10 Ad. & El. 784; Artbouin v.

Anderson, 1 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 498; Stephens v. Foster, 1
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Cromp., Mees. & Ros. 894; Palmer v. Richards, 1 Eng. L. & Eq.

529; Marston v. Allen, 8 Mees. & Wels. 494; Raphael v. Bank of

England, 17 C. B. 161.

An examination of the American reports will disclose a sim-

ilar mutation of judicial opinion upon this subject. For a time,

in several of the states, the rule broached in the case of Gill v.

Cubitt has been acted upon ; but now, in most of them, and in

those of the most commercial importance, that rule has been

entirely discarded. (34 New York, 247; Magee v. Badger; 7

Bosworth 543, Bel Bank of Ohio v. Hoge et al.; 10 Cush. 488,

Worcester, &c., Bank v. Dorchester, &c, Bank; 4 Geo. 287. Mat-

thews v. Poythrcss; 6 Md. 509, Bill v. Martin, 36 New Hamp.

273, Crosby v. Grant).

The subject has also recently been settled, after an elaborate

discussion and full consideration in the Supreme C ourt nf the

United States, in the case of G oodman v Simm\ds,j2Qjloyi, 34V

the result being an explicit repudiation of the doctrine that sus-

picious circumstances will, per se, vitiate the jj tle to commercial

p aper.

From this brief review of the cases. I think it may be safely

said that the doctrine introduced by Lord Tenterden stands at the

present moment marked with the disapproval of the highest

judicial authority. Nor does such disapproval rest upon merely

court to r gard Gill v. ubitt a imp rativ authority. It is true
that that a wa foll w d for a time t a con iderable extent by
the Engli h c urt .
ut a I hav alr ady aid, in • ngland the
original rul ha b n re-in tat d. In Bacl~house v. Harrison, 5
B. &
I. IO , l\Ir. Ju tic Patt r n ay : "I hav no h itation
in ayin that th d trin first laid down in Gill v. Cub£tt, and
acted up n in th r ca , ha er ne t o far an 1 u ht to b
r trict d." And in Goodman v. Harue31 4 ,\cl. & El. 70, Lord
nman thu f r ibly
pr
the rul e at pr
nt pr vailing in
th court at vVe tmin t r: "The qu tion I off r d to ubmit to
the jury wa , whcth r th plaintiff had been c:ruilty of gro neglig nc or n t. I b Ii v we are all of opinion that gro ne crligence
only ' ould not b a ufficient an wer where the party ha given
con id ration f r th bill. Gro neglicrenc may be vidence of
mala fides, but it i not the ame thing. 'vVe have hakcn off the
la t remnant of th contrary doctrin . Where th bill ha pa ed to
the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him, there i no
objection t hi titl . ' The following a e recoc:rnize and enforce
the sam rule: Uther v. Rich, IO d. & El. 784; Artbouin v.
A ndcrson , I
d. & EL ( . . ) 49 ; Stephens v. Foster, I
Cramp., ie . & Ro . 894; Palmer v. R£chards, I ng. L. & Eq.
529 · U arston v. Allen, Mees. & Wels. 494; Raphael v. Bank of
England 17 C. B. r6r.
n examination of the American report will di clo e a imilar mutation of judicial opinion upon thi ubject. For a tim ,
in sev ral of the tat , the rule broached in the ca e of Gill v.
Cubitt ha been act cl upon; but now, in mo t of them, and in
those of the mo t comm rcial importanc , that rule ha been
ntirely di carded. (34
ew York, 247; ~Ia (Fc e v. Bad (Fer; 7
Bosworth 543, Bel. Bank of Ohio v. Hoge et al.; IO u h. 4
TV orcester, &c. Bank v. Dorchester, &c., Bani?; 4
I alt hews v. Poythress;
1d. 50 Elli v. ~1 artin, 3
273, Crosby v. Grant).
Th ubject ha al
rec ntl b n ttl d, aft r an laborat
discu ion and full c n ideration in th
Court of the
Unit d tat , !!in~th~~~~~~.;;J.U..L.1..Lio'-X,.......................J.Ll.l...u...i.,~""-....!..u.l..n....~
the re ult bing ~~.:.:.
n_:::::.~..:..:::.:..!:......!~~.!..::::..::~:.....:::~~~~~~.....u.5d."-..............
piciou circum tanc
paper.
---Prom thi bri f r view of th a
, I think it may be af l
said that the doctrin introduc d by Lord Tent rd n tand at the
pre ent m m nt mark d with th di appro al f th highe t
judicial authority.
uch di approval re t upon merely
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speculative grounds. That doctrine was put in practice for a

course of years, and it was thus, from experience, found to be

inconsistent with true commercial policy. It s defect — a great

d efect, as Ijh ink — was, that it provided nothing like a criterion"

^ ^ OvatttA ^ on which a verdict was to be based. The rule was, that to defeat

jk^ \ th e note, circumstances must be shown of so suspicious a c haracter

that they wo uld put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry —

a nd by force of such a rule it is obvious e ypry c?sp possessed of

unusual incidents would, of necessity, pass under the uncontrolled

discretion of a jury. An incident of the transaction from which

any suspicion could arise was sufficient to take the case out of the

control of the court. There was no judicial standard by which

suspicious circumstances could be measured before committing

them to the jury. And it is precisely this want which the modern

rule supplies. When mala fides is the point of inquiry, suspicious

circumstances must be of a substantial character, and if such

circumstances do not appear, the court can arrest the inquiry.

Under the former prac tice, circumstances of slight suspicion

would take the case to the~ju ry ; under the present rule, the cir r

cumstance s mu st be strong, so" that bad taith can be reasonably
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inferred. Thus the subject has passed trom the indefinite to

comparatively definite ; from the intangible to the comparatively

tangible. From a mere matter of fact, the question, to some

extent, has become one of law. I cannot doubt, when we recol-

lect that inquiries of this nature always attend that class of

cases where judgments are sought against innocent and unfor-

tunate parties, that the change is most beneficial. All experi-

ence_ has shown how hard it is to prevent juries from seizing

on_t he slighte st circumstances to avoid giving a ve rdi ct against

the maker of a n ote which had_ b een obtained by fraud or theft .

To preserve the negotiability of commercial paper and guard the

interests of trade, it is absolutely necessary that large power

should be placed in the judicial hand when the question arises as

to what facts are sufficient to defeat the claim of the holder of a

note or bill which has been taken before maturity, and for which

value has been paid. It is only in this mode that the requisite

stability in transactions of this kind can be retained. But I do

not think the difference between the two rules above discussed

is as great as some persons have supposed. In my apprehension,

the e ntire vari jLnc e-Xonsi&ts in the degree of proof which the court

wi]1^_reqnirp in order to subm it the inquiry to the jury. Mere

carelessness in taking the paper will not, of itself, impai r the title,

so acquired ; but carelessness may be so gross that bad faith rnav

peculative grounds. That loctrine wa put in practice for a
cour e of y ar , and it wa thu , from exp rience, found to be
incon i tent with true commercial p)licy. Its d feet-a great
defect, as I think-wa , that it provided notl;-ing lik a cntenon
on which a verdict was to be based. The rule was, that to defeat
the note, circum tance mu t be hown of o su piciou a character
that they would put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiryancl by force of uch a rule it i obvious eyery case possessed of
unu ual incidents would, of necessity, pa s under the uncontrolled
di cretion of a jury.
n incident of the transaction from which
any suspicion could ari e was sufficient to take the case out of the
control of the court. There was no judicial standard by which
suspicious circumstances could be rnea ured before committing
them to the jury.
nd it is precisely this want -w hich the modern
rule supplie . When ma la fides is the point of inquiry, suspicious
circumstances must be of a substantial character, and if such
circumstance do not appear, the court can arre t the inquiry.
Under the former practice, circumstances of sli ht sus icion
would take t e case to t e jury; under the present rule, the circumstances must be strong, so that bad faith can be reasonabl
inferred.
1us t 1e subject has passed from the indefinite to
comparatively definite; from the intangible to the comparatively
tangible. From a mere matter of fact, the question, to some
extent, has become one of law. I cannot doubt, when we recollect that inquiries of this nature always attend that class of
cases where judgments are sought against innocent and unfortunate parties, that the change is most beneficial. All experience has shown how hard it is to prevent juries from seizing
on the slightest circumstances to avoid giving a verdict against
the maker of a note which had been obtained by fraud or theft.
To preserve the negotiability of commercial paper and guard the
interests of trad , it i absolutely nece sary that large power
should be placed in the judicial hand when the question arises as
to what fact are ufficient to defeat the claim of the holder of a
note or bill which has been taken before maturity, and for which
value ha been paid. It is only in thi mode that the requisite
tability in transactions of this kind can be retained . But I do
not think the difference b tween the two rules above discussed
i as great as some per on have suppo ed. In my appr hen ion,
the entire varjance consist in the degree of proof which the court
will require in order to submit the inquiry to the jury. Mere
carele nes in taking the paper will not, of itself, impair the title
so acquired; but carelessne s may be o gross that bad faith may
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be inferred from it. Nor is it necessary, in order to defeat the

title of the holder, that he have actual knowledge of the facts and

circumstances constituting the particular fraud ; it is sufficient if

he have knowle dge that the paper is tainted with any fraud,

although he may be ignora nt of the nature of it. In the case of

May v. Chapman, 16 Alees. & \Y. 355, Baron Parke says: "I

agree that 'notice and knowledge' means not merely express

notice, but knowledge, or the means of knowledge, to which the

be i1ferred from it. Nor is it nece sary, in order to defeat the
title of the hold r, that he have actual knowledge of the facts and
circum tanc constituting the particular fraud; it is sufficient if
he have knowledge that the pa er is tainted with an fraud
although h may e ignorant of the natur
In the case of
Uay v. iap111an l .l ees. & \\'. 355, Baron Parke say : 'I
agree that 'notice and knowledge· m ans not merely express
notice, but knowledge, or the mean of knowleclo-e, to which the
party wilfully shuts his eyes."
eviewed in this nse, as I have
already remarked, the principle seems to me a highly salutary
one, and, in the language of Professor Parsons, is well "adapted
to the free circulation of negotiable paper and the true interests
of trade." (1 Par. B. & N. 259).
I thinli a new trial should be granted.
SCUDDER and
AN SYCKEL, Justices, concurred.
~ ,~ ,
1

party wilfully shuts his eyes." Reviewed in this sense, as I have

already remarked, the principle seems to me a highly salutary

one, and, in the language of Professor Parsons, is well "adapted

to the free circulation of negotiable paper and the true interests

of trade." ( 1 Par. B. & N. 259) .

/ think a new trial should be granted.

Scudder and Van Syckel, Justices, concurred. JLvj-^ V^-eww

y. Cheever v. The Pittsburg &c. R. R. Co. ( 1896) , 150 N. Y. 59. \yfal&C^ ' f

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme ^\ I •

Court in the, first judicial department, entered upon an order made

October 13, 1893, which overruled plaintiff's exceptions taken

on the trial at Circuit and ordered to be heard in the first instance
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at General Term, and directed judgment for the defendant dis-

missing the plaintiff's complaint as to the first and second causes

of action therein contained.

The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are

stated in the opinions.

Austen G. Fox, for appellant.

Y... Cheever v. Th~ Pittsburg &c. R.R. Co. (I896), ISO

. Y. 59.

Frank Sullivan Smith, for respondent.

O'Brien, J. — The complaint in this action contained four

separate causes of action, each upon a promissory note of the

defendant. The last two causes of action were not defended, and

upon these the plaintiff recovered, but was defeated upon the

two notes embraced in the first and second causes of action. The

defense to these two notes was that they were made by the defend-

ant's president, one M. S. Frost, and by him wrongfully diverted

from the uses and purposes for which they were intended to his

own personal or private benefit, or the benefit of a firm of which he

was a member, and that the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder, but

chargeable with notice of these facts.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme
Court in the, fir t judicial department, entered upon an order made
October 13, 1893, which overruled plaintiff's exceptions taken
on the trial at Circuit and ordered to b heard in the first instance
at General Term, and directed judgment for the defendant dismi ing the plaintiff's complaint as to the first and second causes
of action therein contained.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are
stated in the opinions.

Austen G. Fox for appellant.
Frank Sullivan Smith~ for respondent.
1

'BRIEN, J.-The complaint in this action contained four
separate cau es of action, each upon a promi ory note of the
defendant. The la t two cau es of action w re not defended, and
upon these the plaintiff recov red , but was defeated upon the
two notes embraced in the fir t and econd cause of action. The
defense to the e two note wa that the wer made by the defendant's pre ident, one M. S. Fro t, and by him wrongfull diverted·
rom e uses and purposes for which th y were intended to his
own personal or private benefit, or the benefit of a firm of which he
was a member, and that the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder, but
charo-eable with notice of the e facts.
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The following- are copies of the two notes in controversy,

with the indorsements thereon when put in circulation hy the

defendant's president:

"$5,000. Greenville, Pa., Feb'y 24th, 1888.

The following are copies of the two note in controversy,
with the indor eme nt thereon when put in circulation b~ the
d fendant' pre ident:

"Four months after date the Pittsburgh, Shenango and Lake

Erie Railroad Company promises to pay to the order of John T.

Bruen five thousand dollars, at the American Exchange National

Bank, New York city.

"Value received. The Pittsburgh, Shenango & Lake

"Attest, Erie Railroad Company.

"E. S. Templeton, By M. S. Frost,

"Secretary. "President."

'Indorsed :

"Pay to the order of M. S. Frost & Son,

"John T. Bruen,

"M. S. Frost & Son."

"$5,000.00 Greenville, Pa., Feb'y 24th, 1888.

"Three months after date the Pittsburgh, Shenango and Lake

Erie Railroad Company promises to pay to the order of John T.

Bruen five thousand dollars, at the American Exchange National
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Bank, New York city.

"Value received. The Pittsburgh, Shenango & Lake

"Attest, Erie Railroad Company.

"E. S. Templeton, By M. S. Frost,

"Secretary. "President."

Indorsed — "John T. Bruen,

"M. S. Frost & Son."

The body of these notes and every part of them except the

signature of the president was in the handwriting of Templeton,

the secretary. The president was authorized by the board of

directors to issue the corporate notes to the extent of $10,000

for the purpose of purchasing flat cars. In March, 1888, before

the notes became due. Frost w r ent to Boston and there negotiated a

cash loan of $30,000 from Francis A. Brooks for the benefit of M.

S. Frost & Son, giving the firm note therefor and delivering to him

the two notes in question, indorsed as they now appear, with

other obligations, as collateral security for the payment of this

'' 5,000.
GREE VILLE PA., Feb'y 24th, I888.
··Four month after date the itt burgh, henango and Lake
Erie Railroad ompany promise to pay t the order of John T.
Bruen fiv e thou and dollars, at th
merican Exchang National
Bank, New York city.
''\.alue receiv d.
THE PITT B "RGH, RENA "GO & LAKE
" _ tte t,
ERIE RAILROAD COMP.A TY.
By M. s. FRO T,
''E. . TEMPLETO r ,

" Secretary.

'' President. '

'Indor ed:
"Pay to the order of M. S. FRO T & o ,
" JoH T. BRUEN,
"M . S. FROST & SoN."
"$5,000.00
GREENVILLE, PA., Feb'y 24th, I888.
"Thr e month after date the Pittsburgh, Shenango and Lake
Erie Railroad ompany promi e to pay to the order of John T.
Bruen five thou and dollar , at the merican Exchange National
Bank, New York city.
"Value received.
THE PITT BURGH, SHENA GO & LAKE
"Attest.
ERIE RAILROAD Co~1PA Y.
By M. s. FRO T,
"E. s. TE~PLETON'
"President."
"S ecretar31.
Indor ed-"JoHN T. BRUEN,
"M . S. FROST & SoN."

loan. Subsequent to the maturity of the notes Brooks became the

absolute owner by consent of the pledgor and the proceeds applied

upon the debt, and still later he transferred them to a third party.

and they have come to the hands of the plaintiff for value. It

is not claimed that the plaintiff occupies any other or different

The body of the e notes and every part of them except the
signature of the pre id nt was in the hand writing of Templeton,
the secretary. The president v. a authorized by the board of
directors to i u the corporate notes to the extent of $10 ooo
for the purpo e of purchasing flat car . In March, I 88, b fore
the note became due, ro t went to Bo ton and there ne otiat d a
ca h loan of $30,000 from Franci
. Brook for the benefit of M .
. Fro t & Son, g iving the firm note therefor and delivering to him
the two note in quc tion, indor ed as they now appear, with
other obligation . a collateral ecu rity for the payment of this
loan. Sub equent to the maturity of the note Brook becam e the
absolute owner by con nt of the pledgor and the proceeds applied
upon the debt, and till later he transferred them to a third party,
and they hav come to the hand of the plaintiff for value. It
is not claimed that the plaintiff occupie any other or different
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position than Brooks would if he had brought the action upon

the notes at maturity. Bruen, the payee of the notes, was the

private secretary of Frost, the president, and the notes were made

payable to him by Templeton, the secretary of defendant, who

drew them in that form at the suggestion of the president. There

is not and cannot be any dispute with respect to the authority of

Frost to make the notes. They were made with sufficient author-

ity, the fraud upon the defendant consisting in the wrongful use

of them when made for a legitimate purpose by the president for

his own private business.

Nor is there any dispute with respect to the fact appearing

on the plaintiff's case, that Brooks paid value for the notes and

made present advances in cash to Frost in the sum already stated.

It is equally clear upon the record that Brooks had no actual

knowledge of the facts surrounding the origin of the paper or of

the diversion of it by the president. He received the notes and

made the advance in Boston, whereas they were made and the

transaction stated with respect to them took place in a distant

State, where the office of the company was, and is indicated on

the paper as the place where made.
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The learned trial judge held as matter of law that the plain-

tiff could not recover upon the notes for the reason that he was

chargeable with knowledge of the facts and circumstances that

rendered them invalid in the hands of Frost. The plaintiff is,

doubtless, chargeable with such knowledge or notice as to the

antecedent equities of the defendant as Brooks, his assignor, had,

but with no others. If the notes were valid obligations in the

hands o f Brooks the plaintiff may assert every right that he could

have~asserted. It needs no argument to show that if Brooks had

knowledge or noti ce or is in law ch argeable with knowledge or

notice of the fraud by means of which the notes were diverted^

from the purpose for which they wer e authorized to be made, that

the plaintiff cannot recover^ But it is not claimed that he knew

anything abouT~fne origin' or diversion of the paper in fact. All

that is claimed is that when it was presented to him in Boston by

Frost, whom he knew to be the president of the railroad, there

was enough upon the face of the paper to put him upon inquiry

and, therefore, to charge him with knowledge of all the facts that

such inquiry would have disclosed. He knew nothing, so far as

appears, outside of the paper itself, except the fact that the party

presenting it was defendants' president and that he was proposing

to pledge notes for his own debt, or rather for the debt of his

firm, which for all the purposes of the question may be assumed

position than Brook would if he had brought the action upon
the notes at maturit . Bruen, the pay e of the notes, was the
private seer tary of Frost, the presid nt, and the note were made
payable to him by Templ ton, the secretary of defendant, who
nrew them in that form at the ugge tion of the president. There
1s not and cannot b any di pute with r spect to the authority of
Frost to make the note . They were made with ufficient authority, the fraud upon th defendant con i ting in the wrongful u e
of them wh n made for a legitimate purpo e by the president for
his own private busin s.
~ or i there any dispute with r spect to the fact appearing
on the plaintiff's ca e, that Brooks paid value for the notes and
made pre ent advance in cash to Fro tin the sum already stated.
It i equally clear upon the record that Brooks had no actual
knowledge of the facts surrounding the origin of th e paper or of
the diver ion of it by the president. He received the notes and
made the advance in Boston, whereas they were made and the
transaction tated with re pect to them took place in a distant
State, where the office of the company was, and is indicated on
the paper as the place where made.
The learned trial judge held as matter of law that the plaintiff could not recover upon the notes for the reason that he was
chargeable with knowledge of the facts and circumstances that
rendered them invalid in the hands of Frost. The plaintiff is,
doubtless, chargeable with such knowledge or notice as to the
antecedent equities of the defendant as Brooks, his assignor, had,
but with no others. If the notes were valid obligations in the
.£?.nd of Brooks the plaintiff may assert every right that he could
have asserted. It needs no argument to show that if Brooks had
knov
e or notice or is in law char eable with knowledge or
notice of the fraud b means of which the note.s were 1verte
fro
pur ose for which 'the - were aut110rized to e made, t 1at
the ralntiff cannot recover. But 1t is not claime
anything abou
e or m or diversion of the paper in fact.
that i claimed is that when it wa presented to him in Bo ton by
Frost, whom he knew to be the president of the railroad, there
was enouo-h upon the face of the paper to put him upon inquiry
and, therefore, to charg him with knowledge of all the facts that
such inquiry would hav di closed. He kn ew nothino-, so far as
appears, outside of the paper it elf, except the fact that the party
presenting it wa defendant ' pre ident and that he wa proposinoto pledge notes for hi own debt, or rather for th debt of his
firm, which for all the purpo e of th que tion ma be assumed
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to be the same thing. The question in the case is, therefore.

reduced to a very narrow inquiry, and that is whether Brooks,

standing in all other respects in the position and sustaining- the

charcter of a bona tide purchaser of negotiable paper, is deprived

of that character and the benefits of that position by reason of

anything appearing upon the face of the notes themselves.

The mind, at the threshold of the inquiry, encounters two

principles that point in opposite directions and lead to different

conclusions, as the one or the other is allowed to preponderate

in the mental process of determining the legal rights of the par-

ties. On the one hand is the principle which protects a bona fide

holder of commercial paper from existing antecedent equities

between the parties, and on the other the principle which protects

a corporation from the unauthorized and fraudulent acts of its

own officers. There is not much difficulty in stating the rule of

law defining the duties and obligations of a party to whom nego-

tiable paper is presented for discount or sale before due. He is

not bound at his peril to be on the alert for circumstances which _

might possibly ex cite the suspicion of wary vigilance ; he does not

owe to the party who puts the paper afloat the duty of active
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inquiry in order to avert the imputation of bad faith. The rights

of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty

and good faith, and not by a speculative issue as to his diligence

or negligence. The holder's righ ts ca nnot be def eated without

pro of of actual notice of the defect in title or ba cT fa ith on hisC

part evidenced by circumstances. Thou gh he may ha ve been neg-

ligent in taking the paper , and omitting precautions which a pr~

dent man would have taken, nevertheless, unless^ he actcKjnalq/ S.

tide, his title, according to settled doctrine, will prevajh (Magee

V. badger, 34 N. Y. 249; Am. Ex. Nat. Bk. v. A r . Y. Belting, etc.,

Co., 148 N. Y. 705; Knox v. Eden Musee Am. Co., 148 N. Y.

454; CanajoJiarie Nat Bk. v. Diefcndorf, 123 N. Y. 202; Vos-

burgh v. Diefcndorf, 119 N. Y. 357; Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach

Co., 148N. Y. 652).

Applying these rules to the conceded facts of the case, it

se ems to me to be impossible to impu te bad faith to Brooks in the

transaction. He advanced a large sum of money on the faith of

the paper, without any actual knowledge that the relations of the

party with whom he dealt to the paper were different from what

they appeared to be on the face of it. The question now is, not

what the facts were, but what they appeared to be, and what he

had the right, from the notes themselves, to assume. He had the

right to assume that the relations to the paper of every party

to be the same thin . The que tion in the ca e i , therefore,
r clue cl to a v ry narr w inquiry, and that i wheth r Brook ,
~tanding in all
ther r pect in th position and sustaining th e
charcter of a bona nde purcha er f negotiabl pap r, i deprived
of that character and the b nefit of that po ition by rea on of
an) thino- appearin upon the face of the note them lv .
The mind, at the thr hold of th e inquiry, encounter two
principles that poi nt in oppo it direction and 1 ad t diff rent
on lusion , a the one or the other is allowed to pr ponderate
in the mental proc s of determining the legal right of the partie .
n the one hand is the princi1 le which protects a bona fide
hold r of commercial paper from existing antecedent equitie
between the parties, and on the other the principle which protect
a corporation from the unauthorized and fraudul nt acts of it
own officer . There i not much difficulty in stating the rule of
law defining the lutie and obligation of a party to whom negotiable paper i presented for discount or sale before due. He..!.._
not bound at his penl to be on the alert for circum tance which
mi ht os ibly excite the susp1c1on of wary vigilance; he does not
owe to the party w 10 pu s t e paper a oat the duty of active
inquiry in order to avert the imputation of bad faith. The right
of the hold er are to be determined by the simple test of honesty
and good faith, and not by a speculative is ue a to his diligence
or neo-ligence. The holder's rights cannot be defeated without
proof of actual notice of the def ct 111 title or bad fa1 th on hi
part evidenced by circumstances. /nougn he ma bave been ne-;:ligent in taking the paper, and omitting precautions which a prudent man would have ta en, nevert 1ele s unle he acte ma a ·
fide, his title, accor Lng to settled doftrine,..Yfill prev~I. CM agei
v. Badger, 34 . Y. 249; Am,. Ex. Nat. Bk. v. N. Y. Belting, etc. ,.
Co., 148 N. Y. 705; Kno."C v. Eden Musee Am. Co., 148 N. Y.
454; Canajohart'e Nat. Bil. v. D£efendorf, 123 N. Y. 202; Vosburgh v. Diefendorf, rr9 N. Y. 357; Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach
Co., 148 I . Y. 652) .
Applying these rules to the conceded facts of the ca e, i.L
. e m to me to b impossible to impute bad faith to Brooks in the
transaction. He advanced a large um of rnoney on the faith of
the paper, without any actual knowledge that the r lation of the
party with whom h dealt to the paper were different from what
they appeared to b on th fac of it. Th que tion now is , not
what th e fact w r . but what they app ared to be, and what he
had the right, from the notes thems lv , to assume. He had the
right to assume that the relations to the paper of every party
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•whose name appeared on it were precisely what they appeared to

be. (Hoge v. Lansijig, 35 N. Y. 136). lie had the right to

believe that the notes had been issued by the defendant to Bruen

for value in the regular course of business, and were by him trans-

ferred to Frost & Son in like manner. There was nothing to sug-

gest to him that Frost was dealing with paper that belonged to

the railroad for his own benefit. The appearances were that the

defendant had put the notes in circulation by delivery to Bruen,

and that they came to Frost's firm in the regular course of busi-

ness for value and were then the property of the firm. It is quite

true that all these appearances were deceptive and that the actual

facts were otherwise. But how was a banker or business man in

Boston to know or suspect that Bruen was only the nominal payee

and a mere instrument in the transaction to enable the president

to divert the paper to his own use. The name of the party who pre-

sented it and had it in his possession appeared on the face of the

paper to have signed it as president. The name of another officer

of the corporation was upon it also, attesting its regularity, and

everything was in his handwriting except the signature of the

president and the indorsement of the payee. So far as Brooks
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was concerned, the paper showed that it had been issued to a

stranger in the regular course of business, and, through his

indorsement, had come to the hands of a mercantile firm of which

the president of the corporation was a member. If this were the

fact, there is no doubt as to his right to use it in the business of

the firm. The holder of a note who has no actual knowledge or

notice of a defect in the title, or other equities between the parties,

when circumstances come to his knowledge sufficient to put him

upon inquiry, is chargeable with knowledge of all the facts that

such inquiry would have revealed. The difficulty in this case is

to find the circumstance which can be said to be sufficient to put

Brooks upon the inquiry. There was absolutely nothing on the

face of the paper except the signature, as president, of the party

who was dealing with it, and that, we think, was not sufficient in

view of the fact that the appearances were that he was a pur-

chaser from a third party.

The principle that applies in a case where an officer of a cor-

poration makes the corporate obligation payable to himself, and

then attempts to deal with it for his own benefit, does not aid in

solving the question in this case. When paper of that character

is presented by the officer or agent of the corporation, it bears

upon it s f ace sufficient notice of the incapacity of the officer or

agent to" issue it. (Hanover Bank v. Am. Dock & T. Co., 148

N. Y. 612; Bank of N. Y., etc., v.Am. Dock & T. Co., 143 N. Y.

whose name appeare l n it wer preci ly what th ey appeared to
be. (Hoge v. Lan siJ1g 35 N . . 136) . Ile had th rig ht to
believe that th notes had b n issu ed by th def nd ant to Bru en
for valu in th regular cour of busine s, and w re by him transferred to Fro t & on in lik manner. T b r was nothing to sugg est to him that Frost wa c1 alin \.V ith pape r that belonged t
the railroad for his own ben fi t. The appearance were that the
defendant had put th e note in circulation by deliv ry to B ru en,
and that th ey came to Fro t' firm in th e regular course of business for valu and w r th n th property of the firm. It is quite
true that all these app aranc s were deceptive and that the actual
facts v ere otherwi e. But how was a banker or business man in
Boston to know or uspect that Bruen was only the nominal payee
and a mere in trument in the tran action to enable the pre ident
to divert th paper to his own use. The name of the party who presented it and had it in his possession appeared on the face of the
paper to have igned it as pre ident. The name of another officer
of the corporation was upon it also, attesting its regul arity, and
everything was in his handwriting except the signature of the
president and the indorsement of the payee. So far as Brooks
was concerned , the paper showed that it had been issued to a
tranger in the regular course of business, and, through his
indorsement, had come to the hands of a mercantile firm of which
the presid ent of the corporation was a member. If this were the
fact, there i no doubt as to his right to use it in the bu in e s of
the firm. The holder of a note who has no actual knowl edge or
notice of a defect in the title, or other equities between the parties,
when circumstances come to his knowledge sufficient to put him
upon inquiry, i chargeable with knowledge of all the facts that
uch inquiry would have revealed. The difficulty in this case is
to find the circumstance which can be said to be sufficient to put
Brooks upon .t he inquiry. There was absolutely nothing on the
face of the paper except the sianature, a president of the part ,
who was d aling with it and that, we think, was not sufficient in
view of th e fact that the appearance were that he was a purchaser from a third party.
The principle that applies in a case where an officer of a corporation makes the corporat obligation payable to himself, and
then attempt to deal with it for his own benefit, do not aid in
solving the question in thi case. Wh n paper of that character
is presented by the offic:er or ao-ent of the corporation, it bear
u on its face sufficient notice of the inca acit of th
agent to issue it.
anover an v. Am. Dock & T. Co., 148
N. Y. 612; Bank of N. Y., etc., v.Am. Dock & T. Co. 143 N. Y~
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559; Wilson v. M. E. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 145; Gerona v. McCor-

mick, 130 X. Y. 261). There are numerous cases that belong to

that class cited by the learned counsel for the. defendant on his

brief. There is a manifest distinction between them and the case

at bar. Here the officer was not dealing with the corporate notes

payable to himself but with notes that had been regularly issued,

so far as appeared from their face, to a stranger, and by him

transferred to a firm of which the officer was a member and for

which he acted as agent in procuring the loan from Brooks and

pledging them as security. The presence of Frost's name upon

the paper, as one of the agents who issued it, was not naturally

or reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to arouse sus-

picion in the mind of Brooks, or to lead him to believe that the

president was attempting to defraud the corporation in disposing

of the notes. None of the cases cited by the learned counsel for

the defendant sustain the proposition that such a circumstance is

sufficient to put the purchaser of negotiable paper upon inquiry

or charge him with knowledge of the fact in case he fails to make

it, and there are many cases that tend to support the contrary

view. (Am. Ex. Nat. 'Bank v. N. Y. B. & P. Co., 148 N. Y. 698 ;
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Miller v. Consolidation Bank, 48 Penn. St. 514; Walker v. Kee,

14 S. C. 142).

It is said that if the plaintiff's right to recover in this case

is sanctioned by this court an easy way will be opened for the

perpetration of frauds upon corporations by officers intrusted

with its negotiable obligations, and that the device of making the

paper payable to the order of a nominal payee, interested or aid-

ing in the fraud, will be a favorite one to accomplish the end.

We must leave all such cases to be dealt with upon the peculiar

facts and circumstances as they arise. It is more reasonable and

just to assume that corporations will be able to protect themselves

by proper vigilance from the dishonesty of their own officers, than

to impute to parties who have taken the paper for value, ignorant

of its origin, constructive knowledge of the facts upon such cir-

cumstances as exist in this case.

We think that there was nothing on the face of the paper or

in the facts shown to warrant the court in holding as matter of

law, as it did, that the obligations were received by Brooks and

the advances made on them mala fide. That is the effect of the

ruling at the trial, and the conclusion was not supported by the

facts.

// follows that the judgment must be reversed and a new

trial granted, costs to abide the c:-cnt.

Bartlett, J. (dissenting). &cn_- fdU-w^ '

559; TT'ilsoJZ v. JI. E. R. Co., 120 N. Y . 145; Gerona v. M cCormick, 130
Y. 261). Th re are num erou cases that belong to
that cla cited by the learned coLrn I for tht defendant on hi
brief. There i a manife t di tinction betw en th m and the case
at bar. Her the officer wa not d aling v ith the corporate note
payable to him If but with not that had been regularly issued,
o far a appear d from their face, to a stranger, and by him
tran £erred to a firm of which the officer was a member and for
which he acted a agent in procuring the loan from Brook and
pledging them as security. The pr ence of Fro t's name upon
the paper, a one of the agent who is ued it, was not naturally
or reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to arou e suspicion in the mind of rook , or to lead him to believe that th
pr ident wa attempting to defraud the corporation in di posing
of the notes. None of the ca e cited by the learned coun el for
the defendant su tain the propo ition that uch a circum tance is
ufficient to put the purchaser of negotiable paper upon inquiry
or charge him with knowledge of the fact in case he fails to make
it, and there are many case that tend to support the contrary
view. (Am. Ex. I\ a.t. Bank v. . Y. B. & P. Co ., 148 N. Y. 698;
Jfiller v. Consolidation Banll, 48 Penn . t. 514; Walker v. Kee,
14 S. C. 142).
It is said that if the plaintiff's right to recover in thi case
is sanctioned by this court an easy \vay will be open d for the
perpetration of fraud upon corporation by officers intrusted
with its neo-otiable obligations, and that the device of makino- the
paper payable t the order of a nominal payee, intere ted or aiding in the fraud, will be a favorite one to accomplish the end.
\Ve mu t leave all such ca e to be dealt with upon the peculiar
fact and circumstances as they ari e. It is more rea onable and
ju t to a ume that corporation will be able to protect them elve
by proper vigilance from the dishonesty of their own officers, than
t impute to partie who have tak n the paper for va lu , io-norant
of its orio-in, con tructive knowledge of the facts upon such circum tance a exi t in thi ca e.
vV e think that th er wa nothing on the face of the paper or
in the facts sho \Yn t warrant the court in ho1 li ng a. matter of
law, a it did, that th obligations were rec ived by rooks and
the ach ances made on them 111ala fide. That i the effect of the
ruling at th trial, and the conclu ion was not supported by the
fact .
It follo'ltts tliat the j1tdg111e11t must be reversed and a new
trial gra nted, costs to ab1.de the ec:ent.
BARTLETT, J. (di enting) .
~ ~.
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McNamara v. Jose (1902), 28 Wash. 461.

Appeal from Superior Court, King county. — Hon. George

Mc Ta111ara v. Jose (1902), _8 !flash. 461.

Meade Emory., Judge.

John E. Humphries and Harrison Bostwick, for appellant. «

William 1'armerlee, for respondent.

pp al fr m

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Fullerton, J. — The respondent brought this action against j

the appellant and one Thomas Carstens to recover upon a promis- j

sory note of which the following is a copy:

"$1,000. Seattle, Wash., Dec. 28th, 1899.

fEADE E.111 RY,

up rior
.

ourt, I -ino- county.-Ilon. GEORGE

Judg

John E. Humphries and Harrison Bostwicl~, for appellant.
~Villimn Pannerlee, for re pond nt.

"On or before July I, 1900, after date, (without grace) I

promise to pay to the order of James Daly, one thousand dollars,

The opinion of the court was d liver d by

for value received, payable only in United States gold coin.

"Payable at Cape Nome.

"Jose & Carstens,

"Per Alfred Jose."

He alleged in his complaint that he purchased the note from

the James Daly named therein as payee, prior to its maturity,

for a valuable consideration, without notice or knowledge of

"anv defenses or equities, existing in favor of defendants, and
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against said Daly." The appellant- alone answered. He denied

all of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged affirmatively,

in substance, that the note was given Daly as part of the purchase

price of a certain lot situated in the town of Nome, Alaska, to

which Daly had no title, and to which he falsely and fraudulently

represented he had title as an inducement to the appellant to pur-

chase the same, all of which was well known to the respondent

at the time he purchased the note from Daly. At the trial of the

cause the respondent called the appellant as a witness, who testi-

fied that he executed the note personally, that Carstens had not

authorized him to sign his (Carstens) name thereto, and, while

he believed he had authority to so sign it at the time, he did not

in fact have such authority. On this being shown, the respondent

dismissed as to Carstens, and the action proceeded against the

appellant. At the conclusion of the evidence the court took the

case from the jury, and directed a judgment to be entered in

favor of the respondent against the appellant for the full amount

of the note. The errors assigned raise the question of the correct-

ness of this ruling.

FuLLERTO , J.-The r pondent brought thi action against J
the appellant and one Thoma
ar ten to recover upon a promisory not of which the following i a copy:
'$1,000.
EATTLE, v A H. , Dec. 2 th, 1899.
n or before July l 1900, after date, (without grace) I
promi to pay to the order of James Daly, one thousand dollars,
for valu received, payable only in United States gold coin.
" ayable at Cape Nome.
"JOSE & CARS TE
"Per lfred Jose."
J

He alleo-ed in his complaint that he purchased the note from
the Jam
aly named therein as payee prior to its maturity,
for a valuable consideration, without notice or knowledge of
" any def n e or equities existing in favor of defendant , and
again t aid Daly.' The appellant · alone answered. He denied
all of th allegations of the complaint, and alleged affirmatively,
in sub tance, that the note was given Daly as part of the purchase
price of a certain lot ituated in the town of ome, la ka to
which aly had no title, and to which he fal ely and fraudulently
repre ente<l he had title a an inducem nt to the app llant to purcha e the ame, all of which wa w 11 known to the re pondent
at the tim h purcha ed the note from Daly.
t th trial of th
cau e the re pondent called the appellant a a witn
who te ti:fied that h xecuted the note per onally, that ar ten had not
authorized him t io-n his (Car ten ) name thereto, and, while
he believ d he had authority to so ign it at th e tim , he did not
in fact hav uch authority. On this b ino- hown, th re pondent
di mi ed a to arsten , and th e action proce d d ao-ain t the
appellant.
t the conclu ion of the vidence th court took the
ca e from th e jury, and directed a judo-ment to be entered in
fayor of the re pond nt ao-ainst the app llant for th full amount
of the note. The errors as igned rai e the que tion of the correct-ne of thi ruling .
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From the evidence the jury could have well found that the

note was procured by Daly from the appellant through his mis-

representations as to his title to the property deeded as a consid-

eration for the note. It must, therefore, for the purposes of this

appeal, be taken as established that the appellant has a defense

to the note as against Daly, or against any one taking the note

from him with knowledge of its infirmity or defect, "or knowl-

edge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument

amounted to bad faith." Session Laws 1899, p. 350, § 56. The

circumstances under which the respondent received the note

appear from his own testimony. He not only testified in his own

behalf, but was called by the appellant, and subjected to a most

searching examination. In brief, his story is that he purchased

the note from Daly some three months after its execution, paying

him therefor $470 in cash, and cancelling an account he held

against him of $30, making $500 in all ; that he knew both Jose

and Car-stens at the time, and knew them to be solvent; that he

made no inquiry other than of Daly as to the consideration for

the note ; that he made no inquiry of either Jose or Carstens con-

cerning it, and had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument,
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or that the appellant had published a warning against its pur-

chase ; and that, if he had, he would not have purchased it. That

when Daly first mentioned the note to him it was in the hands of

one Thomas McCorey, whom Daly said he had bargained it to

for $700, but did not think he had effected a sale, as he did not

believe McCorey could raise the money ; that he first asked him

$700 for the note, but finally consented to take the amount paid :

that he noticed the note was payable at Cape Nome, and he did

not think it strange that Daly would sell the note for $500, "as

he was the kind of a fellow that wanted that much money at that

time." While it was shown that the respondent had a place of

business, the character of that business — whether or not he made

it his business, or a part of his business, to discount commercial

paper — does not appear. There is nothing in the record, however,

that questions his repute, and his statements as to the circum-

stances under which he obtained the note are not called in

question.

The Negotiable Instruments Act of this state (Laws 1899.

P- 35°> § 5 2 ) defines a holder in due course of a negotiable instru-

ment to be one who has taken the instrument under the following

conditions :

"(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) that

he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without

From the evidence the jury could have well found that the
note wa procur d by Daly from the appellant through hi mi representation as to his title to the propert de ded as a con ideration for the n t . It mu t, therefore, for the purpo e of thi
appeal, be taken a establi hed that the appellant ha a defen e
to the note a against Daly, or against any on taking the note
from him with knowled e of it infirmity or defect, "or knowledge of such fact that hi action in taking th in trument
amounted to bad faith." Session Law i899, p. 350, 56. The
circum tance under which the re pondent r ceived the note
appear from hi own testimony. He not only testified in hi own
b half, but was called by the appellant, and subjected to a most
searching examination. In brief, his tory is that he purchased
the note from Daly some three months after its execution, paying
him therefor $470 in cash, and cancelling an account he held
against him of $30, making $500 in all; that he knew both Jose
and ar.stens at th time, and knew them to be solvent; that he
made no inquiry other than of Daly a to the consideration for
the note; that he made no inquiry of either Jose or Carstens concerning it, and had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument,
or that the appellant had published a warning against its purcha e; and that, if he had, he would not have purchased it. That
\.\'hen Daly fir t mentioned the note to him it was in the hands of
one Thoma McCorey, whom Daly said he had baro-ained it to
for $700, but did not think he ha I effected a sale, a he did not
believe Mc orey could raise the money; that he first asked him
$700 f r the note, but finally con entecl to take the amount paid;
that he noticed the note was payable at Cape Jome, and he did
not think it trange that Daly would ell the note for $500, "a
he was the kind of a fellow that wanted that much money at that
time." \Vhile it was hown that the re pondent had a place of
business. the character of that business-whether or not he made
it his business, or a part of his business, to discount commercial
paper-does not appear. There is nothino- in the record, however,
that questions hi repute, and his statements as to the circumstances under which he obtained the note are not called in
question.
The Negotiable In truments ct of this state (Laws 1899.
p. 350, § 52) defines a holder in due course of a negotiable instru ment to be one who has taken the in trument under the following
condition :
" (I) That it is complete and regular upon its face; ( 2) that
he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without

McNAMARA v. JosE

533

McNamara v. Jose 583

notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the

fact; (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4) that at

the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity

in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiat-

ing it."

The act further provides (Id. § 56) that, to constitute notice

of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person

negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must

have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowl-

edge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument

amounted to bad faith;" and (Id. §57), that "a holder in due

course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior

parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among

themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the

full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon." But, not-

withstanding this act positively provides that, to constitute notice

of an infirmity in a negotiable instrument, the purchaser must

have knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instru-

ment amounted to bad faith, we cannot think that the legislature

meant to sav that a purchaser of a negotiable instrument can
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s hut his eyes to the surrounding circumstances, remain in willful

ign orance of facts which would have made known to him the"

infirmities of the instrument he purchases, and then claim, because

he ha d no actual knowledge of such infirmities, that his title there-

to is unimpeachable ; but that it is still the rule that willful ignor-

a nce and guilty knowledge alike involve the result of bad faith.

This, however, does not mean that the holder's title is to be over-

thrown by slight circumstances. He does not owe to the party

who puts the paper afloat the duty of active inquiry in order to

avert the imputation of bad faith. His rights are to be deter-

mined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, not by a

speculative inquiry into diligence or negligence. Although he

may have been negligent in taking the paper, and omitted pre-

cautions which a prudent man would have taken, nevertheless,

unless he acted mala fide, his title will prevail. Crawford, Nego-

tiable Instruments Law (2d. ed.), p. 54.

"Suspicion of defect of title or the knowledge of circum-

stances which would excite suspicion in the mind of a prudent

man, or gross negligence on the part of the taker, at the time of

the transfer, will not defeat his title. That result can be pro-

duced only by bad faith on his part." Murray v. Lardner, 2

Wall. no.

Tested bv these rules, is there anything in the evidence before

notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the
fact; (3) that he took it in good faith and for value; (4 that at
the time it was negotiat d to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the titl of the person negotiating it."
·The act further provides (Id. § 56) that, to constitut notice
of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated must
have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the in trument
amounted to bad faith;" and (Id. § 57), that "a holder in due
cou rse holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior
parties, and free from defenses available to prior parties among
themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the
full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon." But, notwithstanding this act positively provides that, to constitute notice
of an infirmity in a negotiable instrument, the purchaser must
have knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith, ~ cannot think that the legislature
meant to sa that a urchaser of a ne otiable instrument can
shut his eyes to the surrounding circumstances, remam m w1 u
i"'gnorance of facts which would have made known to him the
mfirmities of the instrument he purchases, and then claim, beca,use
he had no actual knowledge of such infirmities, that his title thereto is unimpeachable; but that it is still the rule that willful ignorance and guilty knowledge alike mvolve the result of bad faith.
This, however, does not mean that the holder's title is to be overthrown by slight circumstances. He does not owe to the party
who puts the paper afloat the duty of active inquiry in order to
avert the imputation of bad faith. His rights are to be determined by th e imple test of honesty and good faith, not by a
speculative inquiry into diligence or negligence. Although he
may have be n n gligent in takinrr the paper, and omitted precautions which a prud ent man would have taken. nevertheless,
unless he acted 111ala fide, his title will prevail. Crawford, N egotiable Instrument Law ( 2d. ed.), p. 54.
"Suspicion of ~efect of title or the knowledge of circumstances which \;<,'OL ld e.'cite u picion in the mind of a prudent
man, or gro negligence on the part of the taker, at the time of
the transfer, will not defeat hi title. That re ult can be produced only by bad faith on his part." Mitrray v. Lardner, 2
Wall. IIO.
Tested by these rules, is there anything in the evidence before
1
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us, which required the submission of the cause to the jury? We

think not. Layi ng aside the fact that it was purchased at such,

a large discount there is nothing that even tends to show bad_

faith on thepart of t he appellant, and this one fact loses much

of its persuasiveness whe n it is remembered that the note is pay -

able at Cape Nome, which the court judiciously knows is on the

co ast of Alaska, inaccessible for a greater portion of the year,

and not at any time in the line of reg ular co mmunication. It

certainly would not blTsought by investors in commercial paper

so long as there was a possibility of their being compelled to

enforce its payment at that place. Again, the purchase of a note

at a discount is not of itself, under ordinary circumstances, evi-

dence of bad faith. When it is very large, that circumstance may

be considered in connection with other circumstances in deter-

mining the question of the purchaser's good faith ; but unless the

consideration be merely nominal, or so grossly inadequate as to

lead to the conclusion that the purchase is made for the purpose

of speculating upon the chances of collection, it is not of itself

sufficient to justify a finding of bad faith.

The appellant makes some question on the order in which the
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court admitted the proofs. He also contends that the recovery

should be limited to the amount the respondent paid for the note.

The first, if error at all, could not operate to the prejudice of the

appellant, and the second, whatever may have been the former

rule, is now settled against this contention by our Negotiable

Instruments Act. Laws 1899, p. 350, § 57.

The judgment is affirmed.

Reavis, C. J., and White, Hadley, Anders, Mount and

Dunbar, J J., concur. J>^ ^u^^. .

DelVitt v. Perkins ( 1868) , 22 Wis. 757. §§ 54-3. 58.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.

Action on defendant's promissory note. The jury, by direc-

tion of the court, found for the plaintiff ; and the defendant

appealed from the judgment. The question in dispute will suffi-

ciently appear from the opinion.

B. Mariner and David S. Ordway, for appellant.

Geo. IV. Lakin, for respondent.

Dixon, C. J. — The plaintiff, knowing the defendant, and

that he was in fair credit and able to respond, purchased, shortly

u , which required the ubmis ion of the cause to the jury? We
think not. Laying a ide th fact that it wa pur ha cl at uch
a larg di count there i nothing that even tend to how bad
faith on th part of th app 11ant, and thi one fa t lo e much
Oflt per ua iv ne -;hen it is remembered that th note i payable at ape I me, whi~.!2_ the ~-~-~_r!._~diciou ly knows i on the
coa t of laska, inacce ible for a gr ater portion of the year,
and not at any time in the line of r gular communication. It
certainly would not be ought by mve tor in -COiTiiTi"ercial paper
o long a ther was a possibility of their being compell d to
enforce its paym nt at that place. Agai n, the purchase of a note
at a di count is not of it elf, und r ordinary circum tances, evidence of bad faith. When it is very large, that circumstance may
be considered in connection with oth r circumstances in determining the que tion of the purchaser's good faith; but unle s the
consideration be merely nominal, or so grossly inadequate as to
lead to the conclusion that the purchase is made for the purpose
of speculating upon the chance of collection, it is not of itself
ufficient to ju tify a finding of bad faith.
The appellant make some questi n on the order in which the
court admitted the proofs. He also contends that the recovery
should be limit d to the amount the respondent paid for the note.
The first, if error at a11, could not operate to the prejudice of the
appellant, and the second, whatever may have be n the former
rule, is now settled against this cont ntion by our Negotiable
Instruments Act. Laws 1899, p. 350, § 57.

The judgment is affirmed.
NDERS MouNT and

REAVIS, C. J., and WHITE, HADLEY,
D NBAR, JJ., concur.

DevVitt v. Perkins (1868),

22

vVis. 45r.

§§ 54-3, 58.

Appeal from the County Court of Milwaukee County.
Action on defendant's promissory note. The jury, by direction of the court, found for the plaintiff; and the defendant
appealed from the judgm nt. The question in dispute will sufficiently appear from t he opinion.

E. Mariner and David S. Ordway, for appellant.
Geo. W. Lakin, for r pondent.
DrxoN, C. J.-The plaintiff, knowino- th d f ndant, and
that he was in fair credit and able to respond, purchased, shortly
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before its maturity, a promissory note against him for three hun-

dred dollars and interest for six months, paying therefor only the

sum of five dollars. As between the defendant and the payee,

the note was invalid for want of consideration. Is the plaintiff

a bona fide holder for value, so as to protect him against the

defense of a want of consideration ? We answer, no. The consid-

eration paid by him was merely nominal. It is as if the note had

been given to him, and he should claim the protection afforded a

bona fide holder for value. It appears on the face of the transac-

tion that it was not a negotiation of the note in the usual course of

business, but that the sum exacted on the one side and paid on

the other was to give that the semblance of a sale, which other-

wise was intended as a mere gift, or, what is worse, a shift to get

the note out of the hands of the payee so as to cut off the defense

of the maker, for the payee's benefit. Either view is equally fatal

to the action of the plaintiff, provided the defense of a want of

consideration is established.

Again, the buying of a note against a solvent maker, the pur-

chaser knowing him to be such, for a mere nom inal consi deration,

is very strong, if not conclusive, evidence of ma la fides. "It is con-
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structive notice of the invalidity of the note in the hands of the

seller — such as to put the purchaser upon inquiry, which if he

fails to make, he acts at his peril. {Brown v. Taber, 5 Went.,

566; Mathews v. Poythrcss, 4 Ga., 287, 299 et seq., and cases

cited ; Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y., 600; Whitbread v. Jordan,

1 Younge & Collyer [Exch.], 303, 328; Jones v. Smith, 1 Hare,

68 ; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 254, 259-60) . The proof

offered to show a failure of consideration should have been

received, and the case submitted to the jury on this ground.

Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.

v^ ^-

PAYEE AS HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. § 54.

Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. Steuer (1903), 183 Mass. 140,

97 Am. St. Rep. 426.

Contract for $1,823.25 for work done and materials furnished

for a building of the defendant numbered 811 on Beacon street

in Boston. Writ dated April 11, 1899.

At the trial in the Superior Court before Bishop, J., without

a jury, the judge excluded certain evidence offered by the defend-

before its maturity, a pr mis ory not again t him for three hundred dollars and int rest for ix month , paying th erefor only the
um of five dollars.
s b tw en th e defendant and th e paye ,
the not was invalid for want of consideration. Is the plaintiff
a bona fide holder for value, o a to prot ct him against the
defen e of a want of consideration? W an w r, no. The consideration paid by him wa m r ly nominal. It is as if the note had
been giv n to him, and he should claim the protection afforded a
bona fid e hold r for valu . It appears on the face of the transaction that it wa not a negotiation of th note in the usual course of
bu ines , but that the um exact d on the on id and paid on
the other wa to g iv that the semblance of a sale, which otherwi e was intended a a mere gift, or, what is worse, a hift to get
the note out of the hands of the payee so as to cut off the defense
of the mak r , for the payee's benefit. Either view is equally fatal
to the action of th e plaintiff, provided the defense of a want of
con ideration i e tablished.
gain, the bu in of a note against a solvent maker, the purcha er knowin him to be sue
or a mere nomma consideration,
is very strong, if not conclusive, evidence of mala es.it is con~1cti~ notice of the invalidity of the note in the hand of the
seller-such as to put the purchaser upon inquiry, which if he
~to make he acts at his peril. (Brown v. Taber, 5 Went.,
566; 111a.thews v. Poythress, 4 Ga., 287, 299 et seq. , and cases
cited; Anderson v. Nich olas, 28 N. Y., 6oo; Whitbre ad v. Jordan,
I Younge & Collyer [Exch.], 303, 328; Jones v. S mith, I Hare,
68 ; I Parsons on Notes and Bill , 2 54, 2 59-60) . The proof
offered to show a failure of consideration should have been
r ceived, and the case ubmitted to the jury on this ground.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
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Boston Steel and Iron Co. v. teuer (r903), r83 M ass. r40,
97 Am. t. Rep. 426.
Contract for $1 823.25 f r work don and material furnished
for a: building of the defendant numb r d I I on Beacon treet
in Boston. Writ dated April I I I 9 .
At the trial in the Superior Court b fore i hop J. without
a jury, the judge excluded c rtain vidence off red by th defend-
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ant and refused to make certain rulings requested by the defend-

ant. He found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,043.86; and the

defendant alleged exceptions.

E. Greenhood, for the plaintiff".

/. K. Berry, for the plaintiff.

LorinG, J. — The only question in issue between the parties

in this case is the right of the defendant to be credited with two

ant and refu ed to make c rtain rulin
ant. II found for th plaintiff in th
defendant alleged exceptions.

reque ted by th defendum of $2,043. ; and the

E . Greenhood, for the plaintiff.
!. K. Berry, for the plaintiff.

sums of $200 and $400, respectively, under the following circum-

stances :

On December 31, 1898, the defendant's husband owed the

plaintiff $1,781.30, for iron work furnished by it to him in the

construction of a house number 819 Beacon street. On being

pressed for payment, the defendant's husband, on January 21,

[899, ilelivered to the plaintiff the defendant's check for $200.

payable to the plaintiff. It is stated in the bill of exceptions that

on February 2, 1899, "he paid the plaintiff the further sum of

$400 in a check made by said Jennie D. Steuer." But it appears

from the auditor's report, which was before the court and is

referred to in the bill of exceptions, that the plaintiff's manager's

name was Newcomb, and that his story was that the check for
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$400 "was brought to him at his office on Devonshire street by

Mr. Steuer in response to further demands for money, and that

it was made out in blank and filled up by himself, Mr. Steuer

being unwilling that it should be made for more than two

hundred dollars, while Mr. Newcomb insisted that it should be

for the larger amount and so made it, with Mr. Steuer's consent,

and applied it to his debt." The defendant's story was "that she

gave the check to Mr. Newcomb at her house."

In addition to the iron furnished the defendant's husband for

819 Beacon Street, the defendant's husband had ordered two

iron columns and a base plate from the plaintiff for another

house, No. 811 Beacon Street, which the plaintiff supposed was

Steuer's until his manager was told on March 10 that it belonged

to the defendant's wife. These two columns and base plate were

delivered on December 22, 1898, and at the rate charged in the

bill of items were worth $150.35. From December to March

there were negotiations between the defendant's husband and the

plaintiff for a contract by which all the iron work for 81 1 Beacon

Street should be furnished by the plaintiff for a fixed sum, pay-

ments on account to be made as each floor was finished ; and on

or about March 1, 1899, the plaintiff's manager submitted to the

defendant a written contract to this effect. On March 10 this

LoRL'G, J.-Th only que tion in i sue betw en th partie
in thi ca e i th right of the defendant to be credited with two
um of 200 and $400, respectively, under the following circumtance :
On December 31, 1898, the defendant' hu band wed the
plaintiff $1,78r.30, for iron work furni bed by it to him in the
construction of a house number 819 Beacon street. On being
pressed for payment, the defendant's husband, on January 21,
1899, c elivered to the plaintiff the def ndant's check for $200,
payable to the plaintiff. It is stated in the bill of exceptions that
on February 2, 1899, "he paid the plaintiff the further sum of
$400 in a check made by said Jennie D. Steuer." But it appears
from the auditor' report, which was before the court and is
referred to in the bill of exceptions, that the plaintiff's manager's
name was Newcomb, and that his story was that the check for
$400 "was brotwht to him at his offic on Devonshire street by
:\[r. teuer in r sponse to further demands for money, and that
it wa made out in blank and filled up by himself, Mr. teuer
being unwilling that it hould be made for more than two
hundred dollars, while Mr. I ewcomb in i ted that it should be
for the larger amount and so made it, with Mr. Steuer's consent,
and applied it to his debt." The defendant's story was "that she
gave the check to Mr. Newcomb at her house."
In addition to the iron furnished the defendant's husband for
19 Beacon treet, the defendant's hu band had order d two
iron column and a base plate from the plaintiff for another
house, No. 811 eacon Street, which th plaintiff suppos 1 was
St uer' until his manager was told on March IO that it belonged
t the defendant' wife . Thes two columns and ba e plate were
delivered on December 22, 1898, and at the rate charO'ed in the
bill of items were worth $150.35. From December to March
there were n gotiations betw en the defendant's husband and the
plaintiff for a contract by which all the iron work for 81 l eacon
tr t should be furnished by the plaintiff for a fixed sum, payments on account to be made a each floor was fini shed ; and on
or about March 1, 1899, the plaintiff's manager submitted to the
d fendant a written contract to this effect. On March IO this
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was returned by the defendant's husband with the statement

already referred to, that 811 Beacon Street belonged to his wife,

and that the contract should be made with her. No written con-

tract was ever made between the plaintiff and the defendant, but

the plaintiff went forward and delivered the iron work for two

of the six stories of the house, part being delivered before March

10 and part after that date. The last was delivered on March

1 8, when the plaintiff stopped because it had not been paid for

what it had done. Thereupon this action was brought to recover

the reasonable value of the materials furnished and work done.

At the trial the defendant contended "that the amount of

said payments should be credited to her in this action on the

ground that they were payments required by the plaintiff to be

made in advance on account of her said building numbered 811

Beacon Street, and that the checks were given to her said hus-

band, as her agent, to make such payments," and "offered evi-

dence of her instructions to her husband as to the use and appli-

cation of said checks, not made in the presence of the plaintiff

or any one representing him, and claimed that the same should

be admitted in evidence. The court declined to admit the same
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and the defendant duly excepted to the exclusion." The other

exceptions taken at the trial have been waived, and the question

raised by this exception is the only matter now before us.

The plaintiff has argued that it did not appear but that these

instructions were given in a private conversation between hus-

band and wife. But on a fair construction of the bill of excep-

tions we do not think that the evidence can be taken to have

been excluded on that ground. It is stated there that the

"defendant offered evidence of her instructions to her husband

as to the use and application of said checks, not made in the

presence of the plaintiff or any one representing him." This

must be taken to be a statement of the ground of the objection,

and the ruling must be taken to be a ruling that competent evi-

dence was offered and was excluded because not made in the

presence of the plaintiff or of some one representing it.

The judge before whom the case was tried without a jury

found "that neither of said payments was required by the plain-

tiff to be made in advance on account of her said building num-

bered 811 Beacon Street, and that neither of them was made

according to any agreement for payment to be made on account

of said 811 Beacon Street, and that no floor in said building was

completed at the time either of said payments was made, and that

said payments were made by said Bernard Steurer on account

''as returned by th d f ndant' hu band with the statement
already referred to, that I I Beacon treet belon d to his wife,
and that th contract hould be made with h r.
o written contract was ver made b tw en the plaintiff and th cl f ndant, but
the plaintiff went forward and deliver cl th iron work for two
of the six torie of the hou e, part b ing delivered b fore l\Iarch
IO and part after that date. The la t wa delivered on .i\larch
1 , when the plaintiff topped becau e it had not b en paid for
\ hat it had done. Ther upon thi action wa brotwht to recover
the reasonabl value of the material furnish d and work done.
At the trial the defendant contended "that the amount of
said payment should be credited to her in thi action on the
ground that they w r payment required by the plaintiff to be
made in advance on account of her aid building numbered 8n
Beacon treet, and that the check were given to her said husband, as her agent, to make such payments," and "offered evidence of her in tructions to her hu band as to the use and application of said checks, not made in the presence of the plaintiff
or any one repre enting him, and claimed that the same should
be admitted in evidence. The court declined to admit the same
and the defendant duly excepted to the exclusion." The other
exceptions taken at the trial have been waived, and the que tion
rai ed by thi exception i the onl) matter now before u .
The plaintiff has aro-ued that it did not appear but that the e
in truction were given in a private conversation between husband and wife. But on a fair construction of the bill of exceptions we do not think that the evidence can be taken to have
been excluded on that ground. It is stated there that the
''defendant offered evidence of her in truction to her husband
a to the u e and application of aid checks, not made in the
presence of the plaintiff or any one repre entino- him." This
must be taken to be a tatement of the a-round of the objection,
and the ruling- mu t be taken to be a ruling that competent evidence was offered and was excluded becau e not made in the
presence of the plaintiff or of ome one repre entino- it.
The judge before whom the case was tried without a jury
found "that neither of aid payment wa requir d by the plaintiff to be made in advance on account of her aid buildino- numbered 8II Beacon tr et. and that n ither of them wa made
acco rding to any agreement for payment to be made on account
of said 8n Beacon treet, and that no floor in aid buildino- "a
completed at the time either of aid payment wa made, and that
aid payments were made by aid
rnard teurer on account
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of his building numbered 819 Beacon Street, and were received

by the plaintiff on account therefor.''

This finding makes the evidence excluded immaterial so far

as the check for $200 is concerned. If this evidence had been

admitted, the defendant's case on the $200 check would have been

this : A check payable to the plaintiff is handed by the drawer

to her husband, to be delivered by him to the plaintiff in payment

of a debt to become due from the drawer of the check to the

payee, and is fraudulently handed by the husband to the payee

of the check, in payment of a debt due from him to the payee,

and is accepted by the payee in good faith in payment of that debt.

In such a case the pavee of the check is a bona tide purchaser

of the check for value, without notice, and the drawer could not

s et up her husband's fraud in defense of the check, nor maintain^

an action for money had and received after payment of it on

discovering the fraud.

The f act that the plaintiff is the payee of a negotiable security

does not p rpvpnr ^E]^Lll2S 1 becoming a bona fide purchaser of it

at comm o n law, w ith all thfi_jjghj g incident to a purchaser to ?

value th ereof wi th™ 11 " inntirp That was decided in Watson v.
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Russell, 3 B. & S. 34, and affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber

in the same case. 5 B. & S. 968. To the same effect are Poirier

v. Morris, 2 El. & Bl. 89 ; Nelson v. Cowing, 6 Hill, 336, 339 ;

Munroe v. Bordicr, 8 C. B. 862, and Armstrong v. American

Exchange Bank, 133 U. S. 433. 453. The case of Fairbanks v.

Snow, 145 Mass. 153, might have been decided on this ground

but was disposed of on common law principles.

That payment of a pre-existing debt makes the holder a pur-

chaser for value in this Commonwealth was settled law before

the negotiable instruments act was enacted. (Blanchard v. Ste-

vens, 3 Cush. 162; Stoddard v. Kimball, 6 Cush. 469; Good-

win v. Massachusetts Loan & Trust Co., 152 Mass. 189, 199;

National Revere Bank v. Morse, T63 Mass. 383 ; H olden v.

Phoenix Rattan Co., 168 Mass. 570).

The checks in question in the case at bar were given after

the negotiable instruments act (St. 1898, c. 533; R. L. c. 73)

went into effect, and are governed by its provisions. The plaintiff

is a holder in due course of the $200 check within R. L. c. 73.

§60. This section is taken from §29 of the English bills of

exchange act of 1882, and Watson v. Russell is cited in Chalmers,

Bills of Exchange, (5th ed.) 89, as an example of a person who

is a holder in due course within that section.

of his building numbered 19 eacon treet, and "ere received
by the plaintiff on acco unt therefor."
Thi finding make th evidence excluded immaterial so far
as the check for $200 is concerned. If this evidence had b en
admitted, th d fendant' ca e on the $200 check would hav been
thi : A ch ck payable to the plaintiff is hand ed by the drawer
t her hu band, to be d liv red by him to the plaintiff in payment
of a debt to b come due from th e drawer of the check to the
payee, and is fraudulently handed by th e husband to the payee
of the check, in payment of a debt due from him to the payee,
and is accepted by the paye in good faith in paym nt of that debt.
In such a case the payee of the check is a bona fide purchaser
of the check for value, without notice, and the drawer c uld not
set up her husband 's fraud in defense of the ch ck. nor maintain
an action for money had and receiyed after payment of it on
discove ring the fraud.
The fact that the laintiff is th e a ree of a n e otiable securit
does not
becomi n ~ a bona fide purchaser of 1t
i htSinc1d nt to a urchaser for
That was decided 111 Watson v.
Russell, 3 B. & S . 34, and affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber
in the same case. 5 B . & S. 968. To the same effect are Poirier
v. Morris, 2 E l. & B l. 89; Nelson v. Cowing, 6 H ill, 336, 339;
Munroe v. Bordier, 8 C. B. 862, and Armstrong v. Anierican
Exchange Bani?, 133 U . S. 433, 453. The case of Fairbanlis v.
Snow, 145 Mass. I 53, might have been decided on this groun d
but was disposed of on common law principles.
That payment of a pre-ex isting debt makes the hold er a purchaser for value in thi Commonw alth was settled law before
the n egotiable instrument act was enacted . (Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cu h. r62; Stoddard v. K1"111ball, 6 Cush . 469; Goodwin v. Massachusetts Loan & Trust Co ., r52 Mas . r89 , 199 ~
N ational Revere Bank v. lvf orse, 163 Mass. 383 ; Hold en v.
Phrenix Rattan Co., r68 Mass. 570).
The checks in question in the case at bar were given aft r
the negotiabl instrument act ( t. r898, c. 533 ; R. L. c. 73)
went into eff ct, and are gove rn cl by its provisions. The plaintiff
i a hold r in due course of the $200 ch ck within R. L. c. 73 ,
§ 6q . This section is taken from § 29 of the English bill of
xchange act of 1882, and T!Vatson v. Russell is cited in Chalmers,
]?_ills of Exchang , (5th ed .) 8 , as an exam pl of a person wh°'
is a holder in du course within that section.
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It was stated by Lord Russell in Lewis v. Clay, 67 L. J. Q.

It was tated by Lord Rus ell in Lei is v. Clay) 67 L. J. Q.
B. (N. .) 224, that a pay e of a promi ory note cannot be a
hold r in du e cour e within § 29 of the Engli h bill of exchange
act of I 2. In H erd11ian v. vVheelcr) [ 1902] l K . B. 361, 372,
it was pointed out that this statem nt of Lord
u ell' was
obiter) and it was al o point d out that in Herdman v. Wheeler)
as in Lei is v. Clay) it wa not nece ary to pa on that point.
The case of Watson v. Rllssell) 3 B. & . 34; S. C. 5 . & . 968,
doe not eem to have been brought to the attention of the cou rt
in either of these ca
nd in neither case does the court seem
to have taken into con ideration the practice of a check beincr
procured drawn by an ther to be used in paying a debt due from
the person procurincr th check to the per on to whom the debtor
has had th check mad payable. The practice is recognized in
ca e of foreign bills of xchange, and the person procuring the
bill is known technically as the remitter of it. See U11nroe v.
Bordier) 8 C. B. 862, where it wa held that the payee of a
foreign bill, who took it from the r mitter of it for value, was
a bona fide purchaser for value. It was this practice which wa
applied in Watson v. Russell) 3 B. & S. 34, in case of a check.
In our opinion, a check received by the payee named in it, in
payment of a debt due from the remitter of the check, is received
by a holder in due course within § 6g of the negotiable in trument act, t. 1898, c. 533, R. L. c. 73, and that it is o even
if we hould follow the deci ion made in H erd11ian v. iVheeler)
[ 1902] l K. B. 361, and hold that a payee never can be a holder
in due cour e to whom the bill ha been "necrotiated" within the
last clause of§ 31 of our act, R. L. c. 73, which is taken from § 20
of the Engli h bill of exchange act of 1882 ( 45 & 46 \ ict.) c. 6r.
The rule that payment of a pre-exi tincr debt make the holder a
holder for value was adopted in R. L. c. 73 § 42.
But o far as th ch ck for $400 i concerned, we are of '.:2- ~ \ <i.....
,opinion that the evid n e hould have be n admitted. If the~~ 4- ~
defendant' tor were found to b tru , namely, that he handed ~ ,
th check to the plaintiff' manacrer at her hou e, thi check
would stand on the ame footing a the other. But the tory of
the plaintiff' manager wa that the h ck wa brought to him by
the defendant's hu band, igned in blank by the lefendant, and
that it wa filled up by him for the um of .fOO. ' ith the hu band' con nt. \ e a ume in fa or of th plaintiff that thi i
to be interpr ted to m an that th only blank in the check when
it was brought to the plaintiff's mana 5 er by th defendant
husband, wa in the amount for whi h it a to b drav n.
1

B. (N. S.) 224, that a payee of a promissory note cannot be a

holder in due course within § 29 of the English bills of exchange

act of 1882. In Herdman v. Wheeler, [1902J 1 K. B. 361, 372,

it was pointed out that this statement of Lord Russell's was

obiter, and it was also pointed out that in Herdman v. Wheeler,

as in Lewis v. Clay, it was not necessary to pass on that point.

The case of Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 34; S. C. 5 B. & S. 968,

does not seem to have been brought to the attention of the court

in either of these cases. And in neither case does the court seem

to have taken into consideration the practice of a check being

procured drawn by another to be used in paying a debt due from

the person procuring the check to the person to whom the debtor

has had the check made payable. The practice is recognized in

case of foreign bills of exchange, and the person procuring the

bill is known technically as the remitter of it. See Munroe v.

Bordier, 8 C. B. 862, where it was held that the payee of a

foreign bill, who took it from the remitter of it for value, was

a bona fide purchaser for value. It was this practice which was

applied in Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 34, in case of a check.
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In our opinion, a check received by the payee named in it, in

payment of a debt due from the remitter of the check, is received

by a holder in due course within § 69 of the negotiable instru-

ments act, St. 1898, c. 533, R. L. c. 73, and that it is so even

if we should follow the decision made in Herd man v. Wheeler,

[1902] 1 K. B. 361, and hold that a payee never can be a holder

in due course to whom the bill has been "negotiated" within the

last clause of § 31 of our act, R. L. c. 73, which is taken from § 20

of the English bills of exchange act of 1882 (45 & 46 Vict.) c. 61.

The rule that payment of a pre-existing debt makes the holder a

holder for value was adopted in R. L. c 73, § 42.

But so far as the check for $400 is concerned, we are of 3- v^&\ < ^-» £«,

opi nion that the evidence should have been admitted . If the -Oo^ ft M- <n>

defendant's story were found to be true, namely, that she handed c_X/-»^>ri .

the check to the plaintiff's manager at her house, this check

would stand on the same footing as the other. But the story of

the plaintiff's manager was that the check was brought to him by

the defendant's husband, signed in blank by the defendant, and

that it was filled up by him for the sum of S400. with the hus-

band's consent. We assume in favor of the plaintiff that this is

to be interpreted to mean that the only blank in the check, when

i t was brought to the plaintiff's manager bv the defendant's

husband, was in the amount for which it was to be drawn.

~
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It had been held in England before the bills of exchange act

in 1882, that such a piece of paper is not a check ; that one who

It had been held in England before the bill of exchange act

buys it buys'an incomplete instrument ' a nd ""his rights depeniL

upon the real authority which the signerT^ rTfTfact given in

TIT Flriatter. Awde v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869. See also Hatch v.

Sanies, 2 Sm. & G. 147; Hogarth v. Latham, 3 Q. B. D. 643;

Watkin v. Lamb, 85 L. T. (N. S.) 483; franco v. Clark, 26 Ch.

D. 257, 262. And see Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307. Such

an incomplete instrument is prima facie authority to fill in the

blank. Crutchly v. Mann, 5 Taunt. 529; Swan v. North British

Australasian Co., 2 H. & C. 175, 184. But this prima facie

authority, as we have said, may be met by evidence of what

authority was in fact given, as was done in Awde v. Dixon, 6

Exch. 869. If the blanks are filled up before the instrument is

negotiated, it does not lie in the maker's mouth to set up that

it was incomplete when delivered by him. In such a case, a plain-

tiff who buys for value without notice gets the rights of a bona

fide purchaser for value of a negotiable instrument ; and the fact

that there was no authority for filling up the blanks as they were

filled up, or the fact that the paper was otherwise wrongfully
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dealt with, is no defence. Schultz v. Astley, 2 Bing. N. C. 544;

Foster v. Mackinnon, L. R. 4 C. P. 704, 712.

In this Commonwealth it was held on the other hand that a

note with a blank for the payee's name was a promissory note

and not an incomplete paper which might be made into a prom-

issory note. Ives v. Farmers' Bank, 2 Allen, 236. And in Frank

v. Lilienfeld, 33 Gratt. 377, it was held that the purchaser in

good faith of a note in printed form indorsed by the defendant,

where the date, payee's name and amount had been left blank,

had an absolute right to fill in the amount advanced thereon and

to fill up the other blanks. It also has been held here, as it has

been held in England, that such a blank, in the absence of other

evidence, might be filled in by a bona fide purchaser; see Andro-

scoggin Bank v. Kimball, 10 Cush. 373 ; and that a bona fide

purchaser of such a paper which is filled before it is negotiated,

has the rights of a purchaser for value without notice. See

ll'hitmore v. Xickcrson, 125 Mass. 496; Binney v. Globe National

Bank, 150 Mass. 574. See also in this connection Herdman v.

Wheeler, [1902] 1 K. B. 361.

It is not necessary to consider how a blank check would be

dealt with in Massachusetts at common law, where the amount

in place of the name or date is lacking. The negotiable instru-

ments act, R. L. c. 73, §31, adopted the English law on this

e
'lXOll,
XC .
ee al O
:S earl es, 2 Sm. & G. 147; Hogarth v. La.tham, 3 Q.
. 643;
TVatkill \'. La1J1b, 85 L. T. (N. .) 483 · FraJzce v. Clari?, 26 Ch.
D . 257, 262. A nd e Ledwiclz v. 1ll cK im, 53 . Y. 307.
uch
an incomplete instrum ent i prinza facie authority to fill in th e
blank. Crutch!-:>' v. U awz, 5 Taunt. 529; S wall v . .X orth British
.r:l ustralasian Co . 2 11. & C. 175, l 4.
ut thi prima facie
ffi n1atte r.

authorit; a we hav e aid, may be m t by evidence of what
autho rity was in fact given, as was done in Awde v. Dixon, 6
Exch. 869. If the blanks are fill ed up before the instrument i
negotiated, it does not lie in the maker' mouth to et up that
it wa incomplete when delivere l by him. In such a case, a plaintiff who buys for value without notice gets the riO'hts of a bona
fide purchas r for value of a negotiable in trument; and the fact
that th ere was no authority fo r filling up th e blanks as they were
fill ed up, or the fact that the paper wa oth erwise wrongfully
dealt with, is no defence. Schult:: v. A stle31, 2 Bing. N. C. 544 ;
Foster v. M ac/n'mzon, L. R. 4 C. P. 704, 712.
In this Commonwealth it was held on the other hand that a
n ote with a blank for th e payee's name wa a promissory note
and not an incomplete paper which might be made into a promi ory note. I ves v. Fan11 ers Ba11ll, 2 Allen, 236. And in Frank
v. Lilicnf eld, 33 Gratt. 377 it was h eld that the purchaser in
good faith of a note in printed form indor d by the defendant,
where the date, payee' name and amount had been left blank,
had an al solute riD"ht to fill in the amount advanced thereon and
t fill up the other blank . It also has been held here, as it has
been h eld in England, that uch a blank, in the absence of other
vidence, might be fill d in by a bona fide purchaser; see Androscoggin Banll v. Kimball, 10 Cu h. 373; and that a bona fide
purcha r of uch a paper which i filled before it is negotiated,
has the riO'ht of a purcha er for value without notice. See
vVhitm ore v . 'i\- iclurso 11 , 125 1\Ia . 4 6; Billlle'y V. Globe National
Ba11k , 150 1a . 574. See also in this connection Herdman v.
vVheeler, [1 0-] l K. . 36r.
It i not neces ary to consider how a blank check would be
dealt with in /[as achu ett at common law, wher the amount
in place of the name or date i lacking. The negotiable instrument act, R. L. c. 73 , § 31, adopted the Engli h law on this
1
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point, and it follows that if Xcwcomb's story is to be believed,

the blank check brought to him must be treated as an incom-

plete instrument and not as a check.

The defendant further contends that it was inadmissible to

show the real authority given to the husband in the absence of

the plaintiff, and cites in support of that contention Markey v.

Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 103 Mass. 78, 93, and Byrne v. Massa-

soit Packing Co., 137 Mass. 313. These are cases where the act

done was within the ostensible scope of the authority given an

agent, and for that reason the real authority could not be invoked.

The only act relied on as giving ostensible authority to the hus-

band in the case at bar was putting him in possession of the

blank check. There was no more ostensible authority here than

there was in Awde v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869; Hogarth v. Latham,

3 Q. B. D. 643, or Wat kin v. Lamb, 85 L. T. (N. S.) 483. An

incomplete check gives an authority to fill it up which is only a

prima facie authority. It does not import an ostensible authority

to fill it up which is absolute.

The pla intiff's rights und er the blank check for $400, and to
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the monev received for it, depend upon the authority actually

given by the defendant when she signed it, and the evidence

off ered should have been admitted in respect of the credit

claimed for the $400 paid under the blank check.

The entry must be,

Exceptions su/tained.^ ^^__ ^ $ ^ a

W r HEN PERSON NOT DEEMED HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.

§ 55-

La Due v. Bank of Kasson (1883), j/ Minn. 5?.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for

Dodge county, refusing a new trial, — after a trial by Buckham,

J., a jury being waived. The case is stated in the opinion.

Jones & Gore, for appellant.

Chas. C. Willson, for respondent.

point, and it follows that if ewcomb's tory is to be beli ved,
the blank ch ck brought to him mu t be tr at d a an incomplete instrument and not as a check.
Th defendant further contend that it wa inadmissible to
show the r al authority aiv n t the hu band in the ab ence of
the plaintiff, and cite in upport of that cont ntion lvl arkey v.
Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 103 i\Ias . 78, 93 and Byrne v. Uassasoit Pac kin <r Co., 137 1a . 313. The e are ca e where the act
done was within the o tensible cope of the authority given an
ag nt, and for that reason the r al authority could not be invoked.
The only act relied on as giving ostensible authority to the husband in the case at bar was putting him in possession of the
blank check. There vva no more osten ible authority here than
ther wa in Awde v. Dixon, 6 Exch. 869; Hogarth v. Latham,
3 Q. B. D. 643, or T,Yatkin v. Lanib, 85 L. T. (N. S.) 483. An
incomplete check give an authority to fill it up which is only a
prim.a fac·ie authority. It doe not import an ostensible authority
to fill it up which is absolute.
.
The plaintiff's rights under the blank check for
oo, and to ~L,
"'
·
11
~~,..1-4-o
!he money received or it, epend upon the authority actua y
~ ~
given by the defendant when she signed it, and the evidence
~
offered should have been admitted in re pect of the credit
~
claimed for the $400 paid under the blank check.
\) _
.
~
The entry must be,
~ ~- ~~

_ _ _ _ Exceptio/ained.\.-- <»\-

Mitchell, J. At Kasson, Minnesota, on the 15th of October,

1 88 1, the defendant drew its draft or bill of exchange for $500 on

the Ninth National Bank of New York, payable on demand, to

the order of plaintiff, and. for value, delivered the same to the

payee, who, on the same day, indorsed it to one Edison, who held

WHEN PER 0

NOT DEEMED HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.

§ 55·

La Due v. Bank of Kasson (1883), 31 Uinn. 33.
Appea! by plaintiff from an order of the di trict court for
Dodge county, refusin g a new trial,-aft r a trial by Buckham,
J., a jury being waiv d. The ca e i tat d in the opinion.

Jones & Go'le, for app llant.
Chas. C. Willson, for r pond nt.
MITCHELL, J.
t as on, Minne ota, on th 15th of October,
1881, the d fendant dr w it draft or bill of xchan e for 500 on
th Ninth National Bank of i ew York, payable n demand, to
the order of plaintiff. and for value, d liv r d th
ame to the
pa ee who, on the same day, indor ed it to one Edi on, ' ho held

""'~ 9- ~
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M jj_:c it until the 8th of March, 1882, without presentation for pay-

^ • . . -, ' ^^BLment, and, on the day last named, indorsed it to one Jordan, who,

on the nth of the same month, indorsed it to the Exchange Bank

^j. Vj^s-Av^. of Louisiana. Missouri, which caused it to be presented for pay-

^♦^* -^*-Ss ment on the 15th of the month, when payment was refused, and

^^V^-r^vA the draft protested. On the 4th of April, the Exchange Bank

^A>vvA-v-^-f^ 3 -^ ;rans ^ erre< ^ ft to pl am tiff- No explanation is given why Edison

i^%i^jZ^2jA> nr ' ( ' lnc c l rait so ^ on g without presenting it for payment, nop

C ^Tj^tev^ ^ does ft a PP ear that either Jordan or any of the subsequent

j^^_^^3~ indorsees asked for any explanation of this fact when they pur-

^-yv^ta. o, i^*S<± chased it. In October, 1881, immediately after the draft in ques-

L >ju~»~^»»w 1 is-L tion had been transferred to him, Edison absconded from the

state, leaving debts unpaid, among which was a promissory note

for $500 and interest, dated September 26, 1881, payable in 30

days to the order of defendant bank, and which it then held and

still holds, and which has never been paid. About the first of

v^«^. a-.-* Vv-o November, 1881, the defendant, having ascertained that Edison

t *c^£°~W~ was tne owner of the draft in question, notified the drawee not

^to pay it. This last fact is, perhaps, not material. Upon being

, - sued upon the draft, the defendant now seeks to set off against it
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^"Y^*^ w. th e promissory note against Edison already referred to, and the

' only question in the case is whether, under the facts stated, this

can be done. It may be here remarked that La Due, the payee,

was clearly discharged from liability as indorser, by the delay of

five months in presenting the_ draft for payment^ hence, he can

claim no rights as an indorser who has been compelled to pay.

His purchase of the draft from the Exchange Bank was a purely

voluntary act, and he has now no greater rights under it than

if he had never before been a party to the instrument.

According to the commercial law in England, and in prob-

ably all those states where a different rule has not been fixed

by statute, an indors ee of an overdue bill or negotiable note takes

it subject only to such equities or defences as attached to the hi IT

or note itself, and not to claims arising out of collateral matters'

or independent transactions, whether they arose against the payee

or an intermediate holder; the idea being that such commercial"

paper, although overdue, did not lose its negotiability. Our state.

following the example of many others, has by statute entirely

changed this rule. Gen. St. 1878, c. 66, §27, provides: "In the

case of an assignment of a thing in action, the action by the

assignee is without prejudice to any set-off or other defence

existing at the time of, or before notice of, the assignment ; but

this section does not apply to a negotiable promissory note or bill

. ,..i.k-:-

it until the th of :March, 1882, without pre entation for payment, and, on th day la t named, indor ed it to one Jordan, who,
on the I Ith of the am month indorsed it to the Exchange Bank
~
of Loui iana, l\Ii ouri, which cau d it to be presented for payt ,._ ~'<A ment on th I 5th of the month, when payment wa refu ed, and
~~the draft prot ted.
n the 4th of pril, the Exchange Bank
.......,.~ ran ferred it to plaintiff.
o explanation i given why Edi on
; - '-'">
I~ n lcl the draft 0 long without presenting it for payment, nOF
;..;,. ~,....,,.. 'c;.._
do
it appear that either Jordan or any of the ubsequent
·
indor ees asked for any explanation of this fact wh n th y pur~ cha ed it. In October, 1881, immediately after the draft in ques~
tion had been transferred to him, Edison abscond d from the
tate, leaving debts unpaid, among which was a promissory note
fo r 500 and intere t, dated eptember 26, 1881, payable in 30
day to the order of defendant bank, and which it then held and
till holds, and which has never been paid. About the first of
~- ~-\I\.;) November, 1881, the defendant, having ascertained that Edison
~
was the owner of the draft in question, notified the drawee not
"
- ._to pay it. This last fact is, perhaps, not material. Upon being
• -\;: - S\-1
WV sued upon the draft, the defendant now seeks to set off against it
~ ""' t he promi ory note against Edison already referred to, and the
'onl y question in the case is whether, under the facts stated, this
can be done. It may be here remarked that La Due, the payee,
wa clearly discharged from liability as indorser, by the delay of
fiv e month in presentm - t e draft fo r ~ ment. hence, he can
claim_n_Q_ rights as_ an in_q;~e!_ who_b._as been compelled to pay.
His purchase of the draft from the Exchange Bank was a pure y
voluntary act, and he has now no greater rights under it than
if he had never before been a party to the instrument.
According to the commercial law in England, and in probably all those state where a different rule has not been fixed
by statute, an indor ee of an overdue bill or negotiable note takes
!_!__ ubject only to uc egmbes or e ences as __c:t~ached to the bill
~ r note itself and 1l.Q_t to cl~ms arising out of collateral matters
or independent transactions, whetf1er they arose-against t le payee
or an- intermediate holder: the id a being t at s uch corii'fuercialpaper, although overdue, did not lose its neo-otiability.
ur state.
following the example of many other . has by statute entirely
changed thi rule. Gen. t. 1878, c. 66 § 27, provide : "In the
ca e of an a ignment of a thing in action, the action by the
a signee is without prejudice to an) set-off or other defence
exi ting at the time of or before noti e of, the assio-nment; but
this section does not apply to a neo-otiable promissory note or bill
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of exchange, transferred in good faith and upon good considera-

tion before due." The effect of this statute, clearly, is to place

an overdue bill or note upon the same footing as any other chose*

Tn actio n, and, if it Be assigned after due, a set-off to the amount

of the note or draft may be made <>l' any demand existing against

any person who has assigned or transferred such note or hill

after it became due. if the demand is such as might have been set_

off against the assignor while the note or bill belonged to him.

A set-off arising out of an independent transaction against an

intermediate holder is thus placed upon the same footing as an

equity attaching to the bill or note itself against the original

payee. This same rule is laid down, in somewhat different lan-

guage, in the provision regarding set-off in justice's court. Gen.

St. 1878, c. 65, § 40. To illustrate, suppose Edison had been the

payee, and had obtained the draft by fraud and without consid-

eration, or had received payment on it while he owned it, but by

oversight or mistake it remained in his hands. These would have

been defences attached to the draft itself, as between the original

parties, and, if the draft was overdue when Edison indorsed it

to Jordan, defendant could have set them up even under the
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former rule against the draft in the hands of Jordan, or those to

whom he subsequently transferred it. But now, under the stat-

ute, defendant could set off this note, although it arises out of

an independent matter, against an intermediate holder, because

it is a demand which might have been set off against Edison

while the draft belonged to him, had he sued on it. Linn v. Rugg,

19 Minn. 145, (181) ; Martin v. Pillsbury, 23 Minn. 175; Harris

v. Burwell, 65 N. C. 584.

Such a rule may render precarious the business of dealing in

overdue paper, especially when it has passed after maturity

through the hands of several holders. The policy of such a law

is exclusively for the legislature, but we may suggest that we see

no reason why overdue commercial paper should not be placed

on the same footing as any other chose in action. Notes and bills

of exchange are only treated as business paper when negotiated

before maturity. When overdue they are dishonored. In the

principal commercial states of the Union, such as New York, this

same rule has long been established by statute. Hence, our state

cannot be charged with having adopted a rule in opposition to the

judgment or usages of the business world.

The only question left, then, is whether this draft was over-

due when Edison indorsed it to Jordan on the 8th of March, 1882,

four months and twenty-three days after its date.

of exchange, transferred in good faith and upon good consideration befor du ." The ff ct of thi tatute, clearly, is to place
an overdue bill r note -upon th same footing a any other chose- .
ill _act~ and, if it b a igned after due, a et-off to the amounf
of the note or draft mayb made
any demand xisting against
any p r on wh ha a i n d or tran ferred uch note or bil1
after it becam due, if th demand i such a might have been set
off again t th a ignor hile the not or bill belonged to him~
A set-off arisino- out of an independent transaction again t an
intermediat hold r i thu placed upon the same footing as an
equity attaching to the bill or note itself against the original
payee. Thi ame rule i laid down, in somewhat different language, in the provi ion regarding set-off in justice's court. Gen.
St. I 78, c. 65, § 40. To illustrate, uppose Edison had been the
payee, and had obtained th draft by fraud and without con ideration, or had received payment on it while he owned it, but by
over ight or mi take it remained in hi hand . These would have
been defences attached to the draft itself, as between the original
partie , and, if the draft was overdue when Edi on indorsed it
to Jordan, defendant could have set them up even under the
former rule again t the draft in the hands of Jordan, or those to
whom he sub equently transferred it. But now, under the statute, defendant could set off this note, althOLwh it ari es out of
an independent matter, aaain t an intermediate holder, because
it is a demand which mio-ht have been et off against Edi on
while the draft belonged to him, had he sued on it. Linn v. Rugg,
19 Minn. 145 ( 181) ; JVJ artin v. Pillsbur:y, 23 Minn. 175; H Mris
v. Burwell, 65 N. C. 584.
uch a rule may render precarious the bu ine of dealino- in
overdue paper, e p cially when it ha pa sed after maturity
through the hand of v ral holder . The policy of uch a la\
is exclu ively for the leo-i lature, but we may suo-ge t that we ee
no reason \ h overdue commercial paper hould not be placed
on the ame footino- a any other cho in action.
ote and bill
of exchan e ar only tr ated a bu in
paper wh n neo-otiated
before maturity. Wh n overdue they are di honor d. In the
principal commercial tat of the nion, uch a
w York, thi
same rule ha lono- b n e tabli hed by tatute. H nee, our state
cannot b haro-ed ' ith havin adopt d a rul in oppo ition to the
judgment or u ao-e of the bu in
,, orld.
T he only que tion 1 ft , then i wheth r thi draft ' a overdue when Edi on indo r ed it to Jordan on the th of March 1882
four month and tw nty-three day aft r it dat .
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I n the case of a bill, note, or check, paya ble on demand , no

exact day of payment is fixed in the instrument. The general

. r ule is that it must be presented for pa yment within a reasonable

time, having in view ordinary business usages, and the purposes^

which paper of that class is intended to subserve.

The term "ov erdue,"_ as applied to a demand bill of exchange,_

i- used in different conuections_in each of which it has a differ-

ent meaning; and the failure to keep these distinctions in mind

has perhaps led to some misapprehension regarding the present

case> Somtimes jt is used m reference to a right of action against

a drawer or indorser. In that connection a bill is not overdue,

until presented to the drawee for payment, and payment refused.

Sometimes the term is used in considering whether an indorser.

lias been released by a failure of the holder to present the bill for_

payment, and to give the indorser notice of its dishonor within a

reasonable timeCJ AVgain, the term is applied to a bill which has

come into the hands of an indorser so long after its issue as to

charge him with notice of its dishonor, and thus subject it in his

h ands to the defences which the drawer had against it in the

han ds of the assignor. It is in this last connection that the term
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"overdue" is considered in the present cas e. That in this case.

a bill may be said t o be overdue, although it has never been in

fact presented to the drawee for paj yn^ent, is recognized every-

where throughout the books, and will be apparent, we think, on a

moment's reflection. Suppose a draft has been held by the payee

five years, without ever having been presented to the drawee for

pavment, and is then indorsed to another party. It would not be

due so as to give a right of action against the drawer, because his

contract is only to pay in case it is not paid by the drawee on

presentation. But there would be no doubt that it would be over-

due or dishonored, so as to charge it in the hands of the indorsee

with any defences which the drawer had against it in the hands

of the payee, although, when he took it, it had never been pre-

sented for payment. The retention of a demand draft so long a

time without presentment, when no defence exists against it,

is so unusual and contrary to business usages that this circum-

stance would be held to charge the indorsee with notice when he

purchased the draft that it was dishonored. The lapse of time

would in such case be so great as to put a purchaser upon inquiry

as to the reason why it was still outstanding and unpaid.

The cases are almost innumerable in which it has been held

that parser payable on demand had been outstanding so long when.

transferred, as to be deemed overdue and dishonored^ so as to

In th e ca e of a bill, note.z.....9r _ch~k a 'able on demand, no
ex ac t day of payment i fixed in the in trument. The gene ral
· rule is that it mu t be present d for payment within a reasonable
time, havin o- in view ordinary bu ines usao-e , -and the purposes
which pager of that c@. §.. is intended to subserve. _
Th lerm_"ov . .!:_due" a applied to a demand bill of exchange,
i u ectin different conn ct.i.Qp in each of which it ha a differ-ent meaning ; and the failure to keep these di tinction in mind
ha perhaps 1 d to some misapprehen ion regarding the pre ent
1
ca . ~omtim it i used in reference to a right of action againsL
a drawer or indorser. In that connection
bill is not overdue
;ntil r - e~te"'d to th~dra,;ee fo r payment, and _payment refuse~
'l
ometimes=the ~te~m is u~ed in sonsidering whether an indo rser ha been rele? ed by a fai lure of the holder to pre ent the bill for
~yment, and t~ive theJ..ndorser notice of its dishonor within 3;
!.S!asonable tin~UJAgain, the term i applied to a bill which ha
come into the hands of an indorser so long after its i sue as to
charge him with notice of its dishonor, and thu ubj ect it in his
hands to the defences which the drawer had against it in the
hands of the assigno~. It is in this last connection th at the term
''overdue" is considered in the present case. That in this case
a bill may be said to be overdue. althoug-h it has neve r been in
fact presented to the drawee for payment, is recognized everywhere throughout the books, and will be apparent, we think, on a
moment's reflection. Suppose a draft has been held by th e payee
five years, without ever having been presented to the drawee for
payment, and is then indorsed to another party. It would not be
due so as to g ive a right of action against the drawer, because hi
contract is only to pay in case it is not paid by the drawee on
presentation. B ut there would be no doubt that it would be overdue or dishonored, so as to charge it in the hands of th indorsee
with any defences which the drawer had against it in th e hand
of the payee, although, when he took it, it had never bee n preent d for payment. The retention of a demand draft o long a
time without presentment, when no d fence exists ao-ainst it,
is so unusual and contrary to bu ine u ages that thi circumtance would be held to charge the indorsee with notice when he
purchased the draft that it wa dishonored. Th lapse of time
would in uch case be so g reat as to put a purchaser upon inquiry
as to the reason why it was till out tanding and unpaid.
The ca e are almost innurnerabl in which it has been held
that m r .Payable on demand had been outstandino- so long when
wns.f erred as to be_ deem-ed overdue and disbonored so as to
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subject it, in the hands of the purchaser, to any defences which

the maker or drawer had against it in the hands of the payee;

and in none of these cases is the question whether or not the

paper had been, before the transfer, presented for payment to

the maker or drawee, referred to as at all material. Down v.

Hailing, 4 B. & C. 330 ; First Nat. Bank v. Needham, 29 Iowa,

249; Cowing v. Altman, 71 N. Y. 435; Sylvester v. Crapo, 15

Pick. 92; Ranger v. Carey, 1 Met. 369; Hcrrick v. Wolverton,

41 N. Y. 581 ; Story on Prom. Notes, § 207 and note ; Thompson

v. Hale, 6 Pick. 258; American Bank v. Jenncss, 2 Met. 288;

Carlton v. Bailey, 27 N. Ii. 230; Parker v. Tattle, 44 Me. 459;

Nevins v. Townsend, 6 Conn. 5; Camp v. Scott, 14 Vt. 387;

Morey v. Wakefield, 41 Vt. 24.

That in jletermining whether an indorsee took a demand n ote

or bill as jl ishonored and overdue paper, subject to all equities or

defences, the test is the length of time it has been outstan ding,

and not whether it has in fact been presented for paym ent, may

be illustrated in another way. Suppose a draft had in fact been

presented for payment, and payment refused, on the very day it

was issued, it would then be overdue as to the drawer, so that an
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action would then lie against him. But suppose, immediately after

such presentation, and on the same day, the holder should indorse

the draft to another, who took it in good faith, for value, without

notice of this actual dishonor; clearly such indorsee would not

take it as overdue paper, subject to the equities or defences against

it in the hands of the former holder, because, a reasonable time

for its presentation not having expired, there was nothing to put

him upon inquiry, or to charge him with notice of such equities.

Himmclman v. Hotaling, 40 Cal. III. In fact, in determ ining

whether an indorsee takes such paper as overdue paper, subject^

to such defences or equities, the question of actual demand and_

dishonor does not enter into the discussion.^ The point of inquiry

is, had the paper been outstanding so long after its date as to put

the purchaser upon inquiry, and charge him with notice that there

is some defence to it? In view of the well-known fact that bills

of exchange are not always transmitted immediately for pay-

ment, but first pass through the hands of several intermediate

holders in the ordinary course of business, and in other cases are

purchased by travellers to be carried with them instead of cur-

rency or coin, to be negotiated as occasion may require, we are

not disposed to lay down any narrow rule on this subject. But

in this case we think that the fact that this draft was. without any

explanation of the reason, found outstanding nearly five months

subject it, in the hand of the purcha er, to any defences which
the maker or drawer had against it in the hands of the payee;
and in none of thes cas s is the question whether or not the
paper had been, before th transfer, pre ented for payment to
the maker or drawee, referred to a at all material. Down v.
Halling) 4 B. & C. 330; First Nat. Ban/? v. iVeedham, 29 Iowa,
249; Cowillg v. Altman) 71 N. Y. 435; Sylvester v. Crapo, 15
Pick. 92; Ra11ger v. Carey) l Met. 369; H erricl? v. Wolverton,
41 N. Y. 581; tory on Prom. 1 ote , § 207 and note; Thompson
v. Hale, 6 Pick. 258; American Bani? v. Jenness, 2 Met. 288;
Carlton v. Bailey, 27 N. H. 230; Parker v. Tuttle) 44 Me. 459;
evins v. Townsend) 6 onn. 5; Camp v. Scott, 14 Vt. 387;
Morey v. Wakefield, 41 Vt. 24.
That in determining- whether an indorsee took a demand note
or bill a dishonored and overdue paper. subject to all equities
defence , the test is the length of time it has been outstandi;&..
and not whether it has in fact been presented for a _!!.1en_!i may
be illu trated in another way. Suppose a draft had in fact been
presented for payment, and payment refused, on the very day it
was issued, it would then be overdue as to the drawer, so that an
action would then lie again t him. But suppose, immediately after
such pre entation, and on the same day, the holder should indorse
the draft to another who took it in good faith, for value, without
notice of this actual di honor; clearly such indorsee would not
take it as overdue paper, subject to the equities or defences against
it in the hands of the former holder, because, a reasonable time
for its presentation not havino- expired, there wa nothing to put
him upon inquiry, or to charge him with notice of such equities.
Himnielman v. Hotaling, 40 Cal. I I I. In fact, in determining_
whether anjgdorsee tak~s _uch paper a ov~rdue paper, subject
to such defences or e uities the question of actual demand an<[
dishonor does not enter into the discus ion ~ The point of inquiry
is, had the paper been out tanding so long after its date as to put
the purcha er upon inquir}, and charo-e him with notice that there
is some defence to it? In view of the well-known fact that bills
of exchange are not always transmitted immediately for payment, but first pass through the hands of everal intermediate
holders in the ordinary cour e of bu ine , and in other ca e are
purchased by trav llers to be carried with them in tead of currency or coin, to be negotiated as occa ion ma require, we are
not dispo ed to lay down an narrow rule on thi ubject. But
in this ca e we think that the fact that thi draft wa without an
ex lanation of the reason fou nd ou t tanding nearly five month -

or
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V " - after it s date, fully justified the trial cou rt in holdi ng- it overdue

^ " rand dishonored when Jordan took it, so as to charge it in his

^. %i jOw-. vU*j*. Rands, or the hands of those who hold under him, with an?

<*~. v-->^ defence or set-off which the drawer had against it in the hands

y^^TT^of Edison, Order affirmed.

notice before full amount paid. § 56.
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Dresser v. Missouri etc. R. R. Const. Co. (18/6), 03 U. S. 02.

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Dis-

trict of Iowa.

Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. James Grant, for
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NOTICE BEFORE FULL AMOUNT PAID.

.
§ 56.

the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. George G. Wright, contra.

Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court.

This action is brought upon three several promissory notes

Dresser v . Missouri etc. R.R. Const. Co. (1876), 93 U.S. 92.

made by the Missouri and Iowa Railway Construction Company,

dated Nov. 1, 1872, payable at two, three, and four months, to the

order of William Irwin, for the aggregate amount of $10,000.

The defence is made that they were obtained by his fraudu-

lent representations.

But a single point requires discussion. Conceding that the
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present plaintiff received the notes before maturity, and that his

Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa.
Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. J a11ies Grant, for
the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. George G. Wright, contra.

holding is bona tide, the question is as to the amount of his recov-

ery.

Under the ruling of the court he recovered $500. His con-

testation is, that he is entitled to recover the face of the note, with

interest.

After the evidence was concluded, the plaintiff asked the

court to charge the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence,

that the plaintiff purchased the notes in controversy of William

Irwin for a valuable consideration, on the 1st of November, 1872

and paid v$500, part of the consideration, on 21st of January, 1873.

before any notice of any fraud in the contract, he was entitled to

recover the whole amount of the notes ; and the court refused this

instruction. But the court charged the jury, —

"That, in the first place, the jury must find that there was

fraud in the inception of the notes as alleged ; and that if the

defendants failed to satisfy the jury of that fact, the whole defence

fails.

That if the fact of fraud be established, and the jury find

~fr.

JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.
This action i brought upon three several promissory notes
made by the Missouri and Iowa Railway Construction Company,
· dated Nov. r, 1872, payable at two, three, and four months, to the
order of vVilliam Irwin, for the aggregate amount of $ro,ooo.
The defence is made that they were obtained by his fraudulent representations.
But a single point requires discu ion. Conceding that the
pre ent plaintiff received the notes before maturity, and that his
holding is bona fide, the question i as to the amount of his recovery.
Under the ruling of the court he recovered $soo. His contestation i , that he is entitled to recover the face of the note, with
intere t.
fter the evidence was concluded the plaintiff asked the
court to charo-e the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence
that the plaintiff purchased the note in controversy of \ illiam
Irwin for a valuable con ideration, on th rst of November, 1872.,
and paid $soo, part of the con ideration, on 2r t of January, 1873.
before any notice of any fraud in the contract, he was ntitled to
recove r the whole amount of the notes; and the court refused this
in truction. But the court charged the jury."That, in the fir t place. the jury must find that there was
fr aud in th inception of the notes as alleged; and that if the
defendants failed to satisfy the jury of that fact, the whole defence
fail
That if the fact of fraud be established. and the jury find
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from the evidence that the plaintiff paid $500 upon the notes

without notice of fraud, and that after receiving notice of the

fraud the plaintiff paid the balance due upon the notes, he is pro-

tected only pro tan to; that is, to the amount paid before he

received notice."

It does not appear that, upon the purchase of the notes in

suit, the plaintiff gave his note or other obligation which might by

its transfer subject him to liability. His agreement seems to have

been an oral one merely, — to pay the amount agreed upon, as

should be required ; and he had paid $500, and no more, when

notice of the fraud was brought home to him.

The argument of the plaintiff in error is that negotiable

paper may be sold for such sum as the parties may agree upon,

and that, whether such sum is large or small, the title to the entire

paper passes to the purchaser. This is true, and if the plaintiff

h ad bought the notes in suit for $500, before maturity and without

notice of any defence, and paid that sum, or given his negotiable

note therefor, the authorities cited show that the whole interest

in the not e would have passed to him, and he could have recovered

the fuTTamount due upon them. {Fowler v. Strickland, 107
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Mass. 552; Park Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y. 490; Bank of Michi-

gan v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140). The present case differs from the

cases referred to in this respect. The notes in question were pur-

chased upon an unexecuted contract, upon which $500 only had

been paid when notice of the fraud and a prohibition to pay was

received by the purchaser. The residue of the contract on the

part of th e purchaser is unperformed, and honesty and fair deal-

ing require that he should not perform it ; certainly, that he should

not be permitted, by performing it, to obtain from the defendants

money which they ought not to pay. As to what he pays after

notice, he is not a p urchaser in good faith . He then pays with

"knowledge ot the _ fnmd, to which he becomes a consenting party.

O ne who pays with knowledge of a fraud is in no better position

than if he had not paid at all. He has no greater equity, and

receives no greater protection. Such is the rule as to contracts

generally. In the case of the sale of real estate for a sum payable

in instalments, and circumstances occur showing the existence of

fraud, or that it would be inequitable to take the title, the pur-

chaser can recover back the sum paid before notice of the fraud,

but not that paid afterwards. {Barnard v. Campbell, 53 N. Y.

73; Lewis v. Bradford, 10 Watts, 82; Juvenal v. Jackson, 2 Har-

ris, 529; id. 430; Youst v. Martin, 3 S. & R. 423, 430).

In Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 291, the court use this Ian-

from the vidence that the plaintiff paid $500 upon the notes
without notice of fraud, and that after receiving notice of the
fraud the plaintiff paid the balance due upon the not s, he is protected only pro tanto; that is, to the amount paid before he
received notice."
It does not appear that, upon the purchase of the notes in
suit, the plaintiff gave hi note or other obligation which might by
its tran fer ubject him to liability. His agreement seem to have
been an oral one merely,-to pay th amount agreed upon, a
hould be required; and he had paid $500, and no more, when
notice of the fr"aud was brought home to him.
The argument of the plaintiff in error is that negotiable
paper may be sold for such sum as the parties may agree upon,
and that, whether such sum is large or small, the title to the entire
paper pas es to the purcha er. This is true, and if the plaintiff
had bought the notes in suit for $soo, before maturity and without
notice of any defence, and paid that sum, or given his negotiable
note therefor, the authorities cited show that the whole interest
in the note would have assed to him and he could have recovered
the fu amount due upon them. (Fowler v. Strickland, ro7
Mass. 552; Park Bank v. vVatson, 42 N. Y. 490; Bank of Micln'gan v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140). The present case differs from the
cases referred to in this respect. The notes in question were purchased upon an unexecuted contract, upon which $soo only had
been paid when notice of the fraud and a prohibition to pay was
received by the purchaser. The residue of the contract on the
part of the purchaser is unperformed. and honesty and fair dealing require that he should not perform it; certainly, that he should
not be permitted, by performing it, to obtain from the defendant
money which they ought not to pay. As to what he pays after
notice, he is not a purchaser in good faith. He then pays with
'knowledge of the fraud, to which he becomes a consenting party.
One who pays with knowledge of a fraud i in no better po ition
than if he had not paid at all. He has no greater equity, and
receives no greater protection. Such i the rule as to contracts
generally. In the ca e of the sale of real e tate for a sum payable
in instalment , and circumstances occur hawing the existence of
fraud, or that it would b inequitabl to take the title, the purchaser can recover back the um paid before notice of the fraud,
but not that paid afterwards. (Barnard v. Ca111pbell 53 N. Y.
73; Lewis v. Bradford, IO Watts, 82 · JuveJJa! v. Jackson, 2 Harris, 529; id. 430; Youst v. li1 artin, 3 S. & R. 423, 430).
In Weaver v. Ba.rde11, 49 N. Y. 291, the court u e this Ian-
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guage: "To entitle a purchaser to the protection of a court of

cquitv. as against a legal title or a prior equity, he must not only

be a purchaser without notice, but he must be a purchaser for a

valuable consideration; that is, for value paid. Where a man

purchases an estate, pays part and gives bonds for the residue,

notice of an equitable incumbrance before payment of the money,

though after giving the bond, is sufficient. (Touz-ille v. Naish,

3 P. Wins. 306; Story v. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 630). Mere

security to pay the purchase price is not a purchase for a valu-

able consideration. (Hardingham v. Nicholls, 3 Atk. 304; Maun-

drell v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. 246, 271 : Jackson v. Cadwell, 1

Cowen, 622; Jewell v. Palmer, 7 J. C. 65). The decisions are

placed upon the ground, according to Lord Hardwicke, that if

the money is not actually paid the purchaser is not hurt. He can

be released from his bond in equity."

The plaintiff here occupies the same position as the bona fide

purchaser of the first of a series of notes, of which, after notice

of a fraud, he purchases the rest of the series. He is protected

so far as his g ood faith covers the purchase, and n o farther.

Upon receiving notice of the fraud, his duty wa s to refuse
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further paymen t ; and the facts before us required such refusal by

him. Authorities supra.

Crandell v. Vickcry, 45 Barb. 156, is in point. Holdridge had

obtained the indorsement by Vickery of his (Holdridge's) notes

by false and fraudulent representations. These notes were trans-

ferred to Crandall without notice or knowledge of the fraud, he

giving to Holdridge several checks for the amount, upon the

understanding that they were not to be presented for payment,

but when the money was wanted, he was to give new checks as

needed. Before giving the new checks, plaintiff was informed

of the fraud, and requested not to make payment, or to give his

checks. I te did, however, give his new checks, according to the

original agreement, and brought suit upon the notes against Vick-

ery, the indorser.

It was held that he was not a bona fide holder, for the reason

that the transaction was executory when he received notice of

the fraud; that he had then parted with no value; that the real

obligations were given afterwards, and under circumstances that

afforded no protection.

That case is stronger for the holder than the one before us,

in the fact that checks were there given on the original trans-

action, which might have been presented or passed off to the pre-

g-uage : "Tn entit le a purcha r to th protection of a court of
L'quity, a again,t a le al tit! or a prior iuity, h mu t not only
he a pu rcha er with out noti , but he mu t be a purchase r for a
yaJuablc con id rati o n; that i , for valu paid. \\h er a man
purcha ' C an
tat , pay part and giv
bond for th re idue
notice of an equitable incumbrance b for payment of the m n y,
th ugh after giYing th bond, i ufficient. (Touville v. Xaislz,
J P. \Vm . 306 ; tory v. Lord fVindsor, 2
tk. 630 . ).I r
ccurity t pay the purchase price i not a purcha e for a valuabl con icleration . (H ardilz u/z.am v . Nicholls, 3 Atk. 304; M azt11drc!l v. 1lln.11ndrcll, IO Ve . 246, 271; Jackson v. Cadi ell, I
w en, 6_2; J C<-uell v . Palmer 7 J. . 65). The cl , 'i i n, ar
placed upon the ground, accordin to Lord Hardwicke, that if
the money i not actually paid the pu rcha er is not hurt. He can
b rclea ed from hi bond in equity."
The plaintiff here occupie the same position a the bona fide
purcha er of th fir t of a erie of no"te , of which, after notice
of a fraud, he purcha e the re t of th
eries. He i protected
o far a hi good faith covers the purchase, and no farther.
"Ce_on r c iYing notice of the fraud, his duty was to refuse
further payment; and th e facts before u r equired such refu ~ al by
him. Authorities supra.
Crandell v. Vickery•, 45 Barb. 156, is in point. Holdridge had
obtained the indor ement by \ ickery of hi (Holdridrr ' ) note
by false and fraudulent r pre entation . These notes were tran £erred to Crandall without notice or knowledge of the fraud, he
givinrr to Holdridge everal checks for the amount, upon the
understanding that they were not to be pr ented for payment,
hut when th money wa wanted, he was to give new check a
nc cled. Before giving the new check , plaintiff wa inform d
of th fraud. and r qu ted not to make payment, or to give hi
ch ck . l I c did, however, ive hi new checks, according to the
o riginal agr ment, and brought uit upon the note a?"ain t \ ickcry, the indorser.
It was held that he wa not a bona fide hold er. for th rea on
that the tran action was executory wh n he rec ived notice of
h fraud; that h had then part d with no value; that the real
ohlig-a,tion w r given aft rward , and under circum tance that
afforded no protection.
That ca e i tronger for the hold r than the on I fore us,
in th L: fact that ch ck were th re g iv n on the original transaction, which might have been presented or pa ed off to the pre-

PORTER
judice of the maker; while here the transaction was oral through-

out.

To the same purport in principle, although upon facts s*

what different, are the cases of Garland v. The Salem Bank, 9

Mass. 408; The Fulton Bank v. The Phoenix Bank, 1 Hall, 562,

and White v. Springfield Bank, 3 Sandf. S. C. 227.

The cases are numerous that w r here a bona fide holder takes

a note mis appropriated, fraudulently obtained, or without con-

sideration, as c ollateral security, he holds for the amount advanced

upon it, and for that am ount only. (Williams v. Smith, 2 Hill,

3o0-

In Allaire v. Hartshorn, 1 Zabr. 663, the case was this:

Hartshorn sued Allaire on a note of $1,500 at ninety days, made

by Allaire. It was proved that the note had been misapplied by

one Pettis, to whom it had been entrusted ; that he had pledged

to the plaintiff as security for $750 borrowed of him on Hege-

man's check, and also as security for a $400 acceptance of another

party then given up to Pettis.

On the trial, the court charged the jury, that, if any consider-

ation was given by the plaintiff for the note, "they should not
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limit their verdict to the amount so given, but should find the

whole amount due on the face of the note." The case was carried

to the court of errors and appeals of the State of New Jersey,

upon an exception to this charge. The court reversed the judg-

ment, holding that, although a bona fide holder, Hartshorn could

recover only the amount of his advances.

The case before us is governed by the rule that the portion

of an unperformed contract which is completed after notice of

a fraud is not within the principle which protects a bona fide pur-

chaser.

No respectable authority has been cited to us sustaining a

contrary position, nor have we been able to find any. The judg-

ment below is based upon authority, and upon the soundest

principles of honesty and-£ear dealing.

It has our concurrence and is affirmed.
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Porter et al v. Hardy et al. (1901), 10 N. D. 557. §§ 126, 127.

Appeal from District Court, Wells county ; Glaspell, J.

Action by Frank J. Porter and others, doing business under

the firm name of Porter, Melick & Co., against L. M. Hardy and
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j udice of the makc: r; ' ·bile here th e tran action
oral throughout.
To th am purport in principle althou o-h up n fact omewhat different, ar lh ca
of Gar!aJLd v. Tlz c Salem Bank) 9
l\Ia . 40 ; The Fulton Banh v. The Pho enix Ballll I Hall, 562,
and TVhite \. Spri11 afield Bank) 3 andf. ~ . . 2_7_
The ca e ar nurnerou that wh re a bona fi de holder takL
a note mi appropriated, fraudulently obtained, or without conideration, as collat ral ecurity, he hold for the amount advanced
upon it, and for that amount only. ( vVilliams v. mith, 2 Hill,
301).
In lllaire v. Hartshorn, r Zabr. 663, th e ca e was thi :
Hart horn ued Allair on a note of $1,500 at ninety day , maue
by Allaire. It wa proved that the note had been misapplied by
one P etti . to \ horn it had been entrusted; that he had pledged
to the plaintiff a ecurity for $750 borrowed of him on Heo-eman' check, and al o a ecurity for a $400 acceptance of another
party th n given up to Pettis.
On the trial, the court charged the jury, th at, if any consideration wa given by the plaintiff for the note, "they should not
limit their ve rdict to the amount o g iven, bu t should find the
whole amount due on the face of the note." The case was carried
to the court of errors and appeals of the State of New J ersey,
upon an exception to this charge. The court reversed the judgment holding that, although a bo1ia nde holder, Hart horn could
recover only the amount of hi advance .
The case before us is governed by the rul e that th e portion
of an unperformed contract which is completed after notice of
a fraud i not within the principle which protects a bonp nde purcha er.
No re pectable authority has been cited to us su taining a
contrary position, nor have we been able to find any. The j udgment b low i ba ed upon authority, and upon the sounde t
principle of hone ty ancl-fea-r dealing.
'
It has our concurrence and is afli,nned.
lt> ~ .A,:,.,..
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126, 127.

Appeal from i trict ourt, \ V 11 county; L \ PELL) J.
Action by Frank J. Porter and oth r , doino- bu in s under
the firm name of Porter, M lick 7 o., ao-ain t L. . . I. Hard and
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thers. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

George . I. Bangs and Cochrane & Corliss, for appellants.

/•'. Baldwin, for respondents.

Young, J. — Plaintiffs, for cause of action, allege that on May

5, i8(^, the defendants executed and delivered their promissory

note, dated on that day, wherein, for value received, they prom-

ised to pay one E. Cooper, or order, $700. on October 1, 1894,

S700 on ( October 1, 1895, and $600 on October 1, 1896, with

interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum until paid, payable

annually ; and that plaintiff is indorsee in due course of said note;

and that the same has not been paid. The defendants, who are

ten in number, answer jointly. Broadly stated, their defense is

that they did not execute the note sued upon. The answer admits

the genuineness of their signatures, but alleges a fraudulent and

material alteration of the instrument to which such signatures

were originally attached, and a total want of consideration. The

trial was to the court without a jury, under § 5630, Rev. Codes,

1899. Judgment was ordered and entered for defendants. Plain-

tiff has appealed from the judgment, and in a statement of case
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settled under said section has specified for retrial by this court the

eighteenth finding of fact made by the trial court, which finding is

that "the defendants in signing said paper in the manner and

form in which it was presented to them, were not guilty of negli-

gence." All other findings of fact are conceded to be correct.

The following facts material to a determination of the ques-

tions presented by this appeal are established by the findings which

are unchallenged : On or about May 5, 1893, one R. A. White-

head had a number of imported stallions at Carrington, in Wells

county. The stallions were owned by E. Cooper, who was a

breeder and importer of blooded stallions, residing near Adrian,

Minn. Whitehead, who was Cooper's agent to sell said stallions,

solicited these defendants, who were farmers residing in the vicin-

ity of Carrington, to organize a stock company with a capital stock

of $2,000, for the purpose of purchasing one of these stallions.

The contemplated purchase was conditioned upon the organiza-

tion of the company and an examination of the stallion. The

defendants agreed with Whitehead that they would meet and try

to form a stock company if a sufficient number of farmers would

meet with them, and the said Whitehead thereupon produced a

book, which was so bound in the middle that upon being opened

the two pages appeared to be one continuous statement or con-

o,hers. F rom a j udgm nt in favor of defendant , plaintiffs appeal.
\ffi rmcu .
Gcor crc A . Ba1tgs and Cochrane & Corliss for appellant .
F. Baldwin, for r pond nt .
You G, }.- Plaintiff , for cau of action, allege that on May
5, I 93, the defendant x ecuted and delivered their promi sory
note, dat d on that day, wher in, for valu received, they promi d to pay one E . Cooper, or order, $700, on October I, 1894
7 00 on October l, 1895, and $600 on
ctober l, 1896, with
in tere t at the rate of 8 per cent. per annum until paid, payable
annually ; and that plaintiff i indor ee in due course of said note;
and that the same ha not be n paid. The defendant , who are
ten in number, an wer jointly. Broadly stated, their defense i
that they did not execute the note sued upon. The an wer admit
the O'enuineness of their siO'natures, but alleges a fraudulent and
material alteration of the instrument to which such ignatures
were originally attached, and a total want of consideration. The
trial was to the court without a jury, und r § 5630, Rev. Codes,
1899. Judgment was order d and entered for defendants. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment, and in a statement of ca e
settled und er said ection has specified for retrial by this court the
eighteenth findinO' of fact made by the trial court, which finding is
that "the defendants in signing said paper in the manner and
form in which it was presented to them, were not guilty 0£ negliO'ence." All other findings of fact are conceded to be correct.
The following facts material to a determination of the question presented by this appeal are establi hed by the findings which
are unchall nO'ed: On or about May 5, 1893, one R. A. Whitehead had a number of imported stallions at Carrington, in Wells
county. The stallions wer owned by E. Cooper, who was a
breeder and importer of blooded stallions, residing near Adrian,
Minn. Whitehead, who was Cooper's aO'ent to sell said stallions,
olicited these defendants, who were farmers residing in the vicinity of Carrington, to organize a tock company with a capital stock
of $ 2 ,000, for the purpose of purchasing one of these stallion .
T he contemplated purcha e wa conditioned upon the organization of the company and an examination of the stallion. The
<l f ndants agreed with vVhit head that they would meet and try
to form a tock company if a sufficient number of farmers would
meet with them, and th e aid Whitehead thereupon produced a
book, which was o bound in the middle that upon being opened
the two pages appeared to be one continuous statement or con-
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tract, and said statement or contract was so punctuated that it

would show one continuous instrument ; whereas in fact the leaves

of the book were so perforated that they could be detached down

in the binding, but in such a manner as not to be easily percept-

ible. Said Whitehead requested the defendants to sign said state-

ment or contract, stating and representing to them, and each of

them, that all he wanted was their names to show that they were

willing to meet and form a stock company, and that when he got

names enough he would notify them, and have them meet for

that purpose. He also represented that the memorandum of

agreement was to the effect that the signers thereof would meet,

and form a stock company, and, if organized, they would buy a

horse, and give three notes therefore to E. Cooper, if, on examina-

tion, they were satisfied with the horse; and it was agreed that

they were not to execute and deliver their promissory note until

said organization was duly effected, and a horse bought. Relying

upon these representations, the defendants signed the printed

document contained in the book referred to. In said book com-

mencing upon the upper page, and ending at the bottom of the

lower page, were the following words and figures, when signed
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by these defendants, to wit :

Stock Contract.

We, the undersigned stockholders, realizing the necessity of

improving our horses, do hereby associate ourselves together to

buy of E. Cooper the imported stallion

No said is

guaranteed to be a breeder. Certificate of registry to accompany

the horse. Capital Stock,

tract, and said statement or contract was so punctuated that it
would show one continuous instrument; whereas in fact the leaves
of the book were so p rforated that they could be detached down
in the binding, but in such a manner as not to be easily perceptible. Said Whitehead requested the def ndant to ign said statement or contract, tating and representing to th m, and each of
them, that all he wanted was their names to how that they were
willing to meet and form a stock company, and that when he got
name nough he would notify them, and have them meet for
that purpo e. He al o r presented that the memorandum of
agreement wa to the effect that the signers thereof would meet,
and form a stock company, and, if organized, they would buy a
horse, and give three notes therefore to E. Cooper, if, on examination, they were satisfied with the horse; and it was agreed that
they were not to execute and deliver their promissory note until
said organization ~as duly effected, and a horse bought. Relying
upon the e representations, the defendants signed the printed
document contained in the book referred to. In said book commencing upon the upper page, and ending at the bottom of the
lower page, were th e following words and figures, when signed
by these defendants, to wit:

$2,000.00. May 5, 1893.

For value received we, or either of us, promise to pay to

Stock Contract.

or order dollars on the first day of ...... . 189. ., and

dollars on the first day of 189. ., and dollars on the

first day of 189. . . Bank of with interest at

per cent, per annum from date until paid, payable annually.

Here followed the signatures of the defendants.

That portion of the contract above set out down to the words

"Capital Stock," and including the same, was upon the upper

page, and the rest was upon the lower page. Between the pages,

and close under the bound portion of the book, were perfora-

tions, by which the lower page could be detached. This book

was presented to the defendants for their signatures while they

were at work in their fields. All of them were able to read and

We, the under igned tockholders, realizing the necessity of
improving our horses, do hereby associate our elves together to
buy of E. Cooper the imported ............ stallion ........... .
No ....................... said ... . ................... is
guaranteed to be a breeder. Certificate of registry to accompany
the horse. Capital Stock,
$2,000.00.
I fay 5, 1893.
For value received we, or either of us, promise to pay to ..... .
or order ...... dollar on the first day of. . ., ... 189 .. , and ..... .
dollar on the first day of ...... 189 .. , and ...... dollar on the
first day of. ..... 189 . ., Bank of. ...... ., with interest at. .... .
per cent. per annum from date until paid, payable annually.
Here followed th i natures of th defendant .
That portion of the contract above et out down to the words
"Capital Stock," and including the ame, ' as upon the upper
page, and the re t was upon th lower page.
tween th pa es
and close under th bound portion of the book. were perforations, by which th lower page could be detached. Thi book
was presented to the defendants for their io-nature while the_
were at work in their field . All of them were able to read and
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write, and they all read the paper hereinbefore set out before sign-

ing the same and they understood its general purpose. White-

head, however, opened the book but partially, and because of the

way in which it was bound it was almost impossible to notice the

perforations. Thereafter, Whitehead, without the knowledge or

consent of these defendants, or any of them, tore off the lower

\\'rite, and they a ll read th e paper h r inbefore set out before igning the ame and they under tood its general purpose. Whitehead , howe er, p necl the bo k but partially, and because of the
\\'ay in which it wa bound it was almost impossible to notic the
perforations. Thereafter, \ hitehead, without the knowledge or
consent of th e e defendant , or any of th m, tore off th 1 w r
page, containing th ignature of th ese defendants, and fill ed in
the blank o a to fo rm the note sued upon, which note omitting
the i<Ynature , read as follows:
$2,ooo.oo
New Rockford, N. Dak.,
1

page, containing the signatures of these defendants, and filled in

the blanks so as to form the note sued upon, which note omitting

the signatures, reads as follows:

$2,000.00 New Rock ford, N. Dak.,

May 5, 1893.

For value received, we, or either of us, promise to pay to E.

Cooper, or order, seven hundred dollars on the first day of Octo-

ber, 1894, and seven hundred dollars on the first day of October,

May 5, 1893.

1895, and six hundred dollars on the first day of October, 189(5, at

New Rockford, N. D., Bank of New Rockford, with interest at

eight per cent, per annum from date until paid, payable annually.

The words and figures in italics were filled in by Whitehead.

The stock company was not formed, and no horse was purchased

by the defendants. Whitehead, however, after detaching the
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lower page, and filling out the blanks, sent the pretended note to

E. Cooper, his principal. On or about June 1, 1893, Cooper

indorsed the note in suit to plaintiff as collateral security to a

debt which he then owed it, and received back from plaintiff other

collateral security. The amount of Cooper's indebtedness to the

plaintiff was then and is now in excess of the amount of the note

here in suit.

It further appears from the findings that no part of the note

in suit has been paid ; that plaintiff parted with value for said note

in the due and regular course of business, before maturity, and

in good faith, without notice of any defects in the execution of

said paper, or of the fact that a portion of it had been filled out

after it had been executed by the defendants to said E. Cooper,

or that any paper or writing had been attached to said paper, or

was in the same book with it, or of any other matter or thing

which would provoke inquiry as to the defense now set up by the

defendants.

The question of the defendants' negligence in signing the

document, which was afterwards converted into the note in suit, —

and that is the only question relied upon by appellant, — is to be

determined upon the facts hereinbefore set out. The trial court

found, both as a matter of fact and as a conclusion of law, that

the defendants were not guilty of negligence. It appears from

For value received, we, or either of us, promise to pay to E.
Coo per or order, seven hundred dollars on the first day of October, 189-J, and se'l!Cn hundred dollars on the first day of October,
1895, an d six hundred dollars on the fir t day of October, 1896, at
N cw R ockford, N . D., Bank of New Roc!cford, with interest at
eig ht per cent. per annum from date until paid, payable annually.
T he word and figures in italics were filled in by Whiteh ad.
The tock company was not formed, and no horse was purchased
by th e defendants. \i\Thitehead, however, after detaching th e
lower page, and filling out the blanks, sent the pretended note to
E . Cooper, his principal. O n or about June l, 1893, Cooper
indorsed the note in uit to plaintiff a collateral security to a
debt which he then owed it, and received back from plaintiff other
coll ate ral security. The amount of Cooper's indebtedness to the
plain tiff was then and is now in excess of the amount of the note
here in suit.
It further appears from the findings that no part of the note
in suit has been paid; that plaintiff parted with value for said note
in the due and regular course of busin e s, before maturity, and
in good faith, without notice of any defects in th execution of
said paper, or of the fact that a portion of it had been filled out
after it had been executed by the defendants to said E. Cooper,
or that any paper or writing had been attached to aid paper, or
wa in the same book with it, or of any other matter or thing
which would provoke inquiry as to the def n e now set up by th e
defendants.
The question of the defendants' n gligence in siO'ning th e
document, which wa aft rwards converted into the note in suit,and that is the only question relied upon by appellant,-is to be
determined upon the facts her inbefore set out. The trial court
found. both as a matter of fact and as a conclusion of law, that
the defendants were not guilty of negligence. It appears from
1
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the facts already stated that the note in suit is without consider-

ation, and that it has been materially altered, and is not the instru-

ment originally signed by the defendants. It goes without saying

that, as between the original parties, a recovery could not be had.

The defense now interposed would necessarily be sustained.

What is the position of the plaintiff, who concededly is a pur-

chaser of the note in due course? Can the plaintiff, merely

because it is a good faith purchaser of the note in suit, recover on

the same, notwithstanding the fact of the alteration of the instru-

ment ? There can be no doubt that under the general rule relating

to the alteration of instruments a negative answer would be

required to this question. The alteration in this case was material,

and made by the agent of the payee, and without the consent of

the defendants. It is well settled that, e ven, as agai nst an innocent

indorsee, a negotiable instrument so altered is rendered void. The

rule which is sustained by both reason and authority is well

stated by Judge Dillon in his article on "Alteration of Instru-

ments" in 2 Enc. Law & Proc, at page 177, as follows: "Any/

change in an instrument which causes it to speak a different
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language in legal effect from that which it originally spoke—

which changes the legal identity or character of the instrument,

eit her in its terms or the relation of the parties to it — is- a material

;! ;an ge, or technical alteration, and such a change will in validate

the i nstrument against all parties not consenting to the change.

Not only will an alteration vitiate the instrument as between the

immediate parties, but also as aj rains^ a bona fide holder or

Indorsee without notice ; and the latter can acquire no right or

title other than that of the person under whom he claims." See

cases cited by state under note 82 ; also, 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law

(2d Ed.) p. 193, and cases cited; also, the opinion of this court

in Bank v. Laughlin, 4 N. D. 391, 61 N. W. Rep. 473. and § 3937,

Rev. Codes, 1899, which is declatory of the rule as above stated.

As was said in Bank v. Laughlin, supra, "After such alteration,

the paper is no longer the same paper as that sent out by those

who executed and delivered the original instrument." Counsel

for plaintiff frankly admits that under the rule as above stated

the plaintiff cannot recover in this action. Their sole contention

is that upon the facts of this case the defendants are estopped

from denying the execution of the note in the form in which it

was purchased by the plaintiff. It is claimed that the defendants

were guilty of gross negligence, both in fact and in law. in sign-

ing the instrument which was afterwards converted into the note

sued upon. While it is a well-settled rule that a material and

the facts already tated that the note in suit i~ without consideration, and that it has been materially altered, and is not the instrument originally igned by the defendants. It goes without saying
that, as betw en the original parties, a recovery could not be had.
The defense now interposed would neces arily be su tained.
What is the position of the plaintiff, who concededly is a purcha er of the note in due course? Can the plaintiff, merely
because it is a good faith purchaser of th note in suit, recover on
the same, notwithstanding the fact of the alteration of the instrument? There can be no doubt that under the general rule relating
to the alteration of instruments a negative answer would be
required to thi question. The alteration in this case was material,
and made by the agent of the payee, and without the consent of
the defendants. It is well settled that,~ven as against an innocent
indorsee, a negotiable instrument so altered is rendered void. The
rule which is sustained by both reason and authority is well
stated by Judge Dillon in his article on "Alteration of Instruments" in 2 Enc. Law & Proc., at page 177, as follows: "Any
...__..._
chanae in an instrument which causes it to s eak a different
language in legal effect from that which it originally spokewhich changes the legal identity or character of the instrument ,
either in it terms or the relation of the parties to it-is· a material
change, or technical alteration, and such a change will inyalidate
the instrument against all parties not consenting to the change.
Not onl will an alteration vitiate the instrument as between the
1mme ta e ar ies
u
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~orsee wit ou no ice; and the latter can acqmre no rw t or
title other than that of th e person under whom he claims." See
ca es cited by tate under note 82; also, 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law
( 2d Ed.) p. 193, and cases cited; also, the opinion of this court
in Bank v. Laughlin) 4 N. D. 391, 61 . W. Rep. 473, and § 3937,
Rev. Codes, 1899, which is declatory of the rule a above stated.
A was said in Bank v. Laughlin, supra, "After such alteration,
the paper is no longer the ame paper a that sent out by those
who executed and delivered the original instrument." Counsel
for plaintiff frankly admits that under the rule as above stated
the plain~iff cannot recover in this action. Their sole contention
is that upon the facts of this case the d fendants are e topped
from denying the execution of the note in the form in which it
was purchased by the plaintiff. It i claimed that the defendants
were g uilty of gTo s negligence, both in fact and in law, in signina the instrument which '~a aftenvard convert d into the note
.sued upon. While it i a well- ettled rule that a material and
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unauthorized alteration of a negotiable note renders it void even

as against an indorsee in due course, it is equally well-settled that

ther eare exceptions to this rule, under which the maker may be

prevented from relying upon the alteration for the purpose of

defeating a recovery. The most familiar exception as applied to

negotiable notes, covers all of these cases where parties have

eit her signed skeleton not es, or notes only partially filled out,_

and the same have t hereafter been filled out, and transferred to

an innocent hol der. The cases are exceeding JvjiumfTQ'ls wherp

notes so altered have been enforced at "the suit of innocent

indorsees notwi thstand ing the fact that they were mater ially dif-

fere nt from the instrument signed by the maker . The doctrine

upon which a majorit} of these cases rests is thai the maker oi

the note, by signing it while it contains blanks, and knowing that

it may be given currency as commercial paper, impliedly, assents

that the blanks may be filled out ; that is, the law implies his con-

sent to the alteration from the fact of his signing it with blanks

therein. In that view the person filling the blanks is held to be

the agent of the maker. The alteration, in this view, is made with

the consent of the maker of the note, and the contract therefore
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is his contract. Other cases place the liability of the makers upon

the ground of estoppel by negligence. The limitations upon this

implied power to fill blanks is well stated by Judge Dillon in the

article before referred to. on pages 159 and 161, as follows: "It

may be laid down generally that if one signs an instrument con-

taining blanks he must b e understood to intrust it to the person^

to whom it is so delivered to be filled up properly, according to

the agreement between the parties ; and when so filled the instru-

ment is as good. as if originally executed in complete form ; and,

if one signs or indorses a bill containing blanks to be filled, the

deliver}- of such an instrument is an authority to fill up the blanks

in conformity with the original instrument. * * * The implied

authority to fill blanks is confined to such insertions as are neces-

ry to make the instrument perfect according to its nature,

frame, and intended use. There is n o inference of authority to

make any ad ditions to the terms o f the instrument, or to make a

new_ inst rument by erasing what is written or printed, or by filling"

blanks with stipulations r epugnant to the plainly expressed inten-

tion of the paper as shown by its written or printed terms ; and

such an addition or alteratio n wilTavoid the instrument, even in

tn"e hands of "an innocent "HoTder , unless the person authorized to

fill the blanks may be considered as a stranger with reference to

any other changes which he may make." See cases cited under

notes 74, 75. 82, and 83.
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We may now inquire whether, upon the facts in this case, the

defendants are liable upon the note in suit under the doctrine of

implied authority or estoppel by negligence. We are agreed that

they are not liable. It certainly cannot be claimed that the plain-

tiff has any right of recovery upon the note sued upon which

depends upon the doctrine of implied authority. The instrument

sued upon is a negotiable promissory note. The instrument signed

by the defendants was not a nego tiable note in form, wit h unfilled

blanks, but on_t he contrary, was a stock contract, in which the

signers agreed to associate themselves together to bin a horse.

Applying the doctrine of implied authority to the instrument

sisne d_by the defendants, it is apparent that it would extend only*

to filling the blanks in the instrument according to the purport

and effect of the roni-rari- as contained within its four corners.

Had all of the blanks been filled, it would still be a contract, non-

negotiable and conditional, and the promises to pay therein con-

tained would be unenforceable save upon the condition of an

actual association being formed and an actual purchase of a stal-

lion. The instrument was not so filled out, but, -on the contrary,

the contract was cut in two, and an entirely different instrument
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was created. As we have seen, the doctrine of implied authority

does not e xtend to the crea te >n of different instr uments. We find

no basis of fact in this case to conclude that there was any implied

authority in Cooper or his agent to convert the contract signed

by the defendants into the note here sued upon. Neither are we

able to find that the defendants were negligentjn signing the"

contract as they did. The cases are numerous where parties who

have unwittingly signed negotiable notes have been held liable

to good-faith purchasers because of their negligence and careless-

ness in not ascertaining the nature of the instrument signed by

them. That, however, is not this case. In this case the parties

signed the instrument knowingly. But they did not sign a skel-

eton note, or a note containing blanks, but an entirely different

instrument. They were able to read the contract and they read

it before signing it, and understood its general nature. We are

not able to see wherein they were negligent in signing it. The

most that can be said is that they were negligent in not having

the blanks filled out ; but, as we have seen, they were not bound

to assume that the instrument would or could be filled out in any

other way than according to its general terms and purport. We

do not thi nk th e cjDnJxacLsign ed. by_ihe_ ..deign dan ts_pj e serrtejijsuch

an appearance as to make the mere fact of their signing the paper

an act of carelessness. The loss resulting from the forgery must

VVe may now inquir whether, upon the fact in this ca e, the
defendants are liable upon th note in uit under the doctrine of
implied authority or estopp l by n gligence. vVe are agr ed that
they are not liable. It c rtainly cannot be claimed that the plaintiff has any right of recovery upon the note ued upon which
depend upon the doctrin of implied authority. The instrument
ued upon i a negotiabl promi sory note. The in trument signed
by the defendant was not a neo-otiable note in form, with unfilled
blanks, but on the contrary, was a tock contract, m which the
signer agreed to as ociate themselves together to buy a horse.
Applying the doctrine of implied authority to the in trumen()
igmed by the defendants, it is ap._uarent that it woulaextend on y~ '(
to filling the blanks in the instrument according to the purport
and effect of the contract as contained within its four corners.
Had all of the blanks been filled , it would still be a contract, nonnegotiable and conditional, and the promises to pay therein contained would be unenforceable save upon the condition of an
actual association being formed and an actual purchase of a stallion. The instrument was not so filled out, but, .on the contrary,
the contract was cut in two, and an entirely different instrument
was created. As we have seen, the doctrine of implied authority
does not extend to the creation of different instruments. We find
no basis of fact in this case to conclude that there was any implied
authority in Cooper or his agent to convert the contract signed
by the defendants into the note here sued upon. Neither are we
able to find that the defendants were negligent in signing the
contract as they did. The cases are numerous when· parties who
have unwittingly signed negotiable notes have been held liable
to good-faith purchasers because of their negligence and careless.:
ness in not ascertaining the nature of the instrument signed by
them. That, however, is not this case. In this case the partie
signed the instrument knowingly. But they did not sign a skeleton note, or a note containing blanks, but an entirely different
instrument. They were able to read the contract and they read
it before signing it, and understood its general nature. vVe are
not able to see wherein they were negligent in signing it. The
most that can be said is that they were negligent in not having
the blanks filled out; but, as we have een, they were not bound
to assume that the in trument would or could be filled out in any
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do not think the co
sio-ned
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fall upon the purchaser of the forged paper, and not upon the

innocent makers of the stock contract. The defendants had as

gi iod a right to rest upon the presumption that the contract which

they signed would not be converted by forgery into a negotiable

promissory note as the plaintiff had to presume that the note

which he purchased was not forged. Parties taking such paper

must be considered as taking it at their own risk, so far as the

question of forgery is concerned, and as trusting to the character

and credit of those from whom they receive it and of the inter-

mediate holders. Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427, 7 Am. Rep.

661 ; Bank v. Clark, (Iowa) 1 N. W. Rep. 491, 33 Am. Rep. 129;

Bank v. Stowcll, 123 Mass. 196, 25 Am. Rep. 67; Gerrish v.

(, lines, 56 X. H. 9; Kellogg v. Steiner, 29 Wis. 626; ScoHeld v.

Ford, 56 la. 370, 9 N. W. Rep. 309; Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N.

Y. 396, 10 Am. Rep. 382 ; Searlcs v. Scipp, 6 S. D. 472, 61 N. W.

Rep. 804. It follows from what we have said that the trial court

correctly held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this

action. ^L^y-u < ^ La As

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

All concur.
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Wirt v. Stubblefield (1900), 17 A pp. Cas. D. C. 283.

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of

the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia under the Seventy-

third rule of that court for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense

in an action on a promissory note. Affirmed.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Mr. F. H. Stephens, for the appellant.

Mr. Howard Boyd, for the appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice Alvey delivered the opinion of the Court :

This is an appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of

Columbia, and the question involved arises under the Seventy-

third rule of that court. The action was brought by the appellee,

Thomas W. Stubblefield, as indorsee of a promissory note, dated

August 12, 1899, for $375, payable three months after date, made

by the present appellant, John L. Wirt, payable to C. T. Haven-

ner or order, and by the latter indorsed to the appellee, the plain-

tiff in the action. The action was brought jointly against both

the maker and the indorser of the note, as authorized by the stat-

ute. Judgment was rendered against the indorser, but the maker,

WRIT V.
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the appellant, resisted judgment under the rule of court, upon the

defense interposed by him, by plea and affidavit, "that the said

note sued on was given in payment of money alleged to be due

on a certain wager or gaming transaction, to wit, a wager upon

the fluctuations in the price of certain stock wherein the said

defendant lost, and the said note was given to meet the payment

of the said loss." The affidavit of the defendant was filed to sup-

port this plea; but the court below ruled the affidavit to be insuf-

ficient, under the Seventy-third rule of the court, and thereupon

entered judgment against the defendant under the rule, for want

of sufficient affidavit of a valid defense ; and the defendant has

appealed.

This defense of gaming consideration for the note, set up

by plea and affidavit, is made upon the assumption that the old

British statutes against gaming, of 16 Car. 2, Ch. 7, and 9 Anne,

Ch. 14, were in force in the state of Maryland at the time of the

cession by that State of the District of Columbia to the United

States, or at the time of the passing of the act of Congress of

February 27, 1801, declaring what laws should be in force in this

District, and that they formed a part of the statute law of the
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State that was adopted and declared of force in this District by

the act of Congress. That those British statutes against gaming

were in force in the State of Maryland in 1801, there can be no

question or doubt (Alex. Brit. Stats. 476, 689) ; and that they

were adopted and became a part of the law of this District, is

equally free of doubt. Fleming v. Foy, 4 Cranch. Cir. Ct. Rep.

426. And those statutes are still in force here, except as they

may have been repealed by force of the act of Congress of January

12, 1899, known as the "Negotiable Instrument Law," so far

as they relate to or may affect negotiable instruments, such as

bills and notes.

Gaming consideration is not mentioned, nor is that of usury,

in the recent act of Congress of January 12, 1899; nor are any

of the statutes upon the subject of gambling or usury referred to,

and therefore, if the old British statutes to which we have

referred have been partially repealed by the act of Congress, it is

by implication and^Tiot by express terms. The act of Congress

does provide, however, by section 190, "That all laws of force

within the District of Columbia, inconsistent with the foregoing

provisions of this act, be, and the same hereby are, repealed." It

must, therefore, have been supposed, and within the contempla-

tion of Congress, that there were laws or legislation in force

proper to be repealed ; and the question is, what laws were thus

intended to be repealed ?

the app llant, r i ted judgment under the rule of court, upon the
defen e interpo ed by him, by pl a and affidavit, "that the said
note u d on wa given in payment of money all ged to b clue
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h. 14, ·were in force in the state of l\Iaryland at the time of the
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February 27, 1801, declaring what laws should be in force in this
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question or doubt (Alex. Brit. Stats. 476, 689) ; and that they
were adopted and became a part of the law of this District, is
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426.
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as they relate to or may affect negotiable instrument . uch as
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does provide, however, by ection 190. "That all laws of force
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To determine, then, the question, whether there is conflict

or inconsistency between the provisions of the act of Congress

and the effect and operation of the British statutes of 16 Car. *2,

Ch. 7, and 9 Anne, Ch. 14, we must consider not only the express

provisions of the act of Congress, but the policy and object of its

enactment, as compared with the effect and operation of the stat-

utes against gaming. We know the origin and history of the act

of Congress. We know it is largely derived, in its form and pro-

visions, from the English act upon the subject ; and we know,

moreover, that the great and leading object of the act, not only

with Congress, but with the large number of the principal com-

mercial States of the Union that have adopted it, h^s been to estab-

lish a uniform system of law to govern negotiable instruments

wherever they might circulate or be negotiated. It was not only

uniformity of rules and principles that was designed, but t,o

embody in a codified form, as fully as possible, all the law upon

the subject, to avoid conflict of decisions, and the effect of mere

local laws and usages that have heretofore prevailed. The great

object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute

was, to free the negotiable instrument , as far as possible, from
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all latent or local infirmities that would otherwise inhere in it,

to the prejudice and disappointment of innocent holders, as

against all of the parties to the instrument professedly bound

thereby. This clearly could not be effected so long as the instru-

ment was rende red _absolutely null and void by local statute, as

against the original maker or acceptor ; as is the case by the

operation, indeed, by the express provision, of the statutes of

Charles and Anne . For although the statutes declare that all bills

and notes made upon gaming considerations shall be void to all

intents and purposes, yet it has never been allowed as a valid

objection to an action against the drawer or indorser that the hill

or note was accepted or made on a gaming consideration^ This

construction of the statutes has proceeded upon the ground that

it was necessary to further the object of the statute ; for to exempt

the drawer or an indorser from suit might assist a winner, whom

the statutes meant to punish, not to protect. Edwards v. Dick,

4 B. & Aid. 212. But as against the maker of a note or the_

acceptor of a bill, the instrument was absolutely null and void._

even in the hands of an innocent holder for value, taking the

reaper in due course before maturity . This was certainly an evil

that required correction ; and the necessity for the correction is

founded upon a just commercial policy of sustaining the credit

and circulation of negotiable instruments, and falls clearly within

To determine, then, the que tion, wh ther there i conflict
or inconsi t ncy )J tween the provi ion of the act of ongre s
and the effect and operation of the riti h tatutes of 16 Car. -z,
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the ubject, to avoid conflict of decisions, and the effect of mere
local laws and u ages that have heretofore prevailed. The great
ob ject so ug ht to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute
was, to free the negotiable instrument, as far as possible, from
all latent or local infirmities that would otherwi e inhere in it,
to the prejudice and disappointment of innocent holders as
again t all of the parti es to the in trument profe edly bound
thereby. Thi clearly could not be effected o long as the instrument was rendered absolutely null and void by local statute. as
against the original maker or acceptor; as is the case by the
operation , ind ed, by the express provi ion, of the statutes of
harles and nne. For although the statutes declare that all bills
and notes made upon gaming consideration shall be void to all
intents and purpo es, yet it has never been allowed as a valid
ob jection to an action against th drawer or indorser that the hill
o r note was accepted or made on a gaming consideration. Thi
con tructi on of the statutes ha proceeded upon the ground that
it wa neces ary to furth er the object of the statute; for to xempt
the drawer or an indorser from uit might assist a winner, whom
the tatutes meant to punish, not to protect. Edwards v. Dicli
4 . & ld. 212 . J?ut as against the maker of a note or the
acceptor of a bill, th e in trument was ab olutely null and voi 1.:ev n in the hand of an innoc nt hold r for value. taking the
paper in due cour e before maturity. This was certainly an evil
that required correction; and the nee ssity for the correction is
founded upon a just commercial poli y of su taining the credit
and circulation of negotiable in trum nts, and falls clearly within

t
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the object and policy of the act of Congress of January 12, 1899.

The old English statutes, to which we have referred, have been

repealed in England, by Stat. 8 and 9 Vict., Ch. 109, and other

provisions substituted for them ; and we are not aware that the

provisions of those old statutes, so far as they were made to affect

negotiable instruments, constitute the existing law in any State

of the Union ; though such statutes may have been, and doubtless

were, extensively adopted in the last and the early part of the

present century.

By the ''Negotiable Instrument Act" of January 12, 1899,

in its 55th section, it is provided "that the title of a person who

negotiates an instrument is defective within the meaning of this

act, when he obtained the instrument or any signature thereto,

by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or

for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of

faith, or under such circumstances as amount to a fraud."

And by section 60 it is provided "that the maker of a nego-

tiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it accord-

ing to its tenor, and admits the existence of the payee and his

then capacity to indorse."
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Consideration is illegal either at the common law, or by

statute. When the title to a bill or note is defective by reason

of an illegal consideration at. thp common law^, the instrument is_

good in the hands of an innocent indorsee ior value against all

parties . But not so where the consideration is made illegal bv

sjgrtu je, and'tluHnstrument itself is declared to be null and void,

as~7n cases of bills or notes made upon gambling or usurious

transactions. Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 60.

This subject, with the distinction just stated, is expounded

with great force and clearness by Judge Story, in his work on

Promissory Notes, in sections 191 and 192. He says, "that a

bona fide holder for value, without notice, is entitled to recover

upon any negotiable instrument, which he has received before it

has become due, notwithstanding any defect or infirmity in the

title of the person from whom he derived it ; as, for example, even

though such person may have acquired it by fraud, or even by

theft, or by robbery. And the same doctrine will generally apply

to all cases of a bona fide holder for value, without notice before

it becomes due, where the original note, or the indorsement there-

of, is founded on an illegal consideration ; and this upon the same

general ground of public policy, without any distinction between

a case of illegality, founded in moral crime or turpitude, which is

malum in se, and a case founded in the positive prohibition of a

the object and policy f the act of
r s of January 12, 1899.
The old Engli h tatute , to which w hav referr d, have been
and
-ict., h. IO , and other
rep aled in England, by tat.
provi ions substituted for them; and w ar not aware that th
provi ion of tho e old tatute , o far a they w re made to affect
xi ting law in any State
n gotiabl in trument , con titute th
of the Union; though uch tatute may have b en, and doubtles
were, exten iv ly adopt d in the la t and the early part of the
present c ntury.
B)· the "Negotiable In trument Act" of January 12, 1899,
in it 55th ction, it i provided " that the title of a person who
neo-otiates an instrument is defective within the meanino- of thi
act, when h obtained th in trument or any signature thereto,
by fraud, d ure , or force and fear ; or other unlawful mean , or
fo r an illegal con ideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of
faith, or under such circumstances a amount to a fraud."
And by section 60 it is provided "that the maker of a negotiable instrument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor, and admits the existence of the payee and hi
then capacity to indorse."
Consideration is illegal either at the common law, or by
tatute. \Nh en the title to a bill or note is defective by reason
of an illegal consideration at the common law, the in trument is
good in the hands of an innocent mdor ee for value against all
parties. But not so where the consideration is made illegal BL
syitpte, and "the!nstrument itself is declared to be null and void,
as m cases of bills or notes made upon gambling or usurious
transactions. Cromwell v. Sac Co1inty, 96 U. S. 60.
This ubject, with the di tinction ju t stated is expounded
with great force and clearne s by Jud e tory, in his work on
Promissory Notes, in section 191 and 192. He says, "that a
bona fide holder for valu , without notice, is entitl d to recover
upon any neo-otiable instrument, which he has received before it
has become due, notwith tanding any defect or infirmity in the
title of the per on from whom he derived it; a , for example, even
thotwh such person may have acquir d it b fraud, or even by
theft, or by robbery.
nd the ame doctrine will o- n rally apply
to all case of a bona fide h 11 r for valu , \\"ithout n tice before
it becomes due, where the orio-inal note, or th indor m nt thereof, is founded on an illeo-al con ideration; and thi upon the same
general ground of public policy, without any di tinction between
a case of illegality, founded in moral crime or turpitude. which is
malum in se, and a case founded in the po itive prohibition of a
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statute, which is malum prohibitum; for, in each case, the innocent

holder is, or may be, otherwise exposed to the most ruinous con-

nces, and the circulation of negotiable instruments would be

materially obstructed, if not totally stopped. The only exception

is, where the statute, creating the prohibition, has, at the same

time, either expressly, or by necessary implication, made the instru-

ment absolutely void in the hands of ever) bolder, whether be has

such notice, or not. There are few cases, in which any statute has

created a positive nullity of such instruments, either in England

or America. The most important seems to be the statutes against

gaming, and the statutes against usury. And the policy of these

enactments has been brought into so much doubt in our day, that

in England the rule, as to usury and gaming, and some other cases,

has been changed by recent statutes; and a total repeal, or partial

relaxation of it, has found its way into the legislation of America."

It is difficult to conceive, if we bear in mind the object and

policy intended to be promoted by, as well as the entire scope

and express provisions of, the "Negotiable Instrument Law," that

the framers of that act ever intended to save and preserve unre-

pealed, as part of the law governing negotiable instruments, the

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

old English statutes of 16 Car. 2, and 9 Anne, against gaming.

( )n the contrary, it was most clearly among the objects and pur-

poses of that act, to get rid of all such impediments and hindrances

to the circulation of negotiable instruments as had been created by

those old statutes, and to embody the entire law upon the subject,

as far as practicable, into one well digested and consistent act.

It is true, as a general rule, that where there are two acts on the

same subject, the rule is to give effect to both, if it can consistently

he done. "But if the two are repugnant in any of their provi-

sions, the latter act, without any repealing clause, operates to the

extent of a repugnancy as a repeal of the first; and even where

two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act

covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provi-

sions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for

the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." Davics v.

Fairbairn, 3 How. 636; United States v. Tynen, it Wall. 88,

92. It is quite clear that the act of Congress was intended to

cover the whole subject of negotiable instruments as far as it

could be done by statute ; and therefore to exclude the operation

and effect of former statutes like those of Charles and Anne.

But there is manifest inconsistency or repugnancy, as we have

shown, between th e effect and operation of those old English,

statutes, so far as they affect negotiable instrument^ _^rul_th£.

provisions and policy of the "Negotiable Instrument Law" of

tattttc, \\'hich is ma/um prohibit11111; for in ach a e, th e innocent
huldcr j..,, or ma) be . otherwi e xpo I t the most ruin ous con:cqucncc , and the circ ulati n of n otiabl e in trum nt would be
materially b tructcd if not totally topp d. The only xception
is, \\here the tatute, er ating the prohibiti n, ha , at th
amc
time, either xpre 1y , o r by n ce ary implication, ma d e the in trument ab.olut ly void in the h and of ever) h old r whether h ha
s11c h notice . o r not. T her ar few ca
, in which any statute ha
·reatecl a po itive nullity of uch in trument , ith er in Englan l
or , \m rica. The mo t important seems to b th e tatute ao-ain t
gaming, and the tatute again t u ury . , \nd th e policy of the e
ena tm nt has been brought into so much d oubt in o ur day that
in E ngland the rul e , a t u ury and gaming, and om oth r ca e ,
ha been changed by r ecent statutes; and a tota l repeal, o r partial
r la.·at ion f it, ha found it way int th e 1 g i lati n o f merica."
It is difficult to cone ive, if we bear in mind th e object and
po licy intended to be promoted by, a well a the entire cope
and expre s provi ions of, the " egotiablc Instrument Law," tha t
th fram r o f that act eve r intend ed to ave and pre erv e unrepealed . as part of th e law governing negotiable in trument , th e
old Engli h statut s o f 16 ar. 2, ancl 9 Anne, again t gam ing.
On the contrary, it was mo t clearly among the obj ct and purposes of that act, to get rid of a ll such impediment and hindrance
to the circulation of n egot iable in trument a had been created by
tho e old statutes, and to embody the entire law upon the subject,
a far as practicable, in to one well <lier ted and con si tent act.
It i tru e, a a general rule , that where the re are tw o act on th
ame ubj ect, the rule is to give effect to both, if it can con i tently
be done. "But if the tw o are r epugnant in any of their proviion . the latter act, with ou t any repealing cbu e, operate to th
ext nt of a reptwnancy as a r epeal of the fir t; and ven where
two act ar not in expre s term r pugnant. yet if the latter act
cove r the whole subj ct of the fir t, and mbraces new proviion . plainly bowing that it wa int ndecl a a ub titut for
the fir t act. it will op rate a a r p al of that act.' Davies v.
Fairba irn, 3 IT ow . 636; U11ited States v. Tynen, 1 T \ all. 8 ,
92. Tt i quit clear that th act of
ngr
wa int nded to
cove r the whole ubject of n egotiable in trument as far as it
could be lon e by statute; and th r f r to xclude the operation
and fiect o f former tatute like tho
of Charl
and . nne.
nut ther is manif
hown, b twe n th
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Congress ; and this construction of the latter act is strongly forti-

fiedlby the general provision of that act which declares that "In

any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law mer-

chant shall govern." We know that no such prohibition or nullity

as that declared in the old statutes against gaming has any recog-

nition in the law merchant. The law merchant is a system of\

commercial law founded upon the most liberal and enlarged cus- 1

toms and usages, for the promotion of trade, and which is applied /

to for the decision of the causes of merchants, by such general I

rules as obtain in all commercial countries, and is, therefore, I

wholly inconsistent with the gaming statutes ; and it applies often \

even in matters relating to domestic trade, as, for instance, with J

regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer of inland /

bills of exchange, i Black. Com. 173. And since the statute 3

and 4 Anne, Ch. 9, promissory notes, when indorsed, are placed

upon the same footing of inland bills of exchange, if they were

not so before that statute.

We are clearly of opinion that t he British statutes o f 16 Car.

2, Ch. 8, and 9 Anne, Ch. 14, against gaming, so far as they

might or would, if in force, affect the validity of the negotiable
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instruments embraced by the act of Congress, are inconsistent

with the_p rovisions of the l atter act_and_they are, therefore,_to.

the exte n t that they are so inconsistent or repugna nt to the act

of Cong re ss, repealed , and no longer, as to negotiable instruments,

in force in this District.

The affidavit of the defendant, filed under the Seventy-third

rule of the court, showing no sufficient defense to the action,

there was no error in entering the judgment for the plaintiff

under that rule ; and the judgment appealed from must be

affirmed; and it is so ordered. ^L***- ^ L - <KyVN ^-

Judgmcnt am'ined.

HOLDER DERIVING TITLE THROUGH HOLDER IN DUE COURSE TAKES

FREE FROM EQUITIES. § 60.

Simon v. Merritt (1871), S3 Iowa, 537.

Appeal from Lee District Court.

Action by the holder of a promissory note against the maker.

There was a verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff

appeals.

Jno. Van Valkcnburg, Slagle & Acheson, for the appellant.

F. Semple, for the appellee.
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Beck, Ch.J. — The defendant filed an equitable answer set-

ting up fraud practiced by the payee of the note upon defendant

in order to procure its execution, and alleging a conspiracy on

the part of the transferree of the note, the payee and others to

cheat and defraud citizens generally, and that defendant, by the

fraud practiced upon him, was induced to sign the note. The

answer avers that plaintiff had notice of the fraud in procuring

the note, and that it was given without consideration. It is also

alleged that plaintiff's transferrer had notice of the fraud. The

answer is in the nature of a cross-bill, and the payee, Hunter, a

former transferee, Leggett, with others, are made defendants.

These parties, or at least plaintiff, Simon, and his immediate

transferrer, Leggett, answered the cross-bill, denying the matters

therein alleged. Upon the issues thus formed, no objection

having been made to the manner of their presentation and trial,

the cause was submitted to a jury, and evidence in support and

denial of the allegations of the pleadings was introduced. Among

other instructions the court gave the jury the following: "If you

find from the evidence that the note in question was obtained of

the makers by fraud and deception, and if you further find that
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the plaintiff, Simon, knew of such fraud and deception, or if he

had reason to know or believe that said note was fraudulently

obtained of the maker, and that it is void, and if, because of such

knowledge or belief, he refused to receive or purchase it of Leg-

gett until an indemnifying bond was executed to him by Leggett.

then the law of the case is with the defendant, and if you so find

then your verdict should be for defendant." And the instruction

directed the jury that if plaintiff, "in good faith, for a valuable

consideration, obtained the note in the ordinary course of busi-

ness, before maturity, without notice of fraud, or without having

reason to know or believe that the note was obtained by fraud of

the maker," they should find for plaintiff.

These instructions are erroneous. They leave out of view

the well-settled doctrine that if Leggett, the transferrer of plain :

tiff, was such an innocent and bona fide holder of_the_p_aper. that

in his hands it could have been enforced against defendant, plain-

tiff, although he may have taken the n ote chargedTwith notice of

its infirm i ties, may recover in this action . If Leggett so held the

note, his title and rights thereto were such that they could not

have been defeated by defendant. In the transfer, the title and

rights held by him passed to plaintiff. The notice whj c ji plaintiff .

may have had of the fraud in the original transa ctignjloes not

defe at the rights he acquired by the transten

~~One reason of the rule is obvious. The maker of the note

h. ].-The def ndanl filed an equitabl answer ettin o- up fraud practic d by the payee of the not upon defendant
in orde r to procure it ex cution, and alleging a con piracy on
th e part of the tran ferree of the not , the payee and oth r to
cheat and d fraud citizen generally, and that defendant by the
fraud practiced upon him, was induced to ign the note. The
an wcr aver that plaintiff had notice of the fraud in procuring
th note, and that it was o-iven without con ideration. It is also
all cred that plaintiff' tran f rrer had notic of the fraud. The
an w r i in the nature of a era s-bill, and the payee, Hunter, a
form r tran feree, Leggett, with other , are mad defendants.
The
parti , or at lea t plaintiff, imon, and his immediate
tran ferrer, Legaett, answer d the cross-bill, denying the matters
ther in alleged. Upon the issues thus formed, no objection
having been made to the manner of their presentation and trial,
the cause was submitted to a jury, and vidence in upport and
denial of the alle ations of the pleadings wa introduced.
mong
ther instructions the court gave the jury the following: "If you
find from the evidence that the note in question was obtained of
the makers by fraud and d ception, and if you further find that
the plaintiff, imon, knew of such fraud and deception, or if he
had reason to know or beli ve that aid note wa fraudulently
obtained of the maker, and that it is void, and if, becau e of such
knowledge or belief, he refused to receive or purchase it of Leggett until an indemnifying bond was executed to him by Leggett,
then the law f the case is with the defendant, and if you so find
then your verdict should be for defendant."
nd the instruction
directed the jury that if plaintiff, "in good faith, for a valuable
con ideration, obtain d the note in the ordinary cour e of bu ine , before maturity, without notice of fraud, or without havino·
rea on to know or believe that the note was obtained by fraud of
the maker," they should find for plaintiff.
The e in tructions are erroneous. They leave out of view
the well- ettled doctrine that if Leggett, the tran ferrer of plaintiff, was such an innocent and bona fide holder of the paper. that
in his hands it could have been nforc d aaain t defendant laine may have ta en the note charged, with notic of
tiff, althoug
it infirm1tl , may recover in thi action. If Leggett so h ld th
not , hi titl and right ther to wer such that they could not
have been cl feated by d fendant. In the transfer, the titl and
right h Id by him pa ed to plaintiff. Th notice which plaintiff
may have had of the fraud in the ori inal transaction does not
def at the nghts he acqmr l by the transfer.
One reason of the rule is obvious. The maker of the not'e
n ccK,
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would be liable to the transferrer; his condition is made no harder

by the note coming into the hands of one having notice of its

infirmities. We do not understand that there is any conflict in

the authorities upon this point. Hoskell & Geruey v. Whitmorc,

19 Me. 102 ; Smith v. Hiscock, 14 id. 449; Prentice & Messenger

v. Zone, 2 Gratt. 262; Boyd v. McCann, 10 Md. 118; Howell v.

Crane, 12 La. An. 126. See authorities cited in Story on Prom.

Notes, § 191.

The instructions above set out, being in conflict with this

doctrine, ought not to have been given. For this reason the

judgment of the district court is ^ Reversed.

Jennings v. Carlucci et al. (1904) , 8/ N. Y. Supp. 4J5.

Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term, w

Action by Clarkson Jennings against Frederick Carlucci and

another. From a judgment for plaintiff and an order denying a

motion for new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

would be liable to the transferrer; his condition is made no harder
by th note coming into the hand
f one having notice of it
infirmitie . We do not understand that ther i any conflict in
the authoritie upon this point. H oskell & Gervey v. Whitnwre,
19 Me. 102 ; mi th v. Hiscock, 14 id. 449; Prentice & Messenger
v. Zan e, 2 ratt. 2 2; Boyd v. Jl!lcCam1 IO Md. II ; Howell v.
Cran e, 12 La. n. 126.
ee authoriti e cited in tory on Prom.
Note , § l r.
The instructions above set out, being in conflict with thi
doctrine, OLwht not to have been given. For this reason the
judgment of the district court is
Q_ _ Reversed.

~--~ -

Argued before Freedman, P. J., and Scott and Blanch-

ard, J J.

Menken Bros., for appellants.

Jennin g s v . Carlucci et al. (I904), 87 !\ . Y. Supp. 475.

Otto Drocgc, for respondent.
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Blanchard, J. This action was brought to recover the

amount due on a promissory note made by the defendant Gag-

iano to one Bell, and indorsed by the defendant Carlucci and as

so indorsed delivered to said Bell. The note was thereafter

indorsed by Bell, without recourse, to A. Lambertti, who indorsed

it to P. J. Lambertti, who indorsed it to Di Lorenzo. The evi-

dence established the facts that Di Lorenzo was a bona fide holder

of the said note ; that he acquired it in due course, and for value,

before maturity ; that he transferred it for value, after maturity,

to the plaintiff. The defendants, by their answers, interposed

certain defenses which might have been available as between the

Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.
ction by lark on Jennings against Frederick Carlucci and
another. From a judgment for plaintiff and an order denying a
motion for new trial, defendants appeal.
£firmed.
Aro-u d before FREEDMA , P. J. , and ScoTT and BLANCH.\RD, JJ.
M cu ken Bros. , for appellants.
Otto Droege, for re pondent.

original parties to the note. But Di Lorenzo, being a bona fide

holder of the said note in due course, and for value, took the note

without any infirmity a ttaching thereto, and his title to it appears

to have been perfect. The same title pass ed to the plaintiff upon

the tran sfer of the note to him by Di Lorenzo for value . Neg.

Inst. Law, § 97 (Laws 1897, p. 732, c. 612) ; JTeems v. Shaugh-

nessy, 70 Hun, 175, 24 N. Y. Supp. 271. The exceptions of the

defendants are without merit.

The judgment and order appealed from should be

All concur. affirmed, with costs. V^-^ A^^vn..

BLA CHARD, J. This action wa brought to recover the
amount due on a promissory note made by the defendant Gagiano to one Bell, and inclorsed by th e defendant Carlucci and a
so indorsed delivered to said Bell. The note was thereafter
indor ed by Bell, without recour e, to A. Lambertti , who indorsed
it to P. J. Lambertti, who indorsed it to Di Lorenzo. The evidence establi h d the fact that Di L orenzo was a bona fide holder
of the said not ; that he acquired it in due cour e, and for value
before maturity· that he transferred it for value, after maturity.
to the plaintiff. The d fendant , by their an wer interpo ed
certain defen es which mio-ht have been available as between the
original partie to the not . But Di Lorenzo, being a bona fide
holder of the aid not in due cour , and for value, took the note
without any infirmity attaching th reto , and his titl t it appear
to have b n perfect. Th same titl pa ed to the plaintiff upon
the transfer of the note to him b ' D1 Lor nzo f
Neg.
Inst. Law, 97
aw 1897 p. 732, c. 612) ; TVeenzs v. Shau o-hness.v, 70 Hun 175, 24 N. Y. upp. 27r. The x ption of the
defendant ar without merit.
The j11dgnient and order appealed from shou..ld be
All concur.
aflir111ed 7. ith costs.
·
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PAYEE DERIVING TITLE THROUGH HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DOES NOT

TAKK FREE FROM EQUITIES. § 60.

Kost v. Bender {1872), 23 Mich. 515.

Error to Lenawee Circuit.

A. L. Millard, for plaintiff in error.

Howell & Watts, and C. A. Stacy, for defendant in error.

Cooley, J. — The declaration in this case is upon a promissory

note which was given to the plaintiff by the defendant as part

payment on a purchase of lands supposed to be valuable for the

production of mineral oil. The defense is. that the defendant

was defrauded in the sale, and has sustained damages in conse-

quence, which he is entitled recoup.

The note is negotiable, and was transferred by the plaintiff,

before it fell due, to a party, who, he claims, was a bona tide pur-

chaser, without notice of any infirmity, and who afterwards, for a

new consideration, sold it back to him. And the plaintiff further

claims, that the note, having once passed to a bona tide holder in

whose hands it was subject to no defense, of fraud in inception,

or defect in consideration, is forever thereafter discharged of such

defense, into whose hands soever it may afterwards come.
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It is perfectly true as a general rule, that the bona fide holder

of negot iable paper has 'a right to sell the same, with all the rights

and equities attachi n^tojtjn his own hands, to w hoever mav see-

fit to buy of him, whether such purchaser was awar e of the orig-

inal infirmity or not. Without this right he would not have the

full protection which the law merchant designs to afford him.

and negotiable paper would cease to be a safe and reliable medium

for the exchanges of commerce. For, if one can stop the negotia-

bility of paper against which there is no defense, by giving notice

that a defense once existed while it was held by another, it is

obvious that an important element in its value is at once taken

away.

But I arnno t aware that this rule has e y£r_been_a pplied to a

p urchase by the ori gin al payee, nor can n5er ceTvelhat it is essen-

ti.il tolhe protectio ri _of the inn ocent-i ndorsee -t hat i t should bq .

It c annot be very^ ^^ortantJoViinir that the re is one person

Incapable of s ucceeding to his equities, and who consequently

wouhTnot be likely to become a purchaser. Tf he may sell to all

the rest of the community, the market value of his security is not

likely to be affected by the circumstance, that a single individual

KOST

v.

BENDER

565

m

Kosr v. Bender 565

cannot compete for its purchase, especially when we consider that

the nature of negotiable securities is such that their market value

is very little influenced by competition. Nor do I perceive that

any rule^of princ ip le of law would be violated by p ermitting the

aker'to set up t his defense against the payee, when he becomes

indorsee, with t he same effect as he might have done before it

had been sold at all, or that there is any valid reason a p^in st it.

The ground of defense is, the claim for damages which the

maker has, by reason of the fraud alleged to have been practiced

upon him. It is not pretended that this claim is extinguished by

the sale of the note, but only that it is thereby separated from

the note and incapable of again becoming annexed to it. After the

payee had sold the note, he might have been sued upon this claim,

and when he again becomes the holder, he is indisputably liable

in some form. The question, then, seems to be, whether the

maker shall be compelled to submit to judgment on his note, and

then resort to a separate action far damages, or whether all dis-

putes growing out of the one transaction shall be submitted to

one jury.
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In general, the policy of the law is to avoid circuity of action,

wherever it can be done without confusion ; and cases of a counter

claim like this, are always held to be proper cases for the applica-

tion of this rule of policy. And if we do not apply it in this case,

it must be because of a purely technical reason, and not because

the interests of justice would be prejudiced.

The technical reason is, that by the sale of the note to a bona

Ude holder the claim for damages has been severed from it, and

the payee when he again becomes holder, will sue upon it in his

character of indorsee, and cannot have his demand reduced by a

claim which could only be offset because of its being an incident

to the debt, and which ceased to be an incident when the first

transfer took place. But there are many cases in wJ TkjiJdieJaWt

to avoid circuity of action, disregards such intermed iat e transac-

tions, and remits the parties to their original rights and equities,

with a view to the most speedy and effectual remedy. When this

defense was severed from the note by the first transfer, it was done

by means of the plaintiff's own wrong. Jj_ the defendant had a

legal and just defense to the note, either in whole or in part, aris-

ing from th e conduct of the plaintiff, it was the duty of the latter

to recognize and allow _it, and he had no moral right to cut it off,

or attempt so to do, by anv transfer . But. having done so, and

afterwards ac quired the note a second tim e 1 _^_l aw^_jye thin k,

\yiHjiot permit him to take advantage of this wrong , but will

cannot compete for its purchase, especially when we consider that
the nature of negotiable ecuritie i such that their market value
or do I perceive that
is very little influenced by competition.
any rule of principl of law would b violated by permitting the
maker to set up thi defense a ainst th
a ee wh n he become
indorsee, with t 1e sam effect as he might have done before it.
had been old at all, or that there is any valid reason against it
The ground of defen e is, the claim for damages which the
maker has, by rea on of the fraud alleged to have been practiced
upon him. It is not pretended that this claim is extinguished by
the sale of the note, but only that it i thereby separated from
the note and incapable of aaain becoming annexed to it. After the
payee had old the note, he might have been sued upon thi claim,
and when he again becomes the holder, he is indisputably liable
in ome form. The question, then, seems to be, whether the
maker shall be compelled to submit to judgment on his note, and
then resort to a separate action far damages, or whether all dispute a-rowing out of the one transaction shall be submitted to
one Jury.
In general, the policy of the law is to avoid circuity of action,
wherever it can be done without confusion; and cases of a counter
claim like this, are always held to be proper cases for the application of this rule of policy. And if we do not apply it in this case
it must be because of a purel) technical reason, and not because
the interests of justice would be prejudiced.
The technical reason i , that by the sale of the note to a bona
fide holder the claim for damages has been severed from it, and
the payee when he again becomes holder, will sue upon it in hi
character of indorsee, and cannot have his demand reduced by a
claim which coul l only be offset becau e of its being an incident
to the debt, and which ceased to be an incident \vhen the first
transfer took place. But there are many ca es in which the law.
to avoid circuity of action. disregards such intermediate transactions, and remits the partie to their original right and equities,
with a view to the most speedy and effectual remedy. v hen thi
defense wa severed from the note by the fir t tran f r, it wa done
by means of the plaintiff own wrong. If the d fendant had a
legal and ju t defen e to the note, eith r in whole or in part, ari i ng from the conduct of the plaintiff, it \i\a the duty of the latter
to recognize and allow J!., and he had no moral right to cut it off,
or attempt o to do, py any tran fer.
ut having done so. and
afterwards acquired the note a second time, the law . we think,
will not permit him to take advantage of this wrono-, but will
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remit th e defendant to his original rights. Such, we think, should

be the rule ; because it avoids circuity of action, expense to the

parties, and inconvenience to the courts, without, at the same time,

endangering any substantial rights. We had occasion to recog-

nize an application of the same principle, in Dubois v. Campau,

24 Mich., 360, in which a party, whose duty it had been to pay

certain taxes, sought afterwards to claim the benefit of a tax-title

which was based upon his default to pay them, and which a third

party had bought in, and then sold to him. It was held in that

case that he had no more right to claim the benefit of the title he

had thus bought in, than he would have had if he were the original

purchaser at the tax sale ; and we think the same rule is applicable

here, and rests upon reasons equally strong.

For the errors pointed out :

The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new

trial ordered. -Pjfvi_ &Ji&

The other justices concurred. \j

HOLDER PRESUMED TO HE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. § 6l.

Paton v. Coit ct al. (1858), 5 Mich. 305.

Error to Wayne Circuit.
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The action was assumpsit by defendants in error against

plaintiff in error, upon the acceptance by the latter of a draft

drawn upon him by Hildebrand & Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, dated

March 30th, 1857, payable to the order of C. & A. Ives, and by

remit th def ndant to his orio-inal ri hts.
uch, we think, shoul~
b - th rul ; because it avoid s circuity of action, expen se to the
parties, and inconvenience to th e courts, without, at th ame tim ,
·ndang ring any ub tantial right . 'vV had occa ion to recognize an application of the same principl e, in Dubois v. Ca11ipau,
24 Mich., 3 o, in ' hich a party, who duty it had been to pay
c rtain tax , soug ht afterwards to claim the benefit of a tax-title
which was ba ed upon hi d fault to pay th m, and which a third
party had bought in, an d th n sold to him. It was h ld in that
case that he had no more right to claim the benefit of the title h
had thus bought in, than he would have had if he were the original
purchaser at the tax ale; and w think the ame rule is applicable
here, and re ts upon reasons equally strong.
For th errors pointed out:
The judgment 111/U St be reversed, with costs, and a new
trial ordered.
The other justice concurred.

them indorsed.

The defendant pleaded the general issue.

On the trial the acceptance having been given in evidence,

the plaintiff rested.

HOLDER PRESUMED TO BE HOLDER l

DUE COUR E.

The defendant then introduced a witness, and being required

§ 6r.

to state what he expected to prove by such witness, stated that

he expected to prove that such acceptance was given in payment

Paton v. Coit et al. (1858), 5 Mich. 505.

and as security for ten barrels of intoxicating liquor, called

whisky, purchased by defendant on the 30th day of March, 1857,

in Detroit, of the drawers of said draft.

The plaintiffs objected to such evidence, upon the ground

that under the exceptions in section two of the prohibitory liquor

law of 1855, tne presumption was that said draft was in the hands

of bona fide holders, to wit, the plaintiffs; and that the onus was

on the defendant to show, or propose to show, notice before said

Error to Wayne Circuit.
The action was assumpsit by defendants in error against
plaintiff in error, upon the acceptance by the latter of a draft
drawn upon him by Hildebrand & Co., of Cleveland, Ohio, dated
March 30th , 1857, payable to the order of C. & A. Ives, and by
them indors cl.
The defendant pleaded the general issue.
On the trial the acceptance having been given m evidence,
the plaintiff rested.
The defendant then introduced a witness, and being required
to tate what he expected to prove by uch witness, stated that
he expected to prove that such acceptance was given in payment
and as s curity for t n barr I of intoxicating liquor, called
whisky, purchased by defendant on the 30th day of March, 1857,
in Detroit, of th drawers of said draft.
The plaintiffs objected to such vid nee, upon th ground
that under the exceptions in section two of the prohibitory liquor
law of 1855, the presumption was that aid draft was in the hands
of bona fide holders to wit, th plaintiffs; and that the onus was
on the defendant to show, or propose to show, notice before said
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testimony could be received. The court sustained the objection,

and refused to allow the testimony to be given; and defendant

excepted.

Judgment having been rendered for plaintiffs below, for the

amount of the acceptance, the defendant brought the case to this

court by writ of error.

Howard, Bishop & Holbrook, for plaintiff in error.

Walkers & Russell, for defendants in error.

testimony could b r ceiv d. Th court sustain d the objection,
and r fu d to allow th testimony to be given; and defendant
xc pted.
Judgment having b n rend red for plaintiffs b low, for the
amount of th ace ptanc , the defendant br ught the ca e to this
court by writ of error.

Christiancy, J. — Whether the evidence in this case was

properly rejected, does not depend upon the question, Whether,

standing alone, it would have constituted a complete defense

against the draft in the hands of a bona fide holder for value ; but,

Howard, His hop & Holbrook, for plaintiff in error.
vValkers & Russell, for defendants in error.

Whether it would have been sufficient to throw upon the plaintiff

the burden of proving himself to be such bona fide holder; or,

Whether, in fact, the evidence tended, prima facie, to establish a

defense.

It is assumed by the counsel for the defendants in error

(plaintiffs below), that the only effect of the statute in reference

to negotiable paper given for liquors sold, "is to render such

paper without consideration as between the immediate parties,"

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and that "the effect of the exception in section two is simply to

put this statute equity on a footing with all other equities" between

the original parties to negotiable paper.

If this be the only effect of the statute, then, according to the

prevailing current of recent decisions, the evidence was properly

rejected, though the cases upon this point are by no means uni-

form ; and we do not wish to be understood as giving any opinion

upon the question presented by this hypothesis, as we do not think

it involved in the present case.

The defense here proposed was not merely the want, but the

illegality of consideration; and this, being allowed as a defense

between the original parties, irrespective of, and even contrary to

the equities of the parties, can not, without perversion of lan-

guage, be called an equity. It is not on the defendants' account

that such a defense is allowed, as will more fully appear in the

sequel.

The effect of the statute in question is not merely to render

such paper with consideration, but absolutely void and illegal.

between the immediate parties, and all others who have not

obtained it for value, and without notice — not only void in the

negative sense of having no legal basis, but affirmatively illegal

as violating the positive provisions of the statute. It was not even

C1rnr TIAr CY, ].-Whether the vidence in this case was
prop rly rejected, does not depend upon the que tion, Whether,
tanding alon , it would have constituted a complete defen e
ao-ain t th draft in the hands of a bona fide holder for value; but,
Whether it would have been sufficient to throw upon the plaintiff
the burd n f proving himself to be such bona. fide holder; or,
Whether, in fact, the evidence tended, prima facie, to e tablish a
defense.
It i a urned by the counsel for the defendants in error
(plaintiff below), that the only effect of the statute in reference
to negotiable paper given for liquors sold, "is to rend er uch
paper without consideration as between the immediate parties,"
and that "the effect of the exception in section two i imply to
put this tatute equity on a footing with all other equities" between
the orio-inal partie to negotiable paper.
If thi be the only eff ct of the statute, then, according to the
prevailino- current of recent decisions, the evidence was properly
reject d, though the cas s upon this point are by no mean uniform; and we do not wish to be understood as giving any opinion
upon the que tion presented by this hypothesis, as we do not think
it involved in the present ca e.
'
The defense here proposed was not merely the want, but the
illegality of consideration; and this, being allow d as a defense
between the original parties, irrespective of, and even contrary to
the equitie of the parties, can not, without p rver ion of language, be called an equity. It i not on the def ndant ' account
that such a d fen
allowed, as will more fully appear in the
sequel.
The effect of the tatute in qu tion i not merely to render
such paper with con i leration, but ab olutely void and ille al,
between the immediat parti
and all other ' ho have not
obtained. it for value, and without notice-not nly void in the
negative sen e of having no leo-al ba i , but affirmativ ly illegal
as violating the positiv provision of the statute. It wa not even
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c ontended that the facts offered to be shown by the defendant

would not have made a prima facie case of an illegal s ale, without

showing that the sale did not come within any of the exception s'

of the statute ; and if the plaintiffs claimed to maintain the validity

of the sale under any such exception, the burden of proof (this

being a civil case) rested upon them to bring it within the ex cep-

tion^ '

Now, upon principle, as a question of statute construction,

and without reference to any authority, when the statute expressly

declares all such paper void and illegal, and forbids any action to

be bro ught or maintained upon it "except when brought bv a bona

fide holder who has received the same upon a valuable and fair

consideration without notice or knowledge," etc., it would seem.

_to_fol]o^v_ as a logical necessity, that when the paper is shown to

have been given for such illegal c onside ration, the plaintiff's right

of recovery is cut off by the general prohibition of the statute .

unless, in avoidance of this J _ h£_gjye s evidence of those facts which

alone can bring him within the exception .

We do not propose to give a definite opinion upon the point,

whether, the illegality being first shown, the burden of proof in
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this case would have rested upon the plaintiff s to show actual want J

of notice; this might be requiring actual proof of a negative. But

we are inclined to the opinion that they should have shown the

nature of the transaction accompanying tn~e transfe r; and if that

disc losed no suspici o n of such notice, it might m ake a prima facie

case of want of notice, and throw upon the defendant the burden

ofj M'oving notice. But the amount of the consideration given by

the plaintiff is distinct from the question of notice, and the absence

of such consideration, in such a case, would be a defense, though

the paper had been taken by the plaintiff without notice. The

amount of consideration given by the plaintiff is an affirmative^

fact perculiarly within his own knowledge, and not generally in

th at of the defendant, and being necessary to bring the plaintiff's

case within the exception of the statute, should be proved by him.

To allow him to recover without such proof, would be an evasion

of the statute. Such proof (the illegality being first shown) is a

necessary part of the plaintiff's case, without which he shows no

prima facie right to recover ; and though, in ordinary cases, this

fact would be presumed in favor of theTTolder, this presumption

can never be allowed without proof, when the paper was abso-

Jutelv void between the original parties, on the ground of fraud . /

illegality, or duress.

This construction of the statute is sustained by authority. In

contend d that the fact offer d to b hown by the defendant
would not have made a prima facie case of an illegal sale, without
JlO\\'ing that th sale did not ome w1th111 anv of the xc ption
of the tatute; and if the plaintiffs claimed to maintain the validity
of the ale unJ r any such exce ption, the burden of proof ( this
being a civil ca e) rested upon them to bring it within the excep-

tWi._row, upon principle, as a question of statute construction,
and without ref rence to any authority, when the statute expr ssly
declare all such paper void and illegal, and forbids any action to
be brought or maintained upon it "except when brought by a bona
fide holder who ha received the same upon a valuable and fair
consideration without notice or knowledge," etc., it would seem
to follow a a logical nece ity, that when the paper is shown to
have been o-iven for such illegal consid ration, the laintiff's ri ht
of recovery i cut off by the genera prohibition of the statute,
unle , in avoidance of this. he gives evid ence of those facts which
alone can bring him within the exception.
vVe do not propose to give a definite opinion upon the point,
whether, the illegality being first shown, the burden of proof in
this case wo ura naverestea upon tb~ plaintiffs to snow actual want
of notice; this might be requiring actual proof of a. negative. But
we are inclined to the opinion that they should have shown the
nature of the transaction accompanying th e transfer; and 1£ that
d1 clo ed no susp1c10n of such notice, it mi ht make a
· ia acic
ca e o want o notice, an t row upon the defendant the burden
of proving notice. But the amount of the consideration given by
the plaintiff is distinct from the question of notice, and the absenc
of such consideration, in such a case, would be a defen e though
the paper had been taken by the plaintiff without notice. The
amount of consideration given by the plaintiff is an affirma~
fact perculiarly within his own knowledge, and not generally in
that of the defendant, and bein neces ar to brin the laintiff'
case wit m the exception of the statute, should be proved by him.
'Io allow him to recover without such proof, would be an evasion
of the statute. Such proof (the illegality being first shown) is a
nece sary part of the plaintiff' ca e, without which he show no
prima facie right to recover; and though, in ordinary cases, this
fact would b pre urned in favor of the holder, this presumption
can never
v1t out
ute y vo1
tween t e ong-inal parties on the ground of fraud,
illefrahty, or <lure .
This construct10n of the tatute is ustained by authority. In
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England, by the statute of Anne, a note or bill given or indorsed

upon a usurious consideration, was void, even in the hands of a

bona fide holder for value (Chit, on Bills, 9 Am. Ed., no) ; but

the statute, 58 Geo. III., Chap. 93, made such note valid in the

hands of a bona fide holder for value without notice. In the case

of Wyat v. Campbell, 1 M. & M., 80, where the note had been

indorsed by a previous indorser upon a usurious consideration,

and no notice given to plaintiff to prove consideration, it was con-

tended that the plaintiff was not bound to prove it. But, by Lord

Tenterden, Ch J. — "the statute, 58 Geo. III., Chap. 93, makes a

note tainted with usury valid in the hands of a bona fide holder;

the on us is the refore upon thejiolder^ to prove he is such; other-^ j

wise__the_ ^tatute does n ot apply, and the note is^ voi d under the

statute of Anne ."

In that case, it is true, the exception was in a subsequent stat-

ute ; here it is in the same statute ; but we are unable to perceive

how this can make any difference as to the burden of proof. If

the fact was not to be presumed in that case, it can not be in

this.

But whether this conclusion be right or wrong, as depending
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purely upon a question of statute construction, can make little

difference in this case. The rule as to the burden of proof is the

same upon principle and authority to common law. Whenever \\\€\

consideration of the paper between the original parties has been (

illegal, especially if in violation of a positive prohibition of statute, 7

proof of such illegality throws upon the holder the burden of I

proving that he got it bona fide, and gave value for it : Northam v. I

Latouche, 4 C. & P., 140; Bailey v. Bidwell, 13 M. & W., 73 ; J

Harvey v. Toivers, 6 Exch., 656; Smith v. Brain, 20 Q. B., 201 ;

Fitch v. Jones, 32 Eng. L. & Eq., 134 ; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend.,

615; Edw. on Bills, 686, 687; Chit, on Bills, nth Am. Ed., 661,

662 ; Story on Bills, § 193.

The case of Bailey v. Bidzvcll is directly in point ; and Parke

B. gives a very satisfactory reason why the fact in question is not

to be presumed by the plaintiff. "If," he says, "the note were

proved to have been obtained by fraud, or affected by illegality,

that afforded a presumption that the person who had been guilty

of the illegality would dispose of it, and would place it in the

hands of another person to sue upon it." The subsequent case of

Fitch v. Jones, above cited, shows that in such case the original

payee is still presumed to be the owner, and that the plaintiff sues

fo? his benefit ; and it is to overcome this presumption that the

plaintiff is required to prove himself a bona fide holder for value.

England, by the statute of Anne, a note or bill given or indorsed
upon a usurious con ideration, wa void, even in the hands of a
bona fide holder for value (Chit. on Bills, 9 Am. Ed., l IO) ; but
the statute, 58 Geo. III., Chap. 93, made uch note valid in the
hands of a bona fide holder for value without notice. In the case
of Wyat v. Campbell, l M. & 1\1., 80, where the note had been
indorsed by a previous indorser upon a usurious consideration,
and no notice given to plaintiff to prove con ideration , it was contended that the plaintiff was not bound to prove it. But, by Lord
Tenterden, Ch J.- 'the statute, 58 Geo. III., Chap. 93, makes a
note tainted with usury valid in the hands of a bona fide holder;
t he onus is therefore u on the holder to prove he is such; otherwi e t e tatute does not a 1), and thg- note 'is void under the
~a]J.te of ~ nn~
In that case, it is true, the exception was in a subsequent statute; here it is in the same statute; but we are unable to perceive
how this can make any difference as to the burden of proof. If
the fact was not to be presumed in that case, it can not be in
this.
But whether this conclusion be right or wrong, as depending
purely upon a question of statute construction, can make little
difference in this case. The rule as to the burden of proof is the
ame upon principle and authority to common law. \!Vhenever the
consideration of the paper between the original parties has been
illegal, especially if in violation of a positive prohibition of statute,
proof of such illegality throws upon the holder the burden of
proving that he got it bona fide, and gave value for it: Northam v.
Latouche, 4 C. & P., 140; Bailey v. Bi.dwell, 13 M. & W., 73;
H a,rvey v. Towers, 6 Exch., 656; Smith v. Brain, 20 Q. B., 201;
Fitch v. I ones, 32 Eng. L. & Eq., 134; Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend.,
615; Edw. on Bills, 686, 687; Chit. on Bills, nth Am. Ed., 661,
662; Story on Bills, § 193·
The ca e of Bailey v. B idwcll is directly in point; and Parke
B. gives a very sati factory rea on why the fact in question i not
to be presumed by the plaintiff. "If," he says, "the note were
proved to have been obtained by fraud, or affected by illegality.
that afforded a presumption that the per on who had been guilty
of the illegality would dispose of it, and would place it in the
hands of another person to ue upon it." The sub equent case of
Fitch v. Jo nes, above cited, shm·~.rs that in such case the original
payee is still pre urned to be the owner, and that the plaintiff sues
f~ his benefit; and it is to overcome thi presumption that the
·plaintiff is required to prove himself a bona fide holder for value.
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Th e rule is the same as to the burden of proof, where it is_

shi >w n that the paper was obtained bv fraud or duress, and when

stolen, or put in circulation by fraud. See authorities above cited,

and Millis v. Barber, i M. & W., 425 ; Holme v. Karsper, 5 Binn.,

469; Aldrich v. Warren, i(> Maine, 465 ; N. Y. & Va. State Stock

Bank v. Gibson, 5 Duer, 574. In fact, many of the cases, and most

of the elementary works, place illegality in the same category

with fraud or duress, as casting the burden of proof upon the

holder.

But while the result is the same, it is manifest that the basis

of the rule in the case of illegality, though equally solid, is quite

different. In the case of duress and fraud, as well as where the

paper has been stolen, the equities of the defendant constitute the

basis of the rule. But in the case of illegality of consideration,

both parties are generally equally in fault ; and it is not to protect

the equities of the defendant, but on broad grounds of public pol-

icy — to uphold the law, and to discourage its violation or evasion

— that the burden of proof is cast upon the plaintiff. It is as

much the duty of courts to discourage the violation or evasion of

law as to protect the equities of parties. And it is upon this prin-
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ciple only that the naked defense of illegality is allowed. See

opinion of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, Cowp.. 343.

And upon this principle, courts should be careful to avoid doing

anything to facilitate the enforcement of such contracts, unless

it appear affirmatively that the plaintiff is not in fault, and that

he has real equities to be protected.

The evidence was improperly rejected.

The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

All the Justices concurred.

Th e rul e is th e same a to the burd n of proof, wh r
·hmv n that th e a er wa obtained b · fraud r dur , and when
ee authoriti s aboye cite .
to len, or ut in circulation by fraud .
a nd 1Uillis v. Barber, I :I. & W., 425; Holme v. Karsp er, 5 Binn.,
469; A ldrich v. TVarren, 16 l\Iaine, 4 5; . Y. & Va. tate Stock
Bank v. GibsoH, 5 uer, 574. In fact, many of the case , and m t
of the elementary work , plac illegality in the same category
wi th fraud or <lures . as casting the burden of proof upon th ·
holder.
But while the result is the same, it is manifest that the ba is
of the rule in the ca e of illegality, though equally olid, is quite
different. In the case of dur ss and fraud, as well as where the
paper has been tolen, the equities of the defendant con titute the
basis of the rule. But in the case of illegality of consideration,
both parties are generally equally in fault; and it i not to protect
the equities of the defendant, but on broad ground of public policy-to uphold the law, and to di courag its violation or eva ion
-that the burden of proof is cast upon the plaintiff. It i a
much the duty of courts to discourage the violation or evasion of
law as to protect the equities of parti~s. And it is upon this principle only that the nak d defense of illeo-ality is allowed.
ee
opinion of Lord Mansfield in H olrnan v. Johnson, Cowp .. 343.
And upon this principle, courts should be careful to avoid doing
anything to facilitate the enforcement of such contract , unless
it appear affirmatively that the plaintiff is not in fault, and that
he has real equities to be protected.
The vidence was improperly rejected.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
All the Justices concurred.

TITLE IV.

Discharge of Negotiable Instruments,

discharge of party primarily liable. § 121.

Page Woven Wire Fence Co. v. Poole {1901), 129 Mich 57.

Error to Montcalm : Davis, J.

Assumpsit by the Page Woven Wire Fence Company against

Phoebe M. Pool on a promissory note. From a judgment for

TITLE IV.

defendant on verdict directed by the court, plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

Plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit. The declaration

Dr

was upon the common counts, with notice attached that plaintiff

CH RGE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTR '11E~TS.

would "give in evidence a certain promissory note, copy of which

is given below." The note and indorsement read as follows :

DI CHARGE OF PARTY PRIMARILY LIABLE.

"$200.

§ 121.

"Grand Rapids, State of Michigan, Sept. 28, 1899.

"Ninety days after date, I, of Lakeview postoffice, residing

Paae Woven Wire Frnce Co. v . Poole (1901) , 129 Mich 57.

in the town of Cato, county of Montcalm, State of Michigan, for

value received, promise to pay to the order of the Page Woven

Wire Fence Co., or bearer, without default, two hundred dollars,

payable at Lakeview Bank, with exchange and collection charges.

Interest at seven per cent, per annum until paid.
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"Residence 4 l / 2 miles S. E. Lakeview of postoffice.

"Phcebe M. Pool."

Indorsed as follows : ^

"E. E. Metcalf.

[Two two-cent revenue stamps canceled.]

"Pay to the order of any bank for collection and remittance

to Page Woven Wire Fence Co., Adrian, Mich."

Under plea of the general issue, defendant gave notice that

she would give in evidence —

Error to Montcalm: DAVIS, J.
Ass1t1npsit by th
age Woven Wire Fence Company against
Phrebe M. ool on a promis ory note. From a judgment for
defendant on v rdict directed by the court, plaintiff brings error.
Rev red.
laintiff brought an action of assumpsit. The declaration
was upon the common counts, with notice attached that plaintiff
would "giv in evidence a certain promissory note, copy of which
is given below. The note and indorsement read as follows:

"That from and after the 27th day of December, A. D. 1899.

said plaintiff did not hold any promissory note signed and exe-

cuted by defendant, and that on the 1st day of January, A. D.

1900, said plaintiff did not hold any such note, and that said

plaintiff did not at the date of the commencement of this action,

"$200.
'GRA D RAPIDS STATE OF MICHIGAN, Sept. 28, 1899.
"Ninety days after date, I, of Lakevi ew postoffice, resid ing
in the town of ato, county of Montcalm, tate of Michigan, for
value received , promise to pay to the ord r of the Page Woven
Wire Fence o., or bearer, without default, two hundred dollar ,
payable at Lakeview Bank, with exchano-e and collection charges.
Interest at ven per cent. per annum until paid.
"Residence 40 mile S. E. Lakeview of postoffice.
"PHCEBE M. PooL."
Indorsed a follows :
"E. E. Metcalf.
(Two two-cent revenue tamp canceled.]
"Pay to the ord r of any bank for collection and remittance
to Page Woven Wire F nee Co. Adrian, Mich."
Under plea of th g n ral i sue, d fendant gav notice that
she would give in evidence"That from and after the 27th day of Dec mber, A. D. 1899,
said plaintiff did not ho1d any prorni or note io-ned and executed by defendant, and that on the r t day of January, A. D.
rgoo, said plaintiff did not hold an
uch note. and that said
plaintiff did not at the date of th commencem nt of this action,
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and docs not at this date, hold an) promissory note signed and

executed by this defendant, and that defendant does not owe said

plaintiff, on any note or otherwise, any sum of money whatever;

that defendant has no knowledge of the promissory note copy

of which is given in plaintiff's declaration, but defendant admits

the execution of a promissory note identical in form to the copy

set forth in said declaration, which said promissory note so given

b) defendant as aforesaid has been fully paid, and is now, and

since the 27th day of December, A. D. 1899, at which time this

defendant paid the same in full, has been, in defendant's posses-

sion, as receipt and evidence of the payment thereof ; and that, if

plaintiff now holds any note against defendant, it is only a copy

or forgery, as the note paid by defendant, and now in her posses-

sion, is the identical note executed to plaintiff, and the only note

executed and delivered by defendant to plaintiff."

To this was attached her affidavit setting forth the same

facts.

In opening the case to the jury, counsel for plaintiff stated

that, before the note became due, plaintiff forwarded it to a bank

at Lakeview for collection, as its agent supposed; that in that
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letter the name of defendant was given as Philo M. Pool ; that

on the same day it wrote a letter to Philo M. Pool, stating that

the note was sent to the bank for collection; that afterwards, dis-

covering its mistake in the name, it wrote to the bank and defend-

ant, correcting the mistake, and informing her that her note was

in the bank for collection ; that she called at the bank to see about

the matter ; that when it became due she did not call at the bank,

and has never paid it ; that the first time plaintiff's agent or attor-

neys saw the note afterwards it was in defendant's hands ; that

she has it now ; that plaintiff never authorized any one to collect

the note except the bank ; and that plaintiff did not know how it

came into her possession. Plaintiff had given defendant notice

to produce the note. After the opening to the jury, plaintiff's

counsel asked defendant's counsel to produce it. Her counsel

admitted that they had the note in court, but declined to produce

it except upon the order of the court. The reason given by coun-

sel was that plaintiff had given notice that it would give in evi-

dence the note declared upon, that it had no such note in its

possession, and that it had not sued upon a lost note or given

indemnification. The court sustained defendant's contention, and

directed a verdict for her.

Robertson & Clark and L. C. Palmer, for appellant.

V. H. & H. H. Smith, for appellee.

and doc not at thi date, hol<l any promi ory not
igned a nd
..,.~cuted by thi cle fendant, and that d f ndant do not ow aid
plaintiff, on any note or oth rwi , any um of mon y whatever ;
that def ndant ha n kn w l dg of th promi
ry not c py
l)f "hich i
o-iv n in plaintiff' d ecla rati n, but defendant admits
the ex , uti n f a promi ory not id nti ·al in f rm t th copy
et forth in aid declaration, which said promis ory note o iven
1>) defenda nt a afore aid ha b en fully paid, and i now and
since th _7th da) of ecemb r, . D. I 99, at which time thi
cl fonda nt pai 1 th am in full, ha b n , in clef nclant' po
sio n, a r ec ipt and evidence of the payment th er eof; and that, if
plaintiff now holds any note again t 1 f ndant, it i only a cop_
r fo rg ry, a the note paid by def n !ant, and now in h r posse ion i the id entical note executed to plaintiff, an l the only note
' Xecut cl and d eliver cl 1 y def ndant t 1 laintiff. "
To this was attach d h er affidavit s tting forth the same
facts .
In op nino- the ca e to t he jury, counsel for plaintiff stated
that. before the note became due, plaintiff forward d it to a bank
at Lakevi w for co ll ction, a its ao-ent supposed; that in that
letter the name of defendant was given a Philo M . ool; that
on the same clay it wrote a lette r to Philo M. Pool, tatino- that
the note wa ent to th e bank fo r collection; that afterwards, discove ring it mistake in th e narn , it wrote to the bank and def ndant, corr ctin o- the mi take, ancl in fo rmino- her that h r note was
in the bank for collection; that h e called at the bank to see about
the matter; that wh n it became clue h did not call at the bank,.
and has n v r paid it; that the first tim e plaintiff's agent or attorn y aw the note afterwar 1 it wa in d fen lant' hand ; that
h ha it now; that plaintiff never auth rized any one to collect
th n ote exc pt the bank; and that plaintiff did not know how it
am into h r po ses i n. P laintiff had giv n d fendant notice
t produce the note.
fter th e openino- to the jury, plaintiff's
c unsel a keel def nd a nt'
o un el to produce it. Her coun el
admitted that th y had the note in court, but declined to produce
it except up n th ord r of the court. The rea on g iv n by counel wa that plaintiff had aiven notice that it would give in evidence the note d clare l up n. that it had no uch note in it
po e sion, and that it had n t sued up n a lo t note or given
ind rnnification. The court su tain d d fendant' cont ntion, and
clir ct d a verd ict for her.
·

Robertson & Clark and L. C. Palmer, for appellant.
V. H. & H. H. Smith, for appelle .

PAGE WovEN WIRE FENCE Co. v. PooLE
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Grant, J. (after stating the facts). The court said there

were two theories upon which plaintiff might have proceeded :

(i) That the note was lost; and (2) that, if it was not lost, the

declaration ought to apprise defendant of the plaintiff's claim of

the manner in which the note came into her hands. Before bring-

ing suit plaintiff knew that defendant had the note in her posses-

sion. The payor of a promissory note cannot be subjected to a

suit, and compelled to accept a bond of indemnity under the stat-

ute, w hen the payee knows where the note is. and has it in. his

power to produce it in c ourt. It is not necessary to determine

whether the note is negotiable or non-negotiable. The suit is

between the payee and the payor. No third person is interested.

The note, which is only evidence of the debt, was in the posses-

sion of the payor, the defendant. The declaration does not allege

that plaintiff is in possession of the note, but only that it will

give it in evidence upon the trial. Plaintiff took the proper and

legal steps to do so, and they resulted in the production of the

note in court. The sole question for determination was, Had it

been paid ? Undoubtedly the possession of the note by the payo r.

made a prima facie case of payment, and threw the Burdetiupon
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the pfaintiff to prove" non-pavment." If defenuThFTiacI "not paid

it to an authorized agent of plaintiff, the question would be, Was

it paid by defendant to some one under such circumstances that

the law protects her in doing so ? The court below based its deci-

sion on McKinney v. Hamilton's Estate, 53 Mich. 497 (19 N.

W. 263). That case does not apply. The note there was in the

possession of a third person claiming title to it, and having the

usual marks of ownership. The holder of the note was not made

a party litigant, and the estate might have been subjected to two

suits, and to two judgments against it. It was held that the

claimant must be prepared to produce the note in court upon the

trial, so as to be properly marked and impounded. In the present

case the note is in court, and under* its control. All the parties

interested are in court, and are parties to the suit. Plaintiff

asserts ownership, non-payment, and that the note did not come

lawfully into the possession of the defendant. The declaration

asserts ownership and non-payment. The defendant in her plea

asserts payment. The issue is clearly drawn by the pleadings,

and both parties understood it. The ruling of the court was

erroneous.

Reversed and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred. 0_^ ^x^a^— -

GRANT, J. (after statino- the facts).
The court said there
were two th ori s upon which plaintiff might hav proce d d:
(I) That the note was lost; and ( 2) that, if it was not lost, th
declaration ought to appri d fendant of th plaintiff' claim of
the manner in which the note came into her hands.
efore bringing suit plaintiff kn w that defendant had th n t in her po ession. The a 'Or of a promis ory note cannot be ubj cted to a
suit, and compelled to accept a bond of indemnity und r the tat'ute, when the pay knows where the note is, and has it in his
pow r to produce it in court. It i not nece ary to determine
whether the note is neo-otiable or non-negotiable. The suit is
Jo third person is interested.
between th payee and the pay or.
The note, which i only evidence of the debt, was in the possesion of the payor, the defendant. The declaration does not allege
that plaintiff is in possession of the note, but only that it will
give it in evid nee upon the trial. Plaintiff took the proper and
legal teps to do so, and they resulted in the production of the
note in court. Th sole question for determination was, Had it
been paid? Undoubtedly the possession of the note by the payor
made a prima facie case of payment, and threw the burden upon
~plaintiff to prove non-payment. If defendantna - not paid
it to an authorized agent of plaintiff, the question would be, Was
it paid by defendant to some one under such circumstances that
the law protects her in doing so? The court below based its decision on McKinney v. Hmnilton's Estate, 53 Mich. 497 (19 N.
vV. 263). That case does not apply. The note there was in the
possession of a third person claiming title to it, and having the
usual marks of ownership. The holder of the note was not made
a party litigant, and the e tate might have been subjected to two
suits, and to two judgments against it. It was held that the
claimant mu t be pr pared to produce the note in court upon the
trial, o as to be properly marked and impounded. In the present
case the not is in court, and under· its control. All the parties
interested are in court, and are parties to the suit. Plaintiff
asserts owner hip, non-paym nt, and that the note did not come
lawfully into the po session of the defendant. The declaration
asserts owner hip and non-payment. The defendant in her plea
asserts paym nt. The issue is clearly drawn b the pleadings,
and both parties understood it. The rulinrr of the court was
erroneous.
Reversed and a new trial ordered.
The other Justices concurred.
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Lanccy r. Clark (1876), 64 N. Y. 209.

Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the second judicial department, affirming a judgment

Lancey v . Clark (1876), 64 N . Y.

209.

in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee and

granting a new trial. (Reported below, 3 Hun, 575.)

This action was brought upon a promissory note made by

defendant, payable to the order of Frederick Lambert, who was

at the time one of the firm of Lambert & Lincoln. The note

was made for the accommodation of said firm and was discounted

by the North River Bank and the proceeds passed to the credit

of the firm. Soon after the firm was dissolved, Lincoln agreeing

to settle up the firm business. About a week before the note

matured Lincoln wrote to the plaintiff, who lived in Canada, ask-

ing him to take the note and to send money to take it up ; this

the plaintiff did. Lincoln deposited the money in the bank to

his individual credit and upon the day the note fell due gave his

check for the amount thereof. He received the note and directed

the clerk to have it protested "to hold the indorser and maker."

Nothing was said by him about a purchase or transfer of the note

or that he was acting as agent, and plaintiff's name was not men-
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tioned nor the bank informed that the money belonged to plain-

tiff. The note was protested and then sent by Lincoln to plain-

tiff. It was not canceled by the bank.

Thos, H. Hubbard, for the appellant.

C. F. Brown, for the respondent.

Earl, J. The defendant made the note in suit for the ben-

efit and accommodation of the firm of Lambert & Lincoln. It

was discounted and the proceeds passed to their credit by the

North River Bank. Each member was therefore bound, as to

the maker, to pay the note, and thus save him from liability on

account thereof. Before the note became due the firm was dis-

solved, and Lincoln was to close up its business. Plaintiff lived

in Canada, and Lincoln wrote him, requesting him to take up the

note and furnish the money for that purpose. Plaintiff, a few

Appeal from order of the General T rm of the upreme
ourt in the econd judicial departm nt, affirming a judgment
in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a refere and
granting a new trial. (Reported below, 3 Iun, 575.)
Thi action wa brought upon a promissory note mad by
def ndant, payable to the order of F r ede rick Lambert, who was
at the tim one of the firm of Lamb rt & Lincoln. The note
wa made for the accommodation of aid firm and was di counted
by the North River Bank and the proceed pas ed to the credit
of the firm.
oon after the firm was di solved , Lincoln agreeing
to ettle up the firm busines .
bout a week before the note
matu r ed Lincoln wrote to the plaintiff, who lived in Canada, asking him to take the n ote and to send money t o take it ·up; this
the plaintiff did. Lincoln deposited th money in th e bank to
hi individual credit and upon the day the note fell due gave his
check fo r the amount thereof. He received th e n ote and directed
the clerk to have it prote ted "to hold the indorser and maker."
Nothi ng was said by him about a purchase or transfer of the note
or that he was acting as agent, and plaintiff's nam e wa not mentioned nor th e bank inform ed that the money belonged to plaintiff. The note \va protested and then sent by Lincoln to plaintiff. It wa not canceled by the bank.

days before the maturity of the note, sent Lincoln the money,

which he placed in the bank to his individual credit. On the day

the note fell due he went to the bank, and, by his individual check,

paid the note to the discount clerk, who knew at the time that it

Thos. H. HHbbard, for the appellant.
C. F. Brown, for th e respondent.

was an accommodation note. He did not assume to act as agent

for any one, and did not ask to have the note transferred to any

EARL, J. The defendant made the note in suit for the benefit and accommodation of the firm of Lambert & Lincoln. It
was di scounted and the proceeds passed to their credit by the
No rth River Bank. Each m mber wa therefore bound, as to
the maker, to pay the note, and thus save him from liability on
account thereof. Before the note became due the firm was disolved, and Lincoln was to close up it bu ine s.
laintiff lived
in Canada, and Lincoln wrote him, reque sting him to take up the
note and furni sh the money for that purpose. Plaintiff, a few
days before the maturity ·of th e note, ent Lincoln the money,
which he placed in the bank to his individual credit.
n the day
the note fell due he went to th bank, and, by his individual check
paid th note to the discount cl rk, who knew at the time that it
was an accommodation note. He did not assume to act as agent
for any one and did not ask to have the note transferred to any

LANCEY

v.

CLARK

Lancey v. Clark

575

one, and did not mention plaintiff's name in any way. It is true

that he asked to have the note protested so that he could hold

the indorser and maker, but he did not disclose why he wanted

to hold them. After he had thus paid and taken it, he sent it to

the plaintiff. Upon such a state of facts, did plaintiff take his }

title from the bank or from Lincoln? If he took it from the /

bank, he took the place of the bank, and his title and right to I

enforce it were as good as those of the bank at the time he took I

it. But if he took it from Lincoln, it being past due, he took it J

subject to any defence defendant could have made if sued by/

Lincoln, and in such case defendant's defence would have been

perfect. Iie_could n ot be successfully sued by eith er of the pqr-

1k' made the note.

from the bank. It matters not ",

/hose accommodation

Plaintiff did not take title

*K4L V

that h e furnished the money, and that Lincoln promised to use .

it in taking up this note for him. It matters not that the n ote .
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wa s protested so that the indorser and maker could be held, or

that the bank did not intend absolutely to discharge and cancel '

the note. The question is, did the bank transfer or sell the note ,

to the plaintiff? To make a sale or transfer takes two parties,

one t o sell and the other to buy, and the bank could not be made

a s eller without its knowledge or consent . It was not bound to

sell or transfer the note. All it was bound to do was to surrender j

it upon payment by the person liable to pay it. A seller in such

a case incurs some obligation by the sale, although he does not "T

indorse the paper. He impliedly warrants that the paper is

genuine and all it purports to be on its face, and he cannot be

drawn into this implied warranty without his consent. (Eastman

v. Plurner, 32 N. H. 238 ; Delaware Bank v. Jarzns, 20 N. Y.

226; Morrison v. Currie, 4 Duer, 79; Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I.

218; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills [2d ed.], 37.) All the bank

did in this case was to take payment of the note, and deliver it

up to a party paying and liable to pay, after protesting it, so that

he could make such use of it as the law and the facts wo uld

authorize . It did not transfer or intend to transfer it. The plain-

tiff, therefore, took no title to it from the bank, but he took it

from Lincoln, and cannot, therefore, enforce it against the

defendant.

The order of the General Term must, therefore, be affirmed,

and judgment absolute ordered against the plaintiff, with costs.

All concur.

Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.

one, and did not mention plaintiff' name in any way. It is true
that h asked to have the not pr tested
that h could hold
the indors r and mak r, but h did n t li clo why he wanted
to hold them.
fter he had thu paid and tak n it, he sent it to
the plaintiff. Upon uch a tat
f fact , did plaintiff take hi
title from the bank or from Lincoln ? If h took it from the
bank, he took th place of the bank, and hi titl and right to
enforc it were a
ood a those of the bank at the time he took
it. But if h took it from Lincoln, it being past due, he took it
ubject to any d fenc d fendant could have made if sued by
Lincoln, and in uch ca defendant' defenc would have been
perfect. II could not b ucce sfully sued by either of the perho e accommodation h mad the note.
Iaintiff did ;-ot tak title from the bank. It matters not
l;e furni h d the money, and that Lincoln promi ed to us
it m takina up thi note for him. It matters not that the note
wa protested o that the indor er and maker could be held, or
that the bank did not intend ab olutely to discharge and cancel
the note. The question i , did the bank transfer or sell the note
to the plaintiff? To make a sale or transfer takes two parties,
one to ell and the other to buy, and the bank could not be mad
a seller without its knowledge or con ent. It wa not bound to
ell or tran fer the note. All it wa bound to do was to surrender
it upon payment by the per on liable to pay it. A eller in such
a case incurs some obligation by the sale, althotwh he does not
indor e the paper. He impliedly warrant that the paper i
genuine and all it purports to be on its face, and he cannot b
drawn into this implied warranty without hi consent. (Eastman
v. Plumer, 32 N. H. 238; Delawarre Bank v. Jariis, 20 N. Y.
226; llf orrison . Currie, 4 Duer, 79; Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I.
218 · 2 Par on on Not and ill [2d ed.], 37.) A ll the bank
did in this ca e was to take paym nt of the note, and deliver it
to a party paying and lial le to pay, after prote ting it, so that
he could mak
uch u e of it a the law and the fact woul
authorize. It did not tran fer or int nd to tran fer it. The plaintiff, ther fore, took no title to it from the bank, but he took it
from Lincoln, and cannot th refore, enforce it again t the
defendant.
The ord r of the General T rm mu t, therefore, be affirmed,
and judament absolute ordered aaain t th plaintiff, with costs.
All concur.

up

Order a.ffin11ed a11d judgment accordingl·y.

~~·
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Larkin v. Hardcnbrook (1882), 90 X. V

"• ~> ?

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court, in the second judicial department, entered upon an order

Larllin

t,'.

Hardenbrook (1882), 90 \ '. 1·. "'33·

made February 15, 1881, which affirmed a judgment in favor of

defendant, entered upon the report of a referee.

This action was brought to recover the amount of a promis-

sory note executed by defendant to Isaac C. Loper, plaintiff's

testator, which the complaint alleged had been lost or destroyed.

The referee found that said Loper executed to defendant a

deed of certain premises, and in consideration thereof, the note

in suit was executed, and delivered to the grantor, who there-

after voluntarily and intentionally canceled, destroyed, and

surrendered up the same to the defendant.

Further facts appear in the opinion.

/. /. Perry, for appellant.

John J. Armstrong, for respondent.

Miller, J. The note described in the complaint was given

by the defendant to the plaintiff's intestate, upon the convey-

ance to him of certain real estate, and as a consideration there-
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for, on the nth day of October, 1870. The referee before whom

the trial was had has found that in or about the month of

Appeal from judgment of the
neral Term of the Supreme
Court, in th econd judicial d partm nt, entered upon an order
made February 15 1881, which affirmed a judgment in favor of
<l fen<lant, ntered upon the report of a referee.
This action wa brought to r cover the amount of a promisory note executed by defendant to I aac C. Loper, plaintiff's
te tator, which the complaint alleged had been lost or de troyed.
The r feree found that said Loper executed to defendant a
deed of certain premises, and in consideration thereof, the note
in uit wa executed, and delivered to the grantor, who thereafter voluntarily and intentionally canceled, destroyed, and
urrendered up the same to the defendant.
Further facts appear in the opinion.

January, 1871, the grantor voluntarily and intentionally can-

celed, destroyed and surrendered up to the defendant said security

and note, and as a conclusion of law. the intestate discharged

the defendant thereon, and that no recovery could be had either

J. J. Perry, for appellant.
John J. Arm,strong, for respondent.

on the note or on the original consideration. We think that

the finding of fact by the referee is sufficiently supported by the

evidence, and that the conclusion arrived at was the legal and

necessary result of said finding. The rule seems to be well settled

by the authorities that where an obligee delivers up the obligation

which he holds against another party, with the intent and for

the purpose of discharging the debt, where there is no fraud or

mistake alleged or proven, that such surrender operates in law

as a release and discharge of the liability thereon; nor is any

consideration required to support such a transaction when it has

been fully executed. (Bouv. Law Die, title Release; Albert's

Exrs. v. ZiegWs Exrs., 29 Penn. St. 50; Beach v. Endress, 51

Barb. 570; Doty v. Wilson, 5 Lans. 10.)

There certainly could not be higher evidence of an intention

to discharge and cancel a debt than by a destruction and surren-

MILLER, J. The note described in the complaint wa given
by the defendant to the plaintiff's intestate, upon the conveyance to him of certain real estate, and as ·a con ideration therefor, on the nth day of October, 1870. The referee before whom
the trial was had has found that in or about the month of
January, 1871, the o-rantor voluntarily and intentionally canceled, destroyed and surrendered up to the defendant said security
and note, and as a conclu ion of law, the intestate discharged
the defendant thereon, and that no recovery could be had either
on the note or on the original consideration. We think that
the finding of fact by the referee is ufficiently supported by the
evidence, and that the conclu ion arrived at was the lea-al and
necessary result of said finding. The rule seems to be well settled
by the authoritie that where an obligee delivers up the obligation
which he holds against another party, with th intent and for
the purpo e of di charging the debt, where there is no fraud or
mistake alleged or proven, that uch urrender operate in law
a a relea e and discharge of the liability ther on; nor is any
consideration required to support such a tran action when it has
b en fully executed. ( ouv. Law Die., title Release; Albert's
Exrs. v. Ziegler's Exrs. 29 Penn. St. 50; Beach v. Endress, 51
Barb. 570: Dot3 v. Wilson, 5 Lan . ro.)
There certainly could not be higher evidence of an intention
to di charge and cancel a debt than by a destruction and surren 1
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der of the instrument which created it, to a party who is liable

by virtue of the same. In this case the evidence shows that the

deed and the note were executed under somewhat peculiar cir-

cumstances, and it may perhaps be inferred that the design was

to protect the property of the grantor from liability to creditors.

While these facts would not exonerate the defendant from an

obligation he assumed in taking the conveyance and giving the

note, yet under the decisions cited the grantor had a perfect right

to surrender and cancel the note, and the testimony shows that

on being applied to for the note, and it being stated to him that

the business was settled, he left the room where he was, returned

and produced a piece of paper with the defendant's signature,,

he said it was the signature to the note and "that settled it," and

handed the same to the person who made the application on behalf

of the defendant.

These facts, together with the findings of the referee, are,

we think, conclusive in regard to the surrender or destruction of

the note, and upon no legal ground can the action of the plaintiff

be maintained. The fact that the deed was absolute upon its face

and expressed a consideration cannot affect the right of the
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holder of the note to cancel and discharge it, or to make a valid

gift by delivery of the same to the maker thereof, and the admis-

sion of evidence to show such a transaction does not violate the

well-established rule of law that parol evidence is inadmissible,

and cannot be introduced to contradict the deed or to impair its

legitimate effect. The execution of the deed and note, and their

delivery, constituted one transaction, and the surrender of the

note is another and a different one, distinct and independent of

itself, and having no relation whatever to the original transac-

tion. Nor is proof of such surrender evidence tending to estab-

lish an intention on the part of the grantee to reconvey the prop-

erty, but proof of the act of the grantor by which he released

and discharged the grantee from the obligation which he had

assumed. We do not perceive that any rule of evidence was

violated by the admission of the evidence establishing the sur-

render and cancellation of the note by the original grantor. The

fact that defendant did not offer to reconvey the premises is not

a proper subject of consideration in this action, which involves

simply the liability of the defendant upon the note in question.

It may be conceded, as is claimed by the counsel for the

appellant, that the money consideration and acknowledgment of

its payment expressed in the deed is prima facie evidence that

such was the consideration ; but this presumption does not inter-

577

cl r of the in tmment whi h er ated it, t a party who i liabl
by virtue of th sam . In this ca e th vid nc how that the
d eel and th not w r
· cuted und r om what p culiar circumstanc , and it may p rhaps be inf rr cl that the de ign wa
t prot ct th pr p rty of th grantor from liability t er ditor .
\ hile th
fa t w uld not xonerate the defendant from an
obligation h a um l in taking th conv yanc and giving th
not , y t under the decision cit d the grantor had a perfect right
to urren<l r and cancel the not , and th te timony how that
on b ing appli d to for the note, and it being tated to him that
the bu ine wa ettled, he 1 ft the room wher he wa , returned
and produced a piece of paper with the defendant' ignature,.
he aid it wa the io-nature to th note and "that ettled it," and
hand d th ame to the per on who made the application on behalf
of the def ndant.
The e fact , together with the findings of the referee, are,
we think, conclusive in regard to the urrender or de truction of
the note, and upon no legal ground can the action of the plaintiff
be maintain d. The fact that the deed was absolute upon it face
and expr sed a con ideration cannot affect the right of the
holder of the note to cancel and di charge it, or to make a valid
o-ift by delivery of the same to the maker th reof. and the admision of evidence to show such a transaction doe not violate the
well-e tabli hed rul of law that parol evidence i inadmi ible
an l cannot be introduced to contradict the de d or to impair its
legitimat effect. The execution of the deed and note, and their
delivery, con tituted one tran action, and the urrender of the
note i another and a different one, di tinct and independent of
it elf, and havino- no relation whatever to the original tran action. Nor i proof of such surrender evidence tend in a to e tabli h an intention on the part of the grant e to reconvey the property, but proof of the act of the o-rantor by which he relea ed
and discharged th o-rantee from th obli ation which he had
a urned. \ e do not perceive that any rule of vidence wa
violat d by the admi ion of th vid nee e tabli hing the urrender and cancellation of the note by the original rantor. Th
fact that def ndant did not off r to rec n ey th pr mi e i not
a proper ubject of con ideration in thi action, which involve
sir.iply th liability of th def nclant upon th not in qu tion.
It may be conceded a i claimed by the coun el for the
appellant, that the mon y con id ration and a knowl do-ment of
its payment expre ed in the d ed i prima facie evidence that
such was the con ideration; but thi pre umption do not inter-
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fere with the right to show an independent act by which an

obligation taken in consideration of a conveyance was given up

f re with the right t
how an incl pend nt act by which an
ul It ·ation taken in c n id ration f a conveyance wa given up

voluntarily to the party who executed it.

After a careful consideration of the position urged hy the

counsel for the appellant and the authorities cited by him, we

are unable to discover any ground of error in the trial court in

holding that the complaint should be dismissed.

There was no error on the trial in the admission of testimony

or in the refusals to find as requested by the counsel for the

appellant, or in any of the rulings to which exceptions were

taken by him.

The judgment should be affirmed.

All concur, except Rapallo, J., absent.

Judgment affirmed.

Shaw v. Pratt (iSjq), 22 Pick. 305.

Assumpsit on a joint and several promissory note for the

sum of $3464, dated November 30, 1833, made by the defendant

and John B. Pratt, and payable to the plaintiff or bearer, in

annual instalments with interest.

, oluntarily t th party ' h execut cl it.
.\ft~r a car ful con ideration of the po ition ur
d by the
coLm el fo r the appellant and th authoriti
cited by him, we
arc unable to di COY r any ground of error in the trial court in
holdino- that th complaint h ulcl I di mi ed.
There wa no error on the trial in the adrni ion of t timon)
or in the r fu al to find a requ tecl by the coun el for the
appellant, or in any of the ruling to which exception w re
taken by him.
The judgment hould be affirmed.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., ab ent.
Judgment affirmed.

The defendant offered in evidence a writing dated June 23,
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1838, signed by the plaintiff, but not under seal, which was in

the following words :

Slza~' t:'.

Pratt ( 1839),

2-

Pie!?. 305 .

"In consideration of an assignment by John B. Pratt of a

mortgage and the notes given to him by Sydney S. Pratt for

$2800, to me, I hereby agree and bind myself and my heirs to

discharge the note, being a joint and several one. signed by

John Pratt and John B. Pratt, and held by me, so far as John

B. Pratt is or may be liable to pay the same, except that this

agreement shall not operate in any way to discharge or affect

the suit already begun by me against John Pratt, and for which

a farm in New Ashford has been attached on said note."

Tt was admitted by the plaintiff, that the note in suit was

given for the consideration of the sale of a tract of land to the

defendant ; and that the defendant had subsequently conveyed

the land to John B. Pratt, who verbally agreed with the defend-

ant to assume the payment of the note; but the plaintiff had no

agency in this arrangement and never assented thereto.

It was further admitted by the parties, that the notes received

by the plaintiff of John B. Pratt, were not due, but were payable

at a future time.

The defendant contended : t. That he was legally discharged

. \ ump it on a joint and everal prorni sory note for the
um of $3464, dated ovember 30, 1833, made by th def ndant
and John B. Pratt, an cl payable to the plaintiff or bearer, in
annual instalment with intere t.
The defendant offered in evidence a writino- dated June 23,
1838, igned by the plaintiff, but not under seal, which wa in
the following word :
"In con ideration of an a ignment by John B. Pratt of a
morto-ao-e and the note given lo him by ydney . Pratt for
$2800, to me, I hereby agree and bind myself and my heir t
di charge the n ote, being a joint and several one, igned by
John Pratt and John B. Pratt, and h Id by m , o far a John
B. Pratt i or may be liable to pay the ame, except that thi
agreement hall not operate in any way to di charge or affect
the uit alr acly b o·un by me again t John Pratt, and for which
a farm in N w A hford ha been attach cl on said note. '
It wa admitted by the plaintiff, that the note in suit \Va
given for the con ideration of the ale of a tract of land to the
defendant; ancl that the d fenclant had subsequently conveyed
the land to J Im B. Pratt, ~r ho v rbally agre d with the cl fendant to a sum the payment of the note; but th plaintiff had no
ag ncy in thi arran ernent and never a nted ther to.
It wa further admitted by th partie , that the not rec ived
by th plaintiff of John n. ratt. wer not due, but wer payable
at a future time.
The (1 fendant cont ncled: 1. That he wa legally discharged
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from all liability to the plaintiff upon the note in suit; and

2. That the payment of the sum of $2800 was to be applied in

discharge of so much of the note as should first become due and

payable.

As the case presented merely questions of law, it was taken

from the jury by consent. If in the opinion of the whole court,

the plaintiff was entitled to maintain this action, the defendant

was to be defaulted, and damages to be assessed for such sum

as the court should direct. But if the court should be of opinion

that the evidence constituted a legal defence to the action, the

plaintiff was to become nonsuit.

Briggs and Porter, for the plaintiff.

Rockwell and Tucker, for the defendant.

Dewey, J., delivered the opinion of the court. It is con-

tended, that the agreement made by the plaintiff with John B.

Pratt, one of the promisors of the note declared upon in the

present action, to discharge him from all liability to pay the

same, has the effect to release and discharge his co-promisor, the

present defendant.

There are, it seems to us, several objections to this instru-
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ment as a release of the defendant.

1. It is very doubtful whether it is anything more than an

agreement to discharge, and therefore not to have the effect of a

present actual discharge.

2. As an agreement to discharge John B. Pratt, it is accom-

panied with an express stipulation excluding any such effect as

to the defendant.

3. There is another objection entirely fatal to this defence.

which we have more particularly considered. The instrument

relied upon as a release of all the promisors of the note, is not

under seal, and is not therefore a technical release. Nothing

but a technical release under seal discharging one of several

promisors, can operate to discharge the other promisors from

their liability on the contract. This principle is well settled,

and sustained by many adjudicated cases. Walker v. M'Culloch,

4 Greenleaf, 421 ; Harrison v. Close, 2 Johns. R. 449; Rowley v.

Stoddard. 7 Johns. R. 209; De Zcng v. Bailey, 9 Wendell, 336.

The only remaining inquiry is, whether the amount received

from John B. Pratt, shall be applied in payment of the money

already due. or be taken to be in discharge of that part of the

note which is payable at a future clay. Upon recurring to the

facts stated in the case, it appears, that there was no actual pay-

ment of monev. but a transfer to the plaintiff of a certain mort-

from all liability to the plaintiff upon the note in suit; and
That the payment of the sum of 2800 was to be applied in
di charge of so much of th not a should first become due and
payable.
s the case pre ented mer ly question of law, it was taken
from the jury by consent. If in the opinion of the whole court,
the plaintiff wa entitl d to maintain this action, the defendant
vvas to be defaulted, and damages to be a ses ed for such sum
ut if the court hould be of opinion
a the court should direct.
that the evid nee con tituted a legal defence to the action, the
plaintiff wa to become nonsuit.
Briggs and Porter) for the plaintiff.
Roclnuell and Tucker) for the defendant.
DEWEY) J., delivered the opinion of the court.
It is contended, that the agreement made by the plaintiff with John B.
Pratt, one of the promisers of the note declared upon in the
pre ent action, to discharge him from all liability to pay the
ame, ha the effect to release and discharge his co-promisor, the
present defendant.
There are, it seems to us, several objections to this instrument as a release of the defendant.
r. It is very doubtful whether it is anything more than an
agreement to discharge, and therefore not to have the effect of a
present actual discharge.
2. As an agreement to discharge John B. Pratt, it is accompanied with an express stipulation excluding any such effect a
to the defendant.
3. There is another objection entirely fatal to this defence,
which we have more particularly considered. The instrument
relied upon as a relea e of all the promisors of the note, is not
under seal, and i not therefore a technical relea e.
othing
but a technical relea e under seal discharging one of several
promi ors, can operate to discharge the other promi or from
their liability on the contract. This principle i well settled,
and sustained by many adjudicated cases. vValker v. M)Culloch)
4 Greenleaf, 421; Harrison v. Close, 2 Jolms. R. 449; Rowley
Stoddard, 7 Johns. R. 209; De Zeng v. Baile3) 9 vVendell, 36.
The only remaining inquiry i , whether the amount received
from John B. Pratt, hall be applied in payment of the money
alreadv due or be taken to be in di charo-e of that part of the
note \~hich is pa) able at a future day. Upon recurrino- to th e
facts stated in the ca e, it appear , that there \\a no actual payment of mon y, but a tran fer to the plaintiff of a certain mort2.
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gage and notes, which notes were not payable, by the terms of

them, until a period long after the transfer. Had there been no

application of this payment, by the mutual understanding of the

parties, the question must have been decided by those general

rules which have been adopted in the application of payments

in such cases; but, as it seems to us, in the present instance, the

parties have by their own stipulations provided for the application

of the amount thus received. The agreement was in terms, that

this payment was not to operate in any way to discharge or effect

this suit.

This stipulation clearly imports some other and different

application of the amount received by the assignment of the notes

and mortgage, than in discharge of that part of the note upon

which judgment is now asked by the plaintiff. It can have the

limited effect stipulated by the parties in the written instrument,

only by applying the same in discharge of that part of the note

not due, and entering judgment for the plaintiff for so much as

remains unpaid of that part of the note which had become payable

at the time of the institution of the suit.

Judgment for the plaintiff.
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The Madison Square Bank v. Fierce (1893), I 37 N. Y. 444.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court in the first judicial department, entered upon an order

made December 31, 1891, which affirmed a judgment in favor

of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Circuit.

This was an action upon a promissory note.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

age and notes , which note w r not payable, by the terms of
them, until a period long aft r the tran fer. Ilad ther been no
application of thi payment by the mutual under tandin of the
partie , the question mu t have been decided by thos g neral
rule which have bee n adopted in th application of payments
in such ca e ; but, as it eem to u , in the present in tance, the
partie have by th eir own tipulation provided for th application
of the amount thus received. The agreement wa in term that
thi payment wa not to operat in any way to di charge or effect
thi uit.
Thi
tipulation clearly import
ome other and different
application of th amount received by the a ignment of the note
and mortgao-e, than in discharge of that part of the note upon
which judgment i now asked by the plaintiff. It can have the
limited eff ct tipulated by the parties in the written instrument,
only by applying the same in discharge of that part of the note
not due, and ntering judgment for the plaintiff for so much as
remain unpaid of that part of the note which had b come payable
at the time of the in titution of the suit.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Dai'id Kcanc, for appellant.

John Delahunty, for respondent.

Finch, J. We have a novel and interesting question before

us on this appeal, although its apparent importance will lessen

as we pass from first impressions to some slower reflection. It

TlzeJiadisonSquareBa1ik v. Pierce (r893), r37N. Y. 444.

arises upon facts which are very brief and simple and may at

once be stated. The defendant, Pierce, made his promissory

note payable to his own order and indorsed it to the Bates Co.,

Limited, which indorsed it to the plaintiff bank; the latter dis-

counting it and paying the proceeds over to the immediate

indorscr. Thereafter the Bates Co. became insolvent and passed

into the hands of a receiver, who paid to the bank upon the liabil-

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Suprem
Court in the fir t judicial department, entered upon an order
made December 31, 1891, which affirmed a judgment in favor
of plaintiff entered upon a deci ion of the court on trial at Circuit.
This wa an action upon a promissory note.
The fact , so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

Dwuid Keane, for appellant.
John Delahunty, for respondent.
FIN II, J. \Ve have a novel and inter sting question before
us on thi appeal, although its apparent importance will lessen
as we pass from first irnpre ions to some slower reflection. It
arise upon facts which ar very bri f and simpl and may at
once be tated. The def ndant, Pierce, made his promissory
note payable to his own order and indorsed it to the Bat s Co.,
Limited, "' hich indor ed it to the plaintiff bank · the latter di counting it and paying the proceeds over to the immediate
indors r. Thereafter the Bates Co. became insolvent and passed
into th e hand of a receiver. ·w ho paid to th bank upon the liabil-
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ity of the indorser seventy-three and one-quarter per cent of the

amount secured by the note. Later, the bank sued Pierce, the

maker, and recovered judgment for the full amount of the note

in spite of the proof showing the payment made by the receiver,

and in disregard of the claim asserted by the defendant that he-

should only be held liable for the balance remaining unpaid.

That judgment has been affirmed by the General Term, Judges

Daniels and Barrett each writing very strong and valuable opin-

ions in support of their doctrine, and relying upon the authority

of Jones v. Broadhurst (9 M. G. & S. 177 ; 67 Eng. Com. L. 175),

which fully warrants their conclusion. The question does not

seem ever before to have arisen in this country, and we are left

at liberty to examine the English rule and to follow it or not as

we approve or disapprove its logic and its consequences.

We are not to regard the note as being accommodation

paper, but must assume its transfer for value. The form of the

transaction is equivalent to what it would have been if the Bates

Co. had been named as payee, and loses none of its force by the

intervention of the maker as first indorser. That indorsement,

in the form adopted, was needed for the regular transfer of title,
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but does not change or affect the nature and character of the

maker's liability. He remains the ultimate debtor, the person

who ought to pay the debt, in preference to and in exoneration

of all the other parties to the paper, who in some form or other

are entitled to have final recourse to him. And it is to the case

of such a maker of the note or such an acceptor of the bill of

exchange that the English rule alone applies; and it is explicitly

declared inapplicable where the indorser or drawer is the real

debtor, although in form only secondarily liable.

Pierce, therefore, was the ultimate debtor, and the party

who ought to pay the note, both in discharge of the obligation to

the holder and in exoneration of the indorser. When the bank

sued on the note, it was the legal holder and the legal party in

interest. Upon production of the paper and the usual proof,

judgment against the maker for the full amount was inevitable,

unless some defense should be interposed. The only possible

one for Pierce was part payment, and he was compelled to assert,

and his counsel are compelled to argue, that the money paid by

the indorser to the holder inured to the benefit of the maker as

a payment on his debt. But that doctrine cannot prevail for very

obvious reasons. The indorsees payment did not in the least

lessen or satisfy the maker's debt. He owed it all exactly as

before. What had happened possibly changed somewhat the

ity of the indor r eventy-thr and n -quarter per cent of the
amount ecur d by the n t . Later th bank u d ierc , th
mak r, and rec v r d judgm nt f r th full amount of the note
in pite of the proof hawing the payment mad by the r c iver,
and in <lisre ar<l of the claim a sert cl by the d f ndant that he
hould only be held Jiabl for th balance remaining unpaid.
That judgment ha b n affirm d by the
neral Term, Judge
Dani 1 and arr tt ach writing very tron and valuable opin~
ion in upport of th ir doctrin , and r lying upon the authority
f J OHes v. Broadhurst (9 M. . & . 177; 67 Eng. om. L. 175) ,
which fully warrant their conclu ion. The que tion doe not
m ever b fore to have ari n in thi country, and we are left
at liberty to examin the En lish rul and to follow it or not a
we ;ipprove or di approve it Jorrie and it consequences.
We are not to r gard the note as being accommodation
paper but mu t a sum it tran fer for value. The form of th e
tran action i quivalent to what it would have been if the Bate
Co. had been named a payee, and loses none of its force by the
intervention of the maker a fir t indorser. That indorsement,
in th form adopt d, was needed for the reo-ular transfer of title,
but does not change or affect the nature and character of the
maker' liability. He remain the ultimate debtor, the person
who ought to pay the debt, in preference to and in exoneration
of all the other partie to the paper, who in ome form or other
are ntitled to have final recourse to him. And it i to the ca
of uch a maker of the not or uch an acceptor of the bill of
exchange that the Eno-Ii h rule alone applies· and it is explicitly
declared inapplicable "her the indor er or drawer i the real
debtor. although in form only secondarily liable.
ierce, therefore, wa the ultimate debtor, and the party
who ought to pay the note, both in di chawe of the oblio-ation to
the holder and in exoneration of the indor er. When the bank
ued on the not , it wa th legal holder and the leo-al party in
intere t. Upon production of the paper and th u ual proof,
judo-rnent again t the maker for the full amount wa in vitabl ,
unle
some defen e should be interposed. The only possibl
one for Piere wa part pa rment and he wa compelled to a ert.
and hi coun el are compelled to ar ue, that th rnon y paid by
the indor er to the hold r inured to th b nefit of the mak r a
ut that doctrine cannot pre ail for very
a payment on hi d bt.
obvious reasons. The indor er' payment id not in th lea t
Jes en or sati fy the maker' d bt. H
wed it all exactly a
before. \tVhat had happ ned po ibly hano-ed omewhat the
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real creditor, but left the whole debt due and unpaid. To whom

he should pay might become a new question, but how much he

should pa) in discharge of the note was not made doubtful in

any degree. What the receiver advanced to the holder is famil-

iarly described as a payment ; but it was such relatively to the

indorser's liability alone ; while relatively to the obligation of the

maker, it was an equitable purchase instead of a payment. That

view of it was taken in a very early case, the decision of which

tided necessarily upon it. In Callow v. Lawrence (3 Alan.

& Sel. 95), it appeared that one Pywell drew a bill upon Law-

rence to his own order, which Lawrence accepted. The drawer

indorsed the bill to Taylor, who discounted it and thereafter

indorsed it to Barnett. It was protested for non-payment. The

drawer paid Barnett the full amount and took the bill and,

striking off the indorsements of Taylor and Barnett, transferred

the bill to Callow, who sued the acceptor upon it. The latter

claimed that the bill was paid and extinguished, which the court

denied, saying that the drawer "became the purchaser of the bill"

when he paid and took it up out of Barnett's hands ; that it was

not paid by the drawer, animo solvendi, in order to extinguish
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it, but only to redeem himself from the situation in which he

stood. That must always be true of payment by indorser to

holder, where the maker is the ultimate debtor. To the extent

of the money paid, the indorser becomes equitably entitled to be

substituted to the rights and remedies of the holder, and becomes,

pro tanto, the beneficial owner of the debt; so that the maker's

obligation to pay the note in full, at first due to the holder solely

in his own right, becomes, after the part payment by the indorser,

still wholly due to the holder, but partly in his own right and

partly as trustee for the indorser. A court of law cannot split

die note into parts, and must act upon the legal interest and

ownership.

In the present case there was no privity between maker and

indorser as it respects the action of the latter. He paid not as

the agent of the maker, not at his request, not for his benefit.

and under no duty to relieve him, but independently, upon his

own obligation, to lessen his own responsibility, and not at all to

discharge the ultimate debt which it was the maker's duty to pay.

It seems very clear, therefore, that the maker cannot utilize for

■ iwn benefit a payment which, as to him, is not a payment

upon the debt. It becomes, as I have said, merely a question to

whom he shall pay and who may sue for and collect the whole

unpaid sum. In that question the maker has no concern beyond

rt!al creditor but left the whole <lel t due and unpaid. To wl om
he houlcl pay might becom a n v qu tion, but hO\ · much h
. . J1011ld pay in di charge of the note wa not mad doubtful in
any degree. v\' hat the r ceiver advanced to the holder i familiarly de crib d a a payment; but it was such relatively to the
inclor r's liability alone; while r latively to the obligation of th
maker, it wa an equitable purchase instead of a payment. That
\'icw of it wa tal-en in a very early ca , the deci ion of which
depended necessarily upon it. In Calloiv v. Lawrence (3 .:\Iau .
~'·
el. 95), it appeared that one Pywell drew a bill upon Lawrence to his own order, which Lawrence accepted. The drawer
in<lor eel the bill to Taylor, who di counted it and thereafter
indorsecl it to Barnett. It wa prote ted for non-payment. The
drawe r paid Barnett the full amount and took the bill and,
triking off the indorsements of Taylor and Barnett, transferr cl
the bill to Callow, who sued the acceptor upon it. The latter
claimed that the bill was paid and extingui bed, which the court
denied, saying that the drawer "became the purchaser of the bill''
when he paid and took it up out of Barnett's hand ; that it wa
not paid by the drawer, animo solvendi, in orde r to extinguish
it, but only to red em himself from the situation in which he
~ tood.
That must always be true of payment by indor er to
holder, where the maker i the ultimate debtor. To the extent
of the money paid, the indor er becomes equitably entitled to be
sub tituted to the rights and r medies of the holder, and become ,
pro tanto, the beneficial owner of the debt; so that the maker'
obligation to pay the note in full, at first due to the holder solely
in hi own right, becomes, after the part payment by the indorser,
still wholly clue to the holder, but partly in hi own right and
partly a tru tee for the indorser. A court of law cannot split
the note into part , and must act upon the legal interest anc1
owner hip.
In the pre ent ca e there was no privity between maker and
indor er a it re pect the action of the latter. H paid not a
the agent of the maker, not at his request, not for his benefit,
and under no duty to r lieve him, but independently, upon hi
nwn obligation, to lessen his own responsibility, and not at all to
di charg the ultimate debt which it wa the maker's duty to pay.
It eems very clear, therefore, that the maker cannot utilize for
his own benefit a payment wh ich, as to him, is not a payment
upon the debt. It becomes, as I have aid, merely a question to
whom he shall pay and who may sue for and collect the whole
unpaid sum. In that question the maker has no concern beyond
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the inquiry whether he may become liable to different persons

for the same debt and encounter the danger of paying it twice.

I can discover no such peril. The judgment in favor of the

holder is a bar to any other suit on the same note, and payment

to the holder discharges the note utterly. Ordinarily, the indorser

cannot recover except upon the note and as holder and in accord-

ance with the law merchant. If he ever has any other right of

action against the maker, it is either in equity or by force of

some facts beyond the bare relation established by the paper.

And where the note is merged in the holder's judgment or paid

in full to him by the maker, the indorser's only right is through

the judgment or against the proceeds, if he has made a partial

payment to the holder. That does the indorser no wrong. If

he is not content that the holder shall collect to some extent as

his trustee, he may prevent it by payment in full to the holder

and so entitle himself to the possession of the note on which to

sue, or if judgment has been obtained, to be subrogated to all

of the rights of the plaintiff therein.

I think this result is clearly indicated by our own decisions.

In Mechanic's Bank v. Hazard (13 John. 353), the maker of the
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note had been arrested in an action upon it and his bail sought

to relieve themselves by force of a payment made by the indorser

to the holder, but such effect was denied to it ; the court saying

that it was not a payment by or on behalf of the maker, or of

which he or his bail could avail themselves. And in Guernsey v.

Burns (25 Wend. 411), where the suit was by the holder, repre-

senting the legal title and interest, it was said to be no defense

to the maker and no concern of his that some property in the

note was in another.

It thus becomes apparent that there is no very great import-

ance in the question which method of securing payment from

the maker is adopted since the same result follows from each

and that it narrows down to the inquiry whether as matter of

correct doctrine and of convenience in practice the holder may

recover the whole debt against maker or acceptor for himself

and as trustee for the indorser to the extent of his acquired inter-

est ; or whether he shall take judgment only for the balance,

leaving the indorser to sue in some way and on some theory,

which apparently could not be upon the note because already

merged in the judgment, but might be for money paid for use of

the maker since he gets the benefit of it in the reduction of the

judgment, as was held in Pozvnal v. Ferrand (6 B. & Cress. 439),

where the holder deducted the indorser's payment from the levy

the inquiry whether he may become liabl to different persons
for the ame debt and encounter the dang 'r of paying it twic .
I can di cover no uch p ril. Th j udgm nt in favor of the
hold r is a bar to any oth r uit on the same note, and payment
to the holder di charge th note utterly.
rdinarily, th e indor er
cannot recover exc pt upon the note and a holder and in accordance with the law merchant. If he ver has any other right of
action again t th maker, it i either in equity or by fore of
om fact beyond th bare relation e tabli bed by the paper.
nd where the note i merged in the holder' ju lgment or paid
in full to him by th e mak r, the indorser's only right is through
the judgment or ao-ainst the proceed , if he ha made a partial
paym nt to the holder. That does the indorser no wrong. If
he is not content that the holder shall collect to ome extent as
hi tru tee, he may prevent it by payment in full to the holder
and o entitle him elf to the po ession of the note on which to
ue, or if judgment ha been obtained, to be subrogated to all
of th rio-ht of the plaintiff therein.
I think this re ult i clearly indicated by our own deci ion .
In 111echanic's Bank v. Ha:::ard (13 John. 353), the maker of the
note had been arre tecl in an action upon it and his bail ought
to relieve themselv s by force of a paym nt made by the indorser
to the holder, but uch effect was deni ed to it; the court aying
that it was not a payment by or on behalf of the maker, or of
which he or his bail could avail themselves.
nd in Guernsey v.
Bums ( 25 Wend . 41 l) , where the uit was by the holder, repreenting th legal title and interest, it wa aid to be no defen e
to the maker and no concern of hi that some property in the
note was in another.
It thu becomes apparent that there is no very great importanc in the que tion which method of ecurino- payment from
the maker is adopted ince the same re ult follow from each
and that it narrows down to the inquiry wh ther a matter of
correct doctrine and of convenience in practice th holder may
recover the whole debt a ·ain t maker or ace ptor for himself
and as tru tee for the indorser to the extent of hi acquired interest; or whether he hall tak judgment only for the balance,
leaving the indorser to ue in ome way and on ome theory,
which apparently could not b upon the not becau e already
merged in the judgment, but might be for rnon y paid for u e of
the mak r ince he a-et the ben fit of it in the reduction of th
judgment, as wa h Id in Pownal'. Ferrand (6 B. & Cre . 439),
where the holder d duct d th indor er's pa m nt from the levy
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against the maker. The former seems to me to be the logical and

convenient method and so 1 think we should follow the English

doctrine.

I have not underrated the assault made upon it by the appel-

lant. He asserts that Jones v. Broadhurst is contrary to the

earlier cases and has been criticized and shaken by the later

ones. I have examined them all, with some wonder at the

amount of learning and ingenuity expended upon the subject.

i Pierson v. lhinlop, Cowper. 571 ; Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Bos.

& P. 652; Bacon v. Searles, 1 H. Bl. 88; Hemming v. Brook,

1 Car. & M. 57; Randall v. Moon, 12 C. B. 261 ; Cook v. Lister,

13 C. B. [N. S.] 543; Solomon v. Davis, 1 Cahabe & Ellis, 83;

Thornton v. Maynard, 10 Com. PI. L. R. 695.) The prior cases

were very fully and carefully reviewed by Baron Cresswell in

the opinion rendered in Jones v. Broadhurst, and of the subse-

quent cases 1 deem it only necessary to say, that, along with seme

criticism and occasional doubt, the doctrine has remained sub-

stantially unshaken, and the case last cited was declared by Lord

Coleridge to be the accepted law.

It must not be forgotten, however, and I may prudently
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repeat, that the doctrine has no application to accommodation

paper, and rests wholly upon the actual and ultimate indebted-

ness of maker or acceptor as the party who ought to pay. In

such a case as that, which correctly describes the one now before

us, and where no disturbing facts affect the relations of the

parties as fixed by the paper itself, I think the holder may sue

and recover the full amount, receiving so much of the proceeds

as represents a part payment by the indorser as trustee for him.

It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur, except Maynard, J., dissenting.

Judgment affirmed.

Schzvartzman v. Post imp. (1904), 94 App. Div. 474, 87 N. Y.

Supp. 8/2, 84 N. Y. Supp. 922.

Appeal by the plaintiff, Abraham Schwartzman, from an

order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, entered in

the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 16th

day of November, 1903, which order reversed a judgment of the

City Court of the city of New York in favor of the plaintiff,

entered in the office of the clerk of said court on the 15th day of

February, 1903. upon the verdict of a jury, and also (as stated

ao-ai n t th maker. The former em t me to be the loo-ical and
convenient meth od and so I think we should follow the English
doctrine.
I hav not und errated the a ault made upon it by th e app 1lant. H e a ert that Jones v. Broadhurst i contrary to the
earlier ca e an l has been criticized and shaken by the lat r
ones. I have examined them all, with orne wonder at the
amoun t o f 1 arning and ingenuity expended upon the subj ct.
(Pierso n v. D unlop, Cowper: 571; T¥alwyn v. St. Quintin, I o .
& P. 652; Bacon v. Searles, I H. Bl. 8; H em,111ing v. Brooh,
I
ar. & M. 57; Randall v. Moon, 12 . B. 261; Coolc v. Lister,
13 C. B. [N. .] 543; So!o111on v. Dav is, I Cahabe & Elli , 83;
T lz omton v. JJ1aynard, IO Com. Pl. L. R. 695.) The prior case
we re very fully and carefully reviewed by Baron Cresswell in
th e opinion rendered in Jones v. Broadhurst, and of the subsequent ca es I cl em it only neces ary to say, that, along with ~cme
criticism and occa ional doubt, the doctrine has remained subtantiall y un haken, and the case last cited was declared by Lord
Coleridg e to be the accepted law.
It mu t not be forgotten, however, and I may prudently
repeat, that the doctrine has no application to accommodation
paper, and re t wholly upon the actual and ultimate indebtedne of maker or acceptor as the party who ought to pay. In
uch a ca e as that, which correctly describe the one now before
u , and where no disturbing facts affect the relations of the
parties as fixed by the paper itself, I think the holder may sue
and recover the full amount, receivino- so much of the proce ds
a represent a part payment by the inclor er as tru tee for him.
It follow that the judgment hould be affirmed, with co ts.
All concur, except MAY~ARD, J., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.

Schwartznian v . Post imp. (1904). 94 App. Div. 474, 87 N. Y.
Supp. 872, 84 N. Y. Su,pp. 922.
Appeal by the plaintiff,
braham Schwartzman, from an
order of the ppellate T rm of the upreme Court, entered in
the office of th e clerk of the county of New York on the 16th
clay of November, 1903, which order reversed a j udgm nt of the
ity Court of the city of New York in favor of the plaintiff,
entered in th e office of the clerk of aid court on the I 5th day of
F ebruary , r 03, upon th e verdict of a jury, and al o (as tated
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in the notice of appeal) from a judgment of reversal entered in

the office of the clerk of the city of New York on the 13th day

of January, 1904, upon said order of the Appellate Term.

Alexander Rosenthal, for the appellant.

B. Lewinson, for the respondent.

Determination of Appellate Term affirmed, with costs, on

the opinion of the court below, and judgment absolute ordered

for defendant, with costs.

in the notice of appeal) from a judgment of reversal entered in
the office of the clerk of the city of New York on the 13th day
of January, 1904, upon said order of the ppellate Term.

Alexander Rosenthal, for the appellant.
B. Lewinson, for th respondent.

Present — Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, Ingraiiam, Mc-

Laughlin and Laughlin, JJ.

Laughlin, J. (dissenting). According to the testimony of

the plaintiff the note was not paid nor was it surrendered up to

Determination of Appellate T rm affirmed, with costs, on
the opinion of the court b low, and judgment ab olute ordered
for defendant, with costs.

the defendant Post upon the understanding that it was to be

deemed unpaid, but on the distinct agreement that the defendants

were to remain liable for the balance for which plaintiff has

recovered in this action. The defendants did not, therefore, in

my opinion, by this surrender become holders of the note in their

"own right" within the intent and meaning of subdivision 5 of

section 200 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Laws of 1897,

chap. 612), and the transaction did not constitute a discharge
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of the note. The defendant Post merely became the bailee there-

of for the payee.

The following is the opinion delivered by Freedman, P. J.,

in the court below :

Freedman, P. J. This action was brought to recover an

alleged balance of $1,750 claimed to be due upon a demand note

for $5,000, dated May 1, 1899, payable to the order of the maker,

the defendant Post, and indorsed by him and his father, the

defendant Postawalsky. Postawalsky was not served with the

summons and did not appear. After a trial by a jury a verdict

for the amount claimed was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's complaint, originally, averred that he is "now the

lawful owner and holder" of the note in suit, but it was subse-

quently amended by striking out the allegation that plaintiff was

the "holder." The answer denied the delivery of the note to the

Pre ent- N BRUNT, P.
LAUGHLIN and LAUGHLIN, JJ.

J.,

PATTER ON, INGRAHAM, Mc-

LAUGHLI , J. (di senting) . According to the te timony of
the plaintiff the note was not paid nor was it surrendered up to
the defendant Post upon the understanding that it was to be
deemed unpaid, but on the di tinct agreement that the defendants
were to remain liable for the balance for which plaintiff has
recovered in this action. The defendants did not, therefore, in
my opinion, by this surrender become holders of the note in their
"own right" within the intent and meaning of subdivision 5 of
ection 200 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (Laws of 1897,
chap. 612), and the tran action did not constitute a discharge
of the note. The defendant Post merely became the bailee thereof for the payee.
The following is the opinion delivered by FREEDMAN, P. J.,
in the court below:

plaintiff and that he was the owner thereof, and set up, among

other defenses, that the note had been delivered up and surren-

dered to Post, the maker, about April 9, 1900, and that defendant

had ever since been the holder thereof.

At the beginning of the trial, the note, in pursuance of a

notice given by plaintiff's attorney, was produced by the defend-

FREEDMA , P. J. Thi action was brought to recover an
alleged balance of $1,750 claimed to be due upon a demand note
for $s,ooo, dated l\Iay r, 1899, payable to the order of the maker,
the defendant Post, and indorsed by him and hi father, the
defendant Po tawalsky. Postawalsky was not served with the
ummons and did not appear. After a trial by a jury a verdict
for the amount claimed wa rend red in favor of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's complaint, originally, av rred that he i " now the
lawful owner and holder" of the note in uit, but it was subsequently amended by striking out the allerration that plaintiff was
the "holder." The answer denied th deliv ry of the not to the
plaintiff and that he was the owner thereof, and et up amona
other defen e , that the note had be n d livered up and surrendered to Po t, the maker, about pril 9 1900 and thdt defendant
had ever since been the holder thereof.
At the b ginninrr of the trial, the note, in pur uance of a
notice given by plaintiff's att rney. ''"a produced b) th defend-
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ant Post, and by plaintiff's attorney offered and received in

evidence.

The testimony of the transaction out of which the cause of

action arose, as given by the parties, is very conflicting, and a

reading of the record convinces one that neither party lias given

a complete statement of the facts.

The plaintiff's version, however, was accepted and helieved

by the jury, and must, therefore, for the purposes of this appeal

be taken as true, and, briefly stated, as follows:

In 1898 the plaintiff and the defendant Postawalsky were

copartners in the cloak business. This partnership was di>solved

by mutual consent in 1899, and plaintiff received the note in ques-

tion for his interest in said husiness. Subsequently, upon demand-

ing payment of the note of the defendants, Post told the plaintiff

that he (Post) could not pay the full amount of the note, but

would pay $2,000 if the plaintiff would give up the note. This

offer was" afterwards increased by Post to the sum of $2,500.

Plaintiff then authorized his brother (Schwartz) to continue the

negotiations with Post. For some reason, not appearing, the

plaintiff had placed the note with one Kohn. who testifies that
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he also called upon Post in regard to obtaining payment of the

note, and that Post refused to pay in full. Plaintiff's brother

(Schwartz) testifies to similar conversations with Post. In all

of the conversations Post is alleged to have said, in substance,

that unless the amount offered was accepted by the plaintiff and

the note given up, that he, 1'ost, would "protect" himself, that

"I have been through the mill once before and I know how to

take care of myself." These witnesses also testify that Post

promised to pay the balance of his indebtedness, but insisted

upon the surrender of the note to him. Matters between the

parties culminated in a meeting of Post, Kohn, one Kohler, attor-

ney for Post, one Essberg, attorney for plaintiff or his brother

Schwartz, and Schwartz, at Essberg's office, at which time Post

paid $2,750 and Essberg $500 to Schwartz, who then gave the

note to Essberg. The S.^.250 was then paid plaintiff, and the

note eventually given to Post, although when Post came into

possession of the note does not appear, nor is it shown for what

reason Essberg contributed the sum of $500 towards the amount

paid the plaintiff.

At the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the close of

the whole case the defendant's attorney moved to dismiss the

complaint upon the ground that "the plaintiff had failed to estab-

lish a cause of action and upon the ground that by his own admis-

- nt P ost, and by plaintiff' attorney offered and received in
evidence.
The te limony of the tran action out of which th cau e of
<1c tion aro e, a given by the parties, i v ry conflicting, and a
r a ling of the record convinces one that neither party ha g1v n
a complete tatement of th facts.
The plaintiff version, however, was accepted ancl b lieved
by the jury, and mu t, therefore, for the purpo e of this appeal
be taken a true, and, briefly tated, as follows:
In I 98 the plaintiff and the defendant Po tawal ky were
copartner in the cloak busin . Thi partner hip wa di - olved
by mutual con ent in i899, and plaintiff received the note in que tion for hi intere tin said bu iness. ubsequently. upon demanding payment of the note of the defendant , Post told the plaintiff
that he (Po t) could not pay the full amount of the note, but
would pay 2,000 if the plaintiff would give up the note. This
off r wa afterwards increased by Post to the um of $2,500.
Plaintiff then authorized his brother (Schwartz) to continue the
negot1at10n with Po t. For ome rea on, not appearing, the
plaintiff had placed the note with one Kohn, who te tifies that
he also called upon Post in regard to obtaining paym nt of the
note, and that Post refused to pay in full. Plaintiff' brother
( chwartz) testifies to similar conversation with Post. In all
of the conversations Post is alleged to have said, in ubstance,
that unless the amount offered was accepted by the plaintiff and
the note given up, that he, Po t, would "protect'' him elf, that
"I have been through the mill once before and I know how to
take care of my elf." These "itnes e also te tify that Post
promised to pay the balance of his indebtedness. but insi ted
upon the urrencler of the note to him. Matters between the
parties culminated in a meeting of Po t, Kohn, one Kohler, attorney for Post, one Essberg, attorney for plaintiff or hi brother
chwartz, and Schwartz, at Essberg' office, at which time Po t
paid $2,750 and Essberg '· 500 to chwartz, who then gave the
note to E sberg. The $3,250 wa then paid plaintiff, and the
note ev ntually given to Post, although when Post came into
po
ion of the note do s not appear, nor is it hown for what
reason Essberg contributed the sum of $500 towards the amount
paid the plaintiff.
t the close of the plaintiff's ca e and again at the close of
the whole ca e the defendant' attorn y moved to di mi s the
complaint upon the ground that "the plaintiff had failed to establi h a cause of action and upon the ground that by hi own admis-
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sion of the delivery and surrender of the note by him to the

defendant, (the plaintiff) extinguished any liability on that note.

* * * My contention is that the delivery of thai note by the

plaintiff to the defendant constituted a discharge and cancellation

of that note."

I am of the opinion that the defendant Post is right in this

contention.

The cause of action is based wholly upon the note. Sub-

division 5 of section 200 of the Negotiable Instruments Law pro-

vides that a negotiable instrument is discharged "when the

principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after

maturity in his own right."

The instrument in question was a negotiable note. The term

'"holder" is defined in section 2 as follows : " 'Holder' means the

payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it,

or the bearer thereof," and section 3 contains the following defini-

tion : "Person primarily liable on instrument. — The person 'pri-

marily' liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms

of the instrument, is absolutely required to pay the same."

The words of subdivision 5 of section 200, "in his own
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right," merely exclude such a case as that of a maker acquiring

the instrument in, purely, a representative capacity.

The case at bar comes exactly within these provisions. Post

was the maker of the note and primarily liable thereon ; it was

surrendered to him and he became the "holder" thereof without

fraud or mistake in "his own right."

Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law,

it has been held that if a note be surrendered by the payee to the

maker the whole claim is discharged. (Jaffray v. Daz'is, 124 X.

Y. 164, 170; Ellsworth v. Fogg, 35 Yt. 355: Kent v. Reynolds,

8 Hun, 559; Beach v. Endrcss, 51 Barb. 570; affd. in Larkin v.

Hardenbrook, 90 N. Y. 333.)

Whether the plaintiff" can maintain an action upon the origi-

nal indebtedness or upon the defendant Post's promise to pay the

balance due, the consideration therefor being the plaintiff's sur-

render of the note, need not now be determined.

As the foregoing views necessitate a reversal of the judg-

ment the other alleged errors need not be considered.

Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, with costs to the

appellant to abide the event.

ion of the delivery and urrender of the note by him to the
defendant, (the plaintiff) c ·tinguished any liability on that note.
:;: * * My contention i that the delivery of that note by the
plaintiff to the defendant con titut d a discharge and cancellation
of that note.''
I am of the opinion that the defendant o t i rio-ht in thi
contention.
The cau e of action i based wholly upon the note. Subclivi ion 5 of section 200 of th e Negotiable Instrument Law provides th at a negotiable inst rument i discharaed "when the
principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after
maturity in his own right."
The instrument in qu tion was a negotiable note. The term
'holder" i defined in cction 2 as follows : " 'Holder' means the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it,
or the bearer thereof," and section 3 contains th e following definition: "Per on primarily liable on instrurnent.-The person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms
of the in trument, is absolutely required to pay the same."
The words of subdivision 5 of section 200, "in his own
ri<Tht," m rely exclude such a case as that of a maker acquiring
the instrument in, purely, a representative capacity .
The case at bar comes exactly within these provisions. Post
wa the maker of the note and primarily liable thereon; it was
surrende red to him and he became the "holder" thereof without
fraud or mi take in "his own right. ·' '
Prior to the adoption of the regotiable Instruments Law,
it has been held that if a note be surrendered by the payee to the
maker the whole claim i discharged. (! affra':>' v. Da.V?·s r 24
Y. 164, 170; Ells·worth v. Fogg, 35 Vt. 355: Kent v. Reynolds7
8 Hun, 559; B each v. E11dress, 5r Barb. 570; affd. in Larkin
Hardenbrook, 90 . Y. 333.)
Whether the plaintiff can maintain an action upon the original indebtedness or upon the defendant Post' promi e to pa) the
balance due, the con ideration therefor being th plaintiff' urrend er of the note, need not now be determin ed.
A the foregoing views neces itate a r ever al of the jud ·ment the other all ge l errors n ed not be con i ered.

Judg111c11t reversed. new trial order d. z ith costs to the
appellallt to abide the e •ent.
1
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§ 122.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme

Court, in the third judicial department, entered upon an order

1
•

Fingar ( 1885), 100

. Y. 539·

made July 2, 1883, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plain-

tiff, entered upon a decision of the court on trial without a jury.

This action was brought against defendant as indorser of a

joint and several promissory note dated March 19, 1866, for

$500, payable on demand, with interest, made by Jacob Niver,

James Ham and Norman Niver.

Defendant became the owner of the note soon after its exe-

cution ; he indorsed and transferred it in April, 1868. Plaintiff

became the owner in 1869. Interest was regularly paid upon it

by Jacob Niver, one of the makers, up to April, 1875. In 1876

said Jacob Niver died. In March, 1877, plaintiff presented the

note to the administratrix of the estate of said deceased maker

and demanded payment, and on the same day demanded payment

of the other makers, which was refused, and defendant was noti-

fied of such presentment, demand and non-payment. No demand

was made prior to that time. The makers of the note were not
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copartners.

John B. Whitbeck, for appellant.

Samuel Edwards, for respondent.

Ruger, Ch. J. We think the court below erred in applying

thi' doctrine of Merritt v. Todd (23 N. Y. 29) to the facts of

this case, and that its true solution is to be found in the rules

prescribing the duties and obligations of a creditor to his surety.

This court, in the case of Parker v. Stroud (98 N. Y. 379), fol-

lowing Merritt v. Todd, expressly reserved from the effect of the

decision, the question as to the liability of the indorser, when

the maker had been released from liability, by the laches of the

A pp al from judgment of the General Term of the upreme
ourt, in the third judicial department, ntered upon an order
made July 2 , 1883, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, ntered upon a decision of the court on trial without a jury.
T hi action was brought aga·in t cl f ndant as indor r of a
join t and everal promis ory note <lat d March 19, 1866, for
500, payable on demand, with inter st, made by Jacob Niver,
J ame Ham and Norman iv r.
Defendant became the owner of the note oon after its exeClltion; he indor ed and transferred it in pril, 1868. Plaintiff
became th e owner in r869. Interest was regularly paid upon it
by Jacob Niver, one of the makers, up to April, 1875. In 1876
aid Jacob Niver died. In March, r877, plaintiff presented the
note to the administratrix of the estate of aid decea ed maker
and demanded payment, and on the same day demanded payment
of th e other maker , which was refused, and defendant was notified of such pre entment, demand and non-payment. No demand
wa made prior to that time. The makers of the note were not
copartners.

holder. The doctrine of Merritt v. Todd has been so long acqui-

esced in, and has been followed and approved in so many cases,

that it would be impolitic now to permit the rule there laid down

to be questioned or disturbed, and it must, therefore, be consid-

ered as settled law in this State that a note payable on demand,

with interest, is a continuing security, and no cause of action

3 thereon against an indorser until after actual demand.

The defendant is here sued as indorser of a demand note,

dated March 19, 1866, made by Jacob Niver, James Ham and

Norman Niver. payable, with interest, to Francis O'Coner or

J olzn B. ~Vhitbeck 1 for appellant.
Sa1nu el Edi ards for respondent.
1

Ch. J. We think the court below erred in applying
the doctrine of .Merritt v. Todd ( 23 I . Y . 29) to the facts of
this case, and that its true olt1tion i to be found in the rule
pre cribino- the duties and obligations of a creditor to hi surety.
T hi court, in the case of Parker v. Stroud (98 N. Y. 379), following "iYJ erritt v. Todd expres ly reserv d from the effect of the
d ci ion, th question as to the liability of the indorser, when
th e maker had been relea cd from liability, by the laches of the
holder. The doctrine of 111 crritt v. Todd ha been o long acquicecl in , and ha been followed and approved in so many cases,
that it woul l b impolitic now to permit the rule there laid down
t be qu estioned or listurb cl, and it must, therefore, be considered a -ettled law in this tate that a note payabl on demand,
with intere t, i a continuing security, and no cause of action
ari . c th r on ao·ain t an in lor er until after actual demand.
T he defendant i her u d as indorser of a demand note,
lated March T9, 1866, made by Jacob N iver, Jame Ham and
orman
iYcr. payable, with intere t, to Franci
oner or
RuGER 1

1

SHUTTS

v.

5 9

FINGAR

Shutts V. fclNGAR 589

bearer. The defendant afterward became the owner and holder

of the note, and in April, 1868, transferred it to one Potts, and

at the request of Potts then indorsed it. Potts held the note

about one year, when he sold it to the plaintiff, who has ever

since remained its owner. Jacob Niver paid interest on the note

annually until March, 1875, since when no payments have been

made thereon. Jacob Niver died in 1876, and administrators of

his estate were then appointed. In March, 1877, the plaintiff,

after demanding payment of the note of the makers, James Ham

and Norman Niver, and also of the personal representatives of

Jacob Niver, and failing to collect it, notified the defendant of

the fact and of his intention to hold him for its payment, and

thereupon commenced this action in June, 1878.

The authorities now uniformly hold that the statute com-

mences to run, upon a note payable on demand, in favor of the

maker, at its date (Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 481;

Wheeler v. Warner, 47 id. 519; Parker v. Stroud, 98 id. 379),

and that the expiration of six years from such date constitutes

a bar to an action thereon unless a renewal of the cause of action

has been effected by partial payments or otherwise. The makers
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in this case were not partners, and occupied no such relation to

each other as constituted the party making payment, in any sense,

the agent of the other for such purpose, and it necessarily follows

that the payments made by Jacob Niver did not renew the note

as to the other makers, and they were, therefore, discharged from

liability thereon, several years prior to any demand of payment

from them. ( Van Keurcn v. Parmelee, 2 N. Y. 524 ; Schoemaker

v. Benedict, 11 id. 176.)

It must be conceded upon settled principles of law, that

defendant, after payment of the note, would have no recourse

for indemnity against any of the parties thereto, except upon

the note itself, and if any of such parties were relieved from

liability thereon, either by the act, or laches of the holder, the

indorser lost his right of action against such party. The rule

which, upon payment of a note, implies a promise by the maker

to repay the indorser the amount paid by him, proceeds upon

the theory that the payment has been made at the request of the

maker, and the cause of action arising in favor of the indorser,

is based upon the act of payment, and not upon the note. (Brand

on Suretyship and Guaranty, §§ 176. 179.) Where, however,

commercial paper is indorsed after its execution, to subserve the

interests of the indorser, no such promise of repayment can be

implied, and the only remedy for indemnity, from the prior

bearer. The defendant aft rward b came the O\vner and holder
of the note, and in pril, 1868, tran ferred it to one ott , and
at the reque t of Potts then indor ed it.
ott held the note
about one year, wh n he old it to th plaintiff, who has ever
ince r main d it owner. Jacob iver paid int r t on the note
annually until 1\Iarch, 1875, inc wh n no payments have been
made thereon. Jacob Niver di d in 1876, and a<lmini trators of
his estate were then appointed. In i\farch, 1877, the plaintiff,
after demanding paym nt of the not of the maker , Jame Ham
and l orman Tiver, and al o of th e personal rep resentatives of
Jacob iv r, and failing to collect it, notified the defendant of
the fact and of hi intention to hold him for it payment, and
thereupon commenced thi action in June, 1878.
The authorities now uniformly hold that the tatute commence to run, upon a note payable on demand, in favor of the
maker, at it date (Herrick v. liVoolverton, 41 N. Y. 481;
Wheeler v. TV a.mer, 47 id. 519; Parlur v. Stroud, 98 id. 379),
and that the expiration of ix yea rs from such da te con titutes
a bar to an action thereon unless a renewal of the cause of action
has been effected by partial payments or otherwi e. The makers
in this ca e were not partners, and occupied no such relation to
each other a constituted the party making payment, in any sense,
the agent of the other for such purpose, and it nece sarily follow
that the payments made by Jacob Iiver did not renew the note
a to the other makers, and they were, therefore, discharged from
liability th reon, several years prior to any demand of payment
from them. (Van Keuren v. Pa:rnielee, 2 N. Y. 524; Schoeniaker
v. Benedict, I I id. 176.)
It mu t be conceded upon settled principles of law, that
defendant, after payment of the note, would have no recourse
for indemnity again t any of the partie thereto, except upon
the note it lf, and if any of such parties were relieved from
liability thereon, either by the act, or !aches of the holder, th
indorser lo t hi right of action again t uch party. The rul
' hich, upon payment of a note, implie a promi e by the maker
to repay the indorser the amount paid by him, proceeds upon
the theory that the payment ha been made at the r que t of the
maker, and the cause of action ari ing in favor of the indorser,
is based upon the act of payment, and not upon the not . (Brand
on Suretyship and Guaranty, § 176, 17 .) v\ here howe er.
commercial paper i indor ed after it x cution, to ubserve the
interests of the indorser no such promi e of repayment can be
implied, and the only remedy for indemnity, from the prior
1
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parties is by resorting to the paper itself. (Brandt on Suretyship

an.l Guaranty, §180.) Upon payment of such obligation, an

indorser is entitled to demand its possession from the creditor,

with the right of subrogation, to all securities and remedies pos-

sessed by him against the prior parties thereon, unimpaired by

any act or laches of such creditor. (Goodyear v. Watson, 14

Barb. 48] ; Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. 524; Beardsley v. Warner.

6 Wend. (113; Daniels on Neg. Inst.. § 1306; Townsend v. Whit-

ney, 73 X. Y. 432.)

The obligation which a party assumes upon indorsing a note

is, among other things, to pay it, in case the parties primarily

liable thereon, after demand, neglect or refuse to do so. The

demand stipulated for is an essential part of the indorsees con-

tract, and the same considerations which induce its requirement,

also require that it shall be made upon an existing cause of action,

and of parties who are legally liable to respond in damages for

its non-performance. (Daniel on Neg. Inst. § 1308.) The

contract, except in the case of parties originally incompetent to

contract, is predicated upon the assumption that there is a legal

liability against parties, upon whom the demand is to be made.
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A demand upon a party after he has ceased to be liable would be

an idle ceremony and a fraud upon the meaning and spirit of the

indorser's contract.

Except in the case of a partnership note, the demand must

also be made upon each of the several makers at the maturity

of the note. (Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518). It would be quite

absurd to claim that a note could mature after the parties thereto

had been discharged by the expiration of the period of limitation,

and a demand upon such parties, after the bar of the statute had

fallen, would not, therefore, be a compliance with the conditions

of the indorser's liability. It was held in the case of an indorser

of a note secured by mortgage upon real estate, the lien of which

was lost by the neglect of the creditor to record it, that the surety

was discharged, the court saying that it worked a change in the

terms of the surety's undertaking. "He only guarantees the

note as secured by the mortgage, and when the mortgage was

destroyed his contract was no longer existent." (Atlanta Nat.

Bk. v. Douglass, 51 Ga. 205.)

From the foregoing considerations it would seem to follow

that, in order to sustain the contention of the respondent, we

would he required to hold that an indorser remains liable upon

a note, after Ins principals have been discharged from their obli-

gation upon it, and that his right of subrogation entitles him

partic - i by r orting to the paper it elf. ( randt on uretyship
and c;uarant),
I o.
pon paym en t of such obligation, an
inclor er i entitled to demand it po e ion from th creditor,
\\'ith the right of ubrogation, to all ecurities and rem di e posse -eel by him aCTain t the prior parti
thereon, unimpair d by
an) act or !aches of uch er di tor. (Goodyear v. TVatso11, q
Larb. 4 l ; Clason v. JJ,J orris, IO J ohn . 524; B eardsley v. Wanzer,
6 \ 'end. 13; aniel on eg. In t., § 1306; Townsend v. Wlzit11cy, 75 . . r . Y. 432.)
The obligation which a party a sumes upon indorsing a note
i , amon(J" other thing , to pay it, in ca e the parti es primarily
liable thereon, after demand, n eglect or refu se to do so. Th e
demand stipulated for is an essential part of the indor er's contract, and the ame con iderati on which indu ce its requir ment,
al o require that it shall be made upon an exi ting can e of action,
and of partie who are legally liable to respond in damages for
it non-performance.
( Daniel on
eg. Inst. § 1308.) The
contract, except in the case of parties originally incompetent to
contract, i predicated upon the assumption that th ere i a legal
liability again t parties, upon whom the demand is to be made.
A demand upon a party after he has ceased to be liable would be
an idle ceremony and a fraud upon the meaninCT and spirit of th e
indorser' s con tract.
Except in th e case of a partner hip note, the demand mu t
al o be made upon each of the s ve ral makers at the maturity
of the note. (Gates v. Beecher, 60 . Y. 518). It would be quite
ab urcl to claim that a note could mature after the parties thereto
bad been di charged by the expiration of the period of limitation.
and a demand upon such parties, after the bar of the statute had
fallen would not, therefo re, be a compliance with the conditions
of the indor er's liabi lity. It was held in the case of an indorser
of a note secured by mortgage upon real estate, the lien of which
was lost by th e neglect of the creditor to record it, that the surety
wa di charged, the court aying that it worked a change in the
term of th e surety's undertaking. "He only guarantees th e
note as cur d by th e mortgage, and when the mortgage was
d troyed his contract was no long r xi tent." (Atlanta Nat .
BI?. v. Douglass, 5 T Ga. 205 .)
From the foregoing con ideration it would eem to follow
that, in order to ustain the contention of the respond ent, w e
wou ld be r equired to hold that an indorser remains liable upon
a not , after hi principal have been discharged from th eir obligation upon it, and that hi right of ubrogation entitl
him
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only, to the possession of a security rendered worthless by the

neglect of the creditor. Where such consequences are produced

by the direct action of the creditor all of the authorities concur

in holding that it constitutes a good defense to the indorser, and

it is difficult to see why the same consequences produced by the

deliberate laches and inaction of the creditor should not lead to

the same result.

There are cases holding that an indorser is not discharged by

the delay of the holder in prosecuting the maker, at a time when

the debt could be collected from him, and such remedy has

become fruitless by the maker's subsequent insolvency. (Trimble

v. Thome, 16 Johns. 152; Wells v. Mann, 45 X. Y. 327.) These

cases proceed upon the theory that, it is the privilege and duty of

the indorser, after receiving notice of dishonor, to pay the note

and enforce it himself, if he fears the impairment of the maker's

solvency through lapse of time. We have, however, been unable

to find any case holding that an indorser can be made liable who

has had no notice of dishonor, or opportunity to take up the note,

where the liability of the maker has been discharged by the laches

of the holder in allowing the period of limitation to run thereon.
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The responsibility of the indorser for the loss occasioned by

the bankruptcy of a maker, after the maturity of a note, is put

upon him because of the opportunity which is afforded him of

protecting himself, and when he is deprived of this opportunity

by the neglect of the holder, we know of no principle of law

which will hold him liable for the consequences of such a loss.

It is a general rule that whatever discharges the maker or

acceptor of a bill or note discharges the drawer and indorser,

who are sureties, for the contract which they undertook to

assume thus passes out of existence by the act of the beneficiary.

(Daniel on Xeg. Inst., § 1306.) It is also said that "whatever

discharges a prior indorser discharges all subsequent indorsers,

for the reason that he stood between them and the holder, and

on making payment each one could have had recourse against

him but from which his discharge precludes them." The con-

tracts of the parties to a note are said to be like the links of a

pendant chain, if the holder dissolves the first every link falls

with it. (Daniel on Xeg. Inst., § 1307.)

It was held in the case of Bcardsley v. Warner (supra), that

if the creditor does any act impairing the surety's claim against

the maker it may be shown in defense of the surety. Barhydt

v. Ellis (45 X. Y. in) holds that where, by the laches of the

creditor, the surety's means of indemnity are impaired, his liabil-

only, to the possession of a s curity r ndered worth less by the
n glect of the er ditor. vVher uch con cqu nc are produc d
by the direct acti n of th er ditor all of the authorities concur
in holding that it con titut a good d fen to th in<lor r, and
it i difficult to see why th ame con equ nces produced by th
deliberate !aches and inaction of the er ditor should not 1 ad to
the ame re ult.
There arc ca e holdinO' that an indor r i not di charged by
the delay of th hol l r in pro ecuting the maker at a time when
the debt could b collected from him, and uch r medy ha
become fruitle by th mak r's subsequent insolvency. (Trimble
v. Thor11e, r John. rs-; TVells v. JIJam z, 45 :N. Y. 327.) Thee
ca e proc ed up n th theory that it is the privilege and duty of
the indor r, after r c ivinO' notic~ of di honor, to pay the note
and enforce it him elf, if he fears the impairment of the maker's
olvency through lap e of time. We hav , however, been unabl e
to find any ca holding that an indorser can be made liable who
ha had no notice of di honor, or opportunity to take up the note,
where the liab ility of the maker ha been di charged by the !aches
of the hold r in allowinO' the period of limitation to run th ereon.
The re pon ibility of the indorser for the loss occa ioned by
the bankruptcy of a maker, after the maturity of a note, is put
upon him beca u e of the opportunity which i afforded him of
protecting him elf and wh n he is deprived of thi opportunity
by the neglect of the hold r, we know of no principle of law
which will hold him liable fo r the con equences of such a los .
It i a O'e neral rule that whatever discharge the maker or
acceptor of a bill or note di charges the drawer and indorser,
who are uretie , for th e contract which they und ertook to
a sume thu pa . e out of x istence by th e act of the beneficiary.
(Daniel on T O'. In t. § 1306.) It i al o aid that '\ hatever
discharge a prior indorser discharges all subsequent indorsers,
for the rea on that he tood bet\ een them and the holder, and
on making payment each one could have had r ecou rse again t
him but from which hi di charO'e preclude them. ' Th contract of th parti t a note are aid to be like the link of a
pendant chain, if th holder di olve th fir t e n · link fall
with it. (Dani 1 on J g. In t., § 1307.)
It wa held in the ca of Beardsley v. TT- arner (supra ) . that
if the creditor doe an act impairin the urety' claim aO'ainst
the maker it may be hown in defen e of the urety. Barh; dt
v. Ellis (45 N. Y. II r) hold that where, b) th !aches of the
creditor, the urety's means of indemnity ar impair d hi liabil-
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itv is discharged to the extent of the loss sustained by reason

of such neglect. The necessary implication from the rule thus

laid down would seem to require his absolute discharge when

the responsibility of an individual liable for the whole debt has

been lost by the act of the creditor.

It is among the fundamental rules applicable to the relations

of principal and surety that a creditor cannot vary or change the

contract to the prejudice of a surety ; that he cannot extend the

time of its performance, or release any security held therefor, or

discharge any party therefrom, without thereby releasing the

surety wholly or partially from his obligation. (Daniel on Neg.

Inst., § 1308). In Stewart v. Edcu (2 Caines, 121), it was held

where the holder released one of the makers of a note, reserving,

however, his liability to the irrdorsers, that such release did not

discharge the indorsers. But it was then conceded that if the

release had operated to wholly discharge such maker it would

have been otherwise.

While there are some qualifications of the general rules above

referred to, there are none that I have been able to find excusing

a creditor, for allowing the statute to run in favor of the princi-
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pals, upon a note by which they are discharged from liability.

The general rule applicable to such laches seems to be well stated

in the case of Reese v. Barrington (2 Lead. Cas. in Eq., part 2,

p. 373, cited in the note to Fell's Law of Guaranty and Suretyship,

217). "But although the creditor is not bound to take active

measures to enforce payment of the debt, and may, therefore,

stop short in those which he has taken, even when their further

prosecution would have been successful, yet he is not entitled to

relinquish any hold which he has actually acquired on the prop-

erty or estate of the principal and which might have been made

effectual for the payment of the debt. This is the necessary result

of the rule that a creditor shall not arbitrarily shift the burden

of a debt from the party primarily liable for its payment «md

impose it on another whose liability is secondary."

We are, therefore, of the opinion that an indorser cannot be

held upon a note payable on demand with interest, unless the

holder can show a demand made of the makers upon a subsisting

obligation against all of the parties thereto, and be able to deliver

to such indorser upon payment by him the note, unimpaired as an

obligation by any act or omission of the holder occurring sub-

sequent to the contract of indorsement.

The judgment of the court below should be reversed and a

new trial ordered, with costs to abide event.

All concur. Judgment reversed.

ity is di haro-ed to the xtent of th los su tained by rea on
of uch n gkct. Th n cc ary implication from th e rul thus
laid clown wou ld e m t require hi s absolut li charg wli n
the re pon ibility of an individual liabl e for th whole debt has
b en lo "t by th e act f th er ditor.
It is amono- the fundamental rul applicabl to the relations
o f principal and urety th at a creditor cannot vary or chan e the
contract to th preju<lic
f a ur ty · that he cannot ext nd the
time of it performance, or relea e any ecurity h eld ther for or
discharge any party th rcfrom, with ut th reby relea ing the
. ur ty wh ll y or partially from hi oblig ati on. (Daniel on Neg.
In t., § 1308). In Steic.1art v. Eden ( 2 aine , 121) , it wa s held
wh r the h ol ler rel ea e I one of th e makers of a note, re erving,
howeYe r, his li ab ility to the iildor er , that uch relea e did not
di charge the ind o r r . B ut it was then conceded that if th
r lease had operated to wholly discharge uch maker it wou ld
have been otherwise .
\ Nhil e th er e are om e qualifications of the general rules above
referred to, there are none that I have been ab le to find xcu ing
a credito r, for allowing the statute to run in favor of the principals, upon a n ot e by which they are discharged from liability.
The general rule applicable to such !aches seems to be well stated
in th e case of Reese v. Barrington (2 Lead. Cas. in Eq. , part 2,
p. 373, cited in th note to Fell's Law of Guaranty and Surety hip,
21 7). " But althouo-h the credito r is not b uncl to take active
measure to enforce payment of the debt, and may, therefore,
top short in those which he ha taken, ev n when their further
prosecution would have b en successful, yet he is not entitled to
relinqui h any hold which he ha actually acquired on the property or e tate of the principal an l which might have been mad e
effectual for th e payment of th d bt. This i th neces ary result
of the rule that a creditor hall not arbitrarily hift th burden
of a debt from the party primarily liable for it paym nt und
impose it on anoth r who e liability i econdary."
W are, th r efo re, of the opinion that an indor er cannot be
h Id upon a note payab l on demand with int rest, unless the
hold r can show a demand mad
f th mak r upon a ub i ting
obligation again t all of the parti th r to, an l b able to deliver
to such indorser upon payment by him the not , unimpa!reC:. as an
obligation by any act or omi sion of the holder occurrina ubequent to the contract of indor ement.
Th judgment of the court below h ould b r versed and a
new trial ordered, with costs to abid event.
• 11 concur.
Judgment reversed.
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Boatmen's Savings Bank v. Johnson (i88j), 24 Mo. .//>/>• 316.

Appeal from the St. Louis Circuit Court, Shepakd II arclay,

Boatmen's

avillgs Bani? v. JohnJon

1887), 2.; Mo .

.A.pp.

316.

Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

A. M. Gardner, with whom are Kerr & Tittman, for the

appellant.

George H. Shields, and Glover & S lie pie y, for the respon-

Appeal fr m th
t. Loui
Judg .
Reversed and remanded.

ircuit

ourt,

HEP.ARD

ARCLAY,

dents.

Thompson, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The single question presented by this record is whether an

endorser or surety is released by a composition agreement

between the holder of the obligation and the maker, acceptor, or

other principal debtor, \yjuch_j^ojiirjo^

A. M. Gardner, with whom are Kerr & Tittman, for the
appellant.
Gcorae H.
dents.

hields, and Glover &

hepley, for the re pon-

r eserves every right and remedy which the holder, or obligee, h as^

agai nst ot her persons. The question must be answered upon

authority, and such an agreement does not discharge the endorser

or surety.

Two principles are universally conceded in respect of the

rights of sureties, and are not disputed by the parties to this
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proceeding : ( 1 ) That a valid agreement between a creditor and

his principal debtor, whereby the creditor, in consideration of the

payment of a part of the debt, discharges the principal debtor,

will, without more, operate to discharge a surety. (2) That an

agreement between a creditor and his principal debtor, whereby

the creditor agrees, for a consideration, to extend the time of

payment, will, without more, operate to discharge a surety. But_

it is an exception to the_former of these rules,, equally well

settled, that such a n agreement will not operate to discharge a

surety wheTe~t he^agreeme"nt itselfco n tains an express ., reservation

of th cM grn^lirTg L the cTect itor against sureties, or a gainst all per_-

sons othe r than the principa l d ebtor, who mav be liable . ( Ex

ParTTGTfford, 6 Yes. 805, 807, per Lord Eklon, L. C. ; Hubbcll

v. Carpenter, 5 N. Y. 171 ; Sohier v. Loring, 6 Cush. 537: Tobey

v. Ellis, 114 Mass. 120; Mueller v. Dobschuets, 89 111. 176, 182;

Stirewalt v. Martin, 84 N. C. 4: Morse v. Huntington. 40 Yt. 488,

496). This principle was recognized by this court in Broadway

Saznngs Bank v. Sehmueker (7 Mo. App. 171). It i s an equally.

well settled exception to the_ sgcond of these rules, t hafSTfch an

apreem ent will not operaTe~todischarg_e a _su J^tv^jyjTer^thejigTee-

ment itself contains an express reservation of the remedies of the

universally conceded in re pect of the
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liU^m.

u debtor wlio m ay be l iable^ (nx

thick, $iy;T?oitItficc v'T^luobs, 18 Ves. 20, 26; A'ichols v. A" orris,

3 Barn. & Ad. 41 ; Clagett v. Salmon, 5 Gill & J. 314; /J'yAv v.

rs, 1 DeG., M. & G. 408; Melville v. Glendenning, 7 Taunt.

[26; Bangs v. Strong, [0 Paige, 1 1 ; £#»& v. Lewis, 8 Pick. 458;

Blackstone v. /////, 10 Pick. 132; Zjoz/A' v. Lineberger, 83 N. C.

454; I 'idle v. Hoag, 24 Vt. 46). Our supreme court made a

ruling which rests upon similar reasons in Rucker v. Robinson

(38 Mo. 154).

These two exceptions to the two rules above stated rest upon

the same principle. They are grounded upon the principle that,

c editor
Llrincipal debtor

uretie , or again t all er o n
ll:,!1
may be ia I . ( •x parte

re .

th n the

lend e1uzing,

I

Uuck, 517; Bo11lthce v.°'s1Jt/)os, IS
20, 2 ; Tichols v.
orris,
3 UJrn . & .\cl ...p; Claf:ett v. alnzo11, 5 ill & J. 314; TV:ylu v.
Nv~as, 1 De ;. , ~I. ·
. 40 ; Jlel'ziille v. Gle11de1111i11g, 7 Taunt.
126; Bangs"· 'tro11g , ro I>aicre, I I; Ba7lk v. L ei •is,
ick. 45
B lacksto11c ". 11 ii!, IO Pick . l 32; Bank v. Li1zeber o-er, 3
454; T'iclle "· Hoag. -4 Yt. 46) .
ur upreme court made a
ruling which re ~ t upon imilar rea on in Rucker v . Robinson
(3 ~Io . 154).

where a contract expressly reserves the remedy of the creditor

against other persons (which includes sureties), the sureties are

in no way prejudiced by the agreement. By entering into su ch

an ag reement the_ principal de b tor implied ly consents that what-

ever - remedies his suretjeshave against him shall remain open to

I grn. They are, thereafter, at liberty to pay the debt at once, and

proceed immediately against their principal for reimbursement.
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An examination of many decisions shows that the principles

which support these two exceptions to the respective rules above

stated are precisely the same. Courts adopt the same mode of

reasoning in the two cases, and cite interchangeably decisions

where the agreement was for a discharge of the principal debtor,

and where it was merely for an extension of time to him.

This principle has been applied in a number of cases where

the agreement was merely that the creditor would not sue the

principal debtor within a stated period of time. {Price v. Barker,

4 El. & Bl. 760, 778; C. C, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 157; Kearsley v.

Cole, 16 Mees. & W., 128, 135; Perkins v. Gilman, 8 Pick. 229;

Pullman v. Valentine, 11 Pick. 156; Kenworthy v. Sawyer, 125

Mass. 28; Hagey v. Hill, 75 Pa. St. 108). In these cases, where

there is a reservation of the remedies of the creditor against all

other persons, or against sureties, the reasons upon which the

courts refuse to discharge the sureties, are two-fold : ( 1 ) The

reason above stated, that the agreement in no way prejudices the

surety as to any remedy which he may have against his principal.

(2) The additional reason that a covenant not to sue can not be

pleaded in bar of an action, in case it is brought in violation of

the covenant, the courts proceeding upon the refinement that such

a covenant affords merely the ground of an action for damages.

This distinction was noticed by our supreme court in Rucker v.

Robinson (supra). Whether it is well, or ill, founded, we need

The e two xception to the two rule ab v tat d re t upon ,
the same principle. They are grounded upon the principle that,
where a contract expres ly reserve the remedy of th creditor
again t other per on (w hich includes suretie ) , the sureties are
in n way prej uclicecl by the agreement. By entering into uch
an agreement, the rinci1 al debtor im li ed ly consent that wi'1'ate~ remed1e his suret' have again t um s all r mam open to
~ They are, thereafter, at 1_, e y to pay t e e t at once, and
proceed immediately again t th eir principal for r eimbursement.
,\n examination of many decision
ho v\'S that the principle
which support the e two exception to the r e pective rul s above
tated a r e precisely the same. Courts adopt the ame mode of
rea oning in the two ca es, and cite interchangeably deci ion
where the agreement was for a di char<Ye of the principal debtor,
and where it \Va m er ly for an extension of time to him .
This principle has been appli ed in a number of cases \ her
the agreement was merely that the creditor would not sue the
principal debtor within a tated p riod of time . (Price v . Barker,
4 1. & Bl. 760, 778 ; C. C., 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 157 · Kea1J-sle}' v.
Cole, 16 Mee . & W., 12 , 135; Perkins v . Gilman, 8 Pick. 229;
Fullmal}i v . Va lentin e, I I Pick. 156; K enworthy v . Sawyer, 125
:\Ia . 28; Ha gey v. Hill, 75 Pa. t. 108). In the e ca e, where
there i a reservation of the remedies of the creditor against a11
ther per on , or again t uretie , the r a on upon wh ich the
courts refuse to di char<Ye the sureties, are two-fold: ( l) The
rea on abov tated, that the agre ment in no way prejudices the
urety as to a ny rem edy which he may have aaain t his principal.
( 2) The additional r a on that a covenant not to ue can not be
pleaded in bar of an action, in ca e it is brought in violation of
the covenant, the court proc edin<Y upon the refinement that such
a covenant afford m rely the ground of an action for damages.
Thi distinction wa n oticed 1 y our upr m court in Rucker v.
Robinson (s11pra). \ hether it is ·well , or ill , founded, we need
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not now consider. Assuming that it is well founded, the defend-

ant's position is not helped ; because, in the cases where the

agreement was merely an agreement not to sue, the courts have

universally rested their decisions as well upon the reason that the

sureties were not prejudiced by the agreement, and hence not dis-

charged, as upon the reason that the agreement did not prevent

the creditor from suing the principal debtor at any time. An

examination of numerous cases convinces us that, with one or

two isolated exceptions, they afford no ground for raising the dis-

tinction which has been attempted in this case, between agree-

ments not to sue and agreements to discharge the principal debtor

entirely, reserving rights against all other persons. We should

add that the statement of Judge Wagner in The State ex rel. v.

Matson (44 Mo. 305, 308), that "a release of the principal will

always discharge the surety," was an obiter dictum and did not

correctly state the law. Nor is there anything in the provisions

of section 666, Revised Statutes, to which we have been cited,

which changes the rule of the common law on this subject.

We find, then, that the exception to the general rule, which

supports the plaintiff's claim in this case, has been thoroughly
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settled in England, and in this country, by the most authoritative

courts ; and as we have no jurisdiction to change the law, we

must hold that the circuit court erred in the view that the defend-

ant was not liable, and in non-suiting the plaintiff.

II. The decedent, against whose estate this claim was proved,

became liable as . an endorser for value on a bill of exchange

drawn in favor of a partnership firm of which he was a member.

In view of this fact, we have thought it worth while to consider

whether the statute providing for the discharge of a surety by the

delay of the creditor, upon notice to sue the principal debtor (Rev.

Stat., sect. 3896, ct seq.), might not operate to change, in this

state, the rule of the common law above stated. But we find, on

examination of the decisions of our supreme court, that it is settled

in this state that this statute has no application to endorsers, even

for accommodation, of commercial paper, but that it applies only

to sureties who were originally liable as such by the terms of the

instrument creating liability. ( Clark v. Barrett, 19 Mo. 39 ; Miller

v. Mellier, 59 Mo. 388; Faulkner v. Faulkner, jt, Mo. 327, 338;

recognized in Friest v. Watson, 75 Mo. 310, 316).

The judgment will be reversed and the ease remanded.

It is so ordered.

All the judges concur.

not now consider.
suming that it is well founded, the defendant' po it1on i not helped; becau e, in the ca es where the
agreement was merely an agreement not to sue, the courts have
univer ally re t d th ir d ci ions a well upon the rea on that the
ureties were not prejudiced by the agreement, and hence not discharged, a up n th rea on that the agreement did not prevent
the creditor from suing the principal debtor at any time. An
e -amination of numerou ca e convince u that, with one or
two isolated exception they afford no ground for raising the di tinction which ha been attempted in thi ca e, b tween agreements not to sue and a()"reements to discharge the principal debtor
entirely, re erving right again t all other per on . We should
add that the statement of Judge Wagner in The State e.x rel. v.
Matson ( 44 Mo. 305, 30 ) , that "a relea e of the principal will
always di char()"e the surety," was an obiter dfrtuni and did not
correctly tate the law.
or i there anything in the provision
of ection 666, Revi ed Statutes, to which we have been cited,
which changes the rule of the common law on thi ubject.
We find, then, that the exception to the general rule, which
supports the plaintiff's claim in this ca e, has been thoroughly
settled in England, and in this country, by the most authoritative
courts; and a we have no jurisdiction to change the law, we
must hold that the circuit court erred in the view that the defendant wa not liable, and in non-suiting the plaintiff.
II. The decedent, against whose estate this claim was proved,
became liable as an endorser for value on a bill of exchange
drawn in favor of a partnership firm of which he wa a member.
In view of this fact, we have thought it worth while to consider
whether the statute providing for the di charge of a urety by the
delay of the creditor, upon notice to ue the principal debtor (Rev.
Stat., ect. 3 96, et seq.), might not operate to change, in thi
tate, the rule of the common law above stated. But we find, on
examination of the d ci ion of our supreme court that it i ettled
in thi tate that thi tatute ha no application to endorsers. eYen
for accommodation, of commercial paper, but that it applie only
to sureties who ' ere originally liable a such by the term of the
instrument creating liability. (Clark v. Barrett, 19 1o. 39; Miller
v. M ellier, 59 1o. 3 ; Fa.zdkner v. Fa,ulkner 73 1o. 327 338 ·
recoO'nized in Priest v. Watson, 75 1o. 3ro, 316).
The judgnient will be reversed and tire case remanded.
It is so order ed.
All the judge concur.
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Carroll v. Sweet (1891), 128 N. Y. 19.

See also § 188.

Carrollv.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Superior

Court of the city of New York, entered upon an order made

February 9, 1891, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff

entered upon a verdict directed by the court, and affirmed an order

denying a motion for a new trial.

This was an action to recover the balance of an indebtedness

for services rendered. The defense of payment by check was

interposed.

The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.

//. E. Losey and /. W. Bartraui, for appellant.

Carter, Hughes & Kellogg, for respondent.

Andrews, J. — The indorsement and transfer by the defend-

ant to the plaintiff of the check to Woodruff operated as pro-

visional payment only of so much of the antecedent debt owing by

the defendant to the plaintiff. There was no agreement that it

,. eet (1891),1281. Y. 19.
See also § 18 .

. \ppeal from jud m nt of the eneral T rm of th
uperior
oi the city of
w York, ent red upon an ord r mad
Fcbruar) 9, I )9I, which affirmed a judgm nt in favor of plaintiff
entered upon a verdict dir cted by the court and affirmed an order
denying a motion for a new trial.
Thi wa an action to recover the balance of an ind btednes
for ervice r ndered. The defense of paym nt by check wa
interpo ed.
Th facts, so far a material, ar tated in the opinion.
~o urt

should be taken in absolute satisfaction of the debt and, in the

absence of such an agreement, the intendment of law is that it

was conditional payment only. {Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 566;
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Bradford v. Fox, 38 id. 289). The debt remained until discharged

H. E. Lose31 and J. W. Bartram, for appellant.
Carter, Hughes & Kellogg, for re pondent.

by payment of the check or by such dealing with the check by

the plaintiff as would, in judgment of law, convert what was

originally a provisional payment into an absolute one. The check

was dated August 22, 1887, and was drawn on the Asbury Park

National Bank, and was on the same day indorsed and delivered

by the defendant to the plaintiff at the place where the bank was

located.

The plaintiff on accepting the check assumed, as between

himself and the defendant, an obligation to present the same to

the bank for payment within the time prescribed by the law mer-

chant, that is to say, not later than the next day after its date, and

if refused, to protest the same and give notice of non-payment.

(Smith v. lanes, 20 Wend. T92). It was not presented until

the thirty-first of August, nine days after it was received by the

plaintiff. The defendant was, by such delay, discharged from

liability as indorser of the check, irrespective of any question of

loss or injury. Presentment in due time, as fixed by the law mer-

chant, was a condition upon performance of which the liability of

the defendant as indorser depended, and this delay was not

excused although the drawer of the check had no funds, or was

ANDREWS, J.-The indorsement and tran fer by the defendant to th plaintiff of the check to Woodruff operated a provisional payment only of so much of the antecedent debt owing by
the defendant to the plaintiff. There was no agreement that it
houlcl be taken in absolute satisfaction of the debt and, in the
ab enc of uch an agre ment, the intendment of 'law i that it
wa conditional payment only. (Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 566;
Brad/ ord v. Fox, 38 id. 289). The debt remained until di charo-ed
by payment of the check or by such dealing with the ch ck by
the plaintiff a would, in judgment of law, convert what was
originally a provisional payment into an ab olute one. The check
was elated August 22, I 7, and was drawn on the Asbury Park
~ ational Bank, and wa on the ame day indor eel and delivered
by the defendant to the plaintiff at the place where the bank was
located.
The plaintiff on accepting the check as urned, as between
him elf and th defendant, an obligation to pre ent the ame to
the bank for payment within the time pr scrib d by the law merchant, that i to say, not later than the n xt day aft r it date and
if refused, t protest the same and give notice of non-payment.
( S1'nith v. Ja11es, 20 W nd. 192). It wa not pr ented until
the thirty-fir t of Augu t, nin days after it was receiv d by the
plaintiff. Th cl fenclant wa , by uch delay, discharged from
liability a inclorser of the chc k, irre p ctive of any que tion of
lo s or injury. Presentment in du time as fixe I by the law merchant, wa a condition upon p rformance of which the liability of
the d fcndant as indorser cl pended, and this delay was not
excused although the drawer of the check had no fu nds, or was
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insolvent, or because presentment would have been unavailing

as a means of procuring payment. ( Mohaivk Bank v. Brodcrick,

10 Wend. 304; Gough v. Stoats, 13 id. 549). A different rule

obtains as between the holder and drawer of a check. As between

them presentment may be made at an)- time and delay in present-

ment does not discharge the liability of the drawer unless loss has

resulted. (Little v. Pheni.v Bank, 2 Hill, 425).

The action here is not upon the indorsement of the defend-

ant, but upon the original indebtedness. If the discharge of the

defendant's liability as indorser discharges also his liability as

debtor for the original debt, the judgment must on that ground

be reversed. In Hamilton v. Cunningham (2 Brock. 350), Chief

Justice Marshall considered the effect of the neglect of the holder

of a bill to give due notice of dishonor, whereby prior parties

thereto were discharged, upon the liability of a debtor for the

debt for which the bill was drawn. After showing that the

authorities in which the debtor had, been held discharged, pro-

ceeded upon the theory that he had sustained an actual loss,

reached the conclusion that the true principle is "that if a bill be

received as provisional payment, the omission to give due notice
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of its dishonor, deprives the creditor of his action on that bill, but

does not compel him to take it in absolute payment or deprive him

of his action on the original debt further than damage has been

sustained actually or in legal supposition by the debtor." (See

also Gallagher s Ex'rs. v. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191 ; Fleig v.

Sleet, 43 Ohio St. 53). I am not sure that this doctrine is recon-

cilable with expressions in the opinion of this court in Smith v.

Miller (43- N. Y. 171 ; S. C, 52 id. 545). That was an action to

recover a debt for which the defendant had drawn his draft on J.

K. Place & Co., and forwarded it to the plaintiff, the creditor. It

was presented on the same day it was received to the drawees, and

the plaintiffs received therefor the drawee's check on a bank and

surrendered the draft. The check was not presented to the bank

until the next day, when payment was refused, the drawee mean-

while having failed. The check would have been paid if it had

been presented on the day it was given, which might have been

done. The plaintiffs did not demand a return of the draft, and it

was not protested, nor was any notice of non-payment given to

the drawees. The court rendered judgment for the defendant on

two grounds, first, that in the absence of proof of demand and

refusal and notice to the drawees, according to the usual course,

there could be no recovery upon the draft or upon the indebted-

ness upon which it was given, and second, on the ground of negli-

insolvent, or because presentment would have been unavailing
as am ans of procuring payment. (M ohai k Bank v. Broderick,
IO \!Vend. 304; Gough v.
taats, 13 id. 549).
different rule
obtains as between th holder and draw r of a check. As between
them presentment may be made at any tim and delay in presentment does not clischarg the liability of th drawer uni s lo has
r ulted. (Little v. Phenix Bank, 2 Hill, 425).
The acti n here i not upon th e indorsement of the defendant, but upon the original indebtedness. If the di charge of the
defendant' liability a indorser di charges also hi s liability as
debtor for th original del t, the judgment must on that ground
be rever d. In Hamilton v. Cwininghanz (2 Brock. 350), Chief
Ju tice Mar hall con idered the effect of the neglect of the holder
of a bill to give due notice of dishonor, whereby prior parties
thereto wer discharged, upon the liability of a debtor for the
debt for which the bill was drawn. After showing that the
authorities in which the debtor had . been held discharo-ed, proceeded upon the theory that he had sustained an actual loss,
reached the conclu ion that the true principle is "that if a bill be
received a provisional payment, the omission to give due notice
of it dishonor, deprives the creditor of his action on that bill, but
does not compel him to take it in absolute payment or deprive him
of his action on the original debt further than damage has been
sustained actually or in legal supposition by the debtor." (See
also Gallagher's Exrs. v. Roberts, 2 Wash. C. C. 191; Fleig v.
Sleet, 43 Ohio St. 53). I am not sure that this doctrine is reconcilable with xpressions in the opinion of thi court in Smith v.
Miller (43· N. Y. 171; S. C., 52 id. 545). That was an action to
recover a d bt for which the defendant had drawn his draft on J.
K. Place & Co. and forwarded it to the plaintiff, the creditor. It
was pre ented on the sam day it was received to the drawees, and
the plaintiffs received therefor the drawee's check on a bank and
surrendered th draft. Th check wa not presented to the bank
until the next day, when payment wa refu ed, the drawee meanwhile having failed. The check would have been paid if it had
been presented on the day it was given, which mio-ht have been
done. The plaintiffs did not demand a r turn of the draft, and it
was not prot t cl , nor wa any notic of non-paym nt given to
the drawe . The court r nd red judgm nt for th d f ndant on
two ground ' first that in the ab enc of proof of d mand and
refusal and notice to th draw es. according to the u ual course
there could b no recov ry upon the draft or upon th indebtedness upon which it was given, and second, on the a-round of negli-
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gence in failing to present the check on the day on which it was

given. The last ground stated was upon the facts a satisfactory

for the judgment, and the same principle was applied upon

similar facts in First National Bank v. Fourth National Bank

;; \. Y. 320).

In the view we take of the present case, it is unnecessary to

inquire whether the cases cited from this and other courts arfe in

conflict, or if so which class of cases stand upon the better reason.

The court in this case directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and in

this we think there was error. It cannot be doubted that if there

was evidence tending to show that the delay in presenting the

check to the Asbury Park Bank prevented its collection, or from

which the jury might find that the whole, or any part of the debt

owing by the drawer of the check to the defendant, for which the

check was given, was lost by reason of the delay in the present-

ment, or by dealings between the plaintiff and the drawer, in

respect to the check, without the assent of the defendant, the

case should have been submitted to the jury. To the extent of

the injury, the law would treat the omission to make due present-

ment as tantamount to payment.

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

The facts most favorable to the defendant need to be stated.

Woodruff, the maker of the check, when the check was given, was

conducting a hotel at Asbury Park, and the parties to the action

were guests at his house. The defendant was indebted to the

plaintiff for dentistry work, and the former, who resided in New

York, had loaned money to Woodruff for which the check was

given, and on same day defendant received the check he delivered

it to the plaintiff on his debt. Woodruff had an account with the

Asbury Park National Bank. On the day of the date of the check

the bank charged to his account a demand note held by the bank

against him for $500, but so far as appears without any notice

to Woodruff, and this rendered his bank account overdrawn.

Woodruff was in embarrassed circumstances, but was in the daily

receipt of about $600 from his business. He used part of the

receipts for current expenses, without depositing them, and

between the twenty-second and thirty-first of August he deposited

$900 in the bank to the credit of his account, and the inference

is that it was applied in part to pay the $500 note and in part to

pay current checks drawn by Woodruff. On the twenty-second

of Vugust, the day on which Woodruff's check to the defendant

is dated, and after it had been indorsed to the plaintiff by the

defendant, Woodruff, who had been informed of the transfer,

requested the plaintiff to accommodate him by holding the check

g nc in failing to pre ent the ch ck on the day on which it was
given. The la t ground stated wa upon the fact a ati factory
ba i for th judgment, and the ame principle wa applied upon
. imilar fact in First ational Bank v. Fourth
ational Bank
( 77 .. . Y. 320) .
In the view we take of the pre ent ca e, it is unnece sary to
inquir wheth r the ca
cited from this and other courts are in
conAict, or if o which cla s of ca es tand upon the better reason.
The court in thi case directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and in
thi we think there was error. It cannot be doubted that if there
wa evidence t nding to show that the delay in presenting the
check to the A bury Park Bank prev nted its collection, or from
which the ju ry might find that the whole, or any part of the debt
owing by the drawer of the check to the defendant, for which the
check was <Yiven, was lo t by reason of the delay in the presentment, or by dealin<Y between th e plaintiff and the drawer, in
respect to the check, without the a sent of the defendant, the
ca e hould have been submitted to th e jury. To the extent of
the injury, the law would treat the omi sion to make due presentment as tantamoun t to payment.
The fact most favorable to the defendant need to be stated.
vVoodruff, the maker of the check, when the check wa given, was
conducting a hotel at sbury Park, and the parties to the action
were guests at hi house. The d tendant was indebted to the
plaintiff for dentistry work, and the forme r, who resided in New
York, had loaned money to Woodruff for which the check was
given, and on ame day defendant received the check h deliv red
it to the plaintiff on his debt. Woodruff had an account with the
bury Park • Tational Bank. On th day of the date of the check
the bank charged to hi account a demand note held by the bank
against him for $soo, but so far as appear without any notice
to \i\T oodruff, and this rendered his bank account overdrawn.
\Voodruff was in embarra sed circumstances, but was in the daily
receipt of about $600 from his business. He used part of the
receipts for current expenses, without depo iting them, and
between the twenty-second and thirty-first of ugust he deposited
900 in th bank to the credit of his account, and the inference
i that it wa appli d in part to pay the 500 note and in part to
pay current checks drawn by Woodruff. On the twenty-second
of ugu t, the day on which Woodruff's check to the defendant
i dat d. and after it had been indorsed to the plaintiff by the
d f ndant, Woodruff who had been informed of the transfer,
reque ted th plaintiff to accommodate him by holding th e check
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a few days, stating as a reason that he was pressed in the pay-

ment of his accounts, to which request the plaintiff assented. He

asked the plaintiff to let him know when he wished to use the

check, as he would then provide for it. Woodruff testified that he

had money in his office sufficient to pay the check, and would have

paid it at any moment had payment been insisted upon ; that he

was in the receipt of about $600 a day, and that he redeemed a

number of other checks which went to protest at this time ; that

two or three days after the conversation of the twenty-second of

August he spoke to the plaintiff again, and the plaintiff informed

him that he had sent the check w r est. Woodruff said to him that

he regretted it very much, as he wished to make provision for the

check. The cashier of the bank testified that there were no funds

to meet the check, and that it would not have been paid if it had

been presented any time after the twenty-second of August. On

August thirty-first Woodruff, who was behind in his rent, was dis-

possessed from the hotel premises and his business was closed and

he then was and now is insolvent.

It may be conceded that the only obligation upon the plaintiff,

as between him and the defendant, was to present the check at
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the bank for payment within the time prescribed by law. and if

pavment was refused, to have the same protested and notice of

non-payment given to the defendant. If he had performed this

duty the defendant would have been apprised of the default and

he would have had an opportunity to take such measures as he

could to secure payment from Woodruff. One of the objects of

requiring prompt notice to be given to indorsers and other parties

secondarily liable on commercial paper, in case of default, is that

they may have an opportunity to secure themselves. Checks are

supposed to be drawn against funds of the drawer and prima facie

where it is shown that the drawer's account was not good, the

inference of injury from non-presentment would be rebutted. But

where, as in this case, it is shown that the maker of the check was

solicitous that it should be paid, that he had the means of payment

at command and would have provided for or paid the check if pay-

ment had been insisted upon ; that the holder was apprised of the

facts and for the accommodation of the maker refrained from

presenting the check, and presentation was delayed until open

insolvency of the maker occurred and he became, by the change of

circumstances, unable to provide for the check, it cannot be said,

we think, that there was no legal evidence of injury to be sub-

mitted to the jury. The plaintiff, instead of taking the usual

course, undertook to deal with the maker of the check in disregard

a few days, statin<Y as a r ason that he was pressed in the payment of hi account , to which r qu t the plaintiff a ented. He
ask d the plaintiff to let him know when he wished to use the
check, a h would th n pr vide for it. vVoodruff te tified that he
had money in his office uffici nt to pay the check, and would have
paid it at any m ment had payment been in i ted upon; that he
wa in the r ceipt of about $600 a day, and that he redeemed a
number of other check which went to prote t at thi time; that
two or thr days after th conv r ation of the twenty- econd of
ugu t he poke to the plaintiff again, and the plaintiff informed
him that b had nt th check west. Woodruff aid to him that
he r gretted it very much, as he wished to make provision for th
check. The cashier of the bank te tified that there were no fund
to meet the check, and that it would net have been paid if it had
been pre ented any time after the twenty-second of Augu t. On
Atwu t thirty-first\\ oodruff who was behind in his rent, was dispo e cl from the hotel premises and his business was closed and
he then was and now is insolvent.
It may be conceded that the only obligation upon the plaintiff,
as between him and the d fendant, was to present the check at
the bank for payment within the time prescribed by law , and if
payment was refu ed, to have the same prate ted and notice of
non-payment given to the defendant. If he had performed thi
duty the defendant would have been apprised of the default and
he would have had an opportunity to take such measures as he
could to ecure payment from \i oodruff. One of the objects of
requiring prompt notice to be given to indorsers and other partie
secondarily liable on commercial paper, in case of default, is that
they may have an opportunity to secure themselve . Checks are
upposed to be drawn again t funds of the drawer and prima facie
where it i hown that the drawer's account was not <YOod, the
inference of injury from non-pre entment would be rebutted. But
where, as in this ca e, it is shown that the maker of the check wa
solicitous that it should b paid, that he had the means of payment
at command and would have provided for or paid the check if payment had been insisted upon ; that the holder was appri ed of the
facts and for the accommodation of the maker refrained from
re entin the checkJ and pre entation v a delayed until op n
insolvency of the maker occurred and he became by the chan<Ye of
circumstances, unable to pro id for the check, it cannot be said
we think, that there wa no legal evid nee of injury to be ubm1tted to the jury. The plaintiff. in tead of takin<Y the u ual
course, undertook to deal with the maker of the check in di reo-ard
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of his primary obligation to the defendant. It was for the jury

of hi primary obligation to the def ndant. It was fo r the jury
t pa upon the circum tances and to fin d wheth r th e conduct
of the plaintiff imposed a pecuniary injury upon the defendant.
To the extent of uch injury the law adjudges that the debt of the
plaintiff has b en paid.
The judgment below hould be rev r s d and a n w trial
grant d, with co ts to abide the event.
All concur.
Ju dg11ient reversed.

to pass upon the circumstances and to find whether the conduct

of the plaintiff imposed a pecuniary injury upon the defendant.

To the extent of such injury the law adjudges that the debt of the

plaintiff has been paid.

The judgment below should be reversed and a new trial

granted, with costs to abide the event.

All concur. Judgment reversed.

Qxj^ **| <° f • °

/> Fall kill Xat. Bank v. Sleight ct al. (1896), 1 A pp. Div. (N. Y.)

189, 37 N. Y., Supp. 155.

Appeal by the defendants, Alexander W. Sleight and Frances

~it \"

S. Titus, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the

plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of

Dutchess on the 4th day of April, 1895, upon the decision of the

court rendered after a trial at the Dutchess Special Term, espe-

)<

/'10

Fall!?ill rY at. Bank v . S leight et al. ( 1896), 1 App. D iv. (N . Y.)
189, 37 N . Y ., Supp. 155.

cially from that part of said judgment which adjudges that they

are or may be liable for any deficiency that may arise from the

sale of the mortgaged premises described in the complaint.

L. B. Sackett, for the appellants.
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Herrick & Losey, for the respondent.

Brown, P. J. — This action was brought to foreclose a mort-

gage upon real estate given by one Henry P. Titus to the appel-

lants to secure them as sureties upon three several promissory

notes made by said Titus and held by the plaintiff, and which

mortgage was, by said appellants, assigned to the plaintiff.

The appellants appeal from that part of the judgment which

adjudged them to be liable for such deficiency on the debt as might

Appeal by the defendants, A lexander W . Sleig ht and F rances
S. Titus, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the
plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of
Dutchess on t he 4th day of A pril, 1895, upon the decision of the
court rendered afte r a t rial at the Dutchess Special T erm, especially from that part of said judgment which adju dges that they
are or may be liable f9r any deficiency that may arise from the
sale of the mo rtgaged premises described in the complaint.

exist after a sale of the mortgaged premises. The defense pleaded

was that the plaintiff had, without the appellants' consent,

extended the time of payment of the notes in suit for thirty days

from the date of a certain chattel mortgage executed by said

Henry P. Titus and delivered to the plaintiff, and that such agree-

ment discharged the appellants from their liability upon the notes

in suit.

^T^ 4 The mortgage sought to be foreclosed was dated January 1 1 .

:*^x>x fc^o. l8 9> and was £i ven to secure the payment of three notes, one of

_^_ which bore date March 26, 1889, and the other two April 3, 1889.

i vr"^) all being payable on demand, with interest.

On the date aforesaid the plaintiff was the holder of said

three notes, upon which there was then unpaid $36,600, and also

L. B. Sack ett, fo r the appellants.
Herrick & Lose':>', fo r the respondent.

P . J.- This action was broug ht to for eclose a mortgage upon real estate g iven by one H enry P. Titus to the appellant to secure th em as sur ties upon three several promissory
n t s made by aid Titus and held by th e plaintiff, and which
mortO'age wa , by said appellants, assig ned to the plaintiff.
The appellants appeal from that part of the judg ment which
adjudged them to be liable fo r such defici ency on th e debt as might
exist after a sale of the m o rtga~:; d premises. The d fense pleaded
~ "-. ~
was that th plaintiff had, without the appellant ' con sent
~
extended the time of payment of the notes in suit for thirty days
I 5o-.ct ~ from the date of a certain chattel mortgag executed by said
~~ Henry .P. T itus and delive red to the plai~ti~, a?~ that such agree~
· ment d1scha rg d th appellant from th eir li ability upon the note
~.~ insuit.
~ ~
Th~ mortgage sought to b fo reclosed wa dated January l l,
~ ~I 95, and was given to s cure the_payment of three not s, one of
b ~-w hich bore elate March 26, 1889, and th e other two pril 3, 1889,
"' \)
all being payable on demand, with interest.
.
n the date aforesaid the plaintiff was the holder of said
thre notes, upon which there was then unpaid $36,600, and also
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of an overude note made by said Titus for $1800, dated July 25,

1894, and made payable four months after date.

On January 11, 1895, said Titus executed and delivered to

the plaintiff a chattel mortgage, which, after reciting his indebted-

ness as aforesaid, provided as follows :

"Now for the securing payment of the said first above-men-

tioned note" (being the $1,800 note) "or any renewal or renewals

thereof, and in consideration of agreement to renew the same for

thirty days, and also for securing payment of said last three above--

mentioned notes, after said first above-mentioned note and any

renewal or renewals thereof shall be first paid or provided for, I

do hereby sell, assign, etc. etc." * * * "This mortgage is on

the express condition that if the said Henry P. Titus * * *

shall pay to the said Fallkill National Bank of Poughkeepsie

eighteen hundred dollars, as conditioned in said first above-men-

tioned note, or any renewal or renewals thereof, and shall also pay

the sum of thirty-six thousand six hundred dollars, as conditioned

in the said last three above-mentioned notes * * * then

this transfer to be void and of no effect."

The argument of the counsel for the appellants is that the
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intent and purpose of the agreement contained in the chattel mort-

gage was to postpone the payment of the three demand notes until

thirty days after the date of the renewal of the $1,800 note.

This contention cannot be sustained. The terms of the chattel t^>J^ "^^

mortgage fixed the order in which that security should be appliedfr Vv ' aa * lA ~ V rv -

" to the payment of the respective notes. It did not purport to alter j^^-Ji

the terms of the demand notes nor to postpone their payment nntil ^^^^^

thema jTintv of the renewal of the $1,800 note . The bank was ijj^j^^

left entirely free to sue upon the d emand notes^o r to avail itself of j^*^w-A Wo.

the security ot the real estate mortgage tor their payment, and in ^J^-^ ^

fact this action was commenced before the expiration of thirty V* *^^^^-

days from the date of the chattel mortgage. Had the appellants

paid the original debt to the plaintiff there was nothing in the

terms of the chattel mortgage that would have prevented their .

immediately suing their principal therefor. The chattel mortgage ,^-W^X*

was merely a new and additional collateral s ecurity f or the pay- ^feSStf]^

men t j)f the three demand notes. And the rule is well settled that jS-SSSc!!^

taking a new securit y from th e_debtor without agreeing to give.. _ -Ha^ ^£^ j

him time does not discharge" a suretvT (Wood v. Robinson, 22 y*^*> -w«-*r

ST. Y. 564; Gary v. White, 52 id. 138). , ^o^^^S

The fact that the collateral may not be enforcible until a_ -w^

definite time in the future does not operate to extend the time

of payment of the principal debt or suspend the right to sue upon

of an overude note mad by said Titus for $1800, dated July 25,
1894, and made payabl four month after date.
On January II, I 95, aid Titus execut d and deliver d to
the plaintiff a chattel morto-a e, which, after'reciting his indebtedness as aforesaid, provided a follow :
"Now for th e securino- payment of the aid first above-mentioned note" (being the $1, oo note) "or any renewal or renewals
th reof, and in con ideration of agreem nt to renew the same for
thirty days, and al o for securing payment of aid last three above- ·
mentioned note , after said first above-mentioned note and any
renewal or renewals thereof shall be first paid or provided for, I
do hereby ell, as ign, etc. etc." * * * "Thi mortgage i on
the expr
condition that if the said Henry P. Titus * * *
shall pay to the said Fallkill National Bank of Poughkeepsie
eighteen hundred dollars, as conditioned in said first above-mentioned note, or any ren ewal or renewals thereof, and shall also pay
the urn of thirty-six thou and six hundred dollars, as conditioned
in the aid la t three above-mentioned notes * * * then
this tran f r to be void and of no eff ct."
The argument of the counsd for the appellants is . that the
intent and purpose of the agreement contained in the chattel mortgage was to postpone the payment of the three demand notes until
thirty days after the date of the renewal of the $1,800 note.
This contention cannot be sustained. The terms of the chattel ~ ~
mo rtgao-e fixed the order in which that securit should be applied~~ ~
to the payment of the re pective notes. It did not purport to a ter ~
the terms of the demand notes nor to ost one their payment until~,_
the maturitv of the renewal of the $1,800 note. The )an was ~ ~~
left entirely free to sue upon the demand notes or to avail itself of ~ ~
the security of tne real fate rnortgao-e for their payment, and in ~ ~
fact this action was commenced before the expiration of thirty ~
days from the date of the chattel mortgage. Had the app llant
paid the original debt to the plaintiff there wa nothing in the
terms of the chattel mortgage that would have prevented their
immediately suing their principal therefor. The chattel mortgage
was rnerel a new and additional collateral securit for the a nd th rule i well settled that
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the original security. (United States v. Hodge, 6 How. [U. S.]

( U11ited

279).

fates v. Hodge, 6 How. [U. S.J

In all cases where it has been held that the time of payment

of the original debt has been extended by the receipt of collateral

security, there has been an express or implied agreement to that

effect.

Such were the cases of Place v. Mcllvain (38 N. Y. 96) and

Hubbard v. Cumcy (64 id. 457), cited by the appellants.

In Kane v. Cortesy (100 N. Y. 132) the only question dis-

cussed was whether the testimony conclusively established an

agreement to extend the time of payment of the original debt.

There is no question in the case before us but that the time for

the payment of the $1,800 note was extended for thirty days, and

that the note was to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the

chattels mortgaged before any of such proceeds could be applied

to the payment of the three demand notes ; but the testimony does

not show that payment of the demand notes was to be postponed

for any definite time, and the court's finding to that effect has

ample support in the evidence.

The judgment, so far as appealed from, must be affirmed,
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with costs.

All concurred.

Judgment, so far as appealed from, affirmed, with costs.

Ilagey v. Hill {1874), 75 Pa. St. 108.

Before Agnew, C. J., Mercur and Gordon, JJ. Sharswood,

J., at Nisi Prius.

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia.

This was an action of assumpsit, brought, November 26th,

1870, by George W. Hill against John Hagey as endorser of the

following note :

il ha b n h Id that th time of payment
of th , original debt ha been xtend d by the receipt of collateral
. ecurity, th re ha been an x pr s or implied agr em nt to that
effect.
~ uch were the ca
of Place v. M cllvaill ( 38 r. Y. 96) and
H ubbard'" Gurney (64 id. 457), cited by the app llant.
In Kane v. Cortesy ( 100 1 . Y. I3- ) th e only que tion discu . ed was wh th r the te tirn ony conclu ively
tabli hed an
ao-re m nt l exten d th e time of paym nl of lhe orig inal debt.
There i no question in th e ca e before u but that th time for
th payment of the $1,800 note wa extend ed for thirty day , and
that the note was to be paid out of th e proceeds of the ale of the
chatl 1 mortgaged befo r any of such proceeds could be applied
to the payment of the three demand n te ; but th e te timony doe
not show that payment of the demand n l s was to be postponed
for any definite time, and th e courl' findino- to that effect has
ample support in the evidence.
Th judgment, o fa r a appeal ed from , mu t be affirmed,
with costs .
. \11 concurred.

"$10,000. Philadelphia, November 4th, 1867.

Judg111c11t, so far as appealed from , aflirnzed, with costs.

"Eight months after date we promise to pay to order of John

~~ ·

Hagey, Ten Thousand Dollars, without defalcation, for value

received. E. Matlack & Son."

(Endorsed) "John Hagey."

On the trial before Hare, P. J., the plaintiff gave the note

I!agc'y '(.,'. !Iill (1874), 75 Pa. St. Io8.

in evidence and rested.

The defendant then gave in evidence this receipt : —

"Received, July 30th, 1868, of E. Matlack & Son, a policy of

Before AGNEW, C. J. , MERCUR and GORDON, JJ. IIARSWOOD,
i i Priu .
Er r r t th Di trict ourt of Philadelphia.
This wa an action of a umpsit, brought, November 26th,
1870, by
r e \ V. Hill again t J ohn Harrey as endorser of th e
following note:

J., at

"$ro,ooo.
PHILADELPHIA, November 4th, 1867.
"Eight m nth aft r clat we promi to pay to order of Jolm
I Tag y, Ten Thousand
ollar , with ut cl falcation, for value
rec iv cl.
E. d:ATLACK & ON."
(Endorsed) " J orn: lL\ EY ."
m

n th trial befo re Har , P. J., th plaintiff gave the note
vicl nc and rest d.
Th e defenda nt then gav in vicl nc this r c ipt : "R c ived July 30th , I 6 , of E. Matlack & on, a policy of

HA EY
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insurance in my favor, dated this day, issued by the American

Life Insurance Company, on the life of Ellwood Matlack, for

the sum of ten thousand dollars. In consideration of which I

hereby agree never to prosecute or demand payment of a certain

promissory note drawn by E. Matlack & Son, endorsed by John

Hagey, and also guaranteed by J. E. Lewars, due and protested

July 7th, 1868, for the sum of ten thousand dollars; provided,

however, that the premium on the said policy of insurance is

promptly paid by the said Matlack, or others. And provided

further, that the interest on said sum of ten thousand dollars is

promptly paid to me, or my order, whenever the same becomes

due. The first year's interest to be paid before the first day of

May, 1869, and the second year on or before July 7th, 1870, and

annually thereafter. Provided further, that no delay of demand

shall interfere with any claim I may have upon the endorsers of

said note. This agreement void if not complied with as above.

"George W. Hill, [seal.]"

E. Matlack, one of the drawers of the note, testified that he

had paid one year's interest on the note, and the premium for

one year on the policy of insurance.

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

There was evidence also that the cashier of the bank where

the note was whilst plaintiff was absent in Europe, took, with the

in uran e in my favor, dated thi day, i uctl by the American
Life Insurance ompany, on th life of llwo d Matlack, for
th sum of ten thou and dollar . In con ideration of which I
hereby agree never to pro ecut or demand paym nt of a certain
promi ory not drawn by E. 1atlack & on, endo rsed by John
Hagey, and also guaranteed by J. E. L ewars, du and prate tecl
July 7th, 18 8, for th
um of ten thou and dollar ; provided,
howev r, that the premium on th
aid policy of insurance i
promptly paid by the aid Matlack, or others. And provided
furth er, that the intere t on said um of ten thousand dollar is
promptly paid to me, or my order, whenever the same becomes
due. The first year's interest to b paid before the fir t day of
l\Iay, 18 9, and the econd year on or before July 7th, 1870, and
annually ther after. Provided further, that no delay of demand
shall interfere with any claim I may have upon the endor ers of
said note. Thi agreement void if not complied with as above.

consent of the defendant, a deed from Matlack for some land,

and 'agreed to release all claim against the drawer's stock of

goods, &c, and that the plaintiff refused to ratify the arrange-

ment, and it was rescinded without the consent of the defendant.

The defendant requested the court to charge the jury : —

1. That as the payment of the premium on the policy of

insurance, by the makers of the note, disabled the holder of the

note from suing thereon for one year, the endorser was dis-

charged, unless the jury believe the endorser consented to the

same.

2. That unless the endorser was informed of the delivery of

the policy to the plaintiff, it was his (the plaintiff's) duty to

inform the defendant of any default made in the payment of the

premium, and his failure so to do discharged the defendant.

3. That if the jury believe that the holder of the note

released the security held by him, by reason of the conveyance of

April 15th, 1868, without the consent of the endorser, then the

defendant was discharged.

The court refused the request and instructed the jury to find

for the plaintiff.

The verdict was for the plaintiff for $11,350.

"GEORGE

w.

HILL.

[SEAL.

J"

E. 1atlack, one of the drawers of the note, testified that he
had paid one year's interest on the note, and the premium for
one year on the policy of insurance.
There wa evidence also that the ca hier of the bank where
the note was whilst plaintiff wa absent in Europe, took, with the
consent of the defendant, a deed from Matlack for some land,
a~d · agreed to release all claim against the dra wer s tock of
goods, &c., and that the plaintiff refused to ratify the arrangement, and it \Va re cinded without the con ent of the defendant.
The defendant requested the court to charg th jury:r. That a the payment of the premium on the policy of
insurance, by th maker of the note, disabled the hold er of the
note from suing thereon for one year, the endorser was discharged, unless the jury believe the endorser consented to the
same.
2. That unle· s the endor er was informed of the delivery of
the policy to the plaintiff, it was hi (the plaintiff' ) duty to
inform the defendant of any default made in the payment of the
premium, and hi failur o to do discharged the d fendant.
3. That if the jury believe that th hold r of the note
released the security h ld by him. by rea on of th conveyance of
April 15th, 186 , without the con ent of the endorser then the
defendant wa discharo-ed.
The court refused th e r equ t an i in tructed the jury to find
for the plaintiff.
The verdict was for the plaintiff f r $1 i.350.
1

O4

DI "CHA RG E OF PARTY

'EC NDARlLY LI ABLE

A»-*<KaA*i/j °

fhe defendan t took a writ and a sign d for rror the refusal
uf hi poin t and the in truction of the court.
D. TV. Sellers for plaintiff in rror.
JI. T . Ki11g, for defendant in error.
T h opinion of th court was d livered by

604 Discharge of Party Secondarily Liable

The defendant took a writ and assigned for error the refusal

of his points and the instruction of the court.

D. W. Sellers, for plaintiff in error.

//. T. King, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Mercur, J. — This suit was against the endorser of a promis-

sory note. The first assignment of error raises the question as to

whether he was discharged by reason of an agreement between

the holder and the maker, after the note became due, extending

the time of payment. It is a well-recognized rule that an exten-

\. sion of time bv a valid agreement between the creditor and the

principa l, will, as a general rule, discharge the endorser. The

reasons therefore are these : The liability of the endorser to the

holder is secondary and contingent. On his paying the note, he

has a right of action against the principal, or of subrogation to the

rights of the creditor. Hence, if time has been given, or an act

has been done by the creditor which prejudices these equities in

the endorser, he will be discharged.

It has, however, been repeatedly held in England and in this
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country, that a discharge by the creditor of the principal debtor

will not discharge the surety, if the re be an agreem ent between

the creditor and the principal that the surety shall not be thereby

discharged : Byles on Bills, 316; Ex parte Glendcnning, 1 Buck

B. C. 517; Ex parte Carstairs, id. 560; Ex parte Gilford, 6 Vesey,

Jr., 805; Boultbce v. Stubbs, 18 Vesey, Jr., 20; Nichols et al. v.

Norris, ^ Barn. & Ad. 41 (23 E. C. L. R.) ; Kearsley v. Cole, 16

Mees. & W'els. 127; Boaler et al. v. Mayor et al. 19 Com. B. N. S.

70 (115 E. C. L. R.). It was said, however, by Lord Chancellor

Eldon, in Ex parte Glendenning, vide supra, "Ever since Mr.

Richard Buck's case, the law has been clearly settled, and is now

perfectly understood, that unless the creditor reserves his rem-

edies, he discharges the surety by compounding with the principal,

and the reservation must be upon the face of the instrument by

which the parties make the compromise; for evidence cannot be

admitted to vary or explain the effect of the instrument." It was

held in Wyke v. Rogers, 1 De G., Mac. & G. 408, that parol evi-

dence might be given to show that an agreement, which would by

itself operate to release the surety, was not to have that effect.

The ground upon which an agreement to give time to the

maker, made by the holder without the consent of the endorsers,

upon a valid consideration, is held to be a discharge of the endors-

ers, is soldy this, that the ho lder the reby impliedly stipulates not

to pursue the endorsers, or to seek satisfaction from them in the

~ I ER l R, J.- Thi
uit wa arrain t th
sory no te. T he fir t a ig nm nt of error rai
the question as to
wheth r h wa di charo-cd by r a on of an agreement between
the h Ider and th e maker, aft r the not b came du , xtending
.
the t ime of payment. It i a well-recognized rul e that an exten~~ ion of tim by a valid agreement betw n the creditor and the_
~principal. will, as a general rule, di charge the endor er. Th
rea on therefor e are th e e : The liability of the endor er to the
holde r i
condary and contingent.
n his paying th note, h
ha a ri D"ht of action against th e principal, or of subrogation to the
ri ght of th creditor. Hence, if tirn has been given, or an act
ha been cl one by the creditor which pr judices these equities in
t he nd or er, h will be di charg d. ·
It has, how ever , been repeatedly held in Enrrland and in this
country, that a di charge by the creditor of the principal debtor
will not di charg e the surety, JLthere be an ag_reement between
the creditor and the principal that the surety shall not be thereb¥
di charged: ylcs on Dills, 316; Ex parte Glendennin u, I
ucl<
B. ·. 517; E x parte Carstairs, id . 560; Ex parte Gifford, 6 Vesey,
Jr., 05; Boultbce v. Stubbs, 18 Vesey, Jr., 20; Nichols et al. v.
Xorris, 3 Darn. &
1. 41 (23 E. C. L. R.); Kearsley v. Cole, 16
M ee . & W ei . 127; Boaler et al. v. Mayor et al. 19 Com. B. N. S.
70 ( II 5 E. . L. R.) . It was aid, however, by Lord Chancellor
E ldon, in Ex pa.rte Glendenning, vide supra, "Ever since Mr.
Ri hard Buck' case, th e law has been cl arly settled, and is now
p rf clly uncl rstood, that unless the er di.tor reserve his rem, lie , he di harg the sur ty by comp unding with th principal ,
and the r erva ti on must b upon the face of the in trument by
whi h th par.ti make th compromis ; for evidence cannot be
adm itt cl to va ry or explain the effect of th in trument." It was
h ' id in TVyke v. Rogers, r De ., Mac. & . 408, that parol videnc might be g iven to how that an a r m nt, which would by
it elf p<' rat t relea e the urety, was not to have that effect.
Th ground upon which an agreem nt to give time to the
mak r , made by th hold r without the consent of the endor er ,
upon a vali l co nsideration , is held to be a di charge of the ndor rs, i.:_ ol ly thi , that th e hol 1 r thereby impli dly stipulat not
to pm ue th nd or se r , or to seek satisfaction from them in the
1
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i ntermediate period. It can never apply to any case where a con-

trary stipulation exists between the parties. Hence, if the agree -

ment for* delay expressly saves and reserves the r ights of the

holder in the intermediate time against the endorsers, it will not

discharge the latter . In such case the very ground of the objec-

tion is removed, for their rights are not postponed against the

maker, if they should take up the note : Story on Prom. Notes,

sect. 416. The same rule is recognized in Viele v. Hoag, 24 Vt.

46; Morse v. Huntington, 40 id. 488; Clagett et al. v. Salmon, 5

Gill & Johns. 315. The whole course of Chancellor Walworth's

reasoning in Bangs v. Strong, 10 Paige's Chan. Rep. 11, leads to

the same result.

The endo rser was not a party to the contract b etween the") X/w**-**"^

holder and the maker. .H.e~was not thereby precluded from paying fr^-*^^-^**

the note at any moment. Having paid it he would have had an llT"'^* ^ 1 ^*"

imme diate right of action against the maker. None of his rights \ ^\*^ J^lT

were in the slightest degree impaired .

Neither the search of counsel nor our own examination has

resulted in finding that the precise point has ever been decided
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by this court. When not in conflict with our own precedents, it is

desirable that we conform to what seems to be the general rule of

the commercial world. The case of Manufacturers' Bank v. Bank

of Pennsylvania, J W. & S. 335, has been cited in opposition to

this rule. Such is not the case. The point there decided is

merely that an endorser may be discharged by the holder giving

time to the maker, after judgment has been obtained against him ;

that the creditor must no more impair the rights of the endorser

after he has obtained judgment against the maker than before.

The written instrument executed by the plaintiff below, byl**-*-***?**^

which he agreed with the maker to extend the time of payment, ;> 'Tt^-r^'^ ■

expressly declares, "Provided further. That no delay of demand _^T[| - f*

shall in terfe re with any claim I may have upon the endorsers of

said note." The case is thus clearly brought within the rule, and '

we hold that the extension of time to the maker in a manner which

preserved all the rights of the endorser, did not discharge the

latter.

The second and third assignments have no merit. The accept-

ance of the conveyance of land in the absence of the plaintiff

below, by one acting without authority, and so known by the

defendant below, and repudiated by the holder of the note, cannot

prejudice his rights against the endorser.

The learned judge was correct in instructing the jury to find

in favor of the plaintiff below. Judgment affirmed.

"■****- VvA^-^AV

-YjEr~»- r&-e~'^~--

intermediate period. It can never J.pply to any case where a contrary stipulation exi t b tw en the parti s.
ence, if th agreement for' dela ex re 1 ' aves and res rve th right of the
hold r in the int rmediat tim agamst t 1e n or er , it will not
di charge the latt r. In such ca the v ry ground of the objection i remov d, for th ir right are not po tponad again t the
maker, if they should tak up the note:
tory on rom. Notes,
ect. 416. Th ame rul i r cognized in Viele v. Hoag, 24 t.
46; Morse v. Huntington, 40 id. 4 8; Clagett et al. v. Salmon, 5
Gill & John . 315. The whole course of hancellor Walworth's
rea oning in Ban as v. trong, IO Paige's Chan. Rep. r l, leads to
the ame result.
The ndorser wa not a party to the contract betwe n the/ ~
holder and the maker. He was not thereby precluded from paym[ 'r~. ~
the note at an moment. Havina aid it he would have had an / ~immediate right of action against the maker.
one o his rights
were in the lightest degree impaired.
N ither the earch of counsel nor our own examination has
resulted in finding that the precise point has ever been decided
by this court. When not in conflict ,\rith our own precedents, it is
desirable that we conform to what seems to be the general rule of
the commercial world. The ca e of l\Janufacturers' Bank v. BQ/ik
of Penns'y lvania, 7 W. & S. 335, has been cited in opposition to
this rule. Such is not the case. The point there decided is
merely that an endorser may be discharged by the holder giving
time to the maker, after judgment has been obtained against him;
that the creditor must no more impair the riahts of the endorser
after he ha obtained judgment again t the maker than before.
. .
Th written instrument executed by the plaintiff below, by 7 e~
which he agreed with the maker to extend the time of payment, r ~
ex res ly d dares, "Provided further, That no delay of demand ~ ~
shall interfere with any claim I may have upon the ndor ers of 1
said not ." The case is thus clearly brought within the rule and
we hold that the exten ion of time to the mak r in a manner which
pre erved all the rights of the endorser, did not di charge the
latter.
The second and third assignm nts have no merit. The acceptance of the conveyance of land in the ab ence of the plaintiff
below, by one actina without authority, and o known by the
defendant below, and r pudiated by the holder of the not , cannot
prejudice his rights against the endorser.
The learned judge was correct in in tructing the jury to find
in fa vor of the plaintiff below.
Judgnie11t affirmed.
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RIGHTS OF PARTY PAYING INSTRUMENT. § I23.

French v. Jan-is (i860), 20 Conn. 347.

RI GHTS OF PARTY P AYI N G l

STRUMENT.

Assumpsit, brought against the defendant as indorser of three

§ 123.

notes, made by one Rowland, payable to the order of the defend-

ant, one for $2,275, dated March 23, 1857, one for $2,337, dated

Frellclz v. Jarvis ( 1860) , 29 Conn. 347.

April 20, 1857, and one for $2,510, dated May 30, 1857, all pay-

able at six months from date. The defendant pleaded the general

issue, with notice, which was closed to the court.

The notes were made by Rowland and indorsed by the

defendant for the accommodation of a joint stock corporation in

New York, and were by the corporation delivered to one Elliott,

a broker in New York, for him to send to Connecticut and get

discounted for the benefit of the corporation ; for which service,

if the discount was procured, he was to receive a commission.

One Baldwin, who resided in New Haven in this state, was inter-

ested with Elliott in his business and in the profits to be derived

from the transaction. Before the notes matured and while they

were in Connecticut, Baldwin himself purchased them for value,

and afterwards, before they became due, indorsed ^them and sold

them to one Townsend, who was the owner and holder of them

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

when they severally matured. When the notes fell due they were

severally presented to the maker for payment and protested for

non-payment, and notice of protest was duly given to the defend-

ant and to Baldwin. Baldwin thereupon paid the amount of the

notes to Townsend, took them up, and became again the owner of

them.

The defendant claimed on the trial that Baldwin had after

this continued to be the holder of the notes, and was such when

the suit was brought, and that the plaintiff, French, had no such

title to the notes as would enable him to maintain a suit upon

them in his own name. The plaintiff denied this, and claimed

to be the legal holder of the notes, and on this point the court

found the following facts.

Baldwin having taken up the notes, and being anxious to

secure their payment, entered into an agreement with French, in

good faith, before the commencement of the suit, by which

French, who was a man of energy and skill, was to investigate

the affairs of Jarvis, and trace out the transmutations of the

property formerly held by him, for the purpose of discovering,

if possible, property which might by legal proceedings be appro-

priated to the payment of the notes, and was diligently to exer-

A ump it, bro ught against th e defendant as indorser of three
note , made by one R owland, payable to the order of the def ndant, one fo r $2,275 , dated March 23, i857, one for $2,337, dat d
.. \pril 20, 1857, and one for $2,510, dated May 30, 1857, all payable at ix months from date. The def ndant plead ed the general
i , ue \\'ith notice, which was closed to the court.
T he notes were made by R owland and indorsed by the
defendant for th e accommodation of a joint stock corporation in
r ew York, and we re by th e corporation delivered to one Elliott,
a broker in Tew Y ork, for him to send to Connecticut and get
discounted fo r the benefit of the corporation; for which service,
if the di scount was procured, he was to receive a commission.
n Baldwin , who r e ided in New Haven in this state, was intere ted with Elliott in his business and in the profits to be derived
from th e transaction. Before the notes matured and while they
we re in Connecticut, Baldwin himself purchased th em for value,
and afte rwards, before th ey became due, indorsed _them and sold
th em to one Townsend, who was the owner and holder of them
when they severally matured. When the notes fell due they were
severally presented to the maker for payment and protested for
non-payment, and notice of protest was duly given to the defendant and to aldwin. Baldwin thereupon paid the amount of the
note to T ownsend, took them up, and became again the owner of
them.
T he defendant claimed on the trial that Baldwin had aft r
this continued to be the hold r of the notes, and was such when
th e suit was broug ht, and that the plaintiff, French, had no such
title to the notes as would enable him to maintain a suit upon
th m in his own name. The plaintiff deni d this, and claimed
to be th e legal holder of the notes, and on this point the court
fo und the following facts.
Daldwin having taken up the notes, and being anxious to
secur th eir payment, entered into an agreement with French, in
good faith , befor e th e commenc m nt of the suit, by which
F rench, who was a man of energy and skill, was to investigate
the affairs of Jarvis, and trace out the transmutations of the
p roperty form erly held by him, for the purpose of discovering,
if possible, property which might by 1 gal proceedings be appropriated to the payment of the notes, and was diligently to exer-
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eise his skill and tact in this business, and make such journeys,

expend such money, time and labor, employ such legal counsel,

and institute such suits and legal proceedings as, in his judgment,

might be necessary; for all which services French was to receive,

in addition to the sum of $150 advanced to him by Baldwin, a

reasonable compensation out of the ultimate avails of the notes;

French to have the power to sue upon the notes in his own name,

and to control all the proceedings to be instituted upon them, and

to personally collect and receive the avails thereof, paying over

to Baldwin the surplus of the avails, if any, that should remain

after compensating himself. When the agreement was made

both Baldwin and French contemplated the rendering of long and

difficult services by the latter under the agreement. In pursuance

of the agreement, before the commencement of the suit, Baldwin

erased his own indorsement from the notes, and delivered them,

indorsd in blank by Jarvis, to French, with intent to carry the

agreement into effect, and to authorize and enable French to deal

with the notes according to the agreement. And the court found

that Baldwin did in fact convey to French the legal title to the

notes, unless the law was imperatively so that a legal title to the

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

notes could not be conveyed in the manner or for the purposes

aforesaid. The court further found that French took the notes,

pursuant to the agreement, and had ever since been the actual

holder thereof, and that he in good faith commenced the perform-

ance of his part of the agreement, and was still engaged in such

performance, and commenced and continued the suit in pursuance

thereof, with the knowledge and assent of Baldwin, and that it

was not certain whether or not he would ever realize from the

avails of the notes more than enough to compensate him for his

services and expenditures under the agreement, though it was

confidently expected by the parties that much more than enough

would be received by him.

It was not claimed by the plaintiff that there had been any

demand on the maker of the notes for payment of either of them,

or anv notice to the defendant of the dishonor thereof, by the

plaintiff or by any one, subsequent to the demand and notice

originally made when the notes severally became due and were

protested for non-payment.

The defendant also claimed that, after the dishonor of the

notes, they could not be transferred to French, so as to vest a

legal title in him and enable him to maintain a suit upon them

in his own name. A question was also made with regard to the

usurious character of the notes, which need not be more fully

e his skill and tact in thi bu in , and make such journey .
expend uch mon y, time and labor, mploy such legal counsel,
and in titute uch suits and 1 gal proc cding a , in hi judgment,
mio-ht be n c sary; for all which servic French wa to receive,
in addition to the sum of $150 advanced to him by Baldwin, a
reasonable compensation out of the ultimate avails of the note ;
French to have the power to sue upon the notes in hi own nam ,
and to control all the proce ding to be instituted upon them, and
to personally collect and receive the avails thereof, paying over
to Baldwin the urplu of the avail , if any that should remain
after compen ating him elf. When the agreement wa made
both Baldwin and French contemplated the rendering of long and
difficult service by the latter under the ao-reement. In pursuance
of the agr ement, before the commencement of the suit, Baldwin
erased his own indorsement from the notes, and delivered them,
indor d in blank by Jarvi , to French, with intent to carry the
agreement into effect, and to authorize and enable French to deal
with the notes according to the agreement. And the court found
that Baldwin did in fact convey to F rench the legal title to the
notes, unl
the law was imperatively so that a legal title to the
notes could not be conveyed in the manner or for the purpose
aforesaid. The court further found that French took the notes,
pursuant to the agreement, and had ever since been the actual
holder thereof, and that he in good faith commenced the performance of his part of the agreement, and was still engaged in such
performance, and commenced and continued the suit in pursuance
thereof, with the knowledge and assent of Baldwin, and that it
was not certain wheth r or not he would ever realize from the
avails of the notes more than enough to compen ate him for hi
services and expenditures under the agreement, th ouo-h it wa
confidently expected by the parties that much more than enough
would be received by him.
It was not claimed by the plaintiff that there had been any
demand on the maker of the note for payment of either of them.
or any notice to the defendant of the di honor th reof by the
plaintiff or b) any one, ub equent to the demand and notice
originally made when the note everally became due and were
protested for non-payment.
The defendant al o claimed that after the dishonor of the
notes, they could not be transferred to French so as to e t a
legal title in him and enable him to maintain a suit upon them
in his own name. A que tion was al o made with reo-ard to the
usurious character of the note which need not be more fully
1
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stated. The court found the issue for the plaintiff, and the

defendant moved for a new trial for error in the rulings of the

court upon the points stated.

Dutton, in support of motion.

· tated . The court found the is ue for the plaintiff and the
<l fen<lant moved for a new trial for error m the ruling of the
court upon the points tated.

R. I. Ingersoll and Harrison, contra.

Storrs, C. J. — It being found by the court below that the

notes in question in this suit were not, as claimed by the defend-

Dutton, in support of motion.
R. I. Ingersoll and Harrison, contra.

ant on the trial, sold in the state of New York, by the corporation

which held them, at a greater rate of discount than the legal rate

of interest in that state, there is clearly no ground for the first

point made by the defendant, which is founded on such a sale.

The finding is conclusive on that question of fact, and is not the

subject of revision before us.

The defendant next claims that Baldwin was always the legal

holder of the notes, from the time when he took them up from

Townsend down to the trial of this case, and therefore that the

plaintiff, never having any legal title to them, could not maintain

this suit. That the plaintiff must have such a title when the suit

was brought, and continue to hold it to the time of the trial, is

well settled. It not being claimed that he ever parted with such
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a title if he acquired it from Baldwin, the question on this point is,

whether he ever so acquired it ; and that he did, we entertain no

doubt. If the circumstances found by the court below, preceding

its final finding as to the conveyance of the legal title of the notes

to the plaintiff, are to be regarded as furnishing evidence merely,

from which conclusions of fact are to be drawn, and this court

had the power to draw such conclusions, we should not probably

hesitate to infer from those circumstances such a conveyance.

But we have no such power, and can only decide on facts found

and presented to us. It is, however, by no means clear that, inde-

pendent of such final finding, enough does not appear to require

us, as matter of law, to pronounce that such a title was conveyed.

But it is not necessary to decide that question, because we are

clearly of the opinion that the finding of the court on the fact of

such a conveyance, notwithstanding its hypothetical form, is in

legal effect absolute and unqualified ; for the court finds that

P.aldwin did in fact convey to the plaintiff the legal title to the

notes, unless the law be imperatively so that a legal title to them

could not be conveyed in the manner and for the purposes before

mentioned ; and we are of the opinion that, under the circum-

stances stated, the law interposed no objection to such a convey-

ance. It was no objection to the transfer of these notes by

TORR ,
• J.-It being found by the court below that the
note in iue tion in thi suit were not, as claimed by the defendanl on th lrial, sold in the state of New York, by the corporation
\Yhich held them, at a greater rate of di count than the legal rate
of interest in that state, there is clearly no ground for th e first
point made by the defendant, which is founded on such a sale.
The finding i conclusive on that question of fact, and is not the
ubject of revision before us.
The defendant next claims that Baldwin was always the legal
holder of the notes, from the time when he took them up from
Townsend down to the trial of this case, and therefore that the
plaintiff, never having any legal title to them, could not maintain
this suit. That the plaintiff must have such a title when the su it
was brought, and continue to hold it to the time of the trial, i
well settled . It not being claimed that he ever parted with such
a title if he acqui red it from Baldw in, the question on thi point is,
whether he ever so acquired it; and that he did,_we entertain no
doubt. If the circumstances found by tl1e court below, preceding
its final finding a to the conveyance of the legal title of the notes
to the plaintiff, are to be regarded as furnishing evidence mere ly~
from which conclusions of fact are to be drawn, and this court
had the power to draw such conclusions, we should not probably
hesitate to infer from tho e circum tance such a conveyance.
But we have no such power, and can only decide on facts found
and presented to us. It i , however, by no means clear that, independent of such final finding, enough does not appear to require
u , as matter of law, to pronounce that such a title was conveyed.
ut it is not necessary to decide that qu stion, because we are
clearly of lhe opinion that the finding of th court on the fact of
such a conveyance, notwithstanding its hypothetical form, is in
1 gal eff ct ab olute and unqualified; for the court finds that
Baldwin did in fact convey to the plaintiff the legal title to the
note , unl ess the law be imperatively so that a legal title to them
could not be conveyed in the manner and for the purposes before
mentioned ; and we are of the opinion that, under the circumstances stated, the law interposed no objection to such a convey··
anc . I_!__was no objection to the transfer of these notes b;r
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Townsend to Baldwin, or by the latter to the plaintiff, that they ^ cj^^. . «~c -

lain tiff

had heen dishonored ; for no principle is better settled than that a^a/ola. ^

negotiable notes are assignable as well after as before they have ^ c)t ^_ y^-J^>

become due, and continue negotiable until they are paid by the .jc^^^^JJ^

party primarily liable on them, subject to 4ke qualifications, which* \^^^ ^X^'

however have no application to the present case , that if trans-

ferred after due they are affected by the equities existing with

regard to them between the original parties and that an indorser

who has taken them up can not transfer them so as to render sub-

sequent indorsers liable. (Chitty on Bills [9 Am. Ed. J, 241, et

scq.; Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 178, 180).

These notes, therefore, continuing to be negotiable, notwith-

standing their dishonor, the only question on this part of the case

is, whether the payment to Townsend by Baldwin of their amount

and his receiving them back, wzts-f negotiation or transfer of the

notes to Baldwin, or an extinguishment of them, so that they

could not afterwards be enforced against any of the prior parties ;

for, if the transaction was of the former character, they were

plainly transferable from Baldwin to the plaintiff^Qn this point

we are clearly of the opinion that the effect of fliaTtr^isactiort was ^o^J^^A
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not a' payment of the notes which operated as an extinguishment ^ir^^^

of them ; that it amounted only to a repurchase of them bv Bald - ~fe~*w*JA>-k. **

wi n, which remitted to him, and reinvested him with, his original °- ^.-^^^t

rights, and placed him, in regard to the parties to the notes prio r w** *~ ***>

to himself, in the same situation in which he was before his trans - y^^^x 1

fer to Townsend ; and that he, by such purchase, acquired the ****- -~<3*->.

same rights as to such prior parties as any other purchaser from

Townsend would be entitled to. Baldwin, having indorsed the

notes to Townsend a nd become liable to him on that indorsement,

mig ht pay him their amount and receive them back from him, and

thus redeem himself from such liability, and place himself in a

situation to obtain the reimbursement to which he would be

entitled from the prior parties to the notes ; and this only was the

legal effect of that transaction. Under a misapprehension of the

point decided in Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bla., 89, note, the Supreme

Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Blake v. Sewall, 3 Mass.,

556, and Boylston v. Greene, 8 Mass.. 465, took a different view

of the effect of taking up a note from the holder by a prior

indorser; but in the case of Guild v. Eager, 17 Mass., 615, these

cases, on a more careful consideration, were overruled by that

court, in accordance with the more recent case of Callow v. Law-

rence, 2 Man. & Sel.. 95. and the views we have adopted fully

established.

mi ht a · him their amount and receive them back from him. and
th1.:!_ redeem him elf rom uc ia 11ty. an pace 1m e m a
ituation to obtain the r imbur em nt to which he would b
ntitled from the prior partie to the note ; and thi onl) \Ya the
legal eff ct of that transaction.
nder a mi appr hen ion of the
point d cided in Beck v. Roble;' I H. la., 9, note. th
upreme
Court of fa achu ett , in the cas of Blake v. Sez all, 3 Ma .,
556, and Bo,y lston v. Greene,
tfa .. 465 took a diff rent view
of the ffect of takino- up a not fr m the holder by a prior
indors r; but in the ca e of Guild v. Eager, 17 Ia ., 615 the e
cases on a more careful con ideration. were o rruled ) that
court, in accordance ' ith th mor recent case of al!o~ v. Lawrence, 2 Mau. &
1.. 5, and the 1e\ v e haY adopt d full
established.
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In respect to the object or consideration of the transfer from

Baldwin to the plaintiff, it is a matter with which the defendant

has no concern although we perceive nothing in the transaction

of a peculiar or exceptionable character.

These principles furnish a complete answer to the claim

urged by the defendant, that the liabilities of the maker of these

notes and of the defendant could not be legally transferred to

the plaintiff, on the ground that the promise of the former had

been broken and the latter had been charged as indorser. The

legal title of these notes being established in the plaintiff, the

well-established principle, already stated, that a negotiable note

continues to be negotiable as well after as before it falls due,

shows conclusively that this claim of the defendant, and the

reason on which it is founded, are without force. For what con-

stitutes the negotiability of such an instrument but the power of

the holder to assign his rights in it to another? But what sort

of negotiability would it be, especially in the case of the notes

now in question, if this claim of the defendant were sustained?

The legal title to the notes would pass to the plaintiff, but no

rights whatever which were attached to them. Baldwin would
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not be liable by reason of his being a party to the instruments,

for his name does not appear on them ; and as no one but the

plaintiff has the legal title to them, we do not see how any other

person than himself could resort to the defendant, the prior

indorser, or why, therefore, the latter would not be altogether

discharged from his liability. On the ground, moreover, upon

which this objection is urged, that the notes being dishonored

no liability on them could afterwards be assigned, Baldwin him-

self, after he had taken up the notes from Townsend, could not

have enforced them against the defendant, because he held them

only as a purchaser after they had been dishonored. But it is

unnecessary to pursue the reasoning on this point. The author-

ities, and those of the highest character, are decisive of it, and

repel the defendant's claim. It is sufficient only to refer to them.

Williams v. Matthews, 3 Cowen, 252; Guild v. Eager, 17 Mass.

615; Callozv v. Lawrence, 3 Mau. & Sel. 95.

As to the remaining point suggested in the defendant's

brief, although not pressed on the argument, that it was incum-

bent on the plaintiff to demand payment of the notes of the

defendant, and to give him notice of their non-payment, and to

which Bishop v. Dexter, 2 Conn. 419, was cited, — it is sufficient

to say that the case has no application to the present, because

there the note was not indorsed by the payee until after it fell

In respect t th e obj ect or con ideration of the tran fe r from
Baldwin t t he plaintiff, it i a matte r with which the defendant
ha no conce rn althoug h we perceive nothing in the transaction
of a pec uli a r or excepti onable character.
T he e principle furni h a com plete answer to th claim
mered by the defendant, that the liabilitie of the maker of these
note an d of the defendant could not be legally transferred to
the pla intiff , on th e g r und that the promise of the fo rmer had
bee n broken and t he latter had been charged as indor er. T he
legal Litle of th e e notes b ing establi hed in the plaintiff, the
well-e tabli hed principle, already stated, t hat a negotiable note
continue to be negotiable as we ll after as befo re it fall due,
show conclu ively that this claim of the defendant, and the
reason on whi ch it is fo unded, a re w ithout fo rce. Fo r what contitu te the n gotiabi lity of such an instrument bu t the pov.rer of
th e holder to as ig n his r ights in it to another? B ut w hat sort
of negotiability wou ld it be, especially in the case of the note
now in qu estion, if thi claim of the defendant were sustained?
Th legal title to t he notes would pass to the plaintiff, but no
rig ht whateve r which we re attached to them. Baldwin would
not be liable by reason of his being a party to the in trument ,
fo r hi. nam doe not appea r on them; and as n one but the
plaintiff has the legal title to them, we do not ee how any other
person than him elf could resort to the defendant, the prior
indor er, or why, therefore, the latter would not be altogether
di charged from his liability. O n the ground, moreover, upon
which this ob jection i urged, that the notes being dishonored
no liability on them could afterward be assigned, Baldwin himself, a fter he had taken up the note from Townsend, could not
have enforced them against the defendant, because he held them
only as a purchaser after they had been dishonored. But it i
unnece sary to pu rsue the reasoning on this point. The authorities, and tho e of the highest character, are decis ive of it, and
repel the defendant's claim. It i ufficient only to refer to them.
TVillia111s v. Jll atthews) 3 Cow n. 2 52; Guild v. Eager) 17 M as .
615; Callow v. Lawren ce, 3 M au . & Sel. 95.
to the remaining point SLwge ted in the defendant'
bri f , although not pre sed on the argument, that it was mcumbent on the 1 laintiff to d mand payment of the note of the
cl fe nclant, and to g ive him notice of their non-payment, and to
wh ich Bishop v. Dexter) 2 Conn . 419, wa cited,-it is sufficient
t
ay that the case has no application to the pr esent, because
th ere the note wa not indorsecl by the payee until after it fell
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due; whereas, in this case, it had been negotiated before due by-jU*. V^-*£ n*

the defendant, and he had regularly received notice of its non-Wx>^W

payment by the holder on its dishonor ; and that notice, it is we 11 ^^^ F\

settled, enured to the benefit of any subsequent holder. Story on G *~~t~ ^

Prom. Notes, §§ 302, 303, 334, 452, and cases cited.

A new trial is not advised.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

New trial not advised.

Gardner v. Maynard (1863), 7 Allen, 456.

Contract against the acceptor of a draft for $1000, drawn

due· whereas, in thi ca e, it had been negotiated before due by~ ~ ....
the defendant, and he had regularly received notice of its non-~ ~ Ju;Ji
payment by the holder on it di honor; and that notice, it i wel~ Y..
settled, enur d to the benefit of any subsequent holder.
tory on ~ ~
Prom. Note , §§ 302, 303, 334, 452, and cases cited.
-vvo ~ \)S ·
new trial is not advised.
~
In thi opinion the other j ud o-e concurred.

New trial not advised.

by Sanford C. Gardner, in favor of J. & C. Levy & Co., upon

the defendant. The draft was duly indorsed and accepted.

At the trial in the superior court, before Allen, C. J., it

appeared that the draft was protested for non-payment, and

returned to Levy & Co., and was afterwards returned to the

drawer, who assigned it by bill of sale to the plaintiff, with the

Gardner v . 111 aynard ( 1863), 7 Allell, 456.

indorsement of Levy & Co. remaining uncancelled. A witness

testified that he saw the draft indorsed by one of the firm of

Levy & Co., and did not see any money paid at that time.

Upon these facts, the chief justice directed a verdict for the
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defendant, which was accordingly rendered ; and the plaintiff

alleged exceptions.

/. II. Butler, for the plaintiff.

/. S. Abbott, for the defendant.

M etc alp, J. These exceptions must be overruled and judg-

ment rendered on the verdict for the defendant, upon the author-

ity of Beck y.-Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, n. That case and this are

alike in all particulars. In both, the bill was made payable, not

to the drawer's own order, but to a third party who indorsed it.

was accepted by the drawee, but afterwards was dishonored by

his refusing to pay it, and was taken up from the indorser by

the drawer, with the indorser's name remaining uncancelled.

In that case it was decided that the bill was not negotiable, and

that the drawer could not reissue it. And that decision has

Contract ao-ainst th acceptor of a draft for $rooo, drawn
by Sanford C. Gardn r, in avor of J. & C. Levy & Co., upon
the defendant. The draft was duly indorsed and accepted.
t the trial in th
u perior court, before Allen, C. J., it
appeared that the draft was protested for non-payment, and
returned to Levy & Co., and was aftenvard returned to the
drawer, who as igned it by bill of sale to the plaintiff with the
indor eme.n t of Levy & Co. remaining uncancelled. A witne
testified that he saw the draft indorsed by one of the firm of
Levy & Co., and did not see any money paid at that time.
pon these fact , the chief justice directed a verdict for the
defendant, which was accordingly rend ered; and the plaintiff
alleged exceptions.

never been overruled or denied, but is cited as established law

in all the books that treat of bills of exchange. See 1 Steph.

N. P. 863: Story on Bills, §223: Guild v. Eager, 17 Mass. 615.

Opinion of Patteson, J., in Williams v. James, 15 Ad. & El.

(N. S.) 505. The doctrine of that decision is. that a_bjn_of_

J. H. Butler, for the plaintiff.
J. S. Abbott, for the defendant.
).lETc. LP', J. These exceptions mu t be overruled and judo-ment rend red on the verdict for the defendant, upon the authority of Beek v.- Roble31, I H. Bl. 89, n. That case and this are
alike in all particulars. In both, th bill was made payable, not
to the drawer's own order, but to a third party who indor ed it.
was accept d by the drawee, but afterwards wa di honored by
hi refu ing to pay it, and was taken up from the indor er by
the drawer, with 1:he indor er' name remaining uncancelled.
In that ca e it was d cid d that the bill was not neO'otiabl and
that th drawer could not rei pe it.
nd that deci ion ha
never been overruled or denied but i cited a
tabli hed law
ee I teph.
in all the books that treat of bill of exchano-e.
N. P . 63: tory on Bills, § 223; Guild v. Eaaer, 17 fa . 615.
Opinion of Patte on, J. in Williams v. James, 15 d. & El.
(N . S .) 505 . The doctrine of that deci ion i . that a bill of
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rvrhan ge cannot be indorsed or negotiated, after it has once

„^><n ~*5 b een pald. -tfsuclTir i dorsemcnt or negotiation would make any

^^y^-*-. <***- oTrmrparTies liable, who would otherwise b e discharged. Bay ley

^^ U^-^- on JJills, (6th ed.) 166, 16/ ; Lhit. Bills, (12th Amer. ed.) 254.

*^ -t^^* tv -55- As tlie first niclorser of a bil1 is liable to ever >' subsequent

' \j^ fide holder, although the bill be fraudulently circulated, it

\^V- ( v w W* follows that if he leaves his name thereon, after he is entitled

W u*^5^ to a discharge, he exposes himself to liability to such holder.

<x^i~ */y^^- Therefore the bill is held not to be negotiable, in such case.

U—P r^-Acfc, This rule of law applies'pnly to cases in which the negotiation

of a bill by the drawer, after he has taken it up on its being

returned to him dishonored, would expose a discharged party to

a new liability . See Callow v. Lawrence, 3 M. & S. 95 ; Hubbard

v. Jackson, 4 Bing. 390; Bayley, Chit, and 17 Mass. ubi supra;

Mead v. Small, 2 Greenl. 207.

Exceptions overruled.

Blenn v. Lyford (1879), 70 Me. 149.

Assumpsit, by indorsee against the maker of a promissory

note.

D. D. Stewart, for the plaintiff.
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Josiah Crosby, for the defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

Appleton, C. J. This .is an action of assumpsit on the fol-

~&~.

lowing note :

"St. Albans, Me., Dec. 2, 1871.

"Seven months from date, value received,' I promise to pay

M. E. Rice, or order, three hundred dollars, at any bank in

B len n v . L y fo rd ( 1879), 70 Al e. 149·

Bangor. H. H. Lyford."

The note was indorsed in blank "M. E. Rice." The following

words were also on the back of the note, erased with ink but

legible : "Holden without demand or notice. M. E. Rice."

Granting the presumption that the plaintiff is a bona fide

holder for value of the note before maturity, that presumption

may be overcome by proof.

It appears from the testimony that the note was indorsed to

Assumpsit, by indorsee against the maker of a promissory
note.
D. D. Stc1,()art, fo r th e plaintiff.
J osialz Crosby, for the defendant.

one Richardson, for value, in the April following its date; that it

was not paid at maturity, and that about three months after its

dishonor he delivered it to Rice, the payee.

The plaintiff then received the note in suit, when overdue.

The note remaining unpaid after maturity w as dishonored, and it

PPLETON,

.

J.

Thi .i s an action of assumpsit on the fol -

lowing note :
" T . A LBAN S, ME., Dec. 2, 1871.
·• even months from date, valu e received, · I promise to pay
M . E . Rice, or ord er, three hundred dolla·rs, at any bank in
H. H. L YFORD."
Bangor.

Th e note wa indorsed in blank "M. E. Rice." The foll owing
word wer al o on th back of th e note, rased with ink but
legible : "Holden without demand or notice. M. E. Rice. "
ranti ng the presumption that th e plaintiff is a bona fid e
holder for valu of th e note befor maturity. that presumption
may be ov rcom by proof.
It app ar from the testi mony that th e note wa ind r d to
on Richard on , fo r value . in th e April following its date; that it
was not paid at maturi ty, and that about three months after its
i ~h n r h d livered it to Rice, the payee.
The plaintiff then received the note in uit, when overdu e.
The note r maining unpaid aft r maturity was dishonored and it
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was the duty oi the indorsee 10 make inquiries concerning it. If

he takes it, though he gave a full consideration for it, he doe- -■

on tlie credit of the indorser. He holds the note subject to all

equities with which it mav he incumbered.

As the plaintiff is the indorsee of a dishonored note, jt was

o n.ipctent for the defendant to show that it was an accommoda-

tion note, and that if had been paid by the party for whose

accommodation it was given.

That the note was for the accommodation of the payee is

abundantly shown by his receipt of the date of February 22, 1872,

as well as by the testimony offered and excluded.

The note being for the accommodation of Rice, it was his

duty to pay it. The note being found after dishonor in the hands

of the one bound to pay it, the presumption is that he paid it.

2 Par. N. & B. 220. It was competent to show that in fact he

paid it, but the answer to an inquiry whether the note was paid

by Rice was excluded. This was erroneous. V-jcjl js>JL*>

Assuming the note to have been paid bv Rice, it was the T^^^ e ^ cw>J0

sameasif paid bv the rnaEer. It was_paid_by__the parfy~whose ^,^^3^ \,

dutv it was to pav it. The purpose for which it was/given has~ c)v >Ajn*v <w.
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been accomplished. The negotiability of a note ceases alfer its ' v ^ > ** *~-

payment by tfte party who shnniri rightfully pay it . "Now it can-', j^^T^;

riot be denied," says Denman, C. J., in Lazarus v. Cowie, 43 E. -j-

C. L. 819, "that if a bill be paid when due by the person ultimately

liable on it, it has done its work, and is no longer a negotiable

instrument. * * * But the drawer of an accommodation bill

is in the same situation as the acceptor of a bill for value ; he is

the person ultimately liable, and his payment discharges the bill

altogether." ^^^ V>A ^

, Rice, when he to ok up the note in suit, h ad no right of actionlo^e^^o-jjaaJ

again st the maker, and could not transfer to the plaintiff any ] W^

H etteT right after maturity than he had . Edwd. B. & N. 564*. ■' < V*

Fish v. French, 15 Gray, 520; Tucker v. Smith, 4 Maine. 415. ^

In the cases cited by the plaintiff there are most important

differences from the one under consideration. In Bank v. Croie.

60 X. Y. 85, the plaintiffs were the indorsees of the note for

value and before maturity, and were consequently to be pro-

tected. In Thompson v. Shepherd, \2 Met. 31 t . it was held that

the indorsee of a note, who receives it for value from the second

indorser. after it has been dishonored by the maker, can recover

thereon against the maker, although he knew when he received it

that as between the maker and first indorser it was an accommo-

dation note. But this is upon the principle affirmed by the court

*\ feA/^i^^aV^p ( KW^<W_ -tfW ^vvjl. W •*" ^^

^v>-^_^3^v^ KeJ^jL. -v*^3u_ *» o~— *-J^ f (^-,

dation not .

d by the court
~
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in Woodman v. Churchill, 52 Maine, 58, that where the first

indorsee of a promissory note acquires a right of action against

the maker, by being a bona fide purchaser, without notice and

before maturity, lie can transfer a good title as well after as before

the note becomes due. Exceptions sustained.

Action to stand for trial.

Walton, Barrows, Dan forth and Libbey, J J., concurred.

RENUNCIATION BY HOLDER. § I24.

in H'oo dmaJL \' . Cllllrcliill, 52 :\Iain 5 , that wh re th e first
in<l or ee of a promi ory note acqu ir a right of action a ain t
the maker, by being a boJLa fide purchaser, without notice and
Ii 'forl' maturity, h can tran fer a good title a we ll after a befor
th note becom due.
Exceptions s1tstained.

/ lction to stand for trial.
and LIBBEY, JJ. , concurr d.

In re George (1890), 44 Ch. Div. 627.

Adjourned summons.

\V ALTON,

BARROW , DANFORTH

~

T. W. George, by his will, dated the 6th of July, 1887,

bequeathed to his niece, Mrs. Margaret Anne Francis, the plain-

tiff, the sum of £6000, and by a codicil, also dated the 6th of July,

after referring to this bequest and to the fact that he had lent

RENUNCIATION BY HOLDER.

the plaintiff a sum of £2000, declared, that if at his death the

124.

said sum of £2000 or any part thereof, or any interest thereon,

In re George (1890), ,;,; Ch . Div. 627.

should be owing from the said M. A. Francis, "then and in such

case all moneys due to me as aforesaid shall be deducted from the

said legacy of £6000 which I have by my said will bequeathed

~ \.<ljourn

d summons.

to or for the benefit of the said M. A. Francis and her children,
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and I direct that in such case the said legacy shall be reduced

accordingly in satisfaction of the moneys due to me as aforesaid."

The sum of £2000, referred to by the testator, was lent by

him to the plaintiff in September, 1886, when the plaintiff exe-

cuted and gave to him a promissory note in the following terms :

"On demand I promise to pay to Mr. T. W. George or his order

the sum of two thousand pounds, together with the interest there-

on after the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the;

date hereof for value received."

Interest was paid on this note up to the 6th of March, 1889

On the 30th of August, 1889. the testator died. Some two of

three hours before his death, the testator directed the promissory

note to be brought to him that he might destroy it ; search was

made, but the note could not be found. The testator then declared

to the plaintiff, in the presence of two other persons, that he

wished to give the £2000 to her, and to forgive her the debt..

The nurse was then sent for, when the testator told her that he-

had lent the plaintiff £2000. and that he wished to forgive the

debt, and that he ought to have destroyed the note, but it could

T. \V. ;eorge, by his will, dated th e 6th of July, 1887,
bequeath d to hi ni ece, 1rs. Margar t A nne Franci s, the plain tiff, the sum of 16000, and by a codicil, also dated the 6th of July,
after referring to thi bequest and to the fact that he had lent
the plaintiff a sum of :£2000, declared, that if at his death th
aid sum of £2000 or any part th ereof, or any interest th ereon,
sh uld be owing from the said M. A . Francis, " then and in such
case all moneys due to me a aforesaid shall be deducted from the
aid legacy of £6ooo which I have by my said will bequeathed
to or fo r the benefit of the said M . A . Francis and her children,
and I direct that in such case the said legacy shall be re luced
accordingly in satisfacti on of the moneys due to me as aforesaid. "
The um of .£2000, refe rred to by the testator, wa lent by
him to the plaintiff in September, 1886, when th e plaintiff executed and gave to him a promi ssory note in the following terms:
" n demand I promise to pay to M r. T. W. George or his order
th um of two thousand pounds, togeth er with th e interest thereon after the rate of four pounds per centum per annum from the
<lat hereof fo r value received."
Int rest was paid on this note up to the 6th of March, 1889
On the 30th of August, 1889, the t tator died. Some two or
three hour before his death the testator directed the promissory
note to b 1 rought to him that h might destroy it; search waf;
made, but th note could not be found. The testator then declared
to th plaintiff, in the pr sence of two other I er ons, that he
wish d to give the £2000 to h er, and to forgive her the d bt..
Th nur e was th en nt for, when the te tator told her that h e
had 1 nt the plaintiff £2000, and that h wished to forgiv e th e
cl bt, and that h ought to have destroyed the not , but it could
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not be found for that purpose; he then made the nurse promise

that she would see the note destroyed, and that she would testify

that it was his wish that it should be destroyed as soon as found,

and he told her that she had better write this down. The nurse

then and there wrote down on the back of a letter she had in her

pocket a memorandum as follows: "30th August, 1889. It is by

Air. George's dying wish that the cheque (sic) for £2000 money

lent to Mrs. Francis be destroyed as soon as found. Mr. George

is perfectly conscious and in his sound mind. (Signed, Nurse T.)."

This memorandum the nurse stated in evidence was, with the

exception of the last sentence, written at the instance of the testa-

tor. The story told by the nurse was corroborated by another

member of the family and otherwise. After the testator's death

the note was found by the executors ; but under the circumstances

they did not consider themselves justified in paying the plaintiff

the legacy of £6000 in full without the direction of the Court, and

accordingly the plaintiff took out an originating summons against

the executors to determine the question whether the promissory

note had been duly cancelled.

Romcr, O. C., and Upjohn, for the plaintiff".
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Byrne, Q. C, and Dunning, for the defendants.

( liiTTV, J. (after stating the will and codicil and the promis-

sory, note, and that the question was whether the note was dis-

charged in the lifetime of the testator, continued) :

The argument for the plaintiff is, that this being a promissory

note, at common law the debt would be waived, and that the

Rills of Exchange Act, 1882, s. 62, sub-s. 1, has only made a lim-

ited alteration in the law, and does not apply to a waiver of a bill

or note before its maturity, but only "at or after its maturity" ;

not b found for that puq
· h th n made the nurse promise
that sh would
the not de troy d, and that he would t tify
that it was his wi h that it hould be cl strayed as oon as found,
and h told her that he had b ttcr write this down. The nurse
then and there wrote down on th back of a Jett r he had in her
p ck t a m moranclum a follow : "30th Augu t, I 9. It is by
Mr. eorg ' lyino- vYi h that the ch que (sic) for £2000 money
lent to Ir . Francis be destroy d a soon as found. ).Ir. eorge
i perf ctly con cious and in hi ound mind. (Signed, N ur e T.) ."
Thi memorandum the nur e stated in evidence was, with the
xception of the last sentence, writt n at the instanc of the testator. The tory told by the nur c was corroborated by another
member of the family and otherwi .e.
fter the te tator' death
the not wa found by the executor ; but under the circumstances
they did not consider themselves ju tified in paying the plaintiff
the leo-acy of £6000 in foll without the direction of the Court. and
accordingly the plaintiff took out an originating summons against
the executors to determine the question whether the promissory
note had been duly cane lled .

Romer, Q. C., and Upjohn, for the plaintiff.
B ':yme, Q. C., and Dunning, for the defendants.

and seeing that the present is a note payable on demand with

interest, it is said it was not "at maturity" when the testator

died, and that, therefore, the case is not affected by the 62nd

section. [After reading sect. 62, sub-sect. 1, his Lordship con-

tinued ] :

The first point, therefore, is, when is a note payable on

demand "at maturity"? That question, though not exactly in this

form, has been often considered. Of the various cases which have

been referred to in argument, I will take one only — Norton v.

Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461. In that case there was a note payable with

interest on demand, and the question was from what time the

Statute of Limitations began to run. Baron Parke, in giving

judgment, says, 2 M. & W. 404: "I entertain no doubt at all on

IIITTY, J. (after tatino- the will and codicil and the promi sory, note, and that the question was whether the note was discharged in the lifetime of the testator, continued) :
The argument for th plaintiff is, that thi being a promissory
note, at common law the debt would be waived, and that the
Bills of Exchange Act I 82, s. 62, sub-s. r, has only made a limited alt ration in the law, and does not apply to a waiver of a bill
or not before its maturity, but only "at or after it maturity";
and
ing that the pr nt i a not payable on demand with
inter st, it is said it wa not "at maturity" wh n the testator
died, and that therefor , th ca e i not affect d by the 62nd
section. [ fter read in s ct. 62, ub- ect. I, hi Lordship continued J :
Th fir t point. therefore i , when i a note payabl on
demand "at maturity"? That qu tion, though not xa tly in th i
form, ha b n oft n con id r d.
f the variou ca
v hich have
been r £erred to in aro-urn nt, I will take one only- orion
Ellam, 2 M. & W . 46r. In that ca th re wa a note payable "·ith
inter st on d mand, and th que tion was from what tim the
Statute of Limitation began to run.
aron ark . in 1 mojudgment, ays 2 M . c" \\ . 464: 'I nt rtain no do 1 t at all on
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this point. It is the same as the case of money lent payable upon

request, with interest, where no demand is necessary before bring-

ing the action. There is no obligation in law to give any notice at

all: if you choose to make it part of the contract that notice shall

be given, you may do so. The debt which constitutes the cause of

action arises instantly on the loan." The note I have before me

was for money lent. "Where money is lent, simply, it is not

denied that the statute begins to run from the time of lending.

Then is there any difference where it is payable with interest?

It is quite clear that a promissory note, payable on demand, is a

present debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute

begins to run from the date of it. Then the stipulation for com-

pensation in the shape of interest makes no difference, except that

thereby the debt is continually increasing de die in diem." I

mention this authority alone, though there are many previous deci-

sions to the same effect, because it appears to me to be decisive

on the point that was argued with reference to the 62nd section,

viz., that this note was not at maturity when the testator died.

Then comes the question, whether there is a "renunciation"

"in writing" within sect. 62, sub-sect. 1. I entertain no doubt
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of the integrity and trustworthiness of the witnesses, and I enter-

tain 'no doubt also that it was the testator's intention to forgive,

or discharge this note in favour of the plaintiff. I am quite satis-

fied with the evidence on this point. Sect. 62, sub-sect. 1, says

the renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up

to the "acceptor," and, changing the language to suit the present

case, that would be, unless the note is delivered up to the maker.

The statute contains provisions for the cancellations of bills of

evchange, and, therefore, of promissory notes also. So that it

is quite clear, that if this note had been in the testator's possession

at the time, he would have had it destroyed : upon that point I

entertain no doubt. I have, however, to deal with the statute,

which is not confined, of course, to cases such as this, but is a

statute as to bills of exchange, and has a wide operation among

mercantile men ; and I feel that I must be on my guard not to

allow any sympathy I may have with the plaintiff on the facts of

the case in any way to influence my judgment in construing this

section; because I might, if I did give way on such a ground as

that, be inflicting considerable injury upon merchants and others.

Now. it is plain that what must be in writing is an absolute

and unconditional renunciation of rights. It is not necessary to

put those words in; but that must be the effect of the document.

Then the document is not to be a note or memorandum of the

thi point. It is th e same as th e ca of money lent payable upon
req ue t, with intere t, where no demand i nece ary before bringing the action. T here is no obligation in law to giv any notice at
a ll: if yo u choo e to make it part of the contract that notice hall
be g iven, yo u may do o. The debt which con titutes the can e of
action arise in tantly on the loan." The note I have before me
\\'a
fo r money lent. " Where money is lent, simply, it is not
denied that the tatute begins to run from the time of lending.
Then i there any difference where it i payable with interest?
I t is quite clear that a promissory note, payable on demand, is a
pre ent debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute
beo-in to run from th e date of it. Then the stipulation for compen ation in the shape of intere t make no difference, except that
th ereby the debt is continually increasing de di e in diem.,, I
menti on this authority alone, though there are many previous deciions to the same effect, because it appears to me to be decisiye
on th e point that was argued with reference to the 62nd section,
viz., that this note was not at maturity when the te tator died.
Th en comes the question, wheth er there is a "renunciation"
"in writing" within sect. 62, sub-sect. r. I entertain no doubt
of th e inteo-rity and trustworthiness of the witnesse , and I entertain 'no doubt also that it was the testator's intention to forgive,
or di charge this note in favour of the plaintiff. I am quite satisfi ed with th e evidence on this point. Sect. 62, sub-sect. I, say
the renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill i delivered up
to the "acceptor," and, changing the language to uit the present
case, that would be, unless the note is delivered up to the maker.
The tatute contains provisions for the cancellations of bills of
evchange, and, th erefore, of promissory notes also. So that it
i quite clear, that if this note had been in the testator's possession
at the time, he would have had it destroyed: upon that point I
entertain no doubt. I have, however, to deal with the statute,
which is not confined, of course, to cases such a this, but is a
. tatute as to hills of exchange, and has a wide operation among
me rcantile men ; and I fe el that I mu t be on my P-uard not to
allow an y ympathy I may have with the plaintiff on the facts of
the ca e in any way to influence my judgment in construing thi
ecti on; becau I might, if I did give way on such a o-round as
that, be inflicting con iderable injury upon merchants and other .
">low, it is plain that what must be in writing is an absolute
and uncon litional renunciation of rights. It is not necessary to
I ut th o e word in; but that mu t be the effect of the document.
Then the document is not to be a note or memorandum of the
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renunciation or of an intention to do it. but it must be itself the

record of the renunciation. I am not called upon to say whether

the words, "the renunciation must be in writing," involves the

signature ; and I do not propose to say anything which would

tend to shew it was my opinion that the renunciation in writing-

need not be signed. I see great danger in holding that the signa-

ture is not required. I leave the point wholly undetermined. This

section, as has been properly pointed out, does not, in terms, say

that the writing must be signed by the holder of the bill or note ;

and it does not, in terms, say that the writing may be signed by

anybody on his behalf — that is, by an agent; and, no doubt, there

are other sections where signature is spoken of, and it must be

the signature of the person himself, or there may be cases where

it is signed by the agent, and provisions are made to that effect

in the statute.

But now I take the document which I have before me, and

compare it with the statute. The facts are these. [His Lordship

then stated the facts as to the writing of the memorandum by the

nurse, and continued] : That memorandum was , no doubt, meant
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to be evidence of his intention. The document is signed by the

nurse, and it was an authority to those concerned, if the note had

been found, to destroy it in his lifetime.

But is that an absolute and unconditional renunciation in

writing of the testator's rights on the note? Mr. Romer's argu-

ment (to put it shortly) was this, that it is final because it is

stated it is Mr. George's dying wish, and that it is immediate

because the note was to be destroyed as soon as found. But the

real question, I think, is this : is the direction to destroy the note

as soon as found an absolute and unconditional renunciation of

the rights on the note ? I put the proposition in that way ; for I

think it is the fairest way to state it in favour of the plaintiff.

I am now assuming that this is a writing by the testator — an

assumption that I am making in favour of the plaintiff.

The pertinent question is, could not the testator, after this -

paper h ad been signed by the nurse, have gone to the bank, if

be recovered, where he supposed the note to be , to get it. or if jt

w as found afterwards and brought to the testator, could he not

say, "I have changed my mind"? T think he could. T think I

am bound in point of law to say that he could.

Having examined the case with all the care that I think could

be given to it, I am unable to come to the conclusion that this

was an absolute and unconditional renunciation in writing such

as is required by the statute.

renunciation or of an int nlion
it, but it must be itself the
r cord of the renunciation. I am not called upon to ay \ hether
the w rd , "the renunciation mu t b in writin ,' involve the
io-natur ' ; and I d not pr 1
t
ay anything which would
t nd to h w it wa my opinion that the renunciation in writing
need not b ianed. I
rrr at Ian er in holding that the ·i nature i not r iuired. I lcJ.Y th point wholly undetermin d. Thi
ection, a ha been properly pointed out doe not, in term
a)
that the writina mu t b i n d by the holder of the bill or not ·
and it do not, in term
ay that the writing may be signed by
anybody on hi behalf-that is, by an ag nt; and, no doubt, th re
are other ection wh r
irrnatur i poken of, and it mu t be
the i natur of the per on him elf, or th re may be ca es where
it i io-ned by the agent, and provi ion are made to that effect
in the tatute.
ut now I take the document which I have before me, and
compare it with the statute. The fact are these. [His Lordship
then tated the fact a to the writinrr of the memorandum by the
nurse, and continued] : That memorandum \Ya , no doubt, meant
to be evidence of hi intention. The document i ianed by the
nurse, and it was an authority to tho e concerned, if the note had
been found, to destroy it in hi lifetime.
But is that an ab olut and unconditional renunciation in
\'vTiting of the te tator' ri ht on the note ? ~Ir. Romer' araument (to put it shortly) wa thi , that it is final becau e it i
tated it i Mr. Georae' dying wi h, and that it i immediat
because the note was to be de troyed a oon a found. But the
real que tion, I think, i thi : i the direction to de troy the note
as oon as found an ab olute and unconditional renunciation of
the riahts on the note? I put th propo ition in that way· for I
think it i th faire t way to tate it in favour of the plaintiff.
I am now a suminrr that thi i a '' ritina by the te tator-an
a sumption that I am makinrr in fayour of the plaintiff.
The pertinent que tion i , c uld not the te tator, after thi . \ .--............-~
paper had been ignecl by the nur , have gone to the bank, if ~ ~
b recover d, ' here he uppo ed th not to be, to aet it, or if it ~ ~
'Wa found afterward and brouo-ht t th te tator, ould h not ~ ~
ay, "I have changed my mind''? I think he c uld. I thin - I
am bound in point of law t ay that h could.
Havino- xamin d the ca with all the are that I think could
be giv n t it, .I am unable to om to the con Ju ion that thi
was an ab olute and uncon lition al r nunciation in writing uch
a i requir d by the tatute.
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Appeal from judgment on report of referee.

Action by George Leask and others, as executors of the

estate of Oliver W. Buckingham, deceased, against J. Harvie

)\Leask et al. r•. Dew ( r905), 92 N. Y.
529.

upp. 891, 102 App. Div.

Dew. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

This action was brought to recover upon a promissory note

given by the defendant to the plaintiffs' testator. The note was

dated November 23, 1901, whereby the defendant promised to

pay to the order of Oliver W. Buckingham, the testator, one year

after date, the sum of $5,000, with interest at 6 per cent. Oliver

W. Buckingham died testate on the 31st day of October, 1903,

and upon the probate of his will the plaintiff's duly qualified as his

executors. The answer averred, for separate and affirmative

defenses, that the testator had canceled the said note by an instru-

ment in writing, and that after the testator's death this defendant

presented a claim against the estate of said deceased for $31,500.

which was disputed by the executors ; that the matter in contro-

versy was finally submitted to a referee, pursuant to the provisions
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of section 2718 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon the

trial of said action the defendants therein offered said note in

evidence by way of offset or counterclaim against the claim of this

defendant, who was plaintiff therein ; and that said action was

pending and undetermined at the time of the joinder of issue.

Upon the trial of this action the plaintiffs proved the making of

the note, the non-payment of which was admitted, except as

stated in the answer, and rested. The defendant then offered

proof that after testator's death the note in question was found

among his papers, inclosed in an envelope together with the fol-

lowing paper, all in the handwriting of the testator, except the

signature of the witness :

"New York, Nov. 25, 1901.

"To my executors.

"Gentlemen: The enclosed note I wish to be cancelled in case

of my death, and if the law does not allow it T wish you to notify

my heirs that it is my wish and orders.

"Truly yours,

"Witness : Oliver W. Buckingham."

"Frank W. Woglom."

App al from j udgm n t on report f ref ree .
•\ct ion by George Leask and other , a executors of the
e tate of Oliv r \ . Buckingham, decea ed, again t ]. Harvie
Dew. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
This action wa brought to recover upon a promissory note
given by the defendant to the plaintiffs' testator. The note was
dated
ovember 23, 1901, whereby the defendant promised to
pay to the order of Oliver W. Buckingham, the testator, one year
after date, the sum of $5,000, with intere t at 6 per cent.
liv r
\ . Buckingham died testate on the 31st day of October, 1903,
and upon the probate of his will the plaintiffs duly qualified as "his
executor . The answer averred, for eparate and affirmative
defenses, that the testator had canceled the said note by an instrument in writing, and that after the testator's death this defendant
presented a claim against the estate of aid deceased for $31,500,
which was disputed by the executors: that the matter in controver y was finally ubmitted to a referee, pur uant to the provisions
of section 2718 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and upon the
trial of said action the defendants therein offered aid note in
evidence by way of offset or counterclaim against the claim of this
defendant, who wa plaintiff therein: and that said action was
pending and und termined at the tim of the join !er of issue.
pon the trial of this action the plaintiffs proved the making of
the note, the non-payment of which was admitted, except a
stated in the an wer, and rested. The defendant then offered
proof that after testator's death the note in question was found
among hi paper , inclo ed in an envelope together with the following paper, all in the handwritino- of the testator, except th
ignature of the witness:
"NEW YORK,

Nov. 25, 1901.

"To my executors.
''Gentlemen: The enclos cl n te I wish to be cancelled in case
of my Jcath, and if the law does not allow it I wish you to notif
my heirs that it is my wi h and orders.
"Truly yours,
"\Vitness:
LIVER W. BUCKINGHAM."
RANK vv. wocLoM."
"
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The defendant's wife testified that she was present at a time

when the testator and her husband were- talking about the note in

question, and that her husband said to the testator that he objected

to debt, and wished to pay the note, but Mr. Buckingham objected

to receiving it, and said that he did not intend to take it, and

wished it appropriated by Dr. Dew to fix the house, and he posi-

tively refused to take it. The counsel for the defendant asked

the plaintiffs to concede that the note in question was offered

as an offset upon the trial of the claim of Dew against the execu-

tors, whereupon the attorney for the plaintiffs said : "I concede

that, prior to the commencement of this suit on the note for

$5,000, Dr. Dew, the defendant, presented a claim against the

estate of Mr. Buckingham amounting to $31,500. which, pursuant

to the provisions of the Code, had been referred to Hon. Henry

E. Howland, as referee, and that on the trial of said action before

the said referee the executors introduced the same note which

forms the subject of this action, and put the same in evidence, but

did not assert the same as a counterclaim." The defendant's

counsel then said : "I claim that the note could be used in evi-

dence for no other purpose than as an offset or counterclaim."
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This is substantially all that was shown in regard to introducing

the note in evidence as an offset in the other action. Both actions

were tried before the same referee, who reported for the plaintiffs

.in the action at bar, and to his findings of fact and conclusions of

law the defendant duly excepted. In the case of Dr. Dew's claim

against the estate of Oliver W. Buckingham, the referee rendered

a brief opinion, entitled in that case only, which closes as follows :

"The note for $5,000, dated November 23, 1901, made to the

decedent by the claimant, is a valid and outstanding obligation

( Dimon v. Keery, 54 App. Div. 318, 66 N. Y. Supp. 817), and the

attempted renunciation was ineffectual." The referee wrote no

other opinion in this case.

Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Hatch, O'Brien,

[ngraham, and Laughlin, JJ.

John M. Scribncr, for appellant.

T. S. Ormiston, for respondents.

II vim. T. The plea of tender is unavailing, as it was not

made to appear that any money was produced at the time when

the tender was claimed to have been made, or that any formal

requisites were observed, sufficient to make a valid tender. It was

said in Eddy v. Davis, 116 N. Y. 247, 22 N. E. 362:

"A tender imports not only readiness and ability to perform,

The defendant's wif t tifi d that h wa pre ent at a time
wh n th t tator and h r hu band \ r talking ab ut th note in
qu tion, and that h r hu band aid l the tc tat r that h o )jecl d
to debt, ancl wi h d t pay the note, but l\Ir. Buckingham object d
to rec iving it, and said that h did not int nd t tak it, and
wi h d it appropriated by r. Dew t fix the hou e, and he po itiv ly refu d to tak it. The ounscl fo r th defendant a ked
the plaintiff to concede that th note in que tion wa offered
a an off t upon the trial of the claim of Dew against the ex cutor , wh reupon the attorn y for th plaintiff aid : "I concede
that prior to the commencem nt of thi suit on the note for
5,000, r. Dew th defendant presented a claim acrainst the
tat of Mr. Buckingham amounting to $31,500, which, pursuant
to the provisions of the ode, had been r eferred to Hon. Henry
.. . Howland, as referee, and that on the trial of said action before
the said referee the executo rs int roduced th e same note which
forms th subj ect of thi action, and put the same in evidence, but
did not assert the same as a counterclaim." The defendant'
coun el th en said: "I claim that the note could be used in evidence for no other purpose than a an offset or counterclaim."
T his is substantially all that was shown in regard to introducing
the note in evidence as an offset in the other action. Both actions
were tried before the same refe ree, who reported for the plaintiff
.in the action at bar, and to 'his findings of fact and conclu ion of
law the defendant duly xcepted. In th e case of Dr. Dew' claim
against the estate of Oliver W. Buckingham, the referee r endered
a brief opinion, entitled in that case only, which clo e a follow :
" The note for $5,000, dated Nov mber 23, 1901, made to the
decedent by the claimant, is a valid and out tandincr oblicration
(Dirnon v. Keery, 54 pp. Div. 3 I , 66 N . Y. upp. 817), and the
attempt d renunci ation was ineffectual." Th r eferee wrote no
ther opinion in this ca e.
rgu ed b fore
N BRUNT P.
L GR HAM, and L AUGHLI , JJ.

J.,

and H TCH

'BRIEN,

John M . Scribner for app llant.
T. . Ormiston, for re pond nts.
H T n J. The pl a of t n l r i unavailin , a it wa not
mad t appear that any mon y wa produced at the tim \\ h n
the tend r v. as claimed to hav b n made, or that any forma l
reqm 1t wer ob rv d. ufficient to make a Yalid t nd r. It wa
. Y. 247 22 N. E. 6-:
aid in Eddy v. Da.v is I l
tender import n t onl y r adin
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but actual production of the thing to be delivered. The formal

requisite of a tender may be waived, but to establish a waiver there

must be an existing capacity to perform."

The only thing disclosed by the evidence is that the testator

but actual production of the thing to be delivered. The formal
rL<tui itc of a tender may b waived, but to establish a waiver there
mu t be an exi ting capacity to perform."

did not intend to take the money, and it may be that from such

situation, if it had been made to appear that the maker of the note

had the ability to perform, it would constitute a waiver of the

formal requisites ; but there is no evidence to show that he either

had the money at the time of the tender ready to pay, or that he

had the means of producing it at the time. The tender of pay-

ment did not discharge the debt, and the mere expression by the

testator that he desired the money to be used for other purposes,

and did not intend to take it in discharge of the note, worked no

estoppel upon him to subsequently change his mind and demand

payment of it. Consequently the tender had no effect upon the

note, and it remained a subsisting obligation.

So far as the plea of the discharge of the note by way of

counterclaim to the defendant's claim made against the estate of

the testator is concerned, it is sufficient to say that it was not used

as a counterclaim in that proceeding, but simply as evidence in
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rebuttal of the defendant's claim. As such, it was competent for the

purpose of showing an indebtedness of the defendant to the testa-

tor which might — dependent upon circumstances — tend to rebut

the inference that there was a large indebtedness in favor of the

defendant against the testator, as the former's liability upon the

promissory note might be entirely inconsistent with the existence

of a large claim in his favor against the testator. But whether

it had great or little probative force is not of consequence, as it

appears not to have been used as an offset or counterclaim to the

defendant's demand, and consequently it was not discharged by

any judgment or determination had in that proceeding.

This brings us to the main question in the case — the construc-

tion of the written declaration of the testator, which was found

in the envelope which contained the note after his death. It is

probably true that this declaration was sufficient to discharge

defendant's obligation upon the promissory note, within the

authority of Wckett v. Raby, 2 Brown's House of Lords, Rep.

386. The declaration therein was made a few days before the

death of the testator, in these words :

"I have Raby's bond, which I keep; I don't deliver it up, for

I may live to want it more than he ; but when I die he shall have

it, he shall not be asked or troubled for it."

The only thing disclo eel by the evidence is that the testator
did not int nd to tak the money, and it may be that from such
ituation , if it had been made to app ar that the maker of the note
had the ability to perform, it would constitute a waiver of the
fo rmal requi ite ; but there i no evidence to show that he either
had the money at the time of the tender ready to pa'y, or that he
had the mean of producing it at the time. The tender of payment did not discharge the debt, and the mere expression by the
tc tator that he desired the money to be used for other purpo es,
and did not intend to take it in discharge of the note, worked no
toppel upon him to subsequently change his mind and demand
payment of it. Consequently the tender had no effect upon the
note, and it remained a subsisting obligation.
o far as the plea of the discharge of the note by way of
ounterclaim to the defendant's claim made against the estate of
the te tator is concerned, it is sufficient to say that it was not used
a a counterclaim in that proceeding, but simply as evidence in
rebuttal of the defendant's claim. As uch, it was competent for the
purpo e of showing an indebtedness of the defendant to the testator which might-dependent upon circumstances-tend to rebut
the inference that there was a large indebtedness in favor of the
defendant again t the testator, as the farmer's liability upon the
promi ~o ry note might be entirely inconsistent with the existence
of a large claim in his favor against the testator. But whether
it had great or little probative force is not of consequence, as it
appear not to have been used as an off et or counterclaim to the
defendant's demand, and consequently it was not discharged by
any judgm nt or determination had in that proceeding.
Thi bring us to the main question in the case-the construction of the written declaration of the testator, which was found
in the env lope which contained the note after his death. It is
probably tru that this declaration was sufficient to discharge
cl fcnclant' obligation upon the promissory note, within the
authority of ~Vckett v. Raby, 2 Brown' Hou e of Lords, Rep.
386. The declaration therein was made a few days before the
death of the testator, in these word :
"I have Raby's bond, which I keep; I don't deliver it up, for
I may live t want it more than h ; but when I die he shall have
it, he ·hall not be a ked or troubled for it."

LEA~K

T AL.

.

D w

21

Leask et al. v. Dew 621

Suit having been brought upon the bond, it was ordered to be

delivered up and canceled, and such decision was affirmed by the

House of Lords upon appeal. The declaration in the present case

is, in one vjvw, stronger than the declaration in that case, for

therein there was the express intention of the testator to keep the

bond as a subsisting obligation against Raby, and it was not to

be enforced save in the event of his death, when it was to take

effect. In the writing under consideration in this case there is

no such expression in terms. A similar doctrine was announced

in Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sandf. Ch. 412. Therein the Raby

Case is cited with approval. The declaration therein was, like the

present, limited in its operative force to events which might hap-

pen subsequently to the death of the declarant. These cases

applied the common-law rule, and, while they are authoritative

declarations of the effect of this instrument at common law, they

are not controlling in its construction at the present time, for the

reason that the force and effect of an instrument of renunciation

is now governed by the provisions of section 203 of the Negotiable

Instruments Law (Laws 1897, P- 744< c. 612) It reads:

"The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any
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party to the instrument before, at or after its maturity. An abso-

lute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the prin-

cipal debtor made at or after the maturity of the instrument, dis-

charges the instrument. But a renunciation does not affect the

rights of a holder in due course without notice. A renunciation

must be in writing unless the instrument is delivered up to the

person primarily liable thereon."

This statute was taken from an act passed by the British Par-

liament in 1882, known as the "Bills of Exchange Act." It has

been quite generally adopted in various states of the American

Union. Its provisions are as follows :

"(1) When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity abso-

lutelv and unconditionally renounces his rights against the

acceptor, the bill is discharged. The renunciation must be in

writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the acceptor. (2) The

liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be renounced

by the holder before, at, or after its maturity, but nothing in this

uit havincr b n 1 rou ht up n th e b nd it was ordered to I
r d up and cane 1 d an 1 uch d ci ion wa affirm d by th e
ou of Lord upon ar p al. The d clarati on in th present ca e
i , in one v! ' W, trong r than the I claration in that ca e, for
th r in th r wa the xpr
int nti n f th testator to keep th e
bond a a ub isting oblirration again t Raby, and it wa not to
b enf reed sav in th
v nt of hi death, when it wa to taf<e
effect. In the writina under con id rati on in thi case th ere i
no uch xpr ion in term . A similar doctrine wa ann unc d
in Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sandf. . h. 412. Ther in th e Raby
ase i cit d with appr val. The 1 claration therein wa , like th
present, limited in its operativ force to ev nts which might happen ub quently to the death of the declarant. These ca e
applied th common-law rule, ancl, while they are authoritative
declaration of the effect of this instrument at common law, they
are not controlling in it construction at the present time, for the
rea on that the force and ff ct of an instrument of renunciation
i now governed by the provisions of ection 203 of the . . eo-otiable
Instruments Law (Laws 1897, p. 744, c. 612) It read :
"The hold r may expressly renounce hi rio-ht a ain t any
party to the instrument before, at or after its m~turity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of hi rights again t the principal debtor made at or after the maturity of the in trument, di charge the in trument. But a renunciation doe not affect the
rights of a hold er in due course without notice. . . renunc1at1on
must be in writing unless the in trument i delivered up to the
person primarily liable thereon. '

section shall affect the rights of a holder in due course without

notice of the renunciation."

It is readily seen that these two statutes, in character and

import, are alike. The only difference is change in the form of

phraseology, but it affects neither the sense nor the construction.

Thi tatute wa taken from an act passed by the riti h Parliament in I 2, known a the "Bill of Exchange ct.' It has
b en quite en rally adopt d in variou
tate of the , merican
nion. Its provisions are a follow :

" (I) Wh n the hold r of a bill at or after it maturity ab olutely and unconditionally r nounc
hi riaht a ain t the
acceptor, th bill i di char ed. The r nunciation mu t be in
writing, uni
the bill i cl liv red up to the acceptor. (2) The
liabiliti of any part to a 1 ill may in lik mann r b renounc d
b th hold r befor , at, r aft r it maturity, but nothina in this
ection hall affect the ri ht of a h Id r in due cour e without
notice of the r nunciation. '

It is readily seen that th

two
import, ar alik . The only diff r n
phraseology, but it affect n ither th

tatute , in character and
chano- in th form of
nor th con truction.

'•)·I
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L NCIA 1 IOX l:lY HOLDER

Renunciation ky Holder

A single case has arisen in England under the provisions of this

statute. In re George, L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 627, decided in 1890.

Therein it appeared that the testator desired to have destroyed a

note for £2,000 given by Mrs. Francis. Search was made for the

same, that it might be destroyed, but it could not be found. At the

instance of the decedent, the nurse in attendance upon him wrote

at 'his dictation: "30th August, 1889. It is by Mr. George's

dying wish that the cheque [sic] for £2,000 money lent to Mrs.

Francis be destroyed as soon as found." The nurse added to this

declaration the words: "Mr. George is perfectly conscious and

in his sound mind. [Signed] Nurse T." This transaction took

place two or three hours before death. The testator therein left

a will, in which he bequeathed to Mrs. Francis, his neice, the sum

of £6,000. The executors of the will declined to pay the bequest in

full, and thereupon the legatee brought an action to determine

the question as to whether the promissory note had been duly

canceled. The court, under the provision of the statute above

quoted, determined that the renunciation was insufficient to dis-

charge the note. Upon the case there presented, I should be dis-

posed to hold that it amounted, within the terms of the act, to an
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unconditional renunciation of the rights of the testator against

the maker of the note. The expression that it was the testator's

wish that it be destroyed would seem to constitute an announced

declaration to destroy the instrument, and, as such, it was a clear

expression of a renunciation of his right to enforce it. In the

declaration of renunciation, it is stronger than the instrument

relied upon in the present case.

There is some obscurity in the provisions of our statute. In

its first sentence it provides for the renunciation of the rights of

the holder against any party to the instrument which may be

made before, at, or after its maturity. In the second sentence it

provides for an absolute and unconditional renunciation of the

rights of the holder against the principal debtor at or after the

maturity of the instrument, and discharges the instrument. The

first relates to the party ; the second, to the instrument. It is

somewhat difficult to see how there could be an absolute dis-

charge of a party to an instrument without discharging the

instrument as an obligation, so far as he is concerned. We do not

clearly perceive why this distinction should have been made. It

is immaterial, however, to the rights of the parties to the present

action. The instrument of renunciation contains no express dec-

laration of the testator to renounce his rights in the note against

the party, or of his right to enforce it as a subsisting obligation.

. \ :ing-le ca e ha ari n in En lane\ under the provi ions of this
tatute. Ill re George, L. R. -t4 h. Div. 6~7, d cided in I 90.
TherLin il appea r ed that the te tator de ired to have de troyed a
nute fo r 12,ooo giYen by ~Ir . Franci .
earch wa made for th e
. amc. that it mi a ht be destroyed but it could not be found. . \t th
insta nce of the dee dent, the nurse in att ndanc u1 on him wrote
at 'hi dictation: "30th ugu t, 1889. It i by Mr. Georae' clyi ng wi h that the ch que [sic] for £2,000 money lent to tl r .
Franci be de troyed a oon a found.' The nur e add d to thi
decla ration the word : "~Ir. G orge i p rfectly con ciou an l
in hi ound mind. [ io-ned] Nurse T.
Thi transaction took
place two or three hour before death. 1 he te ta tor th rein I ft
a \Viii, in which he bequeathed to ~Ir . Franci , hi neice, th ~ um
of £6,ooo. The executor of the will d clin d to pay the bequc tin
full, and thereupon the legatee brouo-ht an action to determine
the que tion a to whether the promi ory note had been duly
canceled. The court, under the provi ion of the statute above
iuoted, det rmined that the renunciation was insufficient to di charge the note. Upon the ca e there presented I should be dispo cd to hold that it amounted, within the term of the act, to an
unconditional renunciation of the right of the testator again t
the maker of the note. The expression that it was the te tator's
wi h that it be de troyed would seem to constitute an announced
declaration to de troy the in trum nt, and, as uch. it was a clear
expre ion of a renunciation of hi right to enforce it. In the
declarati n of renunciation, it is stronger than the instrum nt
relied upon in the present ca e.
Th re is some ob curity in the provi ions of our tatute. In
it fir t entence it provides for the renunciation of the right of
the holder against any party to the in trument which may be
made befor , at or after it maturity. In the second sentence it
provid
for an ab olute and unconditional renunciation of the
right of th holder again t the principal debtor at or after the
maturity of the in trument, and di charges the in trument. The
fir t relate to th party; the second, to the in trument. It is
. om what difficult to ee how there could b an absolute discharae of a party to an in trurnent without di charo-ing the
in trument as an obligation, o far as h is cone med. We do not
I arly perceive why this di tinction should have been made. It
i immat rial, however, to the rio-hts of the parties to the present
a lion. Th in trument of r nunciation contain no exp ress declaration of the te tator to renounc hi rio-hts in the note again t
the party, or of hi right to enforce it as a ubsisting obligation.
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The expression is: "I wish [the note] to be canceled in case of

my death." There is nothing in these words which can be con-

strued as expressing a renunciation of any rights either against

the party or upon the instrument. Had it been delivered to the

defendant during the lifetime of the testator, it would not have

precluded the latter at any time upon maturity from enforcing the

note. There is nothing indicating an intent upon his part not to

enforce it during his lifetime. There was no delivery of it to any-

bodv. and while, doubtless, it was sufficiently authenticated to

accomplish a renunciation, it had no operative effect whatever, as

it did not fall within the statute or comply with its terms.

In principle, the question raised by this case has been decided

by this court. (Dimon v. Kccry, 54 App. Div. 318, 66 X. Y.

Supp. 817). Therein the plaintiff's intestate loaned to the defend-

ant a sum of money, taking her promissory note in writing.

wherein she agreed to pay the same, with interest, on demand.

The expression i : "I wi h [the note] to be canceled in case of
my death." There i nothin in th
word which an be contrued a expre ing a renunciation of any rights either ao-ain t
the party or upon the in trument. Had it been delivered to the
defendant durin th lifetime of the te ta tor, it woul l not ha v
precluded the latter at any tim upon maturity from enforcing the
not . There i nothing indicating an intent upon hi part not to
enforce it during hi lifetim . There v a no delivery of it to anybody, and while, doubtle , it was ufficiently authenticated to
accompli ' h a renunciation it had no operative effect whatever, as
it did not fall '~ithin the statute or comply with it term .
In principle, the question rai ed by thi case ha been decided
by thi court. (Dinwn v. Keer)') 54 pp. Div. 318, 66 • Y.
upp. 817). Therein the plaintiff's intestate loaned to the defendant a sum of money, taking her promissory not in writing.
wherein she agreed to pay the same, with interest, on demand.
At the time the note was delivered, the te tator indorsed thereon
the words: "at my death the above note become null and void.
tephen C. Dimon." Dimon continued to retain po e sion of the
note, and the defendant paid interest thereon, but no principal.
Dimon died about three years after the execution and delivery
of the not . In an action to enforce the same by hi administrator,
the defendant was held liable thereon, a the indor ement wa a
mere declaration by the payee of the note as to his intention concerning it, but that it wa in ufficient a con tituting either a
gift of money, or an agre ment to di charge it as an obligation.
The court therein did not di cuss the tatute which i here the
ubject of consideration. It is manifest, however, that the declaration indorsed upon the note wa not a renunciation of the
liability of the maker durino- the lifetime of the decea ed, or of any
renunciation of the obligation of the in trument; and, a it did
not con titute a gift or an agreement, it neither fell within the
terms of th tatute, nor exempted the defendant, for either reaon from liability thereon. In the in trument relied upon in thi
ca e, o far a the direction for cancellation in the event of death.
and a command to hi heir to obey hi wi h and follow hi order ,
the language i no strono-er than the indor ment upon the ba k
of the note in the Dimon Ca . ror i it as trong, becau e the
lano-uag there u ed wa a declarati n that th note at death
"become null and void." Here th r i imply the expre ion
of a wi h to have it cancel d, and a dir tion to the heir to obey
the ' i h. Consequently the imon a become a direct and
controlling authority in th di po iti n of this contra er y.
T.

At the time the note was delivered, the testator indorsed thereon

the words: "at my death the above note becomes null and void.

Stephen C. Dimon." Dimon continued to retain possession of the
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note, and the defendant paid interest thereon, but no principal.

Dimon died about three years after the execution and delivery

of the note. In an action to enforce the same by his administrator,

the defendant was held liable thereon, as the indorsement was a

mere declaration by the payee of the note as to his intention con-

cerning it, but that it was insufficient as constituting either a

gift of money, or an agreement to discharge it as an obligation.

The court therein did not discuss the statute which is here the

subject of consideration. It is manifest, however, that the dec-

laration indorsed upon the note was not a renunciation of the

liability of the maker during the lifetime of the deceased, or of any

renunciation of the obligation of the instrument ; and, as it did

not constitute a gift or an agreement, it neither fell within the

terms of the statute, nor exempted the defendant, for either rea-

son from liability thereon. In the instrument relied upon in this

case, so far as the direction for cancellation in the event of death,

and a command to his heirs to obey his wish and follow his orders,

the language is no stronger than the indorsement upon the back

of the note in the Dimon Case. Nor is it as strong, because the

language there used was a declaration that the note at death

"becomes null and void." Here there is simply the expression

of a wish to have it canceled, and a direction to the heirs to obey

the wish. Consequently the Dimon Case becomes a direct and

controlling authority in the disposition of this controversy. A.S

'24
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there was no valid renunciation of right of the testator to enforce

the note against the party, or of renunciation from liability upon

the instrument, and as nothing contained in the declaration other-

wise operates to relieve the defendant from liability, it follows that

the note remains a valid and subsisting obligation.

The judgment enforcing it should therefore be affirmed,

with costs.

All concur.

EFFECT OF ALTERATION. § 126.

Simpson v. Stackhouse (1848), p Pa. St. 186, 49 Am. Dec. 554.

In error from the District Court of Allegheny.

there wa no Yalicl renunciation of ri o-ht of the testator to enforce
the note again . t th e pa rty , or of renunciation from liability upon
the in t rumcnt, and as nothing contained in the declaration other" isc operate to relieve the defendant from liabili ty, it follows that
he note r main a yaJid and ub i ting obligation.
Th e judg ment enforci11g it should therefore be affirmed,
zvith costs .
.. 11 concur.

This was an action against an endorser of a note drawn by

Sankey, who resided in Mercer county. It was proved that the

body of the instrument was in the handwriting of defendant ; but

that the words "payable at the bank of Pittsburgh," written at the

EFFECT OF ALTERATION.

end of the instrument, were in a different handwriting.

§ 126.

The defendant's point was, that it was incumbent on the

plaintiff to show these were written at the time of the endorse-

impson

7.'.

StacH1ousc ( l8-J8), 9 Pa. St. 186, 49 Am. Dec. 554.

ment, or with defendant's consent.

The court said the jury must decide this as a matter of fact.
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Shaler and Stanton, for plaintiff in error.

Metcalf, contra.

Gibson, C. J. — As a general rule the law presumes, in favour

of innocence, that an alteration in an instrument is a legitimate

part of it, till the contrary appears; but it is not extended to nego-

tiable securities. The principle of the English cases is, that an

alteration so far apparent on the face of a bill or note as to raise a

suspicion of its purity, makes it incumbent on the plaintiff to

prove that it is still available, and that it is not incumbent on the

defendant to disprove it. Johnson v. The Duke of Marlborough,

2 Stark. Rep. 313; Hcnman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 183; Bishop

v. Chambre, 3 C. & P. 53 ; and Lcykariff v. Ash ford, 12 Moore.

281, establish that the general presumption of innocence in such a

In error from the District

ourt of A llegheny.
This wa an action again t an endo rser of a note drawn by
ankey, who resided in l'.Ierce r county. It was proved that the
body of the in trument was in the handw riting of defendant ; but
that the words "payable at the bank of Pittsburgh," written at the
end of the instrument, were in a different ·handwritin g.
T he defendant's point wa , that it was incuml ent on th
plaintiff to show th e e were written at the tim e of the endorsement, or with defendant's con sent.
The court aid the jury must decide this as a matter of fact.

case is overborne by the nature of the instrument. It was doubted

by the learned commentators on Mr. Phillips's Treatise on the

Law of Evidence, vol. 2, p. 229, whether the principle of the

Shaler and Sta11ton, for plaintiff in error.
Metcalf, contra.

English decisions would be adopted by the American courts. The

later decisions in the United States are discrepant, but their pre-

Gm ON, C. ].-As a general rule the law presumes, in favour
of innoc nc , that an alteration in an in trument is a legitimate
part of it, ti ll the contrary appears; but it is not extend d to negotiable ecurities. The principle of th e Engli h ca es is, that an
alteration o fa r apparent on the face of a bill o r note as to raise a
. u picion of it purity, makes it incumbent on th plaintiff to
prove that it i sitill avai lable, and that it is not incumbent on the
<l efendant to cli prove it. Johnson v. The Duke of Marlborough,
2
tark. R p. 313; Henman v. Dickinson, 5 Bing. 183; Bishop
v. Chambre, 3 . & P. 53; and Leykariff v. A shford, 12 Moore
281, e tabli h that th g neral pre umption of innocence in such a
ca e i overborne by the nature of the instrument. It was doubted
by the 1 arned commentators on Mr. Phillips's Treatise on the
Law of Evidence, vol. 2, p. 229, whether the principle of the
English <leci ions would be adopted by the merican courts. The
later decision in the nited States ar discrepant, but their pre-
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ponderance is in favour of restraining the general rule to deeds

and writings not negotiable. In McMicken v. Beauchamp, 2 Mil-

ler's Louis. Rep. 290, it was ruled that interlineations in a material

part of an acceptance are presumed to have been forged, till the

contrary is shown; in Hills v. Barnes, 11 N. H. Rep. 395, that an

unexplained alteration of a promissory note, apparent on the face

of it, is presumed to have been made after execution and delivery ;

in the Commercial and R. R. Bank v. Lum, 7 Howard's Miss.

Rep. 414, that an alteration on the face of a promissory note

must be shown by the holder to have been innocently made ; and

in Warren v. Lay ton, 3 Harring. 404, that a party cannot recover

on an altered note without explanatory proof. So far the Ameri-

can cases are consistent. But, on the other hand, it was ruled in

Gooch v. Bryant, 1 Shep. 386, that an alteration of a figure in the

date of a note, proved to be such by inspection, is not evidence of

itself that it was made after execution and delivery ; in Crabtree

v. Clark, 7 Shep. 337, that it is for the jury to determine — by

inspection, I suppose — whether an unexplained alteration, appar-

ent by inspection, was made before or after execution ; and in

Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. Rep. 707, that if it cannot be shown by
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whom a note has been altered, the court cannot presume it to have j

been altered by the holder, but the jury may. There are two inde-

cisive cases. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of

New Jersey, in Sayre v. Brookfield's Administrators, 2 South. yT,y,

Mr. Justice Southard, neither admitting nor denying the principle

of the English decisions, thought that the insignificance of the

alteration in that case, which made a difference in the interest of

only a few cents, was sufficient to show the integrity of the trans-

action. In the other case, Runnion v. Crane, 4 Blackf. 466, a

jury of inquiry were allowed to disregard an unexplained altera-

tion of a note, doubtless because they could not go behind the

interlocutory judgment. The decision is authority for nothing.

But how stands the question on principle? The English decisions

are founded in reason, and not in considerations growing out of

the stamp acts. He who takes a blemished bill or note, takes it

with its imperfections on its head. He becomes sponsor for them,

and though he may act honestly, he acts negligently. But the

law presumes against negligence as a degree of culpability ; and it

presumes that he had not only satisfied himself of the innocence

of the transaction, but that he had provided himself with the

proofs of it to meet a scrutiny he had reason to expect. It is of

no little weight, too, that the altered instrument is found in his

hands, and that no person else can be called on to speak of it : for

ponderance is in favour of restrainin the general rule to deeds
and writings not n gotiabl . In McJ.Vlickcn v. Bea·uchanip, 2 Mill r's Louis. R p. 290, it wa rul d that int rlineation in a material
part of an acceptance ar pr sum d to have been forged, till th
ontrary i shown; in Hills v. Barnes, II N. H. R p. 395, that an
unexplained alt ration of a promissory not , apparent on the face
of it, is pr urned to hav b n mad aft r x cution and deliv ry;
in the Commercial and R. R. Ba.nk v. Lum, 7 Howard's Miss.
Rep. 414, rt:hat an alteration on th face of a promissory not
must be hown by the holder to have been innocently made; and
in Warren v. La31ton, 3 Harring. 404, that a party cannot recover
on an alt red note without explanatory proof. So far the American ca es are con ist nt. But, on the other hand, it was ruled in
Gooch v. Bryant, I Sh p. 386, that an alteration of a figure in the
date of a note, prov d to be such by inspection, is not evidence of
itself that it was made afit r execution and delivery; in Crabtree
v. Cla.rk, 7 Shep. 337, that it is for the jury to determine-by
inspection, I suppose-whether an unexplained alteration, apparent by inspection, was made before or after execution; and in
Davis v. Carlisle, 6 Ala. Rep. 707, that if it cannot be shown by
whom a note h.as been altered, the court cannot presume it to have
been altered by the holder, but the jury may. There are two indecisive cases. In delivering the opinion. of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, in Sayre v. Brookfield's Administrators 2 South. 737,
Mr. Justice Southard, neither admitting nor denying the principle
of the English decisions, thought that the insignificance of the
alteration in that case, which made a diff rence in th interest of
only a few cents, was sufficient to show the integrity of the transaotion. In the other case, Runnion v. Crane, 4 Black£. 466, a
jury of inquiry were allowed to disregard an unexplained alteration of a note, doubtless because they could not go behind the
interlocutory judament. The decision i authority for nothing.
ut how stand the question on principle? The English decisions
ar found d in r a on, and not in con id rations growin<Y out of
the stamp act . He who tak s a blemi hed bill or note, takes it
with its imperfection on its head. 1 becomes spon or for them,
and though he may act hone tly h act negligently. But the
law presum s a ainst ne 1i nee a a d r e of culpability· and it
presume that he had not only aiti fied him elf f th innocenc
of the transaction, but that he had provided him elf with the
proofs of it to m et a crutiny he had rea on to expect. It is of
no little weight, too that the altered instrument is found in his
hands, and that no pers-0n el e can b called on to peak of it · for
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without a presumption to sustain him, the maker would in every

case be defenceless. It may be said that the holder, with such a

presumption against him, would also be defenceless. But it was

his fault to take such a note. As notes and bills are intended for

negotiation, and as payees do not usually receive them when clog-

ged with impediments to their circulation, there is a presumption

that such an instrument starts fair and untarnished, which stands

till it is repelled; and a holder ought, therefore, to explain why he

took it branded with marks of suspicion which would probably

render it unfit for his purposes. The very fact that he received it,

is presumptive evidence that it was unaltered at the time ; and to

say the least, his folly or his knavery raised a suspicion which he

ought to remove. The maker of a note cannot be expected to

account for what may have happened to it after it left his hands ;

but a payee or endorsee who takes it, condemned and discred-

ited on the face of it, ought to be prepared to show whatsit was

when he received it. Now, it is agreed that the note before us

was drawn and endorsed for the accommodation of the maker who

negotiated it, and who consequently stands as if it had been drawn

by the endorsee and endorsed by himself, as it might just as well
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have been, the difference being in the plan of the security and not

in its effect. It was distinctly proved that the body of the note is

in the handwriting of the defendant, and that the words "payable

at the Bank of Pittsburgh," are not. The difference in the char-

acter of the writing is obvious ; and the additional words are

broken into two half lines, for to have comprised them in one

would have required it to be run through the signature, and they

were necessarily crowded into the left hand corner, at the bottom

of the paper. That is certainly not the ordinary collocation of the

lines of a commercial instrument. Mr. Chitty says in his Treatise

on Bills, p. 213, that a drawee ought not to accept a bill which

has the least appearance of alteration ; and it was not disputed at

the trial that this note had that appearnce, or that the alteration

was in a material part of it, its effect being to dispense with per-

sonal notice of dishonour. The question was on the onus, and the

defendant prayed instruction that the body of the note being in

his handwriting, and the questionable words being in a different

hand, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that they were in

the instrument at the time of endorsement, or with the defendant's

consent: to which the court responded that the jury must decide

as a matter of fact. The response was a refusal of the prayer,

and a denial that there was any presumption to lead to a particular

conclusion. There was no direct evidence on the subject ; the

without a pre umpti n to u tain him, th maker would in every
ca be d f nc 1 . It may b said that th holder, with uch a
I r umpti n a()"ain t him, would al o b d fenc le . But it wa
hi fault t tak uch a note. As notes and bills are int nded for
n g tiati n and as pay
do not u ually r ceive th m when cloged with imp diment to their circulation, th re is a presumption
that uch an in trument starts fair and untarnished, which stand
till it is r p 11 d; and a holder ought, th r fore, to explain wh)'·h
took it brand d with marks of su picion which would probably
r nd r it unfit for hi purposes. The very fact that he received it,
is presumptive evidence that it was unaltered at the time; and to
ay the 1 a t, hi folly or his knav ry raised a suspicion which he
ought t remove. The maker of a note cannot be expected to
account for what may have happened to it after it left his hands·
but a payee r endo r ee who takes it, condemned and di credited on the face of it, ought to be prepared to show what it was
• us
wh n he rec ived it. Now, it is agreed that the note before
was drawn and endorsed for the accommodation of the maker who
negotiated it, and who consequently stands as :£ it had been drawn
by the endorsee and endorsed by himself, a it might ju t as well
have been, the difference being in the plan f the s curity and not
in its effect. It was distinctly proved that the body of the note is
in the handwriting of the defendant, and that the words "payable
at th Bank of Pittsburgh," are not. The difference in the character of the writing is obviou ; and the additional words are
brok n into two half lines, for to have comprised them in one
would have required it to be run through the signature, and they
were neces arily crowded into the left hand corner, at the bottom
of th pap r. That is certainly not the ordinary collocation of the
line of a commercial instrum nt. Mr. Chitty says in his Tr ati e
on ills, p. 213, that a drawee ought not to accept a bill which
ha the least appearance of alteration; and it wa not disputed at
th trial that this note had that appearnce, or that the alteration
was in a material part of it, its effect being to dispense with personal notice of dishonour. The question was on the onus, .and the
defendant prayed instruction that th body of the note being in
his handwriting, and the questionable word being in a different
hand, it wa incumbent on the plaintiff to show that they were in
the instrument at the time of endorsement, or with the defendant's
cons nt: t which the court r pond d that the jury must decide
as a matter f fact. The re pon e was a refusal of the prayer,
an 1 ad nial that there wa any pr sumption to lead to a particular
conclu ion. There wa no direct evidence on the subject; the
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deposition of Sankey, the drawer, who had given credit to the note

by his name, having been properly ruled out ; but on the prin-

ciple of the English cases, and a majority of our own, the defend-

ant's prayer ought to have been granted

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo azvarded.

Moskowitz v. Deutsch et al. (1905), 92 N. Y. Supp. 721.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan,

Fourth District.

deposition of ankey, th drawer, who had giv n credit to th note
by hi nam , having be n prop rly rul d out; but on the principle of th Engli h case , and a majority of our own, th defendant's pray r u ht to hav b n grant d
Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.

Action by Max Moskowitz against Isidor Deutsch and

another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Argued before Scott, O'Gokman, and Blanctiard, JJ.

Fried & Friedman, for appellants.

Jl!loslw'Z

1it::;

v. Delltsch et al. ( r905), 92 N . Y. Supp. 72 I .

H. M. IVald, for respondent.

O'Gorman, J. — The defendants made a check to one Gold-

berg under date of September 2d. On the following day the

payee represented to the defendants that he had lost this check,

whereupon payment thereof was stopped at the bank, and five or

six days later he received from the defendants another check for

the same amount, which was duly cashed. A day or two after
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September 12th, the original check of September 2d with a "1"

inserted before the "2,'' making the date September "12," was

. pp al from
Iunicipal
ourt,
orough of Manhattan,
Fourth Di trict.
ction by Iax Mo kowitz ao-ain t Isidor Deut ch and
another. From a j udo-m nt for plaintiff, defendant appeal.
Affirmed.
~ ro-ued before COTT,
'Gmn,I ,\N, and BLA rcnARD JJ.

indorsed over to the plaintiff by Goldberg, and cashed. The

plaintiff now sues the drawers, and the defense is a general denial

Fried & Friedman, for appellant .

and forgery. That the date of this check had been altered by

Goldberg, or at his instance, is too clear for dispute. Such an

H. 1ll. Wa1d, for re pondent.

alteration is material, constitutes forgery, and destroys the valid-

ity of the check, except as provided by section 205 of the Negoti-

able Instruments Law (Laws 1897, p. 745, c. 612), which declares

that, ''when an instrument has been materially altered and is in

the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration,

he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."

If it be assumed, therefore, as the court below has found, that

the plaintiff is an innocent holder for value in due course, he may

assert such rights as are conferred by the check as it was before

the alteration. We then have a case where a check dated Sep-

tember 2d is cashed by the plaintiff and presented for payment

more than 10 days thereafter. As all the parties resided, and the

O'GoRMAN, ].-The defendants made a check to one Goldberg und r date of September 2d. On the fOTiowing day th
payee represented to the defendants that he had lo t thi check,
whereupon payment thereof was stopped at the bank, and five or
ix days later he received from the defendants another check for
the ame amount, which was duly cashed. A day or two after
eptember 12th, the original check of eptember 2d with a "r"
in erted before the "2," makinCT th date eptember "12,'' wa
indorsed over to the plaintiff by Goldberg, and ca bed. The
plaintiff now ue the draw r and the defen e i a CTeneral denial
and for(Ter . That the date of thi check had been altered by
GoldberCT, or at his in tance, i too cl ar for di pute. Such an
alt ration is material, con titute fora- ry and de tro thvalidity or fh check, except a provided b
ction 205 of th N to-otia15 e In trument Law (Lav r 97 p. 745, c. 612) which declare
that, ', h n an in trument ha been materially altered and i in
the hand of a holder in du cour e, not a party to the alteration,
he may enforce payment th reof accordin to it ori(Tinal t nor.''
If it b a urned, th erefore, a th court b low ha found, that
the plaintiff i an innocent hold r for valu in du cour
h may
assert such right a are conferred b. the check a it wa b for
the alteration. \ e th n ha
a ca ' her a check dated September 2d i ca hed by th plaintiff and pr ent d f r payment
more than 10 day thereafter.
all th partie r id d, and the
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bank was situated, in the city of New York, the delay in the pre-

sentment of the check was unreasonable, and was sufficient to

discharge the defendants as drawers from liability thereon to the

extent of the loss, if any, incurred by them in consequence of the

delay. But the only way in which a drawer of a check can be

exposed to injury by such delay is where the bank becomes insol-

vent subsequent to the delivery of the check and prior to its pre-

sentment. (Eaton & Gilbert on Commercial Paper, 630, and cases

cited; Andrus v. Bradley [C. C] 102 Fed. 54, affirmed 107 Fed.

196, 46 C. C. A. 238, 53 L. R. A. 432). The loss suffered by the

defendants must be attributed not to delay in the presentment of

the check, but to their imprudent reliance on the false and fraudu-

lent representations of the payee. Before giving the new check.

the defendants might have insisted upon full indemnity from

Goldberg, and thus escaped the loss of which they now complain.

By their conduct, Goldberg found it possible to perpetrate a fraud,

and the consequences of their misplaced confidence in him should

be borne by them, and not visited upon the plaintiff, an innocent

party to the transaction. Upon the facts, the plaintiff was entitled

to judgment.
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Judgment affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Porter v. Hardy. (See page 549.)

r

bank wa ituated, in the city of New York, the delay in the preentment of the check wa unreasonable, and was sufficient to
di charge the defendants as drawers from liability thereon to the
extent of th lo , if any, incurred by them in consequence of the
delay. But the only way in which a drawer of a check can be
e.·po d to injury by uch delay is where the bank becomes insolvent ubsequent to the delivery of the check and prior to its precntment. (Eaton & Gilbert on Commercial Paper, 630, and case
cited; A11dncs v. Bradley [C. C.] 102 Fed. 54, affirmed 107 Fed.
196, 46 C. C. A. 238, 53 L. R. A. 432). The loss suffered by the
defendants must be attributed not to delay in the presentment of
the check, but to their imprudent reliance on the false and fraudulent repre entations of the payee. B_rlog gi_ying 0~..E.e~ _check
the defendants might have insisted upon full indemnity from
Goldbero-, and thus escaped the 1oss of w11ich they now complain.
By their conduct, Goldberg found it possible to perpetrate a fraud,
and the consequences of their misplaced confidence in him should
be borne by them, and not vi£ited upon the plaintiff, an innocent
party to the tran action. Upon the facts, the plaintiff was entitled
to judgment.

Judgment affirnied, with costs.
All concur.

Porter v. Hardy. (See page 549.)

TITLE V.

Conflict of Laws,

what law governs the contract. — in general.

Hamlyn & Co. v. Taliskcr Distillery Co. et al. {1894) {House of

Lords) , L. R. 19, App. Cas. 202.

The facts appear from the opinion.

Lord Herschell, L.C. — My Lords, on the 27th of January,

1892, an agreement was entered into between Roderick Kemp &

Co. of the Talisker Distillery, Carbost, Isle of Skye, and Hamlyn

TITLE V.

& Co. of London, under which Hamlyn & Co. were to supply to

the distillery a patent drying machine which was to be worked by

the distillery company, who were to bag up and deliver to Hamlyn

CONFLICT OF LA ws.

& Co. dried grain free on board at Carbost to their order or

otherwise as required. The agreement concludes with a clause

in the following terms : "Should any dispute arise out of this

WHAT LAW GOVERN THE CONTR CT.-IN GENERAL.

contract the same to be settled by arbitration by two members of

the London Corn Exchange, or their umpire, in the usual way."

This agreement was made between the parties in England.

Shortly after the contract was entered into Alexander Grigor

Hamlyn & Co. v . Talisker D-istillery Co. et al. (1894) (House of
Lords) , L. R. 19, App. Cas. 202.

Allan became the sole partner in the firm of Roderick Kemp &

Co., and the present action was instituted by him in Scotland in
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respect of an alleged breach of the contract. The defenders

pleaded that the Court of Session had "no jurisdiction," and that

"the action is excluded by the clause of reference in the memoran-

dum of agreement." These pleas were repelled by the Lord Ordi-

nary, and his judgment was affirmed by Lord Adam and Lord

M'Laren, in the Inner House, Lord Kinnear dissenting. During

the course of the litigation the pursuer died, and is now repre-

sented by the respondents.

It is not in controversy that the arbitration clause is, accord-

ing to the law of England, a valid and binding contract between

the parties, nor that according to the law of Scotland it is wholly

invalid inasmuch as the arbiters are not named. The view taken

by the majority of the court below is thus expressed by Lord

fyU*

The facts appear from the opinion.
LORD HERSCHELL, L.C.-My Lords, on the 27th of January,
1892, an agreement was entered into between Roderick Kemp &
Co. of the Talisker Distillery, Carbost, Isle of Skye, and Hamlyn
& Co. of London, under which Hamlyn & Co. were to supply to
the distillery a patent drying machine which was to be worked by
the distillery company, who were to bag up and deliver to Hamlyn
& Co. dried grain free on board at Carbost to their order or
otherwise as required. The agreement concludes with a clause
in the following terms: " Should any dispute arise out of this
contract the same to be settled by arbitration by two members of
the London Corn Exchange, or their umpire, in the usual way."
This agreement was made between the parties in England.
Shortly after the contract was entered into Alexander Grigor
Allan became the sole partner in the firm of Roderick Kemp &
Co., and the present action was instituted by him in Scotland in
respect of an alleged breach of the contract. The defenders
pleaded that the Court of Session had "no ·urisdiction," and that
"the action is excluded by the clause of reference in the memorandum of agreement." These pleas were "i=epelle by the Lord Ordinary, and his judgment was affirmed by Lord dam and Lord
M'Laren, in the Inner Hou e, Lord I innear dis entin<Y. During
the cour e of the litigation the pursuer died, and is now repreented by the respondents.
It is not in controversy that the arbitration clause is.., according to the law of En<Yland , a valid an l bindin<Y contract between
the parties, nor that accordin<Y to th law of Scotland it is wholly
invalid ina much as the arbiters are not named. Th view taken
by the majority of th court below i thu expre ed by Lord
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Adam: "So fas as I see, nothing required to be done in England

in implement of the contract. That being so, I am of opinion with

the Lord Ordinary that the construction and effect of the agree-

ment, and of all and each of its stipulations, is to be determined

liv the lex loci solutionis, that is, by the law of Scotland."

It is not denied that the conclusion thus arrived at renders

the arbitration clause wholly inoperative, and thus defeats the

xpressed intention of the parties, but this is treated as inevitably

following from the rule of law that the rights of the parties must

be wholly determined by the lex loci solutionis. I am not able

altogether to agree with the view taken by the learned Lord that

everything required to be done in implement of the contract was

to be done in Scotland, inasmuch as it appears to me that the

arbitration clause which I have read to your Lordships does not

indicate that that part of the contract between the parties was to

be implemented by performance in Scotland. That clause is as

much a part of the contract as any other clause of the contract,

and certainly there is nothing on the face of it to indicate, but

quite the contrary, that it was in the contemplation of the parties

that it should be implemented in Scotland.
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The learned judges in the court below treat the lex loci solu-

tionis of the main portion of the contract as conclusively determin-

ing that all the rights of the parties under the contract must be

governed by the law of that place. I am unable to agree with

them in this conclusion. Where a contract is entered into between

parties residing in different places, where different systems of law

prevail, it is a question, as it appears to me, in each case, with

reference to what law the parties contracted, and according to

what law it was their intention that their rights either under the

whole or any part of the contract should be determined. In con-

sidering what law is to govern, no doubt the lex loci solutionis is a

matter of great importance. The lex loci contractus is also

of importance. In the present case the place of the contract

was different from the place of its performance. It. is not neces-

sary to enter upon the inquiry, which was a good deal discussed

at the bar, to which of these considerations the greatest weight is

to be attributed, namely, the place where the contract was made,

or the place where it is to be performed. In my view they are

both matters which must be taken into consideration, but neither

of them is, of itself, conclusive, and still less is it conclusive, as

it appears to me, as to the particular law which was intended to

govern particular parts of the contract between the parties. Tn

this case, as in all such cases, the whole of the contract must be

. \ dam: " o fas as I e , nothing required to be done in England
in implement of the contract. That being so, I am _Qf opinior!._~ith
the Lord O rdinary that the construction and effect of the agreement and of all and each of its stipulations, is to be determined
'
.
by the lex loci solutionis, that is, by the law of Scotland.''
It is not denied that the conclu ion thus arriv d at renders
the arbitration clause wholly inoperative and thus defeats the
exp ressed intention of the parties, but this is treated as inevitably
following from tQe rule of law that the rights of the parties must
be wholly determined by the lex loci solutionis. I am not able
altogeth er to agree with the view taken by the learned Lord that
everything required to be done in implement of the contract wa
to be done in Scotland, inasmuch as it appears to me that the
arbitration clause which I have read to your Lordships does not
indicate that that part of the contract between the parties was to
be implemented by performance in Scotland. That clause is as
much a part of the contract as any other clause of the contract,
and certainly there is nothing on the face of it to indicate, but
quite the contrary, that it was in the contemplation of the parties
that it should be implemented in Scotland.
The learned judges in the court below treat the lex loci solutionis of the main portion of the contract as conclusively determining that all the rights of the parties under the contract must be
governed by the law of that place. I am unable to agree with
them in this conclusion. Where a contract is entered into between
parties residing in different places, where different systems of law
prevail, it is a question, as it appears to me, in each case, with
reference to what law the parties contracted, and according to
what law it was their intention that their rights either under the
whole or any part of the contract should be determined. In conidering what law is to govern, no doubt the lex loci solutionis is a
matter of great importance.
The lex loci contractus is also
of importance.
In the present ca e th place of the contract
wa different from the place of its performance. It is not necessary to enter upon the inquiry, which was a good deal discussed
at the bar, to which of these consideration the greatest weight is
t o be attributed, namely, the place where the contract was made,
or the place where it is to be performed. In my view they a~
both matters which must be taken into -con id.eration, but neither
of th em i , of it elf, condu ive, and still less- is it conclusive, as
it appears to me, as to the particular law which was intended to
gove rn particular part of the contract between the parties. In
this case, as in an such cases, the whole of the contract must be
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looked at and the rights under it must be regulated by the inten-

tion of the parties as appearing from the contract. It is perfectly

competent to those who under such circumstances as I have

indicated are entering into a contract, to indicate by the terms

which they employ, which system of law they intend to be applied

to the construction of the contract and to the determination of the

rights arising out of it.

Now in the present case it appears to me that the language

of the arbitration clause indicates very clearly that the parties

intended that the rights under that clause should be determined

according to the law of England. As I have said, the contract

was made there; one of the parties was residing there. Where

under such circumstances the parties agree that any dispute aris-

ing out of their contract shall be "settled by arbitration by two

members of the London Corn Exchange, or their umpire, in the

usual way," it seems to me that they have indicated as clearly as .

it is possible their intention that that particular stipulation, which

is a part of the contract between them, shall be interpreted accord-

ing to and governed by the law, not of Scotland, but of England,

and I am aware of nothing which stands in the way of the inten-

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tion of the parties, thus indicated by the contract they entered

into, being carried into effect. As I have already pointed out,

the contract with reference to arbitration would have been abso-

lutely null and void if it were to be governed by the law of Scot-

land. That cannot have been the intention of the parties: it is

not reasonable to attribute that intention to them if the contract

may be otherwise construed ; and, for the reasons which I have

given, I see no difficulty whatever in construing the language used

as an indication that the contract, or that term of it, was to be

governed and regulated by the law of England.

But then it is said that the Scotch Court is asked to enforce

a law which is against the public policy of the law of Scotland,

. and that although the parties may have so contracted the courts in

Scotland cannot be bound to enforce a contract which is against _

the policy of their law. I should be prepared to admit that an

agreement which was opposed to a fundamental principle of the

law of Scotland founded on considerations of public policy could

not be relied upon and insisted upon in the courts of Scotland ;

and if according to the law of Scotland the courts were allowed

their jurisdiction to try the merits of a case to be interfered with

by an arbitration clause, there would be considerable force in

the contention which was urged by the respondents. But that is

not the case. The courts in Scotland recognise the right of the

looked at and the right under it mu t be regulated by the intention of the parties as appearing from the contract. It is perfectly
as I have
competent to tho e who under such circumstanc
indicated are entering into a contract, to indicate by the term
which they employ, which syst m of law they intend to b appli d
to the con truction of the contract and to th e d termination of the
right arising out of it.
Now in the present ca e it appear to me that the language
of the arbitration clause indicates very clearly that the parti
intended that the rights under that clause should be determined
according to the law of England. A I have said, the contract
was made there; one of the parties was residing there. Where
under such circumstances the parties agree that any dispute ari ing out of their contract shall be "settled by arbitration by two
members of the London Corn Exchange, or their umpire, in the
usual way," it seems to me that they have indicated as clearly as
it is po sible their intention that that particular stipulation, which
is a part of the contract between them, shall be interpreted according to and governed by the law, not of Scotland, but of England,
and I am aware of nothing which stands in the way of the intention of the parties, thus indicated by the contract they entered
into, being carried into effect. As I have already pointed out,
the contract with reference to arbitration would have been absolutely null and void if it were to be governed by the law of Scotland. That cannot have been the intention of the parties; it is
not reasonable to attribute that intention to them if the contract
may be otherwise construed; and, for the reasons which I have
given, I see no difficulty whatever in construing the language used
as an indication that the contract, or that term of it, was to be
governed and regulated b the law of England.
But then it is said that the Scotch Court is asked to enforce
a law which is against the public policy of th~ law of Scotland,
· and that although the parties may have so contracted the courts in
cotland cannot be bound to enforce a contract which i again t
the policy of their law. I should be prepared to admit that an
agreement which was oppo ed to a fundamental principle of the
law of Scotland founded on considerations of public policy could
not be relied upon and in i ted upon in the court of cotland ·
and if according to the law of cotland the court w re allowed
their juri diction to tr the merit of a ca to be int rf red with
b an arbitration clau e, there would be con iderable force in
the contention which wa urged by the respond nt .
ut that i
not the C'ase. The court in Scotland recogni the rio-ht of th
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parties to a contract to determine that any disputes under it shall

be settled, not in the ordinary course of litigation, but by an arbi-

tration tribunal selected by the parties. If in the present case the

arbitrators had been named, the courts in Scotland would have

recognised and given effect to and enforced the arbitration clause,

and would by reason of it have declined to enter upon a trial of

the merits of the case. That being so, I have been unable to

understand upon what fundamental principle of public policy

the rule can be said to rest that where an arbitrator is not named

an agreement between the parties to refer a matter to arbitration

ought not to be enforced.

It is not necessary to inquire into the history of the distinction

which has arisen in the courts of Scotland between arbitration

clauses where arbiters are named and clauses with an unnamed

arbiter. It is sufficient to say that when once it is admitted, as it

must be, that the courts of Scotland do enforce and give effect to

an arbitration clause, and hold their hands from the determina-

tion of the merits by reason of the parties having agreed upon it,

it seems to me to follow that if this arbitration clause is to be

interpreted according to the law of England, and is therefore a

Generated for anonymous (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-30 16:52 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t9w09504r
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

valid arbitration clause, there is no reason why the courts in

Scotland should not give effect to it just as much as if it were a

valid arbitration clause according to the law of Scotland.

But then it is argued that an agreement to refer disputes to

arbitration- deals with the remedy and not with the rights of the

parties, and that consequently the forum being Scotch the parties

cannot by reason of the agreement into which they have entered

interfere with the ordinary course of proceedings in the courts

of Scotland. Stated generally, I should not dispute that proposi-

tion so far as it lays down that the parties cannot, in a case where

the merits fall to be determined in the Scotch courts, insist, by

virtue of an agreement, that those courts shall depart from their

ordinary course of procedure. But that is not really the question

which has to be determined in the present case. The question

which has to be determined is whether it is a case in which the

courts of Scotland ought to entertain the merits and adjudicate

upon them. If it were such a case, then no doubt the ordinary

course of procedure in the Scotch courts would have to be fol-

lowed ; but the preliminary question has to be determined whether

by virtue of a valid clause of arbitration the proper course is for

the courts in Scotland not to adjudicate upon the merits of the

case, but to leave the matter to be determined by the tribunal to

which the parties have agreed to refer it. Viewed in that light,

parties to a contract to determine that any disput s under it shal\
b settled, not in the ordinary cours f litigation, but by an arbitration tribunal selected by the parties. If in the present case the
arbitrators had been named, the court in Scotland would have
recognised and given effect to and enforcec;l the arbitration clause,
and would by reason of it have declined to enter upon a trial of
the merit of the case. That being o, I have been unable to
understand upon what fundamental principle of public policy
the rule can be aid to re t that where an arbitrator is not named
an agreement between the parties to refer a matter to arbitration
ought not to be enforced.
It is not necessary to inquire into the history of the distinction
which has arisen in the courts of Scotland between arbitration
clau es wher arbiter are named and clauses with an unnamed
arbiter. It i ufficient to ay that when once it is admitted, as it
must be, that the courts of Scotland do enforce and give effect to
an arbitration clause, and hold their hands from the determination of the merits by reason of the parties having agreed upon it,
it eems to me to follow that if this arbitration clause is to be
interpreted according to the law of England, and is therefore a
valid arbitration cJause, there is no reason why the courts in
cotland should not give effect to it just as much as if it were a
valid arbitration clause according to the law of Scotland.
But then it is argued that an agreement to rder disputes to
arbitration· deals with the remedy and not with the rights of the
parties, and that consequently the forum being Scotch the parties
cannot by reason of the agreement into which they have entered
interfere with the ordinary course of proceedings in the courts
of cotland.
tated generally, I should not dispute that proposition o far a it lays down that the partie cannot, in a case where
the merits fall to be determined in the Scotch courts, insist, by
virtue of an a<Treement, that those courts shall depart from their
ordinary course of procedure. But that i not really the question
which has to b determined in the present ca e. The question
which has to be determinecl i whether it i a case in which the
courts of Scotland ought to entertain the ments and aaJudicate
upon them. If it were such a case then- no doubt the ordinary
cour e of procedure in the Scotch court would have to be followed; but the preliminary quest10n ha to e etermined whether
by virtue of a valid clau e of arbitration the proper course is for
the courts in cotland not to adjudicate upon the merits of the
ca e, but to leave the matter to be d termined by the tribunal to
which the partie have a<Treed to refer it. Viewed iri that light,
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I can sec no difficulty ; and the argument that to give effect to

this arbitration clause would interfere with the course of pro-

cedure in the forum in which the action is pending seems to

me entirely to fail. For these reasons I move that the judgment

appealed from be reversed.

So ordered. The cause remitted * * * in order

that the matters in dispute may be settled by arbitra-

tion in terms of the contract.

(The concurring opinions of Lord Watson and Lord Ash-

bourne omitted).

WHAT LAW GOVERNS CONTRACT OF MAKER OR ACCEPTOR.

Woodruff et al. v. Hill et al. (18/4), 116 Mass. 310.

Contract upon a promissory note for $1352.70. At the trial

in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J., the plaintiffs offered

evidence tending to prove that the defendants made the note, and

that the payees indorsed it before maturity to the plaintiffs, who

paid to thlTpayees at the time of the indorsement, and as the con-

sideration therefor, $699.48 in cash, and credited the payees with

$629.55, in payment of a preexisting debt due from them to the

plaintiffs, the balance of said note amounting to $23.67, being
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charged and allowed for interest. The payees of the note and the

plaintiffs are residents of New York, and the indorsement was

made in that state. The defendants are residents of Boston, in

this Commonwealth, and the note was made and was payable in

Boston.

The defendants offered to prove that by the law of New

York" the plaintiffs, upon the above evidence, were not bona

tide holders for value except as to the amount of the money paid

by them to the payees at the time of the indorsement; that the

note was given by them without consideration to the payees, they _

agreeing not to use the same except as collateral to their own note,

to raise money upon ; and tha t, as between them and the payees,

the transfer of the note to the plaintiffs was f raudu lent. The

defendants did not contend that the plaintiffs had any knowledge

of the. want of consideration of the note, or of the purpose for

which it was given.

The judge ruled that the facts offered by the defendants

would not, if proved, constitute a defense, and that the law of this

Commonwealth and not the law of New York governed, and

h)****'
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instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the

whole amount of the note. The defendants alleged exceptions.

in tructed the jury to return a ve rdict for the plaintiffs for the
whole amount of the note. The def ndants alleged exceptions.

A. A. Ranncy, for the defendants.

H. J. Boardman & C. Blodgett, for the plaintiffs.

Gray, C. J. — The note was made in Massachusetts, and the

contract of the makers with the payees and with any indorsee

1. A. Ranney, for the defendants.
H. J. Boardman & C. Blodgett, for the plaintiffs.

thereof was to be performed here, and governed by our law.

(Story Confl. Laws, §§317, 344, 345). By that law, the facts

offered to be proved at the trial constituted no defence. (Blan-

\ chard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162).

N^ Exceptions overruled.

Phipps et al. v. Harding (1895), 17 C. C. A. 203; 70 Fed. 468.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

This suit was brought to recover the amount of a promissory

note executed by the Hudson Furniture Company (a corporation

J.-The note was made in Massachusett and the
contract of th makers with the payees and with any. incforsee
ther of wa to be performed here, and governed by our aw.
( tory onfl. Law , §§ 317, 344, 345). By that law, the facts
offer d to be proved at the trial constituted no defence. ( Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162).
Exceptions overruled.
GRAY,

.

of the state of Wisconsin), dated Hudson, Wis., March 26, 1892,

payable April 14, 1893, to the order of Edgar Harding, the

defendant in error, for the sum of $5,000, payable at the North

National Bank, Boston, Mass. Prior to its delivery or acceptance,
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the plaintiffs in error severally signed their names upon the back

Phipps et at. v. Harding (1895), 17 C. C. A . 203; 70 Fed. 468.

thereof for the purpose of giving credit to such note with the

payee. It was thereupon sent by mail from Hudson, Wis., to the

payee, at his residence in the state of Massachusetts, with the

request that he would accept it in lieu of and in extension of a

note of the Hudson Furniture Company for a like amount then

held by him, and maturing at or about the date of the new note.

It was received by the payee in the state of Massachusetts, and

there accepted by him for the prior obligation of the company,

upon the faith and security of the individual names upon the

paper. The note was not paid at maturity. It was not properly

protested for non-payment, nor were the plaintiffs in error season-

ably notified of its presentment and non-payment. At the time of

its execution and delivery, the Hudson Furniture Company was

insolvent, to the knowledge of the plaintiffs in error, who were

directors of the company, constituting the majority of its board

of directors at the time of its execution, and so continued down

to and after maturity of the note.

By the statute of Massachusetts (St. 1874, c. 404) it is

In error to the Circuit Court of the U nited State for the
vVestern Di trict of Wiscon in.
This suit was brought to recover th e amount of a promissory
note executed by the Hudson Furniture Company (a corporation
of the state of Wisconsin), dated Hudson, Wis., March 26, 1892,
payable Ap ril 14, 1893, to the order of Edgar Harding, the
defendant in error, for the sum of $5,000, payable at t he North
National Bank, Bo ton, Mass. Prior to it delivery or acceptance,
the plaintiffs in error severally signed their names upon the back
thereof for the purpose of giving credit to such note with the
payee. It was thereupon sent by mail from Hudson, Wis., to the
payee, at his residence in the state of Massachusetts, with the
request that he would accept it in lieu of and in exten ion of a
note of the Hudson Furniture Company for a like amount then
held by him, and maturino- at or about the date of the new note.
It was received by the payee in the state of Massachu etts, and
there accept cl by him for the prior obligation of the company
upon the faith and security of the individual names upon the
pap r. Th n te wa not paid at maturity. It was not properly
protested for non-payment, nor were the plaintiffs in error seasonably notified f its presentment and non-payment. At the time of
it execution and delivery, th e Hudson Furniture Company was
in . olvEmt, to the knowledo-e of the plaintiffs in error, who were
directors of the company, constituting the majority of it board
of clir ctor at th time of its execution, and o continued down
to and aft r matu rity of the note.
y the ~tatute of Mas· achusett (St. 1874, c. 404) it is
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enacted that "all persons becoming parties to promissory notes

payable on time, by signature on the back thereof, shall be entitled

to notice of the non-payment thereof the same as endorsers."

The case was tried in the court below, without the interven-

tion of a jury. The court found the facts as above stated, and,

as conclusion of law upon such facts, held that the several indi-

vidual defendants (plaintiffs in error here) were "joint and sev-

eral makers of said note, and therefore not entitled to protest of

said note," and judgment was rendered against all the defendants

for the amount due upon the note.

It is assigned for error that the court erred in the following

respects: (i) In the finding and decision of the said circuit court

that at the time of the execution and delivery of the note upon

which this action was brought to the plaintiff, the defendant, the

Hudson Furniture Company, was insolvent; (2) in that the said

court also found and decided that such insolvency was known by

the defendants, Phipps, Coon, Jones, and Goss; (3) in the find-

ing and decision of the said court that the said Phipps, Coon,

Jones, and Goss signed the said note ; (4) in the finding and

decision of said court that said Phipps, Coon, Jones, and Goss
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were not entitled to protest of said note; (5) in the finding and

decision that plaintiff recover from the defendants above named

the amount due on said note, with interest and costs; (6) in the

finding and decision of said court by which judgment is ordered

according to the findings.

Charles P. Spooner and James P. Kerr, for plaintiffs in error.

M. H. Houtelle, for defendant in error.

Before Woods and Jenkins, Circuit Judges, and Baker, Dis-

trict Judge.

Jenkins, Circuit Judge, after stating the facts, delivered the

opinion of the court.

We are not at liberty to review the evidence to ascertain

whether the finding of the court below upon the facts was war-

enacted that ''all p r on b comin pa rti
to promissory note
payable on tim , by ignatur on th back ther of, hall b ntitled
to notice of th non-payment th re f th ame a nd r r ."
Th ca e wa tried in th court below, without th intervention f a jury. Th court found th fact a abov tat d, and,
a conclu ion of law up n uch fact h Id th at th e several individual def ndant (plaintiff in rror h re) wer "j oin t and sevral maker of aid not and therefor not entitl ed to protest of
aid note," and judam nt was render d ag ainst a ll the defendants
for th e amount du upon the note.
It is assigned for rror that th court err d in the following
r spects: (I) In the finding and deci ion of th e aid circuit court
that at the time of th x ecution and delivery of th e note upon
which this action was brought to the plaintiff, th e defendant, the
Hudson Furnitur Company, was insolvent; ( 2) in that the said
court also found and decided that such insolvency was known by
the def ndant , Phipp , Coon, Jones, and Go s; (3) in the finding and decision of the said court that the aid Phipp , Coon,
Jones, and Gos signed the said note · ( 4) in the findin a and
decision of said court that said Phipps, Coon, Jones, and Goss
were not entitled to protest of said note; ( 5) in the finding and
decision that plaintiff recover from the defendant above named
the amount due on said note, with interest and co ts; ( 6) in the
finding and decision of said court by which judament is ordered
according to the findings.

ranted by the testimony. We are restricted to the consideration

of the question whether the facts as found support the judgment

rendered. (Jcnks' Adm'r v. Stapp, 9 U. S. App. 34, 3 C. C. A.

244, and 52 Fed. 641). We must therefore consider the case upon

Charles P. Spooner and James P. Kerr, for plaintiffs in error.
M. H. H oittelle, for defendant in error.

the assumption that, at the time of the execution of the note, the

Hudson Furniture Company was insolvent, to the knowledge of

the individual parties to the note, who were its directors. * * *

It is settled doctrine that the federal courts, in the exercise of

their co-ordinate jurisdiction, are not bound by the decisions of

Before WooDs and JENKIN , Circuit Judges, and BAKER, District Judge.
}ENKI s, ircuit Judge, aft r tatina th fact delivered the
opinion of the court.
V are not at liberty to review the evid nee to a certain
whether the finding of the court below upon th fact wa warranted by the testimony. "fV are r tricted to the con ideration
of th que tion whether th facts a found upport the j ud ment
rend r d. (! enks Adm r v. Stapp
U.
pp. 34, 3 . C. ~ .
?44, and 52 F d. 641). We mu t ther for con id r the ca e upon
the assumption that, at the tim f th xecution of th note, the
Hud on Furniture Company wa in olv nt, t th know! dae of
the individual partie to the not wh ' r it dir t r . * * *
It i settled doctrin that the f d ral court , in the e -erci e of
their co-ordinat juri diction, ar n t bound by th d ci ion of
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the state courts upon subjects of general law, but are at liberty to

follow the convictions of their own judgment. (Swift v. Tyson,

16 Pet. i ; Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14; Burgess

v. Scligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. 10; Myrick v. Railroad Co.,

107 U. S. 102, 1 Sup. Ct. 425 ; Railway Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S.

106, 13 Sup. Ct. 261). Therefore, notwithstanding it has been

held by the supreme court of the state in which this note was

executed that parties standing in like relation to bills and notes

with the plaintiffs in error here are to be treated as indorsers

(Blakcslcc v. Hewitt, 76 Wis. 341, 44 N. W. 1105), the supreme

court of the United States, in Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, and

Bendey v. Townsend, 109 U. S. 665, 667, 3 Sup. Ct. 482, has

determined that they must be treated as joint makers of the note

with the party who appears thereon as maker. And such is also

the law of Massachusetts. (Bank v. Willis, 8 Mete. [Mass.] 504;

Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass. 179; Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass.

509; Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. yy). We are therefore con-

strained to hold that the plaintiffs in error were joint makers with

the Hudson Furniture Company of this note, and, if the contract

is to be controlled by the law of the state of Wisconsin, were not
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entitled to notice of protest. Being joint makers of the note, their

liability is controlled by the law of the place where the contract

is payable, because they are deemed to have reference to the law

of such place in the construction of the obligation assumed.

(Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. 263, 2jy; Supervisors v. Galbraith,

99 U. S. 214, 218; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546, 1 Sup. Ct.

418; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. [4th Ed.], §895). It would be other-

wise with respect to the indorser of a note, for he is treated as in

fact entering into a new obligation, undertaking that the maker

will pay at the time and place stipulated, and that he (the indor-

ser) will respond to his obligation at the place of the execution

of his indorsement, if there delivered, in the event of dishonor

and notice. If delivered at a place other than at the place of exe-

cution, the law of the place where delivered controls. (Daniel,

Neg. Inst., §§ 868, 899 ; Slacum v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221 ;

Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262). The plaintiffs in error thus being

joint makers of a note payable and delivered in the state of Mas-

sachusetts, their obligation is to be judged by the law of that

state.

We are therefore brought to the inquiry whether the statute

of that state to which reference has been made is operative to

clothe the joint makers with the rights to notice of protest that

an indorser is entitled to. This statute manifestly regards all

th tate court upon subjects of general law, but are at liberty to
follow the convictions of their own judgment. (Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. l; Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14; Burgess
v. Seliaman, 107 U . S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. IO; Myrick v. Railroad Co.,
107 U. S. 102, I Sup. Ct. 425; Railway Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S.
10 , 13 up. t. 261). Therefore, notwith tanding it has been
h Id by th upreme court of the state in which this note was
ex cuted that parties standing in like relation to bills and notes
with the plaintiffs in error here are to be treated as indorsers
(Blakeslee v. Hewitt, 76 Wis. 341, 44 N. W. uo5), the supreme
court of the nited State , in Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90, and
Bendey v. Townsend, 109 U. S. 665, 667, 3 Sup. Ct. 482, has
determined that they mu t be treated as joint makers of the note
with the party who appears thereon as maker. And such is also
the law of Iassachusetts. (Bank v. Willis, 8 Mete. [Mass.] 504;
Brown v. Butler, 99 Mass. 179; Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass.
509; Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77). We are therefore contrained to hold that the plaintiffs in error were joint makers with
the Hudson Furniture Company of this note, and, if the contract
i to be controlled by the law of the state of Wisconsin, were not
entitled to notice of protest. Being joint makers of the note, their
liability is controlled by the law of the place where the contract
i payable, because they are deemed to have reference to the law
of uch place in the construction of the obligation assumed.
(Brabston v. Gibson, 9 How. 263, 277; Supervisors v. Galbraith,
99 U. S. 214 218; Pierce v. Indseth, 106 U. S. 546, l Sup. Ct.
418; l Daniel, Neg. Inst. [4th Ed.],§ 895). It would be otherwi e with re pect to the indorser of a note for he is treated as in
fact entering into a new obligation, undertaking that the maker
will pay at the time and place stipulated, and that he (the indorer) will re pond to his obligation at the place of the execution
of his indorsement, if there delivered, in the event of dishonor
and notice. If delivered at a place other than at the place of execution, the law of the place where delivered controls. (Daniel,
- eg. In t., §§ 868, 899; Slacu,111, v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221;
Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262). The plaintiffs in error thus being
joint maker of a note payable and delivered in the state of Masachu etts, their obligation is to be judged by the law of that
state.
We are therefore brought to the inquiry whether the statute
of that state to which reference has been made i operative to
clothe the joint makers with the ri<Yhts to notice of protest that
an indorser i entitled to. Thi tatutc manifestly regard all
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parties to a note by signature on the back thereof, whether they

were to be treated as guarantors or as joint makers, in the light

of sureties for the maker, and recognizes the equitable right of

such parties to notice and dishonor of the note by their principal.

It sought to place them, with respect to presentment, demand, and

notice of dishonor, upon the same footing with an indorser. The

statute was thus construed by the supreme judicial court of that

commonwealth in Bank v. Lcnv, 127 Mass. 72, prior to the execu-

tion of the contract in question. We are, of course, bound by that

construction. {Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi,

133 U. S. 587, 10 Sup. Ct. 348; Baltimore Traction Co. v. Balti-

more Belt R. Co., 151 U. S. 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 294). So that,

assuming the validity of that statute, any one becoming a party to

a note payable on time by signature on the back thereof, whether

he be treated as guarantor or joint maker, is in fact a mere surety

for the maker; his liability is conditional and secondary; and

before he can be charged, he must have the same notice of protest

that an indorser by the law merchant would be entitled to under

like circumstances. He stands in this respect in the shoes of an

indorser. The statute entered into and is a term of the contract.
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The engagement of the plaintiffs in error, therefore, was that if,

upon due demand, the note should not be paid according to its

tenor, they would compensate the holder or a subsequent indorser

who was compelled to pay, provided the requisite proceedings on

dishonor were duly taken.

It is urged, however, that we must disregard this statute:

and, in support of this contention, the broad doctrine is asserted

that the several states of this Union have no right by statute to

change the general commercial law. This contention is rested

upon certain observations of justices delivering the opinions of

the court in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18, and Watson v. Tarpley,

18 How. 517, 521. *****

It may not be denied that the language employed gives color

of authority to the pretension. *****

The observations referred to in both the cases were certainly

obiter so far as they seem to imply or can be properly construed

as holding that a state is without power with respect to contracts

made within its jurisdiction, and controlled by its law. In view of

the eminent learing of the distinguished jurists referred to, their

observations are to be treated with great deference ; but, if sus-

ceptible of the meaning contended for, they cannot be held to

declare the settled law of the land without determination of the

question by the supreme court in a cause wherein the question

was involved and necessary to be decided.

parties to a note by ignatur on the back thereof, whether they
were to be treated as guarantors or as joint makers, in the light
of sureties for the maker, and recogniz s the equitable right of
such parties to notice and di honor of the note by their principal.
It sought to place th m, with respect to pr sentment, demand, and
notice of di honor, upon the ame footing with an indor er. The
statute was thus construed by the supreme judicial court of that
commonwealth in Ba.n k v. Law, 127 Ma s. 72, prior to the execution of the contract in qu stion. W are, of course, bound by that
construction. (Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry. Co . v. Mississippi,
133 U. S. 587, IO Sup. Ct. 348; Baltimore Traction Co. v. Baltimore Belt R. Co., 151 U. S. 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 294). So that,
assuming the validity of that statute, any one becoming a party to
a note payable on time by signature on the back thereof, whether
he be treated as guarantor or joint maker, is in fact a mere surety
for the maker; his liability is conditional and secondary; and
before he can be charged, he must have the same notice of protest
that an indorser by the law merchant would be entitled to under
like circumstances. He stands in this respect in the shoes of an
indorser. The statute entered into and is a term of the contract.
The engagement of the plaintiffs in error, therefore, was that if,
upon due demand, the note should not be paid according to its
tenor, they would compensate the holder or a subsequent indorser
who was compelled to pay, provided the requisite proceedings on
dishonor were duly taken.
It is urged, however, that we must disregard this statute;
and, in support of this contention, the broad doctrine is asserted
that the several states of this Union have no right by statute to
change the general commercial law. This contention is rested
upon certain observations of justices delivering the opinions of
the court in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. l, 18, and Watson v. Tarpley,
18 How. 517, 52I. * * * * *
It may not be denied that the language employed gives color
of authority to the pretension. * * * * *
The ob ervations r f rred to in both the ca e were certainly
obiter so far as they seem to imply or can be properly construed
as holding that a state i without pow r with respect to contract
made within its jurisdiction, and controlled by it law. In view of
the emin nt !earing of the distingui hed h~ri t referred to, their
observations are to be tr ated with great deference· but, if susceptible of the meaning contend d for they cannot be held to
declare the settled law of the land without d termination of the
question by the supreme court in a cau e wherein the question
was involved and necessary to be decided.
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There are a number of decisions of the supreme court which

distinctly recognize the right of such legislation by the state.

*****

There arc a number of deci ion of the upreme court which
li tinctly r c o-nize the right of such legislation by the state .

The contention that this statute of Massachusetts is invalid

and inoperative goes to the extent of depriving a state of power

to legislate with respect to the law merchant. It presents a bold

and far-reaching proposition, striking at the root of power in the

iv>]KCtive states to which we are not prepared to yield assent.

We are referred to no provision of the constitution which

expressly or impliedly inhibits the exercise of such power by the

state. The contention assumes that there is a commercial law of

the United States distinct from and independent of the law of the

states. Whence came it, and how was it adopted? Was it the

common law of England or the civil law of continental Europe?

Was it a law appropriated by the nation upon the adoption of the

constitution ? It must then be universal in its application through-

out the nation, overriding all state laws upon the subject and all

right of the states to legislate. We know that most of the states

are governed by the common law of England as modified and

adapted to the peculiar circumstances and conditions of each, and
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that one state, at least, is governed by the civil law. And we

know, moreover, that the commercial law existing in these various

states, while alike with regard to underlying principles, is widely

different in many essential respects. There is no common law of

the United States, except possibly as the common law of England

has been adopted with reference to the construction of powers

granted to the federal Union. *****

Mr. Daniel, in his valuable treatise upon the law of Nego-

tiable Instruments (sections 863 and 864), defines the principle

which should rule the question in the following explicit language:

"Each one of the United States is, in contemplation of its

own and of the federal constitution, a distinct and independent

sovereignty, with its own peculiar code of laws and systems of

judicature. And while, in the aggregate, they compose one inte-

gral confederacy, which is itself an independent nation, paramount

in certain respects to the states, in all other respects the states

retain their separate autonomies, and are deemed as much foreign

to each other as if not in any wise associated together. The reg-

ulation of contracts comes peculiarly within the province of

the states, and therefore contracts between citizens of the differ-

ent states, while they may be enforced by process in the federal

courts, nevertheless are to be construed and effectuated, not by

a general system of laws which overspread the whole country,

.f'

* * * *

The contention that this tatute of fa sachu etts is invalid
a'ncl inoperative goe to th extent of depriving a state of power
t legi lat with re pect to the law merchant. It presents a bold
and far-r achino- propo ition, triking at the root of power in th
re pcctive tate to which we are not prepared to yield assent.
\ Yc are r f rred to no provision of the constitution which
. ·pr ly or impliedly inhibit the exercise of such power by the
tat . Th cont ntion assumes that there is a commercial law of
the nited tates di tinct from and independent of the law of the
tate . \Vhence came it, and how was it adopted? Was it the
common law of England or the civil law of continental Europ ?
\i a it a law appropriated by the nation upon the adoption of the
con titution? It must then be univ ersal in its application throughout the nation, overriding all state laws upon the subject and all
right of the states to legislate. W e know that most of the state
are governed by the common law of England as modified and
adapted to the peculiar circumstances and conditions of each, and
that one tate, at least, is governed by th e civil law. And we
know, moreover, that the commercial law existing in these variou
tat , while alike with regard to underlying principles, is widely
different in many essential respects. There is no common law of
the nited State , except po ibly as the common law of England
has b en adopted with reference to the construction of powers
granted to the federal Un ion. * * * * *
1\J r. Dani 1, in his valuable treatise upon the law of N egotiable Instrument (section 863 and 864 ) , defin e the principle
which should rule the question in the following explicit language:
"Each one of the United States i , in contemplation of it
own and of the federal con titution , a distinct and independent
overeio-nty, with it own peculiar code of laws and systems of
judicature. And wh ile, in the aggregate, they compo e one integral c nf deracy, which is itself an independent nation, paramount
in certain respects to the states, in all other respects the states
r tain their eparate autonomi , and are deemed as much foreign
to each o1her a if not in any wise associated together. The regulation of contracts comes peculiarly within the province of
the tates, and th refore contracts between citizens of the differnt states, while they may b enforced by process in the federal
court , n verth les are to be con tru ed and effectuated, not by
a er ncral sy tern of law which over pread the whole country,
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but in accordance with the principles of international law which

govern transactions between parties of different nations.

"Sec. 864. As long as all the parties to a bill or note are con-

fined within the limits of a single state, the local law alone deter-

mines their rights and liabilities. No suit can be brought in a

federal court, and any question which may be litigated begins and

ends with the local tribunals. But the vast and constant traffic

between the states, and the general use of bills and notes as a

medium of exchange, gives circulation to those instruments from

hand to hand, and from state to state ; and questions of nicety are

often presented in the inquiry by what law the rights and liabili-

ties of the parties are to be ascertained. In some of the states,

as in Maryland, the English statute of 3 & 4 Anne is in force. In

others, as in Virginia, where none but notes payable at bank are

negotiable, there are peculiar statutory provisions respecting com-

mercial paper. In all of the states each recognizes the precedents

of its own courts, as independently of the rulings of the supreme

court of the United States as of those of Great Britain, which

may, indeed, shed great light on all commercial questions, but are

of no binding authority. When suit is brought in one of the
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federal courts, it, on the other hand, will be guided by the general

law merchant in questions referable to it, and will follow its own

views about it, unless the nature of the liability contracted has

already been determined, in the particular state of the contract,

at the time it was entered into."

We are of opinion that these principles are not shaken by the

obiter dicta to which reference has been made. It will thus be

seen that, in the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the

federal court with respect to all contracts not within the exclusive

control of the federal government, we administer the law of the

state which controls the contract, and that each state has the

right to impose such conditions and limitations upon contracts,

not inhibited by the terms of its own or the federal constitution,

as it may see proper. It is, of course, most desirable that there

should be uniformity of laws with respect to commercial paper —

a necessity becoming more and more emphasized day by day, and

which may possibly result in the grant of exclusive control of the

subject to the federal government. It is not, however, within our

provinces to bring about such a result, however desirable. We

are constrained to hold that the act of Massachusetts here in

question was a valid exercise of power, and became a term of this

contract. The nature of the liability at the time of the making of

fHcTon"tract _ was declared by the statute law of the state of the

but in accordance with the principles of international law which
govern tran actions between parties of different nation .
"Sec. 864. As long as all the parties to a bill or note ar confined within the limits of a ingle state, the local law alone determines their rights and liabiliti .
o suit can be brought in a
federal court, and any qu tion which may be litigated begins and
end with the local tribunal . But the va t and constant traffic
between the tates, and the general use of bill and notes as a
medium of exchange, giv circulation to those in truments from
hand to hand, and from tate to state; and questions of nicety are
often pre nted in the inquiry by what law the rights and liabilities of th parties are to be ascertained. In som of the states,
as in faryland, the Engli h statute of 3 & 4 Anne is in force. In
others, as in irginia, where none but notes payable at bank are
negotiable, there are peculiar statutory provisions respecting commercial paper. In all of the states each recognizes the precedents
of its own courts, as independently of the rulings of the supreme
court of the United States as of those of Great Britain, which
may, indeed, shed great light on all commercial questions, but are
of no binding authority. When suit is brought in one of the
federal courts, it, on the other hand, will be guided by the general
law merchant in que tions referable to it, and will follow its own
views about it, unless the nature of the liability contracted ha
already been determined, in the particular state of the contract,
at the time it was entered into."
We are of opinion that these principles are not shaken by the
obiter dicta to w'hich reference has been made. It will thus be
seen that, in the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction of the
federal court with respect to all contracts not within the exclusiv
control of the federal government we administer the law of th
state which controls the contract, and that each state has the
right to impose such conditions and limitations upon contracts
not inhibited by the term of it own or the federal constitution,
a it ma ee proper. It i , of cour e, mo t de irable tliat there
hould be uniformity of laws with respect to commercial paper a neces ity becoming mor and more empha ized day by day, and
which may po ibly result in the o-rant of xclusive control of the
ubject to the federal government. It i not, howev r within our
provinces to bring about uch a result, however de irable. We
are con trained to hold that the act of 1a achu ett here in
question was a valid exerC! e o power and became a ter~of thi
contract. The nature of the liability at the time of the makinO" of
t t: contract wa declared by the tatute awof th
tate of the
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contract, and \vc must construe the contract in the light of such

statute law.

We are thus brought to the question whether the known

insolvency of the maker at the time of the execution of the note,

and the fact that the plaintiffs in error were directors, constitut-

ing a majority of the board of directors, of the maker of the note,

obviate the necessity of presentment of the note for payment,

and the giving of seasonable notice of dishonor. The contract

of the parties was conditional. It was, as we have seen, that if,

upon due demand, the note should not be paid by the corporation

according to its ~tenor, they wo ukTcompensate the holder, or a

subsequent indorser who is compelled to pay, provided the requis-

ite proceedings for dishonor were duly taken. That there should

be demand of payment and notice of dishonor were terms incor-

porated into this contract. {Rothschild v. Carrie, I Adol. & E.

[X. S.] 43). The reason of the condition imposed by the law,

doubtless, was that the indorser might take prompt measures for

his security, and the law presumed injury from want of notice

of dishonor. This presumption is certainly not refuted by proof

of the solvency of the maker evidencing that no injury resulted
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from want of notice to the indorser. It is said, however, that

insolvency known to the indorser dispenses with the necessity of

notice, because nothing could be lost by default of demand and

notice. We are not prepared to concur in the conclusion of fact.

We have said that the solvency of the maker, when no possible

loss could result to the indorser from want of notice, will not excuse

failure to advise of dishonor. Certainly, in the case of insol-

vency notice is more essential, that the party to be charged may

take prompt measures for his security. The insolvency of the

maker might possibly affect the sufficiency of indemnity, but it

would not necessarily result in a total failure of redress. That

would be dependent upon the extent of the insolvency. There

have been cases, invested with peculiar equities, in which courts

have sought to evade this wholesome rule of the common law, and

in which they have permitted evidence of no injury to excuse

notice. We are not prepared to follow a rule that will tend to

confusion in commercial law in order to relieve a supposed hard-

ship. We concur with the supreme court of Massachusetts in

Farnam v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 89, 92, that "the hardship, if any,

arises from a fluctuation of opinion and an uncertainty as to rules,

and seldom from an inflexible adherence to them, because, when

it is once known that exactness in the performance of duty is to

be required, parties will adapt themselves to such a state of things.

contract and we must construe the contract in the light_of such
statute law.
\Ve are thus brought to the question whether the known
insolvency of the maker at the time of the execution of the note,
and the fact that the plaintiffs in error were directors, con tituting a majo rity of the board of directors, of the maker of the note,
obviate the necessity of presentment of the note for payment,
and the giving of seasonable notice of dishonor. The contract
of the partie was conditional. It was, a we have seen, that if,
upon due demand, the note should not be paid by the corporation
according to its tenor, they would compensate the holder, or a
ubsequent indorser who is-compelled to pay~ provided the requisite proceedings for dishonor were duly taken. That there should
be demand of payment and notice of dishonor \Vere terms mcorE.
porated into this contract. (Rothschild v. Currie, -r - Cfol.
[N. S-.] 43). The reason of the condition imposed by the law,
doubtless, was that the indorser might take prompt measures for
his security, and the law presumed injury from want of notice
of di~honor. This presumption is certainly not refuted by proof
of the solvency of the maker evidencing that no injury resulted
from want of notice to the indorser. It is said, however, that
insolvency known to the indorser dispenses with the necessity of
notice, because nothing could be lost by default of demand and
notice. We are not prepared to concur in the conclusion of fact.
\Ve have said that the solvency of the maker, when no possible
loss could result to the indorser from want of notice, will not excuse
failure to advise of dishonor. Certainly, in the case of insolvency notice is more essential, that the party to be charged may
take prompt measures for his security. The insolvency of the
maker might possibly affect the sufficiency of indemnity, but it
would not necessarily result in a total failure of redress. That
would be dependent upon the extent of the insolvency. There
have been ca es, invested with peculiar equities, in which court
have sought to evade this wholesome rule of the common law, and
in which they have permitted evidence of no injury to excuse
notice. We are not prepared to follow a rule that will tend to
confusion in commercial law in order to relieve a supposed hardship. We concur with the supreme court of Massachusetts in
Farn(l!J11, v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 89, 92, that "the hardship, if any,
arises from a fluctuation of opinion and an uncertainty as to rules,
and eldom from an inflexible adherence to them, because, when
it i once known that exactness in the performance of duty is to
be required, parties will adapt themselves to such a state of things,
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and be always diligent and punctual to avail themselves of their

contracts." And we concur with Mr. Daniel (Daniel, Neg. Inst.,

§ 1 134) that it is "a total misconception of the obligation of an

indorser to place his liability at all upon any question involving

the pecuniary circumstances of his principal." Hardship is more

likely to happen from speculation of courts and juries in the

determination of the question of fact whether injury has or not

resulted from want of notice than from strict adherence to the

law and to the terms of the contract. The better opinion is, and,

as we think, the settled doctrine of this country is, that insolvency

is no excuse for failure of notice of dishonor. (French's Ex 'x v.

Bank, 4 Cranch, 141 ; Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380; San ford v.

Dillaway, 10 Mass. 52; Farnam v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 89; Bank v.

Ayers, 16 Pick. 392; Bank v. Spencer, 6 Mete. [Mass.] 308).

Nor do we think that the fact that the plaintiffs in error were

directors and constituted a majority of the board of directors of

the maker of the note is matter of moment or excuses failure of

notice. * * * * *

It seems a curious conclusion that, because the note is

indorsed by a majority of the board of directors, therefore the
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individual liability of each is fixed, and want of notice of dis-

honor excused, upon the ground that they should act together as

a majority, and so could appropriate funds of the corporation to

the payment of the note. The argument assumes that they must

act together as a majority of the board of directors; that there

are funds of the corporation which should have been applied to

the payment of the note, and were not applied, because of the

non-action by the indorsers. The argument concedes that, if the

note were indorsed by a minority of the directors, failure to give

notice would not be excused. But by what right does the court

assume that the majority of the directors indorsing the note will

or should act together as a majority in the board upon any ques-

tion affecting the interests of the company? The argument pro-

ceeds upon the theory that they should act in their own interest

to protect their liability, and possibly in opposition to the interests

of creditors. We think the case is founded upon a mistaken

notion of the duties and obligations of directors. They are only

to administer the property of the corporation as they find it. They

are not obliged to furnish funds for the use of their principal, nor

ought they, as directors, to protect their individual interests

against the interests of their principal. Tt is, moreover, to be

observed that, in the case we have now in hand, the body of the

stockholders, some two months prior to the maturity of this note,

and be always diligent and punctual to avail themselves of their
contracts." And we concur with Mr. aniel (Daniel, Neg. Inst.,
§ 1134) that it is "a total mi conception of the obligation of an
indor er to place his liability at all upon any question involving
the pecuniary circumstanc s of his principal."
ardship is more
likely to happen from speculation of courts and juries in the
determination of the question of fact whether injury ha or not
resulted from want of notice than from strict adherence to the
law and to the terms of th contract. The better opinion i , and,
as we think, the s ttled doctrine of this country i , that insolvency
i no excuse for failure of notice of dishonor. (French, s E:>/ z v.
Bank, 4 Cranch, 141; Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380; Sanford v.
Dillaway, IO Mas . 52; Farnam v. Fowle, 12 Mass. 89; Bank v.
Ayers, 16 Pick. 392; Bank v. Spencer, 6 Mete. [Mass.] 308).
Nor do we think that the fact that the plaintiffs in error were
directors and constituted a majority of the ,board of directors of
the maker of the note is matter of moment or excuses failure of
notice. * * * * *
It eems a curious conclusion that, because the note is
indorsed by a majority of the board of directors, therefore the
individual liability of each is fixed, and want of notice of dishonor excused, upon the ground that they should act together as
a majority, and so could appropriate funds of the corporation to
the payment of the note. The argument as umes that they must
act together as a majority of the board of directors; that there
are funds of the corporation which should have been applied to
the payment of the note, and were not applied, because of the
non-action by the indorsers. The argument concedes that, if the
note were indorsed by a minority of the director , failure to o-ive
notice would not be excused. But by what right does the court
assume that the majority of the directors indorsing the note will
or should act together as a majority in the board upon any question affecting the intere ts of the company? Th arcrument proceeds upon the th or) that they should act in their O\ n intere t
to protect their liability, and possibly in opposition to the interest
of er ditors. We think the case i founded upon a mistaken
notion of the duties and obligation of directors. They are only
to administer the property of the corporation as th y find it. They
are not oblio-ed to furni h funds for the u e of their principal, nor
ought they, as director , to protect their individual intere ts
again ·t the interest of their principal. It is, mor ov r to be
observ d that, in the case we have now in hand, the body of the
tockholders, some two months prior to the maturit_ of this note,
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directed the officers of the company to wind up the affairs of the

company at the earliest date particable, to collect all its assets,

sell all its property, and apply the proceeds to the payment of the

del its of the company. The corporation then ceased to be a going

concern. :;: * * *

It would have been a violation of duty for the plaintiffs in

rnor, as directors of the company, after this resolution of the

stockholders to have sought to apply the assets of the corporation

to the payment of this particular debt for which they were con-

ditionally liable, and thus to relieve themselves of liability, to the

detriment of the general creditors of the company. Their duty

was to refrain from applying the assets of the corporation to the

payment of this note if the assets of the corporation were insuffi-

cient to pay all debts in full. Their power by the resolution

became limited, and their duty was to marshall all the assets of

the corporation, and apportion them ratably among all the cred-

itors of the corporation according to their equality of right. They

could not legally have done that which the supreme court of

Georgia, in the case referred to, holds that they should have done,

and failure so to do wrought legal excuse for failure of duty on
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the part of the holder of the note. In this respect this case is

distinguishable from the case of Hull v. Myers.

The court below held that the plaintiffs in error were joint

makers of the note, and therefore not entitled to notice of pro-

test. We have seen that, by the law of Massachusetts which

governs this contract, they were entitled to notice, notwithstand-

ing that relation to the paper. We hold that failure of notice is

not excused by anything apparent on the record, and that the

plaintiffs in error are discharged from liability upon the paper

by reason of failure of proper demand and of seasonable notice

of dishonor.

The judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded,

with directions to the court bcloiv to render judgment

for the plaintiffs in error upon the findings.

The Junction Railroad Company v. The Bank of Ashland (1870),

12 Wall. {? 9 U. S.) 226.

Error to the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana.

This was an action of debt brought by the Bank of Ashland,

a corporation of Kentucky, against the Junction Railroad Com-

pany, a corporation of Indiana, to recover the amount of nine

direct d the officer of th company to wind up the affairs of the
company at the earlie t date particable, to collect all it a et ,
ell all its property and apply the proceed to th payment of th
debt ~ of the company. The corporation then ceased to be a going
concern . * * : : * : · *
It would haye been a violation of duty for the plaintiffs in
error, a dir 'Ctors of the company, after thi re olution of the
tockholders to have ought to apply th a et of the corporation
to th paym nt of this partirular debt for which they were conditionally liable, and thu to reli eve them elves of liability, to the
detriment of the general creditor of the company. Their duty
wa to refrain from applyino- the a ets of the corporation to the
payment of th i note if the assets of the corporation were insufficient to pay all d bts in full. Their power by th e resolution
became limited, and their duty was to mar hall all the a et of
the corporati on, and apportion them ratably among all the creditors of the corporation according to their equality of right. They
could not legally have done that which the supreme court of
Georgia, in the case referred to, holds that they hould have done,
and failure so to do wrought legal excuse for failure of duty on
th part of the holder of the note. In this respect this case i
di tinguishable from the ca e of Hull v. M3 ers.
The court below held that the plaintiff in error were joint
maker of the note, and therefore not entitled to notice of protest. \Ve have een that, by the law of Massachusetts which
aoverns this contract, they were entitled to notice notwith tanding that relation to the paper. v·v e hold that failure of notice i
not excused by anything apparent on the record, and that the
plaintiff in error are discharged from liability upo~ the paper
by rea on of failure of proper demand and of sea onable notice
of di honor.
The judgmen t will be reversed, and the cwdse remanded,
i ith directions to the court below to render judg11ient
for tile plaintiffs i'n error 11,pon the findings.
1
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bonds of the latter company for one thousand dollars each, with

interest coupons attached. The bonds bore date the ist day of

July. 1853, and were payable to Caleb Jones, or bearer, at the

office of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, in the city

of New York, on the ist day of July, 1863, with interest at the

rate of ten per cent per annum, payable half-yearly. The declara-

tion contained twenty special counts on the bonds and coupons,

and one common count for money lent, paid, had and received,

and account stated. To the last count there was a plea of ml

debet, and to the twenty special counts the defendant filed four

special pleas, the substance of which was that the bonds were

obtained by the plaintiff from the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust

Company, and that they were originally negotiated by the

defendant to that company in Cincinnati at par, under the pre-

tence of a sale of the bonds, but, in truth, by way of a loan of

money from the Ohio Trust Company to the defendant, upon^ ^.

interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum — a rate which, as

stated in the first special plea, the Ohio Company, by its charter,

was prohibited from taking, and which, as stated in the second

of said pleas, the defendant, by the law which authorized it to do
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business in Ohio, was prohibited from paying; and which, as

stated in the third plea, was forbidden by the usury laws of New

York, where the bonds were made payable. The pleas alleged

that the plaintiff took the bonds with notice of the usurious con-

sideration. These pleas being demurred to and overruled, the

defendant filed a fourth special plea to the same counts, setting

forth substantially the same facts as in the first plea, with a more

specific averment of a corrupt and usurious agreement. To this

plea the plaintiff replied that the bonds were purchased from the

defendant by the Ohio Life and Trust Company in good faith,

and that the plaintiff received them in good faith, with the assur-

ance and belief that they had been so purchased and had not been

received as security for a loan.

A jury being waived, the cause was tried by the court, which

made a special finding of the facts ; the substance of which was,

that the bonds declared on were, as alleged in the pleas, originally

negotiated by the defendant below to the Ohio Life Insurance

and Trust Company, at its office in Cincinnati, Ohio, at par, being

parcel of one hundred and twenty-five bonds negotiated together :

that the defendant proposed to sell the bonds to the Trust Com-

panv, but the latter refused to take them unless some persons

other than the defendant would guaranty their payment, which

was done ; whereupon the negotiation was consummated ; that

bonds of th latt r company for on thou ancl. dollar each, with
intere t coupons attach cl. The bond bore date th r t day of
July, r 53, and wer payabl to aleb Jone , or bear r, at the
office of the hio Life Insurance and Tru t Company, in the city
of New ork, on the 1st day of July, 1863, with int r t at th
rate of ten per cent p r annum, payable half-yearly. The d claration contain d twenty pecial count on the bond and coup n ,
and on common count for money lent, paid, had and received,
and ace unt tated. T th la t count there wa a pl a of nil
debct, and to the tv enty pecial counts the defendant filed four
p cial pl a the sub tance of which was that th e bonds were
btained by the plaintiff from the hio Life In urance and Trust
ompany, and that th y were originally negotiated by th e
defendant to that company in Cincinnati at par, under the pretence of a sale of the bonds, but, in truth, by way of a loan of
money from the hio Trust Company to the def ndant, upon
interest at the rate of t n per cent per annum-a rate which, a
tated in the first special plea, the Ohio Company, by its charter,
wa prohibited from taking, and which, as stated in the econd
of said pleas, the defendant, by the law which authorized it to do
busine
in Ohio, was prohibited from paying; and which, a
tated in the third plea, was forbidden by the usury laws of New
York, where the bonds were made payable. The pleas allea-ecl
that the plaintiff took the bonds with notice of the u uriou consideration. These pleas being demurred to and overruled, the
d fendant filed a fourth special plea to the same counts, setting
forth sub tantially the ame facts as in the first plea, with a more
pecific averm nt of a corrupt and u urious a reement. To thi
plea the plaintiff replied that the bond were purcha ed from the
defendant by the hio Life and Tru t Company in good faith
and that the plaintiff received them in good faith, with the a surance and belief that they had been o purchased and had not been
received as ecurity for a loan.
jury being waived, the cau wa tried by the court which
made a pecial finding of the fact · the ub tance of which wa ,
that th bonds declared on were, a allea-ed in the plea orio-inally
negotiated by the d f ndant below to the Ohio Life In uranc
and Tru t ompany, at it office in incinnati,
parcel of on hundred and t\ nty-fi e bond nea-otiat d to eth r :
that th def ndant propo ed to ell the bond to th Tru t ompany, but th latter refu ed to tak th m uni
ome per on
other than th defendant would a-uaranty their paym nt, which
was done· whereupon the nea-otiation ' a con ummat d; that
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said negotiation did not amount to a loan of money, but to a sale

of the bonds, and that the transaction involved nothing usurious ;

that in 1857 the Trust Company transferred the bonds to the

plaintiff below in payment of a debt ; and that the plaintiff took

them in good faith, without any notice of the fact of usury or of

illegality in the issuing of the bonds, but had notice of the guar-

anty Upon these facts the court below gave the plaintiff judg-

ment for the full amount of the bonds and interest ; and the

defendant brought the case here.

To enable the reader the better to judge at this point of the

case, whether the judgment below was rightly or not rightly

given, it should be mentioned, that in New York by a statute

enacted April 6th, 1850, a defense of usury cannot be set up

by corporations; that by a supplement to its character, dated

January 29th, 185 1, the Junction Railroad Company was empow-

ered to borrow money or sell its securities at any rate of interest ;

and that by statute of Ohio, passed December 15th, 1852, any

railroad company authorized to borrow money and issue bonds

for it, may sell its bonds when, where, and at such rate and price

as the directors deem most advantageous to the road ; and finally,
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that by a second statute of the same state, the Junction Railroad

Company was made a corporation of Ohio, and authorized to

perform any act as if originally incorporated therein.

Messrs. C. P. James, Rufus King, and S. J. Thompson, for

the plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. A. G. Porter and W. H. Wadsworth, contra.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.

Unless this case has become embarrassed by the pleadings,

the facts as found by the court present a clear case in favor of

the plaintiff. If they could have been given in evidence under

the common count, we should have felt no hesitation in sustaining

aid n gotiation <lid not amount to a loan of money, but to a sale
f th~ bond , and that the tran action involved nothing u urious;
that in I 57 the 1 ru t om1 any tran ferr d the bonds to the
plaintiff b low in payment of a debt; and that the plaintiff took
th 111 in g od faith, without any notice of th fact of u ury or of
1llcgality in the i uing of the bonds, but had notice of the guarfacts the court below gave the plaintiff j udganty. Upon th
ment for the full amount of the bond and int rest; and the
defendant brought the case here.
To enal 1 the reader the better to judge at thi point of the
ca e, wheth r the judgment below was rightly or not rightly
giv n, it boulcl be mentioned, that in ew York by a statute
enact cl pril 6th, 1850, a defense of usury cannot be set up
by c rporation ; that by a supplement to its character, dated
January 29th, r 51, the Junction Railroad Company was empowered t borrow money or ell its secu rities at any rate of interest ;
and that by statute of Ohio, passed December I 5th, 1852, any
railroad com pany authorized to borrow money and issue bonds
for it, may ell its bonds when, where, and at such rate and price
a the directors deem mo t advantageous to the road; and finally,
t hat by a second statute of the same stat , th e Junction Railroad
Company was made a corporati on of O hio, and authorized to
perform any act as if originally incorporated therein .

the judgment on that count alone, disregarding the special counts

and the pleadings thereto. But it has been held that an agreement

under seal for the payment of money cannot be received to sup-

port the common money counts. It will be necessary, therefore,

to examine the case with reference to the defences set up in the

.Messrs. C. P. I ames, Rufus King, and S. J. Tlzo111pso11, for
the plaintiff in error.
J1lessrs. A. G. Porter and W . H. Wadsworth, contra.

special pleas. In all of them usury and want of authority in the

original parties to make the negotiation are the points of defence

relied on.

With regard to the question what law is to decide whether

a contract is. or is not, usurious, the general rule is the law of the

place where the money is made payable ; although it is also held

fr. Ju tice BR.\DLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
nles thi case has become embarrassed by the pleadings,
the fact a found by the court present a clear case in favor of
the plaintiff. If they could have been g iven in evidence under
th common count, we shou ld have felt no hesitation in sustaining
the judg ment on that count alone, di r garding th e special counts
and the pl ading thereto.
ut it has been held that an agreement
under eal for the payment of mon y cannot b rec i'1ed to support the common money counts. It will be necessary, therefore,
to examin th ca e with r ference to th defences et up in the
sp cial plea . In all of them u sury and want of authority in the
riginal partie to make the negotiation are the points of defence
relied on .
\Vith regard to the qu tion what law is to decide whether
a contract is, or i not, u urious, the general rule i the law of the
place \ her th money i made payable; although it is also held
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that the parties may stipulate in accordance with the law of the

place where the contract is made. In this case it is conceded by

all the pleas, and shown by the special finding of the court, that

the place of payment of the bonds in question was the city of New

York. By the law of that state, passed April 6th, 1850 (of which

the Circuit Court had a right to take judicial notice), (Owings v.

Hail, 9 Peters, 625), no corporation is allowed to interpose the

defence of usury. None of the special pleas allege that the place

of payment mentioned in the bonds was adopted as a shift or

device to avoid the statute of usury. The device complained of

was a pretended sale of the bonds, when the transaction was

really a loan. Admitting that it was a loan, it is not denied that

it was made bona fide payable in New York. Hence the pleas

cannot stand as pleas of usury, properly so called. They must

stand, if at all, on the allegation that one or both of the contract-

ing parties was prohibited by law from making such a contract.

It is certain, however, that no such prohibition exists in the

case of the defendant. By the supplement to its charter, passed

by the legislature of Indiana January 29th, 185 1, it was author-

ized to borrow money or sell its securities at any rate of interest
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or price it might deem proper. The courts in Indiana are author-

ized by the constitution of that state to take judicial notice of

all its laws; and, therefore, the Circuit Court could take judicial

notice of this law. By the law of Ohio, passed December 15th,

1852, any railroad company authorized to borrow money, and to

execute bonds or promissory notes therefor, was authorized to

sell such bonds or notes at such times and in such places, either

within or without the State, and at such rates, and for such prices,

as in the opinion of the directors might best advance the interests

of the company. This is tantamount to a repeal of the usury

laws as to such companies. And although this law had primary

reference to the railroad companies of Ohio, yet the Supreme

Court of that State, in a very sensible and judicious opinion, has

decided that it extends by comity to railroad companies of other

States borrowing money in Ohio. Indeed, the second special plea

sets forth a statute of Ohio, in relation to this very defendant,

which makes it a corporation of Ohio, as well as Indiana, and

authorizes it to perform any act within the State of Ohio the same

as if it had been originally incorporated therein. This act, it seems

to us,' rendered the exercise of comity hardly necessary to bring

the defendant within the privileges of the Ohio act of 1852.

It must be conceded, therefore, first, that the transaction in

question, if a loan at all, was not a usurious loan by the law of

that th partie niay tipulate in accordance with the law of the
place where the contract i made. In thi ca e it is conceded by
all the pleas, and hown by th p cial finding of the court, that
the place of paym nt of th bonds in qu tion \Va the city of New
York.
y th law of that tat , pa e<l April 6th. r 50 (of which
the ircuit Court had a rieht to take judicial notic ) Owings v.
Hall, 9
ter , 625) no corporation i allO\vcd to interpose the
defence of u ury. Non of the sp cial pl as allege that the place
of payment m ntion d in the bonds was adopted as a shift or
device to avoid the tatut of usury. The device complained of
was a pr tended al of the bonds, when the tran action was
dmitting that it wa a loan, it i not denied that
r ally a loan.
it was made bona fid e payable in New York. Hence the pleas
cannot tand as pleas of usury, properly so called. They must
stand, if at all, on the allegation that one or both of the contracting parties was prohibited by law from making such a contract.
It is certain, however, that no such prohibition exists in the
case of the defendant. By the supplement to its charter, passed
by the legislature of Indiana January 29th, 185 r, it was authorized to borrow money or sell its securities at any rate of interest
or price it might deem proper. The courts in Indiana are authorized by the constitution of that state to take judicial notice of
all its laws; and, therefore, the Circuit Court could take judicial
notice of this law. By the law of Ohio, pas ed December 15th,
1852, any railroad company authorized to borrow money, and to
execute bonds or promissory notes therefor, was authorized to
sell such bonds or notes at such times and in such places, either
within or without the State, and at such rates, and for such prices,
as in the opinion of the directors might best advance the interest
of the company. This is tantamount to a repeal of the usury
laws as to such companies. And although this law had primar_
reference to the railroad companies of Ohio, yet the Supreme
Court of that tate, in a very sensibl and judiciou opinion ha
decided that it extends by comity to railroad cornpanie of other
State borrowing money in Ohio. Indeed, the second pecial plea
sets forth a statute of Ohio. in relation to thi very defendant.
which makes it a corporation of hio, a well a Indiana, and
authoriz it to perform any act within the State of Ohio the am
as if it had been originally incorporated therein. Thi act it eem
to u , rendered the exerci e of comity hard! ' neces ary to bring
the defendant within th privileges of the Ohio act of 1852.
It must be conceded. therefore, first. that the tran action in
question, if a loan at all, was not a usurious loan b the law of
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the place which governed the contract; and, secondly, that the

defendant had a perfect right to make it. This observation is

applicable to all the special pleas, and disposes entirely of the

second of them, in which the defendant relies on its own disability

to borrow money at a higher rate of interest than seven per cent ;

and also disposes of the third of said pleas, in which the statute

of usury of the State of New York is pleaded. There remains,

then, only the first plea, in which the point is taken that the

Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company was, by its charter, pro-

hibited from taking more than seven per cent interest. This point

is fully presented in the last plea on which issue was taken, and

the defendant can, therefore, receive no harm, though the demur-

rer to its first plea was wrongly sustained. It still had the benefit

of that defence under the last plea ; and the result is presented to

us in the finding of the court. That finding is, that the transac-

tion was not a loan at all, but only a sale of the bonds ; and it is

not pretended that the Ohio Life and Trust Company might not

purchase securities of this sort at any price it might deem expedi-

ent. But the defendant contends that this was a conclusion of

law on the part of the court, and that it was erroneous. Surely
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the question whether a negotiation of bonds was a sale or a loan

is ordinarily, and prima facie, a question of fact. To make it a

question of law, some fact must be admitted or proved, which is

irreconcilable with one conclusion or the other. What fact in

this case is irreconilable with the conclusion that this negotiation

was a sale ? The defendant contends that the fact that the bonds

were its own obligations is such a fact, and alleges that in law a

party cannot sell its own obligations to pay money. But it cer-

tainly may do this, if authorized by law to do it; and it is shown

that this very thing was authorized by the laws of Ohio, to the

benefit of which the defendant was expressly, as well as by

comity, entitled.

Again, the defendant alleges that the exaction of collateral

security for the payment of the bonds was a fact wholly irrecon-

cilable with the sale. We do not think so. Once concede that

the obligor may sell its own bonds, what difference can it make

how fully and strongly they may be secured? The requirement

of guaranties can only amount to evidence of intention at most ;

the weight of which, in connection with all the circumstances of

the case, is to be judged of by the tribunal to which the facts are

submitted. This has been fairly done in the present case, and the

decision is against the defendant.

the place which rr vernecl the contract; and, secondly, that the
d fenclant had a perfect right to make it. This ob rvation is
applicabl t all the special plea , and di poses ntirely 0t the
econd of them, in which the defendant relies on its own di ability
to borrow mon y at a higher rate of interest than sev n per cent ;
and al o di po
of the th ird of said pleas in which the statute
of u ury of the ~ tate of New York is pleaded. There remains,
then, only th fir t pl a, in which the point is tak n that the
hio Life Insurance and Trust Company was, by it charter, prohibited from ta!?i11g more than even p r cent inter est. This point
i fully pre en ted in the last plea on which issue was taken, and
the defendant can, the re£ re, r eceive no harm , though the demurr r to it fir t plea wa wroogly sustained. It still had the benefit
of that clef nc under the last plea; and the r esult i presented to
u in the finding of the court. That find ing is, that the transac·
tion was not a loan at a ll , but only a sale of the bonds; and it is
n t pretended that the O hi o Life and Trust Company might not
purchase ecuritic of this so rt at any price it mig ht de m expedient. But the defendant contends that this was a conclusion of
law on th part of the court, and that it was erroneous. Surely
th question w hether a negotiation of bonds was a sale or a loan
i ordinarily, and prima facie, a question of fact. To make it a
quc tion f law, some fact mu t be admitted or proved, which is
irr concilable with one conclusion or the other. What fact in
this ca e is irreconilable with th e conclusion that this negotiation
was a sale? The defendant contends that the fact that the bonds
w re its own obli gation s is such a fact, and alleges that in law a
party cannot sell it own obligations to pay money. But it cer·
tainly may do thi s, if authoriz ed by law to do it; and it is shown
that thi v ry thing was authorized by the laws of Ohio, to the
benefit of which the defendant was expres ly, as well as by
comity, ntitled.
gain, the defendant alleges that the exaction of collateral
security for the payment of the bond wa a fact wholly irreconilable with the ale. We do not think o. Once concede that
th
bligor may ell its own bonds, what difference can it make
how fully and tr ngly they may be secured? The requirement
of guaran ti s can only amount to evidenc of intention at most;
the weig-ht of which, in connection with all the circumstances of
the case, is to be judged of by the tribunal to which the facts are
ubmitte 1. Thi ha been fairly clone in the present case . and the
d ci ion is against the defendant.
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In this view of the case we do not decide whether the demur-

rer to the first plea was, or was not, well taken. We are disposed

to think that it was; but do not deem it necessary to incumber

the case with the discussion of that question.

Judgment affirmed.

In this view of the case w do not decid whether the demurrer to the first pl a was, or was not, well taken. W are disposed
to think that it was; but do not de m it necessary to incumber
the case with the discussion of that qu stion.
Judgment <Effir~ ~

what law governs contract of drawer or indorser.

Everett et al. v. Vendryes (1859), 19 N. Y. 436.

Appeal from the Supreme Court. Action by the indorsee

against the drawer of a bill of exchange drawn by the defendant

at Carthagena, in New Granada, upon the New Granada Canal

and Steam Navigation Company, a corporation created by and

WHAT LAW GOVERN

having its principal office in this state. It was payable to the

CONTRACT OF DRAWER OR INDOR ER.

order of Manuel Narcisso Jimenes, indorsed by him at Cartha-

gena, and was protested for non-acceptance. The answer denied

Everett et al. v. Vendryes ( 1859) , 19 N. Y. 436.

the indorsement by Jimenes, in general terms. On the opening

of the trial before Mr. Justice Davies, at the New York Circuit,

the defendant asked leave to amend his answer by inserting the

laws of New Granada in respect to the indorsement of bills of

exchange. The motion was denied, and the defendant took an

exception. After the plaintiffs had concluded their proof, the
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defendant offered to prove the laws of New Granada, and that

by such laws the indorsement of Jimenes, which was in the form

usual in this State, was void. The plaintiffs objected, on the

ground that the said laws were not set forth in the answer; the

objection was sustained, and the defendant excepted. The defend-

ant then renewed his motion to amend the answer, tendering the

proposed amendment which averred that by the law of New Gran-

ada the indorsement of any bill of exchange must contain, first,

the name and surname of the person to whom the bill is trans-

ferred; second, if the value or consideration be received in cash,

in merchandise, or if it be in account ; third, the name and sur-

name of the person from whom it is received, or on whose account

it is charged, if he should not be the same to whom the bill is

transferred ; fourth, the date on which the indorsement is made.

Also, that "an indorsement not expressing the value or date does

not transfer the property in the bill, and it is to be considered as

a simple commission for collection." The court denied the motion,

and the defendant took an exception. The plaintiff had a verdict

Appeal from the Supreme Court. Action by the indorsee
against the drawer of a bill of exchange drawn by the defendant
at Carthagena, in New Granada, upon the New Granada Canal
and Steam Navigation Company, a corporation created by and
having its principal office in this state. It was payable to the
order of Manuel N arcisso Jimene , indorsed by him at Carthagena, and was protested for non-acceptance. The answer denied
the indorsement by Jimenes, in general terms. On th opening
of the trial before Mr. JusTICE DAVIES, at the New York Circuit,
the defendant asked leave to amend hi answer by inserting the
laws of New Granada in respect to the indorsement of bills of
exchange. The motion was denied, and the defendant took an
exception. After the plaintiffs had concluded their proof, the
defendant offered to prove the laws of New Granada, and that
by such laws the indorsement of Jimenes, which was in the form
usual in this tate, was void. The plaintiffs objected, on the
ground that the said laws were not et forth in the answer; the
objection was su tained, and the defendant xcepted. The defendant then renewe l his motion to amend the answer. tendering the
proposed amendment which averred that by the law of N w Granada the indor ment of any bill of xchange mu t contain, first
th name and urnam of th per on to whom th bill i transferr d; econd, if the valu or con id ration be received in cash,
in merchandi e, or if it b in account: third, th name and surname of th per on from wh 111 it i r c ived, or on whose account
it i charg d, if h hould not b th ame to ' h m th bill i
transferred; fourth the date on whi h th indorsement is made.
Also, that "an indorsem nt n t expr ing the value or date does
not transfer the property in the bill, and it i to b con idered a
a simple commi ion for collecti n." The court d ni d th motion,
and the defendant took an xc ption. The plaintiff had a verdict
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and judgment, which having been affirmed at general term in the

first district, the defendant appealed to this court.

.\ icholas Hill, for the appellant.

/. T. Williams, for the respondent.

Denio, J. — The principal contract, the bill of exchange sued

on, though made in New Granada, was addressed to a corporation

legally resident in New York, and was consequently payable

there ; and, upon general principles, the laws of this State are to

be resorted to in ascertaining its nature and interpretation, and

the duties and liabilities which it created. This is too well estab-

lished to require a reference to books. The indorsement was

also made in New Granada, but that is considered to be a separ-

ate contract, and the obligations of the parties to it are to be

determined according to the law of the country in which it was

made; so that if this was a question between indorser and indor-

see, we should have to resort to the laws of New Granada to

ascertain what obligation Jimenes assumed by indorsing the bill

to the plaintiffs. (Ay mar v. Sheldon, 12 Wend., 439). But the

action is not against Jimenes, the indorser, but against the

drawer ; and it is the effect of the original contract and not of the
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auxiliary one, which is in question. By drawing the bill, the

defendant undertook that the drawees in New York would pay it

to Jimenes, the payee, or to his order, that is, to any person to

whom it should be indorsed ; and that if the drawees did not so

pay it he would himself make such payment. The plaintiffs claim

to be indorsees, according to the legal effect of the bill ; and the

question is, which law is to govern in determining whether they

have acquired that character, that of New Granada or New York ?

If the former, the plaintiffs must fail, because they have not been

constituted indorsees with the formalities which the laws of New

Granada have prescribed for transferring a bill by indorsement.

But the indorsement is in due form according to the laws of New

York. I have not been able to find any authority for such a case ;

but I am of opinion that upon the reason of the thing, the laws

of this state should be held to control. These laws are to be

resorted to in determining the legal meaning and effect and the

obligations of the contract. All the cases agree in this. In this

case the point to be determined was, whether the plaintiffs were

indorsees and entitled to receive the amount of the bill of the

drawees. This was to be determined, in the first instance, when

the bill was presented for acceptance and payment in New York.

The plaintiffs' title was written on the bill. The question was,

whether it made them indorsees according to the effect of the

nd judgment, which having been affirmed at general term in the
fir t Ji trict, the defendant appealed to this court.
..\ icholas Hill, for the appellant.
J. T. Williams, for the respondent.
DE · 10, J.-The principal contract, the bill of exchange sued
on, though made in Tew ranada, was addressed to a corporation
legally re ident in
ew
ork, and was consequently payable
th ere ; and, upon general principles, the laws of this State are to
be resorted to in ascertaining its nature and interpretation, and
the duties and liabilities which it created. This is too well established to require a reference to books. The indorsement was
also made in Tew Granada, but that is considered to be a separate contract, and the obligations of the parties to it are to be
determined according to the law of the country in which it was
made; so that if this was a question between indorser and indorsee, we hould have to resort to the laws of New Granada to
a certain what obligation Jimenes assumed by indorsing the bill
to the plaintiffs. (A3 17tiar v. Sheldon, 12 \i\T end., 439). But the
action is not against Jimenes, the indorser, but against the
drawer; and it i the effect of the original contract c:.nd not of the
auxiliar:/ one, which is in question. By drawing the bill, the
defendant undertook that the drawees in New York would pay it
to Jimenes, the payee, or to his order, that is, to any person to
whom it should be indorsed; and that if the drawees did not so
pay it he would himself make such payment. The plaintiffs claim
to be indorsees, according to the legal effect of the bill · and the
question is, which law is to govern in determining whether they
have acqu ired that character, that of New Granada or New York?
If the former, the plaintiffs must fail , because they have not been
constituted indorsees with the formalitie which the laws of New
Granada have prescribed for transferring a bill by indorsement.
But the inclor ement is in due form according to the laws of New
York. I have not been able to find any authority for such a case;
Lut I am of opinion that upon the rea on of the thing, the laws
of this state hould be held to c:ontrol. These laws are to be
resorted to in determining the legal meaning and effect and the
11 the cases agree in thi . In this
obligations of the contract.
case the point to be det rmined was, whether the plaintiffs were
indor ees and entitled to r eceive the amount of the bill of the
drawees. This was to be determined, in the first instance, when
the bill was presented for acceptance and payment in New York.
Th plaintiffs' title was written on the bill. The question was,
whether it made them indorsees according to the effect of the
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words of negotiability contained in the bill itself. Those words

and the actual indorsement were to be compared, and the legal

rules to be employed in making that comparison, were found in

the law merchant of the state of New York; and by those rules

the indorsement was precisely such a one as the bill contemplated.

Besides, it is reasonable to suppose that, in addressing this

bill to the drawees in New York, the defendant contemplated that

they would understand the words of negotiability according to

the law of their own country ; they would naturally be acquainted

with that, while they would, in all probability, be ignorant with

the commercial code of New Granada. When, therefore, he

directed the drawees to pay to the order of the payee, he must be

intended to contemplate that whatever would be understood in

New York to be the payee's order, was the thing which he

intended by that expression in the bill.

The case of Trimblcy v. Vignicr (i Bing. N. C. 151) is not

in hostility to this conclusion. That was the case of a note made

in Paris, the maker and payee being domiciled there ; and no

place of payment being made, it was payable at the residence

of the maker. One claiming to be an indorsee sued the maker
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in England ; but the indorsement to him was in the common

blank form used in Great Britain and in this country, while the

French Commercial Code, like that of New Granada, required

the indorsement of a bill or note to be dated, and to express the

consideration, and declared that if it failed to conform to these

requirements it should not transfer the paper, but should only

amount to a power of attorney. The court held that the law of

France governed the contract, and that the plaintiff had not made

title to the note. Had it been made payable in England, I pre-

sume it would have been held that the law of that country

furnished the rule for determining whether the indorsement was

sufficient.

For the reasons this briefly stated, I am of opinion that this

case was rightly decided in the Supreme Court, and that the

judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

Aymar v. Sheldon et al. (1834), 12 Wend. 429.

Error from the superior court of the city of New York.

Sheldon and others, as endorsees, brought a suit against B. & I.

Q. Aymar, as endorsers of a bill of exchange, bearing date 4th

June, 1830, drawn by V. Cassaigne & Co. St. Pierre, at Mar-

tinique, on L'Hotelier Freres. at Bordeaux in France, for 4000

words of negotiability contained in the bill itself. Those words
and the actual indor em nt were to be compared, and the legal
rules to be employed in making that comparison, were found in
the law merchant of the state of New York; and by those rule
the indor ement was pr ci ly uch a one as the bill contemplated.
Besides, it i rea onable to suppose that, in addre ing thi
bill to the drawee in ew York, the defendant contemplated that
they would under tand the words of negotiability according to
the law of their own country; they would naturally be acquainted
with that, while they would, in all probability, be ignorant with
the commercial code of New Granada. When, therefore, he
directed the drawees to pay to the order of the payee, he must be
intended to contemplate that whatever would be understood in
New York to be the payee's order, was the thing which he
intended by that expression in the bill.
The case of Trimbley v. Vignier (1 Bing. N. C. 151) i3 not
in hostility to this conclusion. That was the case of a note made
in Paris, the maker and payee being domiciled there; and no
place of payment being made, it was payable at the residence
of the maker. One claiming to be an indorsee sued the maker
in England; but the indorsement to him was in the common
blank form used in Great Britain and in this country, while the
French Commercial Code, like that of New Granada, required
the indorsement of a bill or note to be dated, and to express the
con ideration, and declared that if it failed to conform to these
requirements it should not transfer the paper, but should only
amount to a power of attorney. The court held that the law of
France governed the contract, and that the plaintiff had not made
title to the note. Had it been made payable in England, I preume it would have been held that the law of that country
furni hed the rule for determining whether the indorsement was
s uffici en t.
For the reasons this briefly stated, I am of opinion that this
case wa rightly decided in the Supreme Court and that the
judgment should be affirmed.
f ndgment affirmed.

Aymar

'V.

Sheldon et al. (1834)

12 TVcnd. -1-39.

Error from the superior court of the city of New York
Sheldon and others, a endorsee , brOLwht a uit ao-ain t B. & I.
Q. Aymar, as endorsers of a bill of exchano·e, bearino- dat 4th
June, 1830, drawn by V. a aigne & o. St. Pierre. at lvl artinique, on L'Hotelier Frere . at Bordeau:i: in France for 4000
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francs, payable at 24 days sight, to the order of B. Ay mar &

Co., the name of the firm of B. & I. O. Aymar. The plaintiffs

set forth the endorsement of the bill of exchange at the city of

New York, where, they averred, that they and the defendants,

all being citizens of the United States at the time of the endorse-

ment, respectively, dwelt and had their homes ; and then aver that

on the nth August, 1830, the bill of exchange was presented

to L'Hotelier Freres, at Bordeaux, for acceptance, according

to the custom of merchants, and that they refused to accept;

whereupon the bill was duly protested for non-acceptance,

and notice given to the defendants. The defendant pleaded,

1. X on assumpsit; 2. That the bill declared on was made and

drawn in the island of Martinique, a country then, since and

now, under the dominion and government of the king of France,

by persons there dwelling subjects of the king of France ; and

that the bill, according to its tenor was payable at Paris in the

kingdom of France, by persons then and still residing and dwell-

ing at Bordeaux, in the kingdom of France, subjects of the king

of France, to wit, on, &c. at &c. ; that the island of Martinique,

as well as Paris and Bordeaux, and the persons therein respec-
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tively residing, and the drawers and drawees were subject and

governed by the laws of the kingdom of France, there and then,

and still existing and in force, to wit, on, &c. at &c. ; that by the

laws of France, then and still at the several places in the plea

mentioned, existing and in force, it is established, enacted and

provided, in relation to bills of exchange drawn and payable in

the countries subject to the laws of France, among other things,

in manner and form following, namely : The drawer and endor-

sers of a bill of exchange are severally liable for its acceptance

and payment at the time it falls due. {Code de Commerce,

119). The refusal of acceptance is evidenced by an act denomin-

ated protest for non-acceptance, id. 120. On notice of the pro-

test for non-acceptance, the endorsers and drawer are respectively

bound to give security, to secure the payment of the bill at the

time it falls due, or to effect reimbursement of it, with the expense

of protest and re-exchange. The time when a bill of exchange

becomes due, if payable at one or more days after sight, is fixed

by the date of the acceptance, or by the day of the protest for non-

acceptance. The holder is not excused the protest for non-pay-

ment by the protest for non-acceptance. After the expiration of

the above periods, (certain periods specified in the code, and

which, in the case of a bill drawn in the West Indies on France,

is one year,) for the presentment of bills at sight, or one or more

franc s, payabl at 24 days sight, to the order of B. AymM &
Co ., th e name of the firm of B. & I. Q. ymar. The plaintiffs
et fo rth the endorsement of the bill of exchange at the city of
X cw York) where, they averred, that they and. the defendants
all being citizens of the Uni ted tates at the time of the endorsement, r pectively, dwelt and had their homes; and then aver that
on the I rth A ugust, 1830, the bill of exchange was pres~ nted
to L'Hotelier Freres, at Bordeaux, for acceptance, according
to the cu tom of merchant , and that they refused to accept ;
whereupon the bill was duly protested for non-acceptance,
and notice given to the defendants. The defendant pleaded,
r. r on assumpsit; 2 . That the bill declared on was made and
drawn in the island of Martinique, a country then, since and
now, under the dominion and government of the king of France,
by persons there dwelling subjects of the king of France; and
that the bill, acco rding to its tenor was payable at Paris in the
kingdom of F rance, by persons then and still residing and dwelling at Bordeaux, in th e kingdom of France, subjects of the king
of France, to wit, on, &c. at &c.; that the island of Martinique,
as well as Paris and Bordeaux, and the persons therein respectively residing, and the drawers and drawees were subject and
governed by the laws of the kingdom of France, them and then,
and still existing and in force, to wit, on, &c. at &c.; that by the
laws of France) then and still at the several places in the plea
mentioned, existing and in force, it i s established) enacted and
provided) in relation to bills of exchange drawn and payable in
the countries sub ject to the laws of France, among other things,
in manner and form following, namely: The drawer and ~nd_or
sers of a bill of exchange are severally liable for its acceptance
and payment at the time 1t talls due. (Code de Conitnerce,
I 19). The refusal of acceptance is evidenced by an act denominated protest for non-acceptance, id. 120. On notice of the prote t fo r non-acceptance) the endors rs and drawer are respectively
bound to give security, to secure the payment of the bill at the
time it fall due, or to effect reimbursement of it, with the expense
of protest and re-exchange. The time when a bill of exchange
becomes due, if payable at one or more days after sight, is fixed
by the date of the acceptance, or by the day of the protest for nonacceptance. The holder i not excused the protest for non-payment by the protest for non-acceptance. After the expiration of
th e above periods, (certain periods specified in the code, and
which , in the case of a bill drawn in th vVest Indies on Fran ce )
i one year,) for the presentment of bills at sight, or one or more
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days after sight, for protest of non-payment, the holder of the

bill loses all his claim against the endorsers, &c. setting forth,

besides the above, a variety of other provisions of the French

code, relative to bills of exchange, and then averring, that

although at the time of the commencement of the action of the

plaintiffs, twenty-four days after sight of the bill of exchange

declared on had elapsed, from the day when the same was alleged

to have been protested for non-acceptance, yet no protest of the

said bill for non-payment had been made, concluding with a veri-

fication and prayer of judgment. 3. The defendants pleaded, after

referring to the matter of inducement stated in the second plea,

that on notice of protest for non-acceptance, as alleged in the dec-

laration, they were ready and willing to give security; and offered

to the plaintiffs to give security, according to the true intent and

meaning of the laws of France, to secure payment of the bill at

the time when the same should fall due, to wit, on, &c. at, &c,

concluding as in last plea. To the second plea the plaintiffs

demurred, and took issue upon the third, denying that the defend-

ants did offer security, &c.

The superior court, on the argument of the demurrer,
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adjudged the second plea to be bad; after which the issues of

fact were tried. The jury found for the plaintiffs, on the plea of

non-assumpsit, and assessed their damages at $895.52, and found

a verdict for the defendants on the third plea. Notwithstanding

which last finding, the court gave judgment for the plaintiffs on

the whole record. The defendants sued out a writ of error.

D. Lord, jun., for plaintiffs in error.

D. D. Field & R. Sedgwick, for defendants in error.

By the court :

Nelson, J. — The only material question arising in this case is, I

whether the steps necessary on the part of the holders of the bill

of exchange in question, to subject the endorsers upon default of

the drawees to accept, must be determined by the French law, or

the law of this state? If by our law, the plaintiffs below are

entitled to retain the judgment; if by the law of France, as set

out and admitted in the pleadings, the judgment must be reversed.

days after sight, for prot t of non-payment, the holder of the
bill loses all his cla•iJll acraiHst tlze endorsers, c.
tting forth,
besid th above, a vari ty of other provi ion of the Fr nch
and th n averring, that
od , r lativc to bill
f xchan
although at th tim of the comm ncem nt of th action of the
plaintiff , twenty-four day after sight of the bill f xchanO'
d clar d n had elapsed, from th day when th ame was alleged
to hav b n prate t d for non-ace ptance, yet Ho protest of the
said bill for 1zon-pa.y111e11t had bee11 Jllade, concludin with a verificati n and prayer of j uclo-rn nt. 3. The defendants pleaded, after
ref rring t the matt r of inducement tated in the second plea,
that on notice of prot t for non-ace ptancc, a allea d in the declaration, th y were r ady and wi lling to give s curity; and offered
to the plaintiffs to give security, according to the true intent and
meaning of the laws of France, to ecure payment of the bill at
the time when the arne should fall due, to wit, on, &c. at, &c.,
concluding a in la t plea. To th second plea the plaintiffs
demurred, and took i ue upon the third, denying that the defendants did offer ecurity, &c.
The superior court, on the araurnent of the demurrer,
adjudged the second plea to be bad; after which the i ue of
fact were tried. The jury found for the plaintiff , on the plea of
non-assmnpsit, and assessed their damages at $895.52, and found
a verdict for the defendants on the third plea. N otwith tanding
which la t finding, the court gave judgment for the plaintiff on
the whole record. The defendant ued out a writ of error.

We have not been referred to any case, nor have any been

found in our researches, in which the point now presented has

been examined or adjudged. But there are some familiar prin-

ciples belonging to the law merchant, or applicable to bills of

exchange and promissory notes, which we think are decisive of it.

The persons in whose favor the bill was drawn were bound to

D. Lord, jun., for plaintiff in rror.
D. D. Field & R. Sedgwick, for defendant in error.
y the court:
1 elson, J.-The only mat rial que tion ari ina in thi ca e i ,
whether the tep n c ar on the part of the hold r of the bill
f xchan e in qu tion, to ubject th ndor er up n d fault of
the draw s to accept mu t b cl t rmin d by the Fr nch law, r
the law of thi tat ? If by our la\ the plaintiff b low ar
ntitled t r tain th jud m nt; if by th law f Franc , a
t
out and admitted in th pl adina , th juclQTllent mu t b rever ed.
vV hav not b en r f rr d t any ca e, nor hav any b n
found in ur r earch , in which the point nm pre nt d ha
be n xamin d r adjuda d.
ut th r ar om familiar principles b 1 nain to th law mer hant, or applicabl to ill of
exchange and promi ory not
whi h w think ar d ci i
f it.
The p r on in who fa or the bill wa drawn v re bound to
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present it for acceptance and for payment, according to the law

of France, as it was drawn and payable in French territories ; and

it the rules of law governing- them were applicable to the endorsers

and endorsees in this case, the recovery below could not be sus-

tained, because presentment for payment would have been essen-

tial even after protest for non-acceptance. No principle, how-

ever, seems more fully settled, or better understood in commercial

law, than that the contract of the endorser is a new and indepen-

dent contract, and that the extent of his obligations is determined

by it. The transfer by endorsement is equivalent in effect to the

drawing of a hill, the endorser being in almost every respect con-

sidered as a new drawer. (Chitty on Bills, 142; 3 East, 482; 2

P.urr. 674, 5 ; 1 Str. 441 ; Selw. N. P. 256). On this ground, the

rate of damages in an action against the endorser is governed by

the law of the place where the endorsement is made, being regu-

lated by the lex loci contractus. (6 Cranch, 21 ; 2 Kent's Comm.

460; 4 Johns. R. 119). ThaTthe nature and extent of the lia-

bilities of the drawer or endorser are to be determined according

to the law of the place where the bill is drawn or endorsement

made, has been adjudged both here and in England. In Hix v.
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Brozvn, 12 Johns. R. 142, the bill was drawn by the defendant, at

New Orleans, in favor of the plaintiff, upon a house in Philadel-

phia ; it was protested for non-acceptance, and due notice given :

the defendant obtained a discharge under the insolvent laws of

New Orleans after such notice, by which he was exonerated from

all debts previously contracted, and in that state, of course from

the bill in question. He pleaded his discharge here, and the court

say, "it seems to be well settled, both in our own and in the Eng-

lish courts, that the discharge is to operate according to the lex

loci upon the contract where it was made or to be executed. The

contract in this case originated in New Orleans, and had it not

been for the circumstance of the bill being drawn upon a person

in another state, there could be no doubt but the discharge would

reach this contract ; and this circumstance can make no difference,

as the demand is against the defendant as drawer of the bill, in

consequence of the non-acceptance. The whole contract or

responsibility of the drawer was entered into and incurred in

New Orleans. The case of Peters v. Brown, 5 East, 124, contains

a similar principle. See also 3 Mass. R. 81 ; Van Raugh v. Van

Arsdaln, 3 Caines, 154; t Cowen, 107; 6 Cranch, 221 ; 4 Cowen,

512, n.

The contract of endorsement was made in this case, and the

execution of it contemplated by the parties in this state ; and it is

pre ent it for acceptance and for payment, according to the ]aw
of France, as it was drawn and payable in French territories; and
if the rul of law govern ing th em were applicable to the endorsers
and cndorsee in thi ca e, th recovery below could not be sustaine<l, b cau e presentment fo r payment would have oeen essential even after prate t for non-acceptanc . No principle, how'Ve r, c m more fully settl d, or better understood in commercial
law, than that the contract of the endorser is a- new and independent contract, and that the extent of his ooli afions is determTiledby it. The tran fer by endorse11;ent i equivalent in effect to the
drau.ring of a bill, the endo r er being 111 almost every respect coTIider d a a n ew drawer. (Chi tty o n Bills, 142 ; 3 East, 482; 2
urr. 674, 5 ; l tr. 441; Selw. N. P. 256). On this ground, the
rate of damages in an action against the endorser is governed by
the law of the place where the endorsement is mad e, being regulat d by the lex loci contractus. ( 6 Cranch~I;2°Kent's Comm.
4- o; 4 Johns. . i 19 . -111at the nature and extent of the liabilities of the drawer or endorser are to be determined according
to the law of the place where the bill is drawn or endorsement
made, ha b n adjudged both here and in England. In Hix v.
Erown, 12 Johns. R. 142, the bill was drawn by the defendant, at
Tew Orlean , in favor of the plaintiff, upon a house in Philadelphia; it wa protested for non-acceptance, and due notice given:
the defendant obtain ed a discharge under the insolvent laws of
ew Orleans after such notice, by which he was exonerated from
a ll debts previously contracted, and in that state, of course from
th e bill in que tion. He pleaded his di charge here, and the court
say, "it seems to be well settled , both in our own and in the Engli h cou r t , that the di charge is to operate according to the lex
loci upon the contract where it was made or to be executed. The
contract in this ca e originated in New Orleans, and had it not
been for th circumstance of the bill being drawn upon a person
in another tate, there could be no doubt but the discharge would
reach this contract; and this circumstance can make no difference,
as the demand is against th defendant as drawer of the bill, in
con equence of th e non-acceptance. The whole contract or
re pon ibility of the drawer was entered into and incurred in
ew Orlean . The case of Peters v. Brown, 5 East, 124, contain
a similar principle .
ee al o 3 Ma . R. 81; Van Raugh v. Van
Arsdaln, 3 Caines, 154; r Cowen, 107; 6 Cranch, 221; 4 Cowen,
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therefore to be construed according to the laws of New York.

The defendants below, by it, here engage that the drawees will

accept and pay the bill on due presentment, or, in case of their

default and notice, that they will pay it. All the cases which

determine that the nature and extent of the obligation of the

drawer are to be ascertained and settled according to the law of

the place where the bill is drawn, are equally applicable to the

endorser; for, in respect to the holder, he is a drawer. Adopting

this rule and construction, it follows that the law of New York

must settle the liability of the defendants below. The bill in this

case is payable 24 days after sight, and must be presented for

acceptance ; and it is well settled by our law, that the holder may

have immediate recourse against the endorser for the default of

the drawee in this respect. (3 Johns. R. 202 ; Chitty on Bills, 231,

and cases there cited).

Upon the principle that the rights and obligations of the par-

ties are to be determined by the law of the place to which they

had reference in making the contract, there are some steps which

the holder must take according to the law of the place on which

the bill is drawn. It must be presented for payment when due,
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having regard to the number of days of grace there, as the

drawee is under obligation to pay only according to such calcula-

tion ; and it is therefore to be presumed that the parties had refer-

ence to it. So the protest must be according to the same law

which is not only convenient, but grows out of the necessity of

the case. The notice however, must be given according to the

law of the place where the contract of the drawer or endorser,

as the cause may be, was made, such being an implied condition.

(Chitty on Bills, 266, 93, 217; Bayley, 28; Story's Conflicts of

Laws, 298).

The contract of the drawers in this case, according to the

French law, was, that if the holder would present the bill for

acceptance within one year from date, it being drawn in the West

Indies, and it was not accepted, and was duly protested and notice

given of the protest, he would give security to pay it, and pay

the same if default was also made in the payment by the

drawee after protest and notice. This is the contract of the

drawers, according to this law, and the counsel for the plaintiffs

in error insists that it is also the implied contract of the endorser

in this state. But this cannot be, unless the endorsement is

deemed an adoption of the original contract of the drawers, to be

regulated by the law governing the drawers, without regard to

the place where the endorsement is made. We have seen that

therefore to be construed according to the laws of New York.
The def ndant below, by it, h re ngage that the drawe s will
accept and pay th bill on du pr s ntm nt, or, in ca e f their
default an 1 notice, that th y will pay it. All the cases which
determine that th nature an l xt nt f the obligati n of the
drawer ar to be a c rtaincd and settled according t the law of
th place wher th bill i drawn, are iually applicabl to the
endorser; for, in re pect to th holder, he is a draw r. Adopting
thi rul and con truction, it follow that the law of New York
must settle th liability of th defendant b low. The bill in this
case is payable 24 day after sight, and must be presented for
acceptanc ; and it i w 11 ttled by our law, that the holder may
have imm diat recour e ao-ainst th ndorser for the default of
the drawee in thi re pect. (3 John . R. 202; Chitty on Bills, 231,
and cases there cited).
Upon the principle that the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined by the law of the place to which they
had reference in making the contract, there are ome teps which
the holder mu t take according to the law of the place on which
th e bill is drawn. It must be presented for payment when due,
having regard to the number of days of grace th re, a the
drawee is under obligation to pay only according to such calculation; and it is therefore to be presum d that the partie had reference to it. So the protest must be according to the ame law
which i not only convenient, but grow out of the neces ity of
the case. The notice however, must b o-iven according to the
law of th place where th contract of the drawer or endorser,
as the cau may be, was made, such being an implied condition.
(Chitty on ills, 266, 93, 217; Bayley, 28; Story's Conflicts of
Law 298).
The contract of the drawers in this case, accordina to the
F rench law , was, that if th hold r wou ld pr sent th bill for
acceptance within on year from date, it b ina drawn in the West
Indies, and it was not ace pt d, and wa dul prote t d and notice
aiven of the prote t, h would giv ecurity to pa it, and pay
the sam if default wa al o ma
in the paym nt by the
drawee aft r protest and notic . Thi i the contract of the
drawers, accordina to this law, and the couns 1 for th plaintiffs
in error in i ts that it i al th impli d contract of th endorser
ut thi cannot be, unle s the endo r ement is
in this state.
deemed an adoption of th ori ·nal con tract of th drawer to be
regulated by the law governing th draw r , without reaard to
the place where the endorsement is made. We hav seen that
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this is not so; that notice must be given according to the law of

the place of endorsement; and if, according to it, notice of non-

payment is not required, none of course is necessary to charge

the- endorser. But if the above position of the plaintiffs in error

be correct, notice could not then be dispensed with, the law of

the drawer controling. The above position of the counsel would

also be irreconcileable with the principle, that the endorsement

is equivalent to a new bill, drawn upon the same drawee; for

then the rights and liabilities of the endorser must be governed

by the law of the place of the contract, in like manner as those

of: the drawer are to be governed by the laws of the place where

his contract was made. Both stand upon the same footing in this

respect, each to be charged according to the laws of the country

in which they were at the time of entering into their respective

obligations.

I am aware that this conclusion may operate harshly upon

the endorsers in this case, as they may not be enabled to have

recourse over on the drawers. 'But this grows out of the peculiar-

ity of the commercial code which France has seen fit to adopt for

herself, materially differing from that known to the law merchant.
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We cannot break in upon the settled principles of our commercial

law, to accommodate them to those of France or any other coun-

try. It would involve them in great confusion. The endorser,

however, can always protect himself by special endorsement,

requiring the holder to take the steps necessary according to the

French law, to charge the drawer. It is the business of the

holder, without such an endorsement, only to take such measures

as are necessary to charge those to whom he intends to look for

payment. Judgment affirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PROCEDURE AND REMEDY.

Collins v. Manville {1897), 170 III. 614.

Writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;

—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of

Cook county ; the Hon. E. F. Dunne, Judge, presiding.

Oliver & Mccartncy, for plaintiff in error.

Pcckham & Brown, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Cartwrigiit delivered the opinion of the court:

In the Circuit Court of Cook county the defendant in error

recovered a judgment for $8280.80 upon a promissory note pay-

thi i ~ not o; that n otice must be g iven according to the law of
t he place of enclo r em ent; and if, acco rd ing to it, notic of non payment i not required , none of cou r e is necessary to charge
the endo r e r. But if the above po ition of th e plaintiff in error
be correct, noti c could n ot then be di p nsed w ith , th e law of
the d rawe r controling. Th above po ition of the couns 1 would
al
be irreconcil abl e with the p rincipl e, that th e endor sement
i equiv al nt t a new bill, d rawn u pon th e sam drawe e; for
th n t he rig ht a nd liabiliti
of th e end or ser mu t b e g overned
by th law o f the p lace f t h e contract, in like manner as those
o f th e draw r are to be govern ed by th law of th place where
hi ontracl wa made. Both sta nd upon the same fo oting in this
r p ect, ach to be cha rged acco rding to th e law of the country
in whi ch th y were at the time of enterin o- into th ir respective
obli <Yati on .
I am aware that this conclusion may operate harshly upon
th e end orsers in this case, as they may not be enabl ed to have
B ut this grows out of the peculiarr co urse over on the d rawers. 1
ity f th e commercial code which France has seen fit to adopt for
her elf, materia lly d iffe ring fr om that known to th e law merchant.
\ e cannot br ak in upon the settled principles of our commercial
law, to accommodate th em to those of France or any other country. It wou ld involve th m in o-reat confusion. The endorser,
however, can always p rotect himself by special endorsement,
r quiring t h e holde r to tak e th e steps neces ary according to the
Fr nch law, to charge th e drawer. It is the business of the
holder , w ithout su ch an end o rsement, only to take such measures
a ar n ecessa ry to charge th ose to whom he intends to look for
payment.
Judgn!/,ent affirnied.
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twelve months after date, with interest at the rate of six per

cent per annum, and the judgment has been affirmed b> the

Appellate Court.

The note was made and executed in the State of New York,

and the cause of action arose there. Defendant has been a citizen

and resident of that state since the year 1883, and plaintiff lived

in New Jersey when the note was made and until December, 1886,

since which time he has been a citizen of Colorado. The time

within which suit could be brought in this State was therefore

governed by section 20 of our statute in regard to limitations, and

if by the laws of the State of New York an action on the note

could not be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, the action

could not be maintained in this state. That defense was pleaded

and interposed at the trial, and the New York statutes were

admitted in evidence by written stipulation. The New York code

requires that an action of this kind must be commenced within

six years after the cause of action has accrued, and this suit was

commenced August 31, 1893, by plaintiff filing a precipe and dec-

laration, and causing a summons to be issued and given to the

sheriff, directing him to summon the defendant to appear at the
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next term of the Circuit Court. An action on the note was not

barred at that time in the state of New York, and under our

statute such action could be maintained here. The issuing of the

summons and delivery to the sheriff for service were the com-

mencement of action in this state. (Fcade v. Simpson, 1 Scam.

30; Chicago and Northivestern Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 103 111.

588 ; Schroeder v. Merchants and Mechanics' Ins. Co., 104 id. 71 ;

Fairbanks v. Far-well, 141 id. 354) •

The court instructed the jury, in substance, that if the plain-

tiff, within six years from the maturity of the note, caused sum-

mons to be issued and given to the sheriff of Cook county for

service, then the action was not barred. It is claimed that this

instruction was erroneous because of what occurred after the com-

mencement of the suit, and by reason of further provisions of the

New York code as to what should be deemed the commencement

of an action in that state. The provisions in question are, in sub-

stance, that an action is commenced, within the meaning of the

Limitation act of New York, when the summons is served on the

defendant, or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or other-

wise united in interest with him, and that an attempt to commence

an action is equivalent to the commencement thereof when the

summons is delivered to the sheriff of the county in which the

defendant resides or last resided ; but in order to entitle the plain-

twelve months after date, with int rest at the rate of six per
cent per annum, and th e judgm nt ha been affirmed by the
Appellate Court.
The note was mad and executed in the tate of ew York
and the cause of action aro e there. Defendant ha b en a citizen
and resident of that tate ince the y ar 1883, and plaintiff lived
in N w J r ey when the note was made and until December, 1886,
since which time he ha b n a citizen of Colorado. The time
within which suit could b brought in this tate wa therefor
govern d by section 20 of our tatut in regard to limitations, and
if by the law of the tate of New York an action on the not
could not be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, the action
could not be maintained in this state. That defen e was pleaded
and interposed at the trial, and the New York statutes were
admitted in evidence by written stipulation. The New York code
requires that an action of this kind must be commenced within
six years after the cause of action ha accrued, and this suit wa
commenced August 31, 1893, by plaintiff filing a prcecipe and declaration, and causing a summons to be issued and given to the
sheriff, directing him to summon the defendant to appear at the
next term of the Circuit Court. An action on the note was not
barred at that time in the state of
ew York, and unde!"' our
statute such action could be maintained here. The issuing of the
summon and delivery to the sheriff for service were the commencement of action in this state. (Fea:;le v. Simpson, l Scam.
30; Chie ago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. J enllins, rn3 Ill.
588; Schroeder v. Merchants and M echanici Ins. Co. , rn4 id. 71;
Fairbanks v. Farwell, 141 id. 354).
The court instructed the jury, in sub tance, that if the plaintiff, within six years from the maturity of the note. caused summons to be i sued and given to the sheriff of Cook county for
service, then the action was not barred. It is claimed that thi
instruction wa erroneous becau e of what occurred aft r the commencement of the suit, and by reason of further provisions of the
New York code a to what should b deemed the commencement
of an action in that stat . The provi ions in question are, in substance, that an action i commenced, within the m aning of the
Limitation act of New York, wh n the summons i erved on the
defendant, or on a co-def ndant who i a joint contractor or otherwise united in intere t with him and that an attempt to commence
an action i equivalent to the commencement thereof when the
summon i delivered to the heriff f the county in which the
defendant re ide or last resided; but in order to entitle the plain-
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tiff to the benefit of this last provision the delivery must be fol-

lowed, within sixty days after the expiration of the time limited

for the actual commencement of the action, by personal service

upon the defendant or by the first publication of the summons

against him pursuant to an order for service upon him in that

manner. In this case there was no service on the defendant

within sixty days after the expiration of the six years. The sum-

mons was returned by the sheriff "not found," and successive

writs issued for each succeeding term, were returned in like

manner until personal service was obtained, five months after the

suit was commenced.

It is argued that although the suit was commenced in time

in this state and when it might have been brought in New York,

yet because the New York code provides for an abatement of

the action on account of a subsequent event which prevents the

plaintiff from maintaining or continuing it, the same rule of pro-

cedure must be adopted here. To this proposition we cannot

assent. The form and mode of procedure must be according to

the rules of the state. If it were a question of when an action

had been commenced in the State of New York, the laws of that
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State would govern ; but the question here is, when was the action

commenced in this State?— and as to that our laws must control.

The question is purely one of remedy and procedure, governed

by the law of the forum. The laws of each State require that the

action shall be commenced within a certain time, and it was com-

menced within that time. It would not only be contrary to all

established rules to adopt the procedure of the New York code

and abate the action lawfully commenced, but also most unjust,

for the reason that the New York code provides a method by

which the plaintiff could maintain his action by publication of

summons within the time. Our law does not permit such service

in an action of assumpsit, and to apply the New York rule would

be to deprive him of the benefit of that rule as to service by publi-

cation, and cut off his rights by means of the other branch of the

rule.

The only other complaint is, that the court refused to grant

a new trial on account of newly discovered evidence. The evi-

dence was of a cumulative character and not conclusive of the

rights of the parties, and the court did not err in denying the

motion for a new trial.

The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

tiff to the benefit of thi la t provi ion th delivery must be followed, within ixty day after the xpi ration of the time limited
for the actua l commencement of the action, by personal service
up n the 1 fendant or by the fir t publication of the summons
a ain t him pur uant to an order for service upon him in that
manner. In thi ca
there was no ervice on the defendant
\\ ithin ixty <la) after the expiration of the six years. The summons wa r turned by the sheriff " not found," and succe ive
writ i uecl fo r each ucceeding te rm, were returned in like
manner until per onal service was obtained, five months after the
uit wa commenced .
It is argued that althoug h the suit was commenced in time
in thi tatc and when it might have been brought in New York,
yet bccau e the I'\ cw York code provides for an abatement of
the action on account of a ubsequent event which prevent the
plaintiff from maintaining or continuing it, the same rule of procedure must be adopted here. To this propo ition we cannot
a ent. The form and mode of procedure mu t be according to
the rules of the tate. If it were a question of when an action
had been commenced in the State of New York, the laws of that
tate would govern; but the qu estion here is, when was the action
commenced in this tate ?-and as to that our laws must control.
The question is purely one of remedy and procedure, governed
by th e law of the forum. The laws of each State require that the
action hall be commenced within a certain time, and it wa comm need with in that time. It would not only be contrary to all
c tabli heel rul e to adopt the procedure of the
w York code
and abate th e action lawfully commenced but also most unjust,
for the rea on that t he ew York code provides a method by
which the plaintiff could maintain his action by publication of
ummon within the time. Our law does not permit such service
in an action of assumpsit, and to apply the New York rule would
b to deprive him of the benefit of that rule as to service by publication, and cut off his rio-ht by means of the other branch of the
rule.
The only other complaint is, that the court refused to grant
a new trial on account of newly discovered vidence. The evidence wa of a cumulative character and not conclusive of the
right
f the parti
and the court did not err in denying the
motion fo r a n w trial.
The judgment of the ppellate Court will be affirmed .

.T-:,t dgment aflirmed.
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Obcar v. The First Nat. Bank (1895), 97 Ga. 587.

Complaint on note. Before Judge Westmoreland. City

court of Atlanta. May term, 1895.

Obear ·u. Tlze First Nat. Bank ( 1895), 97 Ga. 587.

Mines & Hale, for plaintiff in error.

James H. Gilbert, contra.

Simmons, Chief Justice. — This was an action upon a promis-

sory note, not under seal, which was executed and by its terms

Complaint on not . Before Juclg
court of tlanta. May term, 1895.

vVE LIORELJ\ND.

City

made payable in the state of Alabama. The note was dated Feb-

ruary 9, 1888, and was payable on demand. The suit was filed

April 17, 1894. Upon the note were unsigned entries reciting the

payment of certain amounts thereon on August 7 and August 23,

Hines & Hale, for plaintiff in error.
Jam es H. Gilbert, contra.

1888. By an amendment to the declaration the plaintiff alleged

that these amounts were paid on the dates mentioned, and that

by the law of Alabama partial payments upon a note not barred

by the statute of limitations operate as a recognition of the debt

and establish a new date for the commencement of the period of

limitation. It did not appear by whom the entries on the note

were made. The defendant demurred generally to the declaration

as amended, and demurred to the amendment on the ground that

the facts therein stated do not take the note out of the statute of
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limitations, and that the case is governed by the statute of limita-

tions of Georgia, and not that of Alabama. The defendant also

moved to dismiss the suit because it appeared to be barred by the

statute of limitations of this State. The demurrer and the motion

to dismiss were both overruled, and to these rulings the defendant

excepted.

In this State all actions upon promissory notes not under seal

must be brought within six years after the same become due and

payable. (Code, §2917). The note sued upon was payable on

demand, and therefore was due immediately. (Code, §2791).

In order for a partial payment upon a note to constitute a new

point from which the period of limitations will begin to run, the

payment must be entered upon the note, and the entry must be

made in the debtor's own handwriting, or subscribed by him, or

some one authorized by him. (Code, §§2934, 2935). And the

holder of the note cannot be the agent of the debtor to make such

an entry. (Shumate v. Williamson, 34 Ga. 245; Wright v. Bess-

man, 55 Ga. 187). If, therefore, the case is controlled entirely bv

the law of this state, the action was barred, it appearing that more

than six years had elapsed from the time the right of action

Snvr rnNs, Chief Ju tice.-Thi was an action upon a promi sory note, not und er seal, which wa executed and by its terms
made payable in the state of Alabama. The note was dated February 9, 1888, and was payable on demand. The uit was fi led
April 17, 1894. Upon the note were unsig ned entries reciting the
payment of certain amounts thereon on August 7 and August 23,
1888. By an amendment to the declaration th e plaintiff alleged
that these amounts were paid on the dates mentioned, and that
by the law of Alabama partial payments upon a note not barred
by the statute of limitations operate as a recognition of the debt
and establish a new date for the commencement of the period of
limitation. It did not appear by whom the entries on the note
were made. The defendant demurred generally to the declaration
as amended, and demurred to the amendment on the ground that
the facts therein stated do not take the note out of the statute of
limitations, and that the case is governed by the statute of limitations of Georgia, and not that of A labama. The defendant also
moved to dismiss the suit because it appeared to be barred by the
statute of limitations of this State. The demurr r and the motion
to dismiss were both overruled , and to these rulings the defendant
excepted.
In this State all actions upon promissory notes not und er seal
must be brought within six years after the same become du e and
payable. (Code, § 2917). The note su ed upon was payable on
demand, and therefore was due immediately. (Code. § _791).
In order for a partial payment upon a note to constitute a new
point from which the period of limitations will begin to run, the
payment must be entered upon the note, and th
ntry must be
made in the debtor's own handwriting, or subscribed by him, or
some one authorized by him. (Code, §§ 2934, 2935).
nd the
holder of the note cannot be the agent of the debt r to make such
an entry. (Shmnate v. WiUiamson, 34 Ga. 245; TVri~ht v. Bessman, 55 Ga. 187). If, ther fore, the ca e is controlled entirely b
the law of this state, the action was barred, it appearing that more
than six years had elapsed from the time the right of action
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accrued until the suit was filed, and it not appearing that either

of the alleged payments on the note was entered thereon by the

debtor or by any person authorized by him.

It is well settled that the limitation of actions is controlled

by the lex fori, and not by the law of the place where the contract

was made or is to be performed. This was conceded ; but it was

contended that the rule is different as to the statute of frauds and

laws of that nature ; and that while the period of limitation in

this case is that fixed by the law of Georgia, the law of Alabama

governs with regard to the effect of partial payments in consti-

tuting a new point for the commencement of that period; and

such payments being of themselves sufficient for this purpose

under the law of Alabama, it was not necessary that they should

be entered on the note in the manner prescribed by the law of

Georgia. In support of this contention, counsel relied upon sec-

tion 8 of the code of this state, which declares that "the validity,

form and effect of all writings or contracts are determined by the

laws of the place where executed."

We do not agree with counsel in this contention. This pro-

vision of the code is declaratory of a rule which prevails univer-
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sally among civilized nations, and which is applied in determining

as to the nature, validity and interpretation of contracts ; and it is

not to be so construed as to conflict with the rule, equally well

established, that matters respecting remedies on contracts, such as

the mode of procedure and proof, and the time within which suit

shall be brought, are regulated by the law of the forum, or place

where the suit is brought. A law prescribing the manner in which

a new promise, or a payment from which such a promise will be

implied, shall be evidenced in order to extend the period within

which suit may be brought upon a contract, relates to the remedy,

and does not affect the intrinsic validity of the promise. The

question of what evidence shall be required for this purpose in an

action upon the contract is one thing ; the question whether a

promise not so evidenced is valid or not is another and different

thing. The statute referred to is in the nature of a statute of

frauds, its object being the prevention of fraud and perjury and

the avoidance of the uncertainties to which parol evidence is

exposed (Wcttkins v. Harris, 83 Ga. 683). and it should be

applied as well in cases like the present as in cases where such a

promise is alleged to have been made in this State, if it he possible

to do so without holding the promise itself void. This we think

can be done; and in this view we are supported by various

decisions upon the statute of frauds, both in England and in this

accrm:d until the suit w as fi led, and it not appearing that either
o f the a lleg d paymen ts on th e no te was entered ther on by the
deb to r or by a ny p er on authorized by him.
It i w 11 eltled tha t th e limitation of action i controlled
by the lex f ori, and not by th e law o f th e place where the contract
wa s made or i t be perfo rm ed. 1 his wa conceded; but it wa
co ntend ed that the rul e i di ffe r ent a to the tatute of fraud and
law of that na ture; a n cl th at while the period of limitation in
thi s ca e i t ha t fi eel by th e la w of eo rgia , the law of Alabama
crov rn w ith r ecrard to th e eff ect of partial payments in constituting a new po in t fo r th e commencement of that period; and
. uch paym ent being of themselv es sufficient for this purpos
und er th e la '
f A laba ma , it was not necessary that they should
be en tered on th e n ot e in the manner pre cribed by the law of
;c rgia . In up po rt o f this contention , counsel reli ed upon secti n of t he cod e of thi state, which declares that "the validity,
form a nd effec t of a ll writing or contracts are determined by the
law of th e pl ace '''he re executed."
\ V lo not ag r ee with counsel in this contention. This provi io n of t h code is d eclaratory of a rule which prevails univer·a ll y among civili ze d nation s, and which is applied in determining
a t the natur e, validity and interpretation of contracts; and it i
not t be o constru ed as to conflict with the rule, equally well
e tabli hed , that matte r s respecting remedies on contracts, such a
t h m od e of proc clure and proof, and the time within which suit
ha ll be broug ht, are r egulated by the law of the forum, or place
w he re th s uit is brought. A law prescribing the manner in which
a n w promi se, o r a payment from which such a promise will be
impli d, hall be evidenced in order to extend the period within
wh ich uit may b brought upon a contract, relates to the remedy,
an I Joe not affect th e intrin ic validity of the promise. The
iu tion of wh a t evid ence shall be required for this purpo c in an
acti n u pon th e contract is one t.hing; the question wh ther a
prom i e n ot so evid enced is valid or not is anoth r and different
thi ng. Th e tatute r ef rred to is in the nature of a tatute of
fr a ud , its obj ect 1 ein g th e prevention of frau 1 and perjury and
t he avoidan ce o f t he uncertaintie to which parol evidenc is
xpo ed UVat/? i11 s v. I-I arris, 83 Ga. 83), and it hould be
appli d a well in ca cs like the present a in ca e where such a
promi e i all gcd t h av b n ma le in thi
tate. if it be possible
to do o wi th u t holdi ng th e prorni e it lf void. 1 his we think
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country, and by the authority of leading text-writers. Upon the

ground that compliance with the requirements of the statute does

not constitute the contract, but that the statute presupposes an

existing lawful contract, and affects only the remedy for the viola-

tion of the contract, it is held that where a contract within the

, statute is, by the laws of the country where it is made and to be '

' execut ed, valid and enforceable, still no action can be maintained |

Upon it in the courts of the country where the statute prevails, y

u nless its requirements be satisfied. See Browne, Statute of J

Frauds (5 ed.), §§ 115a, 136, and cases cited ; especially the lead-

ing English case on this subject, Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. 801,

74 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 800, where the question was argued at

some length, and upon the ground above stated it was unan-

imously held by the judges that an action would not lie in the

courts of England to enforce an oral agreement made in France,

and valid there, which if made in England could not, by reason

of the statute of frauds, have been sued upon. See also the well

considered opinion of Park, J., in the case of Downer v. Chcsc-

boroagh, 36 Conn. 39, 4 Am. Rep. 29, where it was held that

the evidence by which the contract was to be proved was no
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part of the contract itself, and was governed therefore by the

lex fori, and not by the lex loci contractus. "Any other view of

the law," it was said, "would lead to endless perplexity. Evidence

merely informs the court what contract was made. It has noth-

ing to do with the obligations imposed by the agreement. Parties

are presumed to contract in accordance with the law of the place

where a contract is made. The law forms a part of it. But can it

be said that the parties contract in regard to the mode by which

its terms and conditions shall be made known to the court if a

suit should be brought on the contract?" There is some con-

flict of opinion on this subject, but we think the views above

stated are sustained by sound reason as well as by the weight of

authority. Dr. Wharton, in his work on the Conflict of Laws

(§ 690) , says : "Such statutes are based on moral grounds. Their

object, as is shown by the title of that which served as the pattern

of all others, is to prevent fraud and perjury. Here then would

come into play the position on which Savigny lays such great

stress, that moral laws, or laws to effect moral ends, which are

imposed by particular states, are peremptory and coercive, and

are to be taken as rules of procedure by the judges of such states.

It is true that Judge Story opposes to such a conclusion his great

authority. He maintains that where palfrol contracts are good

by the law of the place where they are made, they may be

/

country, and by the authority. 0£ leading text-writers.
.,.pon th
ground that compliance with the requirement of the statute doe
not con titute the contract, but that th
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of the statute of frauds, have been sued upon.
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the evidence by which the contract was to be proved was no
part of the contract itself, and was g·overned therefore by the
le.z fori, and not by the lex loci contract11s. "Any other view of
the law," it was said, "would lead to endless perplexity. Evidence
merely informs the court what contract was made. It has nothing to do with the obligations imposed by the agreement. Parties
are presumed to contract in accordance with the law of the place
where a contract is made. The law forms a part of it. But can it
be said that the parties contract in regard to the mode by which
its terms and conditions shall be made known to the court if a
suit should be brought on the contract?" There is some conflict of opinion on this subject, but we think the views abov
stated are sustained by sound reason as weil as by the weight of
authority. Dr. Wharton, in his work on the Conflict of Law
( § 690), says: "Such statutes are ba ed on moral grounds. Their
object, a is shown by the title of that which served as the pattern
of all others, is to prevent fraud and perjury. Here then would
come into play the position on which Savigny lays such great
stress, that moral laws, or lavvs to effect moral ends, which are
impo ed by particular tates, are per mptory and coercive, and
are to be taken as rules of procedur by the judge of such state .
It is true that Judge Story oppo es to uch a conclusion his great
authority. He maintains that where pa/rol contracts are good
by the law of the place where th y are made they may be
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enforced in countries where they would, if there executed, he

barred by the statute of frauds; and he cites a number of cases

to this point, none of which his editor, judge Redficld, states.

3 to adopt the views he here intimates." Judge Redfield, in

the n< >te referred to, says : "We must confess that upon principle,

as the statute does not declare the contracts void, but only that

no action or suit, either in law or equity, shall be maintained on

such contract, it ought to be regarded as a statute affecting the

reined v rather than the contract, and that wherever made, it could

not be sued in the courts of a state where the statute expressly

provided that no such action shall be maintained." In the case of

v v. Williams, 5 Allen, I, where a different rule was stated,

and in the eases of VanReimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gall. 630, Smith v.

Burnham, 3 Sumn. 435, and Low v. Andrews, 1 Story, 38, in

which doubt on this point was expressed by Judge Story, the

question was not actually presented for decision. A case which

goes very far in vindicating the control of the lex fori in such

cases is that of Bain v. Whitehaven, 3 House of Lords Cases, 1,

where the matter is discussed by Lord Brougham, and the con-

clusion stated, that whether a certain matter requires to be proved
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in writing or not, and whether certain evidence proves a certain

fact or not, is to be determined by the law of the country where

the question arises, where the remedy is sought to be enforced,

and where the court sits to enforce it. See also Wilson v. Miller,

42 111. App. 332; Klceman v. Collins, 9 Bush (Ky.), 460; Wood,

Statute of Frauds, § 166.

It follows from what has been said, that the court below

ought to have sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.

Judgment reversed.

^v *»v

cnforc d in c untri
where they would, if there executed, be
barred by the ta tut of frauds; and he cite a number of ca es
t thi point. none of which his editor, Judge Redfield, state ,
cem.:; t ad pt the views he her inti mat s." Judge Redfield, in
the r;ote r 'fcrr ,cl t , says : "\Ve must confess that upon principle,
a the tatute cl s not declare the contract void, but only that
n action or uit, ither in law or equity, shall be maintained on
uch contract, it ought to be regarded a a tatute affecting the
remedy rather than the contract, and that wh rever made, it could
not be su d in the courts of a state where th statute expre sly
provided that no uch action shall be maintained." In the case of
Dc1111;.' v. fl il!iams, 5 Allen, I, where a different rule wa stated,
and in th e ca. cs of VanRc,imsd)'ll v. Kane, I Gall. 630, Sniith v.
BurJ1/ia111, 3 umn. 435, and Low v. Andrews, I Story, 38, in
which cl ouhl n thi point was expressed by Judge Story, the
que Lion \Ya not actually presented for decision. A case which
goe v ry far in vindicating the control of the lex f ori in such
ca e i that of Bain v. TVhitchaven, 3 House of Lords Ca es, r,
where the matter is discussed by Lord Brougham, and the conclu i n stated, that whether a certain matter requires to be proved
in writing or not, and whether certain vidence proves a certain
fact or not, is to be determined by the law of the country where
the qu tion arises, where the remedy i sought to be enforced,
and where the court sits to enforce it. See also Wilson v. Miller,
42 Ill. App. 332; Kleeman v. Collins, 9 Bush (Ky.), 460; Wood~
tatute of Frauds, § r66.
It follows from what has been said, that the court below
ought to have sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.

Judgment .reversed.
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forbidden by statute, effect of 240

illegality in inception of, effect of 240

when lien on, constitutes holder for value 202, 205

overdue, effect of 205

alteration of, effect of 164
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